microsoft-yahoo search business case

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Analyzing decision of the European Commission Microsoft | Yahoo! Search Business Competition, Strategy, and Institutions Yulia AN | Yulia MIRONOVA

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EU Commision's decision on M&A of Microsoft and Yahoo Search Businesses

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  • Analyzing decision of the European Commission

    Microsoft | Yahoo! Search Business

    Competition, Strategy, and Institutions Yulia AN | Yulia MIRONOVA

  • Decision of European CommissionMarket overviewPositive effectsNegative effectsPost-transaction analysisConclusion

  • European Commission

    Parties

    Microsoft Yahoo!

    Online web-wide algorithmic search

    Search advertising businesses including online search advertising platform Panama.

    Internet search platform, Bing. Online search advertising

    platform, adCenter.

    Online Services Business division

  • European Commission

    Subject 10-year exclusive license to Yahoo's search technologies.

    Yahoo internet search and search advertising staff.

    Microsoft as the exclusive internet search and search advertising provider used by Yahoo.

    12% of the search revenues generated on Yahoos and its partners' websites during the first five years of the agreement will go to Mirosoft.

    Rest 88% will go to Yahoo as a traffic acquisition cost.

  • European Commission

    Decision

    Horizontal Merger approved

  • European Commission

    Market overviewPositive effectsNegative effectsPost-transaction analysisConclusion

  • Organic web search

    Search-based advertising

    Non-search-based advertising

    Contextual

    Text

    Contextual Non-context

    Text Display Display

    Adapted from European Commission (2008)

    Market overview

  • 010

    20

    30

    40

    50

    60

    2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

    Paid search Display Classified

    Source: ZenithOpen

    Market overview

  • Advertisers

    Users

    Market overview

  • AUZero-price consr

    aint

    Auction bidding:

    Generalized Second-Price

    Market overview

  • AU~ Single-homing

    ~ Multi-homing

    Market overview

  • Market overview

    Production costs Switching costs

  • Market overview

    Production costs Switching costs

    Highly specific fixed costs Negligible variable costs Sunk

  • Market overview

    Hardware (USD 1 000 mln) Human capital (USD 1 000 mln) Server infrastructure IP patents Algorithm development Algorithm update R&D

    Production costs Switching costs

    Highly specific fixed costs Negligible variable costs Sunk

  • Market overview

    Production costs Switching costs

    High Low Highly specific fixed costs Negligible variable costs Sunk

  • Market overview

    One click away

    Production costs Switching costs

    High Low Highly specific fixed costs Negligible variable costs Sunk

    Credence good

  • Market overview

    One click away

    Production costs Switching costs

    High Low Highly specific fixed costs Negligible variable costs Sunk

    Credence good

    Network externalities

  • Market overview

    One click away

    Production costs Switching costs

    High Low Highly specific fixed costs Negligible variable costs Sunk

    Credence good

    Network externalities

    High entry barriers

  • Market overview

    One click away

    Production costs Switching costs

    High Low Highly specific fixed costs Negligible variable costs Sunk

    Credence good

    Network externalities

    High entry barriers

    High market concentration

  • Market overview

    GoogleYahoo! BingOther

    UK France Germany

    Ireland Italy SpainDigital Clarity. (2011). Yahoo & Bing Search Engine Merger. Available at http://www.digital-clarity.com/blog/search-engines/yahoo-bing-search-engine-merger/

    92% 94,76% 95,69%

    94,67% 97,54% 96,96%

  • European Commission Market Overview

    Positive effectsNegative effectsPost-transaction analysisConclusion

  • Microsoft Yahoo!

    Economies of scale Reduction of costs

    Positive effects

  • Microsoft Yahoo!

    Economies of scale Reduction of costs

    Rationalisation of operational costs Stronger competitor to Google Greater value to advertisors

    Positive effects

  • European Commission Market overview Positive effects

    Negative effectsPost-transaction analysisConclusion

  • Merger

    Advertisers

    UsersPublishers

    Distributors

  • Merger

    Advertisers

  • Merger

    Advertisers

    Increased cost per click (CPC) increased bidder density for

    particular keywords

  • Merger

    Users

  • Merger

    Users

    reduction of variety of choice degradation of organic search unilateral effect

  • Merger

    Publishers

  • Merger

    Publishers

    increased competition among publishers reduced competition between the remaining

    advertising platforms lower prices paid for publishers web space

  • MergerDistributors

  • MergerDistributors

    reduced competition between search platforms for distribution agreements

    increased Microsofts ability to leverage its market power in areas other than online advertising

  • European Commission Market overview Positive effects Negative effects

    Post-transaction analysisConclusion

  • 0,00%10,00%

    20,00%30,00%40,00%50,00%60,00%70,00%80,00%90,00%

    100,00%

    July 2009 April 2014

    AOL, Inc.

    Ask Network

    Microsoft sites

    Yahoo! sites

    Google sites

    Post-transaction analysis

    64,7% 67,6%

    19,3% 10%

    8,9% 18,7%

    Total U.S. search market share Home & Work Locations (2009, 2014). ComScore Explicit Core Search Share Report. comScore qSearch

  • Post-transaction analysis

    10%13%

    22%

    37%

    -10%

    14%

    -20%

    -10%

    0%

    10%

    20%

    30%

    40%

    Impressions ClickthroughRate

    Cost-Per-Click

    Yahoo! Bing Network Google

    U.S. Percentage change of the main search market indicators of Yahoo! Bing Network and Google on a year-over-year basis (Q4 2011 Q4 2012)

    Marin Software. (2012). Online Advertising Report, October-December 2012

  • Post-transaction analysis

    Consumer surplus under normalized network benefit parameters

    Iurkov, V. (2013). Competition, mergers and exclusive dealing in two-sided markets with zero-price constraints: The case of search engines. Universita CaFoscari Venezia.

  • Post-transaction analysis

    Total welfare under normalized network benefit parameters

    Iurkov, V. (2013). Competition, mergers and exclusive dealing in two-sided markets with zero-price constraints: The case of search engines. Universita CaFoscari Venezia.

  • Post-transaction analysis

    A merger between two platforms leads to a slight decrease in consumer surplus and total welfare, but to an increase in total platform profits.However, as t , consumer surplus and total welfare tend to be equal under no merger and merger configurations.

    Iurkov, V. (2013). Competition, mergers and exclusive dealing in two-sided markets with zero-price constraints: The case of search engines. Universita CaFoscari Venezia.

  • European Commission Market overview Positive effects Negative effects Post-transaction analysis

    Conclusion

  • Discussion

  • ReferencesPhotography of Microsoft Office by Jeff Wong, www.jeffwongdesign.com/2013/10/microsoft-office-interior