low frequency/high severity incidents: black swan or red herring? texas emergency management...

Low Frequency/High Severity Incidents: Black Swan or Red Herring?Texas Emergency Management Conference 2012

Black Swan or Red Herring?

Low Frequency/High Severity Incidents:

Low Frequency/High Severity Incidents: Black Swan or Red Herring?Texas Emergency Management Conference 2012Low Frequency/High Severity Incidents: Black Swan or Red Herring?Texas Emergency Management Conference 2012

Instructor Introduction

Randy Templeton (MA, CEM, MCP, MEP, MFF)

Business Continuity and Emergency Management CoordinatorTexas Dept. of Family and Protective [email protected]


What is My Purpose Today?

• To have a discussion of perspectives and viewpoints for considering preparation and planning for LF/HS incidents

• Not really here to teach you anything—I’d rather stimulate your thinking!


Part 1: Defining the Problem

“The first responsibility for any leader is to define reality” –John Maxwell


Risk Management Matrix: Q1 Incidents

Q1 (+,+)

Q4 (-,+)

Q2 (+,-)

Q3 (-,-)

SEVERITY

F R E Q U E N C YLow High

High+

+-

Q1 incidents, though severe, are also frequent. The implications of frequency are that organizations are likely to have devoted substantial resources to address the problem; and, by reason of practice, personnel are typically skilled in making corrections quickly to restore function.

Severit

y

Frequency

Q1Impa

ct


Q2 IncidentsQ2 incidents are infrequent and severe--a dangerous combination. The lack of frequency often means that protocols, tools & equipment, procedures may not be in place, & personnel may not have developed KSAs. These reasons make Q2-type incidents the ideal models for training and exercise.

Q1 (+,+)

Q4 (-,+)

Q2 (+,-)

Q3 (-,-)

SEVERITY


High+

+-

Severit

y

Frequency

Q2

Impa

ct


Q3 IncidentsQ3 incidents are neither severe nor frequent, and rise only to the level of "occasional nuisance." Few resources or attention should be devoted to Q3 problems.

Q1 (+,+)

Q4 (-,+)

Q2 (+,-)

Q3 (-,-)

SEVERITY


High+

+-

Severit

y

Frequency

Q3

Impa

ct


Q4 IncidentsQ4 issues are not severe, though frequent. These often justify improvement/mitigation projects to decrease frequency of occurrence, thus converting them to Q3 occasional nuisances.

Q1 (+,+)

Q4 (-,+)

Q2 (+,-)

Q3 (-,-)

SEVERITY


High+

+-

Severit

y

Frequency

Q4

Impa

ct


Q5 Incidents

These are “Wild Card” or “Black Swan” incidents. Whether local or global, these incidents are profoundly severe in some aspect of their nature that they change the society, the culture, or even the course of human life/history.

Severit

y

Frequency

Impa

ct

Q5


Q6 Incidents

Impa

ct

Severit

y

Frequency

Q6

These incidents are not severe or frequent, but they are impactful—typically cultural or attitudinal. (Example: Kennedy assassination, Woodstock, moon landing, etc.)


What are “Black Swan” and “Wildcard” Incidents?

• “Low probability, high impact [incidents] that, were they to occur, would severely impact the human condition” (John Peterson, “Out of the Blue”);

• “…An [incident] that is believed to be of low probability of materializing but if it does…will produce a harm so great and sudden as to seem discontinuous with the flow of events that preceded it” (Richard A. Posner,

“Catastrophe”;


What are you saying?

• When we say “Low probability…” we typically add the qualifying elliptical clauses, “…in my lifetime” and/or “…in my experience;”

• Catastrophes on a global scale are an established part of earth’s history;

• “Low probability” is more appropriately “Unknown probability” in many cases.


LF/HS Incident Characteristics• (Usually) Sudden onset• May be foreseeable or not, warning or not• Solutions (if any) are often complex• Difficult to visualize; Hard to imagine response• Punctuations in the system• Can originate anywhere, but effect everywhere• Can be driven by perceptions• Can be either/both positive and negative• Difficult to convince others


LF/HS Incident Characteristics (Cont’d)• Can catalyze or have synergistic effects on

other wildcards• We are inventing the possibility of new

wildcards• Some wildcards are “too big to let happen”• Challenge conventional wisdom, the

“official future”• Are game-changers in the biggest sense


Four Rules for W/BS:

• If you don’t think about wildcards before they happen, all of the value of thinking about them is lost!

• Understanding how to think about problems is as important (or more!) than solving all problems.

• Accessing and understanding information beforehand is key!

• Extraordinary events require extraordinary approaches.


Part 2: Understanding the Obstacles

The Law of Apocalyptic Limitation: “No prediction of doomsday can be accurate except the last one.”


Why Do We Fail to Prepare for Wildcard (Q2/Q5) Incidents?

1. The nature of human cognition– Shared mental models of how the world works– Difficulty of discounting the value of events that will

take place in the indeterminate future2. Poor or missing incentives to prepare– Hedging against the future is costly– Long-term payoff vs. immediate comfort

3. Institutional barriers– Solutions require collective action where there is no

basis for trust– No theory of sharing the load, pooling resources or

decision-making authority


17 Reasons…4. Imagination costs: mental exertion to think

about what we have not experienced5. Induction fallacy (“I’ve never seen a black swan,

therefore they do not exist”)6. Optimism bias/technological optimism7. Short-sighted world view (20thvs. 21st century)8. Short-term world view (“Not in my lifetime…”9. Confusing “frequency” and “probability”10. Chicken Little Syndrome (“doomsters”)


17 Reasons…(cont’d)11. Full plates: tyranny of the urgent12. Resource scarcity13. Cultural Conditioning (e.g., “science fiction,”

optimism backlash)14. “One Risk at a time” fallacy (Either/Or thinking)15. Dominant risk fallacy: “If risk A is > B, no

attention should be paid to B.”16. “Probability Neglect”—inability to respond

rationally to very-low-probability risks.17. Collective action difficulties


What do you think?

“A related distinction to bear in mind is between notional and motivational belief. It is possible to affirm a proposition on which one would never act, simply because the proposition was not felt deeply enough to impel action. Everyone knows that he or she will die someday, but a great many people do not act as if they know it.”


What Do You Think?

“Imaginative thinking must also be able to cope with issues that are possible but are also, by their nature, unthinkable. Perhaps their consequences would be horrible…[perhaps] not so bad anyway. Hope vacates judgment. The faster we get over denial, the sooner we can deal with the issue.”


Part 3: Understanding Our Options

“In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is.” --Yogi Berra

Like Mt. Rushmore from the Canadian side:

You know, there are some things that you just never think of...


The Role of Agency Mission

• The more critical your organization’s mission to life, health and well-being, the more time, resources and variety of your Q2 planning.

• In a crisis, should your agency do more, or less, or the same?

• Is there ever a time when it is appropriate/ acceptable to turn out the lights and go home? (BOKYAG Principle)


Response 1: Environmental Scanning

• Purposeful/Intentional monitoring of the internal and external environments.

• Reaching out to individuals and sources from multiple disciplines who think differently and use a variety of filters to make sense of information (open source fusion).

• Used for detecting early signs of both opportunities and threats.


Environmental Scanning Frameworks

• Three Questions:– What are the three most important wildcards for me,

my family, community, society or organization?– Can they be anticipated?– Is there anything we can do to prepare?

• STEEP Model: social, technological, environmental, economic and political.

• “Scenario thinking”• “Choice Structuring”


Response 2: Be Imaginative and Systematic

• Deal with the paradox.• EMs should routinely examine themselves:

“What am I not seeing?”• Practice changing before you have to.• Allot/Guard some wildcard reflection and

planning time.• Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety: “The

capacity to accommodate environmental change depends on the variety available inside the organization.”


• Wildcards are by their nature “unthinkable.”• EMs should guard against blinders that

affect others• EMs should develop strategies for making a

case for some form of wildcard planning• “Eyes wide open” because we do not know

from where the next threat will come.

Response 3: Be Open-Minded


• Ability to survive in the long-term; bending without breaking; “ evolvable.”

• Capability to turn threats into opportunities prior to their becoming either.

• Defining dimensions are resourcefulness, robustness, and adaptiveness– Resourcefulness: “Work-arounds” for technology– Robustness: Redundancy and diversification– Adaptiveness: “Big Chief tablets and fat pencils”

• “Resilience Gap” Analysis: Fault Tree – “The world becoming more turbulent faster than we can build

our resilience.”– “The essence of being resilient is to learn without experience.”

Response 4: Strategic Resilience


• Imaginative thinking• Resource-scarce innovation• Robust design• Adaptive fitness• Sisu (collective toughness, inner

strength—scrapiness!)

5 Requisites of a Resilient Org


People Factors

·Training/Specialty/Certification·Appropriate Authority/ Licensure·Number Sufficiency

AND

· Safety/Health/Nature of Threat· Mobility/Access Dependent· Communication Dependent· Client/Customer Centeredness (e.g., clients

present vs. evacuated)· Administrative Support Dependant· Urgency/Danger to Clients· Task Volume/Calls for Service· Adversarial/Non-Adversarial/Regulatory· Public/Transparency of Government

Tools Factors

· Computer/Internet vs. Paper Record(s)· Telephone/Cell Phone· Vehicle Appropriate for the Circumstance· Shields/Barriers Available· Facilities/Office Space· Access to System Records (secondary)· Stocked Resources (diapers, formula, car

seats, walking canes, etc.)

Performance Factors(How Well/To What Degree)

· State and Federal Statutory Mandate· Mission Essential Functions· Business Continuity Plans and

Measures· Necessary to "Safeguard Life and

Health"· Favorable Public Opinion

AND

Resource Requirements: What Do We Need to Function?

Circumstances Factors

AND

ANDAND

People Factors

·Training/Specialty/Certification·Appropriate Authority/Licensure·Number Sufficiency

AND

· Safety/Health/Nature of Threat· Mobility/Access Dependent· Communication Dependent· Client/Customer Centeredness (e.g., clients

present vs. evacuated)· Administrative Support Dependant· Urgency/Danger to Clients· Task Volume/Calls for Service· Adversarial/Non-Adversarial/Regulatory· Public/Transparency of Government

Tools Factors

· Computer/Internet vs. Paper Record(s)· Telephone/Cell Phone· Vehicle Appropriate for the Circumstance· Shields/Barriers Available· Facilities/Office Space· Access to System Records (secondary)· Stocked Resources (diapers, formula, car

seats, walking canes, etc.)

Performance Factors(How Well/To What Degree)

· State and Federal Statutory Mandate· Mission Essential Functions· Business Continuity Plans and

Measures· Necessary to "Safeguard Life and

Health"· Favorable Public Opinion

AND

Resource Requirements: What Do We Need to Function?

Circumstances Factors

AND

ANDAND


What do you think?

“The more varied and intense the challenges that the organization can cope with, the more robust it is. Robustness is the capacity to accommodate multiple, different futures.” Liisa Valikangas


Questions?

That’s All Folks!!!

References:Peterson, John L., Out of the BluePosner, Richard A., Catastrophe: Risk and ResponseTaleb, N., The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable

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low frequency/high severity incidents: black swan or red herring? texas emergency management...

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q2 incidents

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frequency of occurrence

lack of frequency