nato contents nº4 winter 1999 - volume 47 · publications should be sent to: ... the first nato...

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NATO

Lord Robertson

3 NATO in the new millennium

Lloyd Axworthy

8 NATO’s new security vocation

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

12 Redefining NATO’s mission in the Information Age

Boris Frlec

16 Slovenia’s perspective on promoting stability in South-eastern Europe

Bodo Hombach

20 The Stability Pact: Breaking new ground in the Balkans

Martin Dahinden

24 Swiss security policy and partnership with NATO

Nancy T. Schulte

29 NATO Science Programme intensifies interactions with Partners

Index 1999

33 Principal articles listed by author

34 Contents listed by issue

Cover: NATO Secretary General LordRobertson addresses an informal meetingof the North Atlantic Council on his firstday in office, 14 October 1999.

(NATO photo)

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertsonand the Permanent Representatives ofthe North Atlantic Council at a checkpointon the road from Pristina, Kosovo,to Skopje, the capital of the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, on22 October, during their two-day visitto the region. (NATO photo)

(*) Turkey recognises the Republic ofMacedonia with its constitutional name.

CONTENTSreview Nº4 Winter 1999 - Volume 47

Focus on NATO

15 New PermanentRepresentative of Germany

26 Ireland joins Partnershipfor Peace

28 New PermanentRepresentative of Denmark

3NATO review Winter 1999

◆ historic agreements with Russia and Ukraine;

◆ deepening Partnership with 25 Central Europeanand Central Asian countries;

◆ internal reform, including the new command struc-ture; and, of course,

◆ the massive challenge of the 78-day air campaignto stop the human suffering in Kosovo.

All these challenges were met successfully, thanksto the leadership of Javier Solana and to the remark-able cohesion of the Alliance, as well as its ability toadapt. The Alliance has evolved from a passive, reac-tive defence organisation into one which is activelybuilding security right across Europe. NATO’s agendaover this past decade has been so successfully imple-mented that the Alliance itself is more relevant andmore indispensable than it has ever been. NATO’sfoundations as it enters the 21st century are rock solid.

et me begin by stating how honoured and pleasedI am to have been selected for this position.

NATO has been and remains today the most effectiveAlliance on earth. No other organisation has done moreover the past half-century to preserve the peace, free-dom and democracy of its members. And in recentmonths, the Alliance has proved it is fully up to themost demanding security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Much of the credit for this success in recent years isdue to my predecessor as Secretary General, Dr JavierSolana. During his four-year tenure, the Alliance facedenormous challenges:

◆ the first NATO peacekeeping mission beyond itsterritory in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

◆ the first enlargement of the Alliance since the endof the Cold War;

In his first article in NATO Review, the new Secretary General sets out his vision of the Alliance and his main priorities at the start of his tenure,building on the achievements of his predecessor. As its essential foundation, the Alliance must maintain a healthy transatlantic

relationship, based on shared values and a common commitment to uphold them. To achieve this goal, the new NATO must be better balanced,with a stronger European contribution within a more militarily capable Alliance. And the new NATO must remain open — open to new members,

open to deepening cooperation with its Partners, and open to creative ways to bring peace and security to the Euro-Atlantic region.

L

NATO in the new millenniumLord Robertson

NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council

NATO SecretaryGeneral Lord

Robertson speaksto multinationalSFOR troops in

Sarajevo, Bosnia,on 21 October,

during a two-dayvisit to the region.

(NATO photo)


The North AtlanticCouncil meetsethnic Albanianand Serbcommunity leadersat KFORheadquarters,Pristina, Kosovo,on 22 October.(NATO photo)

My job is to build on that success, in order to ensurethat NATO continues to meet the challenges of thefuture. Let me outline several of the specifics.

Stabilising the BalkansFirst, NATO will have to continue to play its full

role in the stabilisation of the Balkans. We must notonly consolidate the peace we are building in Kosovo,but also contribute to the wider efforts of the interna-tional community to build lasting stability and prosper-ity across South-eastern Europe. We must ensure thatthe future of this region does not remain a prisoner ofthe past.

We have already made real progress in Kosovo.The air campaign achieved our objectives of reversingthe ethnic cleansing, and forcing President Milosevicto withdraw his forces. A secure environment is slow-ly being restored. Over 800,000 refugees have returnedhome. The UN has established its presence, and 1,800UN police are on the streets.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) has been dis-banded, and a civil emergency force has been created.A multi-ethnic transitional council meets weekly, set-ting the stage for a multi-ethnic political future. Andpreparations are underway for elections sometime nextyear. This is real progress, when one remembers thechaos and violence the Kosovars were suffering underthe Yugoslav regime, just a few months ago.

There is still much work to be done. The immediategoal of the international community, including NATO,is to help every citizen of Kosovo enjoy the peace andsecurity that we all enjoy. Over time, we must also fos-ter democracy, and begin to create the conditions inwhich Kosovo can thrive economically. This willrequire real commitment, but we will persevere. Wewon the war — we must not lose the peace.

Bosnia shows the benefits to be derived frompatient engagement. This country has made realprogress since NATO deployed in 1995, and continuesto improve. This year, some 80,000 refugees returnedhome — twice the rate of last year. More and moremoderates are being elected to government becauseBosnians want peace. In fact, the security situation hasimproved to the point that the Alliance is able to reducethe numbers of troops in Bosnia by one-third, to about20,000. Our long-term goal is getting closer: self-sustaining peace in Bosnia.

But to reinforce our success in these two trouble spots,we must look beyond them, to South-eastern Europe as awhole. Throughout the Kosovo campaign, our Partnersfrom South-eastern Europe showed their solidarity withNATO’s actions, supporting the Allies despite the eco-nomic hardships and domestic troubles they face. Theyshould be able to count on our support now.

The EU-led Stability Pact for South Eastern Europeis a major step forward. It acknowledges the need for amore comprehensive approach to the whole region,focusing on three areas: democratisation and humanrights; economic reconstruction, development andcooperation; and security issues.

NATO is actively supporting the Pact in the securi-ty field. The key is the South East Europe Initiative thatwe launched at the Washington Summit last April. Thisinitiative brings together the Allies and seven countriesof the region to develop practical cooperation. We willwork with these Partners to encourage regional cooper-ation. And, as part of NATO’s enlargement process, wewill help aspirant countries from South-eastern Europeto prepare their candidacies for NATO membership.

My goal is to help build a Balkans that is inside theEuropean family of democratic values, not a problemfor it. This will be one of my priorities during mytenure as Secretary General.

Boosting defence capabilities and interoperability

Both Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated the value ofdiplomacy backed by force. If we need the same infuture, we must ensure that adequate force is available.In this respect, the Kosovo crisis was not just a successbut also a wake-up call. It made crystal clear thatNATO needs to improve its defence capabilities. Wehave to make changes today, to be ready for an unpre-dictable tomorrow.

During the air campaign, the United States bore adisproportionate share of the burden, because the other

Allies did not have all the military capabilities andtechnology needed. Clearly, we must rectify this imbal-ance and work to ensure that all the Allies have thetechnology necessary to be militarily effective, and tocooperate effectively together.

The Defence Capabilities Initiative, which welaunched at the Washington Summit, is a big step in theright direction. This project will help ensure that all ofNATO’s Allies develop certain essential capabilities. Itwill also take steps to improve interoperability betweenAllied forces. This is not just a question of spendingmore — it is also about spending more wisely.

Promoting interoperability with NATO’s Partnersis also a key priority. We have seen both in Bosnia andKosovo how important they have become in the con-

duct of peace-support opera-tions in Europe.

A more balancedAlliance

I also intend to help rein-force the European role inNATO. The European Securityand Defence Identity (ESDI)is not just an attractive idea: itis an urgent necessity. Simplyput, the burden of dealing withEuropean security crisesshould not fall disproportion-ately on the shoulders of theUnited States. We need to cre-ate a more balanced Alliance,with a stronger Europeaninput.


US soldiers fromthe 31st Air

ExpeditionaryWing prepare

the laser-guidedbombs of an F-15at Aviano airbase,

Italy, on30 March.

The Allies reliedheavily on the

more advancedweapons

technologies ofthe US air force

during OperationAllied Force.

(Reuters photo)

▼


Dr Javier Solana,High Representativefor the EU’sCommon Foreignand Security Policy,listens to FinnishForeign MinisterTarja Halonen,President of the EUCouncil, at the firstformal joint EUforeign and defenceministers meeting,in Brussels on15 November.Proposals for thecreation of aEuropean rapidreaction force werediscussed, inpreparation for theEU Helsinki Summitin December.(AP photo)

around it. Both Russia and NATO share common interests:keeping the peace in the Balkans, arms control, non-prolif-eration, and cooperation in science.

It is to our mutual benefit to cooperate in areas wherewe agree, and to continue talking even when we disagree.I intend to work hard to build this kind of strong, practicalrelationship.

Strengthening links with our other PartnersI also want to strengthen still further the links

between NATO and its other Partners. Throughout theKosovo crisis, NATO’s Partners have demonstratedclearly that they are no longer standing on the sidelinesof security. They are key players.

The countries neighbouring Kosovo provided invalu-able assistance to the tens of thousands of refugees fleeingthe brutality of Serb security forces. They were staunchsupporters of NATO operations to bring the violence to ahalt. And now, as in Bosnia, over 20 Partners are sendingtroops to Kosovo to help keep the peace.

Through these major contributions, the Partnershipfor Peace (PfP) programme and the Euro-AtlanticPartnership Council (EAPC) have demonstrated theirvalue in developing a cooperative approach to securityacross the Euro-Atlantic region. I want them to becomeeven more operational and relevant to the securityneeds of our Partners. That is why I intend to supportfully the improvements we have recently made to PfPto improve interoperability, and to give our Partnersmore say in planning and conducting NATO-led peace-support operations.

(1)High Representative forthe Common Foreign andSecurity Policy of theEuropean Union.

Europe recognises this — and is starting to do some-thing about it. It now has to build the necessary capabili-ties, as well as institutions, to allow it to play a stronger rolein preserving peace and security. NATO supports thatprocess.

For my part, I will work to ensure that ESDI is basedon three I’s:

◆ Improvement in European defence capabilities;

◆ Inclusiveness and transparency for all Allies; and

◆ the Indivisibility of transatlantic security, based on ourshared values.

ESDI does not mean “less US” ... it means “more Europe”and a stronger NATO. I very much look forward to work-ing on this project with Mr Solana, in his new post as“Monsieur PESC”(1).

Getting NATO-Russiarelations back on trackAnother of my immediate priori-

ties will be to work to establish a deep-er cooperation with Russia. I welcomethe fact that Russia is once again par-ticipating in meetings of thePermanent Joint Council, including atthe military level. But we must movebeyond just discussing Bosnia andKosovo, and resume work on the fullrange of cooperative activities agreedunder the Founding Act.

The reason is simple — security inEurope requires cooperation betweenNATO and Russia. There is no way

Russian PresidentBoris Yeltsin(right), ForeignMinister IgorIvanov (left) andDefence MinisterIgor Sergeyev (centre background)at the openingceremony of theOSCE Summit inIstanbul, Turkey,on 18 November.One of LordRobertson’spriorities for theAlliance is to getNATO-Russiarelations backon track.(AP photo)

▼

NATO SecretaryGeneral Lord

Robertson andSupreme Allied

Commander,Europe, General

Wesley Clark,meet Ljupco

Georgievski, PrimeMinister of the

former YugoslavRepublic of

Macedonia* —one of the Partner

countriesneighbouring

Kosovo that gavethe Allies staunch

support during theKosovo crisis,and provided

invaluableassistance to the

hundreds ofthousands of

Kosovar Albanianrefugees. (Skopje,

22 October ). (Belga photo).

The next round of enlargementFinally, one of my key responsibilities will be to

prepare NATO for the next round of enlargement.NATO’s Heads of State and Government are commit-ted to considering further enlargement by no later than2002.

Between now and then, we must utilise the fullpotential of the Membership Action Plan and give allaspirant countries as much support as possible in meet-ing their targets. The door to NATO will remain open.

Taken together, this is a broad and ambitious agen-da, and it will require a lot of hard work to accomplishit. But as I look to the future of this great Alliance, I amvery confident.

Today, NATO remains the centrepiece of Europe’scollective defence, with new missions, new members,and ever-deepening partnerships. It is essential toensure that NATO continues to make its unique andvital contribution to Euro-Atlantic security well intothe next century. ■


Profile of the Secretary General

Lord Robertson (53) succeeded Dr Javier Solana as Secretary General of NATO on14 October 1999.

Born in Port Ellen on the Isle of Islay in Scotland, he is a graduate in Economics of theUniversity of Dundee. Following his studies, George Robertson worked as a full-time official ofthe General, Municipal and Boilermakers’ Union from 1968 to 1978, where he was responsiblefor the Scottish Whisky industry.

He then entered political life and served as a Labour Party Member of Parliament forHamilton (latterly Hamilton South) from 1978 to 1999. He was Parliamentary Private Secretaryto the Secretary of State for Social Services in 1979.

After the 1979 General Election, he was Opposition Spokesman, first on Scottish Affairs(1979-80) and then on Defence (1980-81). From 1981 to 1993, he served in various capacitiesas Opposition Spokesman on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, including as DeputyOpposition Spokesman on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1983), and as PrincipalSpokesman on European Affairs from 1984 to 1993. He joined the Shadow Cabinet as ShadowSecretary of State for Scotland in 1993, a position he held until the Labour Party came backinto power after the May 1997 General Election.

Mr Robertson then served as Secretary of State for Defence until his appointment as NATOSecretary General.

Before taking up his new appointment, he received a life peerage and took the title LordRobertson of Port Ellen on 24 August 1999.

He has served in an advisory capacity on numerous bodies and received a number ofawards, including being named joint Parliamentarian of the Year in 1993 for his role duringthe ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

[The full curriculum vitae of the Secretary General is available on the NATO web site at: www.nato.int/cv/secgen/robert-e.htm]

(*) Turkeyrecognises

the Republic ofMacedonia withits constitutional

name.

ATO faces a radicallydifferent world in its 50th

anniversary year from thatwhich existed for the first 40years of the Alliance’s history.The end of the Cold Warmarked a dramatic transforma-tion in the strategic environ-ment, both in Europe andglobally. And acceleratingglobalisation and increasinglysignificant transnational phe-nomena continue to transformthe international context.Threats to security are morecomplex now than ever before.A wide range of new issuesthat transcend borders — massmigrations, ethnic conflict,organised crime, disease, pol-lution, overpopulation andunderdevelopment — can havepeace and security implica-tions, as much as the tradition-al threats of interstate aggres-sion.

The human security dynamicIn this changing environ-

ment, conceptions of globalpeace and security based primarily on national securityare no longer sufficient. Most conflicts during the last15 years occurred within states, rather than betweenstates. And most of the casualties have been civilian.The safety of individuals — “human security” — isincreasingly coming to the fore in our definitions ofpeace and security. These new conflicts are often alsoaccompanied by large-scale atrocities, violent crimeand terrorism.

While the security ofstates, and between states,remains a necessary conditionfor the security of people, ourunderstanding of security hasof necessity become muchbroader in recent years. Thenew conflicts we are witness-ing are highly complex andspring from a variety of fac-tors. Their solutions, too, arecomplex and rely on a varietyof instruments — political,civilian and military.

The crisis in Kosovo, andthe Alliance’s response to it, isa concrete expression of thishuman security dynamic atwork. First and foremost, theconflict in Kosovo has made itpainfully clear how individualsare increasingly the principalvictims, targets and instru-ments of modern war. Theindelible images of the conflictin Kosovo — the forced exodusand the brutal, indiscriminateuse of force — all underscoredthe fact that there were noaccepted international mecha-nisms to protect civilians froman aggressive, tyrannical state.The Allies’ response demon-

strated how the defence of human security has becomea global concern: it was the humanitarian imperativethat galvanised NATO into action. Our Alliance hadboth the means and the determination to act, and I haveno doubt it will do so again, if need be.

Unfortunately, it is not always possible to takestrong action in every region of the globe. In CentralAfrica, East Timor and Sierra Leone, civilians have


In the new security environment, the safety of the individual — “human security” — is becoming a more important policy considerationfor democratic governments. The Kosovo crisis shows how individuals are increasingly the main victims and targets of state-sponsored

aggression. It also demonstrates the human security dynamic at work, in that it was the humanitarian imperative that triggered the Alliedintervention. But sanctions and military force are not the only way the international community can tackle threats to human security.There is plenty of scope for preventive action. NATO’s Partnership for Peace promotes democracy, and by extension human security,

throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. And multilateral initiatives in de-mining and combating the illegal flow of small arms — just two areaswhere NATO’s expertise can usefully be brought to bear — also boost human security.

N

NATO’s new security vocationLloyd Axworthy

Foreign Minister of Canada

Canadian ForeignMinister LloydAxworthyinauguratesthe CanadianGovernmentLiaison Office inKosovo’s capital,Pristina, on17 November.(AP photo)

borne the brunt of the new practices of war — such asthe deplorable use of child soldiers and the increasinguse of brutal paramilitaries, sometimes to cover upstate involvement. Civilians also suffer most from theindiscriminate and cheap weapons of modern war, suchas anti-personnel landmines and military small arms.

It has become clear that the UN is able to takeaction to fulfil its peace and security functions, onlywhen member states find the political will to contributeto a solution. Such solutions can involve the use of mil-itary power when appropriate. But other optionsinclude political measures, such as a concerted push tocheck the unregulated flow of small arms.

The issue of human security is, of course, not new.Nor are all of today’s threats to human security recentphenomena. Victimisation and impunity are as old astime. Terrorism and transnational crime may be morerecent problems, but even they have been with us fordecades.

Likewise, the international community’s search fora response to the plight of civilians in armed conflictdid not begin only yesterday. With the founding of theInternational Committee of the Red Cross more than100 years ago, a modern doctrine based on the safety ofindividuals was born. This doctrine is reflected in allthe founding documents that underpin today’s interna-tional system, including the UN Charter, the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights and the GenevaConventions of 1949 (and their additional Protocols of1977).

An ethnic Albanianfamily flees heavyfighting between

the KosovoLiberation Army

and Yugoslavforces in northern

Kosovo, on 22February. “It wasthe humanitarian

imperative thatgalvanised NATO

into action.”

(Reuters photo)

The new security agendaWhat is new is the changing paradigm. The

concept of human security establishes a newmeasure for judging the success or failure ofnational and international security policies,namely: do these policies improve the protec-tion of civilians from state-sponsored aggres-sion and civil, especially ethnic, conflict?

This is not to say that national security, tra-ditionally defined, is any less relevant. On thecontrary, security between states remains a nec-essary condition for the security of people. Andyet, the security of a state cannot in itself guar-antee the security of its people. The concept ofhuman security not only helps us evaluate theeffectiveness of our security policies, it alsohighlights the importance of preventive actionto reduce vulnerability and points the way forremedial action, where prevention fails.

This new security agenda therefore inte-grates both traditional and human securityapproaches, and in practice leads to new ways ofassessing policy responses. Such a new securityapproach encourages policy-makers to examine

the human costs of strategies for promoting state andinternational security, and to question, for example,whether the security benefits of anti-personnel land-

mines outweigh the human cost of lostlimbs and lost lives.


The late PrincessDiana is pictured

here, during a visitto an OrthopaedicWorkshop outside

Luanda, Angola,in January 1997.

Her visit wasaimed at promoting

awareness of the terrible injuriesto civilians caused

by landmines.(AP photo)

▼


Seen through the optic of human security, the pro-motion of human rights, democracy and developmentis a safeguard against unstable states and internal con-flict. Multilateral cooperation is all the more essentialto addressing transnational challenges to the safety ofpeople. Indeed, in the last decade, an array of newinternational instruments has been developed toaddress cross-border organised crime, drug trafficking,terrorism and environmental degradation, all of whichincreasingly affect the lives of ordinary citizens. Butwhat is new — as has been demonstrated in the crisesin Kosovo and East Timor — is the international com-munity’s determination to use coercion, includingsanctions and military force, to deal with grave threatsto human security.

A growing appreciation of human security makes itall the more imperative to strengthen operational coor-dination both internally and with other internationalplayers, in order to bring together all facets of complexpeace-making, peace-building and peacekeeping oper-ations into a coherent, efficient and effective whole.

International actionThe new security agenda has already achieved

some important successes. Last March, the“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnelMines and on their Destruction” came into force. TheOttawa Convention now has 136 signatories and hasbeen ratified by 89 states. At its signing in December1997, countries pledged half a billion dollars for mineaction. The Canadian Government allocated $100 mil-lion and we have put this money to work in some of themost severely affected states — Cambodia, Ecuador,Guatemala, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Peru, as well

as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. One ofCanada’s mine action priorities is to prevent newmines from being used in future conflicts, and wehave begun working in concert with our NATOAllies to achieve this goal by helping countries todestroy their stockpiles of anti-personnel mines.

Allies and Partners are coordinating actionto remove mines that have already been laid,through the “Global Humanitarian De-mining”initiative that was launched in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). NATOteams of experts are also currently assisting theAlbanian military by training specialists toclear unexploded munitions, and advising onissues related to the stable, safe and securestorage of ammunition.

The agreement to establish anInternational Criminal Court was another

important step taken by the international com-munity. The Court will help deter some of the mostserious violations of international humanitarian law.The International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia (ICTY) — a forerunner of the InternationalCourt — is contributing significantly to restoring jus-tice in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Increasing coopera-tion between NATO and the ICTY in recent years isfurther testimony to the growing recognition that secu-rity is truly indivisible.

Tackling the root causes of conflictMany other challenges to human security remain, of

course. Small arms and light weapons — cheap and easyto transport, smuggle and hide — have become tools of thetrade for warlords, drug traffickers, international terrorists

Bosnian Serb Chiefof Staff Col. Gen.Novica Simic (left)shakes handswith the NATOCommander ofSFOR, US GeneralRonald Adams(right), whileCanadianAmbassador toBosnia andHerzegovina SamHanson (centre)looks on, at aceremony to markthe destruction ofanti-personnellandmines atMt. Jahorina,north of Sarajevo,on 15 November1999. Some360,000landmines havebeen destroyedas part of adestructionprogramme basedon the 1997Ottawa Convention.(AP photo)

(AP p

hoto)

“The problem ofsmall arms has

to be tackled asan integral part ofconflict preventionand management,

peacekeepingand post-conflictreconstruction.”

(Reuters photo)

and common criminals. Canada is pursuing the control ofthe use and spread of small arms along three interlockingtracks: arms control, crime control and peace-building.This integrated approach targets both supply and demand,and helps eliminate surplus stocks of weapons left overafter conflicts have ended. The problem of small arms hasto be tackled as an integral part of conflict prevention andmanagement, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruc-tion. Peace operations are that much more dangerous inregions where there is an illegal and unregulated flow ofsmall arms. NATO and the EAPC have a duty to deal atsource with such contributing causes of conflict. I there-fore welcome the initiative that was launched last March inthe EAPC to assist in the control of small arms andweapons, and to strengthen operational aspects ofPartnership for Peace programmes in this regard.

The new security agenda and NATOThis new concept of security is central to the

new NATO. All of the Alliance’s new partnershipand cooperation activities are based on the beliefthat the values which have united the Alliance for50 years — democracy, individual liberty and therule of law — are also the key to lasting peaceand security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The crises in the former Yugoslavia haveput those values to the test. Alliance leadershipof peace-support operations and its willingnessto intervene in Kosovo shows the extent towhich NATO’s new roles are, in fact, all aboutprotecting human security and projecting sta-bility. When thousands of civilians were forcedto flee the rising tide of oppression and vio-lence in Kosovo, NATO stepped in to providebasic services and shelter in hastily constructedrefugee camps, until civilian organisationswere in a position to take over. And, it wasNATO troops who secured the way for thosesame refugees to return to their homes.

Today, NATO and Partner troops are active-ly engaged in helping to rebuild societies in both Bosniaand Kosovo. Their mission is as much about buildingbridges between communities as it is about preventingviolence. They are engaged in everything from provid-ing medical care and emergency services, to rebuildingschools, or the painstaking but essential task of demi-ning. The NATO mission also supports the ICTY in itsinvestigations and the search for evidence to prosecutewar crimes. Kosovo is a clear example of how militarypower can support human security objectives

Prevention is better than cureBut, as the old saying goes, an ounce of prevention

is worth a pound of cure. NATO has a role to play in

responding to emerging threats with a view to prevent-ing conflict. Indeed, the successful Partnership forPeace programme is about extending democratic struc-tures and, by extension, human security throughout theEuro-Atlantic area. Allies and Partners meet regularlyin the EAPC to share expertise and cooperate in tack-ling some of the new transnational risks. The recentEAPC initiatives in the area of de-mining and the pre-vention of illicit small arms traffic are just two exam-ples of how NATO’s expertise is helping addressthreats to human security.

But there are some more traditional threats tohuman security that also require new approaches.In light of the reduced salience of nuclear weapons,Allied foreign ministers in December set in train aprocess to review Alliance policy options insupport of confidence- and security-buildingmeasures, certification, non-proliferation, and arms


control and disarmament. Ministers will discussa report on these issues in December 2000, and I willbe looking for concrete recommendations as tohow NATO can contribute more to arms control anddisarmament.

NATO has, in practice as much as in theory,already integrated a broader appreciation of securityin its response to the new international environment.Security, for the new NATO, is a continuum, compris-ing both state and individual human security concerns.Only through a wider and deeper recognition ofthe importance of human security to peace andstability will NATO retain its relevance and effective-ness in facing the diverse challenges of the comingcentury. ■

osovo is a dramatic example of a larger problem —how should NATO define its mission in the

Information Age? During the Cold War, containment ofSoviet power provided a North Star to guide NATOpolicy. NATO’s official job was simple and well-defined: deter the Warsaw Pact from launching aninvasion against member states. After the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, what should be the limits of NATO’smission? With the Kosovo crisis, NATO fired its firstshots in anger in a region outside the Alliance’s treatyarea, on declared humanitarian grounds. What criteriamight NATO draw on to guide policy on the threat, oruse, of its force in the new strategic environment of the21st century?

The world in the Information AgeWe need first to have a clear sense of the distribu-

tion of power in the Information Age. Some people seethe end of the bipolar world leaving multipolarity in itsstead, but that is not a very good description of a worldin which one country, the United States, is so muchmore powerful than all the others. On the other hand,unipolarity is not a very good description either,because it exaggerates the degree to which the UnitedStates is able to attain what it wants.

Instead, power today is distributed like a three-dimensional chess game. The top military board isunipolar, with the United States far outstripping allother states. The middle economic board is multipolar,with the United States, Europe and Japan accountingfor two thirds of world product. However, the bottomboard of transnational relations that cross borders out-side the control of governments has a more dispersedstructure of power.

This complexity makes policy-making more diffi-cult. It means playing on several boards at the sametime. Moreover, while it is important not to ignore thecontinuing importance of military force for some pur-poses, it is equally important not to be misled by mili-tary unipolarity into thinking that US power is greaterthan it is in other dimensions. The United States is apreponderant, but not dominant, power.

Another distinction to keep in mind is that between“hard power” — a country’s economic and militarypower to coerce — and “soft power”, the ability toattract through cultural and ideological appeal(1). TheWestern democratic and humanitarian values thatNATO was charged with defending in 1949 are signif-icant sources of soft power. Both hard and soft powerare vital but, in the Information Age, soft power is tak-ing on more importance.

Massive flows of cheap information have expandedthe number of transnational channels of contacts acrossnational borders. Global markets and non-governmentalactors play a larger role. States are more easily pen-etrated and less like the classic realist model of solidbilliard balls bouncing off each other. As a result, polit-ical leaders find it more difficult to maintain a coherentset of priorities in foreign policy issues and more diffi-cult to articulate a single national interest.

Different aspects of the Information Age cut in dif-ferent directions in terms of NATO members’ collec-tive interests. On the one hand, a good case can bemade that the information revolution will have long-term effects that benefit democracies. Democratic soci-eties can create credible information because they arenot threatened by it. Authoritarian states will havemore trouble. Governments can limit their citizens’


Kosovo demonstrated how the “CNN effect” — the free flow of information and shortened news cycles — has a huge impacton public opinion, placing some items at the top of the public agenda that might otherwise warrant a lower priority. Politicalleaders in democratic countries are finding it harder than ever to maintain a coherent set of priorities on foreign policy issuesand to determine what is in the national interest. Joseph Nye assesses how power is distributed in the world today, followingthe end of the Cold War and the onset of the Information Age, and suggests what criteria might help guide NATO policy in the

new strategic environment of the 21st century.

K

Redefining NATO’s mission in the Information AgeJoseph S. Nye, Jr.

Dean of the Kennedy School of Government,former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1994-95)

(1)Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Boundto Lead: The ChangingNature of AmericanPower (New York BasicBooks, 1990, chapter 2).

Arecommunications

technologiesproducing a single

cosmopolitanvillage, or a

jumble of globalvillages?

The addedinteractivity of

activist groups onthe Internet is

making it moredifficult for

democratic leadersto maintain a

consistent set ofpolicy priorities.

(Reuters photo)

access to the Internet and global markets, but they willpay a high price if they do so. Singapore and China, forexample, are currently wrestling with these problems.

The “CNN effect”On the other hand, some aspects of the Information

Age are less benign. The free flow of broadcast infor-mation in open societies has always had an impact onpublic opinion and the formulation of foreign policy,but now the flows have increased and shortened newscycles have reduced the time for deliberation. Byfocusing on certain conflicts and human rights prob-lems, broadcasts pressure politicians to respond tosome foreign problems and not others. The so-called“CNN effect” makes it harder to keep some items offthe top of the public agenda that might otherwise war-rant a lower priority. Now, with the added interactivityof activist groups on the Internet, it will be harder thanever for leaders in democracies to maintain a consistentagenda of priorities.

Global parochialismAnother problem is the effect of transnational

information flows on the stability of national commu-nities. The Canadian media guru, Marshall McLuhan,

once prophesied that communications technologieswould turn the world into a global village. Instead of asingle cosmopolitan village, they may be producing ajumble of global villages, with all the parochial hatredsthat the word “village” implies, but also with greaterawareness of global inequalities. Global economicforces are disrupting traditional lifestyles, and theeffects are to increase economic integration and com-munal disintegration at the same time.

This is particularly true of weak states left in theaftermath of the collapse of the Soviet empire and theold European empires in Africa. Political entrepreneursuse inexpensive information channels to mobilisediscontent, provoking the emergence of either sub-national tribal communities, repressive nationalism, ortransnational ethnic and religious communities. This inturn leads to increased demands for self-determination,increased violence, and violation of human rights — allin the presence of television cameras and the Internet.The result is to put a difficult set of issues on the for-eign policy agenda.

Different classes of security risksWilliam Perry and Ashton Carter have recently sug-

gested a list of risks to US security,(2) which can also beprofitably applied to NATO’s strategic interests:


(2)Ashton B. Carter andWilliam J. Perry,“Preventive Defense: ANew Security Strategy forAmerica (Washington,D.C., BrookingsInstitution Press, 1999),pp. 11-15.


A US soldier keepsguard from adefensive positionin Mogadishu,Somalia, inJune 1993.(Reuters photo)

◆ The “A list” of threats on the scale that the SovietUnion presented to Western survival;

◆ The “B list” of imminent threats to Western inter-ests (but not survival) such as was seen in the GulfWar;

◆ The “C list” of important contingencies that indi-rectly affect Western security, but do not directlythreaten Western interests, such as the crises inKosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

It is striking how the “C list” has dominated the USforeign policy agenda and that a “C list” crisis precipi-tated NATO’s first military action in its 50-year history.Carter and Perry speculate that this is because of the

foreground because of their ability to command atten-tion. But a human rights policy is not a strategic policy:it is an important part of foreign policy. During theCold War, this often meant that the West toleratedhuman rights abuses by regimes that were crucial tobalancing Soviet power — for example, in SouthKorea before its transition to democracy.

But the greater attention being devoted to humani-tarian concerns often diverts attention from “A list”strategic issues. Also, since moral arguments are usedas trumps, and pictures are more powerful than words,arguments about trade-offs are often emotional anddifficult.

The problem with such cases isthat the humanitarian interest thatinstigates the action often turns outto be a mile wide and an inch deep.For example, the Americanimpulse to help starving Somalis(whose food supply was being

interrupted by vari-ous warlords) van-ished in the face ofdead US soldiersbeing dragged

through the streets ofMogadishu. This is

sometimes attributedto a popular reluctance in

America to accept casualties. Butthat is too simple. Americans wentinto the Gulf War expecting someten thousand casualties, but therewas more at stake then than simplyhumanitarian issues. More properlyexpressed, Americans are reluctantto accept casualties when their onlyinterests are unreciprocated human-itarian interests.

Ironically, the reaction against cases such asSomalia may not only divert attention and limit will-ingness to support “A list” interests, but may also inter-fere with action in more serious humanitarian crises.One of the direct effects of the Somalia disaster was thefailure of the United States, along with other countries,to support and reinforce the United Nations peacekeep-ing force in Rwanda that could have limited a truegenocide in 1994.

Lessons for the AllianceThere are no easy answers for such cases. We could

not simply turn off the television or unplug our com-puters, even if we wanted to. The “C list” cannot sim-ply be ignored. But there are certain lessons to bedrawn and prudently applied that may help integrate

absence of “A list” threats since the end of the ColdWar. But another reason is the ability of “C list” issuesto dominate media attention in the Information Age.Dramatic visual portrays of immediate human conflictand suffering are far easier to convey to the public, than“A list” abstractions like the possibility of a “WeimarRussia” or the potential collapse of the internationalsystem of trade and investment. Yet, if these largerstrategic issues were to turn out badly, they would havea far greater impact on the lives of most ordinary citi-zens of NATO countries.

The “C list”The reality of the Information Age is that “C list”

issues in which human rights are a key factor, likeSomalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, force themselves to the

The officialmemorial site

dedicated to thevictims of

genocide inthe village of

Ntarama, Rwanda,where 5,000

people were killedin April 1994.(Reuters photo)

such issues into the wider strategy for advancing thenational interest.

First, there are many degrees of humanitarian con-cern and many degrees of intervention such as con-demnation, sanctions targeted on individuals, broadsanctions, and various uses of force. NATO shouldsave the use of force only for the more flagrant cases.

Second, when the Alliance does use force, it isworth remembering some principles of “just war” doc-trine: the cause should be just in the eyes of others; weshould be discriminating in our choice of means toavoid unduly punishing the innocent; our means mustbe proportional to our ends; and, there should be a highprobability (rather than wishful thinking) of good con-sequences.

Third, NATO countries should generally avoid theuse of force, except in cases where our humanitarianinterests are reinforced by the existence of other strongstrategic interests. This was the case in the Gulf War,where the West was concerned not only with theaggression against Kuwait, but also with energy sup-plies and regional allies.

Fourth, public reaction to humanitarian crises maydiffer from one democracy to the other. Therefore,NATO should welcome the idea of combined joint taskforces that would be separable, but not separate, fromthe Alliance and encourage a greater European willing-ness and ability to take the lead on such issues.

Fifth, we should be clearer in our definition of, andresponses to, genuine cases of genocide. The West hasa real humanitarian interest in not letting anotherHolocaust occur. Yet, we did just that in Rwanda in1994. We need to do more to organise prevention andresponse to real cases of genocide. Unfortunately, theGenocide Convention is written so loosely and theterm so abused for political purposes, that there is adanger of it becoming trivialised. But a strict historicalinterpretation based on the precedents of the Holocaustand Rwanda in 1994 can help to avoid such pitfalls.

Lastly, NATO countries should be very wary aboutintervening in civil wars over self-determination. Theprinciple is dangerously ambiguous; atrocities areoften committed on both sides (“reciprocal genocide”);and the precedents can have disastrous consequences.

None of these criteria solve the problem of how todetermine NATO’s mission in the Information Age.But better consequences will flow from a starting pointin which the Alliance’s values are related to its power,and in which any humanitarian mission is rationallypursued within prudent limits. ■


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FO

CU

S

New Permanent Representative of Germany

Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke (61) has succeededAmbassador Joachim Bitterlich as Permanent Representativeof Germany to the North Atlantic Council.

After studying Economics and Law at the Universities ofHeidelberg, Grenoble, Berlin and Freiburg i.B. from 1958 to1963, Mr von Moltke went on to complete his legal trainingand state examinations in law.

He joined the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn in 1968and held posts in the embassies in Moscow and Yaunde(Cameroon) in the 1970s. He returned to the FederalForeign Office in Bonn in 1977, serving in the PersonnelAdministration Division until 1982, when he was postedas Counsellor for Political Affairs to the Embassy inWashington DC.

On returning to Bonn in1986, he was made Head ofthe US Department in theFederal Foreign Office, a posi-tion he held until he was post-ed to Brussels to serve asNATO Assistant SecretaryGeneral for Political Affairs(1991-97). Before taking uphis present appointment inOctober 1999, he wasAmbassador to the Court ofSt. James’s in London.

ver since we gained our independence in 1991,Slovenia has had to cope with the negative

spillover from the ethnic tensions, political unrest anddevelopmental problems that have come to charac-terise and threaten to destabilise the Balkan countriesin the region to our south-east. We had for a long timebeen voicing concern over escalating tensions in theregion and had warned in advance of the risks of long-lasting armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina andthe aggravation of relations between Serbs andAlbanians in Kosovo.

Slovenia, a Central European country, already ful-fils its national security, political and economic inter-ests within the wider framework of existing Europeanand Euro-Atlantic structures. Yet, we recognise thatour long-term security and economic developmentdepend to a great extent on promoting stability andprosperity in the countries of the region to our south-east.

The Stability PactWe therefore welcome the Stability Pact for South

Eastern Europe, which was agreed at the EuropeanUnion’s ministerial conference in Cologne on 10 June1999, and the Declaration endorsed by the Heads ofState and Government of more than 26 European andnon-European countries at their meeting in Sarajevo on30 July 1999. This is one of the international commu-nity’s most significant achievements in the last fewyears. Slovenia is participating actively, as an equalpartner, in this international, comprehensive approachto help the region tackle its political and economicchallenges.

Through the Stability Pact, the international com-munity expressed its determination to take concerted,positive action to eliminate the root causes of South-eastern Europe’s characteristic instability. Strategicdirection is being provided by a common political plat-


Slovenia has an interest in promoting stability and prosperity in countries that lie to its south-east and, equipped with adeep insight into the former Yugoslavia, it is participating actively in the work of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

set up by the European Union in June this year. Dr Boris Frlec, Foreign Minister, outlines Slovenia’s contributions to an endeavour, which hesays will help it significantly to realise its strategic goals.

E

Bodo Hombach,SpecialCoordinator of theStability Pact forSouth EasternEurope (left),talks to SlovenianPresident MilanKucan (right) priorto the start of theViennaconference on theBalkans, organisedby the Europeansocial democraticparties on 22 July,where proposalsfor the StabilityPact werediscussed.(Belga photo)

Slovenia’s perspective on promoting stability in South-eastern Europe

Dr Boris FrlecMinister of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia

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form of participating states and international organisa-tions, through roundtable discussions addressing theregions security, economic, humanitarian and socialproblems.

Political, economic and security issues require dif-ferent methods and institutions for their settling, butthey are inseparably connected and intertwined. TheStability Pact builds on this interdependence. Its com-prehensive and integrated approach offers hope that thedesperate living conditions of people in this part ofEurope will finally be alleviated. It also offers apromising formula for addressing the complex ethnic,developmental, social and political tensions that havebeen seething there since the end of the Cold War.

The Stability Pact aims to support countries inSouth-eastern Europe in their struggle to achieve over-all social prosperity and peace, and stresses that thiswill be possible only if democracy and respect forhuman rights are fostered, along with economic devel-opment. A strong civil society must be established andnational minority issues must be settled. This approachis fully consistent with the position and values of mycountry.

Slovenia’s active involvementSlovenia’s shared history with the countries of

South-eastern Europe and our experiences — both pos-itive and negative — of dealing with them, gives us aunique, in some ways privileged, position in this com-mon endeavour. Our knowledge of the formerYugoslavia — our insight into the different peoples’mentalities and languages — and our traditional eco-nomic links provide major opportunities for us to playa constructive role in the stabilisation process.

In the Stability Pact’s various roundtable discus-sions, Slovenia has already proposed several projectsaimed at promoting democracy and creating conditionsconducive to the peaceful co-existence of peoples ofvarious cultures and religions, as well as projects forthe region’s economic reconstruction and develop-ment.

In the context of discussions in the meeting of the“Working Table on Democratisation and HumanRights”, we have recommended, among other things,that a centre be set up to monitor inter-ethnic relationsin South-eastern Europe. A proposal for the establish-ment of institutions, effective administration and effec-tive management has been drawn up by several min-istries. We have also proposed the founding of aninternational centre for studies on South-easternEurope and an international university for the region.And RTV Slovenia — our national radio and televisionbroadcasting company — has offered to assist media

Norwegian SFORsoldiers raise the

Slovenian nationalflag on

5 November1997 at a campnear Sarajevo to

mark the occasionof 35 members of

the Slovenian airforce being

assigned to SFORfor tasks

in Bosnia.(Belga photo)

democratisation in Kosovo and in South-easternEurope.

Several projects in this field are already underway.Slovenia has agreed to host a number of internationalconferences. The first aimed to identify appropriateconstitutional solutions to contribute to democratisa-tion and the effective protection of human rights, andwas organised together with the Venice Commission ofthe Council of Europe at the end of November. Thesecond, at the beginning of December, was organisedwithin the framework of the Royaumont Initiative oncross-border cooperation between European cities andlocal communities. A third conference on nationalminorities is planned for February 2000 in cooperationwith the Council of Europe.

In the meeting of the Pact’s “Working Table onEconomic Reconstruction, Development andCooperation”, Slovenia has put forward a proposal toeducate managers from South-eastern Europe at theBrdo Educational Centre. And in the context of the“Working Table on Security Issues”, Slovenia is sup-porting moves to extend the activity of the“International Trust Fund for De-mining and Mine



Slovenian PrimeMinister JanezDrnovsek (left)meets the thenNATO SecretaryGeneral JavierSolana at NATOheadquarters on 1 June 1999.Slovenia wasthe first Partnercountry to open itsairspace to NATOplanes at the startof Operation AlliedForce.(Belga photo)

the Euro-Atlantic structures — a goal that is sharedwith many of the countries to our south-east.

Slovenia now enjoys both internal and external sta-bility and seeks to transfer this stability to the widerregion through regional initiatives. We believe thatinterregional cooperation is of key importance forachieving long-term stability in South-eastern Europe.The inclusion of Slovenia in the next wave of NATOenlargement would give an important signal to thecountries of the region. Not only would it offer hopefor their own eventual integration, but the enlargedNATO would also help promote security and stabilitybeyond its own territory to the countries in its immedi-ate vicinity.

From our perspec-tive, of course, the cur-rent instability in South-eastern Europe — thoughit does not threaten usdirectly — strengthensarguments in favour ofSlovenia seeking to safe-guard and consolidate itsnational security withinthe North AtlanticAlliance’s collectivedefence system. Already,Slovenia has proved tobe a reliable regionalally to NATO by oursupport for the Alliedintervention in Kosovo,in defence of the valuesupon which NATO isfounded and whichSlovenia upholds. At thestart of Operation Allied

Force, we were the first Partner country to provideNATO with access to our airspace within 24 hours. Wewere also deeply involved in the political dialogue dur-ing the intense efforts to find a political solution to theKosovo crisis.

I am convinced that Slovenian experience andknowledge of the region will also be of value to NATOin our active participation in the Euro-AtlanticPartnership Council fora, namely: the “ConsultativeForum on Security Matters on South-Eastern Europe”and the “Ad hoc Working Group on South-EasternEurope”.

Realising Slovenia’s strategic goalsThe crises in Bosnia and Kosovo and the interna-

tional community’s responses mirror two of the mainfeatures of the post-Cold War revolution in geopolitics:

Victims Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (ITF)to include Croatia and Kosovo.

Slovenia is active in a range of other internationalendeavours to promote security and stability in South-eastern Europe. These include SFOR and theMultinational Specialised Unit (MSU) in Bosnia,KFOR and the UN Interim Administration Mission inKosovo (UNMIK), the WEU-led MultinationalAdvisory Police Element (MAPE) in Albania, theSoutheast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), andthe Royaumont Process. Over 100 members of theSlovenian armed forces are participating in these oper-ations, and civilian experts are active in Kosovo andAlbania.

Extending NATO’s security umbrellaIt is essential that — in addition to the projects

organised under the Stability Pact — all South-easternEuropean countries be encouraged to participateactively in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) pro-gramme, and clear prospects for their admission to thePartnership must be drawn up. Security, stability andconfidence in the region will be achieved only throughbuilding mutual confidence and cooperation within theframework of this programme for promoting coopera-tive security in the whole Euro-Atlantic region.

Our own participation in PfP led to our commit-ment to adapt the country’s security and military struc-tures and develop appropriate democratic control overthe armed forces. Our admission to the Partnership isthe best proof that Slovenia is developing in the rightdirection, and has good prospects for membership of

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the emergence of inter-ethnic conflicts as one of thenew international security risks; and the emergence ofmore intense international cooperation to address thesenew security challenges. The uniquely comprehensiveapproach of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europeis mobilising the resources of a wide range of actors inthe international community. The experience gainedmay help establish best practices for a fast and effec-tive response in similar cases throughout the world.

The Pact has also confirmed the significance of theEU and NATO for stability on the European continent,and underlines the importance ofclose cooperation betweenthem. Slovenia is aware thatfull membership of bothorganisations would guarantee

(Left to right)Foreign MinistersToomas HendrikIlves (Estonia),

Ioannis Kasoulides(Cyprus), JanKavan (Czech

Republic), JánosMartonyi

(Hungary),Bronislaw

Geremek (Poland)and Boris Frlec

(Slovenia) met inTallinn, Estonia, on11 October 1999,

to discuss issuesrelated to their

negotiations forEU membership,

as well as tightercooperation

between the sixcountries.

(Belga photo)

our long-term security. We are engaged in the activitiesof both, and are ready to embrace the challenges ofmembership.

Slovenia’s active involvement in the work of theStability Pact contributes significantly towards realis-ing our strategic goals. It brings us closer to Europeanand Euro-Atlantic structures, offering an opportunityfor our country to strengthen its international position.But more importantly, the Stability Pact improves the

prospects for Slovenia’s long-term securi-ty by offering the hope of bringinglasting peace, democracy and prosperi-ty to the countries of South-easternEurope — a region that has beenthe tinderbox of Europe for toolong. ■


dangerous trend hasbeen arrested in this last

year of the present century.Too often the conflicts inSouth-eastern Europe becamethe conflicts, or even the wars,of Europe. Equally, Europe toooften carried out proxy wars inthe Balkans. This time, theconflicts in the region werecontrolled. In the Kosovo cri-sis, through joint effort, a dan-gerous conflict was successful-ly limited and isolated. On theeve of the new millennium thatis a great political success.

This success demandscommitment from all of us: theStability Pact for SouthEastern Europe is the politicalframework for maintaining it.A policy of realistic steps isbeing developed, involvingintegration into European andEuro-Atlantic structures, including NATO. One goal isthat of a European Union expanded by the addition ofthe countries of South-eastern Europe. The countries ofthe region must have the possibility to come a bit near-er to this reality each day.

Peace and stability require economic recovery, justas economic recovery requires peace and stability. Thisis where the Stability Pact comes in, with its perspec-tive of integration, and its three equal “WorkingTables” addressing democratisation and the promotionof civil societies, economic development, and ques-tions of internal and external security.

At the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo at the endof July, Finnish President Ahtisaari correctly spoke ofthe Stability Pact in terms of a marathon. I would addthat we want to set ourselves targets along the way toour goal, so that we can measure ourselves by ourachievements at the intermediate stages.

To be politically responsible we must not awakenhopes which cannot be fulfilled. But the Stability Pact

must use concrete successes,based on steering a clear course,to maintain acceptance andmotivation. People’s lives mustbecome a little bit better eachday.

The challenge of YugoslaviaThe Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia remains a centralproblem and challenge. Peoplein Yugoslavia should know thatthe Stability Pact is not build-ing a wall around them. On thecontrary: as soon as Yugoslaviahas solved its political prob-lems, it can and should becomea participant in the StabilityPact with full rights. Until then,the Stability Pact will reach outto the democratic forces in

Serbia and Montenegro.

President Milosevic’s policies have driven hiscountry to political and economic ruin. Aggressivenationalism, despotism and the preservation of his per-sonal power have, over the last decade, engulfedSouth-eastern Europe in blood, hate and expulsions.Europe has not accepted this policy, nor will it be toler-ated in the future.

Against this background, and spurred by the sys-tematic deportation of the Albanian population fromKosovo, the West took a stand against the regime inBelgrade. At stake were the European system of valuesand peace in the region, which was also endangered bythe destabilising movement of tens of thousands ofrefugees into neighbouring countries.

Seldom have such difficult decisions relating topost-war Europe been required. During the air strikes,all politicians carrying responsibility in NATO coun-tries grappled with the best approach. The flagrantabuse of human rights, unrestrained terror, brutal


The Stability Pact launched last summer sets the political and practical framework for promoting peace and stability in South-eastern Europe.With its broad-based membership — including the European Union, the Group of Seven Industrialised Nations plus Russia (G8),

the countries of the region, and key organisations such as NATO — the Pact’s comprehensive approach of preventive diplomacy is breakingnew ground in policy towards the Balkans.

A

The SpecialCoordinator of theStability for SouthEastern Europe,Bodo Hombach, at the openingsessionof the StabilityPact Summit,in Sarajevoon 29 July. (Reuters photo)

The Stability Pact: Breaking new ground in the BalkansBodo Hombach

Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

▼

Finnish PresidentMartti Ahtisaari

(left) — seatednext to Stability

Pact SpecialCoordinator Bodo

Hombach during ameeting of nine

Balkan States onthe eve of theStability Pact

Summit inSarajevo —spoke of the

Stability Pact interms of

a marathon. (Belga photo)

expulsions, and the danger of war engulfing the regioncould not go unchallenged. Yet, it is impossible toentirely protect the innocent from the effects of a mili-tary campaign.

Mobilising initiatives and resourcesThe Stability Pact can mobilise initiatives and

resources, accelerate processes and create politicalmomentum. It does not have its own implementingstructure. For that it is dependent on its participants. Asa framework for coordination and political impulses, itmust call on its participants to act, and to channel exist-ing activities. The Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevowith 40 Heads of State and Government, and heads ofinternational organisations, made clear the firm will ofthe international community to work together with allthe countries of the region to implement the StabilityPact with concrete actions.

We do not want to reinvent the wheel. We want tobuild on what already exists: the varied levels of devel-opment of the countries of the region; the initiatives andprogrammes already started; and the expertise ofNATO, the European Union (EU), the Organisation forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), theCouncil of Europe, the United Nations, internationalfinancial institutions, NGOs, and many others.

The Stability Pact differs from previous ways ofapproaching matters in the region, because it has avision for the region, a coherent policy of preventive

diplomacy, and custom-designed decision-makingstructures.

The Stability Pact’s vision is that of a South-easternEurope with its future founded on peace, democracy,economic prosperity, and internal and external security— South-eastern Europe which will eventually be inte-grated into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.Looking back on this century, this vision is somethingradically new… something that we would not havedared believe possible even a few years ago.

Up to now, policy approaches concerning theBalkans have been directed at symptoms and crises.The Stability Pact is the first attempt at addressing thepolitical and economic structural deficits in the coun-tries of the regions through a comprehensive approachof preventive diplomacy. An innovative aspect is that itfully draws in the countries of South-eastern Europe asequal partners, indeed as owners of the stabilisationprocess.

Above all, this approach makes use of the most suc-cessful concepts of European post-war history: EUintegration unified Western Europe; the HelsinkiProcess helped overcome the division of our continent.We do not have better instruments than these.

The Stability Pact is a type of Helsinki Process forSouth-eastern Europe. Its decision-making structures,which consist of a system of three “Working Tables”,the results of which are brought together at the“Regional Table”, reflect closely the “Baskets” which


Background to the Stability Pact

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted at a special meeting of Foreign Ministers, representatives of interna-tional organisations, institutions and regional initiatives, in Cologne on 10 June 1999. The Pact represents a political commitmentby all the countries and bodies concerned to a comprehensive, coordinated and strategic approach to the region, replacing crisismanagement with preventive diplomacy.

The Stability Pact provides the framework for all relevant existing actors to achieve the common objectives in the fields ofdemocratisation and human rights, economic development and reconstruction, and external and internal security.

A Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact is foreseen in the document agreed at Cologne to facilitate the achievement of theobjectives of the Pact. Mr Bodo Hombach, formerly Minister in charge of the German Federal Chancellor’s Office, was appointed tothe post in July 1999.

❏ There are 29 participants in the Stability Pact: the 15 EU Member States, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,Hungary, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Turkey, United States ofAmerica, the European Commission, the OSCE Chairman in Office, and the Council of Europe.

❏ In addition there are 11 facilitators and five regional initiatives supporting the aims of the Pact and taking part in its struc-tures: Canada, Japan, the United Nations, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, NATO, the Organisation for EconomicCooperation and Development, the Western European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the EuropeanInvestment Bank, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the Royaumont Process, Black Sea EconomicCooperation, the Central European Initiative, the South East Europe Cooperation Initiative, and the South Eastern EuropeCooperation Process.

❏ At the 16 September 1999 meeting of the “Regional Table for South Eastern Europe” the following observers were present:the Czech Republic, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Ukraine. The following Guests of the Chair were alsopresent: Montenegro, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Office of the High Representative, andthe European Parliament.

(*) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.


A general view ofthe start of theStability PactSummit inSarajevo’s ZetraOlympic centre on29 July. Forty Heads ofState andGovernmentand the heads ofinternationalorganisations meetto discuss howto promote peaceand prosperityin South-EasternEurope after adecade ofbloodshed.(Reuters photo)

grouped together similar areas of policy in the HelsinkiProcess.

Only in the Stability Pact’s structure does everyonecome together at the same table, including internation-al financial institutions. And they come together asequals. The Stability Pact is not an additional actor onthe international stage: it has the task of creating a gen-uine added value among existing actors. It stimulatesand accelerates action.

Concrete work is underwayConcrete work is well underway. The meeting of

the “Regional Table” on 16 September concluded thework plan for the “Working Tables”. It also agreed on asystem of chairmanship and co-chairmanship for the“Working Tables”, all of which had their first meetingsin October. The system of co-chairmanship means thatthe countries in the region will be hosting meetings ofthe “Working Tables”, as well as playing a key role intheir preparation and follow-up.

On the substance of the Stability Pact’s work,important progress has been made in a number of keyareas. For example, an investment charter has beendrawn up, which includes firm commitments by coun-tries in the region to improve their investment environ-ment. A business advisory council has been created,composed of senior business executives from Stability

Pact countries, including those in South-easternEurope, which will be closely involved in the imple-mentation of the investment charter. In a division oflabour between the international banks, the WorldBank is preparing a comprehensive approach to regionaldevelopment; the European Investment Bank is leading

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An SFOR soldierkeeps watch from

the tower of theSarajevo Olympic

stadium, wherethe Stability Pact

Summit is held on29 July. “NATO

clearly has a keyrole to play in a

number of impor-tant aspects of the

Pact’s work.”

(Belga photo)


plans on good governance, education, freedom of themedia, gender, ethnic minorities and refugees.

On the defence side, work is progressing well onconfidence-building measures, such as improved mili-tary-to-military contacts, control of arms sales andreducing the amount of small arms in circulation, aswell as the non-proliferation of weapons of massdestruction. The next meeting of the “Working Tableon Security” will take place in Sarajevo in early 2000.

A key date for the Stability Pact will be a regionalfinancing conference which will be held in the firstquarter of 2000. This will provide the resources neces-sary for many of the projects to be implemented. Weare now entering the next phase of practical implemen-tation, in which projects will be turned into construc-tion sites.

Working with NATOIn taking forward the work of the Stability Pact, I

look forward to continuing with Lord Robertson theclose working relationship established with NATOunder his predecessor, Dr Javier Solana. The complex-ity and scale of the tasks we face is such that no oneorganisation or country can handle them alone. ButNATO clearly has a key role to play in a number ofimportant aspects of the Pact’s work. Together, wehave the chance to build a stable and prosperous futurefor South-eastern Europe. ■

on prioritising regional infrastructure projects; andthe European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment is preparing a programme for privatesector development in the region.

An anti-corruption initiative has been launched aspart of an overall effort to fight organised crime. And aseries of task forces are developing integrated action

or centuries, Swiss security policy reliedon autonomous self-defence and neutrality.

But dramatic changes in the strategic environ-ment in Europe and the conflicts in the Balkanshave led the Swiss to adapt their traditional secu-rity stance. For the foreseeable future, securitywill need to be strengthened primarily throughcooperation with other nations and with securityorganisations like NATO. Switzerland does notintend either to join the Alliance or abandon itsstatus of neutrality. It therefore has a pivotalinterest in the lasting success of the Partnershipfor Peace (PfP) programme, and in a more sub-stantive role for the Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil (EAPC).

NATO and the security of SwitzerlandAfter the Second World War, Switzerland’s

security improved significantly when its neigh-bours — France, Germany and Italy — becamepart of an alliance committed to democracy,individual liberty and the rule of law. For thefirst time in centuries, Switzerland was no longersituated at the crossroads of hostile big powers.The North Atlantic Alliance has played a major stabil-ising role on the whole continent, by tying the securityof Europe to the security of the United States. Now, fol-lowing the end of the Cold War, NATO remains a guar-antor against the re-nationalisation of the security anddefence policies of Western European states.

The Swiss welcomed the opening of NATO and itsadaptation to the changing security environment as aneffective way of promoting greater security and stabil-ity in the wider Euro-Atlantic region. PfP made it pos-sible for Switzerland to establish normal relations andengage in a regular dialogue with NATO, building onits close political, economic and cultural relations withindividual NATO member states.

Impact of the crisesin the former YugoslaviaOnly time will tell what long-term impact the

events in the former Yugoslavia will have on Swiss for-eign and security policy. In relation to its size, no otherWestern European country hosted as many refugeesfrom the former Yugoslavia. Switzerland was particu-larly affected by the crisis in Kosovo. About 170,000Kosovar Albanians — nearly 10 per cent of the popu-lation of Kosovo — came to stay in Switzerland.During the crisis, every second refugee in Albania andthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1) declared


Dramatic changes in the European strategic environment since the end of the Cold War, and the crises in the Balkansin particular, have led Switzerland to adapt its traditional security stance. There is no question of abandoning their

neutrality, but the Swiss now seek to strengthen their security through cooperation with other nations and with NATO,in particular through Partnership for Peace (PfP). And while domestic legislation at present prevents the Swiss from

sending armed units abroad, this is now the subject of public debate. Mr Dahinden of the Swiss Mission to NATOoutlines the importance to his country of participating in PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, calling for

cooperation in both to be strengthened.

F

Swiss ForeignMinister JosephDeiss talks with aKosovar Albanianrefugee during hisvisit to the Spitallarefugee camp nearDurres, east ofTirana, Albania,on 16 May.The Swiss reactedswiftly to theKosovo crisisby sendinghumanitarianaid to the region.(Belga photo)

Swiss security policy and partnership with NATOMartin Dahinden

Deputy Head of the Swiss Mission to NATO

▼

(1)Turkey recognises theRepublic of Macedoniawith its constitutionalname.

Swiss UNHCRhelicopters deliverhumanitarian aid

to Kosovarrefugees in

northern Albaniaon 20 April.(Belga photo)

Switzerland as their preferred final destination, shouldtheir return to Kosovo not be possible.

The massive influx of refugees is not the only con-sequence felt in Switzerland of almost ten years of con-flict in the Balkans. The country is also being affectedby illegal arms traffic, organised crime, and troublebetween different ethnic groups from the formerYugoslavia living in Switzerland.

The Swiss reacted swiftly to the Kosovo crisis withits traditional instruments of foreign policy. Extensivehumanitarian aid and reconstruction programmes werelaunched. In 1999 alone, some US$ 200 million werespent in the region, making Switzerland a major donorcountry.

Cooperation between Switzerland and NATO deep-ened to an unprecedented level during the crises inBosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. At the end of1995, the Swiss opened their air space, rail and roadnetworks to IFOR troops. The Ministry of Defencestarted bilateral assistance programmes with the armedforces of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia. Today, these programmes are being coor-dinated under PfP with NATO and with other nations.The experience gained has been very positive.

As hundreds of thousands of people started fleeingKosovo, Switzerland launched bilateral humanitarianassistance programmes in the region. Transport heli-copters from the Swiss armed forces were alsoprovided to the Office of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition tothis assistance, and at the request of several Europeanforeign ministers, Switzerland — together withGreece, Russia and, later, Austria — launched a sup-port programme (FOCUS) for the people displacedwithin Kosovo. Support was also given to victims ofthe armed conflict in Serbia. This operation could nothave been carried out without close cooperation withthe political and military authorities of NATO.Previous experience gained through PfP proved mosthelpful.

Domestic legislation prohibits the Swiss govern-ment from sending armed units abroad. Nevertheless,the Swiss government decided to provide an unarmedsupport unit to the Austrian battalion in KFOR. About140 Swiss soldiers are now deployed in Kosovo. In themeantime, a public debate has started in Switzerland asto whether this prohibition against sending armedtroops abroad should be lifted, as well as other legalobstacles hampering international cooperation.



Preparing missions togetherCareful preparation is the key to successful military

cooperation. The experience gained during operationslike SFOR, AFOR and KFOR becomes the drivingforce for further development of both the Partnershipas a whole and individual countries’ Partnership pro-grammes. This results in more challenging exercises,more effective training and additional efforts toincrease interoperability.

During the early days of Swiss participation in PfP,there was no participation in troop exercises or anyoperations, other than civil emergency planning. Butparticipation in various staff exercises and in the annu-al NATO crisis management exercise has led to better

knowledge of the structures and working methods ofNATO, its members and other nations.

It was only recently that interoperability of armedforces became a part of the cooperation, and it willbecome more important with participation in KFOR.Since 1999, Switzerland has participated in the PfPPlanning and Review Process (PARP). The benefits ofthis go well beyond the Partnership with NATO, andhave also proven useful in cooperation with otherarmed forces in bilateral undertakings.

Swiss added valueThe Swiss government was determined to make a

net contribution to the Partnership, when it decided to

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SIreland joins Partnership for Peace

On 1 December, Irelandbecame the 25th member ofthe Partnership for Peace (PfP)programme.

Irish Foreign MinisterDavid Andrews came to NATOheadquarters in Brussels tosign the PfP FrameworkDocument and submit Ireland’sPfP Presentation Document,which sets out the basis forIrish participation in PfP, asapproved by the IrishParliament.

Mr Andrews emphasisedthat Ireland’s decision to joinPfP was “in full accordancewith Ireland’s policy of neutral-ity”, and that Ireland had nointention of joining the NorthAtlantic Alliance, or any otheralliance. In remarks to the North Atlantic Council, he explained that Ireland — which plays an active role in United Nations peace-keeping and supports the further development of international strategies and actions for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and cri-sis management — “welcomes the role that peacekeeping has assumed in Partnership for Peace and looks forward to contribu-tiong to Partnership activities in this area.”

He went on to say that “Ireland also looks forward to participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. We see the EAPCas an important forum for discussions.... [and] a practical expression of the principle of mutually reinforcing cooperation in thesearch for peace and stability in Europe.”

At the signing ceremony, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson praised Ireland as “one of the foremost contributors of well-trained troops to international peacekeeping missions” — pointing in particular to the Irish contributions of a military police com-pany to SFOR and a transport company to KFOR — and said that “participation in PfP and EAPC will make Ireland’s contributioneven more effective.”

The next step will be to develop an Individual Partnership Programme for Ireland, based on the wide-ranging menu of coop-erative activities available under PfP, which allows Partner countries to tailor their participation according to specific nationalrequirements and priorities. As Mr Andrews stated in remarks to the North Atlantic Council: “Ireland attaches importance to the vol-untary, flexible and self-differentiating characteristics of the Partnership for Peace.”

Irish ForeignMinister DavidAndrews (left)signs the PfPFrameworkDocument andsubmits Ireland’sPfP PresentationDocument to NATOSecretary GeneralLord Robertson, on1 December.(Belga photo)

▼

participate in PfP. This contribution is made in areassuch as search and rescue, civil emergency, dissemina-tion of international humanitarian law, security policyeducation, democratic control of forces, medical edu-cation, and arms control and disarmament, rather thanin core military activities.

In early 1999, the Geneva Centre for SecurityPolicy — an international training facility financed bythe Swiss government — was certified as one of thefirst PfP Training Centres by the North AtlanticCouncil. Another Swiss PfP initiative is theInternational Security Network (ISN) — an institutionthat promotes the use of modern information technologyin the area of security policy. One of the ISN projectsinvolves indexing information to facilitate key-wordsearches of NATO’s web site.

Confidence-buildingSince the days of the League of Nations,

Switzerland has favoured international action toaddress the causes of conflicts and prevent dangerousescalation. Today, conflict prevention, preventivediplomacy and confidence-building are still consideredpriorities.

PfP has generated a new generation of pragmaticconfidence-building measures, while avoiding exten-sive conceptual debates. The daily contacts and practi-cal collaboration among the political, military andcivilian representatives of NATO and Partner nationsare a form of confidence-building that goes far beyondthe classic measures developed during the Cold War. Inthis way, PfP has significantly improved the image ofNATO in non-member nations — even in Switzerland,which has always enjoyed good relations with theAlliance and its members.

Clearly, it will take more than this sort of coopera-tion to resolve certain important European securityissues, which are still the subject of fundamental dis-sent. But the experience gained and the trust builtthrough joint activities improves the conditions forreaching solutions, and helps avoid false perceptionsthat could lead to dangerous escalation.

The future role of the PartnershipPartner nations pursue very different objectives

within the Partnership. Some seek to improve theircapabilities, with a view to eventual membership of theAlliance. For others, the Partnership is an institutionaldoor to the Euro-Atlantic community. Switzerland con-siders the Partnership as a framework for political con-sultations and practical cooperation with NATO. But,irrespective of these different aspirations, there is stillconsiderable unused potential in the Partnership, par-


ticularly in the area of crisis management, the betteruse of the EAPC, and practical cooperation under PfP.

Crisis managementAs early as the 1997 Madrid Summit, the Head of

the Swiss Delegation, Federal Councillor Ogi, statedthat the EAPC is particularly well-suited to deal withthe practical and operational aspects of conflict man-agement. This still holds true today. Switzerland sup-ports the development of capacities to make it possiblefor NATO and Partner nations to react swiftly togetherin emergencies, other than collective defence. TheEAPC should primarily focus on military aspects ofcrisis response, peacekeeping, humanitarian supportactions and disaster relief. The establishment of theEuro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre(EADRCC) to support civil rescue efforts with militarymeans was a significant step. And the OperationalCapabilities Concept (OCC) that was launched at theWashington Summit provides a blueprint for improv-ing the practical and operational aspects of crisis man-agement.

Domesticlegislation

prohibits the Swissfrom sendingarmed units

abroad. But anunarmed support

unit has beenprovided to the

Austrian battalionin KFOR.

(AFO photo)


One of the lessons learned from the Balkan crises isthat crisis management is becoming increasingly com-plex. There are no clear-cut structures and procedures,and different organisations, concepts and instrumentsoperate in parallel. Crisis management strategies tendto be developed during crisesthemselves. And,these difficultconditions willprobably prevailin future emer-gencies.

In this context,the EAPC can andshould play animportant role toencourage morecoherent action byNATO and Partnersin future crises. Forsuch a role to be car-ried out effectively, itwill be important toreflect on recentexperiences, and havean open discussion on gaps in the EAPC’s work and onwhat improvements need to be implemented.

Strengthening the political role of the EAPCSince its inception in 1997, the EAPC has provided

a valuable framework for political consultation, in par-ticular with regard to Kosovo and developments inBosnia and Herzegovina. But, there is room forimprovement. Often, the political discussion is not as

substantive as it could be. The EAPC must becomemore of a starting point for substantive initiatives. Agood start has been made with initiatives in the areas ofglobal humanitarian mine action, the proliferation of

small arms and light weapons, andregional security cooperation inSouth-eastern Europe and theCaucasus. It is up to the Partnernations themselves to come up withproposals for appropriate concertedaction on issues of particular con-cern to them, and to make betteruse of the EAPC’s potential.

Enhanced practicalcooperation under PfPOne of the uncontested quali-

ties of the PfP programme is thedirect military-to-military coop-eration among Allies andPartners in operations, exer-

cises, training and education.Europe’s armed forces are generally facing streamlinedbudgets, while at the same time being charged withadditional tasks that require international cooperation.This also applies to the Swiss army.

Steps were taken at the Washington Summit torespond to those challenges. The “Enhanced and moreOperational Partnership” provides for a better integra-tion of Partners in joint emergency operations withNATO, other than collective defence. Switzerlandlooks forward to making its own particular contribu-tion to this common endeavour. ■

Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network

(http://www.spn.ethz.ch/)

Switzerland and Partnership for Peace

(http://www.pfp.ethz.ch/index.cfm)

Swiss Mission to NATO

(http://www.nato.int/pfp/ch/home.htm)

International Relations and Security Network

(http://www.isn.ethz.ch/)

Geneva Centre for Security Policy

(http://www.gcsp.ch/)

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New Permanent Representative of DenmarkAmbassador Niels Egelund (53) has succeeded Ambassador Gunnar Riberholdt as Permanent Representative of Denmark to the

North Atlantic Council.

Mr Egelund attended the Army Language School (1965-67) and served part-time as a First Lieutenant (Reserve) with the Royal LifeGuards from 1967 to 1971. He then studied History, Russian, and Political Science, respectively, at the Universities of Copenhagen andÅrhus, Denmark, and at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium.

Having completed his studies, he started his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972. His first for-eign posting was as First Secretary to the Embassy in Washington DC from 1976 to 1980. Upon his return, heserved as Counsellor to the Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament Affairs until 1982, when hebecame Deputy Head of the NATO Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1985, he was posted to Bonnas Minister Counsellor and Deputy Chief of Mission.

He returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen in 1987 and was appointed Head ofDepartment, first of Soviet and Eastern European Affairs and the Conference of Security and Cooperation inEurope; then of relations with North and South America, Western Europe, European Political Cooperation, andPolicy Planning (1989-91); and lastly, of relations with NATO and the Western European Union, disarmamentquestions in the UN, and European Political Cooperation and Policy Planning (1991-92).

In 1992, he was appointed Ambassador, Under-Secretary and Political Director, i.e. member of theEuropean Union’s Political Committee. From 1994 until taking up his present appointment in October 1999,he served in the Prime Minister’s Office as Chief Advisor on Foreign and Defence Policy.

Additional sources

of information :


mon research interest between Alliance and Russianscientists. Their work was undertaken in the frame-work of a Memorandum of Understanding onScientific and Technological Cooperation betweenNATO and the Russian Ministry of Science andTechnology, signed by the then NATO SecretaryGeneral, Dr Javier Solana, and the Russian DeputyMinister of Science and Technology, VladislavNichkov, in Luxembourg in May 1998. Areas identi-fied for scientific cooperation include plant biotech-nology, plasma physics, and the prediction andprevention of catastrophes.

Other initiatives are also underway, such as a pro-gramme of industrial partnerships intended to speedthe transfer of technology from academic institutionsto industry; an agreement with scientific leaders in

escribing the transformation of the NATO ScienceProgramme in recent years, Assistant Secretary

General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs YvesSillard explains “The unifying theme is the promotionof interaction and confidence between scientists of the44 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council countries to helpstabilise scientific communities in Partner countries ...By creating and reinforcing links with the internationalscientific community we contribute to the future ofstability and peace.”

Mr Sillard has headed up the Science Programmesince early 1998 and has been spearheading a majorintensification of scientific cooperation with Partnerscientists. Accompanied by members of the ScienceCommittee, he travelled to Moscow in November1998 to forge an agreement outlining areas of com-

As the Alliance has transformed itself, so has its civil Science Programme. Set up 40 years ago to strengthen science andtechnology within the Atlantic Community, the NATO Science Programme today actively builds non-military links between

the Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that participate in Partnership forPeace. In 1999, over 13,000 Alliance and Partner scientists collaborated with each other through joint research,

participation in workshops and study institutes, and holding NATO science fellowships.

D

NATO Science Programme intensifies interactions with Partners

Nancy T. SchulteFormerly of NATO’s Scientific and Environmental Affairs Division

A practicaldemonstration of

the effects of pollution in a

forest in the UpperSilesia industrialarea, during theNATO Advanced

Workshop held inCieszyn, Poland,

in September1997.

(NATO photo)


Bulgarian andGerman scientistsdiscuss theirexperiment in thelaboratory at theFaculty of Physics,Sofia University.A NATO grantmade possibletheir jointresearch intoproblems relatedto the stability ofhigh frequencydischarges in theindustrial use ofplasma-basedtechnologies. (NATO photo)

Ukraine for enhancing Ukrainian participation in thescience programme; and a plan to include Partner sci-entists on the Programme’s peer-review panels whichmake recommendations for proposals.

In October 1999, the Science Committee met inBucharest. There, the Committee members andRomanian experts discussed advances in such areas asoptoelectronics, laser physics and high-resolutionspectral analysis. Romanian President EmilConstantinescu expressed to Mr Sillard his stronginterest in increasing the level of participation in theScience Programme by Romanian scientists.

Partner-Alliance cooperationThe Programme first opened its scientific grants to

applications from Partner scientists in 1992, but thetransition to almost exclusively Partner-Alliance coop-eration was not completed until January 1999. Thismove was due in part to a 1997 review of theProgramme’s activities by an independent group ofrenowned scientists. A central finding of this reviewwas that the Science Programme, through its supportfor the entire spectrum of civil science, was in a uniqueposition to strengthen non-military links between theAlliance and its Partners. Maintaining a dialogue withPartner scientists and helping to provide stability to thescientific communities in Partner countries was seen asmaking a significant contribution to international secu-rity, in an environment where political and military dia-logue can be difficult.

Interaction with Partners takes place through foursub-programmes, targeted at the training of youngresearchers, support for cooperative research, researchinfrastructure, and applied science and technology.Though the audience targeted and the tools used differ,the sub-programmes have several key points in com-mon: the primary selection criterion is scientific excel-lence; proposals are jointly prepared by Partner andAlliance scientists; and participation of younger scien-tists is encouraged. In order to serve the greatest num-ber of scientists, grants cover only travel and partialliving expenses, and occasionally include support forkey equipment purchases for Partners. Salaries are notsupported by NATO scientific grants.

Training young scientists The Science Fellowships sub-programme is aimed

at maintaining the long-term health of the scientificenterprise. It offers opportunities for Partner scientiststo pursue their research or to continue their training ina NATO country, and for scientists from NATO coun-tries to do likewise in Partner countries. Though fel-lows range from Masters-degree level through tosenior scientists, the majority are young post-doctoral

researchers bound for prestigious academic institutionsin Alliance and Partner countries. One objective of theprogramme is to discourage “brain drain” from Partnercountries by insisting that fellows return home at theconclusion of their tenure.

In 1998, the programme supported 487 Partner fel-lows, over 35 per cent of the total of 1,360 fellows.The proportion of Partner fellows will increase signifi-cantly in the coming years, since the North AtlanticCouncil has mandated a redirection of Fellowshipfunding, which requires that 75 per cent be used to sup-port Partner exchanges by 2000.

Cooperative researchThe sub-programme on Cooperative Science and

Technology is aimed at initiating research cooperationand nurturing personal links between scientists incountries that were once separated by political barriers.Researchers in virtually every area of scientificendeavour are eligible for support under a highly com-petitive system in which only the best proposals arefunded. Of the 1,500 proposals received in 1999 forjoint NATO-Partner scientist interaction, only one inthree can expect to be supported.

Funding recommendations are made by four disci-plinary review panels, each composed of about a dozendistinguished scientists and engineers appointed by theScience Committee. Panels convene three times a yearto advise Programme staff on the relative merits of pro-posals under consideration.

The Physical and Engineering Science andTechnology Panel — which covers physics, mathemat-

▼

ics, chemistry, information technology, materials sci-ence and engineering science — receives the largestproportion of proposals. One example of a typical jointproject involves Ukrainian experts led by ProfessorSergej Firstov of the Institute of Problems of MaterialsScience, Kyiv. In collaboration with Canadian andGerman colleagues, his team is developing multi-layered composites, which are advanced materials usedin high-speed computing and aerospace. The projectaffords the Ukrainian team the opportunity to employadvanced research facilities in Canada and Germany,while the Canadian and German teams are exposed to

reclamation of contaminated sites, and for addressingregional environmental problems and natural and man-made disasters. In this regard, the panel supported aSeptember 1997 workshop in Cieszyn, Poland, on howto remedy environmental problems resulting fromchemical contamination of sites in Eastern Europe. Co-directed by Professor Pawel Migula of the Universityof Silesia, Poland, and Dr David B. Peakall of Kings’College, London, the workshop brought togetherexperts from 17 countries to explore solutions to vari-ous contamination scenarios. The panel has also sup-ported a series of projects aimed at increasing theunderstanding of the complex processes of the BlackSea and Caspian Sea ecosystems.

The Security-related Civil Science and Technologypanel is concerned with security-related nuclear, chem-ical, biological and conventional disarmament scienceand technology; hazardous waste storage and disposal;risk assessment, detection science and technology; andsecurity issues associated with nuclear power plants. AJune 1999 workshop on “Nuclear Physical Methods inRadioecological Investigations of Nuclear Test Sites”— co-directed by Dr Siegfried S. Hecker, former direc-tor of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in theUnited States, and Dr Yuri Cherepnin of the NationalNuclear Center, Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan — evaluat-ed existing methods for measuring radioactive contam-inants based on large-scale investigations at theSemipalatinsk test site.

Support for InfrastructureThe Research Infrastructure Support sub-programme

supports Partner countries in developing the researchinfrastructure of their scientific organisations, focusingon computer networking capabilities. Infrastructuresupport takes the form of Computer NetworkingGrants and Science and Technology Policy Grants.

Since the inception of a computer networking pro-gramme in 1994, NATO has played a key role in devel-oping intra- and Internet communication among scien-tists in Partner countries, serving over 50,000 Partnerscientists in over 200 institutes. NATO ComputerNetworking Infrastructure Grants enable Partners tobuy equipment and telecommunications services,which provide reliable and rapid access to researchersthroughout the world.

In contrast to the programmes described above,infrastructure support is one-way, being channelledfrom NATO to Partner countries and institutions. As afirst initiative, the Programme might send a network-ing consultant to a Partner country to help identifyneeds. Subsequent efforts might involve the prepara-tion of proposals to buy networking equipment andprovide start-up funding for durable computer net-works.


new research ideas and highly developed scientificcapabilities.

The Life Sciences and Technology Panel — whichcovers biology, agricultural and food sciences, andmedical and behavioural sciences — supports collabo-ration in such diverse areas as cancer research,immunology, veterinary science, archaeology, psy-chology, and biotechnology. A recent example is that ofa Linkage Grant, which supported a joint projectbetween Latvian and German biomedical specialistsstudying the effect of certain “messenger molecules”on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Theproject synergised the excellent analytical capabilitiesand experience in screening genome libraries on theLatvian side with the advanced laboratory facilities onthe German side.

The Environmental and Earth Science andTechnology Panel — which covers earth and atmos-pheric sciences as well as oceanography — supportsjoint research in areas such as technologies for the


Yves Sillard, NATOAssistant SecretaryGeneral forScientific andEnvironmentalAffairs (left),meets RomanianPresident EmilConstantinescuin October 1999,before themeeting ofthe ScienceCommitteein Bucharest,Romania.(NATO photo)

In every case, proposals must involve several insti-tutes, demonstrate a need by a large number of users,fully incorporate existing Internet facilities, and pro-vide a plan for future self-sustainability.

Another important area of cooperation, Science andTechnology Policy, addresses issues such as the organ-isation and administration of research programmes, thetransfer of research ideas to industry, patents, creationof small and medium-sized enterprises, and intellectu-al property concerns. It has evolved, in part, fromrequests from Partner scientists and officials for assis-tance in reintegrating formerly closed defence commu-nities; learning how to operate in the absence of astrong top-down pyramidal structure; and how toorganise a more effective peer-review system.

As in the area of computer networking, Partnercountries may ask for a consultant to advise on the ini-tial review of their organisation of science policy.Other initiatives include a new internship programme,in which officials from Partner countries gain experi-ence in similar institutions in NATO countries.

Applied science and technology The Science for Peace sub-programme is aimed at

facilitating Partner transition toward market-orientedand environmentally-sound economies. These areapplied science projects, which typically addressindustrial or environmental problems, and they mustbecome self-sustaining by the end of the 4-5 year periodof the grant.

Partner scientists have shown an intense interest inthis sub-programme. Of the more than 1,500 proposalsreceived in the first three calls, fewer than eight percent could be supported with the available funding.

Science for Peace projects include a number ofindustrial-related projects, such as one on “Laser-Based Clean Technologies for Smart SensorFabrication” involving Hungarian, Belgian andRomanian researchers. Other projects focus on theenvironment, such as one concerning “Catalytic andElectrochemical Processes for Sodium Dioxide andNitrogen Oxide Emission Abatement” involvingRussian, Greek, US, Danish and Romanian teams.

An integral part of NATO’s transformationTwo of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s

priorities in taking the Alliance into the 21st centuryare to establish closer relations between NATO andRussia, and to further strengthen the links betweenNATO and its other Partners. By promoting dialogueand redirecting capabilities sustained for military pur-poses during the Cold War to collaborative pursuits,the NATO Science Programme is helping meet thesegoals. ■

Complete information — including downloadableapplication forms — is available on the NATO Scienceweb pages at: http://www.nato.int/science.

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PRINCIPAL ARTICLES LISTED BY AUTHORAKÇAPAR, Burak:PfP Training Centres: Improving training and educationin Partnership for Peace 3 31

AXWORTHY, Lloyd:NATO’s new security vocation 4 8

BALANZINO, Sergio:NATO’s humanitarian support to the victims of the Kosovo crisis 2 9

BOLAND, Frank:NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative — Preparing for future challenges 2 26

BRING, Ove:Should NATO take the lead in formulating a doctrine on humanitarian intervention? 3 24

CLARK, General Wesley:When force is necessary: NATO’s military response to the Kosovo crisis 2 14

CRAGG, Anthony:A new Strategic Concept for a new era 2 19

DAHINDEN, Martin:Swiss security policy and partnership with NATO 4 24

DALE, Charles J.:Towards a Partnership for the twenty-first century 2 29

DE WITTE, Pol:Fostering stability and security in the Southern Caucasus 1 14

DINI, Lamberto:Taking responsibility for Balkan security 3 4

DOMÍNGUEZ, Jorge:Argentina, NATO’s South Atlantic partner 1 7

FRLEC, Boris:Slovenia’s perspective on promoting stability in South-eastern Europe 4 16

GORKA, Sebestyén:NATO after enlargement: Is the Alliance better off? 3 33

HAIN-COLE, Crispin:The Summit Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Rationale and aims 2 33

HOMBACH, Bodo:The Stability Pact: Breaking new ground in the Balkans 4 20

JACKSON, Lt. General Sir Mike:KFOR: Providing security for building a better future for Kosovo 3 16

KLAIBER, Klaus-Peter:The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATO’s door open 2 23

KOUCHNER, Bernard:The challenge of rebuilding Kosovo 3 12

NYE Jnr, Joseph:Redefining NATO’s mission in the Information Age 4 12

OLBOETER, Lt. General Dr. Hartmut:A new College for a new NATO 3 28

ROBERTSON, Lord:NATO in the new millennium 4 3

RUEB, Matthias:Reconstructing Kosovo: On the right track - but where does it lead? 3 20

SCHULTE, Nancy T.:NATO Science Programme intensifies interactions with Partners 4 29

SOLANA, Javier:The Washington Summit: NATO steps boldly into the 21st century 1 3

SOLANA, Javier:A defining moment for NATO: The Washington Summit decisions and the Kosovo crisis 2 3

VAN DER LAAN, Luc:NATO-Russia cooperation in air defence 1 17

VENTURONI, Admiral Guido:The Washington Summit initiatives: Giving NATO the “tools” to doits job in the next century 3 8

ZANDEE, Dick:Civil-military interaction in peace operations 1 10

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No.1 (Spring 1999)

The Washington Summit: NATO steps boldly into the 21st centuryJavier Solana 3

Argentina, NATO’s South Atlantic PartnerJorge Domínguez 7

Civil-military interaction in peace operationsDick Zandee 10

Fostering stability and security in the Southern CaucasusPol de Witte 14

NATO-Russia cooperation in air defenceLuc van der Laan 17

DocumentationMinisterial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 8 December 18Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brussels, 8 December 20Statement on Kosovo, Brussels, 8 December 21Statement on CFE, Brussels, 8 December 21Chairman’s summary of the meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership

Council, Brussels, 8 December 23Updated Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Action Plan 1998-2000 23Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, Brussels, 9 December 26Statement of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council,

Brussels, 9 December 27Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session,

Brussels, 17 December 27Defence Expenditures of NATO countries (1975-1998) 31

No.2 (Summer 1999)

A defining moment for NATO: The Washington Summit decisions and the Kosovo crisisJavier Solana 3

NATO’s humanitarian support to the victims of the Kosovo crisisAmbassador Sergio Balanzino 9

When force is necessary: NATO’s military response to the Kosovo crisisGeneral Wesley K. Clark 14

A new Strategic Concept for a new eraAnthony Cragg 19

The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATO’s door openAmbassador Klaus-Peter Klaiber 23

NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative - Preparing for future challengesFrank Boland 26

Towards a Partnership for the twenty-first centuryCharles J. Dale 29

The Summit Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):Rationale and aimsCrispin Hain-Cole 33

DocumentationThe Washington Declaration D1Statement on Kosovo D1An Alliance for the 21st century D2The Alliance’s Strategic Concept D7Membership Action Plan (MAP) D13Defence Capabilities Initiative D16

No.3 (Autumn 1999)

An Alliance fit for the 21st centuryLetter from the Secretary General 3

Taking responsibility for Balkan securityLamberto Dini 4

The Washington Summit initiatives: Giving NATO the “tools” to do its job in the next centuryAdmiral Guido Venturoni 8

The challenge of rebuilding KosovoBernard Kouchner 12

KFOR: Providing security for building a better future for KosovoLt. General Sir Mike Jackson 16

Reconstructing Kosovo: On the right track — but where does it lead?Matthias Rueb 20

Should NATO take the lead in formulating a doctrine on humanitarian intervention?Ove Bring 24

A new College for a new NATOLt. General Dr. Hartmut Olboeter 28

PfP Training Centres: Improving training and education in Partnership for PeaceBurak Akçapar 31

NATO after enlargement: Is the Alliance better off?Sebestyén L.v. Gorka 33

No.4 (Winter 1999)

NATO in the new millenniumLord Robertson 3

NATO’s new security vocationLloyd Axworthy 8

Redefining NATO’s mission in the Information AgeJoseph S. Nye, Jr. 12

Slovenia’s perspective on promoting stability in South-eastern EuropeBoris Frlec 16

The Stability Pact: Breaking new ground in the BalkansBodo Hombach 20

Swiss security policy and partnership with NATOMartin Dahinden 24

NATO Science Programme intensifies interactions with PartnersNancy T. Schulte 29

CONTENTS LISTED BY ISSUEPage Page


A brass plaque commemorating NATO’s50th anniversary is unveiled at NATOheadquarters by Allied Chiefs of Staffon 9 November. (AP photo)

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