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DOI: 10.1177/03063127103858532011 41: 177 originally published online 15 December 2010Social Studies of Science

Dimitris PapadopoulosAlter-ontologies: Towards a constituent politics in technoscience

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Corresponding author:

Dimitris Papadopoulos, School of Management, University of Leicester, Ken Edwards Building,

Leicester LE1 7RH, UK.

Email: [email protected]

Alter-ontologies: Towardsa constituent politics intechnoscience

Dimitris PapadopoulosSchool of Management, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK

AbstractThis paper identifies four recent conceptualizations of politics in relation to technoscience

that focus on expertise, institutional participation, the inclusion of non-human others and the

importance of marginalized experiences. The paper argues that each of these forms of politics

is mainly concerned with renegotiating the already constituted terms of inclusion in a specific

technoscientific field. In many cases such a strategy is necessary, but the paper aims to open

up discussion of alternative forms of politics that act as constituent forces of radical social and

material transformation in technoscience: alter-ontologies.

Keywordsalter-ontology, assembly, constituent politics, expertise, objectivity, participation, situated

knowledges, technoscience

Attempts to find definite descriptions of the connection between technoscience and poli-tics are usually prone to reductionism and oversimplification. The traditional way in

philosophy of science to think of this relation was epistemology, where the content of

technoscience and the associated politics were subordinated to ways of knowing anddefining truth (Alcoff, 1998). Social studies of science emerging in the 1970s contestedthis view, but their attempts to question traditional epistemology devolved into a newcycle of epistemological disputes between proponents of rationality and sociality(Longino, 2002). These debates will be discussed briefly later in this paper. My argu-ment here is that epistemology is less useful as a tool for discerning and navigatingthrough the intricacies of scientific knowledge/politics than as a tool for reproducingthem by other means. The covert politics of epistemology culminated in provoking thescience wars of the 1990s.

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178 Social Studies of Science 41(2)

The response to these heated debates in science and technology studies (STS) was anattempt to exit epistemology altogether. Furthermore, there is an increasing tendency toconsider science, together with technological and other applications, as technoscience, or

in the words of Jerome Ravetz (2006) post-normal science. These changes led to a newunderstanding of objectivity; one that limits its validity in time and space to a certainfield but nevertheless recognizes that technoscientific knowledge holds objective statuswithin that field. That is, knowledge is shaped by the actual process of technoscientificresearch and its objects, and simultaneously shapes social relations and material arrange-ments in each particular field. Here, I use the expression regions of objectivity to referto the ultimate horizon against which any question about politics in technoscience can bediscussed. In the sections that follow, I will discuss four current conceptualizations ofhow politics is considered to be operative in a region of objectivity. I start with a formal-ist approach to politics, which is mainly concerned with rethinking expertise and creatingthe appropriate procedures for considering legitimate experts in a debate. A secondapproach to politics, participatory politics, is concerned with the expansion of the limitsof public deliberation in a region of objectivity. The third approach focuses on the exten-sion of our understanding of politics beyond human actors. A fourth emerges when actorswho have been hitherto neglected in a region of objectivity contest existing knowledgeand restructure the conditions of scientific knowledge production from the standpoint oftheir experience.

Not only do all these approaches attempt to conceptualize different types of politics ina region of objectivity, but they are also directly or indirectly influenced by existing

forms of political practice beyond the realm of technoscience. I will draw upon resourcesstemming from political theory, social theory and actual political practice that inform theunderstanding of these four approaches. This leads to the final section of the paper, whichattempts to open up debate on a form of politics that seems to be less visible in prevalentapproaches to technoscience: I call this alter-ontological politics, in reference to the prac-tices of new social actors emerging in the wake of the alter-globalization movements inthe past 10 years. The main concern of these politics is to create different forms of knowl-edge production that act as constituent forces of political change: forces aiming to craftalternative regions of objectivity.

Exit from epistemology: regions of objectivity

Constructivist positions emerging within the field of the social studies of science andtechnology, starting in the 1970s and 1980s asserted that scientific knowledge is genu-inely social and political: depending on values, interests, ideologies and resources avail-able to the researcher in the laboratory or in the field. This view was fiercely disputed by

proponents of objectivist positions who argued that knowledge is a cognitive achieve-ment emerging out of the application of rational criteria for evaluating salient phenom-

ena of the social or natural world. In a strange way, both positions are somehow relevantand neither of them is quite true on its own: there is always a social and political contextshaping the design and outcomes of research, and there is always relative autonomy tothe intrinsic rules and material constraints that govern how research takes place. So, ifthe distinction between constructivism and objectivism does not hold (at least in the wayoften supposed), why was it conceived as a problem that dominated the debates over the

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Papadopoulos 179

nature of knowledge production for almost 20 years? A likely answer is that these debatesserved as instruments for changing the contents of knowledge. Rather than illuminatinghow knowledge is produced, they served as means by which scientific and social scien-

tific knowledge itself was contested or consolidated.The constructivismobjectivism debates tried to establishzones of contentionin themiddle of a relatively stable unfolding of science and social science. Epistemologicaldiscussions became an integral part of the everyday functioning of the fabrication ofknowledge. Even if epistemology is a poor way to understand how knowledge is manu-factured, objectivist and constructivist arguments serve as an exceptional tool that can beused to challenge the very content of knowledge. Epistemological disputes are usuallydeveloped by specialists (for example social studies of science scholars or philosophersof science), but the discourses themselves are implicated in the production of scienceitself. Like the controversy between Boyle and Hobbes, contemporary scientific disputesare fought also on the ground of what counts as truth, and not only on the success of

particular experiments. The debate about ideology in the natural and life sciences comingfrom the radical science movement was not just about politics, truth and ideology, buthad implications for the construction of knowledge itself, for example in strengtheningthe critical voices against genetic reductionism in biology. We could conclude from suchdebates that epistemology neither shapes scientific knowledge directly nor is a com-

pletely independent discourse hovering above the real scientists themselves. Epistemologyis an active force one of many and probably not the most important in the making ofscientific knowledge. The question of evidence (scientific and social scientific research)

and the epistemology of evidence (epistemological debates in each particular scientificfield, philosophy of science and social studies of science and technology) are bothlocated in the same economy of knowledge production. Epistemology is not aboutscien-tific research, it is its continuation.

Following the science wars of the 1990s there seems to be a departure from episte-mology as a detached observation of science, and a subsequent turn to consider episte-mological debates as part of the broader conditions of knowledge production. Scientistsand their research the organisms, things or populations under study; technologicalapparatuses, methodological instruments and epistemological debates; ethical beliefs,

cultural imaginaries and the wider polity; interest groups and state authorities; transna-tional institutions and national funding bodies all are players in the same game. Theyexist in same social/ontological field and their co-actions establish spaces in which cer-tain ways of thinking and acting, and the very materiality of their existence, appear asgiven, or, if you like, as matters of fact. In this paper, I shall call such an integrated fielda region of objectivity. This type of objectivity is very different from the objectivity thatdominated the debates of the 1980s and earlier, as the undistorted representation of thelogic of things. As we exit epistemology and enter into zones of contention, a differentconception of objectivity appears to be emerging, as knowledge now seems to be objec-

tive in a certain field to the extent that it manages to thoroughly transform the materialconditions of existence in that field. It is objective to the extent that different actors in thefield manage to object, transform and remake the process of knowledge production itself.Thus, being objective is no longer considered to be an abstract qualifying attribute ofknowledge, but refers instead to the efficacy of knowledge practices to transform themateriality of existence.



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Desires, hopes and investments in the objects under study be they individuals, socialgroups, animals or things mingle with the constraints these objects impose on theresearcher, as well as with interest groups, ethics and beliefs, affected social actors, and

state institutions. Together, they produce knowledge in ways that inexorably transformthe immediate ontological composition of a region of objectivity. The main question formy argument is: What holds together a region of objectivity and organizes the internalrelations between the multiplicity of actors involved, if we know already that this organizingagency is not limited to social interests or other external factors, scientific authorityitself, or some hidden epistemological foundation? I would argue that it is a form of poli-tics, but what kind of politics? There is something paradoxical here: the stronger andmore stable a region of objectivity, the stronger the impression that politics has beenexpelled from it. Nevertheless we also know that the stronger a region of objectivity is,the more it relies on some sort of politics that regulates collective relatedness in order toattain and maintain its (relative) stability. What is the particular type of politics we per-form in a region of objectivity? What is this form of politics and how does it differ fromand relate to other forms of polity? That is, what is the politics of knowledge when it isnot about epistemology, but about the making and remaking of regions of objectivity? Inthe following sections, I approach four distinctive answers to these questions.

Formalist politics and the liberal predicament

One approach to how a region of objectivity is constituted and regulated is to illumi-

nate how legitimacy is achieved in a debate over a technoscientific issue. This is aprescriptive approach to technoscience and politics, which tries to demarcate expertiseand deploy a formal structure to resolve technoscientific controversies. It is thus anexercise in formalist politics. The starting point is a classification of different types ofexpertise that are necessary for shaping public discourse and decision-making (Collinsand Evans, 2007). In the Collins and Evans version, the formalist approach focusesmainly on identifying different forms of expertise beyond contributory expertise (thatis, the highest level of expertise possessed by active practitioners who have a level ofskill and knowledge allowing them to participate fully in their scientific field and to

contribute substantially to its development).Here, the inclusion of legitimate experts (and subsequently the exclusion of non-

legitimate experts) in a formalized process of deliberation over a technoscientific contro-versy is seen as the main way to reshape the relations between different actors in a regionof objectivity. Crucial in this process is then to extend expertise in a regulated way byusing certain standards for identifying actors who can express valuable opinions aboutrelevant technical aspects in a controversial issue (for examples, see Edwards andSheptycki, 2009; Weinel, 2007). From the perspective of formalist politics there is atechnical phase and a political phase in every technoscientific issue: technical decisions

should be left to experts and experts should try to avoid influences from the broadercultural and political environment (Collins and Evans, 2007: 89; Collins et al., 2010).This distinction between technical and political phases challenges the social construc-tionist enterprise, as discussed earlier. Instead of focusing on how extra-scientific factorsinfluence the production of knowledge (the so called political phase), the formalist



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Papadopoulos 181

approach tries to find out how intra-scientific factors can be meaningfully regulated. Thismay seem like a response by social constructivists to the science wars of the 1990s, andit is indeed a way to preserve the relative autonomy and specificity of scientific knowl-

edge. Social constructivism becomes Weberian, but with a twist or two: not only can thecredentialed contributory experts make a difference in the technical phase of debate,but so can other potential experts who lack contributory skills but hold potentially impor-tant knowledge on particular topics in virtue of their experience. However, this is not atrick used in the wake of the science wars to appease scientists enraged with the debunk-ing of their specific expertise by social constructionists. Rather, it is an attempt to pre-serve the specificity of scientific knowledge production while also opening it up tocontributors who had not been acknowledged previously.

The formalist approach simultaneously opens and closes the process of knowledge pro-duction. It opens the process of legitimacy by not restricting it to contributory experts, butit closes it down again when the process of scientific knowledge production is about toimplode through the introduction of extra-scientific interests. The opening is performed byassigning expertise to social actors who possess relevant knowledge without being tradi-tionally recognized as contributory experts. Collins and Evans (2007: Ch. 3) call this cru-cial type of expertise interactional, which allows affected social groups with sufficientexperience and knowledge to participate in a debate over a specific controversy. However,they also exclude other types of knowledge, such as general popular understanding orknowledge extracted from primary sources without deeper immersion (Collins and Evans,2007: Ch. 1). This inclusion and exclusion of different kinds of expertise attempts to define

and preserve the bordersof what counts as legitimate expert participation in a region ofobjectivity. In fact, the formalist approach is about policing these borders, rather than offer-ing substantial sociological or other insights into any particular scientific controversy.

The formalist approach addresses the question of politics not in a substantive way, butby defining rights of participation and inclusion. It does not formulate a core set of guid-ing issues that can be used to resolve a controversy or a debate. Rather it attempts to

provide a framework for regulating how to approach a technical issue. An underlyingassumption of the approach is the necessity of basic agreement on the normative princi-

ples that govern the deliberation process, and so its point of departure is contractualism

(Rawls, 1971). Formalist politics ask what circumstances should be appropriate forresolving a technoscientific controversy, and what principles of deliberation should peo-

ple reasonably embrace in order to achieve resolution. That is, it tries to set out rulesaccording to which all legitimate participants offer reasons for or against certain argu-ments; rules that need to be followed in unforced communications in which all partici-

pants act reasonably, and are well-informed (Habermas, 1993; Scanlon, 1998). Accordingto the formalist approach, such principles are negated when extra-scientific politics enterinto the technical phase of a debate and dilute expert negotiations. This logic is akin tothe centrality experts play in contemporary liberal democratic political ontology (Turner,

2003), in which well-informed representatives and experts are assumed to settle disputesin terms of fundamental rules based on principles that protect everyone: a constitutionthat regulates the process of decision-making.

However, there is a crucial complication with the formalist approach: the structuresthat can be used to facilitate informed and democratic deliberation over a particular



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controversy are already permeated by the controversy itself. The political architecturethat creates the possibility for resolving the controversy does not exist prior to the con-troversy itself. The crux of formalist politics the possibility of constituting a flawless

space as a starting point for communication between the participants in the social contract is an untenable position when viewed in real historical perspective. Such a space is nevera given or actual starting point. One can argue that this presents an even stronger argu-ment for the formalist approach: the more such spaces of communication elude us themore they are necessary, the more they are necessary the more we should accept them asa paramount value (what Collins calls elective modernism). However, elevating formal-regulative principles to core values does little other than to invoke an authoritative moralcode; it does not make them work in reality. Formalist politics occupy the space of thenormative by vacating the space of the actual.

Like any other version of formal-regulative ethics of political engagement (see forexample Habermas, 1984), formalist politics in science and technology misses the sub-stantial embeddedness of structures of communication in the deeply asymmetrical andunequal social, cultural and historical grammars that traverse the structures themselves(Taylor, 1986; Wellmer, 1977). Formalist politics thus misses the fact that controversiesemerge, not because a proper process of expert deliberation has not (yet) taken place, but

because it already has failed somewhere along the way. The formalist approach is goodat illustrating, in retrospect, how such failure takes place. However, a historical momentin which science and technology increasingly fold into each other, demanding that actors

behave as though they could invoke a separate and pure technical phase, becomes unten-

able. In fact, what the formalist approach is good at is detecting the stratified and unequalcontributions that each participant can make. What it cannot do is to engage with them ina real and processual fashion. Formalist politics occupy the space of observation bymissing the space of transformation.

It is, of course, the case that formal rules sometimes can instigate social transforma-tion in a region of objectivity. When rules of negotiation are derived from the particularconditions of a controversy they can have transformative effects. When viewed from anhistorical political perspective, such rules are always the target of social movements thatcontest the formal structures of liberal democracies by demanding radical changes in the

norms and legislation governing social reality (for example, the civil rights movement,the womens movement, the gay rights movement), but this kind of understanding isexactly what the formalist approach denies. Formalist politics are literallyformal: therules are not derived from a certain situation or controversy; instead, the same rules areassumed to apply to every technoscientific controversy. Formalist politics in a trulyHabermasian fashion (see Wimmer, 1980) attempt to operate as a transcendental judgein order to control procedures for deliberating over the controversy. This external univer-salizing position can only function as an adjustment within the constituted order in acertain region of objectivity. Despite its heuristic value and democratic flair, the formalist

approach cannot act as constituent force that remakes, not only the rules for debate, butalso its very content and scope. Formalist politics perpetuate the given constituted orderbecause they fail to engage with effective ways for intervening in the actual circumstancesof a controversy.



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Papadopoulos 183

Participatory politics and the limits of institutions

A second approach to conceiving politics in a region of objectivity focuses on the condi-

tions of participation and the processes through which lay people are included in debatesover scientific research. The participatory approach does not start from a normative orformalist definition of who has the necessary expertise to be included in the delibera-tion process. Instead, it makes a structural claim about the inclusive conditions for shap-ing science and technology (Lengwiler, 2008). This approach thus focuses on threeaspects of participatory politics: Who needs to be included? Where and when is partici-

pation needed? How can we enhance participation? What specific processes need to beconsidered?

The broad answer to the who? question usually attempts to develop insight into howto facilitate the co-constructive role of the public for shaping technological objects andscientific practices. It attempts to go beyond seeing the public as an influence on applica-tions and social consequences of science (Irwin and Michael, 2003; Leach et al., 2005;Wynne, 2005). The public is a highly elusive and easily instrumentalized category,however. Attempts to concretize the public mainly include stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), affected social groups (usually self-organized) orother civil society organizations into the process of decision-making. They tend to empha-size user groups, patient groups and activist groups that organize themselves to articulatespecific claims on existing technologies (for examples see Callon and Rabeharisoa, 2008;Elliott et al., 2010; Epstein, 1996; Felt et al., 2008). This particular form of inclusion has

its roots in the womens health movement (Hubbard et al., 1979) and feminist approachesto medicine (Clarke and Olesen, 1998; Rapp, 2000), organizations of people living withHIV and AIDS (Epstein, 1995), as well as environmental health movements (Brown,2007). Facilitating the participation of such groups can be strengthened by changing

broader scientific research agendas themselves or more specific science policies. Forexample, there are calls to intervene in science upstream (Wynne, 2003) before applica-tions are decided and when it is still possible to shape the compilation of research agendas.Science policy has received particular attention in science and technology studies as wellas the investigation of active interventions in the policies for governing science (Chilvers,

2008; Jasanoff, 2003; Rowe and Frewer, 2004; Webster, 2007).The question of where? often appears in close connection to the problem of how?:

we find approaches that call for practices that invigorate advocacy (Fortun, 2001) andpublic engagement (Elliott and Williams, 2008), and that reinforce the conditions ofpossibility for accountability (Munro and Mouritsen, 1997; Neyland and Woolgar, 2002).There are also broader quests for a civic epistemology and the setting up of an agora asspace for negotiation between scientific and social actors (Nowotny et al., 2001), as wellas accounts that strive to enhance inclusive procedures in decision-making (Liberatoreand Funtowicz, 2003) and deliberation (Davies, 2006).

Participatory politics in all their variety and nuance shift the focus from who isanexpert or who isa legitimate participant in a region of objectivity to the problem ofenhancing inclusionof lay citizens, and in certain cases to the issue ofbecoming expert.They are thus concerned with changing the very structures in which debate in a region of



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objectivity takes place. Participatory politics differ significantly in their scope, target,tactics and radicalism. In this paper when I refer to participatory politics I mean approachesthat aim to reform existing institutions in order to change the conditions of citizens

inclusion. Of course, there are more radical approaches that go so far as to question thewhole institutional structure and propose a radical democratic approach to creatinggrassroots initiatives, or even alternative institutions. Some of these more radical demo-cratic positions will be discussed later, as part of the grounded approaches that highlightthe importance of power inequalities in society and their effects on the shaping of scienceand technology. The form of participatory is politics that I present here is mainly concernedwith the role of social difference in science policy and with invigorating public participa-tion (Epstein, 2007). Deliberative democracy, policy adjustments and public accounta-

bility become the tactical means deployed in participatory politics to promote inclusionthat changes the balance of knowledge/power in a region of objectivity.

The public in participatory approaches is imagined to be civil society. This concept ofthe public tends to homogenize people beyond the main participants in a debate itcan be a whole nation, the inhabitants of a certain region or city, or group of peopleaffected by a certain technology or scientific application. In a sense, this outside publicis constructed by the inside actors who define the terms of the debate. However vagueand opportunistic, this concept of the public performs an important function for the

balance of power in a region of objectivity: it acts as an avatar of civil society. The civicimperative of participatory politics is to construct regions of objectivity such that civilsociety can be included in processes of direct democratic decision-making. Civil society

in participatory approaches refers to actors who come together on a voluntary basisrather than as functions of state-supported institutions such as education and science, or

pure market forces. Civil society is seen as a counterbalance to both strong individualizingtendencies of liberal democracies that emphasize the single person, as well as to theexcessive growth of particular state functions and governmental institutions. Instead offocusing on abstract and formal procedures for settling technoscientific controversies,

participatory politics emphasize that sound science policy can only be achieved if thereis a system in place that relies on citizen deliberation and engagement.

There is here a strong echo of communitarian positions (MacIntyre, 1981; Taylor,

1991), which portray a community whose members negotiate specific issues in termsof their horizons of meaning. In participatory politics, the public is comprised ofsocial groups and communities who deliberate over a common good against the

background of a shared horizon of practice and meaning. Participatory politics workson the interface between the community and existing institutional structures.Institutional spaces guarantee the broadening or narrowing of the accepted horizons ofmeaning against which a controversy in a region of objectivity can be debated andeventually resolved.

The keyword here isframing: appropriate framing of an issue in order to include pub-

lic actors. Framing in this context is not a pure discursive strategy (Leach et al., 2005);rather it refers to real social spaces that enable alternative ways to frame an issue.However, the questions of how far and how many actors can be included in the delibera-tive processes of an institution is always filtered through the existing possibilities andmargins that the institution allows in Neyland and Woolgars (2002: 272) words the



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The central political theme reverberating through the assembly approach is a stronganti-foundationalism, in particular a critique of the split between society and non-humanothers, whereby society and its organizational principles are given primacy over the

non-human in other STS accounts. This anti-foundationalism is situated in the broadercontext of fashionable object-oriented theories concerned with issues of diffused power,hybridity, emergence, and open architectures of networks. Anti-foundationalism of thiskind rests on the assumption that a given entity is an effect: it is made through its connec-tions with other things: Actor-network is, has been, a semiotic machine for waging waron essential differences (Law, 1999: 7). What exists is produced and made through rela-tions: relations everywhere (Strathern, 2005: 37).

This focus on relations and connections, I want to argue, corresponds to a broadershift in thinking about politics as governance in contemporary political theory and prac-tice: politics as an affair of actants perpetually adapting to, and establishing alliances andnetworks with, others. This conceptualization of the political implicitly critiques the gov-ernmentality model that has dominated socio-political theory in recent decades (forexample, Barry et al., 1996). Instead of self-activating actors and processes of subjec-tivation, that is instead of conceiving the production of subjectivities as an effect of

power, governance is a form of a-subjectivemanagement that emerges through connect-ing actors and creating alignments between them.

Governance has increasingly become a dominant trope of political thought and prac-tice (Rhodes, 1997; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). Governance signifies the erosion ofconstitutionalism as an established set of generally accepted principles in sovereign law.

It is post-constitutionalist, that is, in a scene populated by many different interconnectedand partial actors, governance offers a common mode of effective political stability andfunctioning (for example: Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Edwards and Hughes, 2005; EuropeanCommission, 2001). In other words, the polity is not made possible by following prede-fined or abstract principles imposed by a central authority (usually the nation-state).Rather, governance today describes the process of searching for regulating principles, inthe absence of an authority that guarantees such principles. Regulating principles aredeveloped ad hoc through intensive negotiation between participating actants. In thelanguage of ANT this is an assembly. The important contribution of assembly politics is

that it elucidates the existence of, and the connections between, human as well as non-human actors that are necessary for sustaining a region of objectivity.

However, governance is not an innocent form of political organization and manage-ment, rather it is related to an overarching form of production predominant in contempo-rary Western societies (Harney, 2006). It is a mode that renders the actants and entities

participating in a region of objectivity productive, in a double sense: first, politicallyproductive and, second, active participants in the existing mode of production. Regardingthe first: there is a preoccupation in ANT with discerning how a situation comes into

being, how complex assemblages evolve through the relational actions of the participat-

ing actants. This is the political side of assembly politics: it necessitates the creation ofnew political forums that accommodate the emerging constellations between human andnon-human others. However, the insertion into the political assembly happens in corre-spondence with the incorporation of these entities into a new mode of production.Assembly here refers to its other meaning, the assembly plant, yet this is not the linearassembly line of the Fordist factory, but the self-valorising assembly system of the



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Papadopoulos 187

post-Fordist economy. This economy is characterized by deindustrialization, the rise ofservices and immaterial work in the Global North, the global precarization of employ-ment relations, flexible and lean production architectures and the neoliberal dismantling

of social provision (see for example Gorz, 1999; Marazzi, 1998; Panzieri et al., 1976).Thinking politics in a region of objectivity in terms of governance goes hand in handwith the emergence of new forms of displacement. The assembly, as the space for nego-tiation and governance, is not just a descriptive category for practices in the current pol-ity. Rather, it resolves certain limitations and antinomies of the existing order and at the

sametime installs new forms of social and material control. The point here is not aboutgood or bad governance, but about how governance as suchis the very political algo-rithm of contemporary structures of power. Various positions question the effects of gov-ernance and the underlying logic of productionism (Haraway, 1992b; Harney, 2008;

Negri, 2005; Papadopoulos et al., 2008). What is common to all of them is that theyhighlight the proliferation of injustice towards those who cannot or are not willing tocontribute to the spaces that are regulated through governance. The assembly, as thespace where governance is executed, is all-inclusive apart from those who do not or can-not express themselves in the required language let alone those who are unwilling tocontribute to production or, even worse, who undermine the assembly with alternative

political actions.Latour (2004) envisions the assembly as a new possibility for political action that

goes beyond politics as debunking. An emphasis within STS on debunking, under-stood as the search for hidden causes behind peoples actions, was responsible for ignit-

ing a strong antagonism from scientists (who supposedly neither know the sources northe effects of the knowledge they produce). Social constructivism is probably the most

powerful debunking device in STS: it seeks to unravel the secret and invisible life ofscientists practices. The science wars were in fact a response to this understanding ofscience. Against the old-fashioned debunker, Latour proposes the new critic, someonewho assembles, who is visionary, chic, slick, witty and effective, the spokesperson ofthe region of objectivity, somebody who smoothes the way of the participants into thenew assembly.

However, this new critic resembles the prototypical inhabitant of the productionist

regime of the Global North after the rise in the past 20 years of governance and the con-solidation of neoliberalism. For Latour, the ultimate political question is: [c]an funda-mentalism be undone? (Latour, 2005a: 31; see also Latour, 2003: 28). In other wordshow can we ignore or attenuate the effect of all these actors who disrupt the assembly ofgovernance with an intractable conviction about justice, who ask inappropriate ques-tions, who position themselves outside the we of the assembly, who create alternativespaces and bring the wrong messages? If you cannot bring good news, then dont bringany is ANTs answer. Ignore the troublemakers, ignore otherness that is incompatible.From the point of view I am developing in this paper it is necessary to betray the consti-

tuted order of governance in order to allow for a really self-organized assembly to takeplace, as the radical democratic social and ecological movements since the end of the1990s have shown so clearly (Chesters and Welsh, 2006; Papadopoulos et al., 2008).Assembly politics offers an important insight into the intricacies of a region of objectiv-ity by enlarging our understanding of material agency, but ultimately these new forms ofagency are reinserted into the constituted form of polity.



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Grounded politics and the indeterminacy of experience

Haraways (1988) proposal for a situated view of technoscientific knowledge signifies a

very different starting point for conceiving politics in a region of objectivity. Instead ofthinking that a region of objectivity is an already constituted field, a situated perspectiveidentifies with the neglected experiences that certain participants in a region of objectiv-ity enunciate (also see Star, 1991). This line of knowledge politics initially arose withinfeminist standpoint theory. It engages with different marginalized standpoints in a con-text of structural relations of power (for example, Harding, 1991; Hartsock, 1983; Rose,1994). This approach to knowledge politics attempts to understand how knowledge issituated and grounded in the real conditions of conflicting existences in a region ofobjectivity. It is the very process of approaching knowledge as a grounded endeavourthat valorises neglected experiences as oppositional knowledge (Sandoval, 1991). Oneof the avenues that standpoint theory opens is the insistence that the we so oftenassumed or summoned in all previous approaches does not exist (the contractualist we,the possibility of all-inclusive institutions or the we of the assembly). Of course, recog-nized experts, policy-makers, law-makers, facilitators, observers, or mediators are allnecessary instances in creating the political architectures of a region of objectivity, butfrom the perspective of grounded politics the most crucial viewpoint is that of a fullyengaged yet partial participant in a real socio-material configuration. This is the reasonwhy I call this approach grounded: grounded in actual social and material modes of beingand taking into account that every attempt to contest or change them, every possible line

of flight, has, as its starting point, situatedness in a concrete ecology of existence.Politics in this grounded approach ensues because every engagement with science and

technology is arranged across asymmetrical positions. While other approaches attempt toavoid asymmetry altogether (the assembly approach), or locate asymmetry in the qualityof our knowledge (the formalist approach) or in the access to structural institutional func-tions (the participatory approach), the grounded approach sees asymmetrical relations asconstitutiveof the very conditions that produce science and technology in a region ofobjectivity. Thus we see stronger critiques of how technoscience contributes to domina-tion (Feenberg, 1991; Winner, 1993) or louder calls for a deep change of the social and

political structures that facilitate radical forms of intervention (Figueroa and Harding,2003; Shiva, 2006). Finally, attention is drawn to mobilizations of radical science move-ments (Nowotny and Rose, 1979; Ravetz, 1990; Rose and Rose, 1969) and radical demo-cratic participation and science activism (Hess, 2007b; Woodhouse et al., 2002). Manyof these positions reflect radical critiques of technological, scientific and medical ration-alities (for example, Illich, 1979; Marcuse, 1991; for a discussion see Feenberg, 1995)and are historically rooted in the social movements of 1960s and 1970s in particularfeminist, anti-war and anti-nuclear and ecological movements, and in the new socialmovements after the 1990s (Hess, 2004, 2007a; Welsh et al., 2007). It is no coincidence

that standpoint theory, which marked an important historical moment in the developmentof grounded politics, resonates strongly with a Marxist view of social organization.Existing institutions (as in the participatory approach), calibrated and standardized pro-cedures (as in the formalist approach), or spaces of inclusion (as in the assemblyapproach) are facets of a continuous movement of social transformation that is primarily



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Papadopoulos 189

initiated by neglected, silenced or effaced positions in an asymmetrical and thus antago-nistic social order.

Yet the grounded approach also opens up a post-Marxist reading of social transfor-

mation when it refuses to reduce all the contradictions in a region of objectivity to thetotalizing social dichotomy and dialectical struggle emanating from one underlying

antagonism (usually conceived as the antagonism between capital and labour). Here

there is no monolithic totalizing structure that determines the existence of marginalized

positions (Marcuse, 1991), it is rather a decentred and multifaceted structure of injus-

tice that produces a range of different positions. This understanding of marginalized

positions is supported by the rejection of a unified reading of the composition of oppo-

sitional experience. Instead, there is a focus on how different autonomous subaltern

social groups black people, migrant workers, women, new segments of the working

class that could not be easily subsumed to factory workers develop divergent self-

organized experiences that do not simply reflect the main social antagonisms but dif-

fract them into new forms of social existence (Malos, 1980; Moulier Boutang, 1998;

Negri, 2005; Papadopoulos et al., 2008).

However, there is an important question that has to be asked in relation to the verynature of the groups, human and non-human, which are effaced in a region of objectivity:Can their experience which is positioned as a more authentic form of objectivity(Harding, 1986) be treated as given and definite? Does the experience of the excluded

pre-exist the relation of exclusion? While the formalist and participatory approachesseem to take experience for granted (as a have or have not feature of an individual

actor), the assembly approach complicates the problem of experience by refuting itsprimacy altogether. Experience seems to be either reified as a substance or eliminatedand dissolved in pure connectivity (for an extended discussion see Papadopoulos andStephenson, 2007). This impasse between reification and dissolution also pertains toearly positions in the grounded approach to politics. The problem here lies in a paradoxfor performing politics that starts from the assumption that situatedness in an asymmetri-cal world matters. If experience is reduced to a mere reflection of the immediate given

position of the actor in power inequalities, it is also reduced to something that is instan-taneously accessible and transparent. It is this move that undercuts any possibility for

real transformation of the actors themselves because they are ultimately captured in anendless process of reiterating their own experience. This move underpinned identity

politics during the post-war period in the Global North. Although cultural studies havevividly shown that identity is always in process because it entails the remaking of theactors themselves and their social relations (Clifford, 2000; Hall, 1990; Papadopoulos,2006), the 1990s marked a moment at which identity politics became increasingly unableto contribute to radical political mobilizations. Poststructuralism attempted to resolvethis problem by introducing an idea of experience as discursive formation (for example,Scott, 1991). This consists of two parallel endeavours: it challenges both the individual-

istic fallacy invoked in much talk of experience and the notion that experience is a mono-lithic and transparent object of knowledge. However, this important critique of experienceusually goes hand in hand with a reduction of experience to a mere socio-historical inci-dent that undercuts any possibility for agency and introduces a disembodied form ofsocial relationality and existence (Stephenson, 2003).



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Is it possible to challenge the pervasive logic that sees experience trapped in thebinary logic between reductionist essentialism on the one hand and discursive anti-foundationalism on the other? Is it possible to question both the reification of experience

in earlier accounts of grounded politics as well as the elimination of experience throughthe thinking of governance, assemblies and discourse? The answer is yes, if experienceis understood as something that is simultaneously constructed in the process of knowl-edge politics and yet powerful enough to craft alternative worlds that challenge a givenregion of objectivity. The crucial move here is that actors do not already have experience,they make it as they collectively contest existing forms of injustice. Experience in thissense evades representation: either represent yourself and your experience (reification ofexperience in essentialist positions) or study the representations of experience in dis-course (dissolution of experience in anti-foundationalism). Thus, the processual and col-lectively constructed understanding of experience that I am arguing for here becomes aretreat from the self, from clichd subject positions, from the oppressive reduction ofexperience to the discourses prevailing in a certain context. Experience becomes a proc-ess that pushes itself to change (Whitehead, 1979). Experience is all there is (for anextended discussion, see Stephenson and Papadopoulos, 2006).

The point of departure for grounded politics is how experience of the involved humanand non-human actors is collectively produced. The involved actors experience the world

by making it, in a process where radical divergences between participants are negotiatedand these negotiations constitute the processes of social and ecological world making(Haraway, 1992a). Many new social movements probably first and foremost the alter-

globalization movement and radical ecological movements rely on non-representationalunderstandings of experience that do not connect participants on the basis of sharedsubject-positions or experiences, but on the basis of creating common spaces that affordnegotiation of the radical divergences between them and allow for common action. This

politics contests formalist approaches (whether in the form of the inclusion of experts orof governance) as well as approaches which limit participation to an institutional endeav-our. From the perspective of grounded politics the point is not to create the correct

Table 1. Politics in technoscience

Politics Key Process Political ontology Crux

Formalist Normativedefinition ofexpertise

Contractualism Democraticliberalism

Actual structuresof communication

Participatory Deliberation andinclusion of thepublic

Invigoration ofcivil society

Communitarianism Institutionalreductionism

Assembly Anti-foundationalism

Relationalproductionism

Governance Ignorance

Grounded Situated action Contentiouspolitics

Social andecologicalantagonism

Formation ofexperience



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Papadopoulos 191

assembly or institution but to engage with the dividing forms of power that count whetherwe like it or not for the practice of existing radical divergences in social, material andecological environments (Bracke and Puig de la Bellacasa, 2009; Haraway, 1988;

Stephenson and Papadopoulos, 2006).

Alter-ontologies: constituent politics in technoscience

Despite their significant differences and occasional disputes, all these approaches castlight on distinct aspects of the political in technoscience. In a peculiar way they all seemto complement each other. Perhaps this is the reason why a field as diverse as STS can

be still considered a field, a region of objectivity in its own right. Winners question [d]oartefacts have politics? is more than a crucial research question or an astute descriptionof one of the first items on the agenda of a then-emerging field; it indicates the plane onwhich many of the issues in STS can be debated. Although the various approachesdescribed in this paper occupy different positions on this plane, they remain within it andcontribute to the development of the field by performing the very politics they try todescribe. Perhaps a recurring theme in all these approaches is that they scrutinize the

barriers of a region of objectivity: by broadening and codifying the limits of legitimateparticipants, the expansion and re-structuring of institutions, the inclusion of non-humanactors, or the inclusion of neglected voices.

Technoscientific artefacts are indeed political phenomena. Every new technoscien-tific artefact resembles a legislative act that inaugurates a form of socio-material order

(Winner, 1986). What this paper asks is: if technoscientific things are legislative actsthen how is it possible not only to develop a politics that illustrates and highlights thenature of these acts, but also contributes to their making? This is what is meant through-out this paper by constituent politics: a force that not only operates in the realm of thealready constituted order but also reconstitutes a region of objectivity by developinglanguage and skilled practices for the making of things: not how things are made, buthow to make things with constituent political energies. The issue is therefore to developa form of politics in technoscience that attempts to create alternative forms of life that

primarily aim to make new socio-material realities rather than renegotiating the condi-

tions of a given constituted order (as with formalist, participatory and assembly poli-tics). I borrow the term forms of lifefrom Winner (1986, especially Ch. 1), a term hetraces back to Wittgenstein as well as to Marx. In forms of life we encounter a re-weav-ing of the social and the material through the development of new practices and tech-nologies. However, a practice or new technical device is not just used. It does not justenter into an existing organization of life. Rather, a form of life is remade through it; a

practice, a set of practices, a device, a new form of relationality becomes part of a formof life by changing it. Here I want to foreground a materialist reading of forms of life:they set up the very material constraints to what we are, how we act and what we can

become: What has to be accepted, the given, is so one could say forms of life(Wittgenstein, 1958: 226). I understand this as the making and sustaining of forms of lifethat have to be accepted because they transform the social and material order in waysthat cannot be bypassed or neglected. Therefore, a form of life acts as a set of constraintsagainst which actions as well as possibilities for new actions evolve and take place. It is



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in this sense that a form of life cannot be bypassed not because it defines in a determin-istic fashion the outcome of actions (Smith and Marx, 1994), but because actions take

place in the real space and time of a form of life.

The meaning of constituent politics in technoscience can be illustrated with the exam-ple of AIDS treatment activism in the 1980s. Epsteins (1995) description of how activistsbecame recognized experts and increasingly contributed to shaping biomedical researchcan be re-interpreted as a form of constituent politics. Epstein describes a moment whena collective inserted itself into a biomedical region of objectivity in ways that underminedthe existing terms and conditions of debate. He investigates how AIDS treatment activ-ism, once it became powerful enough to enter existing institutions (such as the US Foodand Drug Administration (FDA) drug trials committees), changed the format of treatmentresearch, clinical trial procedures and the distribution of medication. In contrast, I amhere interested in how AIDS activism became possible at allin order to be able to affectthe changes Epstein describes. Epstein investigates the formation of AIDS activism in asomewhat teleological way: as something that targeted the inclusion of the movementsdemands in committees and regulation. I want to read AIDS activism differently: as con-crete, ordinary practical action that primarily targeted the making of justice in everydaylife. Such remaking of the everyday led to the formation of new conditions of existenceand action, which could not be ignoredby existing institutions and public discourse. So,an approach is required that can account for the emergence of such actors long before anyquestion about their inclusion is apparent. If one wishes to discuss constructivism(Stengers, 2008), then this would be a truly constructivist form of politics: the making of

entities that change the conditions of possibility in a region of objectivity.In retrospect, AIDS treatment activism has been analysed from the perspective of

expertise and formalist politics; enhancing institutional participation; assembly politics,in terms of tracing the unpredictable entanglements of human (patients, activists, research,FDA regulators, and so on) and non-human (HIV virus, medications, tests for viral loads,circulating blood, and so on) actants; an actor that develops a voice based on the condi-tions of its exclusion. In this example, however, I want to suggest a politics in techno-science that achieves all of this, but additionally and primarily participates in the verymaking of an actor that ultimately changed the very conditions of counting, perceiving,

knowing, seeing and acting in the region of objectivity of HIV. It is exactly this kind ofconstituent politics that HIV treatment activists embarked upon in the early 1980s(Bersani, 1987; Harrington, 2008), long before their practices were codified as a form of

politics (whether formalist, assembly or participatory). They reordered the conditions ofeveryday experience so as to facilitate the emergence of a new social actor, as well as theconditions in which questions could be posed anew (Stephenson and Papadopoulos,2006). They created a whole new everyday lifeworld, by building organizations on theground, renting and squatting spaces that facilitated a common culture, changing theirsexual practices, fighting homophobia, sharing non-available medication in illegal clubs,

re-appropriating biomedical knowledge, confronting oppression, and reordering per-sonal relations and intimacies.This is the moment that is crucial for constituent politics: the making of a socio-

material actor on the level of everyday existence, beforenegotiations about inclusion inexisting institutions, expert committees or assemblies are possible. Now, beyond that,



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Papadopoulos 193

imagine a constituent politics approach within STS research that can provide conceptsand practices that account for andparticipate in the making of such an actor. Politicshappens when certain human or non-human actors, imperceptible actors, emerge in the

technoscientific scene and change the very constitution of being by materializing ordi-nary relations of justice. Politics is not primarily concerned with contesting given regimesof control by introducing new diversifications of law: that is, rules of equality, the codi-fication of rights and the cultivation of public responsibility. This seems to be a paradoxi-cal proposition since rules of equality, rights and responsibility constitute an indispensableand plausible part of todays forms of active political engagement (and are also at theheart of the formalist, participatory and assembly approaches, and to a certain extentthe grounded approach). Rather, politics arises from the emergence of the miscounted,those who have no place and whose capacities remain imperceptible within the normal-izing organization of the social realm (Rancire, 1998). Politics is a collective enterprisethat exposes a given social order to be limited, contingent and inconsistent by creating analternative lifeworld inhabited by the previously miscounted.

The aim of this paper was to pose the question: How can we develop an account ofconstituent politics that is relevant to the specificities of technoscience: a constituent

politics that accounts for the remaking of the very substance of being and of life? If tech-noscience today produces new worlds of existence new ontologies constituent poli-tics in technoscience is about producing alternative ontologies: alter-ontologies. Thisinvolves merging social and material transformations in ways that cannot be simplyaccommodated within the existing order of a region of objectivity. In fact the whole

constituted situation itself needs to be restructured (Rancire, 1998) in order to be able torespond to the alternative ethical, political and material projects that a constituent power

puts in motion. Constituent power acts in this sense as a subject (Negri, 1999: 324), buta subject that is not external to technoscience itself. Although this subject emerges fromwithin the dynamics of a specific technoscientific field, it, paradoxically, gradually dis-solves as a subject and becomes a new form of life that is an alternative social and mate-rial way of being. This is what AIDS treatment activists did years before they became

political subjects in their own right and constituted a social movement with a distinctprofile. Activists created an alternative objectivity, and alter-ontology of existence. How

else can we describe the circulation of illegal medications, bodily self-experimentation,the changing of forms of everyday sociability and of sexual intimacy, the militant attacksof political institutions, and the material restructuring of urban spaces? Alter-ontologiesgo beyond the subjectobject dichotomy, not because everything is hybrid or becauseeverything is related to everything else, but because they establish forms of life that aresimultaneously the effect and the precondition for the continuation of existence of mar-ginalized actors.

The new social movements of the past decade have increasingly focused on suchsocio-material constituent politics. Consider for example the alter-globalization move-

ment, labour struggles of precarious workers, feminist politics, the new migration move-ment, radical ecological mobilizations (Bauchspies and Puig de la Bellacasa, 2009;Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2010; Samaddar, 2010; Shukaitis et al.,2007). This kind of politics has yet to find clear articulation in the world of technosciencearticulation in the sense of expression but primarily in the sense of recombining existing



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approaches to politics in new, unexpected ways. Constituent politics in technosciencecannot but emerge out of the different accounts of politics already existing in STS. Theydraw from the formalist approach its democratic sensibility towards non-contributory

experts, from participatory politics its bottom-up citizen perspective on science, fromassembly politics the agency of non-humans, and finally from grounded politics ofwhich constituent politics are obviously a direct continuation the importance of a situ-ated view of complex asymmetrical lifeworlds and the transversality of neglected experi-ences. At the same time constituent politics evolve from the limitations of theseapproaches: the neglect of the conflicts which underlie technoscientific controversies inthe formalist approach; the reduction of public deliberation to the extent to which giveninstitutions allow participatory politics; the ignorance towards radical divergences whichdo not comply with relational networks of governance in assembly politics; the reificationof the experiences of marginalized actors in early notions of grounded politics.

Making something that is not already given in technoscience, that performs constitu-ent politics in technoscience, is something that, first, is concerned with matter and, second,is necessarily a post-humanist affair. Starting from the latter, post-humanism does notdeny human agency, nor does it signify the obsolescence of the human (post-humanismis not about apost-human world); instead, it refers to the complex socio-material constel-lations in which certain human, non-human others and the biosphere participate equally

but differently in the creation of alternative environments of existence (for examples seePuig de la Bellacasa, 2010). This is an approach to politics that questions the new grandnarratives of innovation and sustainability in favour of a more humble view of human

roles and powers along with a more demanding sense of personal responsibilities (Winner,2009) in order to create viable forms of life. This relation to post-humanism is neitherabout representational politics in a new parliament of things nor about including thingsas equal others, but about redrawing the material conditions of existence in close coop-erationwith non-human others in a way that forces the constituted order in a certainregion of objectivity to rearrange itself. In an important book Callon and colleagues pro-

pose that the post-humanist condition can be dealt with by entering into hybrid forums ofnegotiation and exchange (Callon et al., 2009). They discuss how actors enter into a newhybrid space of exchange in order to be transformed through this very process of negotia-

tion. However, this endeavour proposes (once again) a new representational arena thatwill foster communication between, and transformation of, the human and non-humanactors involved. Constituent politics are less concerned with the creation of such repre-sentational spaces. Rather they attempt to create material alliances between particulargroups of people (there is no such thing as humans) andparticularnon-human others(there is no such thing as the non-humans) in order to confront injustice and to makenew conditions that ultimately challenge how a certain region of objectivity works. Sothe first issue for constituent politics is to develop the tools and practices for makingcooperative alliances between particular human and non-human groups in order to estab-

lish alternative lifeworlds of material justice.Constituent politics are neither acts of opposition nor of renegotiation of the architec-tures of power (as Callon et al. propose with their hybrid forums); rather constituent poli-tics attempt to think through and literally make alternative forms of sociability andmateriality. Constituent politics in technoscience are inherently transformative and operateimmanently on the plane of matter and material justice. The second open question for



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Papadopoulos 195

constituent politics is thus the question of matter and material justice. Constituent politicsis a form of politics in technoscience that not only is concerned with knowing but alsowith careful doing (Haraway, 1997; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2009, 2011). Crafting alterna-

tive readings, new stories of the world, new ways of existing in the world all thesepractices coexist on the same plane of action. In this sense constituent politics in techno-science is not just a theory about science and technology but a minor science of matteras such (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: Ch. 12; for a discussion see Papadopoulos, 2010).Pamela Smiths work shows that artisanal production was crucial for the emergence ofthe rationalist objectivist scientific word-view that came to dominate the Western worldincreasingly after the 16th century. It was the artisans work, an intellectual revolutionfrom the bottom up, that transformed the contemplative discipline of natural philosophyinto an active one (Smith, 2006: 239; see also Sennett, 2009). Artisan science was latercodified and appropriated into a new disembodied epistemology of experimental sci-ence; but experimental science never abandoned artisanal production. In fact experimen-tal sciences always rely on artisanal production and the minor science of matter. It is onthe purported modesty of meticulous artisanal efforts that Boyles bottom-up experimen-tal laboratory science wins over Hobbes top down geometric science (Haraway, 1997;Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). What has happened is that experimental science and, to alarger extent, todays corporate science, came to obliterate and alienate this artisanalwork with matter (Shapin, 2008: 172). The open question for constituent politics is howto re-appropriate the capacity to craft with matter, how to reclaima science of matter,which, rather than being anchored in a given institution, position, network or subjectiv-

ity, creates alternative conditions of existence that make new forms of life emerge:alter-ontologies.

Note

Discussions with Maria Puig de la Bellacasa and her invaluable critical comments made this paper

possible. Special thanks go to Harry Collins, Joanna Latimer and Ernst Schraube for their sugges-

tions. The input from presentations of earlier versions of this paper at the Culture, Imagination and

Practice Research Group and the Centre for the Study of Knowledge, Expertise and Science at the

School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, the Institute for European Ethnology, HumboldtUniversity in Berlin and the Centre for Philosophy and Political Economy, University of Leicester.

In particular, the comments from Stefan Beck, Michalis Kontopodis, Steve Brown and Stevphen

Shukaitis were crucial for developing the ideas presented here. This paper would not have been

possible without the collaborations with Niamh Stephenson and Vassilis Tsianos and our common

work in earlier publications.

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Biographical note

Dimitris Papadopoulos teaches politics, organization and culture at the School ofManagement, University of Leicester. His work on social and political theory, experi-ence and subjectivity, labour and social transformation has appeared in various journalsincluding Boundary 2; Culture, Theory & Critique; Darkmatter; British Journal of

Social Psychology; andEphemera. He has published numerous books, including, mostrecently, two co-authored monographs: Escape Routes. Control and Subversion in the21st Century (Pluto Press, 2008) andAnalysing Everyday Experience: Social Researchand Political Change(Palgrave, 2006). He is currently working on thePolitics of Matter:Ontology and Justice after Constructivism,a study of matter, materialism, and radicalinterventions in technoscience. He is co-editor of the journal Subjectivity.

papadopoulos ,2011. alter ontologies

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