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Table of Contents

OVERVIEW.......................................................3

THE BALKAN PERSPECTIVE ON NATO.........4THE WESTERN BALKAN LANDSCAPE .........5JOINING NATO, COSTS AND BENEFITS........6BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BiH)................7MONTENEGRO................................................8THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OFMACEDONIA (FYROM).................................... 9ALBANIA AND CROATIA..................................11THE SERBIAN EXCEPTION............................13CONCLUSION..................................................15CONTACTS.......................................................15

NOTES..............................................................16

ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS

ANP- Annual National Program

BCSP - Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina

CEDEM - Centre for Democracy and Human Rights

CSIS- Center for Strategic and International Studies

DRG- Defense Reform GroupEKEM - Hellenic Center for European Studies

EU - European Union

FDI- Foreign Direct Investment

FYROM - former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GDP- Gross Domestic Product

IPAP - Individual Partnership Action Plan

IPP - Individual Partnership Program

ISAF - International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)

MAP- Membership Action Plan

MoD- Ministry of Defense

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OHR- Office of the High Representative

PARP- Planning and Review Process

PfP- Partnership for Peace

US- United States of America

Released 17 November, 2010

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mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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NATO AND THE WESTERN BALKANS

A GUIDE FOR THE MEDIA AND GENERAL PUBLIC

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is set to finalize the

Alliances new Strategic Concept this week at the Lisbon Summit (19-20November). The current Strategic Concept was fashioned in April 1999,

heavily influenced by the Alliances interventions in former Yugoslavia.

Since then, NATO troops have helped keep the peace in the region,

Western Balkan countries have contributed hundreds of troops to the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the

promise of NATO membership has spurred the countries of the region to

adopt security and political reforms that will hopefully consolidate their

nascent democracies.

But all is not well in the Balkans. A series of problems from incompletereforms and unconsolidated democratic institutions still plague the

region. Political gridlock in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the ongoing

name dispute between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Greece,

Kosovos ambiguous status and the implications for Serbia are manifestations of the regions

persistent divides. Even the prospect of NATO membership has not prevented the deterioration

of relations and deepening of divisions between ethnicities, elites and publics throughout the

region. As a recentNew York Times op-ed put it, The Balkans can still be lost.1

This guide is a primer on the state of relations between NATO and the Western

Balkans. Our research team The Athens Working Group: Transforming the Balkans ispart of the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM), a think-tank under the

auspices of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs based in Athens. This guide

inaugurates The Athens Working Group's second year, having been founded in 2009 as

part of the US-GREECE TASK FORCE, a partnership with the Center for Strategic

and International Studies (CSIS) based in Washington, DC. Our researchers are

available for comment and analysis to the media.

Following the Lisbon Summit we will be releasing a policy report on our website

(ekemprogram.org/csis).

NATO and the Western Balkans Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM)!New Strategic Concept, Old Challenges Athens Working Group: Transforming the Balkans

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This guideoffers theinternational

media and thepublic a primer

on the state of

relationsbetween NATO

and the

Balkans.

The WesternBalkans

AlbaniaBiH

CroatiaFYROMKosovo*

MontenegroSerbia


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THE BALKAN PERSPECTIVE ON NATO

Overview

In most Western Balkan countries, NATO membership is viewed as a major strategic choice that would

bring national leaderships and their respective societies closer to Euro-Atlantic integration. Over the lastdecade, the Western Balkans have pursued reforms to bring their militaries closer to NATO norms and

have been contributing hundreds of troops to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Candidate status to either NATO or the European Union (EU) itself is considered a reaffirmation of a

countrys international position. Membership also satisfies these peoples search for a new supranational

identity, lost with the fall of Communism, as well as their leaderships aspirations for new opportunities

and hopes for new coalitions.

Although all seven states of the Western Balkans started making the transition from communism about

two decades ago, each of them is at different stage in the NATO accession process. Croatia and Albania

entered the Alliance in 2009 and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has yet to meet the criteria

on good neighborly relations, in order to join the Alliance. Montenegro and BiH have both shown a keen

interest in membership but have a long road of reforms ahead with domestic public opinions that are at

best ambivalent and at worst hostile toward NATO. Serbia is the lone holdout but has entered NATOs

Partnership for Peace Program (PfP).2 Kosovo, which declared independence in February 2008, would

like to join NATO but its international status remains unclear. Though the end goal of these countries

(except Serbia) is the same, each one conceives NATO membership in a different way.

Table 2: The Western Balkans and NATO membership

Country

Partnership for

Peace

(PfP)

Individual

Partnership

Action Plan

(IPAP)

Intensified

Dialogue

Membership

Action Plan

(MAP)

NATO

Member

Albania January 1994 April 1999 April 2009

BiH December 2006 September 2008 April 2008 April 2010

Croatia May 2000 May 2002 April 2009

Serbia December 2006 April 2008

FYROM November 1995 April 1999

Montenegro December 2006 July 2008 April 2008 December 2009

NOTE: Dates above indicate when agreements came in effect.


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The Western Balkan Landscape

Security, political and economic considerations

Euro-Atlantic integration is seen as bringing stability and security

through democratic and economic reforms but there are political and

economic costs along the path to membership.NATO has supported theWestern Balkans countries in their respective processes of post-

communist transition and of post-conflict reconstruction. The

enlargement perspective has played and continues to play a crucial role

in regional stabilization and pacification procedures, affecting political

and security processes and relations.3 In other words, inclusion in the

Euro Atlantic club is the incentive that drives reform in the region and

the delay in the accession process is the penalty for dragging behind in

reform. Open status questions, instability, nationalistic rhetoric, recurring

waves of inter-ethnic tensions, unresolved territorial and border issues,

weak political institutions, and the absence of the rule of law all afflict

the Western Balkans. A series of bilateral and potentially multilateraldifferences within the region remain unresolved, providing obstacles to

the induction of new members into the Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The largest of these obstacles is that the Western Balkans have not yet found full democratic

consolidation. Major concerns remain about internal animosities and political tensions threatening

stability, although democratically elected governments are now in place. A political culture of

compromise is lacking, and at the same time, patronage, clientelism and ethnocentric thinking

characterize domestic politics. Rampant corruption and a weakened rule of law estrange people from

politics.4 The Western Balkans are also suffering economically from belated effects of the Global

Economic Crisis and the Greek debt crisis. If the perspective of NATO membership becomes unrealistic,

Balkan politics can quickly revert to nationalism and radicalism to distract voters from the economic

woes facing the region.

Chart 1: Why do you consider NATO an important institution?

Source: The survey was carried out in all seven Western Balkan countries in the period January

February 2010 by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in cooperation with its regionalpartners.

No opinion

Do not consider NATO important

Other

A mechanism to fight against terrorism

An effective forum for Trans - Atlantic dialogue

Security in the Euro - Atlantic Area

0% 17.50% 35.00% 52.50% 70.00%


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Table1:CurrentWestern Balkantroop contribution to ISAF


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Joining NATO: A Cost-Benefit Analysis

The costs and benefits of NATO membership have military and political aspects just as the Alliance is

both military and political. Belonging to the worlds most powerful military alliance all but precludes a

conventional foreign attack and establishes a country as a member of the Euro-Atlantic Club.

Nevertheless, the reform process to bring military and civil institutions to NATO standards carries

considerable costs, both monetary and political.

One of the main arguments put forth by the advocates of NATO accession is that membership stabilizes

democracy. National leaders see membership as an affirmation of their new pro-Western orientation and

as a reward for their efforts to get rid of their guilty socialist past. Furthermore, becoming a member of

an elite group of countries that share common democratic values upgrades the international status and

domestic legitimacy.

Western Balkan expectations from membership extend

to economic growth. I.e. participation in NATO equals

risk reduction, which in turn leads to increase of a

countrys credit rating, resulting in the reduction of

interest rates and encouraging FDI (Foreign DirectInvestment). Supporters believe that NATO

membership would enable them to implement the

complex and costly security and defense sector

reforms in better, faster, more rational and less costly

fashion.

But becoming a NATO member has costs. First,

security sector reform is rather expensive.

Modernization and restructuring of troops has

extensive budgetary implications and so does

maintaining an army according to NATO standards.

NATO membership implies keeping defense budget

above a certain level (2 percent of GDP). Joining NATO is a commitment to military involvement in

missions and operations world-wide and there is a likelihood that some soldiers will be killed. Supporters

rarely mention these costs in the public discourse about NATO.

Politically, the Western Balkan countries would be joining a powerful but not always popular club at

home and abroad. The legacy of the NATO bombing campaigns in the region during the 1990s, the social

effects of those wars and the desire to sustain cordial relations with Russia are highly divisive issues

within domestic politics. In some countries, this attitude fuels arguments for neutrality and strengthens

those that question NATO enlargement. There have also been terrorist attacks on some of the nations

supporting the War on Terror. Admittedly, the contributions of the Western Balkan countries would be

small but these countries also feel more vulnerable than larger states such as the US or UK since WesternBalkans countries lack the capacities to fight serious terrorist threats or eventual attacks. Thus potentially,

and paradoxically, Western Balkan states may feel more exposed to threats to their security, despite their

initial, security-driven desire for NATO accession.


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Diagram 2Costs and benefits of NATO membership


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Bosnia and Herzegovina: The question is not if but when

BiH has long made it clear that it wants to join NATO but did not become a member of the PfP untilDecember 2006. It was one of the last Western Balkan countries to do so and a sign of how slowly theprocess has moved as a result of internal disputes. NATO invited BiH to join the Membership Action Plan[MAP] in April 2010 and there are 45 troops currently serving in ISAF. 5 BiHs serious internal divisions

and the dysfunction of the Dayton Constitution seem only to grow with time. The nations three maingroups (Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs) are running in opposite directions. Bosnian Muslims aredemanding a new constitution giving the central state more powers. Croats are calling for the creation ofan autonomous entity within the broader state and Serbs are threatening to call a referendum onindependence. The International Community has taken on more responsibility due to the inability of thethree constituent nations to agree upon basic questions concerning the countrys future. However, thisinternational take-over has provided some domestic forces with new arguments against Westernorganizations, which they accuse of interfering into internal issues of the country.

Chart 2: NATO Public Support in BiH General Results, August 2010

Source: Public Opinion Poll in Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted by the National Democratic Institute for

International Affairs (NDI). Data collection timing: August 2 11, 2010.

Defense reform has been one of Bosnias most daunting tasks on the road to NATO. It took 10 years tomerge three armed forces into one and while these reforms have improved the image of the military inBiH, clear dysfunctions remain. Further steps are considered necessary but it is not clear how far thecountry can go without having serious interethnic tensions.

Public opinion in BiH toward joining NATO seems overwhelmingly positive, but in reality split. Aroundthree quarters or 70 percent of Bosnian citizens support the accession of BiH to NATO, while 15 percentof citizens completely oppose membership. 6 But, the results split along ethnic lines with the public in the

Federation of BiH (mainly Bosniaks and Croats) 90 percent in favor and in Republika Srpska (the Serbentity) 63 percent opposed. Thus, the internal divisions are also reflected in the question of NATOenlargement. Still, political elites remain for now united in the goal of NATO accession. But there are

strong indications that Bosnian Serb politicians may withdraw their support in the future if political crisisin the country escalates.

For a variety of reasons Bosnia has encountered a greater degree of difficulty in meeting some of theconditions compared to other Western Balkan countries. For instance BiH has received a MAP but cannotsubmit its first Annual National Program (ANP), due to the still unresolved issues surrounding state andmilitary property.7

Completely SupportSomewhat SupportSomewhat do not SupportCompletely do not SupportNo Opinion


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Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: the states name, the key for NATO

Although the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has worked closely with NATO on aseries of reforms and the government is backed by strong domestic support, the country continues to beunstable, as it faces not only one, but three major problems that obstruct its path to NATO membership.These are: a) the countrys name, which has been a source of dispute with Greece for almost two decades,

b) interethnic relations between the Slavic majority and ethnic Albanians- which have been re-examinedin the light of the Ohrid Agreement achieved in 2001 with EU and US intervention, and c) the need tofurther proceed with its defense reform. All of these issues bear a great importance for the countrys futureand therefore have to be properly addressed and settled before the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia joins the Alliance, so as not to allow the country to become a problem-importer and adestabilizing factor within NATO.

Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have disagreed over the use of the nameMacedonia since the latter countrys declaration of independence in 1991. At the April 2008 Bucharest

Summit, the Alliance noted with regret that the UN-mediated talks between the two countries have not

produced a successful outcome. The Alliance agreed that an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been

reached. 10

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonias two major national communities, Slavs (about 67 percent)and Albanians (about 22 percent) agree overwhelmingly that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedoniashould join NATO with stability topping the list of positive outcomes expected from membership. Theydisagree on the name issue with 84 percent of Slav Macedonians saying they would take the name overNATO with over 85 percent of Albanians saying the opposite.11 There is a danger that NATO accessioncould go from a unifying force to a divisive one in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a countrythat experienced an Albanian mini-insurgency less than a decade ago. The split in the public opinion isalso reflected in the political elites with Albanians supporting a quick compromise on the name issue sothat the country can reach NATO membership and Slavic members of the governing coalition maintaininga hard-line position on the name issue appearing prepared to even sacrifice the countrys NATOprospects.

There are questions about the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonias preparedness despite being onthe cusp of membership in 2008 and currently contributing 161 troops to ISAF. These questions arelargely related to democratic consolidation. Among the countrys most urgent problems are tacklingcorruption, organized crime, an inefficient public administration, judiciary reforms and promoting goodneighborly relations.

Chart 4: NATO Membership Public Opinion in FYROM April 2010

0%22.50%

45.00%67.50%90.00%

For Against I will not vote

If a referendum were held next week on the entrance of FYROM into NATO, how would you vote?


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Source: Survey conducted by the Institute for Democracy, 2 10 April 2010.


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FYROMs Ethnic Divide on the Name and NATO

Chart5:Do you support the change of the name as a price of joining NATO? General Results

Chart 6: Negative Results by Ethnicity

Source: SurveyconductedbytheIns9tuteforDemocracyintheperiod210April2010.

No Opinion

YES

NO

0% 17.50% 35.00% 52.50% 70.00%

Do you support the change of the name as a price for joining NATO?

0%

23%

45%

68%

90%

84%

7.10% 8.0%

NO

Slav-MacedoniansAlbaniansOthers


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Albania and Croatia: NATO members

Albania and Croatia officially joined NATO in April 2009 one year after their invitation at the BucharestSummit in April 2008. They are small countries, with correspondingly small militaries, which contribute257 and 300 troops to ISAF respectively. Croatia was a prosperous part of the former Yugoslavia, acommunist state that kept the Soviet Union at arms length and had reasonably friendly relations with the

West. Albania, a communist state during the Cold War, was for many years the most isolated country inEurope. At the end of the Cold War, both countries prioritized membership in Euro-Atlantic institutionsand completed the process a few years behind their colleagues in Central Europe.

Albanias Atlantic Dream comes true

Albania was the first ex-communist country to publicly announce its desire to join the Alliance and signedthe PfP in 1994. Through the mid-1990s, Albania sent a number of officers abroad to receive Westernmilitary education and took part in PfP exercises. In 1995, Albania developed the first IndividualPartnership Program [IPP] and in 1996, the country entered the Planning and Review Process [PARP].That same year, Albanian forces joined the NATO-led peacekeeping force in BiH. At the WashingtonSummit in April 1999, Albania received a Membership Action Plan [MAP] and became a NATO aspirantmember country together with Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Albania had not

made convincing progress on political, economic, defense, legal, finance and information security reformsby the Riga Summit in November 2006 but was invited to join at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008.

Especially in the 1990s, Albania was strategically important to NATO for two major reasons. First, itoffered NATO and the United States an important military outpost in the turbulent southern Balkans.Second, NATO feared a southward spread of the Yugoslav conflict to Kosovo and to the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia both of which have large ethnic Albanian population. They wanted an Albaniangovernment that would not stoke ethnic unrest among the ethnic Albanians living outside of its borders.Thus, Albanias candidacy reflected not only Albanias strategic options but also NATO member statesperception that Albanias membership would contribute to regional security.

With accession to the Alliance, Albanias security has greatly improved; however, political instability,illegal trafficking, organized crime, and the weak economy remain the main challenges. Especially, theinternal political conflict between the two main political poles in the country remains a key problem. Thepolitical crisis recently escalated raising internationally fears about further internal destabilization. Thus,NATO membership contributed to Albanias security but did not erase the sources of internal politicalinstability.

Still, NATO has played a pivotal role in assisting the country in the transformation of its armed forces. Inthe context of the modernization and transformation of the armed forces, including a significant reductionin troop levels. According to the Ministry of Defense, the armed forces will become fully professional bythe end of 2010. Due to the limited financial resources, it may take several years for the Albanian armedforces to become fully compatible with those of other NATO nations. Although Albanian representativeshave pledged that they will meet all of NATOs objectives, the country already failed to meet the NATOsuggestion that members devote 2 percent of their GDP to budget defense. Having joined NATO, EUmembership is Albanias primary long-term goal with a long series of political and domestic security

reforms ahead.


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Croatia awaits green light to join European Union

The Croatian Government made joining NATO a strategic priority shortly after the close of the YugoslavWars and was supported by all major political parties. Public support, however, was the biggest weaknessof Croatias membership candidacy. The level of public support did not rise above 50 percent until thebeginning of 2009, when Croatia had already been invited to the Alliance. The attack on the Croatianembassy in Belgrade after Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 and the attempt by Sloveniato block Croatias entry in 2009 affirmed the need for stability and security and pushed approval rateabove 60 percent. Since Croatias accession to the alliance there has been stable support for membershipin the Alliance and Croatian involvement in international operations. 64.6 percent of respondents feelmore secure in Croatia as a NATO member country, while 50.2 percent think that membership in NATOhave increased reputation and strengthen the international position of Croatia.12

Undoubtedly, Croatia was among the best prepared aspirant countries for NATO membership in termsof its political, economic and military status. Moreover, thanks to its geo-strategic position, Croatia canoffer NATO numerous advantages. Although Croatia encountered difficulties on its path toward thedesired membership in NATO, the country overcame these obstacles with greater speed than expected.

Over the past 20 years, the approach towards defense has been changing and developing in Croatia. Thecountry had a force of around 270,000 soldiers at the end of its war of independence and has since createda smaller, more professional, and deployable force. The process of de-politization of the army and defensereform accelerated. By the end of 2010, Croatia plans to have 8 percent of its land forces deployed ininternational forces and to spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense, the level recommended by NATO formember states. The reform stage also concentrated on restructuring, equipping, and training individualsand troops that could take part in NATO missions.

Chart 10: Public Opinion in Croatia after NATO Accession February 2010

Source:

Source: Public opinion survey commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration on the

occasion of first anniversary of Croatian membership in NATO was conducted by GfK Agency in February 2010 onthe representative sample of 750 respondents.

0%

17.50%

35.00%

52.50%

70.00%

Croatians feel safer since the country joined NATO Croatian support ISAF in Afghanistan


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The Serbian Exception

NATO is changing whats there for Serbia?

There have been recent signs of improvement in NATO-Serbia relations, but there is a difficult legacy toovercome. Unlike its regional neighbors, Serbia never declared an interest in membership despiteparticipating in the Partnership for Peace program since 2006 and opening its mission to NATO in 2010.NATOs 1999 intervention against the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forced thelatter to withdraw from Kosovo province. The still vivid memories of the bombing campaign againstSerbia, coupled with a sense of injustice at most NATO members recognizing Kosovo's independencetaint the image of the Alliance in Serbia. As a result, Serbia is the Western Balkan country least interestedin joining NATO.

Support for European Union (EU) membership is far less contested. At least 65 percent of Serbiancitizens who would vote yes if asked should Serbia join the EU while 15 percent of respondents wouldsay no, according to a Serbian EU Integration Office poll from June 2010. These data, compared tofigures from 2008, demonstrate a slight increase in support for EU membership, although enthusiasm hasyet to rebound to pre-Kosovo independence levels when support was as high as 70 percent. Accession

into the EU is taken as the almost indisputable top national priority, challenged by almost none of themost relevant political actors. At the same time, it seems that the EU itself is ready to offer some carrotto Serbia since the European Commission was invited (on October 25) to give its opinion on the Serbianapplication for membership, which was submitted almost a year ago. It could be taken as a sign that theEU will try to encourage Serbias candidacy as a way to support Serbian leaders who have staked theirpolitical lives on membership, after withholding the possibility for years as a way to leverage the hunt forwar criminals, domestic reforms and constructive politics towards the region.

No one in the Serbian political establishment is willing to risk their political future on NATOmembership. Nor do Serbian citizens feel that NATO has much to offer them. In the past, Serbiasofficials were straightforward that future relations with NATO and the possibility of Serbias membershipcould be dependent on the future status of Kosovo. In that context, NATOs role in establishing theKosovo Security Forces (KSF) have strained these relations. More recently, however, this direct

connection between the Kosovo problem and Serbias relations with NATO may be less straightforwardthan it used to be. Soon Serbia will have to clarify the ambiguity surrounding its proclaimed militaryneutrality and to address the states security policy in relation to both NATO and the EU.

Current Serbia NATO relationsAlthough there have been no significant breakthroughs, NATO-Serbian relations seem to be thawing. Theopening of the Serbian mission at NATO headquarters in Brussels this September came after two years ofdeadlock during which Serbian leaders constantly declared the opening of the mission as the priority inrelations with NATO. Serbia is also sending a military representative to its mission at NATO, which couldbe seen as a sign of progress. NATOs Military Liaison Office was established in December 2006 inBelgrade along with the Defence Reform Group (DRG) consisting of both Serbian MoD and NATOofficials. The DRG was suspended after Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 and re-

established in 2010.

The Serbian political leadership lacks a clear message as to whether Serbia should strive for NATOmembership at all or if it has chosen alternative security projects. Since 2006, opinion polls have showthat more than 50 percent of the Serbian public would say no to membership in NATO with littlevariation. There is high support for PfP participation, which is a sign that the Serbian public is generallynot well informed about what NATO or the PfP is, what membership implies and what would be the cost(political, security, economic) of the voluntarily choice to exclude oneself from that security community.The prevailing negative image of NATO among the Serbian public has frequently served as a perfectexcuse for the state leadership to artificially remove the issue of possibly joining NATO from the agenda.


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The Resolution on the protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of theRepublic of Serbia adopted by the Serbian Parliament in December 2007 attempted to officially removethe issue of NATO membership from the Serbian political discourse. The politics of military neutralityhas not been clearly defined either by the resolution or by any following documents outlining Serbia'ssecurity policies, such as the National Security Strategy and Defense Strategy approved by the SerbianParliament in October 2009. Since the political establishment chose not to speak clearly on the issue it is

little wonder that public opinion remains in a permanently frozen ratio of less then 30 percent being infavor of NATO membership.

Discourse on NATO in SerbiaNonetheless, some political actors do try to push the issue of possible NATO membership on the dailypolitics agenda. Among them there are two political parties in favor of membership, one participating inthe government, Serbian Renewal Movement, and the other in opposition, Liberal Democratic Party,both without significant support among voters. Although coming from different sides of the ideologicalspectrum, they use the same rationale to argue why Serbia should aspire for NATO membership. Anumber of civil-society organizations follow either a clear pro-NATO membership agenda or a morevalue-neutral approach in an attempt to improve awareness of NATO-related issues.

Arguments used by both types of actors are almost the same. The first and foremost argument is political;Serbia should not strive for the exceptional position in an environment where all other regional stateshave joined NATO or will soon. In the same category is the argument that NATO and EU membership gohand-in-hand, which has been the experience of all the ex-communist Central and East European states.Second, is the security argument; Serbia should not pass up the collective defense offered by NATO andmilitary neutrality is too expensive in economic terms.

The economic argument has become more prominent with the recent success of the Serbian militaryindustry. The Serbian MoD postures itself as the heir apparent of Yugoslavias developed and reputablemilitary industry. According to the MoD, Serbia is the largest arms exporter in South Eastern Europe,selling its products from Malaysia to Canada and the USA. In 2008, the arms industry earned a profit of$400 million, its highest margin since 1991. Especially prominent have been the trade contracts signedwith Iraq in 2008 worth $235 million mostly regarding the export of infantry weapons and uniforms, and

a similar contract signed with Libya in 2010 which offered the Serbian military industry to be employedan opportunity to construct a military hospital in Libya. The MoDs top establishment argues that NATOmembership would allow Serbia to develop this industry further. That argument has so far been thestrongest in favor of NATO membership since it stresses the possible benefits Serbians could enjoy if theyopt for membership and cooperate with the KFOR mission in Kosovo. That mission is said to be workingfor the benefit of the Serbs living in the province.

On the other side, there is a broad spectrum of actors who are explicitly against NATO. Among them areopposition parliamentary parties, which have different ideological backgrounds and origins. A number ofcivil-society organizations are self-labelled as anti-NATO. Interestingly, the Serbian far right and far lefthave agreed on opposition to NATO for different reasons. Rightist parties and organizations label NATOan enemy who attacked Serbia in 1999 and committed war crimes for which it has never been prosecuted.More moderate, less emotional, anti-NATO arguments make three main points. The first is the dubious

character of the Alliance, which currently lacks clear purpose of mission and definition of enemy. Thesecond argument describes the cost of NATO membership as the lives of Serbian boys who would belost for the sake of participating in peace operations in areas where Serbia has no strategic interest.Another cost would be increased jeopardy of Serbia becoming a target of revenge-seeking terrorist groupsprovoked by Serbian participation in NATO-led operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. The third point takesinto account Russias strategic interest as a security alternative, a favorite argument of rightist elements.This argument was particularly prominent immediately after Russian President Dmitry Medvedevs visitto Serbia in October 2009 when he cited the need for a new European Security Architecture, in additionto reinforcing support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia regarding the Kosovo issue.


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President Medvedev had made this point before but it nonetheless occupied the attention of the Serbianmedia for some time afterward.

A New Concept, A New Relationship?Opponents and proponents of Serbias NATO accession are locked into arguments with little sign ofchange. Public opinion may shift from Serb participation in UN or EU peacekeeping missions, and

regional security initiatives. The MoD has already declared its willingness to cooperate within the EUsecurity umbrella, a possible substitute to the issue of NATO membership since it is both more acceptablefor the Serbian public and in line with the countrys EU membership ambition. President Tadics recentstatement that it is not possible to envisage Serbia aspiring to join NATO in the foreseeable futureconfirms that Serbias political leadership will take no steps to persuade the public of NATOmemberships desirability. They do not necessary have to do so. It would be more welcome if it would beoutlined clearly what vision of security Serbia has, what are its security goals and ambitions, other thannot allowing Kosovo to secede, and what kind of partnerships Serbia would build in the future. NATO,meanwhile, will deliver its new strategic concept, but for the Serbian public it matters little. Moreimportant will be whether members of Serbian political elite read it carefully and whether they try to actstrategically according to it.

Conclusion

By the time all of the Western Balkans become part of NATO, the organization itself will havesignificantly changed, especially under its new Strategic Concept. The enlargement of NATO is not justthe extension of a military alliance, but the broadening of a zone of shared values a zone that must, andwill eventually include all Western Balkan countries. Euro Atlantic integration has worked as a carrot toinitiate and sustain reforms in Western Balkans and represents a framework for conflict settlement and anincentive for improving regional cooperation. The future of the Balkans depends on the successfulteamwork of all Balkan nations, which need to work in a large number of political, defense and socialunresolved issues. A combination of political incentives and an adequate assistance package cancontribute to overcoming the Balkans divisions.

Contacts

Dr. Ioannis Armakolas and researchers Bledi Feta, Jelena Radoman, and Gerasimos Tsourapas

are available for comment about NATO and the Western Balkans. To schedule, please contact us

at +30 698.433.6659 [email protected].

For more material and to access our source list, please visit ekemprogram.org/csis


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mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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NOTES


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1 Soren Jessen-Petersen and Daniel Serwer,The Balkans can still be lost. The New York Times, 10 November2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/opinion/11iht-edjessen.html

2 For more details on the Partnership for Peace (PfP) see the official website of NATO: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm

3 On NATO enlargement and the Western Balkans see the website of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm

4 US-GREECE TASK FORCE,Assessing Human Security in the Western Balkans, CSIS-EKEM policy report no. 4.Available Here: http://ekemprogram.org/csis/images/stories/staff/policy_report_4

5 See the official website of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan: http://www.isaf.nato.int/

6 The survey was carried out in all seven Western Balkan countries in the period January February 2010 by the

Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in cooperation with its regional partners.7 For more information on the Membership Action Plan: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm

8 Public Opinion Poll in Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted by the National Democratic Institute for InternationalAffairs (NDI). Data collection timing: August 2 11, 2010

9 Political Public Opinion in Montenegro, Center for Democracy and Human Rights, Department for EmpiricResearches (CEDEM), October 2010

10 Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

11 A Survey conducted by the Institute for Democracy, 2 10 April 2010

12Public opinion survey commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration on the occasion

of first anniversary of Croatian membership in NATO was conducted by GfK Agency in February 2010 on therepresentative sample of 750 respondents.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htmhttp://www.isaf.nato.int/http://www.isaf.nato.int/http://www.isaf.nato.int/http://www.isaf.nato.int/http://ekemprogram.org/csis/images/stories/staff/policy_report_4http://ekemprogram.org/csis/images/stories/staff/policy_report_4http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htmhttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htmhttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/opinion/11iht-edjessen.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/opinion/11iht-edjessen.html

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