on belief and faith

7/28/2019 On Belief and Faith

1/56

On Belief and Faith

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

1


2/56

1. The principal objects of belief.

Cf. The Roman Catechism:

The Catechism of the Council of Trent, known as the Roman Catechism (and so called

throughout this book), thus introduces the explanation of the twelve Articles of the Creed:

The Christian religion proposes to the faithful many truths which either singly or all

together must be held with a certain and firm faith. That which must first and neces-sarily be believed by all is that which God Himself has taught us as the foundation of

truth and its summary concerning the unity of the Divine Essence, the distinction of

Three Persons, and the actions which are by particular reason attributed to each. The

pastor should teach that the Apostles Creed briefly sets forth the doctrine of these mysteries.

. . .

The Apostles Creed is divided into three principal parts.

The first part describes the First Person of the Divine Nature and the marvellous work of the

creation. The second part treats of the Second Person and the mystery of mans redemption.

The third part concludes with the Third Person, the head and source of our sanctification.

The varied and appropriate propositions of the Creed are called Articles, after a

comparison often made by the Fathers; for just as the members of the body are divided

by joints (articuli), so in this profusion of faith whatever must be distinctly and separ-

ately believed from everything else is rightly and aptly called an Article 1 (Part I,

Chapter I, 4). (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 6 (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

Reply to Objection: 1. Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of faith,

while others are of faith, not in themselves but only in relation to others: even as in sciences

certain propositions are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in

order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists in those things

which we hope to see, according to He 11,2: Faith is the substance of things to be

hoped for, it follows that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly

to eternal life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition

reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of Christs

Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand

certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their own account,

but for the manifestation of those men-tioned above: for instance, that Abraham had

two sons, that a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus bones, and the like, which

are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the

Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct articles. (emphasis

added)

Cf. ibid., art. 7, c.:

1 For the meaning of article here, see my paper, Sundesmos and Arthron: Aristotle on the Connective

Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics 11).

2
http://www.scribd.com/doc/132247591/Sundesmos-and-Arthron%E2%80%99-Aristotle-on-the-Connective-Parts-of-Speech-Papers-In-Poetics-11http://www.scribd.com/doc/132247591/Sundesmos-and-Arthron%E2%80%99-Aristotle-on-the-Connective-Parts-of-Speech-Papers-In-Poetics-11http://www.scribd.com/doc/132247591/Sundesmos-and-Arthron%E2%80%99-Aristotle-on-the-Connective-Parts-of-Speech-Papers-In-Poetics-11http://www.scribd.com/doc/132247591/Sundesmos-and-Arthron%E2%80%99-Aristotle-on-the-Connective-Parts-of-Speech-Papers-In-Poetics-11http://www.scribd.com/doc/132247591/Sundesmos-and-Arthron%E2%80%99-Aristotle-on-the-Connective-Parts-of-Speech-Papers-In-Poetics-11http://www.scribd.com/doc/132247591/Sundesmos-and-Arthron%E2%80%99-Aristotle-on-the-Connective-Parts-of-Speech-Papers-In-Poetics-11http://www.scribd.com/doc/132247591/Sundesmos-and-Arthron%E2%80%99-Aristotle-on-the-Connective-Parts-of-Speech-Papers-In-Poetics-11http://www.scribd.com/doc/132247591/Sundesmos-and-Arthron%E2%80%99-Aristotle-on-the-Connective-Parts-of-Speech-Papers-In-Poetics-11


3/56

I answer thatThe articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, asself-evident principles to a teaching based on natural reason . Among these principles

there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all princi-

ples are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: The same thing cannot be affir-

med and denied at the same time, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9).In like

manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as

Gods existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to He 11: He

that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him . For

the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in theseour happiness consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things which

God dispenses in time, for mans salvation, and which are the way to that happiness:

and in this way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained in

others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of

Christ, His Passion and so forth.2 (emphasis added)

2. On the division of the Creed into articles.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 8, c. (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

I answer that, As stated above (Articles [4],6), to faith those things in themselves

belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to

eternal life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret

of the Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christs

Incarnation, by Whom we have access to the glory of the sons of God, according to

Rm 5,2. Hence it is written (Jn 17,3): This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the

. . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent. Wherefore the first distinction in

matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to

the mystery of Christs human nature, which is the mystery of godliness (1Tm 3,16).

Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed to our belief: first,

the unity of the Godhead, to which the first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons,

to which three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works

proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order of nature, in relation to whichthe article about the creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in

relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article;

while the third refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed

to us concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven

articles referring to the Godhead. In like manner, with regard to Christs human nature, there

are seven articles, the first of which refers to Christs incarnation or conception; the second,

to His virginal birth; the third, to His Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent

into hell; the fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming

for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen articles. Some, however, distinguish twelve

articles, six pertaining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in onearticle the three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three

Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of glorification into two, viz. theresurrection of the body, and the glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and

nativity into one article. (emphasis added)

2 Consequently, as St. Thomas explains (Cf. Super Boethium De Trinitate by Thomas Aquinas, q. 5, art. 4, ad

6), faith, which is in a way the habit of the principles of theology, has for its object the First Truth itself,

and yet the articles of faith contain certain other things relating to creatures insofar as they have some con-

nection with the First Truth, (emphasis added)

3


4/56

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Primam Decretalem (On the First Decretalof Gregory IX)

(tr. B.A.M.):

In the last place one must consider that the articles of the Christian Faith are reckoned bysome to be fourteen, but by others, twelve. For according to those who reckon them to be

fourteen, seven articles pertain to the Godhead, but seven to the humanity [of Christ]. But

those which pertain to the Godhead are distinguished as follows:

There is one article on the unity of the divine essence, which the Symbol touches on when hesays:I believe in one God. A second concerns the Person of the Father, which is touched on

when it says: the Father, the Almighty. A third concerns the Person of the Son, which is

touched on when it says: and in Jesus Christ His Son. A fourth concerns the Person of the

Holy Spirit, which is touched on when it says: And in the Holy Spirit. A fifth concerns the

effect by which we are created in nature, which is touched on when it says: Creator of

heaven and earth. A sixth concerns Gods effect according as we are created again in grace,

which is touched on when it says: the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints, the

forgiveness of sins; the reason being that by grace we are gathered into the unity of the

Church, we communicate in the sacraments, and we obtain the forgiveness of sins. A seventharticle concerns Gods effect by which we are perfected in the being of glory both with

respect to the body and with respect to the soul; and this is touched on when it says: the

resurrection of the flesh, the life everlasting.

But the seven articles pertaining to the Incarnation are distinguished as follows:

The first concerns the conception of Christ, which is touched on when it says: who was

conceived by the Holy Spirit. But the second concerns His birth, which is touched one when

it says: born of the Virgin Mary. The third concerns His passion, which is touched on when

it says: suffered, died, and was buried. The fourth concerns his descent into hell [: he

descended into hell]; the fifth His resurrection [: the third day he rose again from the dead];

the sixth His ascension: he ascended into Heaven; the seventh His return in judgment: He

will come again to judge the living and the dead.

But others holding there to be twelve articles, put down one article concerning the ThreePersons; and the article concerning the effect of glory they divide into two, so that there is

one article concerning the resurrection of the flesh, and another concerning eternal life: and

thus the articles pertaining to divinity are six. Again, they include the conception and birth ofChrist under one article; and so the articles concerning His humanity are also six, so that all

told they are twelve.

4


5/56

3. On the definition of faith according to Hebrews 11:1.

Cf. Hebrews 11:1 (Douay-Rheims):

1 Now faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.

Cf. idem (AV):

1 Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.

Cf. idem (RSV):

1 Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.

Cf. idem (NIV):

1 Now faith is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 67, art. 3, c. (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is in-

cluded in its definition; faith being defined as the substance of things to be hoped for, the

evidence of things that appear not (Heb. 11: 1). Wherefore Augustine says ( Tract. xl inJoan.): Where is faith? Believing without seeing. But it is an imperfect knowledge that is

of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very

nature of faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain

identically the same.

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14, art. 2, obj. 1 (tr.

Alfred J. Freddoso):

In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the

argument (argumentum) of things that are not apparent.

Cf. Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated byFabian R. Larcher, O.P., Lesson on Heb 11-1:

11-1

Heb. 11:1

1 Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.

551. Above, the Apostle showed Christs superiority in many ways by preferring Him to

the angels, to Moses and to Aaron, and advised the faithful to be united to Christ. Since this

union consists principally in faith and begins with faith: That Christ may dwell by faith

in your hearts (Eph. 3:17), the Apostle proceeds to recommend this faith and does three

things: first he describes faith; secondly, he gives various examples of it (v. 2); thirdly, he

exhorts them to the things which pertain to faith (chap. 12).

5


6/56

552. He gives a definition of faith which is complete but obscure. Hence, it should be

noted that in attempting to define any virtue perfectly, one must mention its proper matter

with which it deals, and its end; because habits are recognized by their acts, and acts by their

objects. Therefore, it is necessary to mention the act and its order to its object and end. Thus,

the definition of courage must mention its proper matter with which it deals, namely, fears

and aggressions, and its end, which is the good of the republic. Now, since faith is a theo-

logical virtue, its object and end are the same, namely, God. First, he mentions its order to

the end; secondly, its proper matter (v. 1b).

553. But it should be noted that the act of faith is to believe, because it is an act of the

intellect narrowed to one thing by the command of the will. Hence, to believe is to cogitatewith assent, as Augustine says in The Predestination of the Saints. Therefore, the object of

faith and of the will must coincide. But the object of faith is the first truth, in which the

end of the will consists, namely, happiness. But it is present one way on earth, and another

way in heaven, because on earth the first truth is not possessed and, consequently, not seen:for in regard to things that are above the soul, to possess and to see are the same, as

Augustine says in Book of 83 Questions. Hence, they are only hoped for: But hope that is

sees in not hope. For what a man sees, why does he hope for? (Rom. 8:24). Therefore, the

first truth, not seen but hoped for, is the end of the will on earth and, consequently, is

the object of faith, because its end and object are the same. But the ultimate end of faith

in heaven, which we tend toward by faith, is happiness, which consists in the clear vision ofGod: This is eternal life: to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have

sent (Jn. 17:3). But such is the hope of believers: He has regenerated us unto a lively hope

(1 Pt. 1:3). The end, therefore, of faith on earth is the attainment of the thing hoped for,

namely, of eternal happiness; hence, he says, of things hoped for.

554. But a question arises: since faith is prior to hope, why is it defined in terms of hope?

For it is customary to define the later by the previous, and not vice versa. I answer that the

answer should be obvious from what has been said, namely, that the object and end of faithare the same. Therefore, since the attainment of the things hoped for is its end, it must also

be its object. For it has been stated above that a habit must be defined by the order of its act

to its object. But the true and the good, even though when considered in themselves are

convertible as far as their supposits are concerned, differ in conception. Hence, they arediversely related to each other, because the true is a good and a good is true. In like manner,

the intellect and will, which are distinguished on the basis of the distinction between the true

and the good, have a diverse relationship to each other. For inasmuch as the intellect appre-

hends truth and anything contained in it, the true is a good; hence, the good is under the true:

but inasmuch as the will moves, the true is under the good. Therefore, in the order of

knowing, the intellect is prior; but in the order of moving, the will is prior. Therefore,

because the intellect is moved to the act of faith by the command of the will, in the order of

moving, the will is prior. Therefore, the prior is not being defined in terms of the later,

because, as has been stated, in the definition of faith, the order of the act to its object, which

is the same as the end, must be mentioned. But the end and the good are the same, as it says

inPhys. II. But in the order to the good, the will, which is the subject of hope, is prior.

555. But why not say, of things to be loved, rather than of things to be hoped for? The

reason is because charity is concerned with things that are present or absent. Therefore,because the unpossessed end is the object of faith, he says, of things to be hoped for. Nor

does it make any difference that the thing to be hoped for is also the object of hope, because

it is necessary that faith be ordained to an end, which coincides with the object of those

virtues by which the will is made perfect; since faith pertains to the will as moved by theintellect.

6


7/56

556. But since faith is one virtue, because it is called one habit (for its object is one), why

not say of the thing to be hoped for, instead of things to be hoped for? I answer that happi-

ness, which is essentially one thing in itself, because it consists in the vision of God, is the

principle and root from which the many good things contained under it are derived: for

example, the characteristics of the body, companionship with the saints, and many other

good things. Therefore, in order to show that all these pertain to faith, he speaks in the plural.

557. The word, substance, which appears in the definition, can be explained in a num-

ber of ways: in one way, causally, and then it has two senses: one which is substance[??], i.e., making the things hoped for be present in us. This it does in two ways: in one

way, by meriting, as it were; for from the fact that a person makes his intellect captive andsubmissive to the things of faith, he deserves some day to see the things he hopes for: for

vision is the reward of faith. In another way, as though by its property, bringing it about that

what is believed really to lie in the future, be somehow already possessed, provided one

believe in God. In another way, we can explain the word, substance, essentially, as if

faith is the substance, i.e., the essence of things to be hoped for. Hence, in Greek it is de-

fined as the hypostasis of things to be hoped for. For the essence of happiness is no less

than the vision of God: This is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and

Jesus Christ whom you have sent (Jn. 17:3). Hence, in the book, On the Trinity, Augustine

says: This contemplation is promised to us; the end of all actions. Therefore, the full vision

of God is the essence of happiness. We also see this in the liberal sciences, which, if a personwishes to learn them, he must first accept its principles, which he must believe when they are

delivered to him by the teacher. For a learner must believe, as it is stated in 1 Posterior

Analytics. And in those principles the entire science is somehow contained, as con-

clusions are contained in their principles, and an effect in its cause . Therefore, one who

has the principles of a science, say geometry, has its substance. And if geometry were the

substance of happiness, a person who possessed the principles of geometry would, in a

sense, have the substance of happiness. But our faith consists in believing that the blessed

will see and enjoy God. Therefore, if we will to reach that state, it is necessary that we

believe the principles of that knowledge. And these principles are the articles of faith,

which contain the summary of this knowledge, because the vision of the triune God

makes us happy. And this is one article; hence we believe this. Consequently, he says, the

assurance [substance] of things to be hoped for: We see now through a glass in a darkmanner; but then face to fact (1 Cor. 13:12). As if to say: we shall be happy when we see

face to face that which we now see in a glass and in a dark manner. In these words is shown

the relationship of the act of faith to its end, because faith is ordained to things to be

hoped for, being, as it were, a beginning in which the whole is, as it were, virtually

contained, as conclusions in principles.

558. Then when he says, the conviction [evidence] of things that appear not, he touches the

act of faith in regard to its proper matter. But the act proper to faith, even though it is in

relation to the will, as has been said, is nevertheless in the intellect, as in a subject, because

its object is the true, which properly pertains to the intellect. But there is a difference among

the acts of the intellect: for some are habits of the intellect which imply complete certitude

and perfect understanding of that which is understood, as is clear in the habit of under-standing, which is the habit of first principles, because one who understands that every

whole is great than its part sees this and is certain. But the habit of science also does this:thus the habits of understanding and of science will produce certitude and vision. But there

are others which beget neither, namely, doubt and opinion. But faith is midway between

these: because, as has been stated, faith produces assent in the intellect which can be caused

in two ways: in one way, because the intellect is moved to assent because of the evidence ofthe object which is per se knowable, as in the habit of principles, or known through

something else, which is per se knowable, as in the science of astronomy. In another way, it

7


8/56

assents to something not because of the evidence of the object, by which it is not sufficiently

moved (hence it is not certain), but it either doubts, namely, when there is no more evidence

for one side than for the other; or it opines, if it does have reason for one side, but without

satisfying the intellect, so that there is fear in regard to the opposite side. But faith does not

suggest either of these absolutely: because there is no evidence, as there is in understanding

and science, nor is there doubt, as in doubt and opinion; but it fixes on one side with

certainty and firm adherence by a voluntary choice. But this choice rests on Gods authority,

and by it the intellect is fixed, so that it clings firmly to the things of faith and assents to

them with the greatest of certainty. Therefore, to believe is to know with assent. Therefore,the proper matter of the habit of faith are things that appear not. For appearance has

knowledge, but not faith, as Gregory says. But the act of faith is certain adherence, which theApostle calls evidence, taking the cause for the effect, because evidence produces faith about

a doubtful matter. For evidence is the reason for believing a doubted thing. Or if we follow

the etymology of the word, evidence (argument), which means arguing the mind, then he is

taking the effect for the cause, because the mind is compelled to assent because of thethings certainty. Hence, it is called the evidence of things that appear not, i.e., a sure and

certain apprehension of things it does not see. Now, if someone were to reduce those words

to their correct form, he could say that faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life is

begun in us and makes the intellect assent to things that it does not see. Therefore, it is

obvious that the Apostle has defined faith completely, but not clearly. [Where we have

evidence another version has conviction, because on Gods authority the intellect isconvinced about things it does not see].

559. By that definition, faith is distinguished from all the other habits of the intellect. For

the fact that it is called evidence, faith is distinguished from opinion, doubt and suspicion,

because these three do not cause the intellect to adhere to something firmly. By the words, of

things to be hoped for, it is distinguished from ordinary faith which is not ordained to

happiness. For by proper definition a thing is made known and distinguished from all else, as

in this case; hence, all the others are reduced to it.

560. But it seems incorrect to say, of things that appear not, as it says in Jn (20:26):

Thomas saw and believed. Furthermore, we believe that there is one God, a fact which is

demonstrated by philosophers. I answer that faith is taken in two senses: in the proper sense,it is concerned with things not seen and not known, as is clear from the above. But inasmuch

as there cannot be greater certainty of a conclusion than of the principle from which it is

drawn, because principles are always more certain than the conclusions, it follows that since

the principles of faith are not evident, neither are its conclusions. Hence, the intellect does

not assent to the conclusions as to things known or seen. But taken in a general sense, it

excludes all knowledge that is certain; that is the sense in which it is taken by Augustine in

the Gospel Questions, when he says that faith is concerned with things that are seen. But the

Apostle is speaking in the first sense. Furthermore, it must be said of Thomas that, as

Gregory says, he saw one thing and believed something else: for he saw the humanity and

believed the divinity. To the objection based on demonstration, the answer is that nothing

prohibits one thing being seen by one person and believed by another, as is obvious in

diverse states. For what is not seen on earth is seen by the angels. Therefore, what I believe,an angel sees. Similarly, what is seen by the prophets, for example, that God is one and

incorporeal, must be believed by the illiterate; just as an illiterate person believes in aneclipse which an astronomer sees. However, in such matters faith is taken in a different

sense. But there are some things which absolutely transcend the state of the present life; and

in regard to these there is faith in the strict sense. (emphasis added)

8


9/56

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14 (On faith) (tr.

Alfred J. Freddoso).

Article 1:What is it to believe?

Now it is claimed by Augustine in On the Predestination of the Saints [chap. 2], and it is

maintained in the Gloss on the passage Not that we are sufficient to think (2 Cor 3:5), that

to believe is to cogitate with assent.

HOWEVER, IT SEEMS INAPPROPRIATE TO SAY THIS:

1. One who knows is distinct from one who believes, as is evident from Augustine in On

Seeing God[letter 147, chaps. 2 and 3]. But one who knows, insofar as he knows, cogitates

about something and assents to it. Therefore, believing is inappropriately described when

one claims that to believe is to cogitate with assent.

2. Further, cogitating conveys a sort of investigation. For to cogitate is, as it were, to agitate

[the mind] with, i.e., to reason discursively and to compare one thing with another. But

investigation is ruled out by the nature of faith. For as Damascene says [in On the Orthodox

Faith II, chap. 2], faith is not an examined consent. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that to

believe is to cogitate with assent.

3. Further, to believe is an act of the intellect. But to assent seems to pertain to desiring; for

we are said to consent to something by means of desire. Therefore, assent does not pertain to

believing.

4. Further, no one is said to be cogitating unless he is actually considering something, as is

evident from Augustine, On the Trinity [chap. 7]. But one is said to believe even if he is not

actually cogitating about anythinge.g., a believer who is sleeping. Therefore, to believe is

not to cogitate.

5. Further, a simple light is a principle of a simple cognition. But faith is a sort of simple

light, as is evident from Dionysius in On the Divine Names, chap. 7. Therefore, the believingthat arises from faith is a simple cognition, and so it is not the sort of cogitation which

bespeaks a comparingcognition.

6. Further, faith as it is commonly spoken of assents to a first truth because of that truth

itself. But one who assents to something by means of a comparison assents to it not because

of itself but because of something else to which he compares it. Therefore, in believing there

is no comparing and hence no cogitating.

7. Further, faith is called more certain than every science and every cognition. But because

of their certitude principles are cognized in the absence of cogitating and comparing.

Therefore, believing occurs in the absence of cogitating.

8. Further, a spiritual power is more efficacious than a corporeal power; therefore, a spiritual

light is more powerful than a corporeal light. But an external corporeal light perfects the eye

so that it immediately cognizes visible bodies when its innate light was not sufficient for

this. Therefore, it is in the absence of any cogitating or comparing that the spiritual light

which comes from God will perfect the intellect so that it cognizes even those things for

which natural reason is not sufficient. And so believing occurs in the absence of cogitating.

9. Further, philosophers locate the cogitative power in the sentient part [of the soul]. But to

believe belongs only to the mind, as Augustine says. Therefore, to believe is not to cogitate.

9


10/56

I REPLY:

One should reply that Augustine adequately describes believing. For the essence of

believing, along with its differences from all the other acts of the intellect, can be

demonstrated through this sort of definition of it. This is evident as follows:

I. According to the Philosopher [Aristotle] in On the Soul[III, 5], there are two operations of

our intellect. Thefirstis an operation by which the intellect formulates the simple quiddities

of things, e.g., what it is to be a human being or what it is to be an animal. Now neither the

true nor the falseper se are found in this operation, just as they are not found in noncomplex

spoken words. Thesecondoperation of the intellect is that in accord with which it composes

and divides by affirming and denying. And it is in this operation that the true and the false

are found, just as they are also found in a spoken complex, which is a sign of this operation.

Now believing is found not in the firstoperation but rather in the second. For we believethings that are true and disbelieve things that are false. This is why among the Arabs the first

operation of the intellect is called imagination, whereas the second is called faith, as is

evident from the words of the Commentator [Averroes] in On the SoulIII, [comment 21].

II. Now since the possible intellect is, taken by itself, in potency with respect to all

intelligible formsin just the way that primary matter is in potency with respect to all

sensible formsit is also, taken by itself, no more determined to adhering to a composition

than to adhering to [the corresponding] division, or vice versa.

However, anything that is determined to two things is such that it is determined to one of the

two only through something that moves it. But the possible intellect is moved by only two

things, viz., (i) by its proper object, which is an intelligible form, viz., what a thing is, as is

claimed in On the SoulIII, and (ii) by the will, which moves all the other powers, as Anselm

says [in On Similitudes, chap. 2].

So it follows that our possible intellect is related in diverse ways to the parts of a

contradiction.

A. Forsometimes it is not inclined more to the one part than to the other. This is either (i)

because of an absence of things that move it, as in the case of those problematic matters

concerning which we have no arguments [one way or the other], or (ii) because of an

apparent equality of the things that move it to the one part and the other. And this is thecondition of one who is in doubt[dubitare], i.e., one who fluctuates between the two parts of

the contradiction.

B. On the other hand, it issometimes the case that (i) the intellect is inclined more to one part

than to the other, but that (ii) that which inclines the intellect does not move it sufficiently to

determine it totally to the one part. Thus the intellect accepts the one part and yet is always

in doubt with respect to the opposite part. And this is the condition of one who opines

[opinari], i.e., one who accepts the one part of the contradiction with a wariness about the

other.

C. Nowsometimes the possible intellect is determined in such a way that it adheres totally to

one part. But it is determined in this way sometimes by the intelligible objectand sometimes

by the will.

10


11/56

i. It is determined in this way by the intelligible objectsometimes mediately and sometimes

immediately.

It is determined immediately when the truth of intelligible propositions is infallibly apparent

at once on the basis of the intelligible things themselves. This is the condition of one who

understands principles (intelligere), which are immediately known once their terms are

grasped, as the Philosopher says [in Posterior Analytics I]. And so just on the basis of what a

thing is the intellect is immediately determined to propositions of this sort. On the other

hand, it is determined mediately when, after the definitions of the terms have been grasped,the intellect is determined to one part of a contradiction by the power of the first principles.

And this is the condition of one who knows [scientifically] (scire).

ii. But sometimes the intellect cannot be determined to one part of a contradiction either

immediately through the definitions of the terms, as in the case of principles, or [mediately]

by the power of the first principles, as in the case of demonstrated conclusions. Instead, it isdetermined by the will, which chooses to assent determinately and precisely to one part

because of something that is sufficient to move the will but not sufficient to move the

intellectand this because it seems good or fitting to assent to that part. And this is the

condition of the one who believes, as when one believes what a man says because it seems

proper or beneficial to do so.

And it is also in this way that we are moved to believe what someone says because the

reward of eternal life is promised to us if we believe; and the will is moved by this reward to

assent to the things that are said, even though the intellect is not moved by what is

understood. And this is why Augustine, [in Commentary on John, chap. 26, No one can

come ...], says that an unwilling man is capable of other things, but only a willing man is

capable of believing.

III. From what has been said it is evident that assent is not found in the operation of theintellect by which it formulates the simple quiddities of things, since there is no truth or

falsity there. For we are said to assent to something only when we cleave to it as true.

Similarly, one who is in doubtdoes not have assent, since he does not cleave to the one part

more than to the other. Similarly, one who opines does not have assent, since his acceptanceis not fixed firmly with respect to one of the two parts. Rather, as Isaac and Avicenna claim,

a fixed judgment (sententia) is a distinct or absolutely certain conception of one of the two

parts of a contradiction; but to assent (assentire) is taken from sententia. Now one who

understands (intelligere) does have assent, since he cleaves with absolute certainty to one

part; however, he does nothave cogitation, since he is determined to one of the two parts in

the absence of any comparison. On the other hand, one who knows (scire) has both

cogitation andassent; however, the cogitation causes the assent and the assent terminates the

cogitation. For on the basis of the very comparison of the principles with the conclusions he

assents to the conclusions by tracing them back to the principles, and there the movement of

the one who is cogitating is fixed and put to rest. For in knowledge (scientia) the motion of

reason begins from an understanding (intellectus) of the principles and is terminated in that

same understanding by means of a tracing back. And so the person in question does not havethe assent and the cogitation on equal footing, as it were; instead, the cogitation leads to the

assent, and the assent puts the cogitation to rest.

But in faith the assent and the cogitation are, as it were, on equal footing. For the assent is

caused notby the cogitation but, as was said above, by the will. But because the intellect is

not at all terminated in one part in such a way that it is brought to its properterminus, whichis the vision of something intelligible, it follows that its motion has not yet been put to rest.

Instead, it still has cogitation and investigation concerning those things which it believes,

11


12/56

even though it assents to them with absolute firmness. For just taken by itself, the intellect is

not satisfied and it is not terminated in one part; rather, it is terminated only from the outside.

And this is why the intellect of one who believes is said to be captivated. For it is being held

fast by something elses terminus and not by its own proper terminus (2 Cor 10:5, ...

bringing the intellect into captivity). This is also why it is the case that in one who believes,

though not in one who understands orknows, there can arise a movement with respect to the

contrary of that which he holds with absolute firmness.

So, then, it is through assentthat believing is separated off (i) from the operation by whichthe intellect sees simple forms, i.e., quiddities and (ii) from doubt(dubitatio) and (iii) from

opinion (opinio); on the other hand, it is through cogitation that it is separated off from

understanding(intellectus), whereas it is separated off from knowledge (scientia) by the fact

that it has cogitation and assent on an equal footing, as it were.

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS POSED AT THE BEGINNING:

AD 1. The reply to the first objection is evident from this.

AD 2. To the second objection one should reply that the reason why faith is not called anexaminedconsent is that the assent (or consent) of faith is not caused by an investigation on

the part of reason. However, this does not rule out its being the case that in the intellect of

one who believes there remains some cogitation or investigation concerning the things which

he believes.

AD 3. To the third objection one should reply that the will, though not the intellect, is

referred back to a preceding power, viz., to the intellect. And the reason why assentproperly

pertains to the intellectis that it conveys a certain absolute adherence to that to which one

assents. On the other hand, consentproperly belongs to the will, since to consent is to think

together with another, and so consent is said to be ordered to or compared with something

that precedes it.

AD 4. To the fourth objection one should reply that because (i) habits are cognized through

acts and because (ii) habits themselves are the principles of acts, habits are sometimesdenominated by the names of their acts. And so the names of the acts are sometimes taken as

proper names, as it were, for the acts themselves, and they are sometimes taken as names for

the habits. So believing, insofar as it conveys the act of faith, always includes actual

considering, but this is not the case insofar as believing is taken for the habit. So one whois sleeping is said believe insofar as he has the habitof faith.

AD 5. To the fifth objection one should reply that faith includes something of perfection and

something of imperfection. Thefirmness itself which pertains to assent bespeaks perfection,

whereas what bespeaks imperfection is the lack of vision in virtue of which a movement of

cogitation still remains in the mind of the one who believes. Therefore, that which bespeaks

perfection, viz., assenting, is caused by the simple light, which is faith; but to the extent that

that light is not perfectly participated in, the imperfection of the intellect is not totally

removed, and so the movement of cogitation remains in the intellect without being put torest.

AD 6. To the sixth objection one should reply that this argument proves or establishes that

cogitation* is not a cause of the assent of faith, but it does not prove that cogitation* does

not accompany the assent of faith.

12


13/56

AD 7. To the seventh objection one should reply that certitude can convey two things. One

is a firmness of adherence, and in this sense faith is more certain than any understanding or

knowledge, since the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a more powerful cause

than is the light of reason, which causes the assent of understanding and of knowledge. But

certitude also conveys the evidentness of that to which one assents, and faith does nothave

certitude in this sense, whereas understanding and knowledge do. And this is why

understanding does not involve cogitation.

AD 8. To the eighth objection one should reply that the argument would go throughstraightforwardly if we participated perfectly in the spiritual light in questionwhich will

happen in heaven, where we will see perfectly those things which we now believe. But thefact that the things which that light perfects us to know do not appear manifestly [in our

present state] derives from our defective participation in that light and not from the efficacy

of the spiritual light itself.

AD 9. To the ninth objection one should reply that the cogitative power is that which is the

highest in the sentient part [of the soul], where the sentient part attains to the intellective part

in a certain way, so that it participates in that which is lowest in the intellective part, viz.,

discursive reasoningand this according to the rule of Dionysius in On the Divine Names,

chap. 2, that the beginnings of the secondary things are conjoined to the ends of the primary

things. Thus this cogitative power is called particular reason, as is evident from theCommentator in On the SoulIII, [comment 58]. But this is the case only in human beings. In

brute animals natural judgment takes the place [of particular reason]. And so universal

reason itself, which is in the intellective part of the soul, is called cogitationbecause of a

similarity in these operations.

Translated by

Alfred J. Freddoso

University of Notre Dame

St. Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14 (On faith)

Article 2:What is faith?

In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, theargument (argumentum) of things that are not apparent.

IT SEEMS THAT IT IS INCORRECT TO SAY THIS:

1. No quality is a substance. Faith is a quality, since it is a virtue, i.e., a good quality of the

mind, etc. Therefore, faith is not a substance.

2. Further, spiritual being is added to natural being and is its perfection; hence, it must be

similar to it. But in the natural being of a human being the substance is said to be the veryessence of the soul, which is a first act, but not the power of the soul, which is the principle

of a second act. Therefore, in a spiritual being one should not say that the essence itself is

faith or any other virtue, since a virtue is a proximate principle of an operation and hence

perfects a power. Rather, one should say that the essence is grace, from which (i) spiritual

being derives as from a first act and which (ii) perfects the very essence of the soul.

3. Someone will claim that faith is called a substance because it is the first among the

different virtues. Against this one should reply that virtues are considered in three ways,

13


14/56

viz., (i) as regards theirhabits, (ii) as regards theirobjects, and (iii) as regards theirpowers.

But as regards theirhabits, faith is not prior to the others. For the definition under discussion

seems to be a definition of faith only insofar as faith is formed, since it is only in this sense

that it is the foundation, as Augustine says; but all the gratuitous virtues are infused

simultaneously. Similarly, as regards their objects, faith does not seem to be prior to the

other virtues. For it is not the case that faith tends toward the true itself, which seems to be

its proper object, more than charity tends toward the highest good or more than hope tends

toward what is most difficult thing or toward the Gods supreme liberality. Similarly, as

regards theirpowers, faith does not seem to be prior to the other virtues, since all thegratuitous virtues seem to be referred back to desire. Therefore, faith is in no way prior to the

other virtues, and so faith should not be called the foundation or the substance of the othervirtues.

4. Further, things to be hoped for subsist in us more through charity than through faith.

Therefore, the definition under discussion seems to belong to charity rather than to faith.

5. Further, hope is generated from faith, as is evident in the Gloss on Matthew 1:2, since

faith is posited in the definition of hope. But hope is posited in the definition of a thing to

be hoped for. Therefore, if a thing to be hoped for is posited in the definition of faith, there

will be a circularity in the definitionswhich is absurd, since in that case there will be

something that is prior to and better known than itself. For it will be possible for the samething to be posited in the definition of itself when the definitions are substituted for the

names [defined], and it will also be possible for the definitions to be infinite.

6. Further, diverse habits have diverse objects. But a theological virtue has the same thing

for both its end and its object. Therefore, among the theological virtues it is necessary that

the diverse virtues have diverse ends. But a thing to be hoped for is the proper end of hope.

Therefore, a thing to be hoped for should not be posited in the definition of faith either as

an object or as an end.

7. Further, faith is perfected more by charity than by hope; that is why it is said to be formed

by charity. Therefore, in the definition of faith one ought to posit the object of charity, which

is a good or a thing to be loved, rather than the object of hope, which is a thing to be hopedfor.

8. Further, faith is related precisely to the articles themselves. But the articles do not all

pertain to things to be hoped for just one or two do, viz., the resurrection of the flesh and

life everlasting. Therefore, a thing to be hoped for should not be posited in the definition of

faith.

9. Further, arguing is an act of reason. But faith pertains to things that are beyond reason.

Therefore, it should not be called an argument.

10. Further, in the soul there are two movements, viz., towardthe soul and from the soul.

Now in a movement towardthe soul the principle is extrinsic, whereas in a movement fromthe soul the principle is intrinsic. But it is impossible for the same thing to be both an

intrinsic principle and an extrinsic principle. Therefore, it is impossible for the samemovement to be both toward the soul and from the soul. But cogitation is perfected in a

movement toward the soul, whereas desire is perfected in a movement from the soul.

Therefore, neither faith nor anything else can be both a principle of desire and a principle of

cogitation. Therefore, in the definition of faith it is incorrect to posit both something thatpertains to desire, viz., the substance of things to be hoped for, and something that pertains

to cogitation, viz., the argument of things that are not apparent.

14


15/56

11. Further, a single habit cannot belong to diverse powers. But the affective power and the

intellective power are diverse powers. Therefore, since faith is a single habit, it cannot

pertain both to cognition and affection; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

12. Further, a single habit has a single act. Therefore, since two acts are being posited in the

definition of faith, viz., (i) to make the things that are hoped for subsist in us, in accord with

which act one says the substance of things to be hoped for, and (ii) to convince the mind, in

accord with which one says the argument of things that are not apparent, it seems that faithis not being correctly described.

13. Further, understanding is prior to desire. But the phrase the substance of things to be

hoped for pertains to desire, whereas what is afterwards joined to it, viz., the argument of

things that are not apparent, pertains to understanding. Therefore, the parts of the definition

in question are incorrectly ordered.

14. Further, what is called an argument is that which induces the mind to assent to

something. But the mind is induced to assent to given things because those things are

apparent to it. Therefore, there seems to be an opposition in the phrase that it is added, when

one says the argument of things that are not apparent.

15. Further, faith is a kind of cognition. But every cognition is about something that is

apparent to the one who is cognizing. For by means of a cognition something is apparent

both in the sentient part of the soul and in the intellective part of the soul. Therefore, it is

inappropriate to say that faith is of things that are not apparent.

I REPLY:

One should reply that, according to some people, the Apostle intended by this definition to

show not what faith isbut rather what faith does.

However, it seems better to reply that this explanation of faith is the most complete

definition of it not in the sense that it is rendered in the form appropriate to a definition,but rather because it adequately touches upon all the things that are required for a definition

of faith. For sometimes it is sufficient for even philosophers themselves to touch upon the

principles of [given] syllogisms and definitions, and once these principles are had, it is not

difficult to reduce them to forms that are in keeping with the doctrine of the art [of logic].

Now there are three indications of this point.

I. The first is the fact that all the principles on which the existence of faith depends are

touched upon in the definition under discussion.

For since, as was said above, the condition of one who believes is such that his intellect is

determined to something by his will, whereas the will does nothing except insofar as it is

moved by its object, which is a desirable good and an end, [it follows that] two principles arerequired for the end. One [A] is the good that moves the will, and the second[B] is that to

which the intellect assents when the will makes it [assent].

A. Now there are two ultimate goods of a human being which move the will primarily as

ultimate ends.

15


16/56

One of these goods isproportionate to human nature, since natural powers are sufficient to

obtain it. And this is the happiness that philosophers have spoken about, be it (i)

contemplative happiness, which consists in the act of wisdom, or (ii) active happiness, which

consists primarily in the act of prudence and derivatively in the acts of the other moral

virtues. The other good for a human being exceeds a proportion to human nature, since

natural powers are not sufficient to obtain it, or even to cogitate about it or desire it; instead,

this good is promised to a human being by Gods liberality alone1 Corinthians 2:9:

Without you, O God, eye has not seen the things which you have prepared for those who

await youand this good is eternal life. And it is by this good that the will is inclinedtoward assenting to those things which it holds on faith; thus it is said in John 6:40,

Whoever sees the Son and believes in him has eternal life.

Now nothing can be ordered to an end unless some sort of proportion to the end

preexists in it, a proportion from which there arises in it a desire for the end. And this

happens insofar as a sort of inception of the end comes to exist in it, since it desires

nothing except to the extent that it desires some likeness of that [inception]. And so it is

that in human nature itself there is a sort of inception of that good which is proportionate to

[human] nature. For in human nature there naturally preexist (i) principles of demonstration,

known per se, which are seeds of wisdom, and (ii) certain principles of the natural law,

which are seeds of the moral virtues. Hence, in order for a human being to be ordered

toward the good ofeternal life, it is also necessary that a sort of inception of that goodshould come to exist in the one who is promised eternal life. But eternal life consists in

the full cognition of God, as is evident from John 17:3: This is eternal life, that they should

know you, the only true God. Hence, it is necessary that some inception of this

supernatural cognition should come to exist in us. And this inception comes through

faith, which on the basis of an infused light holds fast to things that by nature exceed our

cognition.

Now in wholes that have ordered parts it is customary for the first part, in which there

exists an inception of the whole, to be called the substance of the whole, e.g., the

foundation of a house and the keel of a ship. This is why the Philosopher claims in

Metaphysics II that if being were a single whole, its first part would be substance.And so

it is that faith, insofar as it is a sort of inception within us of the eternal life that wehope for because of Gods promise, is called the substance of things to be hoped for.

And so here one touches upon the relation of faith to the good that moves the will when it

determines the intellect.

B. Now the will, moved by the aforementioned good, proposes something that is not

apparent to the intellect as being worthy of its assent, and it determines the intellect to that

which is not apparent in such a way that [the intellect] assents to it. Therefore, just as an

intelligible thing that is seen by the intellect determines the intellect and because of this is

said to convince the mind, so too something that is not apparent to the intellect determines it

and induces it necessarily to assent to it by the very fact that it is accepted by the will. This is

why another reading has conviction (convictio), since it convinces the intellect in the way

just explained. And so in saying the argument of things that are not apparent one touchesupon the relation of faith to that which the intellect assents to.

So, then, we have (i) the matterorobjectof faith from the fact that he says about things that

are not apparent, (ii) the actof faith from the fact that he says the argument, and (iii) the

orderingof faith to its end from the fact that he says the substance of things to be hoped

for. Now on the basis of the act one also grasps (i) the genus, viz., habit, which is knownthrough the act, as well as (ii) thesubject[of the habit], viz., the mind. And nothing further is

required for the definition of a virtue.

16


17/56

Hence, in accord with what has been said it is easy to formulate the definition in an artful

way. So we may say that faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life begins in us, a

habit which makes the intellect assent to things that are not apparent.

II. Thesecondindication is that through the definition in question faith is distinguished from

all other things.

For by saying of things that are not apparent one distinguishes faith from knowledge(scientia) and understanding (intellectus). Again, by saying the argument one distinguishes

faith from (i) opinion (opinio) and doubt (dubitatio), in which the mind is not convinced, i.e.,not determined to some one thing, and also from (ii) all habits which are not cognitive.

Again, by saying the substance of things to be hoped for one distinguishes [faith in the

proper sense] from (i) faith as it is commonly understood (fides communiter accepta), in

accord with which we are said either to believe that which we strongly opine or to believe inthe testimony of some human being, and also from (ii) prudence (prudentia) and the other

cognitive habits, which are not ordered toward the things to hoped for or which, if they are

so ordered, are not such that a proper inception of the things to be hoped for comes to exist

in us through them.

III. The thirdindication is the fact that none of those who have wanted to define faith hasbeen able to define it otherwise than by positing this whole definition or some part of it in

different terms.

For when Damascene says, viz., Faith is the hypostasis of things that are hoped for and the

proof of things that are not seen, it is manifestly obvious that this is the same thing that the

Apostle says. On the other hand, when Damascene goes on to add, The unshakable and

unquestionable hope in the things that have been announced to us by God and in the efficacy

of our prayers, this is a sort of explication of what the Apostle had said, viz., the substanceof things to be hoped for. For the things to be hoped for are, first of all, the rewards that

have been promised to us by God and, secondly, any other things we seek from God as

necessary for [obtaining] those rewards, things with respect to which a firm hope is had

through faith. This hope cannot fail, and this is why it is called unshakable; nor can it bejustifiably be reprehended as a vain hope, and this is why it is called unquestionable.

Now when Augustine says, Faith is a virtue by which things that are not seen are believed,

and, again, when Damascene says, Faith is not an examined consent, and when Hugo of

St. Victor says, Faith is a sort of certitude of the soul with respect to absent, a certitude that

is superior to opinion and inferior to knowledge, this is the same thing that the Apostle

means by the argument of things that are not apparent. For faith is said to be inferior to

knowledge because, unlike knowledge, it does not include vision, even though it does

include firm adherence; on the other hand, faith is said to be superior to opinion because of

the firmness of the assent. And so faith is said to be inferior to knowledge to the extent that it

is of things that are not apparent, and superior to opinion to the extent that it is an argument.

And from what has been said it is evident [what one should say] about the other [authorities].Moreover, when Dionysius says, Faith is the enduring foundation of those who believe,

putting them in the truth and putting the truth in them, this is the same thing that theApostle means by the substance of things to be hoped for. For the cognition of truth is a

thing to be hoped for, since beatitude is nothing other than a rejoicing in the truth, as

Augustine says in the Confessions.

AD 1. To the first objection one should reply that faith is called a substance not because

it is in the genus of substance, but because it bears a certain similarity to a substance, viz.,

17


18/56

insofar as it is a first inception of and, as it were, a sort of foundation for the whole

spiritual life in just the way that a substance is the foundation of all beings.

AD 2. To the second objection one should reply that the Apostle means to be comparing

faith not to those things that are within us but to those things that are outside us. Now even

though in natural being it is the essence of the soul that is the first thing and the substance

with respect to the powers and the habits and all the resulting things which are in [the soul],

one nonetheless finds a relation to external things not in the essence but primarily in the

power; and, similarly, one finds a relation to external things not in grace [itself] but in virtue,and primarily in faith. This is why he was not able to say that grace, rather than faith, is the

substance of things to be hoped for.

AD 3. To the third objection one should reply that faith is prior to the other virtues (i) on the

part of its objectand (ii) on the part of itspowerand (iii) on the part of its habit.

It is prior on the part of its objectnot because it tends toward its object more than the other

virtues do, but because its object naturally moves [the soul] before the object of charity and

the objects of the other virtues do. This is evident from the fact that what is good never

moves the appetite except through the intellect, as is said in On the SoulIII. By contrast, in

order for what is true to move the intellect, it does not need any movement on the part of the

appetite. And this is why the actof faith is naturally prior to the act of charity; and the sameholds for the habit of faith, even though [the habit of faith and the habit of charity] exist

together when the faith is formed faith. And for this same reason a cognitive power is

naturally prior to an affective power.

Now faith exists in a cognitive power. This is evident from the fact that the proper object of

faith is the true and notthegood. However, faith does in a certain sense have its completion

in the will, as will be explained below in articles 4 and 9.

AD 4. To the fourth objection one should reply that it is already evident from what has been

said that the first inception of the things to be hoped for comes to exist in us not through

charity but through faith. Nor, again, is charity an argument. Thus, the description under

discussion does not in any way belong to charity.

AD 5. To the fifth objection one should reply that since the good that inclines us toward faith

exceeds reason, it does not have a name. And so by a sort of circumlocution one substitutes

things to be hoped for for [this good]. This frequently happens in definitions.

AD 6. To the sixth objection one should reply that even though every power has an end,

which is its good, nonetheless not every power, but only the will, is related to the nature of

an end or a good insofar as it is good. And this is why the will moves all the other powers;

for every motion begins with the intending of the end. Therefore, even though the true is

the end of faith, still the true does not express the nature of an end; hence, it is not the true,

but rather something pertaining to desire, that should be posited as the endof faith.

AD 7. To the seventh objection one should reply that a thing to be loved can be either

present or absent, whereas only what is absent is a thing to be hoped for. Romans 8:24: Forwho hopes for what he sees? Hence, since faith is of absent things, its end is more properly

expressed by thing to be hoped for than by thing to be loved.

AD 8. To the eighth objection one should reply that an article [of the faith] is, as it were, thematterof faith, whereas a thing to be hoped for is posited not as the matter but as the end.

Hence, the argument does not follow.

18


19/56

AD 9. To the ninth objection one should reply that argument (argumentum) is said in

many ways.

For (i) sometimes it signifies the very actof reason by which one reasons discursively

from principles to conclusions. And (ii) because the whole force of an argument consists

in the middle term, the middle term is also sometimes called an argument. Further, (iii)

it is also the case that the introductions to books, which contain a sort of foretaste of the

work that follows, are called arguments. And (iv) because something is made manifestthrough an argument, the principle of manifestation, as well as the very light by which

something is cognized, can be called an argument.

And faith can be called an argument in each of these four ways.

It can be called an argument in the first way to the extent that reason assents to

something because it is said by God. And so because of the authority of the speaker an

assent is effected in the one who believes, since in dialectics it is also the case that some

arguments are taken from authority.

Now in the secondsense faith is called the argument of things that are not apparent

either (i) to the extent that the faith of believers is a middle term for proving that thingsthat are not apparent exist, or (ii) to the extent that the faith of our fathers is for us a

middle term that induces us to believe, or (iii) to the extent that faith with respect to

one article is a middle term for faith with respect to another article, in the way that

Christs resurrection is a middle term with respect to the general resurrection, as is

evident from 1 Corinthians 16:12.

Faith is called an argument in the thirdsense to the extent that faith is a sort of meager

foretaste of the cognition that we will have in the future.

And faith is called an argument in the fourth sense as regards the light of faith itself,

through which the things believed are cognized. Now faith is said to be beyond reason

not because faith does not involve an act of reason but rather because the reasoninvolved in faith cannot lead one to see the things which pertain to faith.

AD 10. To the tenth objection one should reply that the act of faith consists essentially in

cognition, and therein lies its perfection as regards its form and species. This is evident from

its object, as was explained in the body of this article. But it is in affection that faith is

perfected as regards its end, since it is because of charity that faith is meritorious with

respect to the end. The inception of faith also lies in affection to the extent that the will

determines the intellect to assent to the things which pertain to faith. But that act of will is

neither an act of charity nor a species of charity, but is instead a certain desire for the

promised good. And so it is evident that faith does not exist in twopowers as in a subject.

AD 11. The reply to the eleventh objection is evident from this.

AD 12. To the twelfth objection one should reply that in saying the substance of things tobe hoped for one touches upon not the actof faith but only upon its relation to the end. One

touches upon the actof faith when one relates faith to its objectby saying the argument of

things that are not apparent.

AD 13. To the thirteenth objection one should reply that that to which the intellect assents

moves the intellect not because of its own power but because of the inclination of the will.

19


20/56

Hence, the good which moves the desire is like a first mover in the act of faith, whereas that

to which the intellect assents is like a moved mover. And this is why in the definition of faith

the relation of faith to the good of the desire is posited before its relation to its proper object.

AD 14. To the fourteenth objection one should reply that faith convinces or induces the mind

not because of the evidentness of the matter but rather because of the wills inclination, as

was explained in the body of this article. Hence, the argument does not follow.

AD 15. To the fifteenth objection one should reply that cognition can convey two things,viz., (i) vision and (ii) assent.

Insofar as it conveys vision, cognition is distinguished from faith. This is why Gregory says

that things that are seen have cognition rather than faith. According to Augustine in On

Seeing God, those things are said to be seen which are present to the senses or to the

intellect. But things that are said to be present to the intellect do not exceed its capacity.However, as far as the certitude of the assentis concerned, faith is a cognition, a cognition

by virtue of which it can be called a knowledge and a vision, according to 1 Corinthians

13:12: We see now darkly through a mirror. And this is what Augustine says in On Seeing

God: If it is not improper to say that we know that which we believe most certainly, then

from this it follows that we are rightly said to see with the mind the things that are believed,

even though they are not present to our senses.

Translated by

Alfred J. Freddoso

University of Notre Dame

20


21/56

4. On things not seen as the end of faith.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14, art. 2, obj. 1 (tr. Alfred

J. Freddoso):

In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the

argument (argumentum) of things that are not apparent.

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 67, art. 3, c. (tr. English DominicanFathers):

Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is in-

cluded in its definition; faith being defined as the substance of things to be hoped for, the

evidence of things that appear not (Heb. 11: 1). Wherefore Augustine says ( Tract. xl inJoan.): Where is faith? Believing without seeing. But it is an imperfect knowledge that is

of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very

nature of faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain

identically the same.

Cf. the first article of the Nicene Creed:

I believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth: of all that is, seen

and unseen.

Now as St. Paul teaches, Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence ofthings that appear notthat is, of things unseen. But as the Apostle also teaches, By

faith we understand that the world was created by the word of God, so that what is seen

was made out of things which do not appear. (Hebrews 11:3) That is to say, the world was

made by the word of God out of nothing in accordance with the exemplars of each thing,which pre-existed in the Word.

Now the things which do not appear are the invisible things of God, in accordance withwhich we read, From the creation of the world, the invisible things of God are clearly

seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead

(Romans 1:20). Hence, ...we look not to the things that are seen but to the things that areunseen; for the things that are seen are transient, but the things that are unseen are eternal

(2 Cor. 4:18). But chief among these things is eternal life; for, as St. Thomas states:

1 Corinthians 2:9: Without you, O God, eye has not seen the things which you have

prepared for those who await youand this good is eternal life. And it is by this good that

the will is inclined toward assenting to those things which it holds on faith; thus it is said in

John 6:40, Whoever sees the Son and believes in him has eternal life.

21


22/56

5. The order of nature as pointing to the existence of God.

Cf. Dionysius the Areopagite, Ep. IX, To Titus, Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works,

tr. Colm Luibheid, p. 284:

2. As Paul said and as true reason has said, the ordered arrangement of the whole visible

realm makes known the invisible things of God.3

3 Rom 1:20. [= From the creation of the world, the invisible things of God are clearly seen,

being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead.]

Cf. Wisd.13:1-2:

But all men are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of God: and who by these good

things that are seen, could not understand him that is, neither by attending to the works have

acknowledged who was the workman: but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the

swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon, to be the gods that

rule the world.

Cf. Eusebius of Caesarea: Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation for the Gospel). Tr. E.H.Gifford (1903) Book III, Chapter XIV:

So great is the dissonance of the first physical philosophers: such too is their opinion

concerning first principles, assuming, as they did, no god, no maker, no artificer, nor any

cause of the universe, nor yet gods, nor incorporeal powers, no intelligent natures, no

rational essences, nor anything at all beyond the reach of the senses, in their first principles.

In fact Anaxagoras alone is mentioned as the first of the Greeks who declared in his

discourses about first principles that mind is the cause of all things. They say at least that

this philosopher had a great admiration for natural science beyond all who were before him:

and was the first of the Greeks who stated clearly the doctrine of first principles. For he

not only pronounced, like those before him, on the essence of all things, but also on the

cause which set it in motion. For in the beginning, he said, all things were mingledtogether in confusion: but mind came in, and brought them out of confusion into order.

(emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Suppl., q. 74, art. 2, obj. 3 (tr. English Dominican

Fathers):

Objection 3: Further, this cleansing would seem to consist in purifying the parts of the

world by separating them from one another. Now the separation of the parts of the world

from one another at the worlds beginning was effected by Gods power alone, for the work

of distinction was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the

separation was effected by the act of the intellect which moves all things (cf. Aristotle,

Phys. viii, 9).3Therefore it would seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will bedone immediately by God and not by fire. (emphasis added)

3 On the other hand, Instead of defining this intellect, which he considered to be separate, as the universal

principle of being, he makes it to be only a distinguishing principle, for he did not hold that the bodies that

were mixed with one another, received being (esse) from the separate intellect; they received from it only

distinctions. (St. Thomas Aquinas. Treatise on Separate Substances. Translated by F. J. Lescoe (West Hart-

ford, CT, 1959), Chapter I, n. 3) (emphasis added)

22


23/56

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, The Catechism of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Apostles Creed. In

The Catechetical Instructions of St. Thomas Aquinas . Translated with a Commentary byRev. Joseph B. Collins, S.S., D.D., Ph.D. Introduction by Rev. Rudolph G. Bandas, Ph.D.,

S.T.D. et M. (Baltimore, 1939), What is Faith?, pp 5-8:

The Catechism of St. Thomas Aquinas

The Apostles Creed

WHAT IS FAITH?

The Nature and Effects of Faith.The first thing that is necessary for every Christian is

faith, without which no one is truly called a faithful Christian.[1] Faith brings about four

good effects. The first is that through faith the soul is united to God, and by it there is

between the soul and God a union akin to marriage. I will espouse thee in faith.[2] When a

man is baptized the first question that is asked him is: Do you believe in God?[3] This is

because Baptism is the first Sacrament of faith. Hence, the Lord said: He that believeth and

is baptized shall be saved.[4] Baptism without faith is of no value. Indeed, it must be known

that no one is acceptable before God unless he have faith. Without faith it is impossible toplease God.[5] St. Augustine explains these words of St. Paul, All that is not of faith is

sin,[6] in this way: Where there is no knowledge of the eternal and unchanging Truth,

virtue even in the midst of the best moral life is false.

The second effect of faith is that eternal life is already begun in us; for eternal life is nothing

else than knowing God. This the Lord announced when He said: This is eternal life, that

they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.[7] This

knowledge of God begins here through faith, but it is perfected the future life when we shall

know God as He is. Therefore, St. Paul says: Faith is the substance of things to be hoped

for.[8] No one then can arrive at perfect happiness of heaven, which is the true knowledge

of God, unless first he knows God through faith. Blessed are they that have not seen and

have believed.[9]

The third good that comes from faith is that right direction which it gives to our present life.

Now, in order that one live a good life, it is necessary that he know what is necessary to liverightly; and if he depends for all this required knowledge on his own efforts alone, either he

will never attain such knowledge, or if so, only after a long time. But faith teaches us all that

is necessary to live a good life.

It teaches us that there is one God who is the rewarder of good and the punisher of evil; that

there is a life other than this one, and other like truths whereby we are attracted to live

rightly and to avoid what evil. The just man liveth by faith.[10] This is evident in that no

one of the philosophers before the coming of Christ could, through his own powers, know

God and the means necessary for salvation as well as any old woman since Christs coming

knows Him through faith. And, therefore, it is said in Isaias that the earth is filled with the

knowledge of the Lord.[11]

The fourth effect of faith is that by it we overcome temptations: The holy ones by faith

conquered kingdoms.[12] We know that every temptation is either from the world or the

flesh or the devil. The devil would have us disobey God and not be subject to Him. This is

removed by faith, since through it we know that He is the Lord of all things and must

therefore be obeyed. Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom

he may devour. Whom resist ye, strong in faith.[13] [5-6]

23


24/56

The world tempts us either by attaching us to it in prosperity, or by filling us with fear of

adversity. But faith overcomes this in that we believe in a life to come better than this one,

and hence we despise the riches of this world and we are not terrified in the face of

adversity. This is the victory which overcometh the world: our faith.[14] The flesh,

however, tempts us by attracting us to the swiftly passing pleasures of this present life. But

faith shows us that, if we cling to these things inordinately, we shall lose eternal joys. In all

things taking the shield of faith.[15] We see from this that it is very necessary to have faith.

The Evidence of Things that Appear Not.But someone will say that it is foolish tobelieve what is not seen, and that one should not believe in things that he cannot see. I

answer by saying that the imperfect nature of our intellect takes away the basis of this diffi-culty. For if man of himself could in a perfect manner know all things visible and invisible, it

would indeed be foolish to believe what he does not see. But our manner of knowing is so

weak that no philosopher could perfectly investigate the nature of even one little fly. We

even read that a certain philosopher spent thirty years in solitude in order to know the natureof the bee. If, therefore, our intellect is so weak, it is foolish to be willing to believe con-

cerning God only that which man can know by himself alone. And against this is the word of

Job: Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge.[16] One can also answer this ques-

tion by supposing that a certain master had said something concerning his own special

branch of knowledge, and some uneducated person would contradict him for no other reason

than that he could not understand what the master said! Such a person would be consideredvery foolish. So, the intellect of the Angels as greatly exceeds the intellect of the greatest

philosopher as much as that of the greatest philosopher exceeds the intellect of the

uneducated man. Therefore, the philosopher is foolish if he refuses to believe what an Angel

says, and far greater fool to refuse to believe what God says. Against such are these words:

For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of men.[17] Then, again, if

one were willing to believe only those things which one knows with certitude, one could not

live in this world. How could one live unless one believed others? How could one know that

this man is ones own father? Therefore, it is necessary that one believe others in matterswhich one cannot know perfectly for oneself. But no one is so worthy of belief as is God,

and hence they who do not believe the words of faith are not wise, but foolish and proud. As

the Apostle says: He is proud, knowing nothing.[18] And also: I know whom I have

believed; and I am certain.[19] And it is written: Ye who fear the Lord, believe Him andyour reward shall not be made void.[20]

Finally, one can say also that God proves the truth of the things which faith teaches. Thus, if

a king sends letters signed with his seal, no one would dare to say that those letters did not

represent the will of the king. In like manner, everything that the Saints believed and handed

down to us concerning the faith of Christ is signed with the seal of God. This seal consists of

those works which no mere creature could accomplish; they are the miracles by which Christ

confirmed the sayings of the apostles and of the Saints. If, however, you would say that no

one has witnessed these miracles, I would reply in this manner. It is a fact that the entire

world worshipped idols and that the faith of Christ was persecuted, as the histories of the

pagans also testify. But now all are turned to Christwise men and noble and rich

converted by the words of the poor and simple preachers of Christ. Now, this fact was eithermiracle or it was not. If it is miraculous, you have what you asked for, a visible fact; if it is

not, then there could not be a greater miracle than that the whole world should have beenconverted without [6-7] miracles. And we need go no further. We are more certain,

therefore, in believing the things of faith than those things which can be seen, because Gods

knowledge never deceives us, but the visible sense of man is often in error.[21]

(For Questions for Discussion see Chapter 6.)

24


25/56

ENDNOTES

1. The Catechism of the Council of Trent, known as the Roman Catechism (and so

called throughout this book), thus introduces the explanation of the twelve Articles of the

Creed: The Christian religion proposes to the faithful many truths which either singly

or all together must be held with a certain and firm faith. That which must first and

necessarily be believed by all is that which God Himself has taught us as the foundation

of truth and its summary concerning the unity of the Divine Essence, the distinction of

Three Persons, and the actions which are by particular reason attributed to each. Thepastor should teach that the Apostles Creed briefly sets forth the doctrine of these mysteries.

. . . The Apostles Creed is divided into three principal parts. The first part describes the FirstPerson of the Divine Nature and the marvellous work of the creation. The second part treats

of the Second Person and the mystery of mans redemption. The third part concludes with

the Third Person, the head and source of our sanctification. The varied and appropriate

propositions of the Creed are called Articles, after a comparison often made by the

Fathers; for just as the members of the body are divided by joints (articuli), so in this

profusion of faith whatever must be distinctly and separately believed from everything

else is rightly and aptly called an Article (Part I, Chapter I, 4).

2. Osee, ii. 20

3. In the ceremony of administering The Sacrament of Baptism, the priest asks the Sponsor:

N., do you believe in God the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth?4. Mark, xvi. 16.

5. Heb., xi. 6.

6. Rom., xiv. 23.

7. John, xvii. 3.

8. Heb., xi. 1.

9. John, xx. 29.

10. Hab., ii.

on belief and faith

Documents