nfpa case study: nightclub fires - springfield

NFPA Case Study: Nightclub Fires

Prepared by Robert F. Duval, Senior Fire Investigator, National Fire Protection Association

2 NFPA CASE STUDY: NIGHTCLUB FIRES

© 2006 NFPA

ContentsHistorical Perspective ............................................................................................................................2Rhythm Club ............................................................................................................................................3Cocoanut Grove ........................................................................................................................................4Beverly Hills Supper Club..........................................................................................................................8

The Station ..........................................................................................................................................12Building Construction and Occupancy ....................................................................................................13Egress Arrangement................................................................................................................................15Fire Alarms ............................................................................................................................................15Fire Protection ........................................................................................................................................15

The Incident ..........................................................................................................................................16NFPA Timetable ......................................................................................................................................18The Aftermath ........................................................................................................................................18

NFPA’s Response ..................................................................................................................................24The Continuing Challenge ......................................................................................................................26

Appendix ..............................................................................................................................................28The Rhode Island Response ....................................................................................................................29The Massachusetts Response ................................................................................................................31Report of the Technical Investigation of The Station Nightclub FireNational Construction Safety Team - NIST ..............................................................................................34

NFPA Fire Investigations DepartmentOne Batterymarch ParkQuincy, MA 02169 USA

Phone: (617) 984-7263Fax: (617) 984-7110Email: [email protected] site: www.nfpa.org

NFPA CASE STUDY: NIGHTCLUB FIRES 1

© 2006 NFPA

In the late evening hours of February 20, 2003, a fast-moving fire spread throughThe Station nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island. At the time that the firebegan there were reportedly over 440 occupants in the club. This fire completelydestroyed the building and resulted in 100 fatalities and over 200 injuries,becoming the fourth deadliest nightclub fire in U.S. history.

This fire immediately invoked memories of other tragic fires in assembly occupancies, such as the Cocoanut Grove, the Rhythm Club, and the Beverly HillsSupper Club. Many common factors can be found when analyzing these tragedies,including combustible interior finish, overcrowding, and problems with egress.

Following several months of study and analysis, several changes to key NFPAcodes were completed resulting in new requirements that would help to mitigatesimilar occurrences in the future. These changes were made to NFPA 101®, LifeSafety Code®, and NFPA 5000®, Building Construction and Safety Code®, relating toAssembly Occupancies and included provisions for crowd managers, added furtherrestrictions on festival seating unless a life safety evaluation had been completed,required facilities to conduct egress inspections before opening for business, andadded provisions that would require automatic sprinklers in existing nightclub-typeassembly occupancies with occupant loads of over 100 and in all new nightclub-type assembly occupancies. The Tentative Interim Amendments (TIAs), which wereapproved by the NFPA Standards Council as interim requirements in July of 2003became permanent provisions of the 2006 editions of NFPA 101, Life Safety Code,and NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code, as well as NFPA 1,Uniform Fire CodeTM.

Additionally, the 2006 editions of NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000 require the mainentrance/exit of new nightclub-type assembly occupancies to accommodate notless than two-thirds of the total occupant load. Other exits must accommodate not less than one-half the total occupant load. Thus, the total egress capacity must accommodate 117% of the total occupant load.

This case study will review historic fires in assembly occupancies as well asreview The Station nightclub fire and the response of NFPA to this tragedy.In addition, changes made by the states of Rhode Island and Massachusetts aswell as an investigation completed by the National Institute of Standards andTechnology are also summarized.

Historical PerspectiveFires resulting in large losses of life in assembly occupancies have been occurringfor hundreds of years. In the 19th century, theatres were the most commonassembly location where major fires resulting in large numbers of fatalitiesoccurred. Some examples are:

• Richmond Theatre, Richmond, VA – December 26, 1811 – 72 Fatalities

• Conway Theatre, Brooklyn, NY – December 5, 1876 – 295 Fatalities

• Ring Theatre, Vienna, Austria – December 8, 1881 – 794 Fatalities

• Comiqué Opera House, Paris, France – May 25, 1887 – 200 Fatalities

• Royal Theatre, Exeter, UK – September 4, 1887 – 187 Fatalities

As the 20th century began, the fire at the Iroquois Theatre in Chicago, IL, onDecember 30, 1903, resulted in 602 fatalities, making it the deadliest fire in anassembly occupancy in the United States.

Common contributing factors in these fires were lighting (candles, gas lamps, orelectric stage lights) igniting combustible materials on or near the stage; inade-quate, blocked/locked, or poorly designed egress systems; and combustible interi-or finish. In each of the cases previously mentioned the fire began in the area ofthe stage as a lighting fixture came in contact with combustible materials nearbyand spread rapidly, spreading heat and smoke over the audience, resulting in arush to the exits. In these examples, egress systems were often inadequate innumber or design, if not blocked or otherwise nonfunctional. These conditions ledto many occupants being overcome before they could reach an exit, resulting inlarge losses of life. In the case of the Iroquois Theatre, the facility was touted as“Absolutely Fireproof” as a way to ease the concerns of patrons. While the buildingitself may have been noncombustible, the interior finish, contents, and other fur-nishings were not.

In the years that followed the Iroquois Theatre fire, deadly assembly occupancyfires began to occur in clubs as these establishments became a popular form ofentertainment and socializing.

The following are some examples of fatal fires in club settings. The accounts aretaken from NFPA reports on the incidents.


© 2006 NFPA

Rhythm ClubNatchez, MississippiApril 23, 19401

A fire in the Rhythm Club in Mississippi took207 lives and injured over 200 more of the 700people that were in the building that evening tolisten to a popular Chicago orchestra.

The Rhythm Club was a single-story, wood-framed building measuring 120 ft (36.6 m) x 38ft (11.6 m). (See Figure 1.) The roof and sidesof the converted garage building were coveredwith corrugated metal sheets. The structurecontained approximately 24 windows (most ofwhich apparently were shuttered or nailed shutat the time of the fire).

The club had only one exit, a door measuring 38in. (0.9 m) wide. This door opened inward.

Inside the main entrance foyer was a pair ofdoors measuring 6 ft (1.8 m) wide, which alsoopened inward. These doors opened into alobby area. Proceeding through the lobby onewould enter the dance floor, which constitutedthe majority of the floor space. At the far end ofthe club, opposite the entrance, were theorchestra platform and the bar.

The interior of the club was decorated withdried Spanish moss, which was hung on wiresfrom the ceiling joists above the dance floor.The interior walls were constructed of woodenshiplap boards up to 5 ft (1.5 m) from the floor.The floor was composed of wood planks overconcrete.

At the time of the fire, 700 patrons and staffand musicians were reportedly in the building.

At approximately 11:15 p.m., a fire started nearthe hamburger stand, which was located adja-cent to the only exit from the building. The firequickly involved the Spanish moss, spreadingthe fire rapidly throughout the building, andabove the crowd.

Patrons in the vicinity of the entrance were ableto escape. However, those beyond the lobbyarea were quickly trapped by the fire, as piecesof the burning moss began to drop onto thefleeing occupants, igniting their clothing. Thefire forced those who remained inside deeperinto the building toward the orchestra platform.

FIGURE 1 Layout of Rhythm Club (NFPA)


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It was in this location where the majority of thevictims’ bodies were found.

The fire department was notified and respond-ed, extinguishing the fire quickly. During theoverhaul of the fire, they made the grisly dis-covery of dozens of victims within the charredremains of the building.

The contributing factors leading to the loss oflife in this incident were the lack of requiredexits and the highly combustible interior deco-rations. Less than three years later, these fac-tors would again contribute to a large loss oflife in another tragic fire.

Cocoanut GroveBoston, MassachusettsNovember 28, 19422

The Cocoanut Grove nightclub was a populardestination in Boston in 1942. The club offeredentertainment in a nightclub on the street levelas well as more intimate surroundings in asmall lounge on a lower level. In the monthsleading up to the fire, another lounge (BroadwayLounge) had been opened adjacent to the clubon the main level by renovating several adja-cent buildings and adding them to the club’sfootprint. This renovation gave the facility theshape of two overlapping rectangles.

FIGURE 2 Layout of the Cocoanut Grove (NFPA)

The original building was constructed of con-crete in 1916. In the years prior to its transfor-mation into a nightclub, the building was usedas a garage and film storage facility. It was bor-dered on three sides by Piedmont Street,Shawmut Street, and Broadway.

The building measured 100 ft x 90 ft (30.5 m x27.4 m) in an irregular shape. (See Figure 2.)

The building was mainly a single story (with apartial lower level), except for a small upperlevel above the new lounge that containeddressing rooms and restrooms.

The lower level contained the Melody Lounge aswell as the kitchen and liquor storage for theclub.

The main club area measured approximately 60ft x 60 ft (18.3 m x 18.3 m). The BroadwayLounge measured 40 ft x 40 ft (12.2 m x 12.2m), and the Melody Lounge measured 55 ft x 35ft (16.8 m x 10.7 m).

Exits from the facility were located on thePiedmont Street, Shawmut Street, andBroadway sides of the building. The mainentrance was through a revolving door arrange-ment on Piedmont Street. This entrance openedinto the lobby of the club. Access to the MelodyLounge was via a single set of stairs from thelobby. There were no other means of egressfrom this portion of the club. The ShawmutStreet exit was located approximately halfwayalong the wall in the main club area. Anotherdoor on the Shawmut Street wall, adjacent tothe stage, was locked. The Broadway exit waslocated in the new cocktail lounge. A singledoor, in the lounge, leading to the outer doorson Broadway opened inward.

All other doors within the building that wouldhave provided access to the outside werelocked or obscured at the time of the fire. Oneof these locked doors was located on thePiedmont Street side, to the left of the marqueeover the main entrance. Had this door beenunlocked at the time of the fire, it would haveprovided a means of egress for the patrons inthe Melody Lounge, without them having totravel into the lobby and use the revolving door.(See Figure 2.)

Exits from the dressing rooms on the upperlevel were via stairs that terminated at thelocked Shawmut Street door.

Windows on the Piedmont Street and ShawmutStreet sides of the building were covered so asnot to be visible from the inside of the building.

The interior of the nightclub was decorated withnumerous fabrics and materials. These includedartificial leather on walls and the bars, and clothon the ceilings. Suspended ceilings and falsewalls throughout the facility covered the originalconstruction features of the building. Artificialpalm trees were placed in the club and in theMelody Lounge. Lighting and the associatedwiring were incorporated into these trees. TheMelody Lounge also contained rattan wood wallcoverings.

Many of the furnishings within the club andlounges were covered in artificial leather mate-rial, as well.

Reportedly, just eight days before the fire, firedepartment inspectors found “no flammabledecorations” and sufficient exits and fire extin-guishers. The only deficiency the city buildinginspector found in an inspection just prior to thefire was the lack of a steel fire door betweenthe Broadway Lounge and the main dining area.

After the addition of the Broadway Lounge, theclub had applied for a license as a restaurantwith a capacity of 490 patrons. The reportedcapacity of all areas was approximately 600. Onthe night of November 28, 1942, the CocoanutGrove was well over capacity, with estimates ofover 1,000 occupants in the building at the timeof the fire.

The fire began in the area of an artificial palmtree in the Melody Lounge. A popular accountwas that a busboy used a match to provide lightas he investigated a faulty light bulb within thetree. Within seconds the tree had ignited. Thesmoke, heat, and flames spread rapidlythroughout the lounge, forcing patrons to flee,using the only exit passage toward the stairsand the lobby. Many were overcome before theycould reach the exit.

The first indication of trouble for occupants onthe main floor was when a young woman ranscreaming through the lobby with her hair on


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fire, immediately followed by a wave of smokeand heat from the stairwell. Many headedtoward the exit on Piedmont Street, havingentered the club earlier through the revolvingdoor at that entrance. The revolving door quicklybecame jammed as patrons pushed toward thedoor.

Others within the main club headed toward thedoor on Shawmut Street. Many were able toexit through this door until smoke and toxicfumes, along with the tangle of hundreds oftables and chairs, overcame those remaining inthe building.

Those in the Broadway Lounge were the last toknow of the fire, being the most remote fromthe lobby area. Approximately 4–6 minutes fromignition, occupants from the main club areabegan to rush into the Broadway Lounge seek-ing an exit from the building. The smoke, heat,and fumes followed rapidly. The only remainingviable exit from the building was quicklyjammed as the inward-opening door was forcedclosed by the crush of people attempting to exit.

The fire department, which had several units onthe block for an automobile fire, was alerted bya passer-by to the commotion at the CocoanutGrove. Arriving within seconds, fire fightersimmediately went to work rescuing patronsnear the entrances. Additional alarms weresounded as the magnitude of the situationbecame apparent. Windows were broken on theShawmut Street side in an attempt to gainaccess to the building and as a means ofremoving victims. Fire fighters and civiliansbegan to pull bodies from the building throughany accessible point. Victims, suffering burnsand smoke inhalation injuries, were transportedby all available means to city hospitals.

At this point the fire had consumed the com-bustible interior finish and furnishings and wasextinguished rapidly by the fire department.

Once fire fighters were able to gain access tothe interior of the building they were met with ahorrific sight: bodies piled several feet high atthe revolving door and near the exit in theBroadway Lounge. Approximately 200 bodieswere found at the revolving door and 100 morewere found at the Broadway entrance. Theremaining fatalities were found throughout the

facility, many at their tables, overcome so rapid-ly that they were unable to make an effort toescape.

In the days and weeks following the fire, thedeath toll became a staggering 492, making theCocoanut Grove the deadliest nightclub fire inU.S. history.

In the months following the Cocoanut Grove fire,changes were made to building codes acrossthe country. The most notable advances weremade in the areas of exits, combustible materi-als, emergency lighting, and automatic sprin-klers. The definition of places of public assem-bly was also expanded. Before the fire at theCocoanut Grove, many jurisdictions did not con-sider restaurants and nightclubs to be places ofpublic assembly. Notably, the 1942 edition ofthe NFPA Buildings Exit Code (the early versionof today’s Life Safety Code) did consider night-clubs to be essentially places of public assem-bly, in the same class as a theatre, but having agreater possibility of fire.3

Today it is recognized that all assembly occu-pancies should have at least two separate andremote means of egress, and the necessarynumber, width, and types of reliable exits basedon the expected occupancy should be available.After the fire, Robert Moulton, NFPA’s TechnicalSecretary and the secretary of the NFPACommittee on Safety to Life, indicated in anewspaper interview: “The most glaring featureof this tragedy was the lack of proper exits.Revolving doors have long been considered bythe National Fire Protection AssociationCommittee on Safety to Life as a menace underfire and panic conditions.”4

That same edition of the Code required that“decorations of theatres and assembly hallsshall be of fire-resistive or nonflammable mate-rials. Fabrics and papers used for such purpos-es shall be treated with an effective flame-proofing material.” A cautionary note warned:“Paper and cloth decorative materials should bekept to a minimum in places of assembly sincesuch flimsy materials increase the hazard of thekindling and spread of fire.”

Largely as a direct result of the Cocoanut Grovefire, the Building Exits Code was adopted bymany more jurisdictions across the country, due


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in large part to the efforts of the fire service.The Committee on Safety to Life reported onthat increased usage at the 1945 NFPA AnnualMeeting.

It was during the 1945 NFPA Annual Meetingthat the Committee on Safety to Life also rec-

ommended a change in the method of exitmeasurement, clarification of the need for stair-way enclosure, provisions regulating loosechairs in nightclubs, and changes in lighting andsigns. Those changes were incorporated intothe 1946 edition of the Code, as was a specialnote on interior finish.5


© 2006 NFPA

FIGURE 3 Beverly Hills Supper Club Layout (NFPA)

Beverly Hills Supper ClubSouthgate, KentuckyMay 28, 19776

On Saturday, May 28, 1977, approximately2,400 to 2,800 people were attending severalfunctions within the Beverly Hills Supper Club,an expansive banquet and nightclub facility. Bythe end of the night, 164 patrons and employ-ees would die when a fire that began in anunattended room, and quickly spread through-out the facility, trapped many before they couldexit the complex.

The Beverly Hills Supper Club was a mostlyone-story facility that covered over 65,000 sq ft(6,039 sq m) of total floor space [ground level:240 ft x 260 ft (73.1 m x 79.3 m)] and con-tained numerous function and meeting roomsas well as a large showroom (the CabaretRoom, which could seat over 1,200 people).(See Figure 3.) A second level was locatedabove the Main Bar in the original portion of thecomplex and a partial basement was located

beneath the south portion. The original facilitywas constructed in 1937 and several additionsand renovations were completed in the next 33years until a major rebuilding project wasundertaken after a fire in the complex in 1970.

The construction of the facility was classified asnoncombustible (steel framing, masonry walls,poured concrete floors, and a built-up roof sys-tem on a steel deck). Throughout the facility,there were suspended ceilings of mineral tilesinstalled beneath the original plaster and fibertiles. Wood framing was utilized for interior par-titions in several areas in the complex, and floorjoists in the two-story section (above the ZebraRoom) were constructed of plywood and lum-ber.

The interior of the facility was decorated withwood paneling, draperies, and carpeting, amongother combustible finishes.

Fire protection within the facility consisted onlyof portable fire extinguishers. The building wasnot equipped with automatic sprinklers or


© 2006 NFPA

FIGURE 4 Exit Locations in the Beverly Hills Supper Club (NFPA).

standpipe systems. The complex did not containan alarm system or fire/smoke detectiondevices.

There were eight exit discharge points from thecomplex. (See Figure 4.) However, one locatedin the Viennese Room (C), was “disguised” as awindow, even though there was an exit signinstalled above the door. Another door adjacentto the Cabaret Room was reportedly locked atthe time of the fire (H). This door was adjacentto another exit, equipped with a double door (G).

At approximately 8:45 p.m. on the evening ofMay 28, a fire was discovered by a staff mem-ber in the Zebra Room, which had been unoc-cupied since a wedding party had left sometimebefore 8:00 p.m. Employees alerted managersto the fire, as other staff attempted to battle thefire using portable fire extinguishers. As theycontinued to fight the fire, other employeesbegan to assist patrons in exiting the building.

Customers in the rooms closest to the ZebraRoom (Viennese, Empire, and Café) becameaware of the fire first, as smoke traveled downthe corridors and as the staff began to notifythem to exit immediately.

The fire department was notified of a fire at thecomplex at 9:01 p.m.

Patrons in the Crystal Rooms on the secondfloor above the Zebra Room became aware ofthe fire when smoke and heat began to travelup the open stairway from the first level. All buttwo of the occupants on the second levelescaped by using an unblocked stairwell intothe kitchen. The remaining two were overcomeand perished in the dressing room area on thislevel.

Those in the Cabaret Room were notified to exitby a staff person at approximately 9:06 p.m.Smoke and heat quickly began to fill the room,as the fire began to travel down the corridorfrom the Zebra Room. The smoke and flamesrapidly filled the Cabaret Room and GardenRoom, trapping many of the patrons before theycould reach an exit. Two of the exits from theCabaret Room (B and H) became blocked bysmoke and heat, rapidly forcing almost all ofthe patrons (estimated at 1,200 to 1,300) in theroom to attempt to reach the only remainingexit (A).

As the initial fire department units wereresponding to the scene, smoke was visiblefrom a distance. Upon arrival, the Southgate firechief reported smoke issuing from the mainentrance, several injured people gathered nearthe building, and occupants still exiting thecomplex. The magnitude of the situation quicklybecame apparent and the chief requested addi-tional resources. Several hose lines and aerialstreams were put in service as more and moreapparatus arrived. Rescue efforts concentratedon those victims still in the complex, as person-nel attended to those who had exited or hadbeen removed and were lying injured outsidethe complex.

A decision was made at approximately 11:30p.m. to evacuate all fire personnel from thebuilding as the fire continued to spreadthroughout the massive complex.

Eventually the incident involved every firedepartment in the county. Twenty-four firedepartments responded with ambulances orrescue units from surrounding counties as well.In total, approximately 522 fire fightersresponded to the fire.

The fire was placed under control at approxi-mately 2:00 a.m. on May 29. The search for vic-tims began again at daylight.

The fire was not declared completely extin-guished until Monday, May 30.

The majority of the victims were removed fromthe Cabaret Room on the night of the fire. Theyincluded 99 victims that were located in thevicinity of Exit A, the double swinging doors tothe left of the stage. Another 34 victims werelocated in the vicinity of Exit B, to the right ofthe stage, near the dressing rooms. An addition-al 26 victims were recovered after the fire fromthe area around Exit A. Two victims were locat-ed in the Viennese Room after the fire. Threeinjured victims eventually died at the hospital,resulting in a total of 164 fatalities.

The complex was completely destroyed by thefire. The vast majority of the roof structure col-lapsed into the building as a result of the firedamage.

The team conducting the investigation of thefire determined that the most probable cause ofthe fire was an electrical malfunction in the


© 2006 NFPA

concealed space at the ceiling of the ZebraRoom. The exact fixture or appliance could notbe determined due to the damage in the area oforigin.

The NFPA report on the Beverly Hills SupperClub fire found that the following factors con-tributed to the loss of life:

• Delayed discovery of fire in the Zebra Room

• Attempts by employees to extinguish the firebefore notifying occupants

• No Emergency/Evacuation Plan to trainemployees in proper actions in the event of afire

• Overcrowding: At the time of the fire theCabaret Room contained almost three timesthe number of occupants that the space couldsafely accommodate. At the time of the firethe entire facility contained almost twice thenumber of occupants that the facility couldsafely accommodate.

• The capacity of the means of egress for thefacility and especially the Cabaret Room wasnot adequate for the occupant load when cal-culated based on the square feet per personor the actual number of occupants.

• The interior finish in the main north-southcorridor exceeded the flame spread allowedfor assembly occupancies in the Life SafetyCode and contributed to the rapid fire spreadfrom the Zebra Room to the Cabaret Room.

• The complex was not provided with automaticsprinkler protection as would have beenrequired by the building code and fire codesin effect at the time.

In the next edition of the Life Safety Code(1981) following the fire, changes were made inthe following areas:

• Both new and existing assembly occupancieswith occupant load exceeding 300 wererequired for the first time to have a fire alarmsystem, complete with a voice message formof occupant notification. Therefore, a largefacility such as the supper club (new or exist-ing) in this case, would be required to have afire alarm system.

• New assembly occupancies with occupantload exceeding 300 (regardless of buildingconstruction type) were required for the firsttime to be sprinklered (exemptions included:auditoriums with fixed seating, multipurposeauditoriums less than 12,000 sq ft in educa-tional occupancy buildings, restaurants withan occupant load of fewer than 1,000 per-sons, passenger terminals at or above grade,and gymnasiums used for no other purpose).Therefore, a new facility like the one involvedin this fire would be required to have a sprin-kler system installed.

When reviewing these three incidents, somecommon contributing factors can also be found:

• Combustible Interior Finishes

• Inadequate Egress Capacity

• Overcrowding

With the exception of the ignition sources beingopen flame in earlier incidents, the contributingfactors are the same as those from the inci-dents over 100 years ago.


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© 2006 NFPA

The StationNFPA became aware of The Station nightclub fire in the early morning hours ofFebruary 21, 2003. As the magnitude of the incident became clearer, NFPA SeniorFire Investigator Robert Duval traveled to West Warwick, RI, that morning, at therequest of the Rhode Island State Fire Marshal’s Office, to provide assistanceimmediately following the tragedy.

While on the scene in the hours and days following the incident, opportunitieswere taken to meet with investigators, fire officers, and fire fighters; to view thescene; and to perform an on-site study of the incident. The information gatheredduring the on-site activities and subsequent analysis of that information is thebasis for this report. Entry to the fire scene was made through the cooperation ofthe Rhode Island State Fire Marshal’s Office.

The information in this report is intended to serve as an aid to researchers, safetyspecialists, the fire service, and to the codes- and standards-development activi-ties conducted by NFPA and other organizations. The opinions expressed and con-clusions drawn are those of the NFPA staff who prepared this report and do not,therefore, necessarily represent the official position of NFPA or of the NFPATechnical Committees that develop NFPA codes and standards. (See NFPARegulations Governing Committee Projects 6-1.1.)

All information and details regarding the fire safety conditions gathered in thisreport are based on the best available data and observations made during the on-site data collection phase and on any additional information provided duringthe report development process. It should be noted that the ability of NFPA staff to collect all relevant facts and draw definitive conclusions may be limited by avariety of factors, including available time and access. This report is not intendedto comprehensively document or analyze this fire incident. For such a report, seethe National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) technical investigationreport summarized in the Appendix. Rather, this report focuses on some of thecontributing factors that have been seen in the other nightclub fires summarized inthe first part of this study. The purpose of the report is not to pass judgment on orfix liability for the loss of life and property resulting from the fire but is rather toprovide documentation and discussion that may help to better the understandingof how to minimize or prevent such losses in the future.


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The 2003 editions of relevant NFPA codes andstandards were used as the basis for this analy-sis so that the information gathered about thefire could be reviewed in light of the most cur-rent editions of NFPA codes and standardsavailable at the time of the fire. It is recognized,however, that these codes and standards maynot have been in effect during the design, con-struction, and operation of the building. NFPAhas not analyzed the building in West Warwickregarding its compliance with the local codesand standards in existence when the buildingwas constructed and during its operation. Inaddition, NFPA reviewed information included inthe NIST–National Construction Safety Teamreport on the fire.

The cooperation of the Rhode Island State FireMarshal’s Office is greatly appreciated. Theauthor would also like to extend his apprecia-tion to former Rhode Island State Fire MarshalIrving Owens, Chief Deputy State Fire MarshalsMichael DiMascolo and Richard James, andtheir staff for their assistance during the on-scene portion of the investigation and in prepar-ing this report.

Building Construction and OccupancyThe building that contained The Station night-club was constructed in approximately 1946.The structure was utilized as a restaurant, tav-ern, and nightclub under various owners.Numerous renovations and repairs were com-pleted on the building in the time since con-struction.

A fire damaged the club in March of 1972. Thebuilding remained closed until November 1974,when repairs were completed on the fire dam-age. At this point the building was converted

from a club into a restaurant, and reopened. InFebruary 1985, a change of ownership occurredand the facility was converted once again to a“pub.” According to records, in 1991 the facilitywas converted to nightclub use.7

The building was a wood-framed structure witha mansard-type roof façade on the north side.The walls were of wood construction, withwooden exterior shingles. The wood frame roofstructure was mostly flat with a built-up asphaltcovering.

A partial basement was located beneath theeastern portion of the building.

Windows were located mainly on the north faceof the building. Windows on the east side of thefront entrance consisted of double-hung type,while the west side contained a “sunroom-type”window assembly. Small windows were locatedin the restrooms and office areas on the southwall of the building. These windows containedsecurity bars.

The interior of the building was arranged intotwo distinct areas: the bar and the club. The bararea was located in the northeastern portion ofthe building (to the left as one entered the frontentrance). This area also included the kitchenand dart room portion of the facility. The clubportion, which encompassed the majority of thefacility, was located west (right) of the frontentrance. This area of the facility included thedance floor, the platform, and the sunroom,which contained billiard tables. (See Figure 6.)

The entrance to the facility was arranged with ashort corridor, approximately 15 ft (4.6 m) inlength and 6 ft 6in. (2 m) in width. At the end ofthis corridor there were doorways to the rightand left. The bar area was located to the left,while the club area occupied the space to theright of this corridor.

FIGURE 5 Front (north) View of The Station Nightclub.


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The bar area contained a horseshoe-shaped barin the northeast portion of the building. Thekitchen was located immediately behind thebar. A room referred to as the dart room waslocated behind the kitchen. Access to the foodand beverage coolers was located through thedart room.

The southeast corner of the building containedthe business office and the club restrooms.

The club area of the facility contained smalltables with chairs and a small number of boothsalong the southwest wall of the area. The tablesand chairs could be rearranged or removedfrom the building in the event a large crowdwas anticipated for a show. The billiard tablescould be moved against the walls in the sun-room in order to make room for additionalpatrons. On the night of the fire, the tables weremoved to allow for extra room.

A raised platform was centrally located on thewest wall of the club area. An alcove was locat-ed to the rear of the platform to allow for addi-tional room on the platform. When bands per-formed, the drummer was usually located inthis alcove. The ceiling area directly above theplatform was raised slightly to allow for theinstallation of a stage lighting unit.

The interior finish at the time of the fire report-edly consisted of painted surfaces, woodenpaneling, and expanded foam plastic insulation.In an effort to lessen the noise on the exterior ofthe club when bands performed at the club,expanded foam insulating material was installedon the walls of the building interior, around theplatform and within the drummer’s alcove. Theexact extent of the expanded foam plastic insu-lating material installation and its composition isnot known.

N

FIGURE 6 The Station Building Floor Plan.

Egress ArrangementThe building contained four exits:

• Front (main) doors

• Bar side exit door

• Platform exit door

• Kitchen exit door

The front entrance contained two doors (each36 in. [0.9 m] wide) that swung outward. Aramp and step arrangement was located at thefront entrance. A railing on the platform wasinstalled parallel to the front wall of the build-ing, making the platform at the entrance 6 ft 6in. (2 m) wide. A single, outward swinging doorwas located approximately 6 ft (1.8 m) into thecorridor as measured from the front doors. Thecross-corridor door was approximately 36 in.(0.9 m) wide. The corridor measured 6 ft. 7in.(2 m) in width.

The front entrance corridor contained two open-ings into the main portion of the building, oneon the bar side of the corridor and the other intothe club. A counter for a ticket taker was locat-ed to the left at the end of the corridor.

The bar and kitchen exits each contained a door36 in. (0.9 m) wide that swung outward. Bothdoors were equipped with panic hardware.

The exit near the platform measured 36 in. (0.9m) wide and contained two doors mounted inseries in the door opening: one interior and oneexterior. At the time of the fire, the interior doorswung inward, while the metal-clad outer doorswung outward. The exterior door was equippedwith panic hardware.

Illuminated exit signs were located above eachexit.

Fire AlarmsThe building was equipped with a fire alarmsystem consisting of manual fire alarm boxes,heat detectors, and horn/strobe notificationunits. The heat detectors were located through-out the facility, including above and below theplatform in the club area.

The fire alarm system was not connected to acentral station service or to the local firedepartment alarm office.

Fire ProtectionThis facility was not protected with automaticsprinklers.

Portable fire extinguishers were locatedthroughout the facility, although the exact distri-bution and type could not be determined.

The kitchen contained a chemical extinguishingsystem for the cooking area, as well.


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The Incident On the evening of the fire, the nightclub was hosting a program with severalbands, including a headlining act. The headlining band took the stage at approxi-mately 11:07 p.m. Several seconds into the act, pyrotechnic devices called gerbs8

were activated in the center of the platform, directly in front of the drummer’salcove.

A local television station was filming the evening’s activities for an upcoming storyon nightclub safety in the days following the fatal crowd crush incident at theChicago E2 nightclub, which claimed the lives of 21 on February 17, 2003. Thisnews video provided a firsthand account of the activities inside the club in themoments leading up to the fire, as well as the first terrifying moments after thefire. (A video account of such a tragic incident is rare, but has occurred before asin the case of the Bradford Soccer Stadium Fire in England on May 11, 1985.)


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In the news video, the viewer can see the lightsdim as the band takes the stage and begins thefirst song. As the pyrotechnic devices activate,the sparks emanating from the gerbs ignite thematerial on the walls around the platform, nearthe opening to the alcove. Flames begin toexpand slowly at first, at the two ends of thealcove opening, spreading upward. For the firstfew seconds, the crowd seems to think the fireis part of the pyrotechnic special effects and theband seems unaware of the fire. Within 10 to20 seconds, crowd members begin pointing atthe spreading flames on the walls, as membersof the band become aware of the fire. The bandstops playing and leaves the platform in lessthan 30 seconds. At this point the crowd beginsto react and to attempt to egress the building.

The cameraman’s viewpoint is from the rear ofthe dance floor area and the video clearlyshows patrons beginning to egress the buildingusing the main entrance, which is to the cam-eraman’s right. The fire alarm sounds atapproximately 40 seconds from the time of igni-tion. The horns and strobes can be clearly heardand seen in the video. The cameraman mergesinto the exiting patrons and leaves the buildingapproximately 70 seconds from the time of theignition. As the cameraman exits, the videoshows the fire growing rapidly on the walls nearthe platform and the smoke layer growingthicker throughout the building. As the camera-man enters the corridor near the front entrance,smoke can be seen on the video, growing heav-ier, from a light haze to a darker gray.

Once the cameraman is outside, the video dis-plays the smoke growing thick and black andbillowing out the front doors and windows aspatrons use both to escape. Within seconds,escaping patrons begin to pile up at the frontdoors, as those behind them struggle to escape.Those who have escaped attempt to free thosetrapped in the pile, as heavy smoke pours outover their heads.

The video then shows the scene as the camera-man walks around to the west from the front ofthe building. As he trains the camera in theplatform door opening, the viewer sees thickblack smoke within 12 inches of the floor, andbright orange flames deep within the building.

Approximately 4 minutes and 30 seconds haveelapsed from the time of ignition.

At this point, sirens can be heard. As the cam-eraman walks back toward the front of thebuilding, the situation has worsened. The blacksmoke has turned to flame at the front entranceand at the open windows along the front of thebuilding. As the first fire apparatus arrives onthe scene, a hoseline is stretched to the frontentrance and water is aimed into the front corri-dor in an effort to save those trapped in theentrance corridor.

From the time of ignition to the point where thefacility was well involved in flames less than 6minutes passed.

The initial 911 calls for assistance werereceived from cellular phones at the scene. Thepolice officer stationed at the club on a paiddetail notified his dispatcher of the fire as well.

The West Warwick Fire Department, upon notifi-cation of the severity of the situation, requestedmutual aid from surrounding communities forboth fire apparatus and ambulances. A MultipleCasualty Incident (MCI) was declared and thelocal MCI plan was put into effect.

A triage area was established in a restaurantacross the street from the nightclub. As fire andrescue units converged on the scene, victimswere transported to nearby hospitals and trau-ma centers, quickly filling many to capacity.Over 200 victims were treated on the scene andtransported to several medical facilities in thearea in under 2 hours from the time of the fire.

The initial death toll was 96 on the day after thefire. This rose to 100 over the course of the 70days following the fire, as four of the mostseverely injured died in hospitals in RhodeIsland and Massachusetts.

With the transport of the last of the injured, thetask of recovery of the victims within the build-ing began, with units from the State FireMarshal, State Medical Examiner’s Office, and atask force of law enforcement agencies (local,state, and federal) taking part. The recoveryphase was completed late in the day onFebruary 21. (The last victim was identified onFebruary 25.) The scene was secured as theinvestigation process began.

NFPA TimetableElapsed Time Event

0 Pyrotechnics Activated

9 seconds Flame Visible on Wall

19 seconds Flames Progressing Upward –Crowd Begins to React

25 seconds Flames at Ceiling

35 seconds Band Stops Playing

48 seconds Alarms Heard

1 minute Smoke at Ceiling Throughout Room

1:15 Cameraman at Front Door(Smoke at Ceiling and Out Front Door)

1:30 Fire Visible at Platform Door

1:43 Black Smoke at Bottom ofSunroom Windows

1:53 Black Smoke at Front Door –Occupants Piled at Door

2:00 Alarms No Longer Audiblefrom the Outside of theBuilding

2:23 Occupants Exiting at WindowsNear Bar (Left of Front Exit)

3:00 Black Smoke at All FrontOpenings (Windows andDoors)

3:25 Black Smoke Fills Entire FrontDoor (Victims Still Piled atDoor)

4:00 Black Smoke Thickening at All Front Openings

4:30 Sirens Audible in Background

4:30–4:45 View of Platform Door – Fireon Floor, Heavy Black Smoke,and Dripping Materials fromCeiling

5:00 Fire Visible at Restroom Wing

5:23 Flames at Front Openings(Doors and Windows)

NFPA Timetable Based on TV News Video

The AftermathThe investigation into The Station nightclubtragedy involved many local, state, and federalagencies. Under the direction of the StateAttorney General’s office and State Fire Marshal,an investigative team composed of investigatorsfrom the State Fire Marshal’s office and astatewide task force of law enforcement agen-cies, as well as investigators from the Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) wasformed to conduct the detailed examination ofthe fire.

The fire scene was processed and witnessesinterviewed by the members of the investigativeteam. The scene processing included theinvolvement of a forensic archeologist fromBrown University, whose team divided the sceneinto small grids and further processed the sitefor articles of evidence and personal effects ofvictims.

In the days following the fire, representativesfrom NIST (National Institute of Standards andTechnology) operating under the NationalConstruction Safety Team (NCST) Act visited thescene as well to gather preliminary informationthat would lead to a full report on the fire thatwas released in June 2005 (see Appendix).

On December 9, 2003, a state Grand Jury hand-ed up indictments against the two owners ofthe nightclub and the manager of the headliningact. Each was charged with 200 counts ofmanslaughter. On February 7, 2006, the bandmanager plead guilty to 100 counts of involun-tary manslaughter in a plea agreement. The trialfor the club owners was slated to begin in mid-2006.

When comparing The Station incident with theother historic fires in assembly occupancies,one of the common factors among them is thepresence of combustible interior finish, con-tents, and furnishings. The presence of com-bustible interior contents can be linked to thefire spread in the Rhythm Club (dried Spanishmoss hung from the ceiling rafters), theCocoanut Grove (furnishings and decorations),and the Beverly Hills Supper Club (wall and floorcoverings). In The Station fire, expanded foaminsulating materials were reportedly in place on


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FIGURE 7 View from Interior of Club Showing the Platform and Drummer’s Alcove (NFPA).

FIGURE 8 Exterior View of Exit Adjacent to Platform Area (NFPA).


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FIGURE 9 Exterior View Showing the Kitchen Exit Looking Toward the Platform Area (NFPA).

FIGURE 10 Exterior View Showing Both the Bar and the Kitchen Exits (see arrows) (NFPA).

the walls adjacent to the platform and in thedrummer’s alcove space.

NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, has addressedinterior finish in all occupancies, includingassembly, for many editions of the document.

The classes of interior finish (A, B, and C) arebased on a Flame Spread and SmokeDevelopment Indexes. These indexes are deter-mined by testing a material in accordance withNFPA 255, Standard Method of Test of SurfaceBurning Characteristics of Building Materials(similar to ASTM E 84, Standard Test Method forSurface Burning Characteristics of BuildingMaterials; or UL 723, Standard for Test forSurface Burning Characteristics of BuildingMaterials).

In the 2006 edition of NFPA 101 the subject ofinterior finish is outlined in the following areas:

Chapter 10 Interior Finish, Contents, andFurnishings

10.1 General.

10.1.1 Application. The interior finish, con-tents, and furnishings provisions set forth inthis chapter shall apply to new constructionand existing buildings.

10.2.3.4 Products required to be tested inaccordance with NFPA 255, ASTM E 84, or UL723 shall be classified as follows in accor-dance with their flame spread and smokedevelopment, except as indicated in10.2.3.4(4):

(1) Class A interior wall and ceiling finish shall be characterized by the following:

(a) Flame spread, 0–25

(b) Smoke development, 0–450

(c) No continued propagation of fire in any element thereof when so tested

(2) Class B interior wall and ceiling finish shall be characterized by the following:



(3) Class C interior wall and ceiling finish shall be characterized by the following:



Existing interior finish shall be exempt from thesmoke development criteria of 10.2.3.4(1)(b),10.2.3.4(2)(b), and 10.2.3.4(3)(b).

Chapter 13 Existing Assembly Occupancies

13.3.3 Interior Finish.

13.3.3.1 Interior finish shall be in accordance with Section 10.2.

13.3.3.2 Interior wall and ceiling finish materials complying with Section 10.2 shall be Class A or Class B in all corridors and lobbies and shall be Class A in enclosed stairways.

13.3.3.3 Interior wall and ceiling finish materials complying with Section 10.2 shall be Class A or Class B in general assembly areas having occupant loads of more than 300, and shall be Class A, Class B, or Class Cin assembly areas having occupant loads of 300 or fewer.


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FIGURE 11 Interior View of Front EntranceCorridor Facing North Through the MainEntrance (NFPA).

Interior finish played a significant role in TheStation fire in two ways. Not only was the interi-or finish easily ignited but it also allowed for therapid spread of the fire within the building.According to the Life Safety Code, the interiorfinish is required to be Class A or B for generalassembly areas with occupant loads of morethan 300. Class C interior finish is permitted ifthe occupant load is 300 or fewer. In addition,the expanded foam insulating materialsattached to the walls near the platform wouldbe subject to the provisions for cellular orfoamed plastic, which prohibit the use of thisparticular material as interior finish unless it isutilized with insignificant amounts or the mate-rial has been subjected to fire testing that sub-stantiates the combustibility characteristics forthe use intended under actual fire conditions.

The presence of combustible interior finish inthe area of the fire’s origin affected the ability ofthe occupants to egress the building that night.The fire created conditions within the buildingthat prevented many from reaching an exitbefore being overcome by smoke and heat.When viewing the video taken that night in theclub, one can see that most of the occupantsheaded for the main (front) exit when the firebegan. This exit and its corridor soon becamejammed as occupants rushed to escape theworsening conditions in the building. The bottle-neck at the corridor and the extremely rapidlygrowing fire conditions within the buildingforced occupants to attempt to use windows asa means of escape.

NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, has, for many gen-erations of the document, addressed mainentrance/exit requirements in existing assemblyoccupancies. In the 2003 edition, this require-ment is outlined in the following paragraph:

13.2.3.6 Main Entrance/Exit. Every assemblyoccupancy shall be provided with a main entrance/exit.

13.2.3.6.1 The main entrance/exit shall be of a width that accommodates one-half of the total occupant load and shall be at the level of exit discharge or shall connect to a stairway or ramp leading to a street.

The rapid spread of the fire and the large vol-ume of smoke is validated by the research andmodeling conducted by NIST during its investi-gation.

When examining ignition sources from otherhistoric fires in assembly occupancies, commonforms were found to be lighting (gas, and thenlater, electric) coming in contact with com-bustible materials, or open flame, as was sus-pected in the Cocoanut Grove fire. However, TheStation fire resulted from a form of ignition notoften seen when comparing other fires inassembly occupancies: pyrotechnics.

NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, addressespyrotechnics in existing assembly occupancies,as well as referencing NFPA 1126, Standard forthe Use of Pyrotechnics Before a ProximateAudience, in Chapter 13 on Existing AssemblyOccupancies.

Chapter 13 Existing Assembly Occupancies

13.7.2 Open Flame Devices and Pyrotechnics. No open flame devices or pyrotechnic devices shall be used in any assembly occupancy, unless otherwise permitted by the following:

(1) Pyrotechnic special effect devices shall be permitted to be used on stages before proximate audiences for ceremonial or religious purposes, as part of a demonstration in exhibits, or as part of a performance, provided that both of the following are met:

(a) Precautions satisfactory to the authority having jurisdiction are taken to prevent ignition of any combustible material.

(b) Use of the pyrotechnic device complies with NFPA 1126, Standard for the Use of Pyrotechnics before a Proximate Audience.

A similar requirement is also located in NFPA 1,Uniform Fire Code (1:20.1.4.2).


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NFPA’s ResponseThe inferno at The Station nightclub (February 20, 2003) claimed 100 lives in thefourth-deadliest nightclub fire in U.S. history. Only a few days before, on February17, 2003, a crowd-crush incident at the E2 nightclub took 21 lives in Chicago.

In the immediate aftermath of these incidents, NFPA made available a wide rangeof safety information relating to public assembly occupancies. This included safetytips for club-goers, statistical and historical information about other major night-club fires, NFPA Journal® articles, and links to NFPA fire investigation summariesof similar events. In addition, portions of relevant codes and standards were madeavailable online, as was an inspection checklist for assembly occupancies.


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The most important follow-up in the aftermathof these tragedies fell to the many volunteersthat participate in the development and updat-ing of NFPA codes and standards. NFPA consen-sus codes and standards are developed througha process that brings together volunteers repre-senting varied viewpoints, experience, andexpertise, to achieve a consensus of the affect-ed interests on fire and other safety issues.NFPA staff do not determine the content ofthese codes and standards, but, instead, admin-ister the process and establish rules to promotefairness, openness, and due process in thedevelopment of consensus. Many times in thepast, the codes and standards developmentprocess has responded to and incorporated thelessons learned from major loss incidents. Theresponse to The Station nightclub fire and toThe E2 nightclub crowd-crush incident was noexception and yielded, in short order, new addi-tional code provisions for fire sprinklers, crowdmanagement, and increased main entrance/exitwidth in nightclub-type venues.

Three weeks after the Rhode Island nightclubfire, on March 13, 2003, the NFPA TechnicalCommittee on Assembly Occupancies andMembrane Structures held a special meeting inBoston. Some 30 committee members andalternates, as well as survivors of The Stationnightclub, victims’ families, and members of thefire-safety community, gathered to discuss theStation fire as well as the crowd-crush incidentat Chicago’s E2 nightclub. The committee held afollow-up meeting on July 8–9, 2003, at NFPAHeadquarters.

The committee proposed that NFPA issue emer-gency code amendments, called TentativeInterim Amendments (TIAs). TIAs, which areprocessed in accordance with Section 5 ofNFPA’s Regulations Governing CommitteeProjects, are emergency changes to an NFPAdocument code or standard that occur betweenthe current edition and next edition of that par-ticular document. These code changes are con-sidered tentative because they have only beenapproved by the technical committee andNFPA’s Standards Council, but have not yetgone through the full codes- and standards-making process that includes a review by thepublic through the proposal and comment phas-

es in the revision process. The TIAs are effectiveonly between editions of a document and auto-matically become proposals for the next edition,when the document is then subjected to all ofthe procedures of the entire NFPA open-consen-sus revision process.

As a result of the tentative nature of theseamendments, jurisdictions must adopt TIAsindependently of their adoption of the relevantNFPA document if they so choose. At this point,some jurisdictions opt to use TIAs as guidancetowards establishing their own legislation. In aneffort to provide jurisdictions with codes andstandards addressing the latest issues in build-ing and life safety, NFPA offers support services,including free training, to assist state and localofficials with adoption of these TIAs as well asthe adoption of major NFPA codes and stan-dards.

On July 25, 2003, the NFPA Standards Councilreviewed and issued the technical committee’srecommended TIAs for NFPA 101, Life SafetyCode, 2003 edition, and NFPA 5000, BuildingConstruction and Safety Code, 2003 edition.

The TIAs, which went into effect August 14,2003, includes the following for assembly occu-pancies:

• A requirement that fire sprinklers be installedin new nightclub-like assembly occupancies(such as bars, dance halls, discotheques,nightclubs, and assembly occupancies withfestival seating) [NFPA 101, 12.3.5.1] and inexisting nightclub-like assembly facilities thataccommodate more than 100 [NFPA 101,13.3.5.1] [NFPA 5000 – 16.3.5.1.1]

• A requirement that, before opening to thepublic, building owners must inspect allmeans of egress to ensure that they are freeof obstructions and functioning, and to main-tain records of each inspection [NFPA 101,12.7.1 and 13.7.1]

• A requirement that at least one trained crowdmanager be present for all gatherings, exceptreligious services. For larger gatherings, addi-tional crowd managers are required at a ratioof 1:250 [NFPA 101, 12.7.5 and 13.7.5]

• A prohibition on the use of festival seating forcrowds of more than 250 unless a life-safety

evaluation approved by the authority havingjurisdiction has been performed [Festivalseating, according to NFPA 101, is a form ofaudience/spectator accommodation in whichno seating, other than a floor or ground sur-face, is provided for the audience to gatherand observe a performance.] [NFPA 101,12.2.5.4.1 and 13.2.5.4.1; NFPA 5000,16.2.5.4.1]

On June 9, 2005, at the annual NFPA WorldSafety Conference and Exposition, the membersof NFPA approved these recommendationsbased on the TIAs for the 2006 editions of NFPA1, Uniform Fire Code, NFPA 101, Life SafetyCode, and NFPA 5000, Building Constructionand Safety Code. The NFPA Standards Councilissued these revised codes on August 11, 2005.

An additional requirement that was not part ofthe TIAs was added to the 2006 edition of NFPA101, Life Safety Code. The main entrance/exitwidth for new nightclub assembly occupancieswas increased from a minimum of one-half totwo-thirds of the total occupant load, while theother exits are required to accommodate a min-imum of one-half of the total occupant load, fora total egress capacity of 117% of the occupantload.

Chapter 12 New Assembly Occupancies

12.2.3.6.2 The main entrance/exit width shallbe as follows:

(1) The main entrance/exit shall be of a width that accommodates two-thirds of the total occupant load in the following assembly occupancies:

(a) Bars with live entertainment

(b) Dance halls

(c) Discotheques

(d) Nightclubs

(e) Assembly occupancies with festival seating

12.2.3.7 Other Exits. Each level of an assembly occupancy shall have access to themain entrance/exit and shall be provided with additional exits of a width to accommodate not less than one-half of the total occupant load served by that level.

The Continuing ChallengeOn February 20, 2003, a fire in a small club inRhode Island once again reminded us that his-tory can and will repeat itself. Throughout histo-ry, major fires resulting in large losses of lifehave occurred that have not only stirred thepublic conscience, but also moved the fire pro-tection community to continue to refine ourcodes.

Refining the codes and standards is only part ofthe solution. These tragic fires and the accom-panying loss of life often result from the samecontributing factors which include highly com-bustible interior finish, combustible contentsincluding decorative features, lack of properlydesigned and adequate egress systems, andovercrowding of occupants. In assembly occu-pancy fires, many of these contributing factorshave been addressed in the codes for genera-tions. The methods in our existing codes arebased on sound protection principles that havestood the test of time.

Refining the codes is a continuing process thatcombines the technical advances of today withpresent-day societal attitudes. The second partof the solution is getting the codes adopted. Thethird, and perhaps most important part, isenforcing these codes.

The Station nightclub fire adds to the long list oftragic nightclub fires. Even with the stridesmade toward improving safety in assemblyoccupancies, we are reminded that this battle isfar from won. On December 30, 2004, a firecaused by pyrotechnics (fired by a patron of theclub) resulted in 194 deaths and over 700injuries in an overcrowded club in Buenos Aires,Argentina.


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AppendixIn the time following the Station nightclub fire, the state of Rhode Island and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts moved rapidly, convening a commission and task force, respectively, to hear testimony regarding fire safety in assemblyoccupancies. Both Rhode Island and Massachusetts, as a result of this work,drafted legislation to improve fire safety in nightclubs. The governors of RhodeIsland and Massachusetts each signed the improved protection into law. NFPA participated directly in both State’s efforts by testifying before the commission in Rhode Island on April 30 and May 8, 2003, and before the Massachusetts task force on June 4, 2003.

The states of Maryland and New Hampshire adopted the TIA provisions as part ofthe state adoptions of the 2003 edition of NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, in July andOctober 2004, respectively.

The Rhode Island ResponseIn the weeks following the fire, the Rhode IslandGeneral Assembly created a 17-member com-mission to study changes in state law related toexisting fire codes. This commission, entitledthe Special Commission to Study All Aspects ofLaw Concerning Pyrotechnics and Fire Safety,consisted of members of the state legislature,representatives of the state fire service, theState Fire Marshal, the Lt. Governor, theAdjutant General of the State, the Director of theDepartment of Public Health, the ExecutiveDirector of the State Fire Code Board of Appealand Review, and representatives from the hos-pitality and real estate industries.

Over the course of several weeks, theCommission heard and read testimony from vic-tims and their families, the fire service, fire pro-tection and life safety experts, and members ofthe entertainment and hospitality industries.

The Commission submitted several recommen-dations to the Governor in a report dated June5, 2003. These recommendations can be sum-marized as follows:

• Eliminate the “grandfather clause” in theexisting fire code, effective February 20,2004.

• Require adoption of National Fire ProtectionAssociation (NFPA) codes NFPA 1, UniformFire Code™, and NFPA 101®, Life SafetyCode®, 2003 editions, for new and existingbuildings, effective February 20, 2004.

• Require the Fire Safety Code Board of Appealand Review and the State Building CodeCommission to integrate administration of thefire and building codes by July 1, 2004, andconduct training needed for such purposes.

• Require fire alarms that are municipally con-nected in concentrated use places of assem-bly that are defined as “special amusementbuildings” in the Rhode Island State Code(i.e., nightclubs) with occupancies of 150 orgreater and in all Class A and Class B placesof assembly,9 by July 1, 2004.

• Require sprinklers in all “special amusementbuildings,” as defined in the Rhode IslandCode [nightclubs] as places of assembly

buildings with occupancy of 150 or greater,by July 1, 2006, and in Class A and Class Bplaces of assembly, except fully alarmedplaces of worship and state and municipalbuildings used for governmental purposes, byJuly 1, 2005.

• Require either an occupancy adjustment ofminus 20% for the lack of sprinklers and10% for the lack of fire alarms or a fire fight-er on duty at any special amusement buildingas defined in the Rhode Island State Codewith an occupancy of 150 or greater that iswithout sprinklers and fire alarms during periods of special amusement.

• Require by July 1, 2005, that all “specialamusement buildings” as defined in RhodeIsland State Code with an occupancy of lessthan 150 use fire retardant paints or othercoverings, to a standard acceptable to theFire Safety Code Board of Appeal and Review,unless the building has sprinklers.

• Prohibit use of pyrotechnics in all Class B andClass C places of assembly effective uponpassage, and allow pyrotechnics only in ClassA places of assembly that are fully firealarmed and sprinklered.

• Require NFPA standards for the use ofpyrotechnics, and require all licenses issuedor renewed after February 20, 2004, to haveholder demonstrate satisfactory knowledge ofNFPA standards for the use of pyrotechnics.

• Raise the financial responsibility, which iscurrently $50,000, to $1,000,000 for permitsto possess or use commercial fireworks orpyrotechnics, effective February 20, 2004.

• Make it a felony for violation of requirementsfor commercial and public use or display ofcommercial pyrotechnics, effective upon pas-sage.

• Require “hard-wired” smoke and carbonmonoxide detectors, with combined detectorsspecifically allowed, in three-family dwellings,by July 1, 2008.

• Give power of entry for purposes of inspec-tions to fire marshals similar to those of otherstate and local inspectors, effective upon passage.


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• Give power to fire marshals to order theimmediate abatement of conditions (such asblocked fire exits or improper storage offlammable materials) that pose an imminentthreat to public safety or property, and givepower to the fire marshal, or a designee, toorder premises to be vacated, effective uponpassage.

• Require inspections of places of specialamusement and places of assembly that havea Class B or Class C liquor license at leastonce annually during actual hours of opera-tion when fire risks are highest, and requireproof of compliance with the fire code forrenewal of Class B and Class C licenses,effective February 20, 2004.

• Give power to fire marshals to issue citationsfor violations constituting imminent hazardsthat are identified in inspections for enforce-ment purposes, effective upon passage.

• For failure to correct routine violations, whichare identified in inspections for enforcementpurposes, provide for issuance of notice ofviolation (NOV), and make the failure torespond to the NOV subject to fine and madepart of land evidence record; make failure tocorrect following a second NOV a misde-meanor that includes a greater fine and/or jailtime, effective upon passage.

• Specify that a nightclub is considered a “spe-cial amusement building” and that use of arestaurant as a nightclub with concentratedoccupancy, reduced lighting, or food service,constitutes a change in use for the purposesof fire and building codes, effective February20, 2004.

• Require two fire extinguishers, which shall beat least 20 lbs or such other size as may beestablished as appropriate by the Fire SafetyCode Board of Appeal and Review, in all stageareas, effective February 20, 2004.

• Require that alarm systems sound, that alllighting return to normal levels, and that anyconflicting sounds or visuals stop on theactuation of any smoke detector or fire alarm,effective February 20, 2004.

• Require floor proximity exit signs for all occu-pancies greater than 150, by February 20,2006.

• Require audible announcement of the locationof emergency exits prior to each act or set,effective on passage.

• Require that there be an emergency plan forthe premises, approved by a fire marshal andconsistent with rules established by the FireSafety Code Board of Appeal and Review, byJuly 1, 2004.

• Require that for every occupancy of 300 orgreater there shall be a crowd manager pres-ent during special amusement events, whohas been trained by the Fire Marshal withregard to the emergency plan and basiccrowd management techniques, effectiveOctober 1, 2004. This requirement shall be inaddition to the current requirement for adetail fire fighter.

• Prohibit use of decorative or acoustical mate-rials that are not certified, consistent withNFPA requirements or such other require-ments as may be established by the FireSafety Code Board of Appeal and Review,with a penalty of up to $5,000, effective uponpassage.

• Augment the duties of the Fire Marshal toinclude planning, implementing, and oversee-ing a comprehensive system for fire safetyeducation, fire prevention, fire safety codeenforcement, and fire investigations, effectiveupon passage. (Note: Current law treats theFire Marshal as a law enforcement officer, nota system manager.)

• Require the Fire Marshal to make public therepeat and/or uncorrected fire safety codeviolations of all places of assembly that arespecial amusement buildings and to providethis information on a web site, effectiveFebruary 20, 2004.

• Require the Fire Safety Code Board of Appealand Review to approve all local amendments,changes, additions, or deletions to fire safetycodes, effective February 20, 2004.

• Require the preparation of five-year plans forthe improvement of fire safety in RhodeIsland, with the first plan due by February 20,2004. The plans shall include recommenda-tions regarding fire safety education.

• Require annual reports submitted by the FireMarshal, on or before February 1, to the


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Governor, the Speaker of the House, thePresident of the Senate on fire safety inRhode Island, progress toward meeting goalsset forth in the plan, and recommendationsfor improving fire safety. A copy of the reportshall be provided to the Secretary of State,and the report shall be posted on the website of the Fire Marshal.

• Provide sales tax exemption for sprinklers,fire alarms, and hard-wired smoke detectorsin existing buildings, which are mandated bypassage of the act, effective upon passage.

• Support funding for the Fire Marshal’s officeand the Fire Safety Code Board of Appeal andReview in order to implement the require-ments of the changes in law.

• Request the Attorney General to monitor forprice irregularities vendors and markets thatmay be affected by passage of new fire safe-ty regulations.

The Governor signed a bill making these recom-mendations law on July 7, 2003. As a result,NFPA 1, Uniform Fire Code, and NFPA 101, LifeSafety Code (2003 editions) became the basisfor the Rhode Island Fire Code. The law alsoeliminated the use of “grandfathering” in thefire code where buildings were expected tomeet the fire code in effect at the time of thebuilding’s construction or major renovation. Nowall buildings, new and existing, have to meet theprovisions of the current state fire code.

The state also adopted NFPA 1126, Use ofPyrotechnics Before a Proximate Audience(2003 edition), which restricts the use ofpyrotechnics indoors to only properly protectedfacilities.

The Massachusetts ResponseA third of the victims of The Station fire werecitizens of the Commonwealth ofMassachusetts. The Commonwealth establishedthe Task Force on Fire and Building Safety onApril 3, 2003. The 32-member group was com-posed of the Secretary of Public Safety, theState Fire Marshal, several state commission-ers, fire chiefs from throughout the common-wealth, fire protection engineers and building

officials, representatives of the insurance, hos-pitality and entertainment industries, as well asfamily members of fire victims.

The task force held meetings throughout thestate over the next several months, gatheringinformation and feedback from citizens, fireprotection experts, and entertainment and hos-pitality industry representatives. In September2003, the task force presented the Governor’sOffice with a report containing recommenda-tions on how to improve public safety as itrelates to places of assembly. These recom-mendations included:

• All nightclubs, discotheques, dance halls, andbars with more than a 50 person occupancyshould have automatic sprinklers installedwithin 3 years. Although the State BuildingCode requires automatic sprinkler systems inall new nightclubs, discotheques, dance halls,and bars, the threshold should be decreasedand made to be consistent with the retrofitrequirements for public safety purposes.

• The Board of Building Regulations andStandards should review sprinkler require-ments for buildings used for other publicassembly purposes, and should considerrevising the State Building Code to requireautomatic sprinkler systems in these build-ings. The task force recommends sprinklersbe required at the following thresholds: “A-1”= 0 square feet, “A-3” = more than 5,000square feet, “A-4” = more than 7,500 squarefeet.

• The State Building Code should require thatall buildings used for public assembly purpos-es be equipped with a minimum 72 inch(nominal) width main exit door in addition toother required exit doors at other locations.The building official may allow an alternativemeans of compliance, where construction,regulatory, or other conditions exist thatwould preclude the installation of a 72-inchdoor.

• All owners of buildings used for publicassembly purposes should satisfactorily com-plete a “Fire & Building Safety Checklist” as acondition of receiving a Certificate ofInspection and liquor license. The Board ofFire Prevention and Board of Building


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Regulation & Standards should implementthis recommendation with the coordination ofthe Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission.The “Fire & Building Safety Checklist” shouldinclude questions on emergency planning,egress layout, overcrowding, fire protectionsystems, and employee training.

• The Alcoholic Beverages Control Commissionshould make the issuance or renewal of aliquor license contingent upon a validCertificate of Inspection, issued by the localbuilding official, and upon an inspection bythe head of the fire department.

• The Board of Building Regulations &Standards should study methods to enhanceexit identification in all buildings used forpublic assembly purposes and incorporatethese improvements in the upcoming seventhedition of the State Building Code. Topics forstudy should include low-level lighting thatleads to each exit, outlining exit doors withluminescent marking, distinctive exit signlighting, and scheduled testing and mainte-nance for the operation of exit signs andlights.

• The Board of Fire Prevention Regulationsshould evaluate the requirements for audibleannouncements describing the location ofemergency exits in all buildings used for pub-lic assembly purposes prior to and duringperformances.

• The Board of Fire Prevention Regulations andthe Board of Building Regulations &Standards should study a requirement that allnightclubs, discotheques, dance halls, andbars install an automatic shutdown mecha-nism that disconnects the music sound sys-tem and raises house lighting in the case offire.

• The Board of Fire Prevention Regulationsshould immediately prohibit the use ofpyrotechnics in all nightclubs, discotheques,dance halls, and bars.

• The Board of Fire Prevention Regulationsshould continue to allow the use of pyrotech-nics in large entertainment venues and the-atres that are provided with automatic sprin-kler systems to the extent required by law.

• The Board of Fire Prevention Regulationsshould require the owner, operator, and/ormanager of large entertainment venues andtheatres to sign a written statement on estab-lishment letterhead acknowledging use ofpyrotechnics in the building.

• The Board of Fire Prevention Regulationsshould study, and possibly require the signatures of both the local Fire Chief andFire Inspector on, all permits for indoorpyrotechnics.

• The Board of Fire Prevention Regulationsshould study ways to improve record keeping,use, and storage of pyrotechnics.

• The task force recommends that federal lawbe modified to require anyone who sellspyrotechnics in interstate commerce to notifyin writing the State Fire Marshal and head ofthe local fire department of the intent todeliver pyrotechnic materials. Such notifica-tion will include the type of pyrotechnics andthe date and location of the delivery.

• The Board of Fire Prevention Regulationsshould extend the apprenticeship experiencenecessary for a pyrotechnics license from thecurrent 2 years to 4 years, and require agreater degree of education and training.

• The Board of Fire Prevention Regulationsshould regulate the use of fog/haze machinesin buildings used for public assembly purpos-es.

• The Board of Building Regulations &Standards and the Board of Fire PreventionRegulations should immediately prohibit theuse of all foam plastics on interior finishes inall unsprinklered nightclubs, discotheques,dance halls, and bars.

• The Board of Building Regulations &Standards should review the use of foamplastics on interior finishes in buildings usedfor public assembly purposes, and monitorthe technological development of foam plasticmaterials in regard to meeting flame resist-ance requirements. Code officials should beeducated to ensure that the installation ofsuch materials is in accordance withapproved testing criteria.


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• The Executive Office of Public Safety shouldinvestigate the feasibility of reinstating theToxicity Commission (a previous state-appointed body charged with studying theeffects of smoke and gas developed during afire by materials that ultimately affect theability of a person to properly escape from afire), and study federal oversight of interiorfinishes in public assembly buildings.

• The Department of Public Safety and theDepartment of Fire Services should undertakea program to educate the regulated commu-nity (i.e., nightclub owners, restaurant man-agers, etc.) and enforcement agencies on themeaning of labels found on interior finishmaterials.

• The Department of Fire Services and theDepartment of Public Safety should developand administer a joint training program onfire and building safety standards for both fireand building inspectors. This training programshould include training for police officers inconjunction with the Municipal Police TrainingCouncil.

• Certification of local building inspectors iscurrently required on a statewide basis. Withrespect to fire inspectors, the General Courtshould enact legislation requiring eachmunicipal fire department to have a minimumof one or more trained and certified fireinspectors. An implementation system will bedevised that will allow communities a reason-able period to comply based upon population(i.e., smaller communities will have a longerperiod of time to implement). A contingencypolicy will be developed by theMassachusetts Fire Service Commission thatwill address how communities deal with theabsence of an inspector due to retirement,vacancy, injury, illness, etc.

• The Department of Fire Services and theDepartment of Public Safety should develop acomprehensive training program required foroperators of buildings used for public assem-bly that would institute the employee positionof Crowd Manager in all such buildings withoccupancy loads of 50 or more. These pro-grams should be designed in such a manner

that operators can easily implement ongoingfire and building training at their establish-ments for every employee. Participation inthese training programs should be part of anestablishment’s “Fire & Building SafetyChecklist,” which is a condition of aCertificate of Inspection and maintenance of aliquor license. Similar training should also beoffered to police personnel who are assignedto entertainment venue details.

• The Executive Office of Public Safety shouldinstitute a public awareness campaigndesigned to raise public consciousness ofpersonal fire and building safety whenpatronizing buildings used for public assem-bly purposes.

• The General Court should enact legislationcreating specific criminal penalties for theowner or supervisor of buildings used forpublic assembly purposes who creates a dan-gerous condition with regard to:

1. Any blocked or significantly impeded ingress or egress

2. The failure to maintain or the shutting off of any fire protection or fire warning system required by law

3. The storage of any flammable or explosive without properly issued permits or in quantities in excess of allowable limits of any permit to store

4. The use of any fireworks or pyrotechnicdevice without a properly issued permit

5. Exceeding the occupancy limit establishedby the local building inspector

The first infraction should result in a fine ofnot more than $5,000 and/or imprisonment ofnot more than 21⁄2 years. Subsequent infrac-tions should result in a fine of not more than$25,000 and/or by imprisonment of up to 5 years.

The General Court should enact legislation cre-ating enhanced criminal penalties for an indi-vidual who violates a state building code or firecode provision that results in significant injuryor death. Punishment should be a fine of notmore than $25,000 and/or imprisonment of upto 5 years.


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• The General Court should enact legislationcreating enhanced criminal penalties for indi-viduals who violate an order to comply withfire code regulations. Punishment should be afine of up to $1,000 and/or imprisonment ofup to 1 year. The Housing Court, DistrictCourt, or Superior Court should have jurisdiction.

• The General Court should enact legislationcreating statewide uniform building and firecode enforcement procedures by which build-ing and fire inspectors can issue standardized“code citation tickets” to buildingowners/operators for code violations.

The recommendations in this report became thebasis for a bill that was signed into law as theMassachusetts Fire Safety Act (Chapter 304) inAugust 2004. The law went into effect onNovember 17, 2004. The main points of the laware as follows:

• Mandates sprinklers in places of assembly,such as nightclubs, with an occupancy of 100 persons or more within 3 years (by Nov. 15, 2007).

• Creates a two-strike rule for places of assem-bly with occupancies of less than 100 thatexceed capacity. If a club is cited for an occu-pancy violation twice in a year, automaticsprinklers must be installed within 90 days orthe business will be shut down.

• Eases the financial burden on businessescomplying with the new law by putting inplace an accelerated tax depreciation deduc-tion for the purchase of automatic sprinklersystems required to be installed as a retrofitin existing nightclubs, discotheques, dancehalls, and bars from the current 39 years to 5 years.

• Creates criminal penalties for dangerous con-ditions in public assembly buildings, includingblocking ingress or egress, shutting off orfailing to maintain fire protection systems,storing flammables or explosives, using fire-works or pyrotechnics without a permit andexceeding occupancy limits. The first infrac-tion will result in a fine of not more than$5,000 and/or imprisonment of up to 21⁄2years. Subsequent infractions will result in afine of up to $25,000 and/or imprisonment ofup to 5 years.

• Establishes criminal penalties for individualswho violate provisions of the state building orfire codes when a violation results in signifi-cant injury or death. Violations may result in afine of up to $25,000 and/or imprisonment ofup to 5 years.

• Restores the Student Awareness of FireEducation (SAFE) program, which helps edu-cate children about fire safety awareness,and provides grants to municipalities to assistin the purchase of fire fighter safety equip-ment

Report of the TechnicalInvestigation of The StationNightclub FireNational Construction Safety Team - NISTOn June 29, 2005, the National Institute ofStandards and Technology (NIST) released areport based on the findings of the NationalConstruction Safety Team’s investigation of TheStation nightclub fire.

Under the authority of the National ConstructionSafety Team Act, an investigation team wasdeployed by the NIST Director on Feb. 27, 2003,to investigate the incident seven days earlier atThe Station Nightclub in West Warwick, RhodeIsland.

The objectives of the investigation were as follows:

• Establish the likely technical cause or causesof the building failure

• Evaluate the technical aspects of evacuationand emergency response procedures

• Recommend, as necessary, specific improve-ments to building standards, codes, and prac-tices based on the findings made pursuant tothe duties listed above

• Recommend any research and other appro-priate actions needed to improve the structur-al safety of buildings, and improve evacuationand emergency response procedures, basedupon the findings of the investigation10

In addition to investigating the building con-struction, occupancy, the fire event, as well asthe emergency response, NIST conducted both


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laboratory simulations and computer modelingof the fire, based on available information.

The report indicates that the direct contributorsto the large loss of life were found to be (1) thehazardous mix of building contents, (2) theinadequate capability to suppress the fire duringits early stage of growth, and (3) the inability ofthe exits to handle all of the occupants in theshort time available for such a fast-growingfire.11

Based on observations and results of theresearch conducted by NIST, the report con-tained 10 recommendations.12

Recommendation 1Model Code Adoption andEnforcement NIST recommends that all state and local juris-dictions:

a) Adopt a building and fire code covering nightclubs based on one of the national model codes (as a minimum requirement)and update local codes as the model codes are revised

b) Implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address (i) all aspects of those codes; (ii) documentation of building per-mits and alterations; (iii) means of egress inspection and record keeping; (iv) fre-quency and rigor of fire inspections,including follow-up and auditing proce-dures; and (v) guidelines on recourse available to the inspector for identified deviations from code provisions

c) Ensure that enough fire inspectors and building plan examiners are on staff to dothe job and that they are professionally qualified to a national standard such as NFPA 1031, Standard Professional Qualifications for Fire Inspector and Plan Examiner

Recommendation 2Sprinklers NIST recommends that model codes requiresprinkler systems according to NFPA 13,Standard for the Installation of SprinklerSystems, and that state and local authoritiesadopt and aggressively enforce this provision:

a) For all new nightclubs regardless of size

b) For existing nightclubs with an occupancylimit greater than 100 people.

Recommendation 3Finish Materials and Building Contents NIST recommends that:

a) State and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce the existing provi-sions of the model codes

b) Non–fire-retarded flexible polyurethane foam, and other materials that ignite as easily and propagate flames as rapidly asnon–fire-retarded flexible polyurethane foam (i) be clearly identifiable to building owners, operators, contractors and authorities having jurisdiction (regulatory agencies); and (ii) be specifically forbid-den, with no exceptions, as finish materi-als from all new and existing nightclubs

c) NFPA 286, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Evaluating Contribution of Wall and Ceiling Interior Finish to Room Fire Growth, be modified to provide more explicit guidance for when large-scale tests are required to demonstrate that materials (other than those already for-bidden in b above) do not pose an undue hazard for the use intended

d) ASTM E 84, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, NFPA 255, Standard Method of Test of Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, andNFPA 286 be modified to ensure that product classification and the pass/fail criteria for flame spread tests and large-scale tests are established using the bestmeasurement and prediction practices available.


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Recommendation 4Indoor Use of Pyrotechnics NIST recommends that NFPA 1126, Use ofPyrotechnics Before a Proximate Audience, bestrengthened as described below, and that stateand local authorities adopt and aggressivelyenforce the revised standard.

a) Pyrotechnic devices should be banned from indoor use in new and existing nightclubs not equipped with an NFPA 13-compliant automatic sprinkler system.

b) NFPA 1126 should be modified to includea minimum occupancy and/or area for a nightclub below which pyrotechnic devices should be banned from indoor use, irrespective of the installation of an automatic sprinkler system.

c) Plans for the use of indoor pyrotechnics in new and existing nightclubs should be posted on site, and, in addition to the items listed in paragraph 4.3.2 of NFPA 1126, should describe the measures that have been established to provide crowd management, security, fire protection, and other emergencyservices.

d) Subsection 6.6.2 of NFPA 1126 should bemodified to require the minimum clear-ance between (i) the nearest fixed or moveable contents, and (ii) any part or product (igniter, spark, projectile, or debris) of a pyrotechnic device permitted for indoor use in new and existing placesof assembly, to be twice the designed projection of the device, until such time that studies show that a smaller mini-mum clearance can guarantee safe oper-ation in spite of the possibility that build-ing decorations or temporary features that greatly exceed flame spread or fire load provisions of the fire code may occur.

Recommendation 5Occupancy Limits and Emergency Egress NIST recommends that the factor of safety fordetermining occupancy limits of all new andexisting nightclubs be increased in the modelcodes in the following manner, and that stateand local authorities adopt and aggressivelyenforce the following provisions:

a) Within the model codes, establish the threshold building area and occupant limits for egress provisions using best practices for estimating tenability and evacuation time, and, unless further studies indicate another value is more appropriate, use 11⁄2 minutes as the maxi-mum permitted evacuation time for nightclubs similar to or smaller than The Station.

b) Compute the number of required exits and the permitted occupant loads assuming at least one exit (including the main entrance) will be inaccessible in an emergency evacuation.

c) For nightclubs with one clearly identifi-able main entrance, increase the mini-mum capacity of the main entrance to accommodate two-thirds of the maxi -mum permitted occupant level (based upon standing space or festival seating,if applicable) during an emergency.

d) Eliminate trade-offs between sprinkler installation and factors that affect the time to evacuate buildings.

e) Require staff training and evacuation plans for nightclubs that cannot be evac-uated in less than 11⁄2 minute.

f) Provide improved means for occupants tolocate emergency routes — such as explicit evacuation directions prior to the start of any public event, exit signs near the floor, and floor lighting — for when standard exit signs become obscured by smoke.


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Recommendation 6Portable Fire Extinguishers NIST recommends that a study be performed todetermine the minimum number and appropri-ate placement (based upon the time requiredfor access and application in a fully occupiedbuilding) of portable fire extinguishers for use innew and existing nightclubs, and the level ofstaff training required to ensure their properuse.

Recommendation 7Emergency Response To ensure an effective response to a rapidlydeveloping mass casualty event, NIST recom-mends that state and local authorities adoptand adhere to existing model standards oncommunications, mutual aid, command struc-ture, and staffing, such as:

a) NFPA 1221, Standard for the Installation,Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services Communications Systems

b) NFPA 1561, Standard on EmergencyServices Incident Management System

c) NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments

d) NFPA 1720, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, EmergencyMedical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire Departments

Recommendation 8Research on Human Behavior NIST recommends that research be conductedto better understand human behavior in emer-gency situations, and to predict the impact ofbuilding design on safe egress in fires and otheremergencies (real or perceived), including thefollowing:

a) Impact of fire products (gases, heat, and obscuration) on occupant decisions and egress speeds

b) Exit number, placement, size, and signage

c) Conditions leading to and mitigating crowd crush

d) Role of crowd managers and group interactions

e) Theoretical models of group behavior suitable for coupling to fire and smoke movement simulations

f) level of safety that model codes afford occupants of buildings.

Recommendation 9Research on Fire Spread and Suppression NIST recommends that research be conductedto understand fire spread and suppression bet-ter in order to provide the tools needed by thedesign profession to address Recommendations2, 3, and 5. The following specific capabilitiesrequire research:

a) Prediction of flame spread over actual wall, ceiling, and floor lining materials,and room furnishings

b) Quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires

c) Development of generalized models for fire suppression with fixed sprinklers andfor fire fighter hose streams

Recommendation 10Research on Computer-AidedDecision Tools NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

a) Refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies

b) Develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of casualties is effective


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Notes

The entire NIST report can be found at:

http://www.nist.gov/public affairs/ncst.htm#Rhode_Island_Nightclub

1 “Natchez Dance Hall Holocaust.” 1940. NFPA Quarterly 34(1):70–75.2 Cocoanut Grove Nightclub Fire Report, NFPA, Boston - January, 1943.3 Grant, Casey. 1991. “The Last Dance at the Cocoanut Grove,” NFPA Journal, May–June.4 Ibid.5 Teague, Paul E., M.A. NFPA 101 Handbook, Supplement 1,– “Case Histories: Fires Influencing the LifeSafety Code.” Updated by Chief Ronald R. Farr and Kirsten Paoletti.6 Best, R. 1978. “Reconstruction of a Tragedy — Beverly Hills Supper Club,” NFPA Report.7 NCST/NIST Report of the Technical Investigation of the Station Nightclub Fire, pp. 1–9.8 A cylindrical preloaded pyrotechnic device, intended to produce a controlled spray of sparks with areproducible and predicted duration, height, and diameter. — NFPA 1126, Standard for the Use ofPyrotechnics Before a Proximate Audience, 2006 edition9 Rhode Island Fire Code Classification of Places of Assembly (2000-2001 edition of State Fire Code):

Class A - Place of Assembly – Capacity of 1001 persons or more

Class B - Place of Assembly – Capacity of 301 to 1000 persons

Class C - Place of Assembly (New) – Capacity of 50 to 300 persons

Class C - Places of Assembly (Existing) – Capacity of 76 to 300 persons

References to Class A, B and C occupancies have been removed from current State Fire Code. AssemblyOccupancies are now identified according to occupant capacity.10 NNCST/NIST Report of the Technical Investigation of the Station Nightclub Fire, p. xvii.11 NCST/NIST Report of the Technical Investigation of the Station Nightclub Fire, p. xviii.12 Ibid., pp. xxii-xxv.


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