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Marine Policy 32 (2008) 941–955

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Managing by principle: A critical analysis of the European principles ofIntegrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM)

John McKennaa,�, Andrew Coopera,1, Anne Marie O’Haganb,2

aCentre for Coastal and Marine Research, School of Environmental Sciences, University of Ulster, Coleraine BT52 1SA, Northern Ireland, UKbCoastal and Marine Resources Centre, University College Cork, Haulbowline, Cobh, Co. Cork, Ireland

Received 7 September 2007; received in revised form 16 November 2007; accepted 3 February 2008

Abstract

A set of eight principles is contained in the European Recommendation on Integrated Coastal Zone Management. The principles have

been adopted with the minimum of critical review. The six core principles form two groups, one concerned with strategic goals and one

that has a local focus. The principles are presented as a menu of free-standing options, with no prioritization either within or between

groups. This can produce irreconcilable differences in strategy. The principles require clarification, prioritization of the strategic

principles and recognition that they are an indivisible integrated set which should not be used to select principles to advance a particular

agenda.

r 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: European principles of ICZM; Incompatibility; Strategic versus local conflicts

1. Introduction

It is not uncommon for a set of principles to beestablished in order to guide decision-making and to assistpolicy formulation. Juda [1] extracted a list of seven‘‘heavily cited’’ generic principles from the literature oncoastal and ocean management and a body of national andinternational law. Examples of sets of principles includethose reported for international ocean governance [2]and those established to steer sustainable development inthe UK [3].

The Recommendation concerning the implementation ofIntegrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in Europe[4] states that, in formulating national strategies for coastalmanagement and measures based on these strategies,Member States ‘‘should follow the principles of integratedcoastal management to ensure good coastal zone manage-ment, taking into account the good practices identified,

ee front matter r 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

arpol.2008.02.005

ing author. Tel.: +4428 70324055; fax: +44 28 70324911.

resses: j.mckenna@ulster.ac.uk (J. McKenna), jag.coo-

k (A. Cooper), a.ohagan@ucc.ie (A.M. O’Hagan).

70324429; fax: +44 28 70324911.

1 4703100; fax: +353 21 4703132.

inter alia, in the Commission’s demonstration programmeon integrated coastal zone management’’ (p. 25). Thisprogramme ran from 1996 to 1999 [5] and during it athematic Expert Group observed its 35 projects, and fromthem distilled eight principles that should form the basis ofeffective coastal zone management [6–8]. Chapter II of theRecommendation (p. 25) lists these principles. They aregiven as they appear in the Recommendation below:

(a)

a broad overall perspective (thematic and geographic)which will take into account the interdependence anddisparity of natural systems and human activities withan impact on coastal areas;

(b)

a long-term perspective which will take into accountthe precautionary principle and the needs of presentand future generations;

(c)

adaptive management during a gradual process whichwill facilitate adjustment as problems and knowledgedevelop. This implies the need for a sound scientificbasis concerning the evolution of the coastal zone;

(d)

local specificity and the great diversity of Europeancoastal zones, which will make it possible to respond totheir practical needs with specific solutions and flexiblemeasures;

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(e)

working with natural processes and respecting thecarrying capacity of ecosystems, which will makehuman activities more environmentally friendly, so-cially responsible and economically sound in the longrun;

(f)

involving all the parties concerned (economic andsocial partners, the organizations representing coastalzone residents, non-governmental organizations andthe business sector) in the management process, forexample by means of agreements and based on sharedresponsibility;

(g)

support and involvement of relevant administrativebodies at national, regional and local level betweenwhich appropriate links should be established ormaintained with the aim of improved coordination ofthe various existing policies. Partnership with andbetween regional and local authorities should applywhen appropriate;

(h)

use of a combination of instruments designed tofacilitate coherence between sectoral policy objectivesand coherence between planning and management.

2. Analysis and critique of the principles of ICZM

Since the publication of the Recommendation in 2002the principles have quickly become the standard againstwhich progress in ICZM in Europe is measured [9,10]. Inthis paper, we critically assess the principles and evaluatetheir potential to contribute to achievement of sustainableICZM strategies. The focus of the paper lies heavily on thelocal principles (described below) for two reasons. First, weview the strategic principles as largely non-controversialformulations of accepted sustainability concepts. Second,most of the more intractable problems associated with theprinciples result from the fact that the Recommendationaccords the local principles equal status with strategicconcerns. Within the local principles we look particularlyclosely at public participation because of its dominance inmany other national and European management andlegislative instruments, e.g. the planning process at nationallevel, EIA and SEA Directives at European level and mostrecently the Aarhus Convention at international level.Indeed, the perceived value of participation in ensuringaccountability, local democracy and stakeholder ‘‘buy–in’’is now so well entrenched that Fletcher ([11], p. 315) statesthat ‘‘inclusive participatory coastal management is theprevailing coastal decision-making paradigm in much ofthe world’’.

The authors’ experience with the interpretation andimplementation of the principles is derived from a numberof ICZM projects and initiatives. Firstly, experience wasgained from a major project in the European Demonstra-tion Programme in ICZM on which the Recommendationis based [12]. Subsequent to this, the authors continued towork with the local authority in that area on twosubsequent EU-funded projects on coastal management,

and also on a consultancy/advisory basis on perceivedproblematic issues in various areas of Ireland. While theDemonstration Programme took place at a pan-Europeanlevel, its component ICZM projects focused on specificlocal sites. The same can be said of other Europeanprojects, such as Corepoint. That project focuses on thenorth-west Europe region and has partners in sevenEuropean countries, each of which is ‘‘coupled’’ with alocal authority to advance implementation of ICZM.Therefore, even where a project forms part of a nationalor Europe-wide ICZM programme, it remains a free-standing entity rather than forming an element of anintegrated strategic programme. This local emphasis meansthat there is virtually no relevant literature that describesattempts to operationalize the European principles ofICZM at the strategic level.A central hypothesis of this paper is that effectively all

ICZM initiatives are implemented at the local level, hencean analysis of the principles must focus on that local scale.The strategic principles, outlined below, are effectivelyirrelevant as currently no ICZM projects take place at thathigher level. This is evidenced in the recent evaluation ofICZM in Europe which states that ‘‘integrated approachesto manage the interests in the coastal zone have beenscarcely implemented and were not strategically employed,except on a case study basis’’ ([10], p. 6). In addition, it hasbeen our observation that the day-to-day work of localauthorities is generally dictated by legislative responsibil-ities and duties. For this reason ICZM remains low on their‘‘to do list’’. Advocacy of essentially soft principles of goodcoastal management by the EC or other more localorganizations will rarely result in their implementation,especially if such principles conflict with each other (seebelow). For this reason, it is worthwhile to examine theprinciples in light of their ability to be successfullyimplemented. The authors’ views on the principles reflectthis varied experience.The eight principles cover a range of perspectives on

ICZM. They may, however, readily be divided into threegroups: the first group consists of two ‘procedural’principles, support and involvement of relevant administra-

tive bodies and use of a combination of instruments that arefocused on the attributes of the methods and proceduresthat might be used to best advance ICZM.The second group consists of three ‘strategic’ principles:

broad overall perspective, long-term perspective, and working

with natural processes. These principles mainly focus attentionon long-term goals, and fit easily into the sustainability ethosthat dominates contemporary environmentalism.The third group consists of three essentially ‘local’

principles: local specificity, adaptive management during a

gradual process, and involving all the parties concerned.These can be regarded as a balancing set to the secondgroup, because they focus interest on specific areas andproblems, encourage tailoring of management to localconditions and encourage the participation of the public informulating management policy.

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2.1. The procedural principles

The two procedural principles are focused on meansrather than aims. In some ways it is surprising that theseessentially methodological concepts have been elevated tothe status of principles. Since participation is covered inanother principle, it may be asked why it was considerednecessary to emphasize the support and involvement of

relevant administrative bodies. Participation is primarilyseen in terms of engagement with the general public andvoluntary groups, while this principle is directed specifi-cally towards formal administrative bodies. It was thoughtnecessary to include this as a specific goal because analysisof the Demonstration Programme projects revealed a verycomplicated division of administrative responsibilities. It isalso likely that the significance attached to the cooperationof other organizations reflects the origin of the principle inthe voluntary model of ICZM. Since the voluntary projectshave no inherent authority in their own right, it is deemedespecially important to include all sources of power andexecutive authority in the management effort. Within theexecutive authority organizations, gaining support from allinterested parties is not always straightforward because ofentrenched and opposing positions among competinginterest groups and their client government departments.Support may be perceived primarily in terms of theseauthorities being prepared to make their knowledge bank,expertize and experience available to the managementeffort. However, the latitude involved in defining ‘‘sup-port’’ and ‘‘involvement’’ offers much scope for fudgingthe issue on the part of authorities/interest groups who areambivalent or unenthusiastic about ICZM.

The tradition of European ICZM is that efforts arefocused on influencing the wide base of the power pyramid.This often leads to inefficiency and dilution of effort,because at these lower levels ability to implement initiativesis most constrained. Power within most statutory autho-rities is concentrated at the top. Therefore, ICZMinitiatives would benefit greatly from an explicit top-downtargeting of senior executives of those organizations withthe power to deliver change. It would also be advantageousto widen the concept of administrative authority to includethe authority attached to ownership, because progress inICZM requires the participation and cooperation ofprivate, corporate, government and NGO property owners.

Use of a combination of instruments is a poorly developedprinciple. Here again it can be asked how a basicallymethodological concept can be accorded such significancethat it appears in a list of fundamental principles. As withthe first procedural principle described above, the answermay lie in the genesis of the principles in the voluntarymodel of ICZM. These projects and partnerships tend to beweak because they lack a statutory basis. Therefore, it isconsidered advantageous to pursue management objectivesby using as wide a range of devices as possible, rangingfrom statutory power where it is available to voluntaryagreements where it is not. However, it is also probable

that this principle is aimed at preventing Governmentdepartments from using the absence of appropriate legalinstruments as an excuse to avoid any involvement inICZM.As stated in the Recommendation this principle does not

indicate preference for any particular instrument ofmanagement, but the formulation is probably at leastpartially driven by the traditional discomfort that thevoluntary ICZM projects have with the ‘big stick’approach of statutory diktat, perhaps because statutoryauthorities are sectoral in nature and therefore unable tooffer an integrated vision. ICZM projects prefer instead toachieve their goal of integration through voluntarycooperation. However, this is one of the weaknesses ofcontemporary non-statutory ICZM [13]. No Europeancountry yet has a fit-for-purpose, fully integrated, statutorymodel of ICZM. Thus, pragmatism must prevail, andcoastal managers should use what is available; if anadequate statutory instrument, sectoral or not, is availableto deal with a particular management issue it should beavailed of. The principle’s commitment to a combination ofinstruments as inherently ‘‘good’’ is to introduce unneces-sary complexity into management for the sake of ideolo-gical correctness; a combination of instruments is notnecessary if one will do. This principle would have beenbetter expressed in the wording used later in Chapter IV ofthe Recommendation (p. 26) when discussing nationalstrategies: ‘‘identify the appropriate mix of instruments forimplementation of the principles’’.

2.2. The strategic principles

The strategic principles have much to commend them interms of their ability to contribute to a sustainable coastalstrategy. As guides to the development of strategy, it is notsurprising that they consider large spatial or temporalscales or a multi-sectoral perspective. The principle oftaking a long-term perspective explicitly requires that theprecautionary principle be taken into account and, albeitless directly, taking a broad overall perspective has similarconnotations. Nevertheless, it is surprising that the well-established precautionary principle is not stated as aprinciple in its own right. Taking a long-term perspectiveencourages the development of strategy that considersfuture generations and the long-term implications ofcontemporary management decisions. It avoids short-termism.

Broad overall perspective counsels that every conceivablefactor should be considered before reaching managementdecisions, and assumes that in doing so a productiveintegration will be the result. Of course, the more factorsthat are considered the more complex and difficultdecisions become. The principle offers no guidance onthe importance that should be attached to any given factor,for example it has nothing to say on whether the ecologicaland coastal protection values represented by a saltmarshshould count for more or less than the economic

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development value represented by an industrial plantplanned to replace it (Fig. 1). However, in urging a holisticapproach it is encouraging wider consideration of theimplications of development than is currently the case inmany sectorally based decision-making systems.

Working with natural processes is a principle that hasstrong potential to contribute to sustainability; by identify-ing and understanding natural processes, it will be possibleto undertake coastal activities in such a way as to avoiddamaging measures. The corollary (of resisting or alteringnatural processes) implies an ongoing intervention withassociated costs, both economic and environmental. Thereare circumstances in which it will not be possible to avoidinterference with natural processes; ports require to bedredged for navigation purposes, and strategic infrastruc-ture must be protected (Fig. 2). However, working withnature could, for example, enable sustainable fishingpractices and require minimal expenditure on coastaldefences.

2.3. The local principles

The three local principles contrast with the strategic onesin taking a small spatial or temporal perspective, andtherefore being non-strategic. This might seem unusual forprinciples designed to aid development of strategy, but theyvery much reflect the current ethos of bottom-up,participatory, consensus-based approaches in ICZM[14–16].

Local specificity is, at least in theory, a sensiblepolicy objective. It allows management to be tailoredto local physical, economic and socio-cultural conditions,and avoids the problems caused when ‘one size fits all’

Fig. 1. Petrochemical plant in a saltmarsh, Huelva, Andalucia, Spain. The econ

coastal habitat.

approaches are attempted. At local level, adaptive manage-ment and participatory planning can be seen simply asillustrations of local specificity in action. Local specificityallows coastal areas with particular character, whether this‘character’ take the form of a physical or social problem, atradition, a development ambition, or a visitor attractionto be managed sensitively with due regard to theirindividual characteristics. The downside of local specificityis that, in practice, it is too often used as an excuse forspecial pleading, a device to advance the self-interest ofindividuals or small groups at the expense of the publicgood or long-term sustainability (see later).The principle of involving all the parties concerned (often

called participatory planning) is already very much anintegral part of the work practices of many statutorybodies, e.g. local government planning departments. Theymay also have statutory consultees whose views must besought. The principle is included in European law, forexample in the Habitats Directive, Article 6 assessmentsrequire public consultation. Indeed, the philosophy ofpublic participation is now so deeply embedded that, in thecurrent climate, it would probably be impossible to get EU(or perhaps even national) funding for any environmentalmanagement proposal that did not include a stronglydeveloped public participation component.It may be argued that, on practical grounds, participatory

processes are required to give people a sense of ownershipof ICZM projects: without a local mandate initiatives willfail. The counter argument is that there are pre-existingdemocratic structures (in the UK, for example, they areparish councils, local councils and parliamentary constitu-encies) that exist to address the democratically expressedviews of their electorates. Elections give governments (local

omic advantages of industrial development are obtained at the expense of

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Fig. 2. Dungeness Nuclear Power Station, Kent, England. The plant is protected on its seaward side by an artificial gravel ridge. Defence of this kind of

infrastructure is usually non-controversial.

J. McKenna et al. / Marine Policy 32 (2008) 941–955 945

and national) a mandate to govern. The constant search fora yet more local mandate is a classic ICZM trait, apparentlyreflecting a view that the mandate granted to existing bodiesby their electorates is just a ‘‘mandate to seek moremandates’’. Participatory planning has, in some instances,been taken so far that it is viewed as an alternative toexisting democratic administrative structures. If implemen-ted beyond sensible boundaries public participation can bean expensive, inefficient and time-consuming process. Inaddition, the search for consensus that is typical of ICZMparticipatory exercises often leads to a focus on relativelyminor matters leaving the larger more intractable problemsuntouched [13,17]. Consensus outcomes are rarely envir-onmentally optimum or even environmentally sustainable.

It may be asked whether participation exercises exert anyreal influence on policy formulation or its implementation.Even when carried out by a statutory body, participationmay be little more than an exercise in public relations, asthe authority continues to pursue its own pre-existingagenda. Public opinion will always get a hearing, but it iseasy for an authority to ignore it by citing obstacles of cost,legality or administrative complexity. Managers can claimthat they welcome and encourage participation whileignoring or selectively interpreting its outcomes. Acomparison can be made here with the attitude oftenadopted towards statutory consultees. They must beconsulted, but their opinions do not have to be taken intoaccount. The consultation box is ticked and effectively thatis all that is required. An important factor encouragingthis minimalist response is what Cook [18] calls the‘‘consultation overload’’ faced by many local authoritiesas they struggle to meet central government demands in a

variety of policy fields, and often with unrealistically shortschedules for completion.The effectiveness of participation may be particularly

constrained in the case of the voluntary coastal partner-ships because they lie ‘outside the loops’ of power andinfluence of the statutory bodies where decision-makingpowers rest. Regardless of how well its internal participa-tory ‘cogs’ mesh, a voluntary partnership as a unit does notnecessarily mesh effectively with the external organizationsthat have the statutory remit, power and recurrent fundingto actually bring about real change. Participation of all thestakeholders in a given area may be a means of collatingviews and understanding different perspectives, but there isfrequently a disconnect between anything agreed in thesebodies and the (usually sectorally based) statutory agenciesresponsible for management. Participation may generatean illusion of influence, a false ‘‘feel-good factor’’, becausestakeholders feel that they are being listened to. However,feelings of empathy and solidarity with like-minded peopleshould not be confused with the ability to bring about realchange in the way the coast is managed. Participation maybe an imperative in the voluntary sector not because itfacilitates change, but because voluntary bodies need thelegitimacy and proxy power it confers in the absence of thereal power associated with statutory authority or owner-ship. Unless agreements reached through participationbecome part of statutory management practice, theparticipation will have been ineffective. However, nostatutory body will, or could, allow itself to be tied to thedecision-making process of a non-statutory body. This isthe inescapable and fundamental weakness of the partici-pation aspects of the voluntary coastal projects and

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partnerships. (A recent European directive now providesfor public participation in some aspects of environmentaldecision-making, for example in the context of EIAprocedures. However, this does not strengthen the projectsper se.)

While the reluctance of statutory bodies to take accountof public opinion can sometimes be correctly attributed totheir own inertia and other institutional failings, authoritiessometimes have good reason to be wary of agreedoutcomes. It is unrealistic to expect those involved in aparticipatory process to see issues from any other than alocal perspective. Powerful stakeholders will often push theconsensus position towards their own interest, and if thisself-interest is threatened they may withdraw from theprocess. Local self-interest may not always be in the publicgood, which in a given case might be best promoted byadherence to the strategic principles.

An exaggerated focus on public participation canweaken broad-based organizations, and make them lesseffective pressure groups. The constraints of participation,and in particular the search for consensus, make it difficultto get agreement on anything other than generalities. Thiscreates a perception that the coastal partnerships arelightweight, and lack a cutting edge. In contrast, well-established players like the National Trust, Friends of theEarth, World Wildlife Fund, and specific user groups suchas sailing interests, may be more effective in exertingpressure on those with authority because they have afocused remit undiluted by the need for consensus among aplethora of interest groups. For example, in 2006 Friendsof the Earth in Northern Ireland took the lead in theultimately successful instigation of infraction proceedingsagainst the Department of the Environment (DOENI) atthe European Court of Justice over breach of Europeanwastewater Directives. The use by third-parties of legalprocedures in this way may be one of the few effective waysfor an NGO or voluntary body to influence or changegovernment policy, but it would be very difficult forbroadly based bodies committed to partnership decision-making to get all stakeholders to agree on such a radicalstrategy. In fact, the application of such societal safeguardsmay be weakened if consensus is a requirement forpursuing them.

In summary, participation can be a useful part of ICZM,but its role should be to influence and inform managementrather than replace it. The rules of engagement need to beset so that participants are not given unrealistic expecta-tions of their influence. In particular, the relationship withstatutory regulators and policy-makers should be clearlydefined. Use should be made of existing democraticstructures wherever possible. We believe that the mosteffective role of participation in ICZM is not as a deliverymechanism in itself, but as an aid to decision-making andregulation by competent authorities.

The principle of adaptive management during a gradual

process is superficially attractive, but the flexibility itdemands allows it to be interpreted in ways that are

insidious and dangerous. This is possible because theRecommendation does not prioritize the strategic princi-ples, leaving it open for various interests to use theprinciples as a menu of free-standing options, none deemedmore important than any other. A focus on individualprinciples, rather than on the group of principles, meansthat the Recommendation’s ‘‘containment’’ of the vitalprecautionary principle in long-term perspective only,actually weakens its potential control on the otherprinciples, especially adaptive management. However, theremay be a more fundamental reason why the precautionaryprinciple is not given more prominence in the ICZMRecommendation. The principle is only adumbrated in theEC Treaty and is not specifically defined. (In the few caseswhere it has been examined in the case law, it was in thecontext of public health.) It may be argued that theprecautionary principle is more firmly established ininternational law rather than EC law. Even if theprecautionary principle had been accorded the status of aprinciple in its own right, the failure to emphasize theintegrity of the set of principles rather than its componentswould greatly reduce its influence.Perversely, adaptive management can serve as cover for

actions that subvert and circumvent the precautionaryprinciple and all three strategic principles. This appears tohave occurred during the recent successful planningapplication to install a twin rotor tidal turbine in theStrangford Lough Narrows in County Down, NorthernIreland, one of the most heavily designated conservationsites in Europe. The developers make much of theirwillingness to adapt the turbine design as and whenproblems arise [19]. However, given the level of uncertaintyin a new untested technology, and the environmentalvalues of the site, this was surely a case where theprecautionary principle should have prevailed. Here, thedevelopers were greatly assisted by a UK governmentneed to meet its European obligation to reach a specifiedtarget of energy production from renewables. Indeed, theGovernment though the Department of Trade andIndustry is partly funding the project to the tune of£3.85M. It is hardly credible to argue that the indepen-dence of the planning process in Northern Ireland (run bythe regional Department of the Environment) is notcompromised when a central government department isso obviously supporting the project.At Strangford Lough, as at any important conservation

site, more and better information to improve strategicmanagement is always welcome. However, the conceptionof adaptive management that is used to support the tidalturbine proposal is a distorted one, because it is focused onthe needs of industry rather than on those of theenvironment. Here, adaptive management enables anindustrial enterprise to achieve an environmental compli-ance threshold set by a statutory body. It does this bykeeping the damage done to a heavily protected site belowa certain minimum level, but industry is the real beneficiaryof the process, because there would be no damage at all if

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the power generation industry had not been givenpermission to use a designated site.

True adaptive management is one where the environ-ment itself is the intended beneficiary. In this formulation,adaptive management is a deliberate strategy of experi-mentation with management strategies over time [20–22].Its goal is always to improve management in the face ofuncertainty by increasing the knowledge base. This knowl-edge is then fed back into the policy-making process whichadapts accordingly; it is management policy that adapts,not the nuts and bolts of a specific activity or project. Themotivation should always be to enhance management bymodifying current practice in the light of new informationand insights. An example comes from Scotland whereshellfish licences were originally awarded without therequirement of an EIA because the industry’s practiceswere assumed to be environmentally benign. Morerecently, studies have proven some deleterious effects, sothe extension of EIA requirements to shellfish farms maynow be considered (John Rosie, personal communication,2006) Indeed, the principle of adaptive management couldrequire the complete closure of an existing industry if newresearch indicated that its environmental impacts wereunacceptable. However, the principle is much more likelyto be applied to industry’s benefit. (Even the much-laudedHabitats Directive contains a caveat which allows dama-ging plans or projects to be carried out if it is judged thatthere is an over-riding social or economic public interest.)

Environment-centered adaptive management is thereforequite different from the ‘‘learning by doing’’ formulationwhich is used to allow profit-driven industries to locate onsensitive sites. Because it ultimately serves non-environ-mental goals, this approach encourages a minimalistattitude towards environmental compliance, i.e. industryhas no incentive to do more than the legal minimum, ratherthan the best it can do. Learning by doing is onlyacceptable if there are effective mechanisms for stoppinga project, but institutional inertia plus a concern aboutresources already invested and the legal rights of devel-opers once investment has begun, all act to hamper theprinciple in operation. In Strangford Lough the companybuilding the tidal turbine does regard the project as anexperiment, but it is a cost/benefit pilot experiment drivenby commercial interest, not an environmental managementexperiment driven by a desire to develop an improvedmanagement strategy for a prized site. If the emollient ofadaptive management can be used to allow economic needsto take precedence over natural values in StrangfordLough, the outlook elsewhere is grim if a similar nationalinterest argument is made. (As of June 2007, DOENI isagain facing European infraction proceedings over itsdecision to permit the tidal turbine.)

3. Local versus strategic principles

At first sight, the six core principles seem to be areasonable and balanced formulation of what ICZM

should be in order to deal with the acknowledged seriousthreats to the integrity of the European coast [23].However, the examples above demonstrate that there area number of problems associated with them. The mostintractable problems occur where there is incompatibilitybetween the strategic principles, which demand thatmanagement take a very wide view both spatially andtemporally, and the local principles which focus on thespecific needs of specific people in specific places. Thesedifferent perspectives see a problem in different ways andmay lead to opposing preferred ‘‘solutions’’, each of whichare compatible with a different principle. Already there arenumerous examples of interest groups invoking applicationof one or more of these ICZM principles in support of theirobjectives.A clear example of where the strategic and local

principles clash is when private properties are threatenedby coastal erosion. The village of Happisburgh on theNorfolk coast of England offers a relevant and highlypublicized case study (http://www.happisburgh.org.uk). Atthis site, people whose homes are at immediate risk fromrapid cliff retreat demand that Government come to theiraid by providing coastal defences and/or compensation. Inmaking these demands, individuals and pressure groupshave explicitly, and understandably, invoked the localprinciples of adaptive management and local specificity [24].The local principles, fortified by considerations of socialjustice, might suggest that Government intervention isjustified and perhaps even imperative.However, intervention carries many dangers and risks.

Where coastal defences are concerned, meeting the demandmay compromise the wider aim of maintaining a sustain-able coast. Construction of defences can create seriousproblems for other people (including future generations) atlarger and longer spatial and temporal scales, as coastalareas downdrift suffer sediment starvation and beacherosion. Indeed, close to Happisburg, sea defences erectedduring the 1990s at Sea Palling are already causing erosionof adjacent beach and dune systems [25]. Thus, futuregenerations of beach visitors, many of whom cannot affordto live at the coast, may be deprived of the sandy beachesand dunes they value so highly. Defences also requiremaintenance, and as sea levels rise and storms intensifythey will have to be strengthened at great and increasingcost to future taxpayers.It is relatively easy to make the strategic argument

against the construction of coastal defences by pointingout that, in many cases, construction or maintenance ofsuch structures is indefensible on environmental, cost-effectiveness and indeed social justice grounds. However,Kerby [24] writing from the perspective of residents inthe vulnerable settlement of Happisburgh, presents analternative local specificity argument in favor of compensa-tion. (The emphasis on compensation rather than defencein Kerby’s paper may reflect a growing belief that asystem of one-off payments presents a politically morepalatable option than demands for an open-ended financial

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commitment to defences.) On the face of it compensationcould offer a win/win solution that would give ‘socialjustice’ to those at risk, but would also conserve thestrategic principles focused on a sustainable coast becausethe coast is allowed to retreat naturally.

However, compensation schemes bring their own pro-blems. There are obvious negative implications for localand State finances, and the high costs raise issues of justiceto present and future taxpayers. The introduction of acompensation scheme or State-sponsored property insur-ance scheme (which amounts to the same thing) wouldcreate costly precedents, would distort the normal relation-ship between perceived risk and premiums in the insurancemarket, and could encourage development in high-riskareas. For example, the Federal Flood Insurance model inthe United States has been heavily criticized by Field andField ([26], p. 162) because it encourages inappropriatecoastal development; ‘‘Commercial insurance for propertyconstructed in the coastal zone would normally have suchhigh premiums, because of the expected losses from floods,that few coastal homeowners could afford it. The USgovernment, therefore, subsidizes coastal zone insurance sothat people building in these areas can get insurance atsubstantially less than commercial rates. The effects of thishave been to reduce the private monetary costs of buildingand maintaining houses in the coastal zone; so substantialdevelopment has occurred there, with attendant environ-mental impacts. A reduction in public subsidies to coastalhomeowners not only would reduce these environmentalimpacts but also would lead to an increase in nationalincome. Of course, coastal homeowners would sufferlosses’’.

Outside the EU, the issue of taxpayers’ contributions tosupport private coastal interests has been the focus ofvigorous debate. In North Carolina in USA many citizensobject strongly to taxpayer funding or subsidy of activitiessuch as beach nourishment (http://www.ncspin.com/scrat-chlog_archive_comments.php?id=00068), and the move-ment of private dwellings from the shoreline. Many ofthese cases highlight the dominant position of propertyowners’ rights over those of the public, at least in theperception of politicians [27,28].

It is inaccurate to claim that compensation is a readilyquantifiable, one-off (and therefore financially viable) callon the public purse. Where erosion is progressive, forexample along much of the Holderness and East Angliancoasts in England, the erosion envelope and hence thecompensation envelope will move landwards as the coastretreats. Houses not at risk today will be at risk in 100years time. As sea levels rise, and storms become morefrequent and more intense, coastal retreat will accelerate,which means that demands on any taxpayer-servicedcompensation fund will also increase sharply. It canbe argued that current calls for compensation are self-serving, because those making them rarely if ever considerthe problems posed by the shifting compensation zone;they tend to argue for a compensation zone perceived

as a static entity in which their own threatened propertyis located.Apart from the ubiquitous erosion case studies, there are

other examples where strategic principles are opposed bylocal considerations. For example, dredging of shippingchannels in and close to ports is an interference withnatural processes. Navigation buoys and lights and otherguidance systems cannot be moved easily, so if dredging isnot carried out commercial transportation by water, andactivities like fishing, would become impossible in manyareas and very dangerous in others, because of constantlyshifting channels. Piers and breakwaters present a hardreflective face to wave action and there are well-documen-ted examples where they have led to downdrift erosion andother negative consequences [29]. Nevertheless, water-borne commerce and recreation would be impossiblewithout this infrastructure (Fig. 3), and building alter-natives would be costly.A good deal of the power of the local principles comes

from their association in the minds of the public withconcepts of local democracy and accountability, serving tocounterbalance negative perceptions of an all-powerfulmonolithic state and its impersonal policy objectives. It istrue that arguments based on the local principles canappear persuasive at small spatial and temporal scales, butthey weaken steadily with increasing scale as strategic andsustainability concerns come to dominate decision-making[30]. Certainly some kind of balance must be struck, but ifdecision-making is too heavily influenced by the localprinciples the result could be a blinkered coastal manage-ment that does not take account of wider factors. The legaltruism that ‘‘hard cases make bad law’’ should be borne inmind, and national policy should be guided primarily bylarger and longer scale strategic considerations. Takenalone, the local principles, at best, take no account ofsustainability; at worst they actively militate against it.It cannot be claimed that the European Recommenda-

tion ignores the issue of strategic management, because thedocument is littered with references to strategy andstrategic concepts such as sustainability and climatechange. For example, Chapter IV (p. 26) entitled ‘‘Nationalstrategies’’ asks Member States to ‘‘develop a nationalstrategy or, where appropriate, several strategies, toimplement the principles for integrated management ofthe coastal zone’’. However, nowhere in the document is itclearly stated that the strategic principles per se should beregarded as priorities. There is clearly an awareness of thepotential local versus strategic tension in the two precursordocuments to the Recommendation, the Proposal [31] andthe Communication [32]. The Proposal (p. 4), whendiscussing the relative roles of the different administrativeactors in national strategies, states that, ‘‘this definition ofroles should ensure both adequate local control, and alsosufficient regional vision and consistency (especially inensuring that local administrations are not overly influ-enced by the short-term economic concerns of theirconstituents and neighbours’’. The Communication states

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Fig. 3. Carrickfergus Marina, County Antrim, Northern Ireland. Land reclamation, and the construction of piers and breakwaters interfere with natural

processes, but commercial and recreational water transport requires infrastructure.

J. McKenna et al. / Marine Policy 32 (2008) 941–955 949

in Annex 1 (p. 25) that local and strategic objectives ‘‘mustbe considered concurrently and equally’’. However, theseexhortations are no improvement on the Recommendationtext, because they are calls for balance and equality, andthus place local objectives on a par with strategic goals.They fall well short of what is required, viz. a clearstatement that the strategic principles have priority in bothpolicy and management because only they can deliver thevision of sustainability. The local principles should workwithin them as exceptions, or subsidiary decisions within awider framework. From an academic viewpoint, byprioritizing the principles it becomes possible to avoidneedless debate on the relative merits of the strategic orlocal principles, and also to rationalize exceptions. On thebasis of the existing Recommendation, it may not be legallypossible to prioritize at European level, but it could bedone at national or regional level.

4. Discussion

There has been a surprising lack of fundamental analysisof the principles of ICZM that appear in the EuropeanRecommendation of 2002. Despite this, in many instancesthere have been calls for their adoption in developingpolicy [33,34]. Most work done so far has dealt with howthey can be taught (for example, in the EU-INTERREGIII B Corepoint Project), and how one can test for theirimplementation [10,35,36] but the principles per se havereceived virtually no critical analysis.

While the principles have much to recommend them,there is a danger that they will become accepted asHoly Writ and consequently will not be subjected tocritical analysis. The fact that opposing principles havealready come head to head in management decisions withdifferent strategic or local outcomes prevailing, indicatesthe malleability of the set of principles to suit anycircumstance.A Recommendation allows the European institutions to

make their views known and to suggest a line of actionwithout imposing any legal obligation on those to whom itis addressed (the Member States, other institutions, or incertain cases the citizens of the Union). The ethos of aRecommendation, therefore, is advice and persuasion, notprescriptive statement or even the ranking or prioritizationof suggested actions. Recommendations tend to be ‘‘wishlists’’, anxious to include every possible piece of advice.This leads to the type of contradictions found in the ICZMRecommendation. In contrast, other European instru-ments such as Directives, Regulations and Decisions arelegally binding on Member States, and must give rise toreal actions. Use of the Recommendation instrumentallows a great deal of latitude for national and regionalauthorities to claim deep involvement with the principles,as the political need arises. This is a function of their loosedefinition. It is also true that they tend to be back-fittedto existing policies rather than driving new ones. Theevaluation of ICZM in Europe [10] in fact, passivelyencouraged this approach whereby governments couldidentify existing structures that adhered to one or more

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principles. The broad definitions offer authorities a lot ofroom for manoeuvre, for example it could be claimed thatadaptive management is being pursued in one location andlong-term perspective elsewhere. This type of spatial fudgeallows authorities to tick all the appropriate boxes andthereby pass the notional ICZM test, but in practice theymay follow management agendas that reflect very little ofbest practice in ICZM. In the absence of an objectivemechanism to assess compliance, response is entirelysubjective and may simply involve putting an appropriate‘‘spin’’ on long-established practice. The proceduralprinciples, too, are very open to this type of sterileadministrative box-ticking.

The principles are presented in the Recommendation asa set of discrete precepts; none is deemed to have higherpriority than another, nor are they stated to be an organicwhole or indivisible set. Avoidance of prescription andprioritization may be characteristic of European Recom-mendations, but it constitutes a fundamental weaknessbecause when considered separately, rather than as abalanced counter-weighted set, the principles are suscep-tible to interpretations which will not produce sustainablecoastal management. For example, the concepts of broadoverall perspective and local specificity clearly form abalanced pair. The first of these stresses the need foroverview, while the second emphasizes the need to besensitive to local conditions. Taken together they strike aneffective balance, but on their own and if pushed beyondan appropriate level they run the risk of either needlesslysacrificing local needs to some more ‘‘universal’’ vision or,at the other extreme, catering for a blinkered local interestat the expense of a wider good.

Juda [1] points out the importance of ensuring thatmanagement principles in operation are reconciled withone another. However, the ICZM principles seem unusualamong sets of principles designed to guide policy-makingin that they support apparently mutually incompatiblepolicies and actions. In other fields, principles are presentedthat are not so diametrically opposed. For example, theUK government’s publication on sustainable development[3] lists a set of principles, none of which is potentially atodds with the others. In addition, sets of principles areoften accompanied by an express, or implied, conditionthat they be taken as a whole. ACSJC ([37], p. 12) forexample, proposes ‘‘seven basic social justice principleswhich can provide guidelines for action. These principlesare an organic ‘whole’ for if one is missing the otherscannot retain their meaning’’. Regrettably, this kind ofcondition is absent from the Recommendation on ICZM.More cynically, it may be suggested that since it wasanticipated that there would not be a Directive or anythingelse more binding on ICZM, the principles had to pay lipservice to as many of the findings in the differentdemonstration projects as possible, hence the contra-dictions.

ICZM has as one of its mantras the claim that theapproach offers ‘‘win/win’’ situations in which no one loses

and everyone gains. However, there is naivete in thisclaim because all of the principles cannot be implementedall of the time. On a given coastal stretch, it is simply notpossible to implement mutually incompatible policies, andmanagers must pick the option they consider mostappropriate to the case before them. This is acceptable,provided that decisions are made after careful considera-tion of the complete range of principles, and the fullimplications of the choice made. In practice, however,various interests tend to ‘‘cherry pick’’ the principles bychoosing the ones that suit their own objectives, whileignoring or even denigrating the others. For example, thoseconcerned about houses threatened by erosion willprioritize the principles of local specificity and adaptivemanagement. In contrast, an environmentalist, who facesno personal loss, may insist that the strategic principles oflong-term perspective and the unhindered operation ofnatural processes should take precedence regardless ofpersonal misfortunes (Fig. 4). In this type of debatebetween advocates of opposing actions, the principles tendto be selectively used as weapons against opponents.The situation is more complex than a simple choice of

the principle best suited to the needs of a particularsituation. Even within one principle there can be inter-pretations that lie so far apart that they can be used tobolster opposite sides of an argument. For example, localspecificity and adaptive management are obvious supportsfor those promoting the construction of coastal defences.However, if they are scaled upwards both principles can beinterpreted to lend support to a non-intervention counterargument. If, for example, it is now recognized in Englandand Wales that the wholesale building of coastal defencesafter the 1953 North Sea storm surge was ill-advised, then aplausible argument can be made that adaptive managementmust mean abandonment of this policy and its replacementby a more sustainable one. (The real debate then will beover the time-scale of this change and the possible need fortransitional arrangements.) Similarly, the standard inter-pretation of local specificity is one that is assumed to be tothe immediate advantage of local people. However, localspecificity can be interpreted to mean that in a givenlocation local factors may indicate that it is botheconomically and environmentally unsustainable to defendthe coast; therefore natural processes should be allowed towork unhindered.Even if defences or a compensation scheme were to be

implemented, local specificity could be invoked to putrestrictions on property owners, including forfeiture ofmany of the normal legal rights of property owners. Forexample, within a designated zone along a coast thathas been recently given new, but time-limited, defences,landowners might not be permitted to carry out furtherbuilding development. The beneficiaries of a compensationscheme triggered by anticipated total loss of propertymight find that, in the intervening years, they are notpermitted to add value to their properties. These areforms of local specificity that may be compatible with

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Fig. 4. Coastal erosion at average rates of ca. 1m per year at Blackwater Head, County Wexford, Ireland. It is not cost-effective to defend this rural coast.

J. McKenna et al. / Marine Policy 32 (2008) 941–955 951

strategic goals, but they are unlikely to be favored by localpeople.

The European principles of ICZM can be criticized aslittle more than aspirations couched in the language of avision statement for coastal management. Such aspira-tional statements have little practical utility, because theyare open to tendentious interpretation and therefore can beselectively used to support opposite sides of an argument.They tell us what to consider in broad terms but, as statedin the Dutch stocktake, they are ‘‘too abstract to be useful’’([38], p. 14).

A more balanced view might be that the principlescannot provide a template for management because theyare not formulated as measurable objectives, and even lessso as a set of management regulations. A list of basicprinciples is not intended to function as a managementmanual. The principles do serve to tell us what to considerin the broadest sense, but they offer no guidance on how todeal with particular problems. They are not weighted, so inthose cases where, for example, the strategic and localprinciples are in conflict (or at least suggest differingpaths), the policy-maker and manager are still left to makechoices between short-term human interests and long-termstrategic goals. This choice of priorities is ultimately apolitical decision characterized by the compromises andpragmatism associated with all political processes. This isexpressed by Field and Field ([26], p. 19) as ‘‘y it has to berecognized that in the give-and-take of the political worldin which policy is actually made, choosing amongalternatives is always the order of the day’’.

A more positive view of the potential usefulness of theprinciples might be illustrated by making an analogy withthe management practices of the UK’s major land-owningNGO, the National Trust. Since its first explicit formula-tion in 1995, the Trust’s coastal policy has been under-pinned by a number of principles, several of which are

similar to those in the European Recommendation [39].Among these are:

The Trust accepts that the coast is dynamic andchanging and will work with the natural processes ofcoastal erosion and accretion wherever possible.

and

The Trust will only support interference with naturalcoastal processes where it believes there is an overridingbenefit to society in social, economic or environmentalterms.

Although broadly similar, there is a significant contrasthere with the European principles in that these policystatements are entirely compatible; the strategic principlesprevail but there is sufficient flexibility to cover exceptionalsituations. This allows the Trust to manage its properties ina coherent and integrated way. In line with these policies,and despite requests from other landowners, throughoutthe 1990s the Trust refused to cooperate in strengtheningthe gravel ridge at Porlock in Somerset, England in theyears before it finally breached during a storm in 1996[40,41] (Fig. 5). However, in 1998 at Downhill in NorthernIreland the Trust spent ca. £250,000 to stabilize the sea cliffsupporting the 18th century Mussenden Temple [42,43](Fig. 6). Here, the Trust set aside its default policy ofallowing natural processes to proceed uninterrupted, ratherthan lose one of the area’s prime tourist attractions or riskmoving the building inland. In this specific case the Trustmade a considered judgment that local considerations(socio-economic and cultural value) should take prece-dence over the strategic ‘‘natural processes’’ principle.Nevertheless, the default remains that the strategic, long-term holistic principles prevail in Trust policy. It isunfortunate that the European Recommendation doesnot explicitly state that the strategic principles should be

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Fig. 5. The gravel barrier at Porlock, Somerset, England which breached during a storm in October 1996. The National Trust had refused to cooperate in

strengthening the ridge.

Fig. 6. The 18th century Mussenden Temple, Downhill, County Derry, Northern Ireland. In 1998, the National Trust strengthened the basalt cliff to

protect this iconic building from collapse.

J. McKenna et al. / Marine Policy 32 (2008) 941–955952

prioritized in this way, especially when the application ofdifferent principles can lead to diametrically opposedconclusions in particular situations.

In theory, the principles are ‘vehicle-free’, i.e. there is noassumption that they are to be delivered via any particularmodel of ICZM, statutory or voluntary. However, inpractice the principles are strongly influenced by theirgenesis in the projects of the European Commission’sDemonstration Programme on ICZM. They have beenformulated in the context of the current European

paradigm of coastal management, one where the processis almost exclusively advanced through the medium ofvoluntary projects and partnerships in which agreementand consensus largely replace executive decision-making bystatutory authorities. This probably explains why proce-dures are elevated to the status of principles. Similarly thelocal principles have been given such weight because theRecommendation originated in an analysis of localprojects. It is arguable that, in effect, the principles aredesigned to provide a theoretical policy basis for local

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ICZM initiatives, and are not directed at all towards thestrategic concerns of national governments. (At the time,the EC did not want to implement anything legally bindingon Member States.) At the small spatial scales typical ofICZM projects local perspective is dominant, and thepower deficit of the voluntary model means that it isimperative to seek an alternative source of authority andacceptability through multi-layered public involvement.One wonders if there would be notable differences inemphasis if the principles had been formulated fromobservation of a statutory system such as that establishedby the USA Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.

The fact that the principles are rooted in the voluntarymodel of ICZM does not, of course, invalidate them, butthey will never transform coastal management in Europe iftheir implementation continues to be tied to a non-statutory model that has too many inherent weaknessesto be fit-for-purpose [13]. Despite Europe’s enthusiasticpromotion of the voluntary project-based model, and theallocation of considerable funds, degradation of Europe’scoast is continuing and may be accelerating [23]. The coastis too important an asset to be left in the hands of thevoluntary sector, and it is an abrogation of governmentresponsibility to do so. Statutory, fully legislated instru-ments are required to deliver the principles of ICZM in amanner where they can be objectively assessed. They mightwell be best implemented if there is non-statutory involve-ment, but an effective legal framework is necessary.

As noted above, the standing of the European principlesof ICZM remains that of the document in which theyappear—a Recommendation. The casual response of someMember States to the Recommendation simply reflects itslack of legal authority: something that can be ignored,sidelined, selectively interpreted, partially implemented,diluted or subverted. In contrast, a Directive could changethe face of coastal management in Europe. On this issue itmay be asked why the Commission seems reluctant to use aDirective to promote ICZM. The Floods Directiveproposal of 2006 ([44], p. 7) outlines its reasoning forchoosing a Directive rather than other instruments as theappropriate means to deliver flood control objectives:

Other means would not be adequate for the followingreasons: A Regulation would entail deciding on the levelof flood protection as well as measures and deadlines forall regions of the Community by means of Communitylegislation, an approach which is considered unfeasibleboth politically and technically. Against the backgroundof technical documents and guidance on best practicesalready available, Recommendations would not ensurethe necessary coordination across administrative andpolitical borders. A Directive would provide thenecessary regulatory framework on assessment anddecision-making principles and structures, while leavingkey elements such as the level of protection, choice andbundling of measures and deadlines for achieving theobjective to subsidiarity.

One wonders why similar reasoning could not have beenapplied by the Commission when debating ICZM.

Note: the Floods Directive was adopted on 18 September2007.

5. Conclusions

Of the eight principles of ICZM presented in theEuropean Recommendation two are essentially aboutprocedures, with the other six forming the core of theRecommendation. These six principles can be divided intotwo groups, one directed to serve local interests, the otherto serve general and strategic interests. Unfortunately,tension between these two groups of principles can produceopposing and irreconcilable differences in managementobjectives both between stakeholders, and between themand management authorities. Ironically, the principles ofICZM are not integrated with each other, which leaves theway open for selective interpretations to support virtuallyany policy or action. With no effective guidance on theresolution of strategic/local conflicts the inevitable out-come is a series of ‘political’ compromises.These problems of conflict arise not because any of the

principles are inherently ‘‘wrong’’ in themselves; rather theproblems lie in their interrelationships and balance. Thefundamental reason why the principles are flawed is thatthey appear in a Recommendation, a format traditionallyused for the communication of non-prescriptive, non-prioritized advice and persuasion. In detail, this presents athree-fold problem: first, many of the principles areexpressed in language that lacks clarity and precision;consequently they are open to various interpretations andcan be manipulated to suit both personal and institutionalagendas. Second, the principles are not prioritized and this,combined with the absence of the precautionary principleas a separate principle, means that strategic objectives arenot given primacy over local concerns. Third, theRecommendation does not make it clear that the principlesare an indivisible set that cannot be picked through to findone to serve a specific policy outcome.The principles of ICZM are only really useful if they

inform a coherent integrated strategy at national level. Theabsence of such strategies has encouraged ad hoc use of theRecommendation by individuals and pressure groups whoinvoke particular principles to serve short-term self-interest. It may be that the principles were always intendedto guide policy, and that their widespread use to advancespecific objectives was not anticipated. However, giventheir genesis in a Demonstration Programme based onvoluntary projects in which stakeholder participation wasstrongly encouraged, no one can be surprised that thepublic should feel a strong sense of ownership.The ICZM Recommendation requested that the

European Commission present an evaluation report tothe Council and the European Parliament within 55months of the adoption of the Recommendation.This evaluation of the implementation of the ICZM

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Recommendation was carried out by independent con-sultants and published in 2006 [10] The EuropeanCommission has recently (2007) responded to the evalua-tion via a Communication [45]. The response (p. 5) statesthat the codification of a common set of principles is a ‘‘keyachievement’’ of the Recommendation, but it concedes thatimplementation reveals varying interpretations and under-standings of ICZM across Europe. It is suggested that theprinciples need to be made more operational and bettercommunicated to foster a more coherent and effectiveimplementation of ICZM. In our view, the principles asthey stand do represent an advance in that they haveincreased awareness of the need for integrated coastalmanagement, but the problems are more fundamental thansuggested by the Commission’s response. There remains anurgent need to go beyond guidance on interpretation toexplicit prioritization of the strategic principles. Assuggested above, Member States and individual nationalauthorities could do this, but they are unlikely to act ontheir own initiative.

At first consideration, the outlook for ICZM ‘‘withteeth’’ appears unpromising given the comment in theCommunication ([45], p. 5) that, ‘‘at this time a new specificlegal instrument to promote ICZM is not foreseen’’.Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that futureprospects for ICZM in Europe are actually quite positive.Every recent EC and international environmental manage-ment initiative advocates integration, and there is a strongsense that statutory ICZM is on its way, even if there is noICZM Directive. Among the vehicles that might carry thisICZM legislation are, at national level in the UK, the newMarine Bill, and at European level a number of new andproposed instruments including the Floods Directive, theMarine Strategy Directive and the Maritime Policy. Atinternational level the OSPAR Working Group, whichincludes the European Community, is also moving in thesame direction.

Acknowledgments

This paper was stimulated by discussions and researchundertaken in the course of the COREPOINT (CoastalResearch and Policy Integration) Project co-fundedthrough EU-INTERREG III B NW Europe. However,we do not assume that our project partners wouldnecessarily agree with the ideas expressed in the paper.

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