pakistan's islamist frontier,khyber pukhtoonkhwa

8/6/2019 Pakistan's Islamist Frontier,Khyber PukhtoonKhwa

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RELIGION & SECURITY MONOGRAPH SERIES

NUMBER ONE

Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in PakistansNorth-West Frontier

PAKISTANS ISLAMIST

FRONTIER

BY JOSHUA T. WHITE

CFIA


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Pakistans islamist

Frontier

by joshua t. white


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Pakisans islamis Fonie

Joshua . Whie,Pakisans Islamis Fronier: Islamic Poliics and U.S. Policy in

Pakisans Norh-Wes Fronier, eligion & Securiy Monograph Series, no. 1(Arlingon, VA: Cener on Faih & Inernaional Aairs, 2008).

Copyrigh 2008 by he Cener on Faih & Inernaional Aairs a he Insiue

or Global Engagemen.

Prined in he Unied Saes o America.

Firs published November 2008 by he Cener on Faih & Inernaional Aairs a

he Insiue or Global Engagemen.

is monograph may no be reproduced in whole or in par (beyond copying

allowed under Secions 107 and 108 o U.S. Copyrigh Law and excerps by

reviewers or he public press) wihou he writen permission o he publisher.

Please direc correspondence o CFIA,

P.O. Box 12205, Arlingon, VA 22219-2205.

Email: [email protected].

epor available a: htp://www.ca.org/go/ronier/

ISBN: 978-0-615-22586-9

ISSN: 1945-3256


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Pakistans islamist

Frontier

by joshua t. white

religion & security monograPh series

number one


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Joshua . Whie is a esearch Fellow a he Cener on Faih & Inernaional Aairs and a Ph.D. candidae a e Johns Hopkins Universiy School o AdvancedInernaional Sudies (SAIS) in Washingon. His research ocuses on Islamicpoliics and poliical sabiliy in Souh Asia. He has been on sa wih he Insiueor Global Engagemen since 2001, and spen nearly a year living in Peshawar,

Pakisan in 2005/6. He reurned o Pakisan in he summers o 2007 and 2008 asa Visiing esearch Associae a he Lahore Universiy o Managemen Sciences.He has presened his ndings in various academic and policy ora; has beeninerviewed on BBC, Voice o America, and Geo News; and in February 2008paricipaed in he U.S.-sponsored elecion observer delegaion o Pakisan.

Mr. Whie graduaed magna cum laude, Phi Bea Kappa rom Williams College wih a double major in Hisory and Mahemaics. He received his M.A. inInernaional elaions rom Johns Hopkins SAIS, where he concenraed in Souh

Asia Sudies and Inernaional Economics. Upon graduaing rom SAIS, he receivedhe 2008 Chrisian A. Herer Award, he schools highes academic honor. He has

co-auhored a chaper in Religion and Securiy: Te New Nexus in InernaionalRelaions; and has wrien or he Naion (Pakisan), he Review o Faih &

Inernaional Aairs, Chrisianiy oday, Te Wall Sree Journal Asia, Curren rendsin Islamis Ideology, and he journal Asian Securiy. He has also been acive inpromoing Chrisian-Muslim dialogue, and paricipaes in ineraih evens in bohhe Unied Saes and Pakisan.

about the author


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acknowledgements

For heir encouragemen, assisance, and criicism, I would like o hank WalerAndersen, Qibla Ayaz, Parick Bean, Jonah Blank, Sephen Cohen, Chrisine Fair,omas Farr, Asi Gul, Lakhan Gusain, Mary Habeck, ebecca Haines, eodoreHamilon, Dennis Hoover, Adnan Sarwar Khan, Sunil Khilnani, Daniel Markey,Kimberly Maren, Mariam Mui, Ani Mukherjee, ani Mullen, Haider Mullick,

Shuja Nawaz, Philip Oldenburg, asul Bakhsh ais, Philip einer, Hasan-Askariizvi, Mano umalshah, Naeem Salik, Mathew Scot, Nilouer Siddiqui, DanielSimons, Allyson Slaer, Brian Smih, Chris and Priscilla Smih, Mohammad

Waseem, Marvin Weinbaum, Ania Weiss, he sa o he American Insiue oPakisan Sudies, and many ohers who wish o remain anonymous. e conclu-sions which ollow are, needless o say, enirely my own.

I am also deeply graeul o my parens in Oregon, who have modeled or mehe religious lie; my siser in Mongolia, who is more advenurous han I will ever

be; my dear nana and nani in Caliornia, who inroduced me o inernaional rela-ions; my menors Bob, Margare Ann, and Chris Seiple, who coninue o inspire;

and my riends a he Church o he esurrecion, who are ellow sojourners inhe rues sense.

Finally, I would like o say a word o hanks o my many riends in he Fronier sudens, journaliss, bureaucras, poliicians, businessmen, aciviss, clerics,and scholars who showed me he very nes in Pashun hospialiy and pushedme, ime and again, o see pas sensaionalism and sereoypes. Main ap ka shukr

guzar hun.

Joshua Whie


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contents

abou he auho

acknowledgemens

conens

PeFace 1

execuive summay 3

Islamic Poliics, Counerinsurgency, and he Sae

Te Fronier, 20012008: Evaluaing Islamic Poliics

Te Presen Crisis: U.S. Policy Recommendaions

inoducion 11

Te Changing Fronier

Key QuesionsProjec Scope

Research Mehodology

A Noe on Geography and Governance

glossay oF key ems 17

Map o Pakisans NWFP and FAA

he ise and scoPe oF islamic Poliical inFluence 23

Pre-1947: Religio-poliical Movemens

Pre-1947: Te Emergence o Islamis Paries

194769: Sae Formaion and Islamic Ideniy

197077: Islamiss and Elecoral Poliics


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197788: Zia ul-Haq and Islamizaion

19882002: Fragmened Poliics

Paterns o Islamic Poliics

he mmas islamis govenance 47

Te Rise o he Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal

Te Islamizaion Program: Ambiions and Realiies

Islam as Din:Te Islamizaion Agenda Wri Large

Consrains on Islamizaion

In Summary: Te Limis and Lessons o Islamis Moderaion

new islamiss and he eun oF Pashun naionalism 85

Te Rise o he Neo-aliban

Te Reurn o Pashun Naionalism

u.s. Policy owad he Fonie 101

Pre-2002 Hisorical Conex

Poliical Engagemen

U.S. Assisance o he Fronier

Policy ecommendaions 117

Sraegic Conex

Poliical EngagemenPublic Diplomacy

Securiy and Counerinsurgency

Governance Reorm in he NWFP

Governance Reorm in he FAA

Aid and Developmen

Conclusion: oward Poliical Mainsreaming

ePilogue: Fonie 2010 157

Addressing he NWFP: New Securiy Cooperaion

Addressing he FAA: Counerinsurgency and MRZs


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is monograph is he rs in a series by he Cener on Faih & InernaionalAairs (CFIA) ha will examine he inersecion o religion and securiy issuesin a global conex. e Cener has or several years been a he oreron o hisopic. In 2003 i sponsored a conerence which examined he role o religionand religion policy in poliical and social sabiliy an even which ormed he

basis o a book, Religion and Securiy: Te New Nexus in Inernaional Relaions .1

e Ceners eligion & Securiy esearch Program builds on his iniial work and,by way o inernaional conerences, special repors, and CFIAs journal Te Reviewo Faih & Inernaional Aairs,2 has aken he lead in examining his criical issuerom various regional and religious perspecives.3

A muli-aih iniiaive, he Cener conducs his research wih he convicionha he ree exercise o religion, praciced peaceully, can conribue in prooundlyposiive ways o a sable social and poliical order; bu also ha saes mus akeseriously, and deal inelligenly, wih he social and securiy implicaions oreligious exremism. e Cener exiss, in par, o help scholars, policymakers,

and praciioners srike his criical balance, and encourage discussion abou hechanging role o religion in global aairs.

e Cener operaes as an educaion and research program o he Insiueor Global Engagemen (IGE), a aih-based global aairs hink ank which since2000 has worked o promoe susainable environmens or religious reedom andsponsor innovaive inernaional programs ha ocus on he inersecion o reli-gion, law, and securiy issues. I was an IGE iniiaive which invied NWFP ChieMiniser Akram Khan Durrani o Washingon in 2005 or discussions regardingpoliical Islam in he Fronier; and which resuled in Joshua Whies reciprocal ripo Peshawar as par o a small delegaion. Joshuas subsequen say in Peshawar, and

his exended ineracion wih religious and poliical elies hroughou he Fronier,ormed he inspiraion or his research projec. Many o he hemes and recom-mendaions which appear below were rs oulined by he auhor a a presenaion

Preface


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in Washingon in November 2007, which was joinly sponsored by CFIA and heSouh Asia Sudies program o e Johns Hopkins Universiy School or AdvancedInernaional Sudies.

I is our hope ha his monograph proves o be a valuable resource o bohscholars and policymakers as hey seek o undersand he changing naure oIslamic poliics in Pakisans Fronier.

Dennis R. Hoover, D.Phil., and Chris Seiple, Ph.D., series ediors

noes:

1 ober A. Seiple and Dennis . Hoover, Religion and Securiy: Te New Nexus in Inernaional

Relaions (Lanham, MD: owman & Litleeld, 2004).

2 For more inormaion on he eview, see htp://www.ca.org/.

3 In 2007 he Cener also sponsored, in parnership wih he Carnegie Endowmen or Inernaional

Peace and he Insiue or Public Policy in Bishkek, a conerence in Kyrgyzsan on religion and

securiy in he Cenral Asian conex.


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islamic Poliics, couneinsugenc y, and he sae

Pakisans wesern Fronier has been a geographic and ideological ocal poinor religious exremism or nearly hiry years. I served as a saging ground ormujahidin operaions agains he ussians in Aghanisan hroughou he 1980s. I

was he birhplace o al Qaeda in 1988, and he aliban movemen in 1994. Morerecenly, over he las several years, a neo-aliban insurgency has emerged inhe Pak-Aghan border areas which has grown ino a complex religio-polii-

cal movemen wih hree disinc bu overlapping objecives. One is ocusedwesward on ueling he Aghan conic and overurning he Karzai governmen.A second is oriened globally oward providing a sae haven or al Qaeda and is a-liaes o plan atacks agains Wesern ineress. And a hird is ocused on Pakisanisel on carving ou a sphere o inuence wihin he ribal agencies o heFederally Adminisered ribal Areas (FAA) and he nearby setled disrics ohe Norh-Wes Fronier Province (NWFP) or he esablishmen o Islamis rule,

and on desabilizing he Pakisani sae so as o disrup is cooperaion wih heU.S. and Wesern allies.

Focusing on his hird objecive o he neo-aliban movemen, his monographexamines in hisorical perspecive he ineracion beween Islamic poliics

and he sae in he Fronier, paying paricular atenion o he NWFP properand he nearby setled-ribal border regions. Alhough he analysis largely brackesa number o imporan bilaeral and regional issues such as he challenge osrenghening counererrorism cooperaion; improving Pak-Aghan ineracion on

border issues and larger regional quesions; dealing wih concerns over Pakisanslack o sraegic commimen o rooing ou milian groups; and ineracing

wih a ragile civilian governmen in Islamabad i seeks o provide a rameworkor undersanding he religious and poliical dynamics which are criical o hedevelopmen o any successul U.S. sraegy in he Fronier.

executive summary


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4 | Pakistans Islamist Frontier

e narraive begins wih an hisorical review o Islamism in he Fronier, high-lighing several recurring paterns which shed ligh on conemporary rends. Againshis backdrop, he monograph goes on o analyze he ve-year enure (20022007)

o he Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) Islamis governmen in NWFP which represened he rs exended atemp a acual governance by religiousparies in Pakisans hisory and review he ways in which i shaped he currenpoliical environmen. is analysis is ollowed by a discussion o he MMAs declineover he las year, he rise o he neo-aliban insurgency, and he reurn o Pashunnaionalis poliics. Te concluding chapers examine he hisory o Americanineracion in he Fronier, and recommend policies by which he U.S. migh

work wih he governmen o Pakisan o implemen programs which denyinsurgens a oohold in he setled areas o he Fronier; butress he legiimacy ohe sae in dealing wih religious and milian groups; increase he poliical uil-

iy and long-erm susainabiliy o American developmen assisance; and addresshe governance deci in boh he setled and ribal areas in such a way as o layhe groundwork or more robus sae inuence and counerinsurgency planning.

Given he upsurge in atenion devoed o he hard-core ehrik-e-aliban-e-Pakisan (TP) miliancy in places such as Wazirisan and Bajaur, an analysis whichocuses on Islamic poliical behavior in he NWFP migh a rs seem o be ou osep wih curren crises. Bu his could no be urher rom he ruh: religio-poliicaldynamics in he Fronier are arguably more imporan han ever beore. WhilePakisan and he Unied Saes may increasingly resor o miliary acion agains

TP and oher insurgen groups, miliary eors alone will ulimaely prove insu-cien in producing a sable poliical order ha saises he sraegic objecives oeiher counry.

Ulimaely, counerinsurgency is abou incenivizing poliical endgames.

In he Fronier, his requires a much more robus and comprehensive policy

ocus on local governance, poliics, and even religion. Many U.S. ocials havecome o adop a jaundiced view o poliical soluions in he Fronier believingha hey oo oen serve o empower religious paries, milians, or boh. In his heU.S. is oen correc, bu also complici: American paronage has heavily privilegedhe Pakisani miliary, and done litle o srenghen he kinds o civilian insiu-

ions ha are necessary o provide a counerweigh o boh religious poliics andinsurgen mobilizaion.

A ocus on he setled areas o he Fronier is also long overdue. While he neo-aliban insurgency remains heavily dependen upon bases deep in he FAA, hemovemens cener o graviy is gradually becoming more diuse, blurring he

disincion beween setled and ribal regions. e NWFP has been rocked bya seep rise in milian aciviy over he las wo years, and increasingly resembleshe ungoverned ribal areas. Poliical reorms in he FAA, on he oher hand,are likely o make he ribal areas look more like he setled regions by inroducingregular orms o poliical aciviy. is convergence makes he case or he develop-

men o counerinsurgency programs which operae across setled and ribal lines,and which deny poliical space o new religious insurgen movemens.


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Executive Summary | 5

he Fonie, 20012008: evaluaing islamic Poliics

The limits and lessons o Islamist moderation

e religious paries ve year enure leading he NWFP governmen, rom 2002 o2007, represens a valuable case sudy o he ways in which involvemen in he polii-cal process can serve o shape and ulimaely moderae Islamic poliical behavior.aher han serving as he vanguard o aliban-like rule in he Fronier, as many observershad eared, he MMA insead became relaively pragmaic and ound is Islamis agendalimied by boh inernal and exernal pressures. Te lessons o he MMAs ransor-maion remain deeply relevan in he Fronier, even ollowing he alliances deea

in February 2008. eligious paries will coninue o play a signican role in NWFPpoliics, paricularly i and when heir righ-o-cener parons among he PML-N reurn

o power in Islamabad. e Unied Saes, which has generally avoided engagemen wihhe religious paries, also has lessons o learn rom he consrucive role ha he inerna-ional communiy played in shaping he MMAs Islamis experimen.

Understanding the mainstream-militant divide

e rise o he neo-aliban insurgency since 2005 has deeply complicaed herelaionship beween mainsream religious paries o he MMA, such as he Jamaa-e-Islami (JI) and he Jamia Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl) ( JUI-F), and more milian organiza-

ions such as he TP. While hese wo kinds o Islamiss oen share a common poliicaldiscourse (e.g., regarding he Wes and he shariah) and reain many inormal linkages,he religious paries are increasingly ambivalen abou he goals o he

neo-aliban, and hreaened boh direcly and indirecly by he movemens

expansion ino areas which were radiionally dominaed by democraic Islamisgroups. is realignmen has reduced he inuence o paries such as he JUI-F over he

younger generaion omadrassah graduaes (many o whom are now easily recruiedo milian groups), bu has also creaed new common ineress beween he religiousparies and he sae in channeling disconen ino he ormal poliical process.

Insurgency as local politics

Jus as analyss in 2002 made he misake o reading he MMA hrough helens o he Aghan aliban, and hus underesimaing he degree o which religiousparies would be shaped by local poliical ineress, so oday observers oen make hemisake o reading he neo-aliban insurgency narrowly hrough he lens o al Qaedaand he Waziri milian neworks. In doing so hey again end o underesimae he

ways in which hese insurgen groups and heir agendas are woven deeply inohe abric o boh local and regional poliics. Neo-aliban organizaions operaingin places such as Swa, Khyber, Darra Adam Khel, and Souh Wazirisan while all

linked are also quie disinc and require unique sraegies on he par o he gov-ernmen. While here is clearly a uniying ideological dimension o he insurgency, inoneheless remains highly ragmened and dependen upon local grievances.


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Legitimacy and peace deals

e Wazirisan accords in 2006, signed by he Pakisan army and local milians,

demonsraed ha successul negoiaions wih neo-aliban groups can easily endup as sraegic ailures. American policymakers, however, have been slow o recognizeha he converse can be equally rue. e ailed peace deals in Swa in he spring o2008 were in many ways eecive, in ha hey demonsraed he governmens goodaih and creaed poliical space or he sae o underake srong acion when hemilians reneged on heir commimens. While some agreemens wih miliansare clearly counerproducive,no all peace deals are creaed equal. Negoiaionscan conribue o a larger sraegy o delegiimizing Islamis insurgen aciviy.

The alse secularism vs shariah debate

e MMAs deea in he February 2008 elecions sparked opimism ha secularnaionalism would replace religious poliics in he Fronier. e Awami Naional Pary(ANP) ook advanage o public disillusionmen wih he Islamiss governance and

wih heir inabiliy or unwillingness o sem he rising ide o miliancy. Te naion-aliss vicory, however, says more abou cyclical poliics and ani-incumbency

senimen han i does abou poliical Islam. e ANP-PPP coaliion governmen,vulnerable o criicism rom he righ-o-cener paries, has in ac adoped a religiousrheoric o is own, and promulgaed newshariah regulaions in an atemp o under-

cu public suppor or Islamis insurgen groups.

Local governance and Islamism

e rise o a new, milian Islamism in he Fronier is righly atribued o poliical,ideological, and demographic acors. Bu comparaively less atenion has been paido he inernal and srucural weaknesses o he sae which opened he door o insur-gen inuence. Musharras 2002 governance reorms inadverenly aciliaedhe rise o new insurgens by crippling he saes abiliy o respond o hreas a

he local level, and by urher biurcaing adminisraion o setled and ribal regions.

e governmens consisen ailure o ollow hrough wih basic governance reormsin he FAA has also weakened is hand agains groups which have esablished areligious basis o legiimacy in he ribal areas.

he Pesen cisis: u.s. Policy ecommendaions

American policy oward he Fronier has ocused heavily on counererrorismobjecives in he FAA. e spreading insurgency, however, calls or a more inegraedand creaive agenda designed o bolser he saes poliical legiimacy and improve iscapaciy o respond o new hreas. is means crafing policies which encouragelocal communiies o side wih he sae and agains Islamis insurgens. esepolicies, which may ake disinc orms in he FAA and he NWFP, mus inegrae poli-ical engagemen, public diplomacy, securiy programming, and developmen assisance.


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Executive Summary | 7

Broadening political engagement

roughou he Musharra era, American poliical engagemen was enaive

and overly ocused on a ew elies. Alhough his is slowly beginning o change,i is imporan ha he U.S. coninues o nd pracical ways o signal is com-mimen o civilian governance, insiuionalize indirec suppor o moderaeparies in he Fronier such as he ANP, and reool is bureaucracy or long-ermengagemen wih Pakisan. American diplomas also need o make greaereors o engage wih righ-o-cener and religious paries. egular, consis-en ineracion wih paries such as he PML-N and JUI-F would, ironically, helpo normalize and depoliicize he ineracion, and allow he U.S. o be beter pre-pared or poliical realignmens which may bring hese paries back ino power.

Reocusing public diplomacy

Americas public diplomacy sraegy is oen overly ocused on rying o reduceani-Americanism. he ocal objecive o U.S. public diplomacy in Pakisanshould be o encourage Pakisanis o see cooperaion agains miliancy and

exremism as being in heir own ineres. is requires ha U.S. poliicians and no jus diplomas adop a language o common ineress and commonhreas; avoid raming he neo-aliban insurgency in religious language; and nd

ways o highligh he bleak realiies o insurgen governance in boh he setled

and ribal areas. ere are also opporuniies or he U.S. o promoe rack-wodialogues on issues o religion and on he role o religious leaders in oseringsocial and poliical sabiliy. And raher han ineracing wih hose Muslim lead-ers who are moderae by he sandards o American liberalism, he U.S. musinsead seek ou inerlocuors who are boh moderae and inuenial in heirown conexs.

Planning or counterinsurgency in the NWFP

Communiies in he setled areas o he Fronier increasingly view local

neo-aliban groups as criminal enerprises raher han legiimae religious move-mens, and have in some areas begun pushing back agains insurgen advances.e U.S. should work wih he provincial governmen o ake advanage o hisrend by unding and equipping rapid-response police orces which couldsupplemen and suppor communiy-based lashkars; as well as programswhich address local disconen over he judicial sysem disconen whichhe insurgens oen use o heir advanage. American policymakers should alsoencourage reorm o provincial and local governance rameworks in he NWFP

which migh improve he saes capaciy o respond o miliancy, paricularlyacross complex setled-ribal boundaries.


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Planning or counterinsurgency in the FATA

U.S. suppor or counerinsurgency eors in he FAA has been ocused largely

on he provision o equipmen and raining o he Fronier Corps. is suppor isworhwhile, bu i should no be conused wih promoion o acual counerinsur-gency, which urns on poliical conesaion over governmen legiimacy. Abseninsiuion-oriened governance reorm in he FAA, successul and susain-

able counerinsurgency aciviies are eecively impossible. e Unied Saesshould ake he lead in organizing an expanded and more robus Friends o Pakisanconsorium which could serve as an umbrella organizaion or mulilaeral develop-men eors in he FAA. is consorium should hen work wih he governmeno Pakisan o promoe he esablishmen o Model eorm Zones (MZs) in heribal areas which would inegrae criical governance reorms (e.g., eleced councils

and judicial access), highly concenraed and visible developmen programming,sepped-up securiy presence, and poliical incenives in such a way as o incremen-ally build he legiimacy o he sae and creae a demonsraion eec hroughouhe FAA.*

Leveraging agmentation

e Pakisani governmen has a long hisory o aking advanage o cleavageswihin and among ribal srucures. In he wake o he Anbar Awakening in Iraq,

American policymakers have discussed wheher similar sraegies migh besuccessul in Pakisan. Carrying ou a ribe-oriened Anbar model in and aroundhe FAA would pose real challenges on accoun o he inernally ragmened,egaliarian, and increasingly enrepreneurial naure o he Pashun ribal sysem.

Alhough ribal lashkars may prove o be useul in pushing back neo-aliban advanc-es in some areas, and should be suppored by he sae when hey do so, hese adhoc alliances are likely o disinegrae quickly or even urn agains he governmen.

Any eor o ake advanage o ragmenaion in he Fronier mus inegrae poliicalsraegy wih acical approaches om he ouseand, as argued above, should beoriened around a concered program o incenivize ribal communiies and relaively

moderae Islamis groups o inegrae ino he poliical mainsream.

Increasing the eectiveness o development

Jus as successul counerinsurgency campaigns require insiuional rameworks,so U.S. developmen programs in he ribal areas need o come o erms wih hemassive governance gap in he FAA. Much o he USAID programming in heFAA is innovaive, bu is unlikely o be susainable or poliically eecive.Given he scope o he American aid commimen in he FAA, policymakers shouldinsis ha broader governance issues are concurrenly pu on he able. e U.S.

governmen should also develop plans o direc more aid o he NWFP proper,

*For more on he MZ concep, see Epilogue: Fronier 2010.


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Executive Summary |9

especially he border areas adjacen o he FAA; and explore skills raining programsin parnership wih moderae madrassah neworks and local universiies siuaed inhe souhern par o he province.

conclusion

As he Unied Saes looks oward ormulaing a more comprehensive sraegy inhe region, i would do well o recognize ha Islamism in he Fronier remains highlyragmened no only beween hose groups which paricipae in he democraicprocess and hose which cones he legiimacy o he sae, bu also beween hose

which have ideological or ransnaional agendas and hose which simply operae inhe realm o local poliics. Soluions o he problems posed by illiberal or insur-gen Islamism ulimaely require poliical mainsreaming. is, in urn, calls or

legiimae and capable sae insiuions boh civilian and miliary which canse he poliical boundaries or Islamis paricipaion, and respond eecively o newand unexpeced orms o religious insurgency.


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he changing Fonie

Pakisans Norh-Wes Fronier Province (NWFP) is increasingly a geographicand ideological ocal poin or religious exremism. Bordering Aghanisan and heroubled Federally Adminisered ribal Areas (FAA), he NWFP has experienced

a social and poliical shi over he las wo decades oward conservaive, and some-imes milian, Islam. e overwhelming success o he Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal(MMA) Islamis alliance in he 2002 NWFP provincial elecions an alliancedominaed by conservaive religious leaders who espoused ani-American rheoricand shared an ideological aniy wih he aliban appeared o many o signala shi oward a alibanized Fronier inimical o boh Pakisani and U.S. long-ermineress in he region.

a narraive, however, urned ou o be ar oo simple. e realiy which hasunolded over he las six years has insead been unexpecedly complex. aher hanacing in he radical mold o he Aghan aliban, he MMA ben o he exigencies

o governance and moderaed on a hos o key policies. aher han orging a qual-iaively new poliical orm in he Fronier, he Islamis alliance succumbed o hecyclical naure o local poliics, losing specacularly o Pashun naionalis paries inhe 2008 general elecions. And raher han mainaining heir hold on righ-o-cenerreligious poliics, he MMA consiuen paries were ouanked by a new class oreligious acors operaing on he blurred boundary beween ormal poliics andinsurgen miliancy.

How dramaically has he Fronier changed in six shor years? In 2002, he preem-inen concern o policymakers was ha a coaliion o ani-American and pro-shariahreligious paries would esablish an elecoral oohold in he Fronier, and would use

heir poliical posiion o enac an array o discriminaory laws in he mold o heAghan aliban. Less han six years laer, he preoccupaions o policymakers are bohmore proound and more complex. oday he concerns o lis only a ew are ha

introduction


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al Qaeda has reconsiued is operaions in he FAA, and is planning inernaionaloperaions agains he Wes; ha regional srongmen such as Baiullah Mehsud areaciliaing cross-border miliancy agains coaliion orces in Aghanisan, and in-

ernal disorder in ciies such as Islamabad and Lahore; ha local aliban-like insur-gencies, oen in collaboraion wih Punjabi or Waziri groups, are gaining ground inhe setled areas o he NWFP, hreaening he wri o he sae and he long-erm

viabiliy o civilian governance; and ha religious paries, once eared as he van-guard o alibanizaion, are now losing even he abiliy o draw religiously-minded

young people away rom insurgen aciviy and ino he poliical mainsream. 1

In ligh o hese dramaic changes, he key objecives o his monograph are wo-old. Firs, o examine hrough a poliical lens he overlapping Islamis narraives ohe las six years he rise and all o he MMA, and he concomian rise o new in-surgen acors. And second, o propose a se o policies by which he Unied Saes, in

close cooperaion wih he people and governmen o Pakisan, migh consrucivelyrespond o he prevailing siuaion in he Fronier.

e rs objecive is imporan or he simple reason ha much o he analysis oreligious poliics in he Fronier ends o ocus on milian capabiliies and oucomes(access o resources, organizaional srucures, number o atacks, ec.) raher hanpoliical and social drivers (objecives, rivalries, parnerships, leverage, ec.). In doingso, i is easy o miss he undamenally poliical naure o he conics in odaysFronier. In and around 2002, or example, observers oen made he misake o read-ing he MMA hrough he lens o he Aghan aliban; in doing so hey underesimaed

he degree o which he Pakisani Islamiss would be shaped by (even enrapped by)local poliical ineress. Similarly, observers oday oen make he misake o readinghe new class o neo-aliban insurgen groups narrowly hrough he lens o al Qaedaand he Waziri milian neworks; in doing so hey again end o underesimae he

ways in which hese insurgens and heir agendas are woven deeply ino he abric oboh local and regional poliics.

e second objecive is equally criical. In he years since 2001, he Unied Saeshas unorunaely no adequaely come o erms wih he implicaions o his changingIslamic poliical aciviy or Americas core ineress. U.S. policy oward he Fronierhas been poliically cauious, generally uncreaive, largely driven by counererror-

ism objecives, and poorly coordinaed wih he Pakisani governmen. Alhough heFronier has hisorically been a recruiing ground or milian groups, U.S. poliicalengagemen, public diplomacy, and aid iniiaives in he region are only beginning oocus in a coheren way on counering ideological suppor or exremism. Boh heU.S. and Pakisan have also been slow o recognize he imporance o good governanceand access o jusice in co-oping local suppor or Islamis insurgen groups.

key Quesions

e work which ollows does no purpor o be a sudy o errorism, exremism,

or miliancy as such. Neiher does i purpor o delve deeply ino he macro polii-cal environmen in Souh Asia, or he ransnaional characer o Pakisans currensecuriy dilemmas. I is, raher, a ocused atemp o race he dynamics o poliical


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Introduction | 13

Islam in he Fronier in he pos-9/11 era. In paricular, i seeks o provide insighino several undamenal quesions abou religious dynamics and poliical sabil-iy in he Fronier, he answers o which may have resonance beyond simply he

scope o U.S. policy oward Pakisan:i) Wha can we learn rom he MMAs experience abou he moderaing eecs o

governance on Islamic poliical behavior? Wha were he enabling and consrainingacors which aced upon he alliances abiliy o carry ou he illiberal aspecs o isagenda? Wha are he legacies o he MMAs Islamis experimen?

ii) Wha are he advanages and disadvanages o Islamis paricipaion in heormal poliical process? a is, how do we weigh, on he one hand, he risks oilliberal poliical behavior by Islamiss agains, on he oher hand, he miigaingadvanages o Islamis paricipaion in poliics namely, he co-oping o poeniallyradical religio-poliical impulses?

iii) Wha are he paterns o relaionship and he lines o conesaion beweenreligious paries and groups which engage in vigilanism or miliancy? Are herecleavages beween and among hese groups ha Pakisan can leverage in he pursuio regional sabiliy?

iv) How can he U.S. cra a orward-looking policy oward he Fronier ha, incooperaion wih he governmen o Pakisan, engages he ull range o poliical ac-ors in such a way as o butress moderae, democraic, and poliically accommoda-ionis elemens over he long-erm?

v) How can he U.S. parner wih Pakisan o address he underlying weakness-

es o he sae, especially in hose areas which are mos prone o he advance o anIslamis insurgency? And wha does he recen hisory o Islamis governance in heNWFP ell us abou he rade-os inheren in underaking srucural and governancereorms in he Fronier?

Pojec scoPe

is sudy is bounded in wo signican ways. Firs, he narraive covers six years,rom Sepember 2002 hrough Sepember 2008. Given ha nearly ve o hese yearsell under he governance o he MMA alliance in he NFWP, he hisory and poli-

ics o he religious paries in he Fronier orms a large par o he analyical discus-sion. More recen developmens, including he rise o new insurgen groups and he

vicory o he ANP, are also deal wih, alhough i is sill oo early o draw conclu-sions abou many o he broad rends which underlie hese more recen evens.

Second, raher han presuming o discuss he enire Fronier region comprehen-sively, his analysis ocuses predominanly on he NWFP proper, ha is, he areasunder he conrol o he provincial governmen. One canno, o course, discuss heNWFP wihou seriously accouning or he FAA, and issues o ribal governanceand he saes managemen o he setled-ribal border areas will indeed be exam-ined below. a being said, wha ollows is no a deailed review o he siuaion

in he FAA isel.2 e hisory, analysis, and recommendaions seek insead o ll ananalyical gap by ocusing in large par on he setled areas, and he implicaions orecen Fronier developmens or policymakers in he U.S. and Pakisan.


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eseach mehodology

is analysis is or he mos par descripive, and is drawn largely rom he auhors

own experiences in he Fronier, as well as ormal inerviews and background research.e bulk o he eldwork was conduced in he spring and summer o 2007,

during which ime he auhor was a Visiing esearch Associae a he LahoreUniversiy o Managemen Sciences (LUMS). During ha period, he conducedover a hundred semi-srucured inerviews in Peshawar, Islamabad, and Lahore

wih leaders rom he major religious paries; senior ocials in he provincial andederal governmens; local expers and civil sociey groups; represenaives oinernaional organizaions; and ocials rom he miliary and securiy services.

e auhor also drew upon his experience o living in Peshawar as a CFIA ellowrom he all o 2005 hrough he summer o 2006, during which ime he had

exensive ineracion wih he MMA leadership and raveled widely in he NWFP;his paricipaion in he U.S.-sponsored elecion observer delegaion o he February2008 general elecions; a review o exising lieraure, including English and Urdunewspaper archives; a research rip o Pakisan in Augus 2008; and inerviews in

Washingon conduced during 20078.

a noe on geogrPhy and govenance

Pakisans Fronier is managed under a complex and someimes bafing pach-

work o governance sysems, many o which were inheried and adaped rom Briishimes.3 For he purpose o his monograph, he erm Fronier is aken o includeboh he Norh-Wes Fronier Province (NWFP), which is governed by an elecedprovincial governmen in Peshawar; and he Federally Adminisered ribal Areas(FAA), which operaes under he oversigh o he ederal governmen hrough heoce o he governor in Peshawar.

e NWFP is subdivided ino boh setled and ribal areas. e setled areasare hose in which all or mos o Pakisani civil law, regulaions, and axaionapply.4 e Provincially Adminisered ribal Areas (PAA), on he oher hand,are hose in which some or all aspecs o regular Pakisani law have been wihheld

(or in some cases, rescinded) in avor o ribal or shariah sysems o governance.O he 24 adminisraive disrics in he NWFP, 17 are setled areas and 7 are rib-al. Each disric, wheher setled or ribal, is managed by a disric coordinaionocer (DCO). e PAA disrics oen operae as a hybrid beween setled ormso governance and auonomous ribal rule. Malakand disric in norhern NWFP,or example, is a PAA region which in many respecs operaes like a setled dis-ric (wih local elecions, cours, ec.), bu is also exemp rom axaion and oherregulaions, and has a hybrid sysem o governance which, iner alia, draws onlevied raher han proessional police orces.5 All old, he NWFP covers an area oabou 29,000 square miles and has a populaion o abou 21 million, which consi-

ues 13% o Pakisans oal. Is economy is heavily oriened around services andagriculure (alhough only 30% o he land is culivable), and i ranks hird ou oPakisans our provinces wih respec o mos healh and developmen indicaors.6


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Introduction | 15

e FAA, or is par, is subdivided ino ribal agencies and ronier regions(Fs). Each o he seven ribal agencies is adminisered by a poliical agen (PA) whorepors o he governor o NWFP. Under he ramework esablished by he Fronier

Crimes egulaion o 1901, he PA negoiaes principally wih ribal leaders whohave been appoined by he sae as maliks. e six F areas, which are considerablysmaller han he agencies, are each atached o a nearby setled disric (Bannu, DeraIsmail Khan, Koha, Lakki Marwa, Peshawar, and ank), and are managed by an as-sisan poliical agen (APA) who repors o he DCO o ha disric. Alhough heF areas are ederally adminisered, he provincial governmen also a imes plays arole in he ronier regions on accoun o heir proximiy o he setled areas, and heiroversigh by DCOs who operae in he setled disrics. e FAA covers an area oabou 10,500 square miles, and has a populaion o abou 3.5 million. Male and e-male lieracy are approximaely 30% and 3%, respecively, and he area suers rom a

proound lack o inrasrucure and basic services.7

noes:

1 Examining hese and oher challenges, a biparisan group concluded in Sepember 2008 ha we

nd U.S. ineress in Pakisan are more hreaened now han a any ime since he aliban was

driven rom Aghanisan in 2001. Pakisan Policy Working Group, Te Nex Chaper: Te Unied

Saes and Pakisan, Sepember 2008, 1.

2 For a more comprehensive, regional policy perspecive on he curren challenges o he

Fronier, see Daniel Markey, Securing Pakisans ribal Bel (New York: Council on Foreign

elaions, Augus 2008); as well as orhcoming repors on Pakisan by he Cener or Sraegicand Inernaional Sudies (CSIS) and he Cener or American Progress (CAP). (Noe ha

he auhor paricipaed in advisory groups or hese publicaions.)

3 For a deailed background on hese sysems, see Markey, Securing Pakisans ribal Bel, 310;

Joshua . Whie, e Shape o Fronier ule: Governance and ransiion, rom he aj o he

Modern Pakisani Fronier, Asian Securiy 4, no. 3 (Auumn 2008); and Naveed Ahmad Shin-

wari, Undersanding FAA: Atiudes owards Governance, Religion & Sociey in Pakisans Federally

Adminisered ribal Areas, (Peshawar: Communiy Appraisal & Moivaion Programme, 2008).

4 e concep o setled areas under he Briish aj reerred primarily o he presence o normal

sysems o axaion. In odays conex, setled reers more broadly o he presence o Pakisani

law and regulaions.5 Some ocials reer o Malakand and oher PAA regions as agencies, bu or all inens and

purposes hey are reaed as disrics o he NWFP.

6 For comparison wih oher provinces, see Unied Naions Developmen Programme, Pakisan

Naional Human Developmen Repor: Povery, Growh and Governance, 2003. e mos compre-

hensive analysis o he NWFPs economic siuaion is World Bank and Governmen o NWFP,

Acceleraing Growh and Improving Public Service Delivery in he NWFP: Te Way Forward, Pakisan

Norh Wes Fronier Province Economic epor, December 8, 2005.

7 Civil Secrearia (FAA), Governmen o Pakisan, FAA Susainable Developmen Plan

(2006-2015), 2006.


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Agency an adminisraive uni wihin

he FAA, urher subdivided ino ehsils;

overseen by a poliical agen.

Alim a religious scholar.

Amir a ile reerring o he leader o a

pary or group.

ANP Awami Naional Pary, a le-o-

cener Pashun naionalis pary.

Barelvism a Sunni Sus Islamic move-

men wih roos in Briish India.

Chief Minister he senior eleced ofcial

o a province, chosen by he leading pary o

he governing coaliion.

Counterinsurgency a orm o warare ha

has as is objecive he credibiliy and/or

legiimacy o he relevan poliical auhoriy

wih he goal o undermining or supporing

ha auhoriy.2

Counterterrorism he acics and sraegy o

deecing and deerring poenial erroris acs.

DCO

Disric Coordinaion Ocer, a civilocial who oversees a disric; repors o

he chie miniser o he province.

Deobandism a Sunni Islamic revivalis

movemen wih roos in Briish India.

District an adminisraive uni wihin he

NWFP local governmen sysem, urher

subdivided ino ehsils.

Division an obsolee adminisraive

uni wihin he NWFP which aggregaed

several disrics.

Durand Line a erm or he border

beween Aghanisan and Pakisan, delimied

in 1893 by Sir Morimer Durand; he Line

is no acceped by Aghanisan.

FATA Federally Adminisered ribalAreas, comprising seven ribal agencies and

six ronier regions.

is glossary is provided as a basic reerence or he narraive and analysis which ollow.1

glossary of key terms


24/162


Fatawa religious opinions issued by an

Islamic scholar (plural o awa).

Fatwa a religious opinion issued by an

Islamic scholar.

FC Fronier Corps, a paramiliary

orce recruied rom he Pashun ribal

areas o Pakisan, and led by Pakisan

army oicers.

FCR Fronier Crimes egulaion, he

legal ramework which governs he FAA,

and which las underwen major revision

in 1901.

Frontier Pakisans norh-wes errio-

ries, encompassing boh he NWFP and

he FAA.

Frontier Region an adminisraive uni

wihin he FAA, overseen by he DCO o

an adjacen disric o he NWFP.

Governor he head o governmen o a

province, appoined by he presiden.

ISI Iner-Services Inelligence

Direcorae, he larges and mos powerul

inelligence agency in Pakisan.

Islamism an ideology which advocaes a

poliical agenda based on Islamic principles.3

JI Jamaa-e-Islami, an Islamis pary

ounded by Maulana Mawdudi; also

reerred o as he Jamaa.

Jihad sruggle, dened as inernal

(e.g., spiriual puricaion) or exernal

(e.g., he legiimae deense o Islam); also

commonly used as a shorhand o reer

o he campaign agains he Sovies in

Aghanisan in he 1980s.

Jirga an assembly o ribal leaders

which reaches decisions on a consensus

basis; may be convened ad hoc or a hereques o a poliical agen or oher

governmen ocial.

JUI Jamia Ulema-e-Islam, a Deobandi

Islamis movemen whose aneceden was

he Indian Jamia Ulema-e-Hind (JUH).4

JUI-F Jamia Ulema-e-Islam, Fazlur

ehman acion.

JUI-S Jamia Ulema-e-Islam, Sami

ul-Haq acion.

Khassadar force a ribal police orce

asked wih proecing roads and oher

sae ineress.

Lashkar a ribal miliia; oen raised in an

ad hoc manner o implemen he decisionso a jirga.

Madaris Islamic schools or seminaries

(plural o madrassah).

Madrassah an Islamic school or seminary.

Mainstream parties he PPP, PPP-S,

PML-N, and PML-Q.

Malik a ribal leader, appoined by he

ribe or by he sae.

Maulana a ile or a Muslim religious

leader or scholar.

Maulvi a ile or a Muslim religious

leader or scholar.

MMA Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (Unied

Acion Council), an alliance o six Islamis

paries, o which he JI and he JUI-F werehe dominan members.


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Glossary | 19

MPA Member o he Provincial Assembly.

MNA Member o he Naional Assembly.

Mohajir a Muslim immigran rom Indiawho setled in Pakisan; reers paricularly o

hose who setled in Karachi ollowing he

1947 Pariion o India and Pakisan.

Mufti a ile or an Islamic judge qualied

o rule according o he shariah.

Mujahidin hose who engage in jihad.

Mullah ile or a Muslim religiousleader or scholar.

Nationalist parties he ANP, Mohajir-

ocused Mutahida Qaumi Movemen

(MQM), and he Baloch paries.5

Neo-Taliban a erm used or a loose

movemen o sel-described aliban groups

which emerged in Pakisans Fronier aerSepember 11, 2001; many o hese groups

have enuous connecions, or none a all, o

he original aliban movemen.

NWFP Norh-Wes Fronier Province,

one o he our provinces o Pakisan; he

ohers are Punjab, Sindh, and Balochisan.

Pashto an Indo-Iranian language spoken

by ehnic Pashuns; pronounced Pashoin souhern areas o he Pak-Aghan border

areas, and Pakho in norhern areas.

PATA Provincially Adminisered ribal

Areas, comprising seven ribal disrics/

agencies which all under he governance o

he NWFP.

Pashtun an ehno-linguisic ribal group

based in norhwes Pakisan and souhernand easern Aghanisan.

PML Pakisan Muslim League, a righ-

o-cener pary ounded by Pakisans rs

leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

Pashtunwali an unwriten code oPashun radiion and values.

PML-N Pakisan Muslim League, Nawaz

Shari acion; a pary ounded by ormer

Pakisani Prime Miniser Nawaz Shari.

PML-Q Pakisan Muslim League,

Quaid-e-Azam acion; a pary which

suppored Presiden Musharra.

Political agent an adminisraive oce in

he ribal areas hrough which he governor

exercises auhoriy on behal o he sae.

PPP Pakisan Peoples Pary, a le-o-

cener pary ounded by Zulkar Ali Bhuto

in 1967.

PPP-S

Pakisan Peoples Pary, Sherpaoacion; a spliner pary rom he PPP, led by

NWFP poliician Aab Sherpao.

Qazi ile or an Islamic judge qualied o

rule according o he shariah.

Qazi court an Islamic cour presided

over by a qazi; hese cours are ound in

various orms hroughou he Muslim world

(including India) and radiionally rule onmaters o amily law, operaing parallel o

he civil legal sysem.

RCO egional Coordinaion Ocer, a

civil ocial who oversees several adjacen

disrics and ribal agencies; repors o he

chie miniser o he province.

Religious parties poliical paries which

ake an explicily Islamis agenda; he mosprominen examples are he JI and he

various paries o he JUI.


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Settled areas hose regions in which all or

mos o Pakisani civil law, regulaions, and

axaion apply.

Shariah he body o Islamic religiouslaw, as derived rom he Quran and Sunnah

(pracices o Muhammad).

Talib a suden.

Taliban a religio-poliical movemen,

largely Deobandi in orienaion, which

emerged in 1994 in he Fronier and ruled

much o Aghanisan rom 19962001.

Tehsil an adminisraive uni wihin he

NWFP local governmen sysem, made up

o union councils.

Tribal areas hose regions which are no

setled areas, ha is, in which civil law,

regulaions, or axaion do no apply.

TNSM ehrik-e-Naaz-e-Sharia-e-

Muhammadi (Movemen or he

Enorcemen o he Islamic Law o

Muhammad), a movemen ounded by

Maulana Su Muhammad in 1992; i hasbeen paricularly acive in and around Swa.

TTP ehrik-e-aliban-e-Pakisan

(Movemen o he Pakisani aliban), a

loose umbrella organizaion o neo-aliban

groups, ormed in 2007.

Ulema religious scholars (plural o alim).

Ummah he worldwide communiy oMuslim believers.

Union council he lowes adminisraive

uni in he NWFP local governmen sysem.

noes:is glossary does no presume o pu orward comprehensive or rigorous social science deni-1

ions. Noe also ha ranslieraions o Urdu, Arabic, and Pasho words have been simplied in his

monograph. In general, common spellings have been reained; leters such as he ayin have been

removed; plurals are occasionally ormed according o English convenion (e.g., lashkars); and

shor and long vowels are no disinguished (wih he occasional excepion oaa or ).

is deniion is adaped rom he working deniion o irregular warare approved by he U.S.2

Depuy Secreary o Deense on April 17, 2006. e U.S. armys new counerinsurgency manual

also provides a helpul descripion o his orm o warare: Poliical power is he cenral issue in

insurgencies and counerinsurgencies; each side aims o ge he people o accep is governance or

auhoriy as legiimae. Insurgens use all available ools poliical (including diplomaic), inor-maional (including appeals o religious, ehnic, or ideological belies), miliary, and economic

o overhrow he exising auhoriy. is auhoriy may be an esablished governmen or an inerim

governing body. Counerinsurgens, in urn, use all insrumens o naional power o susain he

esablished or emerging governmen and reduce he likelihood o anoher crisis emerging. U.S.

Deparmen o he Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counerinsurgency (Washingon, DC: Headquarers,

Deparmen o he Army, December 15, 2006), 13.

ere are many deniions o Islamism. In he conex o his monograph, i is used o reer o3

poliical Islam, as a concep which is disinc rom Islam as a religion, or Islamic religious pracice.

Unless oherwise specied, JUI reers o he Jamia Ulema-e-Islam pary as i exised beore is spli4

ino JUI-F and JUI-S acions ollowing Mui Mahmuds deah in 1980. When used in a pos-1980

conex, JUI reers generally o boh acions o he movemen.

Noe ha he pary was originally known as he Mohajir Qaumi Movemen.5


27/162

Map o Pakistan's NWFP and FATA | 21


28/162

I

the rise and scoPe

of islamic Political

influence

e hisory o Islamis inuence in he Pakisani poliical process has beenexensively documened and debaed. e hisorical review which ollows is simplya capsule summary o major rends which have shaped he Islamism o he modernFronier, as well as a discussion o several key paterns o Islamic poliics which helpo rame he conemporary siuaion. As he ocus on his work is on he changing

dynamics o poliical Islam, his narraive ocuses in large par on he origins anddevelopmen o Pakisans major Islamis paries, heir ineracion wih he sae andwih exernal acors, and he poliics which lie behind heir agiaion. is hisory isessenial or raming a proper evaluaion o he pos-2001 Fronier, in which he reli-gious paries and heir insurgen aliaes on he poliical ringe played a cenralrole in reshaping he regions poliical and securiy environmen.

Pe-1947: eligio-Poliical movemens

e niney years beween he ailed uprising o 1857 and he pariion o 1947

laid he groundwork or Islamic poliical expression in independen Pakisan. ehisory o his period is muliaceed and deeply complex, and has received excel-len scholarly reamen in several recen works.1 A number o imporan movemensarose during his period paricularly in he Norh-Wes Fronier Province and heIndo-Aghan borderlands which are worh noing insoar as hey se ino reliehe conemporary poliical conex o he Fronier.

e rs o hese was he uprising o 1858, which arose in he areas dominaed byhe Yusuzai clan he region now roughly consiuing disrics Buner, Malakand,Mardan, Swabi, and Swa. is region has a cenuries-long hisory o alliances-o-convenience beween charismaic spiriual leaders and heir ribal supporers. Wha

began as an inernecine sruggle beween wo such power blocs evenually coalescedino over opposiion o he Briish.2 Akhund Abdul Ghaur, a Supir(sain) whosucceeded Sayyid Akbar Shah as leader o he Swa kingdom, culivaed a nework


29/162


omujahidin who were known o he Briish as he Hindusani Fanaics, as wellas a line omurids (disciples) who would come o have enormous inuence in hereligious and poliical developmen o he adjacen ribal areas.3 A conronaion

unolded in 1863 beween hese mujahidin and he Briish, and ollowing a paternwhich would coninue well ino he modern era, he conic was evenually resolvedalong essenially poliical lines. e Akhund, earul o he prospec o Briish armiesadvancing ino an area which had resised oreign rule or nearly hree hundred years,urned on his Sayyid allies and assised he Briish in expelling he mujahidin. Byassising he Briish wih heir acical objecives, he assured his own coninued rolein he norhern ronier areas, and a he same ime leveraged he Briish acion odecapiae his leading religio-poliical rival.

e hree decades which ollowed he Swa uprising were by no means unevenulor Briish adminisraors on he ronier: hey were orced o conron widespread

criminal aciviy in he Indo-Aghan border areas (leading o he enacmen o hers Fronier Crimes egulaion in 1873), and engaged in ull-scale armed conicin Aghanisan in he second Aghan War, beginning in 1878. is was, signicanly,a period marked by he gradual expansion o Briish inuence: in 1881 he railroadreached Peshawar; in 1893 he border wih Aghanisan was nally setled; and in1895 Briish adminisraors demarcaed Malakand agency, which included heprincely saes o Chiral, Dir, and Swa.4 Wha looked o he Briish like a simpleplan o raionalizing a once-chaoic ronier policy looked o he ribesmen like ascheme designed o encircle, co-op, and conrol regions which had or cenuries

remained auonomous. As a resul, he ribes rose up in 1897 agains his Briishexpansionism, rs in Malakand, and hen hroughou nearly all he ronier regions.5e resisance was led in large par by he Hadda Mullah, a murid in he line o he lae

Akhund, and he Hadda Mullahs own disciple, Saror Faqir, who was dubbed heMad Mullah by he Briish.6 e resisance o 1897 did no las long in he ace olarge-scale Briish miliary operaions, and by 1898 he Briish had resored peace, andeecively exended heir wri o he boundaries o wha is oday he modern ronier.

e creaion o he NWFP as a ormal poliical space in 1901 by Lord Curzon noonly inuenced he ways in which he Briish conceived o heir projec o roniergovernance. I also, by he second decade o he wenieh cenury, began o inu-

ence local concepions o ehnic Pashun ideniy, and creae pressures or Pashunparicipaion in he rising ide o pan-Islamism ha was creaing linkages amongMuslims in India, Aghanisan, and he Arab saes. In he Silk Leter Conspiracy o191416, Briish inelligence uncovered a wildly ambiious plo by leading clericsin he Unied Provinces (modern-day Utar Pradesh, India) o raise an Islamic armyo Pashun ribesmen in suppor o he urkish sulan agains he Briish.7 And onhe ar wesern ron, he Briish became embroiled in a hird Anglo-Aghan war in

which he new Aghan amirrallied he Hindusani anaics rom he ribal areas oAghanisan orjihad.8 (All o his was in addiion o he regular Briish expediionsagains he ercely independen Mehsud ribes in Wazirisan.)

Imporan changes in mass poliics were also aking shape in he Fronier.Alongside Gandhis noncooperaion movemen, designed o pressure he Briish ohonor heir pre-war rheoric o sel-deerminaion, Muslims launched he Khilaa


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The Rise and Scope o Islamic Political Infuence | 25

movemen in 1919, which agiaed agains he proposed aboliion o he Otomancaliphae.9 One o he sranger sub-narraives o he Khilaa sory was he atempedhijra (migraion) o ens o housands o Muslims rom India ino Aghanisan in

1920, seeking o cross he Durand Line ino he dar ul-Islam (abode o Islam).Whileboh he Khilaa movemen and he hijra were specacular ailures, hese move-mens marked he rs atemp o mobilize pan-Islamic senimen across he subcon-inen, and presened he religious clerics o he Fronier wih an opporuniy o rallyhe Pashun in opposiion o he Briish, build neworks wih oher organizers, andry heir hand a acivis poliics.10

e locus o Islamic agiaion in he Fronier shied somewha in he 1930s and40s, away rom Swa, he Peshawar valley, and Aghanisan proper and oward heribal agencies. In 1930, he governmen mobilized is larges ronier operaionssince he war o 1919, in response o lashkars raised by local mullahs and Khilaa

commitees.11 e Briish were also orced o conron quie regularly he speceroad hoc ribal miliias led by charismaic leaders in Wazirisan. Oen hese lead-ers used pan-Islamic language in order o provide a veneer o legiimacy or heirprojec o aggregaing sel-ineresed ribal acions agains a larger neighbor or anexernal power. e Faqir o Ipi was one amous exemplar o charismaic leadershipin Wazirisan, bringing ogeher in 1936 a lashkaro Mehsuds, Wazirs, and assoredmullahs o conduc raids agains he Briish miliary.12 His inuence would coninue

well hrough independence a decade laer.

Pe-1947: he emegence oF islamis Paies

e wo major Islamic poliical movemens operaing in Pakisan oday boh haveheir anecedens in pre-1947 India. e rs o hese are he Deobandis. is move-men races is roos o modern-day Utar Pradesh, where a group o clerics ounded heDar ul-Ulum Deoband in 1866. Esablished in he wake o he ailed uprising in 1857,his madrassah became he ocal poin o a wider religious revivalis movemen whichsough o reconsolidae and reocus he religious and culural lie o he Muslim ummahon he subconinen. Far rom being poliical, he early Deobandis were or he mos parinward-looking and primarily concerned wih he Islamic qualiy o individual lives.13

rough he Firs World War, mos Deobandi clerics remained apoliical. Some,however, came o believe ha he revivalis message which began a Deoband hado be broadened beyond is pieisic vision so as o include a poliical resoraion ohe Muslim communiy. Several o he clerics, such as Maulana Mahmud ul-Hasanand oher aculy a he Dar ul-Ulum implicaed in he Silk Leter Conspiracy, sougha miliary response o he dual problems o Briish rule and Muslim disenranchise-men. Ohers perhaps he majoriy o he poliically-minded Deobandis eneredhe poliical realm by means o he Khilaa movemen. O hese clerics, a greanumber evenually ormalized heir poliical paricipaion by joining he JamiaUlema-e-Hind (Assembly o Indian Clerics, JUH), a pary esablished in 1919.

roughou he 1920s, he JUH clerics sruggled o dene heir poliical agen-da, and heir role in he ani-Briish agiaion. e parys acivis energy, however,could no be susained aer he ailure o he Khilaa movemen, and rom he end


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e Jamaas early experiences o conronaion wih he marial sae would alsoanicipae is uure ineracion wih he miliary and bureaucraic elie. When Governor-General Iskander Mirza declared marial law in Ocober 1958 and appoined General

Ayub Khan as Chie Marial Law Adminisraor, he did so in par o hwar he designso he Jamaa and is growing involvemen in he poliical process.24 And when AyubKhan ook conrol rom Mirza laer ha same monh and inauguraed his own mariallaw governmen, he resul was he banning o poliical paries. Alhough Mawdudichose o ollow a pragmaic pah ha avoided direc conronaion wih he miliaryregime perhaps because he was aware o he ae o he Muslim Broherhood inEgyp he Jamaa remained one o he erces opponens o Ayubs marial rule.

e basic poliical orienaion o he Jamaa during he Ayub era was pro-democracy, ani-miliaris, and above all, ani-secularis. I resened Ayubs modernisexperimenaion, which ran almos direcly couner o is vision o he ideal Islamic

sae. Is popular slogan in he 1960s, ajaddud Band Karo!(Sop he innovaions!),expressed he spiri o is proes and is ear o a poliy modeled increasingly along

Wesern lines.25 e parys anipahy oward secularism in he Ayub era was par andparcel o is anipahy oward he Wes. Mawdudi saw he secularizing rends in he Araband Persian world, and eared ha, wih Americas help, he Ayub regime was charinga similar course. In language which very much oreshadowed he Jamaas rheoric ourdecades laer, he claimed in 1960 ha America [does] no wan Muslim naions oremain Muslim; ha he Americans mos unscrupulously suppor dicaorshipsagains democracy; and ha heir policies are possessed by he devil called Jewry.

In spie o his sriden opposiion o he aheism o he communis bloc, he concludedha he Wesern counries loom upon Islam as a greaer menace han communism. 26

On he whole, Ayubs enure was an era o vocierous rheoric by he religiousparies, bu minimal Islamis inuence. e 1965 war wih India brough he Jamaaand Ayub ono he same page or a shor while, bu i was only a emporary conver-gence o ineress.27 e Islamiss inuence would begin o change in he decade

which ollowed.

197077: islamiss and elecorl Poliics

e lae 1960s and early 1970s saw he rise o leis poliics in Pakisan, led byZulkar Ali Bhuto and his Pakisan Peoples Pary (PPP). e religious paries, orcedo conron he emergence o a new mass poliics, spli on he quesion o socialism: hemore poliically-minded (Madani acion) Deobandis insised ha socialis hough was

basically in resonance wih he populism and ani-imperialism o he pre-Pariion JamiaUlema movemens, while he less poliically-acive (anwi acion) Deobandis and, es-pecially, he Jamaa-e-Islami claimed ha socialism amouned o ku(indeliy).28 eMadani Deobandis were ulimaely more adep a aligning heir poliics wih he leismo he ime, and did so in a way ha esablished paterns o JUI poliics which coninueo he presen day.

Few expeced ha i would be Mui Mahmud who would ake up he manle oleis Deobandi poliics in Pakisan. Born in he souhern NWFP disric o DeraIsmail Khan in 1919, he sudied a a Deobandi seminary in Muradabad in he Unied


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Provinces, where he became involved in he JUH beore reurning norh o each a amadrassah in Mianwali, a Pashun-dominaed disric adjacen o Dera Ismail Khan.29During he 1940s, he Mui ormed close ies wih he pro-Congress Maulana Husain

Ahmad Madani (raveling wih him in NWFP in 1943) and began building a poliicalbase in his home disric. By he lae 1960s, he Mui had inheried he socialis-leaning Madani wing o he JUI, and had developed an acive Pashun consiuencyin he souhern NWFP and he ribal agencies.30

When i came ime or he 1970 elecions, Mui Mahmuds JUI did no are par-icularly well, wih one noable excepion: he Mui himsel managed an upse vicoryover Zulkar Ali Bhuto, chairman o he PPP, in he holy conesed naional assemblysea rom Dera Ismail Khan. e Muis poliical saure and inuence among he JUIulema, paricularly in he Fronier, paid o once Bhuto came o power as Presiden in lae1971 ollowing he war which saw he deea o Pakisan and he creaion o Bangladesh.

Seeking o orm a governmen, Bhuto, Mui Mahmud, and Wali Khan (son o he greaed Shir movemen leader Khan Abdul Ghaar Khan) o he Naional Awami Pary(NAP) signed a riparie Agreemen in 1972 ha se up a join JUI-NAP governmenin NWFP.31 On May 1, 1972, Mui Mahmud was sworn in as chie miniser.

e JUI-NAP governmen was no o las or more han en monhs.32 I was, how-ever, he rs insance o a religious pary coming o power in Pakisan, and i servedas a high waer mark or Deobandi inuence in he poliical arena. Mui Mahmudsagenda as chie miniser would se he one or he nex 30 years o JUI poliics. He

began a vigorous Islamizaion program; banned alcohol; inroduced an Islamic re-

orm o he inheriance law; and mandaed he observance o amadan. He urher(hough unsuccessully) se ou o gran ineres-ree loans; esablish an ulema advi-sory board; make reading o he Quran and sudy o Arabic compulsory or universiyadmission; require women o be veiled in public; insis ha he shalwar-kamiz unico be mandaory or governmen servans; ban dowry; and prohibi gambling.33

e Muis enure was brie and unsuccessul, bu once his governmen ell heseemed no dissuaded in he leas. His poliics in he nal years o Bhutos democra-ic era involved he proposal o increasingly sweeping and sringen Islamic-orienedlegislaion, including ani-blasphemy amendmens o he consiuion. In 1974, heook he lead wih Maulana Yusu Binori o he amous Madani-inuenced Binori

madrassah in Karachi o once again raise his ime successully legislaion ha would declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims.34 (Zulkar Bhuto wen along wih heseIslamis iniiaives in he later years o his enure in an eor o srenghen hisincreasingly enuous poliical posiion.)

By he ime Zia ul-Haq ook power in 1977, he JUI o Mui Mahmud had grownino a serious and vocierous poliical voice in Pakisan. Is associaion wih hesocialis PPP and is simulaneous use o Islamis rheoric and promoion o a shariahagenda led many o dismiss i as hypocriical, expedien, and cynically pragmaic amovemen ha was only commited o keeping isel alive, and no an ideologicalorganizaion ghing or a given cause.35 e early reicence by Madani Deobandis

o creae an Islamic sociey rom above had been washed away by he opporuniiesha Pariion presened hem o redene heir poliics and make hemselves newlyrelevan o sae and sociey.


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197788: Zia ul-haQ and islamiZaion

Zia and the Jamaat

General Zia ul-Haq seized power in a coup da in July 1977, and quicklydeclared marial law. His enure marked a period o remendous expansion o Islamisinuence in Pakisani poliics, he conours o which are now well known. Zia begana drive o Islamize Pakisans insiuions, rom he army o he cours o he bureau-cracy. He propagaed he Hudood Ordinance, revised he penal code o make blas-phemy a capial crime, and promulgaed a number o oken Islamic reorms whichnoneheless sen a powerul message abou he ideological characer o he sae.36I was a program ha he would coninue or 11 years, unil his deah in 1988.37

e Jamaas domesic policy during his era was consumed wih he quesion

o wheher o give precedence o Zias program o Islamizaion, or o hold o heparys democraic principles and insis on civilian governance. Aer much inernaldisagreemen, Mawdudis successor Mian uail decided ha he opporuniy o doaway wih Bhuto and insiuionalize he shariah program o he Jamaa was ooappealing o pass up: he pary became a parner wih Zia and conribued severalcabine members o his governmen.38

e Jamaas governance experience during he early years o he Zia regime was, onhe whole, disappoining. Aside rom Khurshid Ahmad who promoed new policiesor zakaand banking he minisers were unable o sir he ederal bureaucracy ino

implemening heir shariah agenda.39

eir inuence was more pronounced, however,in he Council o Islamic Ideology, where Jamaa nominees helped o ormulae a newpackage o Islamic penal reorms; and, mos o all, in he miliary, where hey were givenunprecedened access o he senior ocer ranks. is became mos eviden during he

Aghanjihad, where he JI was mobilized o ake on a major role.e years o he Aghan jihad under Zia are oen characerized as he heyday

o he Jamaa, and in a sense hey did represen he apex o he parys inuence inocial circles. Bu he narraive linking miliary rule and Islamic poliics is no asclean cu as some observers would make i. Jus as here was sporadic and symbioicmanipulaion beween he miliary and he religious paries during he Ayub era

puncuaed by periods o ourigh hosiliy so he relaionship beween Zia andhe Jamaa played ou in complex and ambivalen ways.

Even in he heady, early days o he jihad, some elemens wihin he pary wereless han enhusiasic abou he marial governmen; hey considered he opporuniiesha came rom parnership wih Zia o be a disracion rom he real poliical vision ohe movemen. I was, hereore, only a mater o ime beore he Jamaa became disil-lusioned wih is sep-child role in he Zia governmen and in he jihad operaions.40 By1982, he relaionship had begun o sour. Zia was eeling more conden in his supporrom he Unied Saes and rom he ulema, and a he same ime more concerned abouhe poenial or he Jamaa o mobilize is well-organized suden base agains him.41

Aer he 1985 non-pary elecions, in which Jamaa-aliaed candidaes perormedpoorly, he spli was complee. e resuls demonsraed o Zia ha he Jamaa had losis inuence, and he urned o oher paries or popular suppor.42


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The Deobandis and the Aghan jihad

e JUI had a much more limied ineracion han he Jamaa wih Zias govern-

men as such; by he early 1980s, he JUI, like he JI, was disillusioned wih Ziasreorms and began agiaing or a reurn o civilian rule. Bu he Deobandis wereulimaely shaped in proound ways during he Zia era hrough heir paricipaionin he Aghan jihad, and by he paronage hey received rom he sae. e jihadicampaign agains Sovie orces in Aghanisan, unded by he Americans and Saudisand operaed by he Pakisani inelligence services, resuled in he esablishmeno hundreds omadaris hroughou he Fronier.

No only did he madaris prolierae, bu heir qualiy deerioraed markedlyhroughou he 1980s. e jihadi ideology became more imporan han masery oradiional scholarly subjecs. e careul and comprehensive curriculum designed by

he ounders a Dar ul-Ulum gave way o mass educaion ha was decidedly moreideological in characer. In one respec, he educaion sysem isel changed, rom amodel which valued exended sudy under a learned alim, o one ha promoed some-hing o a reelance, ranchise model. ese changes did no ake place in a vacuum.ey were par and parcel o hejihad in Aghanisan a conic which undamen-ally alered he ace o Deobandism, paricularly in he Fronier. Many o he muja-hidin were rained in NWFP, eiher by or wih Deobandi comparios. And leadingDeobandi ulema including Mui Mahmud in Dera Ismail Khan and Mui YusuBinori in Karachi issued aawa encouragingjihad agains he Sovie indels. ese

new legiimaing ideologies ojihad ha had previously no held a signican placein Deobandi religious hough, combined wih a newly decenralized educaionalinrasrucure, aciliaed he rapid spread o radical ideologies in he Fronier.

e jihad also began o change, in basic ways, he role o he ulema in Pashunsociey. radiionally, he village mullah did no have a separae poliical role ousidehe scope o his religious duies.43 e ulema were able o operae in a poliical roleonly i hey managed o leverage heir religious credibiliy in he pursui o powerpoliics. Akbar Ahmeds accoun o how Maulvi Nur Muhammad a disciple oMui Mahmud played his game beginning in he 1950s in Souh Wazirisan is anexample o he ways in which some leading clerics learned o conrol Islam raher

han be conrolled by i, ha is, o impose a religious rame on a secular [issue] so aso wield religious language or non-religious ends.44 In his way he mullah uncionedopporunisically as a poliical mobilizer, sparring or inuence wih ribal elders andgovernmen ocials.45

Such gures are sill prominen in Pashun sociey oday; indeed, one couldargue ha he curren generaion o JUI leadership largely operaes in his mold,leveraging he symbolism o Islam in order o mobilize wha is essenially apoliical base. e real legacy o he Aghanjihad, however, is o be ound no onlyin he prolieraion o he madrassah-as-ranchise culure o he 1980s, bu in healim-as-enrepreneur culure which ollowed i. Lower-level ulema beneed only

indirecly rom sae paronage during hejihad; ollowing he end o he war andhe wihdrawal o oreign involvemen, hese poorly rained clerics a produco he heologically shallowmadaris ha had prolieraed hroughou he province


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ound hemselves unemployable, or a leas discouraged by he bleak prospecsavailable ouside o hejihadi line o work.46 ese ulema, Vali Nasr argues, begano sake ou heir own claim o power and wealh saiaing appeies or power,

saus and wealh ha Islamizaion had wheted bu le unsaiaed.47e second-order eecs o he emergence o his new class were also, in rero-

spec, o grea impor. Boh he presige and he exernal nancing which came wihhe jihadi vocaion began o upend he radiional social order, paricularly in heribal areas. ribal elders, including hose malikswho served as paid liaisons beweenhe ribes and he saes poliical agen, ound heir sanding undermined by newgroups o enrepreneurial youh. is rend doveailed wih he explosion o remi-ance income rom he Gul saes in he 1970s, which urher reshaped in dramaic

ways he poliical economy o he ribal areas.48 e sysems o indirec rule whichhe sae had relied upon or over a cenury began o deeriorae in he ace o new

regional and economic realiies.e Aghanjihad, and he poliical-economic shis which i occasioned, opened

he door o new orms o Islamism in he Fronier. I brough o he oreron a newclerical class, largely Deobandi in orienaion, which was boh more diuse and moreideologically enrepreneurial han is anecedens. I was hese petyulema manyo whom, o be clear, had only loose connecions o he scholarly Deobandi esab-lishmen who in par carried on he mos desrucive aspecs o hejihad ino hepos-Zia era: he prolieraion o small arms and he developmen o he so-calledKalashnikov culure; he enrenchmen o secarian movemens and heir ideol-

ogies-o-dierence;49

and, perhaps mos dangerously, he creaion o a vas cadre oboh ideological and opporunisic veeranjihadis beholden in only he mos enuousashion o he sae sysem.

ejihad also undamenally reshaped he demographic prole o he Fronier.e inux o reugees rom Aghanisan, beginning in he early 1980s, evenu-ally reached saggering gures; many esimaes pu he number above 3 million.50Peshawar, once dominaed by speakers o Hindko (a Punjabi dialec) was soonlled wih Pasho-speaking Aghans who quickly overwhelmed he educaion andsocial service capaciy o he provincial governmen, and came o dominae heransporaion secor and imporan roues o he smuggling rade. e sprawl-

ing reugee camps near Peshawar and he ribal bel became, over ime, mujahidinrecruimen ceners even long aer he end o he jihad and he Sovie wih-drawal rom Aghanisan.

is Aghanizaion o he Pakisani Fronier was complemened by he con-san sream o oreigners who passed hrough Peshawar during he 1980s, seek-ing o soke hejihad and serve as aciliaors or pan-Islamis cadres in heir owncounries. ese oreigners hailed rom he Arab world, Chechnya, and he Horno Arica. Among heir ranks were, mos inamously, Abdullah Azzam, ounder ohe Makab al-Khidma (he precursor o al Qaeda), and Osama bin Laden. e

broad inernaional paricipaion injihadi aciviy in he Fronier in he 1980s

oreshadowed he pos-9/11 environmen, in which he Fronier would onceagain become a proving ground or young religious milians rom he ar-ungcorners o he Muslim world.


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19882001: Frgmened Poliics

Political realignments (198893)

e rs wo civilian governmens which came o power in Islamabad aer morehan a decade o marial rule aced a hos o problems in assering civilian domi-nance over an enrenched miliary-bureaucraic complex. is was a period o rela-ively minimal poliical involvemen or he Deobandi clerics, and one o indecisionor he Jamaa, which was orn beween is ani-marial idealism and he pressureso poliical expediency.

Benazir Bhutos PPP garnered a pluraliy o voes in he elecions held aer Ziasdeah in 1988, and managed o orm a governmen in he ace o a rival elecoral al-liance orchesraed by he ISI he Islami Jamhuri Itihad (IJI) which included

he Jamaa and pro-miliary mainsream paries. e IJI leveraged Islamis rheoric,played on ears o a emale prime miniser, and argued or he necessiy o coninuinghejihad in Aghanisan.

Even in deea, he IJI paries coninued o be a horn in Bhutos side: her govern-men, which lased less han wo years, was hobbled by he awkward power-sharingarrangemen wih Presiden Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Chie o Army Sa Aslam Beg,as well as local compeiion rom Punjab Chie Miniser Nawaz Shari.

e Jamaa, hough i had played a major role in he IJIs elecion campaign, wasnever enirely comorable wih is place in he pro-miliary alliance. In 1987 Qazi

Hussain Ahmad had aken over leadership o he Jamaa rom Mawdudis successor,Mian uail. As an ehnic Pashun, Qazi Hussain was he rs non-Mohajir o lead hepary since i incepion in 1941, and was more sympaheic han his predecessors opopulis poliical mobilizaion.51 Under his leadership he Jamaa reained is ideo-logical ocus on Islamizaion, bu broadened is poliical agenda o include populisagiaion and more rheoric on socio-economic issues. is orienaion did no al-

ways comorably wih he IJIs poliical approach.e JIs ambivalen relaionship wih he pro-miliary block in he pos-Zia

era was also acceleraed by domesic poliical realignmens which were hreaen-ing is hold on is radiional base o suppor among he Mohajir communiy. e

rise o he Mohajir Qaumi Movemen (MQM) in Karachi in he lae 1980s arise engineered in par by Zia and he army o weaken he Jamaa le he parycasing abou or new consiuencies. Qazi Hussains ehnic background andIslamic-hemed populism allowed he Jamaa o broaden is base o suppor amonghe non-Mohajir middle classes in Punjab and perhaps mos imporanly ino he Pashun ronier areas.

As a resul o hese shis, he Jamaa played a very vocal bu relaively insigni-can role in he ve years ollowing he reurn o democraic rule. Is poliics werealmos consisenly conrarian. During he 1988 campaign i joined he pro-miliaryIJI relucanly. In March 1990, upse a he IJIs pressure on he army o overhrow

he PPP governmen, he Jamaa looked or an excuse o back away rom he alli-ance. I ound i, as i so oen did, by pivoing around a oreign policy issue andannouncing is principled inenion o sand wih Benazir Bhuto in her suppor


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o he Kashmiri independence movemen.52 When i became clear several monhslaer ha he IJI was on rack o win he new elecions, he JI, in a shrewd ac o

bandwagoning, a las decided o re-join, and again used an inernaional issue o

pivo domesically in his case, opposiion o he U.S. decericaion o Pakisanunder he Pressler Amendmen.

Bu once again he Jamaa would char is own way. Dissaised wih he IJIs ail-ure o carry ou Islamic reorms, he pary once again became disillusioned, and oneagain urned o oreign policy in order o provide a convenien cover or is pivo wihrespec o domesic poliics. When he IJI governmen decided o accep a setlemeno he conic in Aghanisan, he Jamaa crowed ha i was selling ou he mujahidinand beraying he pah ojihad. I qui he IJI in May 1992 and began agiaion againshe Nawaz governmen ha lased unil is all in April 1993.

New Islamist movements (199399)

e nal six years o democraic governance in he lae 1990s saw second ermsor Benazir Bhuto (199396) and Nawaz Shari (199699). is was a period ullo signican developmens, including a nancial crisis; Pakisans rs nuclear es;he rise o he aliban in Aghanisan; and a war over Kashmir. From he perspeciveo religious poliics, boh he Deobandis and he Jamaa played oundaional rolesduring his era in aciliaing he emergence o new Islamis movemens.

e mos visible o hese new movemens was he aliban, led by Mullah

Muhammad Omar, and seeded rom he exensive nework o Deobandi madariswhich had sprung up in he Pakisani ronier areas aer he Aghanjihad. As noedabove, hejihad no only resuled in a prolieraion omadaris, bu spawned a new, en-repreneurial class o clerics whose ies o he Deobandi esablishmen were inormala bes. Many o he alibs (sudens) who evenually joined he aliban movemenhad sudied a Sami ul-Haqs Dar ul-Haqqania madrassah ouside o Peshawar, andmany ohers a Madani Deobandi madaris in Karachi.53 A he ime, he JUI leaders wen ou o heir way o highligh heir connecions wih, and inuence over, heburgeoning aliban movemen.

In realiy, heir inuence on he new movemen was oversaed; hey had

been overaken by he enrepreneurial characer o Deobandi poliics in heFronier. I was he poorly educaed, ideologically hardened, disenranchisedulema who ormed he core o he movemen. esponding o his rend, heradiional leaders had graviaed oward he role o broker, rading on access,inuence, and rheoric o mediae beween insiuions (governmens, madaris,poliical paries) and he organic movemens hemselves. Perhaps no poliicalgure was so adep a his as Maulana Fazlur ehman, son o Mui Mahmud,

who hrew his suppor behind Benazir Bhuto during her second erm, bu wasalso, like nearly every elemen o he Pakisani miliary-poliical esablishmen including Bhuto hersel providing rheorical and logisical suppor o he

aliban.54 e suppor or he aliban among Deobandi gures in Pakisan waslargely atribuable o heir shared hisory among he madaris and he opporuni-ies which he aliban movemen presened o he Pakisani clerics or advancing


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heir own poliical agendas. Bu he Pashunizaion o he Pakisani Deobandiswas also a major conribuing acor. e aliban represened a se o obscuran-is (and supposedly Islamic) values many o which would have shocked he

early, scholarly Deobandis. In realiy, heir aims were more closely aligned wihhe spread o conservaive Pashun values han wih any grand Islamic vision.e Deobandi experience in he Fronier had produced over ime a syncreicorm o Sunni Islam, and one in which, as a pracical mater, Pashunwali rumpedradiional Hana inerpreaions.

Alhough he Jamaa was no a he oreron o he alibans advance inoAghanisan, i did play a role indirecly in he emergence o anoher Islamis move-men during his period. e ehrik-e-Niaz-e-Sharia-e-Muhammadi (NSM), orMovemen or he Sysem o he Shariah o Muhammad, was esablished in 1989 indisric Dir, par o he Malakand adminisraive division in he norhern, mounain-

ous region o he Fronier province. e region which became known as Malakanddivision was originally consiued by princely saes; hese independen saesacceded o Pakisan in 1969.55 Bu by he mid-1970s, here was agiaion in disricDir over he righs o local merchans o imber royalies, and a local movemenormed which demanded a reurn o he more avorable legal saus quo which wasoperaive beore 1969.56

In response o he demands rom Malakand division, Zulkar Ali Bhutoimposed a new sysem o ribal law in he area. is sysem, in urn, was challengedin he Peshawar High Cour by lawyers rom Malakand during he rs prime

minisership o Benazir Bhuto, and was evenually overurned. e legal wran-gling over he ribal law creaed an opening ino which Maulana Su Muhammad,he rs amir o he NSM, rallied members o he movemen o demandshariah as he proper successor o he sysem o ribal law. e movemen wasalso, no surprisingly, able o rally local smugglers and imber merchans ohe cause.57 e Maulana and his ollowers were no highly educaed ideologuesin he radiional mold o he Jamaa (hey drew, or example, on ani-modernis

Wahhabi inuences as well), bu hey did have linkages o he JI, and heir ocusedinsisence on he implemenaion o he shariah was resonan wih he paryspoliical approach.58

Evenually he sae relened o he NSMs demands, and in May 1994promulgaed a shariah ordinance or Malakand which was o remain in eec orour monhs.59 e ordinance insiued qazi cours which were o be enorced

by he provincial governmen.60 e NSM conduced urher proess aerhe ordinance expired, and he conic urned violen. Evenually, an agreemen

was reached beween he NSM and he governmen, in which he sae adop-ed a hands-o approach o he areas around Malakand. e new shariah sysemresuled in ewde aco changes o he srucure o governance, and he sae avoid-ed inrusive axaion policies which migh iname local religious senimen.61e policy was eecive in muing he impac o he NSM or seven years. Only

ollowing he U.S. atacks in Aghanisan aer 9/11 was he movemen again ableo mobilize he masses around a cause.


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A return to military rule (19992001)

Pervez Musharra s coup in Ocober 1999 brough a reurn o miliary rule. One

o he mos noable aspecs o he wo years which ollowed was Musharras policyo supporing an enlighened moderaion wih respec o domesic aairs, whileconinuing vigorous sae suppor or Kashmiri milian groups and or he aliban.Shorly beore he coup, Nawaz Shari had been under pressure by he Unied Saeso reverse course on Pakisans policy oward he aliban, and he army coup was aleas in par an atemp o oresall ha change.62

e governmens suppor or he Pashun aliban was exensive, and he sae in-elligence services also provided a proecive cover over al Qaeda members operaingin Pakisan, including he Norh-Wes Fronier.63 In May 2000, Musharra publiclyatesed o his suppor or he aliban:

I jus wan o say ha here is a dierence o undersanding on who is a erroris.e percepions are dieren in he Unied Saes and in Pakisan, in he Wesand wha we undersand is errorism. Aghanisans majoriy ehnic Pashunshave o be on our side. is is our naional ineres. e aliban canno bealienaed by Pakisan. We have a naional securiy ineres here.64

e saes suppor o he aliban, much o which was cover, was acilia-ed in par by he Pakisani religious paries, mos noably he Deobandi JUI. In

July 2001 Human ighs Wach repored ha a reired senior Pakisani m

pakistan's islamist frontier,khyber pukhtoonkhwa

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