midwest regional consultation on u.s. policy toward...

MIDWEST REGIONAL CONSULTATION ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

HYATT AT UNIVERSITY VILLAGE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS FEBRUARY 28, 1998

The Africa Fund 17 John Street, 12th Floor

New York, NY 10038

Tilden J. LeMelle, Chairman Jennifer Davis, Executive Director

Phone: (212) 962-1210 Fax: (212) 964-8570

E-Mail: [email protected]

Midwest Regional Consultation on U.S. Policy Toward Africa February 28, 1998, Chicago, Illinois

The Africa Fund, 17 John Street, 12th Floor, New York, New York 10038

Document 1

Document2

Document3

Document4

Document 5

Document 6

Document 7

Document 8

Document 9

Document 10

Additional Documents

Index to Conference Documents Document 1

Index to Conference Documents

Participant Information Form

Midwest Regional Consultation on U.S. Policy Toward Africa Program

U.S. - South Africa Foreign Policy

Provincial Legislatures in South Africa

Africa Policy Outlook 1998

Mobil In Nigeria: Partner in Oppression

Action for Human Rights in Nigeria

Human Rights Activism in Africa: A Frog' s Eye View

Foreign Aid Programs Provide No Protection for Aid to Africa

Global Connections: A National Conversation About A Changing World (InterAction)

Making a Difference in Africa: A Report on USAID Assistance to Africa (USAID)

Women in Africa: Profiles of Leadership (UNDP)

Together for Change: The Botswana Consultation (African Women in Politics)

Sister Cities International Information

Africa & U.S. National Interests (The American Assembly)

Report on The Africa Fund Delegation of Southern African Women Legislators to the United States, April/May 1996

The Midwest Regional Consultation on U.S. Policy Toward Africa is made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation ofNew York. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not the Carnegie Corporation.



Participant Information Form Document 2

Please return this form before the end of the Consultation. In order to keep our records current, we are requesting that you give us as much informati<?n as possible.

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Address

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The Midwest Regional Consultation on U.S. Policy Toward Africa is made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not the Carnegie Corporation.



8:00 a.m. - 9:00 a.m.

9:00 a.m. - I 0: I5 a.m.

I0:30 a.m. - II :45 a.m.

Consultation Program Document 3

REGISTRATION (Concourse Lobby)

OPENING PLENARY: Africa in the 21st Century (Conference Room ABC) Chair: Senator Jesus Garcia (Illinois)

Invocation: Reverend Dr. Thanda Ngcobo, Trinity United Church of Christ

Welcome: Dr. Cedric Herring, Professor and Interim Director, Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy, University of Illinois at Chicago

Greetings: Edward Palmer, Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy, University of Chicago at Illinois; Co-Chair, The PEOPLE Program

Introduction of Speakers: Tilden LeMelle, Chair, The Africa Fund

Speakers: US. -Africa Relations in the 21st Century: Two Perspectives

Mlulami Singapi, Vice-Consul, South African Consulate General and

Dr. Alice Palmer, Professor, Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy, University of Illinois at Chicago; Co-Director, The PEOPLE Program

PLENARY: Promoting Constructive Trade and Investment in Africa (Conference Room ABC) Chair: Senator Virgil Clark Smith (Michigan)

Honorable Danny K. Davis, United States Congressman, 7th District, Chicago, Illinois - The African Growth and Opportunity Act

Jeffrey Lewis, Managing Director and General Counsel, DST Catalyst, Inc. - Doing Good and Doing Business in Africa

Salih Booker, Senior Fellow, Africa Studies Program, Council on Foreign Relations - US. Aid, Trade and Investment- Getting the Mix Right

Professor Robert Stumberg, The Harrison Institute for Public Law, Georgetown University Law Center- The Multilateral Agreement on Investment -A Threat to Cities and States


I2:00 p.m.- I :30 p.m.

I :45 p.m. - 2:45 p.m.

3:00p.m.- 4:00p.m.

Midwest Regional Consultation

LUNCHEON (Conference Room CD) Sponsors: Enron Corporation and Eli Lilly and Company Chair: Jennifer Davis, Executive Director, The Africa Fund

Remarks: Representative Lois M. DeBerry, Speaker Pro Tern, Tennessee House of Representatives; President, National Black Caucus of State Legislators

Introduction: Reverend Dr. Wyatt Tee Walker, President ofThe American Committee on Africa and Trustee of The Africa Fund

Keynote Address: Reverend Jesse Jackson, Sr., Special Envoy for the President for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa - U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy

WORKSHOPS: State and Local Initiatives to Promote Constructive Trade and Investment in Africa

Conference Room AB Chair: Senator Donne E. Trotter (Illinois)

Representative Spencer Coggs (Wisconsin) -Sister Cities: Connecting People and Places

Harold Rogers, Executive Director, Coalition of Black Trade Unionists- Voices From the Field

Dr. John Metzler, Professor, African Studies Center, Michigan State UniversityFrom the Academy to the Ground

Seminar Room Chair: Representative David Haley (Kansas)

Representative Irma Hunter Brown (Arkansas)- Trade and Jobs: Creating Win-Win Partnerships

Prexy Nesbitt, Former Consultant, Government of Mozambique- Locaf.to Global Impacts

William Martin, Professor, University oflllinois; Co-Chair, Association of Concerned Africa Scholars - From the Academy to the Ground

PLENARY: Democracy and Human Rights in Africa (Conference Room ABC) Chair: Representative Charlie Brown (Indiana)

Adotei Akwei, Advocacy Director for Africa, Amnesty International USA -African Struggles for Human and Political Rights

Barine Teekate-Yorbe, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People -Nigeria and the Struggle for Democracy

Midwest Regional Consultation Page 3

4:15p.m.- 5:00p.m. CLOSING PLENARY (Conference Room ABC) Chair: Representative Johnnie Morris-Tatum (Wisconsin)

Honorable Bobby L. Rush, United States Congressman, I st District, Chicago, Illinois - US. -Africa Relations: A Critical Juncture

Jennifer Davis, Executive Director, The Africa Fund - Concluding Remarks and Thanks



U.S.- South Africa Foreign Policy by Jennifer Davis, The Africa Fund

Document 4

This article was reprinted from Foreign Policy In Focus, Volume 2, Number 22, January 199 7, published by the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies.

Since 1994 U.S. statements regarding a newly democratic South Africa, under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC), have frequently been cast in the language of a love fest. "The people of South Africa have captivated and inspired men and women ... in this country and around the world," Vice President Gore declared in 1995, characterizing U.S./South African cooperation as "an example of the best that can come from peaceful negotiated change."

Rewriting history, Gore implied that decades of crushing apartheid rule and centuries of brutal colonial oppression were eliminated in a peaceful transition initiated by negotiations, implemented by democratic elections, and facilitated by a benign U.S. policy. The reality is otherwise.

U.S. policymakers had not always described South African freedom fighters as an inspiration. Since the ANC initiated armed struggle in 1961, Democratic and Republican administrations alike had viewed its anti-apartheid movement through a cold-war lens, constantly referring to its members as terrorists and communists.

U.S. policymakers displayed consistent hostility toward the ANC's call , first made in 1959, for international economic sanctions. Over the decades, the U.S. used its Security Council veto many times to block mandatory universal economic action against apartheid.

South Africa's white-controlled economy relied heavily on foreign investment and therefore was very extremely vulnerable to economic sanctions. U.S . capital continued to expand even as

apartheid repression intensified. In the 1970s South Africa had absorbed about 50 percent of U.S. direct investment in Africa as a whole, excluding oil investments. By 1982, U.S. investment in South Africa amounted to some $14 billion, including approximately $8 billion in the country's mining sector.

Despite anti-apartheid rhetoric that waxed and waned through the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter and Reagan eras, most U.S. policymakers, corporate and political, treated minority-ruled South Africa as the regional power center, to be favored and protected from destabilizing forces. Henry Kissinger's 1969 National Security Memorandum NSSM 39 stated explicitly that "the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them." Variants of this view - dialogue, detente, and constructive engagement - followed, all allowing for significant measures of nuclear, military, intelligence, and economic cooperation. All gave apartheid South Africa the status of a reliable (even if sometimes embarrassing) Western ally in the global confrontation with communism.

South Africa's liberation struggle was not conducted in isolation, but in the context of a series of successful neighboring anticolonial wars that created strong bonds of solidarity between the liberation movements. As Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe achieved their independence between 1974 and 1980, each moved toward varying forms of socialism. Each also extended support to the ANC and each, in turn, became victim of South African destabilization, ranging from invasion and full-scale war to significant support for "contra" activities. Far from opposing these aggressions, the U.S . gave South Africa a green light, and in oil-rich Angola the U.S. joined South Africa in supporting the UNIT A rebels . According to analyst William Minter, "South Africa

The Midwest Regional Consultation on U.S. Policy Toward Africa is made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation ofNew York. The views expressed in this paper are those ofthe author and not the Carnegie Corporation.

could count on virtually unconditional U.S. willingness to blame Moscow and excuse Pretoria."

U.S. policy was slow to shift. State Department officials only began their first cautious meetings with ANC representatives in 1985, after some South African business leaders defied apartheid law to initiate their own consultations with the ANC. In 1986, Congress overrode President Reagan's veto and finally voted to impose sanctions. The Bush administration, however, held fast to its belief in the "good faith" of the white minority leadership and ignored ANC charges that the apartheid government was pursuing a two-track policy, combining covert


the money was not always directed in the most beneficial ways [sic]. The $150 million allotted for education, for example, was spent primarily to provide a U.S. university education for a small elite of less than 1500 South African students.

A further $174 million was devoted to economic private sector projects designed to achieve black small business empowerment. After 1990, approximately $113 million in grants and loans was used to support private-sector housing initiatives. Housing was one early arena for debate over how to balance between fiscal caution and social spending. U.S. AID officials sought to ensure that a new

violence and high profile negotiations for reform. KEY POINTS

government not attempt solutions to the massive housing crisis based on subsidies or state intervention.

Problems with Current U.S. Policy

·During the cold war the U.S. treated South Africa as a reliable although somewhat embarassing Western ally. Significant funding - close to $150

million - was devoted to what the U.S. government called promoting democracy. While some small legal aid and human rights groups benefited from this funding, AID administrators met both suspicion and hostility as they initiated the program. Angered by the Reagan administration's constructive engagement, important forces within the United Democratic Front, the pro-ANC alliance, adopted policies refusing to accept funds under the

U.S. policymakers retreated from their hostile stance toward the ANC after the mid-1980s, and set about wooing new friends in its ranks. This task was facilitated by a

• Despite its anti-apartheid rhetoric, the U.S. quietly bolstered white rule through military, intelligence, nuclear and economic cooperation.

newly developed assistance program. But behind the anti-apartheid, prodemocracy

•The U.S . gave a green light to South Africa aggressions against neighboring states.

rhetoric, another agenda was discernible: the desire to affect the direction of ANC economic policies.

During the last years of the struggle from apartheid rule to

•Only in 1986, when Congress overrode President Reagan ' s veto, did the U.S. impose economic sanctions against South Africa.

democracy, the U.S. government appropriated nearly $900 million in loans and grants to South Africa. This financial support was large enough to give U.S. policymakers access to the new players in the newest game in town. And once the tap was opened, the flow increased each year.

The first major assistance program to South Africa was initiated in 1986 and provided $40 million a year to help "bring an end to apartheid and lead to the establishment of a nonracial democratic government." Between 1986 and 1994 the mandate was expanded as political transformation speeded up in South Africa. In addition to dismantling apartheid and preparing the disadvantaged population for leadership roles, a sectoral focus on democracy and governance, education, and economic empowerment was added. The program provided some $530 million to a range of South African and U.S. NGOs and consultants.

Although under the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act Congress prohibited the funding institutions associated with the apartheid government,

program. But the program continued through the late

1980s and by the early 1990s the U.S. had by far the largest foreign aid mission in South Africa, with a staff of over 100. Funding in the political development arena expanded swiftly after 1992, with intensive efforts to support voter education and governance programs. By 1994, the year of the first democratic elections, the U.S. had become South Africa's largest bilateral donor of political aid.

Shortly after Nelson Mandela's election, the U.S. government announced a major new $600 million aid package to the new Government of National Unity. It included private sector development aid, housing loan guarantees, and financing for strengthening democratic institutions and improving education and health care. The funds have continued to flow, and few recipients are willing to be openly critical. But some common themes are emerging.

One criticism, heard both from South African recipients and other donor agencies, is that AID policymakers are reluctant to shape their programs via


any process of consultation. U.S. priorities determine direction. President Clinton told the U.N. in September 1993 that the expansion of "market-based democracies" was Washington's "overriding purpose." It was predictable then, as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs George Moose reported to Congress that same fall, that "over the past several years we have provided training and information to the ANC and others on various aspects of free market economics."

The ANC came to power facing massive economic inequalities that were the legacy of apartheid, an economy with a zero growth rate, rising

Page 3

Africa as that young country grapples with the conflicting demands of growing the economy and redistributing resources to achieve social justice.

The U.S. and other Western powers, together with the World Bank, have had a chilling effect on economic policy debate in South Africa. In 1994 the ANC's socioeconomic policy document for the final elimination of apartheid described development as "active involvement and growing empowerment." The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) outlined the role of the government in building the economy, creating jobs, and seeking cooperation with

unemployment, aging, outdated industries, high debt, and no new investment. Recognizing the need to

KEY PROBLEMS regional neighbors. It was vibrant with ideas about how a people, when mobilized, might begin to address massive social inequalities. fundamentally restructure the

economy, it adopted the

•After the mid-1980s, the U.S. set out to woo ANC leaders with major loans and grants to affect the direction of ANC economic policies. Only two years later South Africa's

Ministry of Finance produced a new document entitled Growth, Employment, and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic

Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) designed to provide an overall economic framework which would link reconstruction and development in a process leading to sustainable growth in all parts of the economy - with greater equity achieved through redistribution.

•By the 1994 democratic elections, the U.S. was South Africa' s largest bilateral aid donor.

Strategy. In outlining its strategy for

U.S. officials proclaimed their eagerness to link with the objectives of the RDP, but South African officials found the U.S. far

•The $600 million aid package to the Mandela government emphasizes private-sector development and building a "market-based" democracy.

rebuilding and restructuring the economy, popular participation language has disappeared. In its stead are the guidelines for privatization of significant state-owned sectors, including

• By 1995, AID claimed success in redirecting the Mandela government away from "unsustainable social

telecommunications and transport, as well as frequent references to the need to "achieve an appropriately structured flexibility within the collective more willing to deal with individual programs."

government departments than with the planning process represented by close consultation with the RDP Minister, Jay Naidoo.

By 1995 U.S. AID reported that funding for private-sector initiatives had achieved a decisive effect on ANC economic policies and "have led the Government of National Unity leadership to endorse pragmatic economic policies and a fiscally conservative approach to the RDP, contrary to prior expectations than an ANC-dominated government would opt for statist solutions [government-run] and fiscally unsustainable social programs."

Toward a New Foreign Policy U.S. policymakers constantly put the future of

U.S.-S .A. relations on the foundation of market liberalization. This narrows the path dangerously. It ignores the powerful social demand for poverty reduction that was an integral part of the movement that destroyed apartheid rule. It denies validity to the many creative policy proposals developed in South

bargaining system" - a warning to the labor movement not to engage in excessive demands.

Indeed, corporate pressures within South Africa and from the U.S . and other Western governments led to the elimination of a separate RDP office in 1996. South African writer Daria CaJiguire concluded that this move will effect downgrade the importance of reconstruction and development in government policy discussions. "The dismantling of the RDP office," Caliguire wrote, "indicates that economic growth, rather than redistribution, has won the day as a national primary tool for change."

Economic redistribution is central to the final elimination of apartheid ' s legacy. Since 1975 the black population's share of total income in South Africa has been rising. Even so, the top 20 percent of the African population is getting richer, while the bottom 80 percent is getting poorer. U.S. political and economic policy has focused heavily on helping the small black middle class, in effect accelerating this dangerous trend.

The U.S. must reconsider its emphasis on

building a black middle class in South Africa. The already volatile demands from South Africa's rural and urban poor for sharing the fruits of victory will intensify unless the government and the U.S., as its major bilateral patron, are able to help provide housing, health care, schools, and jobs.

On a regional front, the U.S. is eager to encourage South Africa in its role as a surrogate regional power. To date, however, there have been only a few open disagreements, such as U.S. objections to South Africa's continued good relations with Cuba and Libya. But an important shift in U.S. policy would give greater credence to South African positions on issues such as Nigerian democracy and the formation of an African peacekeeping force.

At the same time the U.S.


Publications Africa Today, Lynne Rienner Publishers (1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, Colorado 80301-1 026).

Patrick Bond. "Neoliberalism Comes to South Africa ." Multinational Monitor, May 1996.

Jennifer Davis, "Sanctions & Apartheid: The Economic Challenge to Discrimination," in Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World, ed. by David Cortright and George Lopez (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

Princeton Lyman. "South Africa's Promise." Foreign Policy (Spring 1996).

Kenneth Mokoena. South Africa and the U.S.: the Declassified History (New York: Norton,

should strengthen its capacity to deal with the entire southern African region, not only by expanding its bilateral relations with countries like Angola and Mozambique but also through support for the regional economic alliance, Southern African Development Community. Encouraging South African regional cooperation and integration could provide some additional reparation for the damage caused by direct U.S. intervention in countries like Angola and for apartheid South Africa's hostile regional aggressions.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 1993).

Sources For More Information

Organizations

•The U.S. government should shift some of its focus from the private sector to the role government can play in redistribution of wealth an provision of basic services to the poor.

•The U.S. and other aid donors need to collaborate with, rather than dictate to, South African economic policymakers.

•The U.S. support for a black middle class in South Africa needs to be adjusted so that the gap between rich and poor blacks stops widening.

•The U.S., together with South Africa, should help strengthen regional cooperation.

Martin Murry. Revolution Deferred: the Painful Birth of Post Apartheid South Africa (New York: Verso, 1994).

Edgar Robert, ed. Sanctioning Apartheid (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990).

John Saul. Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1993).

South Africa investor (Investor Responsibility Research Center).

Southern African Perspectives Center for Southern African Studies Working Papers Series, University of the Western Cape (Private Bag X17, Belville 7535, South Africa).

Human Rights Watch/Africa 33 Islington High Street, London N 19LH, England Voice: 011 44 171 713 1995/Fax: 011 44 171 713 1800 Contact: Browneen Manby

Southern Africa Report (603 1/2 Parliament Street, 1'oronto M4X 1P9, Canada).

Southscan (P.O. Box 724, London N16 5RZ, England).

Southern African Research and Documentation Centre P.O. Box 5690, Harare, Zimbabwe

World Wide Web APJC http://www.igc.org/apic/ep/inet.html E-mail : [email protected]

TransAfrica Forum 1744 R Street, N. W., Washington, D.C. 20009 Voice: (202) 797-2301/Fax: (202) 797-2382 Contact: Mwiza Muthali

Washington Office on Africa 110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002. Voice: (202) 546-7961/Fax: (202) 546-1545

Africa News http://www.nando.net/ans/

U.S. State Department http:/www/state.gov

Weekly Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg http: //www/mg.co.za/mg/



Provincial Legislatures in South Africa Prepared by The Africa Fund

Document 5

The nine provinces in South Africa created in the terms of the Constitution brought about a new system of second-tier government. The position of provincial/local government, which is recognized as a separate level of government, is entrenched in the Constitution.

The nine provincial premiers are: Rev. Arnold Stofi/e (ANC), Eastern Cape; Dr. Ivy MatsepeCasaburri (ANC), Free State; Mr. Mothole Motshekga (ANC), Gauteng; Dr. Ben Ngubane (IFP), KwaZulu-Natal; Mr. Mathews Phosa (ANC), Mpumalanga; Mr. Emsley Manne Dipico (ANC), Northern Cape; Mr. Ngoako Ramatlhodi (ANC), Northern Province; Mr. Popo Molefe (ANC), North West; and Mr. Hernus Kriel (NP), Western Cape.

The Government of National Unity ' s Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) acknowledges that the nine provinces are at different levels of socioeconomic development and are not equally endowed with resources. The Constitution requires that the provincial levels of government and the Central Government develop methods for cooperation. This will ensure that development takes place evenly throughout the country and that minimum standards are attained.

In accordance with the 1993 Constitution, each of the nine provinces has its own Legislature, consisting of between 30 and 100 members, depending on the size of the population. Members are elected in terms of proportional representation. The Executive Council of a province consists of a Premier and a number of members. The Premier is elected by the Provincial Legislature. A party must have at least I 0 % of the seats in the Provincial Legislature in

order to be represented by a member m the Executive Council.

Decisions are taken by consensus, as happens in the national Cabinet. In addition to making provincial laws, a Provincial Legislature may adopt a constitution for its province if two-thirds of its members agree. However, a provincial constitution must correspond with the final national Constitution as confirmed by the Constitutional Court.

Provinces have legislative powers over:

•agriculture; •casino, racing, gambling and wagering; •cultural affairs; •education at all levels, excluding university and technikon education; •environment; •health services; •housing; •language policy; •local government; •nature conservation; •police; •provincial public media; •public transport; •regional planning and development; •road traffic regulation; •roads; •tourism; •trade and industrial promotion; •traditional authorities; •urban and rural development; and •welfare services.

Source: African National Congress (online), 1998. List updated by The Africa Fund.


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Africa Policy Outlook 1998 Formulated by the Africa Policy Information Center

Document 6

As Africa moves into 1998, observers on the continent as well as outside are divided on whether to emphasize new hopes or the persistence of old problems. There is evidence to support each view. The continent's economic growth is stronger than at any time since the early 1970s. But Africa still accounts for a small fraction of world trade and investment, and macroeconomic growth is accompanied by stagnant or declining living conditions for the majority of Africans.

Last year saw the removal of one of the continent's longest-surviving dictators, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). But the prospects for the new Congo government are uncertain. Conflict continues in eastern Congo and in the adjacent Great Lakes countries of Rwanda and Burundi, and in many other countries as well.

The demand for democracy continues to grow, with an increasing number of groups engaged in different aspects of that struggle. But momentum is hobbled by ambiguous results, disillusionment, and quarrels among elites--a pattern that is unlikely to change decisively in 1998.

Neither "Afro-pessimism" nor "Afro-optimism" captures what is really a very mixed picture. The situation is different from country to country, sector to sector, observer to observer. Yet there can be no doubt that Africa is taking its own initiatives to address the problems of the "second independence" era. These range from grassroots efforts at survival to regional initiatives for cooperation among both governments and institutions of civil society.

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Economic Progress and Setbacks Africa's growth rate in 1996 exceeded

5%. Although the rate was expected to drop back to 3.4% for 1997, some estimates project up to 4.7% growth for 1998. These results are higher than the 2% growth of the early 1990s. However, they are still insufficient to reduce the highest average poverty rates in the world . Food security in several African regions in 1998 is expected to be threatened further by El Nino's effects on the weather.

A recent report from the International Labor Organization estimates that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of the population living in poverty will increase to over 50% by the year 2000. Unemployment in Africa's large cities is more than 20% and is expected to approach 30% by the end of the decade.

Critics of the structural adjustment packages of the last decade--and even many analysts within the international financial institutions--stress that African countries are unl ikely to break out of this trap without massive investment in education, health and public infrastructure. Doing so will requi.re mobilization of domestic resources and private foreign investment. It will also require steps to reverse the downward trend in international aid and to address the continent's crushing debt burden.

The World Bank/International Monetary Fund initiative for highly indebted poor countries resulted in approval of substantial debt relief packages for Uganda and Burkina Faso in 1997, with Mozambique and Cote d'Ivoire in line for 1998. But the size and

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pace of the relief still falls short of what is needed. The continent's annual debt service payments are predicted to rise from $30 billion in 1996 to $33 billion in 1998, a figure equivalent to 24% of total exports. African and international NGOs and churches will continue to work for greater debt reductions m 1998.

Ongoing Conflicts Fighting continues in Sudan,

Algeria and the Great Lakes region, with little prospect of resolution during the year. These wars have caused casualties in large numbers and have had crippling economic effects.

More limited conflicts afflict other countries, including Uganda and Senegal. Peace agreements being implemented in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic are fragile and incomplete. The military victory of Sassou-Nguesso in the civil war in Congo (Brazzaville) last year brought a new government to power. Sassou-Nguesso has promised a transition to civilian rule, but so far the stability of his government is based on military victory, not legitimacy.

In Burundi, neither sanctions by regional states nor attempts at mediation have diminished the conflict between the Tutsi-dominated military regime and Hutu rebel forces. Regional observers also see increasing signs of coordination among extremist Hutu forces and their allies in attacks in Burundi, Rwanda and eastern Congo.

These forces were responsible for the genocide against Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda in 1994 and they still openly advocate the extermination of the remaining Tutsis. Their resurgence has also led to increasing abuses against civilians in the counterinsurgency campaigns by

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-Rwanda and Congo (Kinshasa).

In Sudan, opponents of the fundamentalist military regime have seen their military prospects improve. But there is little hope of peace any time soon. In Algeria the death toll from massacres continues to mount. Extremist guerrillas, who previously targeted mainly government supporters, educated women and intellectuals, are increasingly going after ordinary villagers as well.

The military regime's primary response is repression, which is often indiscriminate and which has been unsuccessful in curbing the violence. The international community is growing more concerned but the response in 1998 is likely be limited to calls for investigations.

Among campaigners for democracy on the continent, Nigeria will remain the major focus this year. The military regime of General Sani Abacha has promised to return the country to civilian rule by October, but has stepped up repressive measures against its opponents. Almost no one except the regime's own supporters gives credence to Abacha's promise, but there is debate about what measures can be taken to put pressure on the regime.

In various other African countries, there is a persistent gap between governments' public commitment to democracy and a reality which falls far short of that ideal. To cite only a few examples, ruling governments in Kenya, Zambia and Ethiopia can all claim mandates from recent elections, in 1997, 1996 and 1995 respectively, as can Cote d'lvoire from 1995/96. But in each case critics cite major flaws in the electoral process and repression ofthe opposition.

In "no-party" Uganda and one-party Eritrea, critics deplore the

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absence of competitive national elections. But supporters of those governments point to development initiatives under way and to opportunities for popular participation and debate on public issues that exceed those in many countries that have held elections.

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about the extent to which criticism should be leveled against the new governments of Rwanda and Congo (Kinshasa). Some see Kagame in Rwanda and Kabila in Congo (Kinshasa) as part of a self-reliant new generation of African leaders who can move their countries forward, despite their emphasis on stability rather than democratic rights.

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Some contend that under the circumstances, democracy is a luxury that must be put off for later. At the other extreme, some critics say these new leaders are just as bad as their predecessors (the genocidal former 1

Rwandan government and the Mobutu dictatorship). The South African government, among others, has emphasized the potential for cooperation with the new governments and the fact that they do face real security threats.

But many observers stress the danger of ignoring human rights abuses and delays in democratization. It will continue to be difficult for nongovernmental organizations as well as governments to shape policies that promote constructive engagement and reconstruction without providing support for authoritarian government actions.

U.S. Policy Questions Attention to African issues by

U.S. officials, never great, may be on a modest upswing. First Lady Hillary

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Clinton visited Africa in March 1997 and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright went in December; both President Clinton and Vice-President Gore are expected to make Africa trips this year. Secretary Albright has named the African Growth and Opportunity Act as one of the Administration's top four foreign policy issues in 1998.

In the larger picture, though, Africa is still very low on the agenda in U.S. foreign policy circles. In its Winter 1997 issue, for example, the influential Foreign Policy journal graded the President with three analysts from Europe, two from Asia, and one each from Latin America, the Middle East and Russia, but none from Africa. And Africa rated less than a sentence in the President's State of the Union address on January 27.

Among the key unanswered questions about U.S. Africa policy in 1998:

* Will the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and similar initiatives to promote U.S. trade and investment, be balanced by attention to African development priorities that include equity and sustainability?

* Will verbal support for African self-reliance and reconstruction be matched by a willingness to invest increased U.S. resources through multilateral institutions, African ~ governments and civil society, as well as the private sector?

* What will the U.S . government do to support the struggle for democracy in Nigeria and around the continent, while avoiding the "one-size-fits-all" approach on the one hand and opportunistic excuses for human rights violations on the other?

Page 3

Many observers stress the danger of ignoring human rights abuses and delays in democratization.

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Mobil in Nigeria: Partner in Oppression by Michael Fleshman, The Africa Fund

Document 7

The Mobil Oil Corporation is the second largest producer of crude oil in Nigeria, trailing only the Shell Oil Company as a dominant force in the Nigerian economy. Nigeria depends on oil for over 90 percent of its export earnings and 85 percent of all government revenue. Mobil describes itself as a "partner for progress" in Nigeria, but its close financial, security and political ties to the military dictatorship demonstrate that Mobil is really a partner in oppression.

Financing The Dictatorship Mobil is a strategically important

business partner with the military government through its joint ventures with the state oil company. Of the 700,000 barrels of oil currently produced by Mobil Nigeria every day, 420,000 barrels, or 60 percent, go directly to the regime. Mobil's share is the remaining 40 percent, or 280,000 barrels per day. During 1997 Mobil generated over $8 million a day for the dictatorship -- nearly $3 billion annually. This money sustains the dictatorship in the face of overwhelming popular opposition.

Mobil is also a major supplier of petroleum products inside Nigeria, operating over 200 gas stations across the country. The company has launched a multi-billion dollar expansion of its Nigerian operations, including construction of a high volume natural gas processing plant.

Ties To The Security Forces The Shell Oil Company has been

rocked by revelations that it arms and pays the salaries ofNigerian army and police forces sent to crush peaceful opposition to Shell's

environmental destruction. Shell charges that Mobil and other Western oil companies also provide guns and ammunition to the security forces, a charge Mobil representatives deny. The Africa Fund has been unable to independently confirm or deny Shell's allegations. But Mobil admits that it too pays salaries and expenses for a special government security force detailed to guard the oil companies. Corporate funding for any unit of the dictatorship's security forces raise important human rights and political concerns.

Undermining The Democracy Movement In June 1993 the Nigerian military

annulled elections intended to restore elected civilian government. A few months later the current Nigerian dictator, General Sani Abacha, seized power and launched a bloody crackdown on the Nigerian democracy movement. In July 1994 Nigerian oil workers responded to the arrest of the winner of the 1993 vote, Moshood Abiola, with a heroic 12-week strike for democracy. While European oil companies were forced to cut back production, Mobil and another major U.S. company, Chevron, undermined the strike by flying in · foreign strikebreakers and actually increasing production. Although Mobil denies strikebreaking, oil workers union leader Milton Dabibi charged in November 1995 that, "Chevron and Mobil stabbed us in the back during the strikes. They are the main cause of our failure. "

Dabibi was arrested shortly after he made this statement and remains imprisoned without trial. Neither Mobil nor Chevron have made any public statement about the arrests of


Mobil routinely lobbies the

Nigerian government on a

full range of economic and

political matters.

Milton Dabibi, Moshood Abiola, Beko Ransome-Kuti or any of the other estimated 7,000 democracy activists now in Abacha's jails.

A Killing Silence On Human Rights Abuses

The Africa Fund is unaware of any public or private statements from Mobil to the Nigerian military government about the deteriorating human rights situation in the country. The company argues that it does not "interfere" in the internal affairs of other countries, but the record shows quite the opposite. Mobil routinely lobbies the Nigerian government on a full range of economic and political matters related to the company's commercial interests.

It is only on human rights issues that the company maintains a killing silence -- even when oppression strikes Mobil operations and Mobil employees as it did during the 1994 strike.

Corporate Social Responsibility In company publications and

regular 'advertorials' in The New York Times and other major newspapers, Mobil promotes itself as a good corporate citizen in Nigeria -- spending some $5 million a year on community development projects. But in 1997 Mobil's share ofNigerian crude oil sales totaled almost $2 billion, a figure that excludes earnings from the company's lucrative Nigerian retail operations. In a country where military corruption has left 40 percent of Nigerian children malnourished, Mobil returns a fraction of a penny in charitable and development giving to Nigerian people for every dollar it extracts. The harm caused by Mobil's economic support for the dictatorship far outweighs the good done by corporate philanthropy.


Lobbying For Abacha In November 1995, following

the execution of environmentalist and anti-Shell campaigner Ken Saro-Wiwa, President Clinton announced his support for international oil sanctions against Nigeria. But during a recent meeting with The Africa Fund, a state department official acknowledged that lobbying by the oil companies had weakened support for Nigerian sanctions in Washington. In January 1996 Mobil ran a small 'advertorial' in The New York Times opposing sanctions as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. Mobil ran the same anti-sanctions ad full page in the Nigerian press -- sending a clear message of support to Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha.

More recently Mobil has run ads endorsing the regime's bogus 1998 democratization scheme, a cynical plan to put a democratic veneer on continuing military rule. The company's support for the dictatorship stands in sharp contrast to the views of Nigerian church and human rights leaders, who refuse to support an election from which Nigerian democracy leaders are banned and in which Abacha will likely be the only Presidential candidate allowed.

As a member of the powerful and secretive U.S. Corporate Council on Africa, Mobil actively campaigns for a U.S. policy that puts corporate profits ahead of Black lives in Nigeria.


Talking Points on Mobil's Involvement in Nigeria

Mobil Bears Great Moral Responsibility For Human Rights Abuses In Nigeria and Must Withdraw.

Mobil operations in Nigeria produce over $8 million a day for the Abacha military dictatorship. Without these dollars the regime would not be able to survive. Mobil and the other major Western oil companies operate in business partnerships with the military regime and therefore bear direct responsibility for the suffering of the Nigerian people. It is wrong for Mobil to do business with the brutal Nigerian dictatorship just as it was wrong for Mobil to do business in racist South Africa. Human lives are more important than corporate profits.

Mobil Must Immediately Cut Its Ties To The Dictator's Security Forces.

In January 1998, the State Department charged that in Nigeria "all branches of the security forces committed serious human rights abuses." Yet Mobil directly pays salaries and expenses for armed and uniformed Nigerian security forces assigned to protect Mobil facilities. This is direct complicity with the repressive apparatus of the regime and cannot be reconciled with Mobil ' s claims of political neutrality and corporate good citizenship in Nigeria.

Mobil Must Cancel Its Nigeria Expansion Plan.

At a time when Nigerian democracy leaders are calling for international sanctions against the regime, Mobi I has commenced a vast expansion of its Nigerian operations. New investment will only strengthen Mobil ' s ties to Abacha,

signal continued Western corporate support for his regime and will add millions of dollars into his coffers. Mobil should condition any future expansion program on the restoration of democracy and respect for human rights.

Corporate Lobbying For Abaclta Must Stop.

Corporate lobbying against sanctions has blocked effective U.S. action against Nigeria and encouraged Abacha to ignore international condemnation of human rights abuses. Mobil must stop placing anti-sanctions ads in the Nigerian press, halt its lobbying campaign in Washington and speak out publicly against repression. Mobil's highly visible support for the regime is making the company a target for religious, trade union and investor action for democracy and justice in Nigeria.

Page 3

Mobil actively campaigns for a US. policy that puts corporate profits ahead of Black lives in Nigeria.



Action for Human Rights in Nigeria Document 8

Legislative Action on Nigeria What You Can Do

Draft Resolution for the Release of Nigerian Political Prisoners

WHEREAS the west African nation of Nigeria, with a population of over 100 million, a multi-billion dollar oil economy and a rich and diverse culture, should be a focal point for democracy and people-centered development in Africa,

WHEREAS in 1993 the Nigerian army annulled free and fair elections and seized power in a coup, suspending the Nigerian constitution, shackling the press and arresting, exiling or killing thousands of Nigerian pro-democracy and human rights activists, trade unionists, journalists and religious leaders,

WHEREAS in November 1995 the execution ofNigerian environmentalist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others after a flawed trial before a military court was condemned by world leaders from Nelson Mandela to Bill Clinton, and at least 19 other environmentalists have been imprisoned for three years awaiting trial on the same charges,

WHEREAS the Nigerian regime has equipped itself with virtually unlimited repressive power, including indefinite detention without charge or trial and the authority to remove government decisions from judicial review, and the United States Government in January 1998 reported that in Nigeria, "Security officers tortured prisoners with whippings, suspension by limbs from the ceiling, burning with candles and extraction of teeth," and that "detainees frequently died while in custody," and

WHEREAS the recent death in detention of former Vice President Shehu Mus a Y ar 'A Dua raises grave concerns about the health and safety of other prominent Nigerian political prisoners, includi.ng 1993 Presidential election winner Moshood Abiola and former head of state Olesegun Obasanjo, and the crisis in Nigeria can never be resolved while key pro-democracy leaders remain imprisoned, and the peoples' basic liberties are denied,

Be it RESOLVED that the state legislature commends the Nigerian people for their peaceful struggle for democracy and human rights and calls upon the military government to immediately release all political prisoners as a necessary first step toward national reconciliation.

Be it FURTHER RESOLVED that the state legislature urges the United States Government to take all necessary steps, including the use of economic measures, to secure the release of political prisoners, to restore democracy and to protect the human and civil rights of the Nigerian people.


Wednesday February 11, 1998 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

HUMAN RIGHTS: CRUCIAL To US FOREIGN POLICY By Senator Russ Feingold

Has the issue of human rights become the neglected stepchild of American foreign policy? This question is often raised during policy debates, especially where American economic interests are involved, and the answer is often unsatisfactory.

Consider, for example, America's policy towards the west African nation of Nigeria, which is currently under review by the Clinton adminstration.By virtue of its size and geographic location, Nigeria, which has suffered under military rule for most of its nearly 40 years as an independent nation, is important in regional and international politics and thus is critical to American interests. But Nigeria's future is being squandered by the current ruling junta, led by General Sani Abacha, through rampant corruption, economic mismanagement and brutal subjugation of Nigeria's people.

The calamity in Nigeria occurs against a background of economic and political collapse of a nation that has the potential to be an economic powerhouse on the African continent, a key regional political leader, and an important American trading partner. The State Department's annual report stated, "the general level of economic activity continues to be depressed." Oil revenues are the only reliable source of economic grO\vth, with the United States purchasing an estimated 41 percent of the output.

Corruption and criminal activity in this military-controll~d economic and political system have become common, including reports of drug trafficking and consumer fraud schemes that have originated in Nigeria and reached into the United States, including

Abacha government has been working even harder to tighten its grip on the country, wasting no opportunities to practice the subjugation ofNigeria's people.

Late last year, retired Major General Musa Yar'Adua, a former Nigerian vice president and a prominent opponent of General Abacha, died in state custody under circumstances that remain shrouded in mystery. General Yar'Adua was one of 40 people arrested in 1995 during a government sweep and sentenced to 25 years in prison for an alleged coup plot widely believed to have been a pretext to silence government critics. The past few weeks have seen more accusations of coup-plotting and more arrests (without the benefit of due process) under the ensuing government crackdown.

It is unclear whether the administration's new Nigeria policy will lead to increased efforts to cooperate with Nigeria's government or if we will see increased pressure to further isolate the recalcitrant Abacha regime. During Secretary of State Albright's trip to Africa in December,

there were disturbing news reports of statements by senior officials that we would be unfair to hold the governments of certain African nations to "Western" standards of personal and political freedom. These reports contradicted the administration's insistence that human rights remains an integral part of U.S.-African policy.

Moreover, if accurately reported, those statements were a profound insult to the hundreds, if not thousands, of courageous

my home state of Wisconsin. After the military annulled the

1993 election ofMoshood Abiola as Nigeria's president - through what was considered by many observors to be a free and fair

Consider NigerifL Corruption, economic mismanagement and brutal subjugation of

tlte country's people is the norm

pro~emocracy and human rights activists in many African nations who put their lives on the line to win the basic rights that are not only recognized by

election- Chief Abiola was thrown into prison, where he remains, as far as we know, supposedly awaiting trial. Reliable information about his situation and condition is difficult to obtain. Chief Abiola's wife, Kudirat, was detained by authorities last year and was later found murdered by the side of a road under circumstances that suggest the military may have been responsible.

On October 1, 1995, General Abacha announced a so-called "transition" program whose goal was the return of an elected civilian government in Nigeria by October, 1998. But even this flawed transition process moves at a snail's pace. A draft constitution has not been completed, and the registration process for political parties has been extremely restrictive. Any criticism of the transition process is punishable by five years in prison. Reports from many international human rights organizations and our own State Department document years of such brutality. Nigerian human rights activists and government critics are commonly whisked away to secret trials before military courts and imprisoned; independent media outlets are silenced; workers' rights to organize are restricted; and the infamous State Security [Detention of Persons] Decree #2, giving the military sweeping powers of arrest and detention, remains in force .

Perhaps the most horrific example of repression by the Abacha government was the execution of human rights and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others in November, 1995 on trumped-up charges. Since that barbaric act, it appears the

Western nations, but are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose 50th anniversary we celebrate this year.

On a moral level, the United States has a clear obligation to show determined and consistent leadership in the struggle for human rights. On the practical level, the degree to which a government respects human rights can be an accurate barometer of how far we can trust that government to respect its neighbors, its trading partners and the world community at ·large. A government that does not respect the fundamental rights of its people cannot be trusted to respect the obligations of a treaty or a trade agreement, much Jess the rule of Jaw in general.

This is not a call for disengagement, but a demand that fundamental human rights be part of the rules of engagement in our foreign policy.

As is the case with other repressive governments, such as China, the actions of the Abacha government should convince us ofthe short-sightedness of isolating human rights concerns from the rest of our foreign policy or relegating those concerns to second-class status behind economic or political interests. Governments, like individuals, are rarely selectively trustworthy. It is not too much to insist our partners in the international community demonstrate their trustworthiness, their respect for others and their adherence to the rule of Ia w.

Wisconsin Senator Feingold is the ranking Democratic member of the Senate Africa Subcommittee.



Human Rights Activism in Africa: A Frog's Eye View by J. Oloka-Onyango

Introduction There are a variety ol ways ollool<ing at the human rights wndition in Africa and at the nature and extent ol human rights activism that has operated and currently exists on the continent. Depending on that view, one will emerge with either an l"Xtremely pessimistic or a hopeful vision of the present as well as of the potential for the future. There is the view of the bird and that of the frog. The vision of the bird ranges over a far wider expanse, it glides over the swamp and swoops down only to pick out the occasional meal ('the scoop') - it also captures snippets of everything else in sight. The vantage point of the bird however, has the disadvantage of sotretimes mistaking the forest for the .trees. It lacks the microscopic detail that is the province of the frog. The latter· not only inhabits the swamp but obviously has a much greater familiarity with. its environment and daily happenings. The frog may know nothing of the skies, but it has an encyclopaedic knowledge of the swamp.

In this senst', the media in the USA is like the bird. When it does focus on the serious happenings on the continent (which is rare) it is mainly captured by the more sensational events ldking place: the n1.1ssacres in Rwanda and the fighting in Angola, Son1.1lia and liberia; the South .African election, and the pro-democracy movements all over the continent; the events thdt don't rn<tke the headlines, but are ever present cmd of much greater importance thdn the fleeting 'scoop' and attendant sound bvte. ltdoesnotaUowfor a balanced appr.tisal of the failures and successes of political struggles in Africa. 11tis approach invariablyyerpetuates the i.mdge of the dark' unknown':

This paper attempts to develop the viewpointoft.he frog, taken not only from U1e ground leveL but also with a mud1 longer tin1e;-scan. In this wav, it tries to give some i.nkling of the phenomenal diversity and structure of what is conm10niy Called 'civil society' in Africa, and its relationship towhdt !call 'popular society' -that section of African society which lives in the rural area and

Document 9

<XXlSti tu tes the majority of the popula lion ol all but a fewexceptionsofthecountries on the rnntinenl

There is another aspect to the focus ol this paper i.e. not just the human rights condition. but also the issue of human rights activism. That aspect is captured in a famous African parable, rea;>unted by Chinua Achebe in his Anthills of the Savannnh, and one which could easily be adapted to describe the situation of human rights activists throughout the continent. The leopard had long been hunting down the tortoise but has never quite managed to catch up with her. When it finally did, on a dusty village path, and duly infortred the tortoise that it was now prey, the tortoise began to rotate vigorously in one spot, digging in and stirring up the dust all about her. When the leopard asked: 'What are you doing! The tortoise replied 'I want those who walk along here after my dentise to say: She struggled'. Even against tremendous odds, African human rights activists m ntinue to struggle.

Together, the frog and tortoise metaphors provide the backdrop to the present examination. First, I shall attempt to give some perspective to the nature and complexity of the human rights condition and struggle in Africa. 1ltis entails a sl10rt ltistorical summary of the conditions that have existed on th~continent and the way in which those conditions have shaped the response to them. Secondly, I shall try to give some flavour of the range and variety of human rights activity in Africa. and to provide some idea of the broad thrust of that movement. Finally, I shall consider the problems and the prospects of that movement as we proceed into the next ntillemtiun1 a word of caution. Such an overview cannot pretend to provide a comprehensive analysis, especially given the diversity of conditions and the historical experiences of the myriad countries that comprise the African continent. Many ol the nations of Africa are also in tremendous flux. and thus it would be premature to make conclusive statements about specific country

situations. lhe rnnclusions made are thus broad and tentative.

· Human Rights Struggles and Activism in Africa: A Backgi:ound Note There are two aspects to hUIT18J\ rights activism in Africa: the first being the fairly long history ol struggle against colonial hegemony, a struggle which was essentially aimed at the achievement ol the rights to political self-determination; and the second, that which has been directed at the recognition and enforceirellt of the basic human rights of the peoples of the independent African states. 11"1e first can likewise be divided into two, with the struggles for independence of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s (in which anti-colonial movements worldwide played a considerable role) and the other, which was a struggle against the grand ll]m'iheid of the Portuguese colonies and racist South African domination wh.ich also manifested itself in Zimbabwe and. Nantibia. 1his part of the struggle ran tluuugh the 1970sand 1980s, culminating in the 1990s with South Africa's independence (and involving a coalilion of independent African states and the global anti- apartheid movement).

The Colonial Epoch Africa in the colonial era was a deeply regimented society, with a rigid stratification between the European administrative cadre and the 'mloured' native and sometimes with the marginally more privileged immigrant (from India or Lel:rulon) in between. The laws and regulations designed to keep this structure in place were rigid and impenetrable; the sanctions against their breach extensive and harsh. Anti-colonial resistance took a wide variety of forms, both within the context of urban societv, as well as in the rural areas where tre v~t majority of the population lived. Some of it found ntilitary expression, such as the Mau Mau rebellion in Ke11ya, the An-Lu uprising in the Cameroons and the wars of liberation in Algeria and a host of other countries. Others were of a typically civil

The Midwest Regional Consultation on U.S. Policy Toward Africa is made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation ofNew York. The views expressed in this paper are those ofthe author and not the Carnegie Corporation .

d1amcter, sud1 as the struggles to abolish the' pas.c;', the demand for a rerogni lion of trade union rights and the formation of p.trti•!S for political organiza.tion and exprPssion. A great deal of the resistance comprised the earliest fonns of human rights activism on the continent, and took place outside of the colonies, in fact, in the 'mother-countries' of Britain, Portugal and France. Many of the movements and Jliltionalistj activists were located outside the territories in whid1 U1ey directed their attention. ll1e most famous - the Pan Africanist Movement - was set up in Manchester and peopled by legends like Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Joe Appiah and George Padmore, all of whom were destined to play significant roles in the political liberation of the continent.

Despite the tremendous intellectual and transformative spirit -that fired these movements, they were nevertheless trunca ted in their perceptions of the struggle against domination .. For example, Nkrumah cmmselled, 'seek ye first the political kingdom'. All else was presumably to follow. Alias, Utis was not to be so. Tl1e movement for self-determination was either co-opted or destroyed on the adtievemcnt of independence, and whip-lashed or cajoled into confomtity with the dominant political movement. Or else, it wen tin to exile. It is Utis activism which .is now finding resurgence in the movemcmts of self-deterntinalion and secession that are sprouting up all around the continent, and in the process chall enging the very notion of the nation-state as we know it. l11e removal of colonialism greatly aided in the liberation of the African peoples, but titis was on.ly the first ster in a long, hard struggle. Tl1esecond phase of that process may well be against what Basil Davison has called the 'curse' of the Black 1nan' s burden -the nation state, wltich all over the continent is in varying stages of disintegration and atropltism.

The Post-Colonial Period: A Broad Reprise If these was any one slogan that dlaracterized the fonnative years of independent Africa, it was the phrase: 'One nation; one party; one people' - the refrain that echoed from Tanzania to Ghana, and from Mauritrutia to Zaire.ll1e

infancy of the post<olonial state, it was argued, could not allow for a pluralist political landscape; several parties it was alleged will simply deteriorate into multiple ethnicities. The scourge of 'poverty' is the bane of African li bera lion. Or, a!\..Julius Nyerere argued, of what relevance is the right to vote, if you cannot eat? The single party extended its i.nlage ti1roughout African civil society - one trade union, one woman's movement and one movement of the youth. All were propagandized by one newspaper! Tltis monolithicity was perpetrated by the enduring myU1ologies of its perpetrators - it was they, after all, who had 'liberated' our countries, It was they who knew best -a reverence that was epitontised in the nrunes that we gave to them- 'Mzee' (the Old, and presunlc"lbly, the wise one); 'Mwa.limu' (ti1e teacher), and 'Osagyefo' (the onutiscient), and in the Life Presidencies ti1at U1ey took for ti1emselves. In sud1 a context, any human rights activism- that is activism wltich sought to mallenge tile status quo could easily be dismissed as counter-revolutionary or self-seeking. To the extent that there was any reportage and condemnation of hunliln rights violations on U1e continent, this was done by external groups, ranging from Anmesty International to the Intematioilill Conmtission of Jurist (ICJ).

Indigenous human rights activism in titis period was sporadic. individual and truncated . When the single party disintegrated into the military junta, such activism became positively more dangerous, as people were' disappeared', detained and summarily executed. Personalities like Jean Bedel Bokassa and ldi Anlin Dada reigned supreme, and competed in the perfection of torture techniques and llie compilation of murder statistics. It is against this background that African society, cmrunencing in ti1e late 1980s, but running U1roughout the 19'Xls, rebelled. This is the second phase of hun1an rights activism on the African continent, and it is to the activism that spurred this reaction tl1at we now turn and exantine. The Democracy Movement and Human Rights Activism Today

The Status of fluman Rights Activity

Jn !tis 1984 study of human rights NGOs in Africa, Henry Scobie counted 29


groups continent-wide. Of them,. two were government sponsored; five were women's organizations, eight d1urch or religious oriented; four concerned writers and/or journalists; six were lawyers orgaJtizalions wltile the last four were Anmesty International sections1. He then went on to give a litany of weaknesses in the groups ranging from sectarianism,. skewed focus, lintited resources, size and symbolism. At the end of Ius exru1tination, Scobie states:

Certainly th e re is no evidence that existing indigenous groups have played a role in the systematic monitoring and public condemnation oi African regimes guilty of significant violations. Neither is there reason to predict that such African NGOs can play other than a subsidiary, supportive, and generally promotional role in the lo r<:>se<:'able future (emphasis added).

Happily for posterity, Scobie was wrong. In a 1993-9-1 survey of some 26 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in which the present author was involved2

, a total of 197 orgaJtizations are listed as involved in a wide-ranging variety of hwnan rights activity. ll1at nwnber could well l1aVe re.ad1ed 250 by tl1e present time. Ten ye.ars ago in Nigeria, there were almost no noticeable human rights groups in the country. Today, despite the fomtidable problems presented by an extremely autocratic and erratic ntilitary government, hunliln rights groups in the country have mounted a campaign of civil disobedience and opposition, forcing ti1e regime to find ever more i1movative ways of diverting the struggle. All over the continent not only are groups proliferating that describe themselves principally as hun1an rights organizations, but they are also gaining a firm foothold in contemporary African society -a foot-hold that l1as bt_>come part atld parcel of .the motion of political development on the continent. V\1hat explains tltis explosion?

ll1e first, at1d most obvious reason, is the a trophism of the political systems on the continent; even the clilld who dearly loves his/her parents wants lo leave home at 18. WiU1 regimes rumting to tlm.•e decades, theedificewasbound tocollapse sometime. The second was the demise of the Cold War, and the abandonment of the system of patronage that buffeted a host of dictators, although a few dinosaurs (like Mobutu of Ztire and Arap

1 Hcruy Scobie, 1~ ·Human Rights Orcanizations in Black Africa: Their Problems and Prospects in the Wake ol the Banjul Olarter·, in Welch and Meltzer. Hw11u11 Rigllts mtd D.·vdopmmt in Afric• (SUNY Press, Albany, p .183. .

2 IHRIP/Swc>d.ish NGO Foundation (1994), 7k Status ofHumDII Rigltt:; OrganiZDtions itt Sub-S•Itar•n AfricD.


Moi in Kenya) still survive. Lastly, conditions of econorilic and social strife have spurred a whole process of seeking greater popular participation as well as more direct accountability and transparency from the state. Together, these factors hc~ve created a movement that is a far cry from the situation on the continent only c1 decade c~go.

1l1e African hwnan rights movement is ,uuong the most dynanlic and versatile developments of r.;ent times. And yet, one is often disturbed by the fashion in wllich Uwre has been an ~most uncritical embrace of the methodologies and strategies of the glol1c1l (rec~d 'Western'} human rights movement. Such methodologies l1c1ve marked the hwnan rights moveme nt as the new 'missionaries' of the late 20th century, with the Scmw linlitations of their predecessors of the tum of the lc~st century. As we were told to dose our eyes and -give thanks to our christian father, our land had disappeared before we opened them! In sinlilar fasllion, ciS we decry the abuse of tl1e traditional hw11an and political rights (free expression, organization and moveme nt), the insidious denial of t>eonomic and social rights (healtl1, food, shelter and education) are rendering fue human rights struggle a nullity. by uncritically aping the global human rights movement, African hW11an rights activists nm the risk of fading into stark irrelevancy. To fail to <lppreciate tl1at fue most fundamental right remains the right of self-detennination is a basic flaw in the strategy of the contemporary african human rights movement. Human Rights Activism in the 1990s and Beyond Obviously, the picture painted above of the African hun1a11 rights movement is a broad and general one that varies from one country to another. It by no means implies that the movement is free from problems. It also does not mean that the conditions these groups iaceare any more mnducive to the work in wllich they are involved thc1n thev were befor~ the 'second' winds of d1~nge swept U1rough the continent. Nor docs it nledn that the so-caliPd 'trc~ditional' lnm1an rights issues in Africa are no longer c1 problem. lndef'd, the possibility of a dupli cation of Rwand<l, in which human rights activists Wt>rC tlw first to 11<! tM8Pt1•d. is never too rL•motc. It is also import<Jnt to note . however, is the exciting diversity and growing autonomy of the groups

involved in hW11an rights activity on the continent. What, only a decade ago was the crusading. isolated concern of the single sporadic activist, has been transfonned into the shared burden of a broad mass. Tllis alone is progress.

But what exactly do these groups do? Much of the activity pa~allels that of traditional human rights groups in the West, viz.: information collection, evaluation, dissemination, advocacy; legal aid, education and assistanc-e; litigation (Bill of rights or Constitutional test cases) moral comlenmation; and lobbying national, regional and. inter-governmental authorities. Despite the relative conservatism of African rural communities, a formidable women's movement has emerged in the wake of Nairobi 1985, and is systematically confronting the structures of patriard1y and male donlination, manifest in the systems of property-ownership, political participation, inheritance, female mutilation and duld betrothal. At the African Commission o n Human and Peoples Rights - the primary regional organ for hw11an rights protection on the continent - NGOs have successfully challenged and progressively altered the exclusionary and concealing rules of procedure and forced U1e OAU to appoint two women Comnlissioners. Needless to say, the provisions of tl1e African Cl1arter remain grossly insensitive to concerns relating to gender discrimination and the stat us of women, an issue tl1at needs to be adopted in an holistic fasluon by all hun1a11 rights groups, not only by those concerned with the status of women.

There are of course, still fomlidable obstacles to be overcome by the movem.enl The n1ajority of these groups continue to rely on external financing and support, earrling them the derogatory epithet, 'FONGOs' (Foreign-Organized NGOs), or, FFONGO's (Foreign-Funded NGOs). At the other end of the spectrum, given the continuing fear of governments for activity they cannot control, some rnve established their own NGOs (known as 'GONGOs' -Government-Organized NGOs). Coupled with this, many governments still impose considerably onerous conditions of registration and operation, where they do not outrightly harass, detain and even elinlin.a'te those involved in Ulis kind of activity. Laws and regulations severely constraining htU11a11 rights activity l1ave become stcU1dard fare in the struggle. Groups are targetted for llighlighting corruption, police brutality,

Page 3

or simply for criticising governn1ent inaction. But there continue to be 111ajor limitations in the movement.

I:kspite U1e crippling burden of the programs of economic reform. and adjustment that have .been imposed by the IMF in done-like fasluon throughout the continent, very few groups are addressii1g economic and social rightsrights such as to health, education; food and shelter in an activist fasluon. Even though African countries play host to 50% of the world's refugees, virtually · none (local or international) spoke up on the issue of the forcible repatriation of U1e Rwa..ndesc refugees from Tanza11ia. Even if one 111ay agree with the underlying rationale, the danger of the precedent set for other refugees cannot be w1derestimated.

Despite the mythic belief in the 'traditional' hospitality of African communities, ·social and economic realities, as well as a growing xenophobia, have led to the imposition of several constraints on U1e daily existence and protection of refugees in several host countries and the action of the tanzanian goverru11ent will certainly provide solace for others who are sinlilarly enburdened by the presence of refugees. Ulti111ately, the African hun1a11 rights movement has still failed to breach the gap with popular society, and in tllis way n1ay cease to be of any relevance to the vast, dispossesseq and disillusioned 111ajority. 11us majority n1ay now have a little more freedorn, but have also quickly discovered that freedom cannot be e.aten! Julius Nyerere' s dictwn is in fact n1anifesting itself in bold reality. The ·ultimate test for the movemt.>nt will however come after fue honeymoon of 'democratization' is over - i.e. when fue process of multi-party electioneering and politicking is done in Zambia, Qmna, Benin, Mali and a host of other countries wllich have· experienced this 'wave'?. Will this produce fundamental d1ange? And should it fail to do so, will the movement be able to develop strategies U1at will ensure that it remains true to the demands of the oppressed masses who live in fue countryside and hanker ctfter true liberation? All depends, but f'ssential to the process will be U1e PXtent to wllid1 the nt>w actors in-African human rights movement reaches reach out to African popular society, and give concrete meaning to the rights of movement, expression and association by girding them witl1 a -comprehensive

campaign for food, for shelter and for better health. In other words marrying the traditionaf dvil and political rights to the rights of solidarity and development, and tights in the economic and social. sphere. How is this to be done?

Conclusion: Some Pointers to the FutUre \Nhile there are several parallels between the hum<m tights movement in Afrim and that in tlw West there are also significant differenct>S. Quite dearly, as a nascent movement that is still evolving, the groups in Africa have needs specific to the wprk in which they are engaged, extending froin thP investigation and monitoring of violations to the effective documentation and lobbying. 1l1ese however, are needs tiMt will ev<>ntuaUy be ovPrcomP. To L"IE' true to the struggle for gcnuinP and enduring democraq' howevt'r, the African human rights movement must takt> several steps to tr<msform both its thrust and focus - steps that differ fundamcnt<~lly from the nlPthodologies


currently in place, rnethodolo~:.>ies that llilve largely been borrowed from their Westem counter-parts.

Central to this task, is the removal ofthe facade that human rights activism is apolitical work.1l1e first step in achieving a fundamentc~l, transformation of· the human r·ights situation must consequently be directed at the complete democratization of the African state- a process that must not only bring back the thread of the activism of the colonja] period i.e. the activism of self-determination (including a democratic. discussion of the issue of SPCession), but must also deal with the conditions of popular socjety. Hence, it must confront and revolutionize the institutions of both central and local govenm1ent, giving new meaning to the democratic rights to participation and associc~tion. In this process, Afrimn socjety must revisit and revise the conception of the statP and its utility, and also devise new stntdures for the mediation of socia l, politicc~l and econonu!= relations. HithPrto charc1c-

terized by conditions of exploitation and domination to do this the hwnm rights movement must confront the links between local and national autocracy and international c:onruvance and non-chalc~nce. ln t!Us sense, activism in Africa must abandon the almost-exclusive focus on civil cmd political rights, and L"IE'gin action <md c~dvocacy wluch look much more c\ t the connection between sudl rights c1nd econonuc and social conditions. Lastly, for the friends of Africa activists outside Africa, a more delihemtive process of targeting govemmcnts and institutions (sud1 as the World Bank and the IMF) must be conunencPd, in order to continue being useful to the struggle on the continent, which is marufestly political, but directly linked to the social, econonuc and cultun1l cotlllitions on the continent imd in the world outside it.

J. Oloka-Onyango ~utn>ent oi Law

Makt>.rere University, Ugand..

This article was reprinted from the CODESRIA Bulletin, Number 1, 1997, published by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, based in Dakar, Senegal. J. Oloka-Onyango is a Professor in the Department of Law at Makerere University in Uganda.



Foreign Aid Programs Provide No Protection for Aid to Africa by Jim Cason, The Africa Fund

Document 10

President Bill Clinton has proposed a $13 .5 billion foreign aid program for next year that provides no funding for the Development Fund for Africa (DF A) and no protection for general development aid to the poorest continent.

The White House foreign aid proposals made in early February do specifically earmark more than $5 billion for Egypt and Israel and nearly $1 billion for the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

While the foreign aid proposals in the budget President Clinton presented to Congress in early February contain several new trade, debt and peacekeeping initiatives that benefit Africa, they do not restore overall development aid to Africa to the levels of the early 1990s.

Cuts in Aid to Africa Three years ago, Congress cut

development assistance to Africa by 25 percent and eliminated the specific designation of a dollar amount of development funds for Africa.

Although aid to Africa has increased slightly since these dramatic cuts, the level of funding is still well below the early 1990s figure of more than $800 million in development aid channeled through the DF A. In 1998, the Clinton Administration suggests that about $700 million in development aid will flow to Africa through U.S. bilateral development aid programs.

Several years ago Congress also eliminated all funding for the DF A, which directs aid toward projects that encourage long term, sustainable development. Yet until this year, popular pressure has forced at least a nominal suggestion that a specific percentage of all development funds be devoted to Africa.

The 1998 foreign aid program, however, includes no requirement that a specific amount of

development assistance should be devoted to Africa. Instead, Africa, Asia and most of Latin America will have to compete for funds out the modest $1.8 billion in development funding that is not reserved for specific regions.

Africa Aid in 1999 In his foreign aid proposals for the next

fiscal year, President Clinton has included about $1.8 billion in development aid, but again, the White House has decided not to specify an amount of development assistance that will be allocated to Africa.

Instead, the Administration's foreign aid proposals for next year offer small piecemeal allocations to specific programs in Africa, including modest funding for trade and investment programs ($30 million), peacekeeping ($35 million) and debt relief ($35 million).

Administration officials suggest they will probably slightly increase development aid to Africa to about $730 million, but this level is still well below the more than $800 million specifically designated in the early 1990s.

The Clinton Administration's foreign aid proposals will now be considered by Congress, which will hold hearings on foreign aid in the next three months and then is expected to vote on a foreign aid package sometime in May or June.

Last year the Congressional Black Caucus argued that the U.S. government should restore aid to Africa to at least $800 million and channel that aid through the Development Fund for Africa. Some other groups have suggested that given the tremendous needs in Africa, U.S. aid should be at least $1 billion.




Participants List February 28, 1998

Adotei Akwei, Advocacy Director for Africa, Amnesty International USA, Washington, D.C. Dr. Lascelles Anderson, Center for Urban Educational Research & Development, University of Chicago Kimberly August, Enron Corporation, Houston, Texas Salih Booker, Senior Fellow, Africa Studies Program, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. Lisa Brock, Ida W. Wells Forum, Chicago Representative Charlie Brown, Indiana House of Representatives, Gary Representative Irma Hunter Brown, Arkansas House of Representatives, Little Rock Nancy Brown, Women's Network, National Conference of State Legislatures, Stanley, Kansas Paul E. Bryant, The Gallup Organization, Lincoln, Nebraska Sam Burrell, Alderman, 29th Ward, Chicago Eloise Chevrier, Wellington AvenueUnited Church of Christ, Chicago Basil Clunie, Chicago Committee in Solidarity with Southern Africa, Evanston, Illinois Representative Spencer Coggs, Wisconsin House of Representatives, Madison Shirley A. Coleman, Alderman, 16th Ward, Chicago Scott Couper, Africa Office, United Church of Christ/Disciples of Christ, Indianapolis, Indiana Representative William Crawford, Indiana House of Representatives, Indianapolis, Indiana Honorable Danny K. Davis, United States Congressman, 7th District, Chicago Michael Dawson, Director, Center for the Study of Race, Politics & Culture, University of Chicago James Day, Managing Director, Strategic Planning Group, Inc., Washington, D.C. Representative Lois M. DeBerry, Speaker Pro Tern, Tennessee House of Representatives, Nashville; President,

National Black Caucus of State Legislators Michael Elliott, United Auto Workers, Local #551, Park Forest, Illinois Kweku Embil, Chicago-Accra Sister Cities Community, Chicago Sister Cities International Program, Chicago Senator Jesus Garcia, Illinois State Senate, Chicago Joan Gerig, Chicago Representative David Haley, Kansas State Legislature, Kansas City Michael Hanchard, Northwestern University, Chicago Dr. Cedric Herring, Professor and Interim Director, Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy, University

of Illinois at Chicago Barbara Holt, Alderman, 5th Ward, Chicago Eric Hudson, Amnesty International USA, Chicago Dr. Vincent Idemyor, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, Chicago Reverend Jesse Jackson, Sr., Special Envoy for the President for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa Virgil E. Jones, Alderman, 15th Ward, Chicago Elaine Klemen, Wellington Avenue United Church of Christ, Chicago Thubi H.A. Kolobe, Forum for Southern Africans, Oak Park, Illinois Reverend Patricia Kyle, North Indiana Conference Board of Church & Society, United Methodist Church, South

Bend, Indiana Tilden LeMelle, Chair, The Africa Fund, New York, New York James Lewis, Chicago Urban League, Chicago Jeffrey Lewis, Managing Director and General Counsel, DST Catalyst, Inc., Chicago



Vernita A. Lewis, Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy, University ofillinois at Chicago Gary L. Laster, Mayor, Saginaw, Michigan William Martin, Associate Professor, Sociology Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Co-Chair,

Association of Concerned Africa Scholars Gaston Mbateng, CGM Data and Services, Glendale Heights, Illinois Dr. John Metzler, Professor, African Studies Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing Senator Gwendolyn S. Moore, Wisconsin State Senate, Madison Representative Johnnie Morris-Tatum, Wisconsin State Assembly, Madison Prexy Nesbitt, Former Consultant, Government of Mozambique Reverend Dr. Thanda Ngcobo, Trinity United Church of Christ, Chicago Linda Noonan-Ngwane, Southern Africa Network, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Chicago Zolani Noonan-Ngwane, Southern Africa Network, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Chicago Reverend Mangedwa Nyathi, Hartford Memorial Baptist Church, Detroit, Michigan Senator Barack Obama, Illinois State Senate, Chicago Dr. Stella U. Ogunwole, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Chicago Emmanuel W. Onunwor, Mayor, East Cleveland, Ohio Dr. Alice Palmer, Professor, Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy, University of Illinois at Chicago;

Co-Director, The PEOPLE Program, Chicago Edward Palmer, Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy, University of Illinois at Chicago;

Co-Chair, The PEOPLE Program Senator Mary Panzer, Wisconsin State Senate, Madison Brian Pawlowicz, Eli Lilly and Company, St. Paul, Minnesota Representative Coy Pugh, Illinois State Legislature, Chicago David Robinson, Deputy Clerk, Cook County Board of Commissioners, Chicago Harold Rogers, Executive Director, Coalition of Black Trade Unionists; Professor, City College of Chicago, Chicago Carl le Raux, Consul, South African Consulate General, Chicago Honorable Bobby L. Rush, United States Congressman, I st District, Chicago Mlulami Singapi, Vice-Consul, South African Consulate General, Chicago Senator Virgil Clark Smith, Michigan Senate, Lansing Robert Stumberg, The Harrison Institute for Public Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C. Barbara Sykes, Former Member, Akron City Council, Akron, Ohio Representative Vernon Sykes, Ohio House of Representatives, Akron Barine Teekate-Yorbe, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, Des Moines, Iowa Evalyn Tennant, Administrator, Center for the Study of Race, Politics & Culture, University of Chicago Senator Donne E. Trotter, Illinois State Senate, Chicago Representative Arthur Turner, Illinois State Legislature, Chicago Reverend Dr. Wyatt Tee Walker, President, The American Commmittee on Africa; Trustee, The Africa Fund,"New

York, New York Dr. William E. Ward, Mayor, Chesapeake, Virginia Valerie C. Wells, Durban/Chicago Sister City Committee, Chicago Anthony Whitmore, Regional Representative, Governor's Regional Economic Development Office, Dayton, Ohio Standish E. Willis, Chicago Conference of Black Lawyers, Chicago

The Africa Fund Jennifer Davis, Executive Director Susie Johnson, Director of Programs Michael Fleshman, Human Rights Coordinator Richard Knight, Project Associate Annie King, Office Manager Carol Thompson, Rapporteur Basil Clunie, Photographer



Participant Biographies

STATE LEGISLATORS

Charlie Brown has represented Gary in the Indiana General Assembly since 1983. He is Chair of the Public Health Committee and of the Indiana Black Legislative Caucus. He is active in the National Black Caucus of State Legislators (NBCSL), where he serves on the International Affairs Committee. Previously he was an Affirmative Action Officer and Director of the Youth Services Bureau.

Irma Hunter Brown has twenty years of distinguished service in the Arkansas State Assembly. She currently serves as Vice Chair of the Revenue and Taxation Committee. She chairs the International Affairs Committee of the NBCSL. She is active in many organizations concerned with civic and social matters, including civil rights and women' s issues. In 1995, she was among the legislators who visited southern Africa under the auspices of The Africa Fund to exchange views with legislators from South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe and to observe and learn from the experiences of these recently independent nations.

Spencer Coggs, now in his eighth term, is a senior member of the Wisconsin State Assembly, where he serves on the key budget-writing Joint Committee on Finance. He is National Treasurer of the NBCSL and has been elected to serve on the Executive Committee of the National Conference of State Legislatures. A leader of the campaign for anti-apartheid sanctions legislation, he made his first visit to South Africa in 1995 and attended the African-African American Summit in 1997. He is one of four state legislators appointed to President Clinton's National Education Goals Panel.

William Crawford represents Indianapolis in the Indiana House of Representatives.

Lois M. DeBerry is President of the National Black Caucus of State Legislators, which has more than 500 members nationwide. She is Speaker Pro Tern of the Tennessee House of Representatives where she has served since 1972. Her legislative agenda prioritizes children and youth, health care and women's issues, education, criminal justice reform and economic development.

Jesus Garcia has served as a member of the Illinois State Senate since 1992. He is the first Mexican-American to be elected to the Illinois Senate and represents an ethnically diverse population. He is known as an advocate for worker' s and immigrants rights, affordable housing, funding for education and neighborhood development and economic revital.ization. From 1986 to 1992, he served as an Alderman on the Chicago City Council and he served as a Deputy Commissioner under the late Mayor Harold Washington. He is a board member of the National Association of Latino Elected Officials.

David Haley represents Kansas City in the Kansas House of Representatives.

Johnnie Morris-Tatum represents the 11th Assembly District in Milwaukee in the Wisconsin State State Assembly. She is the Chaplain for the National Organization of Black Elected Legislative Women and Chair of the Board of Directors of the Afrikan American Association for International Trade and Commerce.

Barack Obama represents the 13th Legislative District in the Illinois State Senate. He serves on the Judiciary, Public Health and Welfare and State Government Committees. As a lawyer he has specialized in civil rights litigation. In 1992, he served as Director of Illinois Project Vote in Chicago, organizing a voter registration and education campaign targeted

The Midwest Regional Consultation on U.S. Policy Toward Africa is made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation ofNew York. The views expressed in this paper are those ofthe author and not the Carnegie Corporation .


to minority and low-income areas that resulted in 150,000 newly registered voters for the Presidential election .

Mary E. Panzer has served as a member of the Wisconsin State Senate since 1993 and has been a state legislator since she was elected to the House in 1980. She is a member of the Joint Finance Committee and served as the Ranking Assembly Republican from 1989 to 1993. She is active in the National Conference of State Legislatures, having served as vice-chair and chair of the Agriculture and International Trade Committee. In 1990 she participated in a state trade and investment

mission to Asia.

Coy Pugh was elected to the Illinois House of Representatives in 1994 and currently serves as Chair ofthe Human Services Committee. His legislative priorities include fighting crime, bringing business and jobs to poor and neglected areas, protecting minority rights and promoting children's welfare. In 1985, he founded the Westside Small Business Development Corporation, which helps start and develop African-American and minority business. In 1992, he started Wescor Inc. , a small construction company that trains and employs homeless men and women.

Virgil Clark Smith is a member of the Michigan State Senate and is currently Senate Democratic Floor Leader. Prior to being elected to the Senate, he served 12 years in the Michigan House of Representatives. In 1995, he was a member of The Africa Fund's delegation of state legislators to South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Senator Smith is a founding member of the NBCSL.

Vernon Sykes has served in the Ohio House of Representatives since 1984. He serves on several committees, including the Finance and Appropriations Committee, where he is the ranking Democrat. He has sponsored legislation to allow the state pension and insurance plans to invest in the African Development Bank. Prior to becoming a State Representative, he · was a member of the Akron City Council, and is past President of the Black Elected Democrats of Ohio and past Secretary for the Ohio Democratic Party.

Donne E. Trotter is a member of the Illinois State Senate. He has represented the residents of the South and Southeast side of Chicago since being elected to the House of Representatives in 1988, and is currently the Democratic Spokesman on the Appropriations Committee. His special legislative agenda includes health care, education, economic development and job creation. He is Chair of the Illinois Joint Legislative Black Caucus and is a member ofthe International Committee of the Council of State Governments.

Arthur Turner was elected to the Illinois House of Representatives in 1997, where he is Deputy Democratic Leader of the House. He has served as Chair of the Housing Committee and Vice-Chair of the Higher Education Committee. Among his legislative achievements is the Affordable Housing Trust Fund Law, which passed in 1990.

MAYORS

Gary L. Loster is Mayor of the City of Saginaw, Michigan.

Emmanuel W. Onunwor is Mayor of the City of East Cleveland, Ohio.

William E. Ward is Mayor of the City of Chesapeake, Virginia. He is also a Professor of History at Norfolk State University. In 1972, he studied and traveled with the American Forum for International Study in Ghana.

CITY COUNCILMEMBERS

Sam Burrell serves as an Alderman representing the 29th Ward on the Chicago City Council.

Shirley A. Coleman serves as an Alderman representing the 16th Ward on the Chicago City Council.

Midwest Regional Consultation Page 3

Barbara Holt serves as an Alderman representing the 5th Ward on the Chicago City Council.

Virgil E. Jones serves as an Alderman representing the 15th Ward on the Chicago City Council.

SPEAKERS

Adotei Akwei is the Director of Advocacy for Africa with Amnesty International USA. He helps to implement the U.S . governmental component of Amnesty campaigns and meets regularly with Africa policymakers in Congress and the State Department to raise human rights concerns. Before joining Amnesty, he served as Africa Program Director for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Research Director of The Africa Fund. Mr. Akwei is from Ghana.

Salih Booker is Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Studies Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. Booker has worked in Africa and the United States as a consultant for numerous international donor inst~tutions and African NGOs. He was a legislative assistant for TransAfrica from 1980-1983. Mr. Booker was the author of the UN Development Program's first two Development Cooperation Reports on South Africa, and has published articles and opinion pieces for numerous U.S. and international newspapers and journals. He is a member of the African Studies Association and the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars, a member of the Preparatory Committee for the National Summit on Africa and a Trustee of The Africa Fund.

Danny K Davis was elected to represent the 7th Congressional District of Illinois in Congress in November 1996. He is the Regional Whip for the Midwest Region of the Democratic Caucus and a member of the Black Caucus and the Progressive Caucus. Prior to his election to Congress, he served on the Cook County Board of Commissioners. He served for eleven years as a member of the Chicago City Council.

Jennifer Davis has been Executive Director of The Africa Fund and The American Committee on Africa since 1981. She played a key role in building public understanding of African issues, including efforts to impose sanctions on apartheid South Africa, and has worked to achieve U.S. policies which support African democratization and sustainable economic development. Her work has brought her into close contact with a wide range of leaders of struggles for freedom throughout Africa, where she has traveled widely, most recently returning from Rwanda and South Africa. She has testified before numerous legislative bodies on issues such as democracy for Nigeria and aid for Africa. Her research on U.S. policy and into the U.S. corporate role in Africa has been extensively published.

Cedric Herring is a Professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) and Interim Director of the University's Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy. He is also past President of the Association of Black Sociologists and former Chair of the Chancellor's Committee on the Status of Blacks at UIC. He has published several books and monographs, including African Americans and the Public Agenda: The Paradoxes of Public Policy.

Reverend Jesse L. Jackson, Sr. is President and founder of the Rainbow/PUSH Coalition. In October 1997, Reverend Jackson was appointed by President Bill Clinton as Special Envoy for the President and Secretary of State for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa. In his official position as Special Envoy he traveled to Africa in November 1997 and February 1998, visiting Kenya, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia.

Tilden LeMelle is Chair of The Africa Fund. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and was a special guest at the inauguration of President Nelson Mandela. He frequently speaks on behalf of The Africa Fund and is a well known educator, having served as President of the University of the District of Columbia and Provost of Hunter College in New York City.

Jeffrey E. Lewis is Managing Director and General Counsel of DST Catalyst, Inc. DST Catalyst conducts proprietary research and consulting work related to the development of financial markets and institutions. DST Catalyst has offices in six countries, including South Africa. Lewis played a key role in automating the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. He is co-chair of the Chicago Bar Association's Foreign and International Law Committee.


William Martin is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Illinois and Co-Chair of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS), an organization that works for a progressive U.S. policy toward Africa. He has been published frequently on U.S. policy and African affairs. His current projects include faculty and student exchanges with African universities, including the historically Black University of the Western Cape (Cape Town).

John Metzler is a professor of African Studies and International Education at the African Studies Center of Michigan State University. His work has focused on Zambia, Zaire, Malawi and South Africa. He coordinates the university ' s public

outreach programs.

Prexy Nesbitt has extensive experience working in support of African freedom. He was Senior Program Officer at the MacArthur Foundation, Director of the Mozambique Support Project and as a consultant to the government of Mozambique. He has also worked at the World Council of Churches Program to Combat Racism in Geneva and at The American Committee on Africa in New York.

Edward "Buzz" Palmer is co-director of The PEOPLE Program, an interactive international leadership program for policymakers in the U.S., Africa and Europe. In 1997, he was co-chair of a conference at the University of Illinois on the Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Program. He was appointed chair of a special Advisory Council for Southern Africa for former Senator Paul Simon, when Senator Simon chaired the Senate Subcommittee on Africa.

Alice Palmer is a member of the Executive Board of the Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy at the University of Illinois in Chicago and is co-president of The PEOPLE Program. She is a former member of the lllinois State Senate and served as Chair of the International Affairs Committee of the NBCSL.

Bobby L. Rush has represented the First Congressional District in the Illinois House of Representatives since 1992. Prior to his election to Congress, he was an Alderman in the Chicago City Council for eight years. He has been active in the civil rights movement since the I 960s: he was a member of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee from 1966 to 1968 and a co-founder of the Illinois Black Panther Party in 1968.

Mlulami Mzukisis Lucas Singapi is Vice-Consul at the South African Consulate General in Chicago. He acts as the media and cultural liaison, covering the areas of tourism, trade promotion and general representation of South Africa in the Midwest Region. He was born in Port Elizabeth and graduated from Fort Hare University.

Robert Stumberg is a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, where he serves as clinical director for the Harrison Institute for Public Law. His past positions include Policy Director at the Center for Policy Alternatives and Legislative Counsel of Montgomery County, MD.

Barine B. Teekate-Yorbe is from the oil-rich Ogoni region of Nigeria. In 1992, she joined the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), a non-violent movement established by Ken Saro-Wiwa to oppose the environmental destruction ofOgoniland by the Shell Oil Company. In recognition of her leadership, she was elected Coordinator and later National Vice President ofthe Federation ofOgoni Women Association. She is now in exile in the United States.

Wyatt Tee Walker is .President of The American Committee on Africa and a Trustee of The Africa Fund. He has a long history in the U.S. civil rights struggle and has linked that to support for African struggles for human rights and economic justice. He led a delegation to South Africa to observe the historic 1994 election that ended apartheid and was a special guest at the inauguration of President Nelson Mandela. He is Senior Pastor of Canaan Baptist Church of Christ in New York's Harlem community, where he has hosted such African leaders as Nelson Mandela, Namibian President Sam Nujoma and Hafsat Abiola, daughter ofMoshood Abiola, the imprisoned winner ofNigeria's 1993 presidential election.



Adotei Akwei Advocacy Director for Africa Amnesty International USA 304 Pennsylvania Ave., S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003

Dr. Lascelles Anderson Center for Urban Educational

Research & Development University of Chicago 1040 W. Harrison Street (mc-147) Chicago, IL 60607-713 3

Kimberly August Emon Corporation 1400 Smith, EB652a Houston, TX 77002

Salih Booker Senior Fellow, Africa Studies Program Council on Foreign Relations 1779 Massachusetts A venue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20036

Lisa Brock Ida W. Wells Forum 9636 South Winston Chicago, IL 60643

Representative Charlie Brown Indiana House of Representatives 9439 Lake Shore Drive Gary, IN 46403

Representative Irma Hunter Brown Arkansas House of Representatives 1920 Summit Little Rock, AR 72202

Nancy Brown Women's Network- NCSL 15429 Overbrook Lane Stanley, KS 66224

Resource List

Paul E. Bryant The Gallup Organization 300 South 68th Street Place Lincoln, NE 68510

Sam Burrell Alderman, 29th Ward 5902 West North Avenue Chicago, IL 60639

Eloise Chevrier Wellington Avenue United Church of Christ 615 West Wellington Chicago, IL 60657

Basil Clunie Chicago Committee in Solidarity

with Southern Africa 1620 Dobson Street Evanston, IL 60202

Representative Spencer Coggs 3732 North 40th Street Milwaukee, WI 53216

Shirley A. Coleman Alderman, 16th Ward 1249 West 63rd Street Chicago, IL 60636

Scott Couper Africa Office United Church of Christ/Disciples of Christ P.O. Box 1986 Indianapolis, IN 46206-1986

Representative William Crawford Indiana House of Representatives 200 West Washington Street, Room 405 Indianapolis, IN 46024

Congressman Danny K. Davis 3333 West Arthington Chicago, IL 60624


Jennifer Davis Executive Director The Africa Fund 17 John Street, 12th Floor New York, NY 10038

Michael Dawson Director, Center for the Study of Race,

Politics & Culture University of Chicago 5835 S. Kimbark Ave Chicago, IL 60637

James Day Managing Director Strategic Planning Group, Inc. 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006

Representative Lois M. DeBerry Speaker Pro Tern, Tennessee House

of Representatives President, National Black Caucus of

State Legislators 15 Legislative Plaza Nasville, TN 37243

Michael Elliott United Auto Workers- Local #551 2821 Western A venue Park Forest, IL 60466-1802

Kweku Embil Chicago-Accra Sister Cities Community Chicago Sister Cities

International Program 78 East Washington Chicago, IL 60602

Michael Fleshman Human Rights Coordinator The Africa Fund 17 John Street, 12th Floor New York, NY 10038

Senator Jesus Garcia 2500 South St. Louis Chicago, IL 60623


Joan Gerig 1034 South Oakly Boulevard Chicago, IL 60612

Representative David Haley Kansas State Legislature 936 Cleveland A venue Kansas City, KS 66101-1226

I · Michael Han chard Northwestern University 339 East Chicago A venue Chicago, IL 60611

Dr. Cedric Herring Professor and Interim Director Institute for Research on Race

and Public Policy 400 South Peoria Street Suite 2100 ALH (M/C345) Chicago, IL 60466

Barbara Holt Alderman, 5th Ward 1817 East 71st Street Chicago, IL 60649

Eric Hudson Amnesty International USA 55 West Jackson Street, #1162 Chicago, IL 60604

Dr. Vincent ldemyor Movement for the Survival of

the Ogoni People 5305 South Drexel A venue Chicago, IL 60615

Reverend Jesse Jackson, Sr. Rainbow/PUSH Coalition 1002 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20007

Susie Johnson Director of Projects The Africa Fund 17 John Street, 12th Floor New York, NY 10038


Virgil E. Jones Alderman, 15th Ward 2358 West 63rd Street Chicago, IL 60636

Annie King Office Manager The Africa Fund 17 John Street, 12th Floor New York, NY 10038

Elaine Klemen Wellington A venue United

Church of Christ 615 West Wellington Chicago, IL 60657

Richard Knight Project Associate The Africa Fund 17 John Street, 12th Floor New York, NY 10038

Thubi H.A. Kolobe Forum for Southern Africans 1040 West Ontario Oak Park, IL 60302

Reverend Patricia Kyle North Indiana Conference

Board of Church & Society United Methodist Church 4240-2D Irish Hills Drive South Bend, IN 46614

Tilden LeMelle Chair The Africa Fund 17 John Street, 12th Floor New York, NY 10038

James Lewis Chicago Urban League 4510 South Michigan Chicago, IL 60653

Jeffrey Lewis Managing Director and General Counsel DST Catalyst, Inc. 33 North La Salle Street, Suite 1900 Chicago, IL 60602-2604

Vernita A. Lewis Institute for Research on Race


Gary L. Loster Mayor - City of Saginaw 1315 South Washington Saginaw, MI 48601

William Martin Co-Chair Association of Concerned Africa Scholars University ofillinois 702 South Wright Urbana, IL 6180 1

Gaston Mbateng CGM Data and Services 274 Loveland Drive Glendale Heights, IL 60139

Dr. John Metzler Professor African Studies Center Michigan State University East Lansing, MI 48824-1035

Senator Gwendolyn S. Moore Wisconsin State Senate P.O. Box 7882 321 N.E. State Capitol Madison, WI 53707-7882

Representative Johnnie Morris-Tatum Wisconsin State Assembly State Capitol P.O. Box 8953 Madison, WI 53708-8953

Prexy Nesbitt 502 Jackson Boulevard Oak Park, IL 60304-1402

Reverend Dr. Thanda Ngcobo Trinity United Church of Christ 532 West 95th Street Chicago, IL 60628-1196

Page 3

Linda Noonan-Ngwane Southern Africa Network Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 5454 South Shore Drive, #734 Chicago, IL 60615

Zolani Noonan-Ngwane Southern Africa Network Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 5454 South Shore Drive, #734 Chicago, IL 60615

Reverend Mangedwa Nyathi Hartford Memorial Baptist Church 18700 James Couzens Drive Detroit, MI 48235

Senator Barack Obama Illinois State Senate 2125 East 71 st Street Chicago, IL 60649

Dr. Stella U. Ogunwole Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 8765 West Higgins Road Chicago, IL 60631

Emmanuel W. Onunwor Mayor - City of East Cleveland 14340 Euclid A venue East Cleveland, OH 44112

Dr. Alice Palmer Professor Institute for Research on Race


Edward Palmer Institute for Research on Race


Senator Mary Panzer Wisconsin State Senate P.O. Box 7882 Madison, WS 53707-7882


Brian Pawlowicz Eli Lilly and Company 8725 West Higgins, Suite 810 Chicago, IL 60631

Representative Coy Pugh Illinois State Legislature 1210 North Pulaski Road Chicago, IL 60651

David Robinson Deputy Clerk . Cook County Board of Commissioners 118 North Clark Street, Suite 3M Chicago, IL 60602

Harold Rogers Professor, City College of Chicago Executive Director, Coalition of.

Black Trade Unionists 6756 South Shore Drive Chicago, IL 60640

Carlle Roux Consul South African Consulate General 200 South Michigan A venue, Suite 600 Chicago, IL 60604

Congressman Bobby L. Rush 655 East 79th Street Chicago, IL 60619-3036

Mlulami Singapi Vice-Consul South African Consulate General 200 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 600 Chicago, IL 60604

Senator Virgil Clark Smith Michigan Senate P.O. Box 30036 Lansing, MI 48913

Robert Stumberg The Harrison Institute for Public Law Georgetown University Law Center 111 F Street, N.W., Suite 102 Washington, D.C. 20001-2095

r


Representative Vernon Sykes (Mrs. Barbara Sykes) Ohio House of Representatives 615 Diagonal Road Akron, OH 44320

Barine Teekate-Yorbe Movement for the Survival of

the Ogoni People 1306 34th Street, Apartment 27 Des Moines, Iowa 50311-2722

Evalyn Tennant Administrator Center for the Study of Race,

Politics & Culture University of Chicago 5835 South Kimbark Chicago, IL 60637

Carol Thompson 2021 West Hutchinson Chicago, IL 60618

Senator Donne E. Trotter 2954 East 32nd Street Chicago, IL 60617

Representative Arthur Turner Illinois State Legislature 3849 West Ogden Chicago, IL 60623

Reverend Dr. Wyatt Tee Walker President American Commmittee on Africa 17 John Street, 12th Floor New York, NY 10038

Dr. William E. Ward Mayor - City of Chesapeake P.O. Box 15225 Chesapeake, VA 23328

Valerie C. Wells Durban/Chicago Sister City Committee 2856 East 79th Street Chicago, IL 60649

•.

Anthony Whitmore Regional Representative Governor's Regional Economic

Development Office One South Main Street, Suite 2060 Dayton, OH 45402-2016

Standish E. Willis Chicago Conference of Black Lawyers 343 South Dearborn, Suite 604 Chicago, IL 60604

Page 5

The Africa Fund

17 John Street • New York, NY 10038 • (212) 962-1210 Fax: (212) 964-8570 • E-mail: [email protected]

Tilden ]. LeMelle, Chairman Jennifer Davis, Executive Director

A FRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT (H.R. 1432) Sponsors: Congressmen Phil Crane, Jim McDermott and Charles Rangel

While there appears to be wide support for the African Growth and Opportunity Act, this may only reflect the lack of careful analysis on what this bill means in practice for both the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa. While dozens of Atrican ambassadors and other government leaders have publicly endorsed this bill, several African critics believe that the legislation fails to adequately address Africa's debt problems, poverty and overall economic crisis.

These critics are joined by numerous NGOs with experience of conditions on the continent. They stress that opening markets by themselves will not produce economic development and lower trade barriers for African goods entering the United States will produce no benefit for most African states that are not in a position to export significant amounts of goods to the United States. They are backed by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Dvelopment economists who note that there is no simple relationship between trade liberalization and poverty.

The Africa Fund is currently making a critical assessment of the bill which takes a wide range of perspectives into account. Belov,r is a summary of some of the pros and cons we have identified to date.

Some Positive Aspects of the Bill

*Recognizes the need for poverty reduction.

The preamble of the Bill acknowledges the need to "promote stable and sustainable growth and development in Sub-Saharan Africa" and "to reduce poverty and increase employment among the poor." Further, it recognizes the importance of the provision of basic health and education for poor citizens, increased market and credit facilities for small farmers and producers and improved economic opportunities for women as entrepreneurs and employees.

*Supports regional integration.

The Bill supports regional economic integration efforts in Africa, an important step in creating larger and more viable regional markets on the continent.

*Encourages more American-Af rican trade and investment linkages.

The Bill would create equity funds for use by American businesses willing to invest in Africa and would formalize meetings between African and American government officials through the creation of the United States-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum. This diversification of trade and investment linkages for both the United States and Africa is a potentially useful step for enhancing economic growth in both regwns.

Established by The American Committee on Africa, 1966. Contributions are tax-deductible.

Some Serious Problems with the Bill

* Only helps a small number of countries.

The Bill would only help a relatively small number of countries that are at the level of economic development to take advantage of the major incentives in the legislation; it could potentially threaten regional trade initiatives. Hence, trade concessions are in fact quite minor because most African countries are not at a point where they can take serious advantage of the GSP tariffs.

*Backs Structural Adjustment Programs that deepen poverty.

The Bill imposes stringent criteria for participation and some of these criteria contradict the aim of alleviating poverty. For example, the Bill requires adherence to the International Monetary Fund' s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), even though these programs have been responsible for major cutbacks in the provision of health and education to the poorest citizens. Even James Wolfensohn, current President of the World Bank, recently admitted this in his November 5, 1997 discussion with Cardinal Roger Mahoney, Archbishop ofLos Angeles.

In fact, SAPs have transferred the cost of adjusting the economy to the poorest, particularly women and children, and need to be rethought. This has been well documented by numerous scholars as well as UNICEF.

* Makes no firm commitment on debt reduction.

The Bill acknowledges that crippling debt is a serious hindrance to economic growth on the continent and recommends, in non-binding language, support for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) of the IMF/World Bank. However, the HIPC imposes extremely harsh conditions.

Even the few heavily indebted countries considered for debt relief will have to continue to commit to structural adjustment for six years before they will be considered for assistance in the HIPC. The cost of this wait in terms oflives lost to preventable diseases and children's missed education is immense. For example, the debt service payments for Uganda in 1996 amounted to $184 million or more than one third of Government revenue. This sum represents twelve times as much per person spent on primary health, and nine times as much spent on primary and secondary education.

In The Economisr ofF ebruary 21 , 1998, Gordon Brown, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a striking plea for more flexibility in implementing the HIPC. He cites Mozambique as a test case of the international community's commitment to debt relief. It is a country that has struggled to reform - it spends twice as much on servicing its debt than on basic services. Even then the burden of debt is so great that Mozambique manages to service only one third of its obligations!

There is a growing understanding, then, that effective Africa policy will require complementary initiatives to reduce Africa's debt. which currently exceeds $314 Billion. Yet the Bill hardly deals with this situation. This is true even though efforts to promote private investment cannot be successful within the context of this persisting debt crisis.

The United States at present continues to use its influence to delay implementation of debt reduction under the HIPC. This Initiative. while a move in the right direction, still fails to address the debt problem of the majority of African countries. Fundamentally, the development of a self-reliant African economy involves mobilizing knowledge, skills and energy. Such development cannot occur until the G-7 countries and international financial

institutions dramatically reduce Africa's debt and free up resources for health, education and the productive capacity of local people. The vague language in the Bill does not yet suggest that the U.S. is serious in it' s commitment to debt reduction.

*Ignores unequal playing ground, especially in agriculture.

While free trade may be a good way of promoting growth, to achieve greater equity it requires a relatively level playing ground. As the Bill admits, the playing ground between the United States and Africa is grossly unequal.

owhere is this problem more important than in the realm of agriculture. The average American farmer gets $14, 000 worth of subsidies a year. Contrast this to the average African farmer, who is most likely to be a woman and who receives no subsidy or worse, actually suffers from government interference in local markets.

While internal agricultural liberalization would be a good thing, the reduction of tariffs on American agricultural products would likely result in dumping. Dumping would cause the fall of local prices hurting the majority of small-scale African farmers. The net result, then, would be lower food production locally and increased dependency of foreign imports. This means less food security and more dependency for the continent, not the "economic self-reliance" that the Bill claims as a goal.

*Provides no mechanism for ensuring adequate labor and environmental standards are maintained.

Adherence to acceptable environmental and labor standards are not part of the eligibility requirements for African countries to participate in this Initiative. Thus, this Bill misses an opportunity to apply pressure to improve these standards in Africa, where repression of labor and disregard for basic environmental standards are not uncommon.

Prepared by Jackie Klopp and Susie Johnson.

The Africa Fund

17 John Street • New York, NY 10038 • (212) 962·1210 Fax: (212) 964-8570 • E-mail: [email protected]

H.R. 1786 THE NIGERIA DEMOCRACY ACT

Tilden J . LeMelle, Chairman Jennifer Davis, Executive Director

Over 100 million people are enduring injustice and oppression at the hands of a brutal military dictatorship in the oil-rich west African country of Nigeria. The Nigerian military annulled the results of the Presidential election in 1993 and seized power, installing General Sani Abacha at the head of a military government.

Thousands of people, including the democratically-elected President, have been imprisoned without trial. Nigeria 's democratic Constitution has been suspended, stripping the Nigerian people oftheir most basic human and civil rights. In this wealthy nation, nearly 40 percent of Nigerian children suffer from malnutrition and the diseases of acute poverty. Condemnations of the dictatorship come from such organizations as Amnesty International and the United Nations Human Rights Commission and world leaders from Nelson Mandela to Bill Clinton.

There is one piece of legislation before Congress that addresses the human rights situation in Nigeria. H.R. 1786, the Nigerian Democracy Act, was introduced in Congress by Representative Donald Payne (D-NJ) and Representative Amory Houghton (R-NY). This Bill would impose economic and diplomatic sanctions against the military government. The Bill's sponsors report that many Nigerian pro-democracy, human rights and religious leaders have called for sanctions to weaken the dictatorship . They note that oil sales to the United States and other Western countries generate 95 percent ofNigeria' s hard currency earnings and over 80 percent of government revenue . The Bill' s key prov isions include :

• A ban on new U.S. corporate investment in Nigeria, including the strategic energy sector; • A ban on U.S. arms sales; • Denial of visas to members of the military government; • A ban on direct air travel between the United States and Nigeria; • Denial of U.S. economic aid except for human rights and democracy programs; • A freeze on the personal assets of members of the regime; and • l'. S. opposition to loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and a cutoff of American trade loans and guarantees.

The following Members of Congress are currently co-sponsoring the Nigeria Democracy Act: Neil Abercrombie (D-HI); Gary Ackerman (D-NY); Rod Blagojevich (D-IL); Douglas Bereuter (R-NE); Howard L. Berman (DCA); Corrine Brown (D-FL); Sherrod Brown (D-OH); Steve Chabot (R-OH); W illiam Clay (D-MO); John Conyers, Jr. (D-rv1I); Willia m J. Coyne (D-PA); E lijah Cummings (D-MD); Rosa DeLauro (D-CT); Ronald Dellums (D-CA); Eliot L. Engel (D-NY); Anna G. Eshoo (D-CA); Eni Faleomavaega (D-AS); Sam Farr (D-GA); Chaka Fattah (D-PA); Bob Filner (D-CA); Barney Frank (D-MA); E lizabeth F urse (D-OR); Henry Gonzalez (D-TX); Luis Gutier r ez (D-IL); Amory Houghton (R-NY); Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX); J oseph P. Kennedy (D-MA); Dennis J . K ucinich (D-OH); Tom Lantos (D-CA); Thomas Manton (D-NY); Cynthia McKinney (DGA); George M iller (D-CA); James P. Moran (D-VA); Richard E. Neal (D-MA); E leanor Holmes No r ton (DOC); John Olver (D-MA); M ajor Owens (D-NY) ; Donald Payne (D-NJ) ; Nancy Pelosi (D-CA); J ohn Edward Porter (R-IL): Lynn A. Rivers (D-MI); Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA); Bobby L. Rush (D-IL); Bernard Sanders (1-VT); Christopher Shays (R-CT); Louise M. Slaughter (D-NY); Christopher Smith (R-NJ); James M. Talent (R-MO); Esteban Tor res (D-CA); Nydia Vehizquez (D:NY); Maxine Waters (D-CA); Henry A. Waxman (DCA); Lynn Woolsey (D-CA).

February 28, 1998.

Established by The American Committee on Africa, /966. Contributions are tax-deductible.

Repression in Nigeria

·'The human rights record remained dismal. Throughout the year, [Nigerian General Sani] Abacha 's Government relied regularly on arbitrary detention and harassment to silence its most outspoken critics. The winner of the annulled Presidential election, Chief Moshood K. A biola, remained in prison on charges of treason, as did prominent politician Olu Falae, pro-democracy activist Fredrick Fasehun and several others. Security forces committed extrajudicial killings and used excessive force to quell anti-government protests as well as to combat crime, resulting in the death and injury of many individuals, including innocent civilians. Security forces tortured and beat suspects and detainees. There were many reports of sexual abuse of female suspects and prisoners by the security forces. Prison conditions remained life threatening; many prisoners died in custody. Security services continued routine harassment of human rights and pro-democracy groups, including labor leaders, journalists and student activists.

"Citizens do not have the right to change their government by peaceful means. Despite the announced timetable for a transition from military to multiparty rule, there was little progress toward democracy.

'" Other human rights problems include infringements on freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, travel, workers rights and violence and discrimination against women."

Nigeria Country Report on Human Rights Practices

U.S. Department of State January 30, 1998

'·Jam constantly contacted by African-American ministers, heads of organizations and business people on [Nigerian ruler Sani Abacha's} behalf They say he is doing for Nigeria what no one else is doing. And I almost always ansv.;er 'yeah, in the name of dictatorship. ' We are allowing them to advance the wrong leaders, leaders that are not about democracy, leaders that are killing people."

Congresswoman Maxine Waters Chair, Congressional Bla~k Caucus

April19, 1997

"!join with freedom-loving people in New York, our nation and around the world in telling the Nigerian military that we >rill not ignore or forge t the needless and unjust slaughter that for too long has characterized their rule; that we will not ignore or forget their continued disregard for human life and democratic principles. General Abacha. like too many Nigerian military rulers before him, shuns democratic rule and does not hesitate to enforce his ryranny by unleashing his military hardware against unarmed, impoverished, innocent civilians. ,.

Former New York City Mayor David Dinkins September 17, 1997


The Africa Fund, 17 J ohn Street, 12th Floor, New York, New York 10038

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