macedon, illyria, and rome, 220-219 b.c

Upload: -

Post on 04-Jun-2018

226 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    1/17

    Macedon, Illyria, and Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    Author(s): John Van Antwerp FineSource: The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 26, Part 1 (1936), pp. 24-39Published by: Society for the Promotion of Roman StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/296702.

    Accessed: 04/01/2014 05:57

    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

    .JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

    content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

    .

    Society for the Promotion of Roman Studiesis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

    access to The Journal of Roman Studies.

    http://www.jstor.org

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sprshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/296702?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/296702?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sprs
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    2/17

    MACEDON, ILLYRIA, AND ROME, 220-2I9 B.C.By JOHN VAN ANTWERP FINE

    One of the most interesting problems in the political history ofthe last three decades of the third century B.C. is the appearance ofthe Romans east of the Adriatic. Whether Rome in the First andSecond Illyrian Wars was inaugurating a definite imperialistic policywith the conscious aim of gaining control in the Balkan peninsula,or whether at this time she was acting purely on the defensive againstIllyrian piracy, are questions with which I am not concerned atpresent. 1 The fact of primary importance is that, by establishingherself in Illyria, Rome came into contact with Macedon, and thiscontact was bound to lead to hostilities ; for the Antigonids couldnot fail to resent the intrusion of a stranger in what they consideredtheir own sphere of influence. In this paper I propose to considerthe attitude of Philip V to the Roman protectorate in Illyria at thebeginning of his reign. Since his whole life was one long strugglewith Rome, the importance of understanding his policy in regardto this question is obvious. Before entering upon the subject,however, it will be necessary to try to determine how far westwardMacedonian authority extended. A knowledge of this westernfrontier will not only inform us on the proximity of Macedonianpossessionsto the Roman protectorate, but will also reveal some of theproblems which the barbaric Illyrian and Dardanian tribes presentedto Philip in this quarter. Once we have these matters clearly inmind, we shall be in a much better position to form an unbiasedestimate of Philip's attitude to what may be called his Illyrianproblem.

    I. THE WESTERN FRONTIER OF MACEDONThe northern and north-western boundaries of Macedon wereconstantly menaced by the Dardanians, barbarians who apparentlywere closely related to the Illyrians.2 The northernmost districtof the Macedonian kingdom was Paeonia. Since the time whenPhilip II had subdued them, 4 the Paeonians, who also were of

    1 For a discussion of this Roman 'imperialism'see M. Holleaux, Rome, la Grece, et les s;onarchieshellenistiques au iije siecle avant 7.C. (Paris,1921). Cl. also Walek's not too successful replies,Rev. Phil. xlix (1925), 28-54, 118-142, andHolleaux's retorts to these criticisms, Rev. Phil. 1(1926), 46-66, 194-218.2Strabo vii, 5, 6-7, 315 f., says the Dardanianswere an Illyrian tribe, and describes the boundariesof their territory by saying that on the west the

    Drilo river was navigable as far as Dardania, that onthe south the Dardanians bordered on Macedonianand Paeonian tribes, and that on the east, throughthe Galabrii and the Thunatae who belonged tothem, they extended as far as the Maedi, a Thraciantribe.3 Strabo vii, 4, I, 3I3 and vii, frag. 4, roughlydefines the boundaries of Paeonia.4 Diod. xvi, 4.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    3/17

    MACEDON, ILLYRIA, AND ROME, 220-219 B.C. 25Illyrian stock,5 had been sometimes subject to Macedon, sometimesindependent, and sometimes overrun by the Dardanians.6 Shortlyafter his accession early in 229, 7 Antigonus Doson succeeded indriving back the Dardanians, who in the latter part of the reign ofDemetrius II had invaded the Macedonian realm.-8 Immediatelyafter the battle of Sellasia, Doson had to return hurriedly to Macedonto oppose another invasion of barbarians. According to our sourcesthese were Illyrians. 9 Certainly they did not belong to the partyof Demetrius of Pharos, then an ally of Antigonus, 10 or to that ofScerdilaidas, whose cause at this time seems to have been identicalwith that of the Pharian.11 More probably the reference is to thoseIllyrians who lived further inland, and therefore were more closelyassociated with the Dardanians, the perpetual enemies of theMacedonians.12 Doson was victorious, but we are not told whatwere the actual results of his victory. All we know is that Philip Vin the first years of his reign was threatened by Dardanian invasions,13and when he made an expedition against them in the early summerof 217 Bylazora, the chief city of the Paeonians, was in their hands. 14Hence it is probable that at Philip's accession the Dardanians con-trolled territory in Paeonia along the Axius as far south as Bylazora.Concerning western Paeonia we derive some information from apassage in Livy (xxvi, 25, 2-6). Here we are told that in 2II Philip,after he had ravaged the parts of Illyria near Oricum and Apollonia,marched into Pelagonia and took Sintia, a city of the Dardanians,which afforded them a passage into Macedon. Then he descendedthrough Pelagonia, Lyncus, and Bottiaea into Thessaly and fromthere he led his army into Thrace. From this it appears that Sintiamust have been on the northern boundary of Pelagonia. Geyer15very reasonably suggests that it lay in the north of the plain ofMonastir at the entrance of one of the passes into the Vardar (Axius)valley. 16 Philip's taking of this city in 2 I I would lead one tosuppose that he had not held it previously and, therefore, it is probablylegitimate to assume that at his accession the Dardanians, by holdingSintia, controlled the northern part of the plain of Monastir.Directly to the west of Macedon and extending indefinitelynorthward was the region of Illyria. The boundary line betweenMacedon proper and Illyria proper ran through a place called Pylon,

    I Kazarow, ' Die ethnographische Stellung derPaonen,' Klio XViii (1922), 20-26.6 See Geyer in P-W, s.v. 'Makedonia,' coll. 720-

    750.7 Holleaux, REG xliii (1930), 254 ff., has definitelyshown that Demetrius II died before May 229.8 Jtustin xxviii, 3, I4 ; Trogus Prolog. xxviii;Livy xxxi, 28, 2.9 Polyb. ii, 70; Plut. Cleoi,n. 7; 30.1 0 Demetrius aided Doson at Sellasia; Polyb.ii, 6, 5; iii, i6, 3-

    IIAt least in their piratical expedition in 220they were acting in concert; Polyb. iv, i6, 6.IL Cl. note 2. Also see p. 28.13 Polyb. iv, 29, I ; 66, I and 6-7; Justin xxix, I,'0-II.314 Polyb.v, 97, 1I23a Op.Cit. p. 748.16 Kiepert, FOA, xvi, p. 4a, places Sintia on theStrymon river, but this is incompatible with thepassage in Livy just cited.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    4/17

    26 JOHN VAN ANTWERP FINEa little to the east of the city of Lychnidus. 1 It will be remembered-that the Illyriankingdom, which was consolidatedabout the middleof the third century B.C. through the efforts of the powerfultribe ofthe Ardiaeans,8 entered into friendly relations with Macedon in231 B.C.' 9 In 229 occurredthe firstRoman war with Illyria. 0 Atthe end of that campaignthe Romanswere definitelyestablishedonthe easterncoast of the Adriatic. Their protectorate, thus formed,extended on the north to the neighbourhoodof Lissus and on thesouth to the vicinity of Phoenice in Epirus, including the district ofAtintania. This strip of land was about 120 miles long and from20 to 40 miles broad.21

    The question arises-how close was the territory under Mace-donian control to the district now under Roman protection ?Polybius' account of the revolt of Scerdilaidas rom Philip in thesummerof 217 is of importancein deciding this point.22 We aretold that Scerdilaidaspillaged Pissaeum,a town of Pelagonia,wonover, through fear or promises, three cities of the Dassaretae,Antipatreia,Chrysondyonand Gertus, and overran a large part ofMacedon borderingon these places. These towns unquestionablybelongedto Macedon; for Polybiusexpressly aysthat they revoltedfrom Philip and that he recoveredthem.23 Pissaeumalmost surelylay in the plain of Monastirin westernPelagonianear the source ofthe Erigon. 4 The location of Antipatreiaon the Apsus is wellknown (near the modern Berat). Chrysondyonand Gertus cannotbe identified definitely, but they must have been near Antipatreia.After recovering hese towns Philip proceededto take CreoniumandGerus in the land of the Dassaretae,Enchelanae,Cerax, Sation, andBoei in the region of Lake Lychnis, Bantia in the district of theCaloecini and Orgyssusin that of the Pisantini. Of these townsGerus and Orgyssusare undoubtedly the same as Gerrunium andOrgessus,which accordingto Livy's account25 were situated nearAntipatreia. Both Leake26 and Geyer2 7 agree that Enchelanae,Cerax, Sation, and Boei were on the west bank of Lake Lychnis..Leake28suggeststhat Bantiaprobably ay on the site of the modernKoritza,and Kiepert 9 followshim in this hypothesis.

    17 While describing the Egnatian Way, Strabo vii,7, 4, 323 (fromPolyb.; cl. Polyb.xxxiv, 12, 6), says:F7uev obv 7ao-a 'E-yvariLa KaXe?Tacu, ' oe 7pwrTqi7ri Kav5aovuas Xfe',ye-rt, 6povs 'IXXVpLKo6, 5cLAvXvL5oDreXew9KacL IIvuXvos -r6rov bplovros eiv7- 6&3 7-'v Te 'IJXXvpLaKat 7'iv MaKe0ovLav.

    '8 See Holleaux, CAH, vii, 826-827.9 See p. 29.20 Holleaux, REG xliii (I930), 243-26i, hasdefinitely fixed the date of this wvar.21 For the territory which the Romans took undertheir protection, see Polyb. ii, II-I2; Vii, 9, I3;Appian, Illyr. 7-8. See Holleaux's treatments ofthis question, Rossseetc., pp. I04-II2, particularlyp. I Io, n. i, and CAH vii, 836-837.22 Polyb. v, io8, i-8.

    23 Polyb. v, I08, 3 and 8 ; cl. Holleaux, Romeetc.,p. 167, n. 3-remark on contrast between dVEK-rsaO(recovered) and KacTeXcif3e7o(took).24 G. Zippel, Die r6miiischeHerrschalt in Illyrienbis auf Augustus (Leipzig, 1877), p. 6i ; Geyer,op. cit., p- 747-25 Livy xxxi, 27, 2; cl. Zippel, op. cit., p. 6i, andHolleaux, Romle etc., p. i67, n. 3. Creonium wasprobably in the immediate vicinity.26 W. M. Leake, Travels in Northernt Greece

    (London, I835), iii, p. 328.27 op_ cit. p. 747. Kiepert, FOA xvi, however,tentatively places Sation and Boei on the east bank.28 op. cit. p. 329.2 9FOA xvi.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    5/17

    5 $ >'\t, Lyc}:l21 z 2 |

    ....;......................1 . .. .. .. . .. ..

    ;K ..........1w :', .. '::1'., .,N a 's \ ................ ,I S,.,

    ....,SCA~XP^.s -o**s*v*Btia?*

    b~~~~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~~ryss ....-

    FIG.esti

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    6/17

    28 JOHN VAN ANTWERP FINEIt is obvious, therefore, that the geographical situation of many

    of these towns is very problematical. Of this much, however, wecan be certain. Before 217 Philip held only a few towns of theDassaretae, namely Antipatreia, Chrysondyon, and Gertus, andpossibly a few more. It was not until ScerdilaYdas' bortive attemptat revolt that Philip, by bringing practically all the territory betweenLake Lychnis and the Apsus under his control, caused still more ofthe western boundaries of Macedon to march with the eastern limitsof the Roman protectorate. At his accession to the throne Anti-patreia was the furthermost Macedonian outpost (at least of anyimportance), and it was at this point that Rome and Macedon con-fronted each other. 3 0Regarding the various tribes of Illyrians residing between theRoman protectorate and Macedon, north and east of Antipatreia,we have no definite information. The Macedonians held a fewplaces, 31 but it was apparently not until Philip's expedition againstScerdilaidas in 217 that the district around Lake Lychnis camealmost completely under MViacedonianontrol. Very possibly thesepeople were closer to the Dardanians3 2 than to the ArdiaeanIllyrians who had become so powerful under Agron and Teuta. Inthe time of the latter, we hear that some of her Illyrian subjectswent over to the Dardanians.3 3 The trouble which ScerdilaYdasalso had later with his subjects would suggest that the Illyrian princeswere not always able to control these tribes. 3 4

    II. POLITICAL RELATIONS OF THE MACEDONIAN KINGS AND THEILLYRIAN PRINCES

    The following table shows the chronological order of the eventsdiscussed:231 B.C. Demetrius II of Macedon makes alliance with Agron ofIllyria.229. First Roman War in Illyria.229 or 228. Antigonus Doson recovers Hestiaeotis and Thessaliotisfrom Aetolians.222. Demetrius of Pharos in alliance with Antigonus Doson.221 (Autumn). Accession of Philip V.220 (June). Battle of Caphyae.220 (July-August). Piratical expedition of Demetrius of Pharosand ScerdilaYdas.

    3 0 It has generally been agreed that the districtsof Parauaea and Tymphaea belonged to Macedonin 22I B.C. (cf. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte iv,2, pp. 378-379). If this is correct, it would meanthat in this direction also Macedonian territorybordered on the Roman protectorate, for Atintaniawas under Roman influence. In a recent paper,Trans. of the AmiiericanPhilol. Assoc. lxiii (1932),

    I26-130, however, I think I have demonstratedthat all through Philip's reign Parauaea andTymphaea belonged to Epirus.31 E.g. Antipatreia, Chrysondyon, and Gertus.32 See p. 24; also n. z.33Polyb.ii, 6, 4; cf. 8, 5.34 Polyb. iv, 29, 3; v, 4, 3

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    7/17

    MACEDON, ILLYRIA, AND ROME, 220-219 B.C. 29

    220-219 (Winter). Philip V makes alliance with ScerdilaYdas.219 (June-August). Philip V besieges Ambracus and campaignsalong the Achelous.219 (June-August). Second Roman War in Illyria.218. Philip V fails against Cephallenia.217. Philip V regulates affairs of Zacynthus.217. Romans defeated by Hannibal at Lake Trasimene.2i6. Philip V fails against Apollonia.215. Philip V makes alliance with Hannibal.

    It was in 231 B.C. that Philip's father, Demetrius II, enteredinto relations with Illyria. For the major part of his reign he hadbeen engaged in a war with the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, andin this particular year he was confronted with still more enemies.The Dardanians were invading Paeonia in such numbers that he hadto direct all his energies to that quarter. Consequently he wasunable to go to the aid of the Acarnanian city Medeon, which wasbeing besieged by the Aetolians. So as not to desert his ally, hebribed Agron, the powerful Illyrian king, to raise the siege. ThisAgron promptly did.36 In the following year Agron died and wassucceeded by his widow Teuta. She whole-heartedly encouragedthe piratical enterprises of her people in the Adriatic, with theresult that Rome was finally aroused. An embassy was sent to herin 230, but she dismissed it with contempt. Such treatment naturallyangered the Romans, and in the following year they sent a large forceto Illyria. Despite the suggestions of Holleaux37 and De Sanctis, 38it seems probable that Teuta was not reposing any confidence in heralliance with Macedon ; for she must have realized that Demetriuswas too much occupied in struggling against the Aetolians, Achaeans,and Dardanians to offer her any assistance. Nor was AntigonusDoson3 9 able to go to her aid in 229 and, as we have seen, the resultof the First Illyrian War was that Rome established a protectorateover the eastern shore of the Adriatic from Lissus southward to theneighbourhood of Phoenice. According to the terms of the peacetreaty, the Illyrians were not to sail south of Lissus with more thantwo unarmed vessels. Demetrius of Pharos as reward for his defectionto the Romans was put in charge of Pharos and the neighbouringparts of the mainland.40 Appian informs us that the Romans in

    35Cl. p. 25, n. 8.36 Our knowledge of the relations betweenMacedon, Illyria, and Rome from the time of Agrondown to the accession of Philip V is derived fromthe following sources: Polyb. ii, 2-I2; 65, 4;iii, i6, 3; Dio xii, 49 and 53; Zonaras 8, i-zo2;Appian, Illyr. 7-8. The following give no additionalinformation: Orosius iv, I3, 2 ; Eutropius iii, 7;Livy, Per. xx; Florus i, 2I (ii, 5). Whether theRomans made a victorious campaign against theHistrians in zzi does not concern us here. See

    Zippel, op. cit., p. iOI, for the sources. Holleaux,Rossseetc., p. I34, n. I, claims that the expeditionis apocryphal.37 Rosse etc., p. IOO; CAH vii, 833.38 G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Rosssani (Turin,

    I9I6) iii, I, p. 296.39 Doson was too busy with the Dardanians;

    see p. 25, n. 8.4 ? For the probable extent of Demetrius' realm,see Holleaux, Rosneetc., p. IO5, n. 6.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    8/17

    30 JOHN VAN ANTWERP FINEgranting certain places to Demetrius expressly said that this wasonly a temporary arrangement. Becauseof his treachery to Teuta,they naturally could not feel convinced that he would remain loyalto them. The Romans were correct in suspecting Demetrius ; forin the ensuing years, when they utterly neglected eastern affairs, thePharian came closer and closer to Macedon. We know definitelythat by the time of the battle of Sellasia he was an ally of AntigonusDoson,41 and it is highly probable that the good relations betweenthe two men dated back as far as 225 when Demetrius, thinking thatthe Romans were completely embroiled with the Gauls, felt that hecould with impunity act independently of their wishes.42

    We now come to the period which I wish to examine in detailin regard to the attitude of Macedon toward Illyria, and, therefore,towards Rome. Philip V came to the throne in the autumn of221 B.C.43 In the years immediately following, events occurredwhich throw light upon our problem. Polybius44 tells us that inthe summer of 220 Scerdilaidas and Demetrius of Pharos broke theirtreaty with Rome by sailing south of Lissus with a fleet of ninetyvessels. From the context it is possible to assign the beginning of thisexpedition to the end of July or the early part of August.45 Wehave further information concerning these events. Polybius 4 6prefaces his account of the Second Illyrian War with the followingremarks, which are of such importance for our purpose that theymust be quoted in full.

    YUIVOPaVw y&p XOC' iXeLVOUq TOUq XOXLpOUqAY^qTrpLOV TOV FotpLOV,CPlpxpovv,x6-tz 7ovt -r peoxpov eLv aL& ov&s opamvt~ ~ ~~~~~" 7p"eo\Le aux '7" 0; t tr -C71 FaXtcre Or ON rNov a'N KocpX6ov&xv y6opov 7epteCorot TcP&ouLouq,TCX6zg 8' eov- o X7L-80C 'V -7 Mocxavv otXo at raUO?LY0XZp(XZVOX XOZL pYXY6XtZVOX TV 7tpOgI KropzvYLVtUV&)V'Av-rLy6vy,topOzv ,uv xoa X0vr0FpeYeo0z 4 xoc,& 7-v 'I1?upo8C

    41 Cf. p. 25, n. I0.42 For the methods which Doson probablyusedto win over Demetrius,see Holleaux'sconjecturesin CAll vii, 815 andn. i ; cl. Holleaux,Rome tc.,pp. I3I-I35.4 This date is somewhat in doubt. Beloch,iv, 1x p. 7I9, iV, 2, p. II3, places the accession inthe summerof 22I. W. B. Dinsmoor,TheArchonsofAthents Cambridge,Mass. 931), p. 509, places tin September 22. The precisedate is not of im-portance o us. I am acceptingthe suggestionofW. W. Tarn as given in CAH vii, 763.4 Polyb. iv, I6, 6.45 As usual, it is impossible to set an exact date,but from an examination of the events of the year

    220 it is possible to arrive at a sufficiently approxim-ate one. Aratus became strategosabout the middleof May (Polyb. iv, 7, I0; 37, 2; V, I, I. ct. Belochiv, 2 p. 220; B. Niese, Geschichteder griechischenund miiakedonischentaaten ii, p. 433, n. 2; Tarn,

    CAH vii, 736). A careful reading of Polyb. iv,9-Iz, shows that the battle of Caphyae must haveoccurred in June. Shortly afterwards (Polyb. iv, I4)a meeting of the Achaean assembly was held. Thisoccurred at the end of the 13gth Olympiad (Polyb.iv, I4, 9)-hence almost surely in July zzo. At thebeginning of the I40th Olympiad the Achaeanssent ambassadors to the various members of theHellenic League (Polyb. iv, I 5-I6) and immediatelyafterwards the Illyrians set out (i6, 6). SinceDemetrius touched at Pylos, raided the Cyclades(i6, 7-8) and co-operated with Taurion (19, 7-9),and since after these events Philip spent considerabletime in the Peloponnese (zz-z6)-all before Scopaswas elected Aetolian strategos after the autumnequinox (Z7, I ; 37, z)-it seems inevitable toassign the setting out of Scerdilaidas and Demetriuseither to the end of July or to the beginning ofAugust.

    46 Polyb. iii, I6, Z-4.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    9/17

  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    10/17

    32 JOHN VAN ANTWERP FINEalmost certain that it was only a question of time before the Romanswould be so completely occupied with the Cathaginians that theywould have to neglect eastern affairs, are we to suppose that hemade the stupid blunder of inciting them to war in 220 at a timewhen they were quite capable of sending a large army to Illyria ?I think not, unless we wish to believe that already in the first yearof the new reign the cautious and discreet policies of Gonatas,Demetrius II, and Doson were entirely discarded. Certainly thebest interests of Macedon would lead one to believe that Demetriusof Pharos violated the treaty with the Romans before Philip thoughtthe proper moment had come.

    Thus the setting of the political stage in 220 causes one to thinkthat Demetrius was acting independently of Macedonian influence.It is true that he sailed south of Lissus relying 'v Tn Mome86oMv o'XLoc,but such a statement need not mean that he was instigated by Philip.All our information concerning Demetrius shows us that he was areckless, headstrong person. 53 His status of subservience to theRomans was naturally distasteful to him, and very probably theirneglect of eastern affairs since 228 had lulled him into a false con-fidence.54 He was a pirate by instinct and by race, and in hisdepredations during the summer of 220 he was merely giving reinto his own nature. If he looked into the future at all, he possiblyhoped that if he got into trouble with the Romans he would receiveaid from Philip or, at least, in case of defeat would find refuge withhim-as he actually did in 2I9.55General considerations, therefore, point to the belief that Philiphad nothing to do with Demetrius' activities at this time. And thereis positive evidence to support this assumption. When Demetriusand Scerdilaidas set out in 220, they first made an attack on Pylosin Messenia. 56 Ncw at this time Pylos belonged to the AchaeanLeague, 57 and Polybius 58 tells us very clearly that in this enterprisethe Illyrians were co-operating with the Aetolians. Are we to believethen that Demetrius, after being incited by Philip to this expedition,immediately in conjunction with the Aetolians, enemies of Philip,attacked a town which was a member of the Achaean League and hencewas allied to Macedon ? The answer must be in the negative.Holleaux59 says that as yet there was no rupture nor any definitemenace of a rupture between Aetolia and Macedon, and consequentlyimplies that in working with the Aetolians Demetrius was doingnothing against the wishes of Philip. This is a strange statementfor a great historian to make ; for a glance at the events of the years

    53 Polyb. iii, i9, 9-I I; VI I2, 7, etc.54 Ct. Holleaux, Ronie etc., pp. I32 ff.55 See below, p. 36.56Polyb. iv, s6, 7-57 Niese, ii, p. 4Ii, n. i, demonstrated his veryclearly by pointing out that at the congress ofallies at Corinth it was the Achaeans and not the

    Messenians who complained of the attack uponPylos (Polyb. iv, 25, 4).58 Polyb. iV, 25, 4; ix, 38, 8. Good relationsbetween Scerdilaldas and the Aetolians continueduntil the winter of 220-219 ; see Polyb. iv, I6, 9-Il ;

    29, 2-7.59Ronmetc., p. I35, n- 4.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    11/17

    MACEDON, ILLYRIA, AND ROME, 220-2I9 B.C. 3322I-220 will demonstrate ts falseness. For our present purposes afew remarkswill suffice. That the Macedoniansand Aetolians werebitter enemies all throughthe reignsof DemetriusII and AntigonusDoson is well known. After Doson inflicted a severe defeat on theAetolians in 229 or 228 by recovering the Thessalian districts ofHestiaeotis and Thessaliotis, 0 they remained comparatively quietuntil his death in the autumn of 22I. Then, as Polybius61 puts it,they proceededto make war all at once on the Messenians,Epirots,Achaeans, Acarnanians,and Macedonians. Among other exploitsthey invaded the Peloponnesetwice in the early part of 220, eachtime ravagingterritory belongingto the AchaeanLeague.62 Earlyin June Aratus led out the Achaean forces against them and wasbadly defeated at Caphyae.63 Now inasmuch as the Achaeansweremembers of the Hellenic League of which Philip, as successortoDoson,64 waspresident, t is hard to see how one can fail to recognisein the battle of Caphyae he beginning of war betweenthe Aetoliansand the Hellenic League. Certainly this was Polybius' opinion;for after his account of the battle, he writes65:

    t a A,, a zvA,It %'v V~evi6vociVtEococitr7v ckopv~O~v auVywCzx0q 7rt6XZVOqeaZv 'eTOUTOV, -rV Wo'py3tV 'x -,Oi Cti T'Zoocitroc ysvovvou 86yoCrTo4 OmcV(rcV

    o au61YCF V oa Guve?O6vTs4 e' Cov V KopLvO&v7r6?&v sxU6pCacV-0 oCPOU'XLOvV pOaaGVcUG0V-Oq @=z0ou 0oioca6Cs.Holleaux66 objects to this last statement ; he calls attention tothe fact that, when the Achaeans after the disaster at Caphyaeappealed to Philip for help, he decided to maintain peace with theAetolians.67 This evidence is not so strongly in support ofHolleaux's contention as it might seem at first glance. TheAchaeans had also requested that the Messenians be admitted tothe Hellenic League, and Philip readily agreed to this proposal.68Now the Aetolians had voted to go to war with the Achaeans unlessthe latter abandoned their alliance with the Messenians.69 Thuswe see that Philip, by agreeing to receive the Messenians into theHellenic League, was in reality pledging himself to a war with theAetolians; for when they should attack the Achaeans, he was boundto go to the aid of his allies. Consequently Holleaux's remark thatthere was no rupture nor any definite menace of a rupture betweenthe Aetolians and Philip in July 220 seems to me to be wholly mis-leading. To say that the battle of Caphyae was not war is nothingmore than quibbling. It is true that it was war between the

    6 0 See my article, Trans. of Amer. Philol. Assoc.lxiii (i932), I3o-i55, particularly 40-142.61 Polyb. iv, 5, IO.62 Polyb. iv, 6, 3-IO; 25, 4-63 See above, p. 3O, n. 45-64 For Doson as head of the Hellenic Leaguie,see Polyb. ii, 54, 4 ; iv, 9, 4 ; cf. also Pluit. Arat.38, 9: 'A7iryosovog e scar sKaia- YfV Kat KaTa

    Oa'ia r-' aurOKpacLrwp ?flyelAwp aevcayopevUOEe.For Philip as head of the Hellenic Leaguie, seePolyb. iv, 24, 2 25, I ; ix, 37, 7, etc.6 5 Polyb. iv, I3, 6-7.66 Romiie etc., p. 149, n. 1.67 Polyb. iv, I5, I-2; i6, I-3.68 See n. 67.6 9Polyb. iv, 15, 9.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    12/17

    34 JOHN VAN ANTWERP FINEAetolians and the Achaeans, but since Philip was the ally of thelatter, Macedonwas alsoinvolvedin the hostilities.It is clear, therefore, that Macedon and Aetolia were enemies,and consequently, when Demetrius attacked Pylos in collaborationwith the Aetolians,he was workingwith Philip's enemies against hisfriends. Certainly this ought to be sufficient evidence that Philiphad not instigated the Pharian to the undertaking. The point canbe made clearer in an even simpler way. Grantingfor a momentthat relations between Macedon and Aetolia were not strained, wehave still to admit that Demetrius attackeda city belonging to theAchaeanLeague,andhence an ally of Philip. This evidence n itselfought to be adequate to demonstrate hat Demetrius had not sailedsouth of Lissus at Philip's suggestion.So far our evidenceseemsto provethat in his piraticalexpeditionin 220 Demetrius was acting on his own initiative. In attackingPylos he was not deliberately opposing Philip, but was merelyindulging the Illyrian habit of pillaging the coasts of Elis andMessenia. 0 That his relations with Macedon were still friendly isclear from the fact that in his hasty retreat from the Cyclades aterin the samesummerhe put in at Corinth. There, at the requestofTaurion, the Macedoniangeneral in the Peloponnese,71 he agreedto aid the Achaeans and proceeded to raid some places on theAetolian coast.72 This is the first testimony we have to any co-operation between Demetrius and the Hellenic League ; beforethis he had been an independent adventurer, just as Scerdilaidascontinuedto be. Some scholarsmight maintainthat Macedon waspursuinga definitely anti-Roman policy when Taurion enteredintonegotiationswith the man who had recently broken his treaty withthem. To consider his episodeas an instance of an aggressivepolicyagainst the Romans is laying too much stress on an insignificantmatter. It was purely a businesstransaction. Since the Rhodianswere in pursuitof Demetrius,he was only too glad to assistTaurionin return for having his ships hauled across the Isthmus. Toillustrate my point I might ask the following question. TheAetolianshad been co-operatingwith Demetrius shortly before heagreed to work with Taurion; who is going to maintain that theyhad a definite anti-Romanpolicy at this time ?There is further and possiblymore conclusive proof that Philiphadnothingto dowith Demetrius'expedition n 220 and,as acorollaryto this, that Philip's attitude toward Rome in the first yearsof hisreign was purely defensive, not offensive. In the summer of 2I9the Romans sent an expedition to Illyria to chastise Demetrius. Atthis time the SocialWarwas in full swing. As is well known, Philipspent the campaigning eason, first in besieging Ambracus,and thenin his campaignalongthe Achelous. I do not wishto discussany of

    7 0 Polyb. ii, 5, v-2.7 1 For Taurion's position, see Polyb. iv, 87, 8.7 2 Polyb. iv, I 9, 7-9.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    13/17

    MACEDON, ILLYRIA, AND ROME, 220-2I9 B.C. 35the details of these events in this paper, but thus much can be said.with absolute certainty. While the Romans were in Illyria, Philipwas either at Ambracus or in Acarnania. 3 We know this because,when the Romans captured Pharos by a ruse, Demetrius fled im-mediately to Philip and met him just as he was about to cross theAmbracian Gulf from Acarnania to Epirus. 4 This situation in thesummer of 2z9 is extremely interesting and instructive for the lightit casts on Philip's attitude toward the Illyrian problem. As regardsthe Romans his policy was purely a defensive one. His reason forspending these months in western Greece may very well have been hisfear of Roman aggression.75 He wanted to be near home in casethe Romans, after subduing the Illyrians, should attempt to invadeMacedon. But he had no intention of undertaking an offensiveagainst them. Demetrius had incurred their wrath by his rash actsin 220, and now he could pay the penalty alone. As far as militaryforces on the scene of action were concerned, Philip was certainly amatch for the Romans. We have no information at all about thefleet which Rome dispatched on this expedition. In regard to landforces, Lucius Aemilius 76 probably had with him the normal consulararmy of about 20,000 infantry and z,ooo cavalry.77 Philip had withhim at the time about 20,000 men, 78 and these, if joined to the

    7 3 As usual we can formulate only a generalchronological scheme, but, nevertheless, a sufficientlyaccurate one for our purposes. From Polyb. iv, 37,we learn that the following events all occuirred atabout the same time: the younger Aratuisassuimedoffice as Achaean strategos (middle of May, seeabove, p. 30, n. 45); the Romans despatchedLucius Aemilius to Illyria (cf. Polyb. iii, i6, 7-,r6 1-Hpa7ap . . .c.sd . M.aTa T6 7pSrov gTos 7XseKaTO9Tr? Kac TeTTapaKOo-T7e o\VU7rt6a6os-there-fore, probably before July 219); Philip was march-ing from Macedon with his army. This would leadone to suppose that Philip muist have set ouit towardthe end of May. Such an assuimptionfits in with therest of our information. He spent forty days atAmbracus (Polyb. iv, 63, 2). This brings us intoJuly. Since Philip returned home in time to lethis men gather in the harvest and since he spentthe remaining part of the summer in Larisa (Polyb.iv, 66, 7), we must infer that the campaign alongthe Achelous lasted about a month or a little longer.Speaking roughly then, Philip spent June and partof July at Ambracus, and the rest of July and partof August in Acarnania. Since the Romans sailedfor Illyria before July and since Demetrius in hisflight met Philip as he was starting for home, wecan conclude that the Roman campaign in Illyriamust have lasted about two months. This coincideswith Polybius' statement (iii, 19, I2) that Aemiliusreturned to Rome late in the summer (X-qsyo6vorTs Oepe'as). If the above calculations areapproximately correct, it seems reasonable to con-clude that the Romans arrived in Illyria whilePhilip was engaged in his siege of Ambracus andthat they departed (after Aemilius had organisedIllyria, Polyb. iii, I9, I2) about the time Philipreached Larisa (cf. Polyb. iv, 66, 7-8).

    74 Polyb. iii, I9, 8; iv, 66, 4.70 Cf. Holleauix, Ronme tc., 146 ff.76 Polybius, in his account of this war (iii, I6-I9

    cl. iv, 37, 4.; 66, 8)-by far the best one we have,-says that only one consul, LuiciusAemiliuis Paullus,.was sent to Illyria. Niese, ii, p. 436 and n. 4, and.Holleaux, Romiieetc., p. I38 and n. 2, follow him.Beloch, iv, I, p. 732 and n. 3 (see for the sources)prefers the later tradition that the other consul,.M. Livius Salinator, wyas also sent. Holleaux,CAH, vii 848, changes his opinion and follows.Beloch (cf. Munzer in P-W s.v. ' Livius' coil. 892-893 and Gelzer, Hermiiesxviii (I933), 147). I donot see how we can arrive at any certainty in thematter. In my opinion none of the argumentsadvanced is sufficient to warrant rejecting theexcellent testimony of Polybius in favour of thelater, notoriously faulty, annalistic tradition. What-ever may be the proper answer, I think that theassumption that Philip's forces when joined to theIllyrians would have been a match for the Romans.is perfectly justified.II This is Holleaux's suggestion, CAH vii, 849.78 Macedonians-phalanx, I0,ooo; peltasts,.

    5,000; cavalry, 8oo (Polyb. iv, 37, 7). Achaeans-300; Cretans-500 (Polyb. iv. 6I, 2). Acarnanians-2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry (Polyb. iv, 63, 7).Philip also had the complete levy of the Epirots.with him (Polyb. iv, 6i, 2). Their numbers are notgiven. Holleaux, Ronie etc., p. I46, n. 3, points.out that at Sellasia the Epirots contributed i,000infantry and 50 cavalry (Polyb. ii, 65, 4), andreasonably suggests that on this occasion theycertainly put as many into the field-probablymore. The total forces, then, were just short of20,000.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    14/17

    36 JOHN VAN ANTWERP FINEIllyrian forces,79 would have considerably outnumbered the Romans.Nicolaus' suggestion8 0 that the Roman attack was so rapid thatPhilip was unable to bring help to Demetrius is obviously absurd.The Romans were certainly in Illyria for at least two months,81and in this period Philip, having his army in readiness, had ampletime to advance into Illyria if he so desired. Also he must haveknown beforehand that the Romans wvere lanning this expedition,82and therefore could have sent reinforcements to Demetrius beforetheir arrival. As I have remarked above, however, although Philipwas anxious to have the Romans driven out of their protectoratein Illyria, he was too wise to become embroiled with them beforetheir hands should be tied by a war with Carthage. He realizedperfectly that even a victory over the Romans at this time wouldbe dangerous to him; for they would probably have sufficient timeto send other legions across the Adriatic to punish him before thestorm from Carthage broke. Consequently he maintained strictneutrality. The large army he had with him was intended purelyfor defence against the Romans, if such should be necessary, and foroffence against the Aetolians.The whole course of the Second Illyrian War proves that Philiphad nothing to do with causing Demetrius to break his treaty withthe Romans. It was Demetrius' activity in 220 which induced them tocross the Adriatic in the following year; and, if Philip was responsiblefor this Roman expedition, certainly he would have gone to the aid ofthe Pharian. Or does one wish to believe that Philip abandonedDemetrius to his fate ? But Demetrius fled immediately after hisdefeat to Philip, and was kindly received. 83 Is this what one wouldexpect the Pharian to have done if, at the instigation of theMacedonian king, he had become embroiled in a war with Rome andthen, when hard pressed, had received not the slightest help fromthe man who really was responsible for his present plight ? Onewill have to admit that in those circumstances Philip was the lastperson to whom Demetrius would have been likely to turn. It ismuch more probable that he would have gone to the Aetolians withwhom the Hellenic League was then at war, and would have donehis best to take vengeance on the man who had left him in thelurch. We have already seen that Demetrius had been on goodterms with the Aetolians early in 220, and we can be sure thatthey would have gladly welcomed any ally against the coalitionwith which they were struggling.

    7 9 Demetrius had 6,ooo men at Pharos anid hadgarrisoned Dimale and other cities (Polyb. iii, iS,I-z). It should be remembered that Scerdilaidasalso was now an ally of Philip (see below, p. 37).As regards a fleet, we know that Demetriusand Scerdilaidas together had at least 90 less,boi(Polyb. iv, I6, 6).

    80 M. Nicolaus, Zwei Beitrdge zzur GeschichseKDnig Pbilipps IV von AMakedonienDiss. Berlin,1909), 52-53.81 See above, p. 35, n- 73-82 See above, p. 3I, n- 5I-83 Polyb. iv, 66, 4-5

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    15/17

    MACEDON, ILLYRIA, AND ROME, 220-2I9 B.C. 37There are two more pieces of evidence which Holleaux cites to

    demonstrate hat Philip in 220 and 2z9 was pursuing an active anti-Roman policy. I cannot accept his interpretation in either case.The first episodeconcernsPhilip and ScerdilaYdas.4 In the winterof 220-2I9, while Philip was makingpreparations or his war withAetolia, he went to Illyria and succeeded in winning Scerdilaidasover to the Hellenic League. While discussing his event, Polybiusmakes he following remark:XUCL IM [LeV UMt9ZVOU[LeVo4 OWt&) /UYXar6X?UlV rwv -t v'IXup[oc 7rpMyzt&-1&v,roc s Xo-yopov -rv Alrw)?v, 'Qvtc@v

    ZUXOT)y(Op lrm, pqc&x s?C6? UyC7(peLvTo0L 7rpoxoXout?voLq(iv, 29, 3).To Holleaux 5 this statement can only mean that Philip waspromising o help Scerdilaidas o interfere n Roman Illyria. He alsoremarks hat by securingScerdilaYdass an ally for the Social War, hewas causingthe Illyrianonce againto breakhis treaty with Rome.An analysisof the situation will show that Holleaux is using anargumentum silentio to supporthis theory that Philip was carryingout an aggressive anti-Roman policy. In the summer of 220Scerdilaidashad been working with the Aetolians against theAchaeans.6 The Aetolians, however, failed to give him his propershare of the booty, and, ever since, ScerdilaYdasad been harbouringa grudge against them. Philip had heard of this ill-will, 87 and.undoubtedlyit was this knowledgewhich gave him hope of winningover the Illyrian. He succeeded without any difficulty. NowScerdilaidasand Demetrius were princes of that part of Illyriawhich was north of the Roman protectorate, and in this instancethere is absolutelyno reasonto assumethat ScerdilaYdasnd, con-sequently, Philip, were trying to establish themselves south ofLissus. I have already given numerous reasonsfor my convictionthat Philip at this period had no intention of undertakingany sortof offensiveoperations against the Romans. How then are we tointerpret that passage of Polybius-xocL -oX pV U77CxVOUiLVO;oavrw auyXoCaxaFvXCFetrcov XocT& 7-V 'IXupL'8U 7pMypoC0 Theexplanation which seems obvious to me is that ScerdilaYdas ashaving trouble with the variousIllyrian tribes and despots such aswe find to be the case in 2i8, 88 and that as a perfectlynormal con-dition of alliance Philip agreed to help him in quieting thesedisturbancesprovided that Scerdilaidas n return should aid himagainstthe Aetolians.

    It seems almost certain, therefore, that in winning over Scer-dilaidasPhilip was thinking primarilyof his approachingwar withthe Aetolians. In the Polybianaccount of this episodethere is not84 Polyb. V, 29.85 Holleaux, Rome etc., 142 and n. 3.86 Polyb. iv, i6, 6-I I; see above, pp. 32 ff-

    87 Polyb. iv, 29, 7-88 See above, p. z8 and ns. 33 and 34.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    16/17

    38 JOHN VAN ANTWERP FINEa hint that he had any other motive. To have the Illyrian as an allywould be profitable to him in several ways. In the first place it wouldput a certain number of ships at his disposal. This would be a greatasset, considering the bad state of the Macedonian fleet at thattime, 8 9 and also it would deprive the Aetolians of those same vessels.In addition it meant that Philip would not have to worry about anIllyrian invasion on his western frontier ; that a hostile Illyria couldcause considerable trouble for Macedon we learn from the events of2I7 when Scerdilaidas turned against Philip. 9 0 It would be foolish,however, to deny that in his Illyrian policy he was thinking of theRomans. Naturally he wished to win allies for himself along theeastern shore of the Adriatic, 91 and very possibly he was alreadyforming plans to drive the Romans out of Illyria. But these planswere all for the future when a more fitting opportunity should offer.As yet he had done nothing openly hostile to the Romans. Philiphad not instigated Demetrius of Pharos and Scerdilaidas to breaktheir treaty with the Romans in 220, and in procuring the latter asan ally against the Aetolians and in promising to aid him in settlingsome of the troubles in Illyria, he was in no way adopting a policywhich need be construed as aggressively anti-Roman. In conclusion,to these remarks I might also add that by allying himself withScerdilaYdasPhilip was indulging in offensive tactics against theRomans no more than were the Aetolians when they were co-operatingwith the Illyrian in 220. Both Macedon and Aetolia wantedScerdilaYdasas an ally in the Social War, and on this particularoccasion Philip succeeded in outbidding his enemies.There is one more point which should be discussed briefly. Aftertheir defeat at Caphyae in June 220 the Achaeans, as we have seenabove, 92 sent ambassadors to the various members of the HellenicLeague requesting assistance. Regarding Philip's reception of theseenvoys, Polybius (iv, i6, i) uses the following words: ox 3'Hti?Lp@otL zxo @LX7r7 o 3OL?X?US &xoCGav-req T6V 7p?a?&V XTX.Holleaux 93 interprets these remarks as indicating that Philip atthat time-that is, just before Demetrius of Pharos and ScerdilaYdassailed south of Lissus-was probably in Epirus, and he seems tosuggest that Philip's presence there had something to do with theexpedition of the Illyrians. Polybius' language may signify thatPhilip was in Epirus, although I do not see how we can be dogmaticon this subject. But, granting that he was, we are not by any meanscompelled to assume that his presence there was connected withDemetrius' expedition. There could have been many reasons fora trip to Epirus. It was the native land of his mother Phthia ;94

    8 9 Whether the decadence of the Macedonianfleet should be assigned to the reign of DemetriusII or of Doson does not concern us here. Cl.Holleaux, Rev. Phil. 1 (i926), 56, n. i, and Belochiv, 2, 5i6-5I8; 548-552. That Philip hadpractically no navy is evident from Polyb. v, I09,where we learn that, before he could operate in

    Illyria in zi6, he had to have IOO lemboi built in thepreceding winter.9 o Polyb. v, io8.91 See p. 39.92 See above, p. 33-93 Holleaux, Rome etc., I41 and n. 4.94 See my article CQ xxviii (I934), 99-I04.

    This content downloaded from 78.90.58.91 on Sat, 4 Jan 201405:57:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

    http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
  • 8/13/2019 Macedon, Illyria, And Rome, 220-219 B.C.

    17/17

    MACEDON, ILLYRIA, AND ROME, 220-2I9 B.C. 39it was also a member of the Hellenic League and, because of itssituationon the Adriatic, t was especiallynecessary or Philip to keepit loyal. Even if he did come into communicationwith Demetrius,I think we can safely assumethat he would have tried to restrainthe Pharian'sactivity for the presentratherthan to goad it on.In conclusion, then, we can say that for the first years of hisreign Philip's attitude towards Rome was entirely a defensiveone.His programmeconsisted of strengtheninghis position as much aspossiblein western Greece so that, in case Rome shouldcease to bedangerousbecauseof her strugglewith Carthage,he would be readyto attempt to drive her out of Illyria when the proper momentcame. His interest in the territory along the eastern shore of theAdriaticbecomes clear from the most superficialexaminationof hisactivity duringthe years220-2I7. He had allianceswith the Illyrianprinces,Demetriusof Pharos and Scerdilaidas. The summerof 2I9he devoted to aiding the Epirots and Acarnaniansagainst theAetolians, and he also fortified the strategic town of Oeniadae. 5In the following year he made an attempt upon Cephallenia 6 andin 217 he regulatedthe affairsof Zacynthus.97 When the news ofthe Roman defeat at LakeTrasimenereachedhim,98 Philip for thefirst time began to plan an offensive campaign againstthe Romans.The moment for which he had been waiting seemed to have comeat last ; he had every reasonto believe that the Romans were nowtoo much occupied with Hannibal to pay any attention to theirprotectorate in Illyria. Philip immediately made peace with theAetolians and then began to concentrateon his great objective ofsecuringaccessto the Adriatic for Macedon. His first task was tosuppress he revolt of Scerdilaidas-a revolt very possiblyinstigatedby Rome.9 9 Holleaux100 is certainly correct in emphasizing,inoppositionto Walek,101 that after hearingof Lake TrasimenePhiliplost no time in makingpreparations gainstRome. In the winter of2I7-I6 he had a fleet of IOOlemboibuilt and in the summerof 2I6he set out against Apollonia.102 But Holleaux underestimatesPhilip'sfear of the Romans. This fear had kept him wholly on thedefensiveuntil the newsof their defeat in Etruriagavehim reason othink that he could operate with impunity against them. And in2I6 he was still in such dreadof the Romans that a mere rumourthat their fleet was approachingcaused him to flee precipitatelyfrom Apollonia. 03 He persevered, however, in his attempt tooverthrowthe Romanprotectorate and, as is well known,in 2I5 hemade an alliancewith Hannibal.104 But that is beyond the scopeof this paper.

    9 Polyb. iv, 6i-66.9 6 Polyb. v, 3-6.97 Polyb. v, I02, IO.98 Polyb. v, IOI, 6-iO.9 9 Polyb. v, iO8. Cl. Holleaux, Rome etc.,i66 and CAH vii, 855.

    I00 Rev. Phil. I (I926), 208-209.101 Rev. Phil. xlix (I925), 45.102 Polyb. v, I09.103Polyb. v, II0.104Polyb. vii, 9.