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Community Integration and Policies among Elites in Two Border Cities: Los dos LaredoAuthor(s): John W. Sloan and Jonathan P. WestSource: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Nov., 1976), pp.451-474Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174991

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JOHN W. SLOANDepartment f PoliticalScienceUniversity f HoustonHouston, Texas 77004JONATHAN P. WESTDepartment f PublicAdministrationUniversity f ArizonaTucson,Arizona85271

COMMUNITY INTEGRATION AND POLICIESAMONG ELITES IN TWO BORDER CITIES

Los dos Laredo

A number of excellent studies of the U.S.-Mexican borderhave indicated that the border is occasionally a barrier but moreoften a permeable membrane through which goods, services,and people can filter.' Employment practices and reciprocaltrade across the border, together with tourism, have inc-reasedthe need for policy cooperation among the jurisdictionallydistinct but functionally integrated border communities. Ourstudy represents an exploratory effort to find out how bordercities are responding to this imperative of greater policycooperation despite the presence of an international boundary.We selected the cities of Laredo and Nuevo Laredo for our firstanalysis of policy cooperation because our preliminary investi-gations of twin cities had persuaded us that relations betweenthe Laredos were numerous, complex, and friendly. The twoAUTHORS' NOTE: The authors would like to thank the Instituto Technologico inMonterrey, the Institute for Urban Studies at the University of Houston, and theTinker Foundation for supporting this research.Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 18 No. 4, November 1976? 1976 Sage Publications, Inc.

[451]


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CAUSALACrORS COEconomic Interdependence Level of Cormunity:Retail SalesBridge Traffic 1. Numberand scopeImports-exports informal agreemTourism 2. Friendly attitudetoward their couElite Communications Network:Common anguage 3. Friendly attitudeOfficial Contact Patterns toward the peoplSocial, Professional, BusinessContact Patterns 4. Belief of officialShared Information Sources of twin cities

5. Belief of publicthat the well-beiVulnerability: interdependentGeographical IsolationFear of External Decision-Makers

Figure 1: Factors Influencing the Maintenance of A Pro-Business Community in the Two Lar


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Sloan, West / TWO BORDER CITIES [4531cities were obviously interdependent; the incentives to achieve acooperative community appearedto be strong.

Two teams of researchers, one from the University ofHouston and one from the Instituto Tecnologico in Monterrey,Mexico interviewed public officials in both cities between June1974 and August 1974.2 We used a revised version of aquestionnaire originally developed by Friesema (1971) for hisstudy of political cooperation in the Quad City area of Illinoisand Iowa. We personally interviewed 129 governmentaldepart-ment heads (at the federal, state, and local levels) and locallyelected officials in both cities, using our version of Friesema'squestionnaire. We also conducted 75 open-ended interviewswith locally influential citizens-e.g., chamber of commerceofficials, bankers, newspaper people, and the like-who hadbeen identified by respondents as having influence on publicdecisions in their respective cities. Finally, we tried to get abetter historical perspective on our subject by reviewing theLaredo Times newspaper from January 1950 to August 1974.Our -first research task was to designate the types andfrequency of interactions among public officials in both cities.Our second researchobjective was to examine the consequencesof interaction among the political elites of the two Laredos.Here we identified those subject areas where cooperation doesand does not exist between the two cities. In addition wemeasured the attitudes of officials in both cities to determinewhether (1) officials who are in regularcontact with each otherexpress friendly feelings toward one another; (2) officials whoare in regular contact with each other express friendly feelingstoward the people of the other city; (3) officials believe that thepolicy goals of each city are essentially compatible; and (4)officials believe that the well-being of the two cities isinterdependent. In essence, we are stipulating that the existenceof a viable border community will be reflected by: (1) behavior,as measured by policy cooperation; and (2) attitudes, asmeasured by friendly feelings and the sharedbelief that what isgood for one city is frequently good for both.Ourargumentessentially is summarizedin Figure 1.


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[454] JOURNALOF INTERAMERICANTUDIESANDWORLDAFFAIRSTheEconomic Interdependenceof Laredo and Nuevo Laredo

In 1755, Spaniards founded the city of Laredo along thebanks of the Rio Grande about 150 miles west of the Gulf ofMexico. When the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo terminated theMexican War in 1848 and established the Rio Grande as theinternational boundary Laredo became part of the UnitedStates and Mexico established Nuevo Laredo on the south sideof the river across from Laredo. Today Laredo is a city of75,000 people, 85 percent of whom are of Mexican-Americandescent. Laredo is an unusual Texas city in that membersof theMexican-American population are heavily represented in theeconomic and political elite. Most of the population is bilingual,and the relations between Anglos and the Mexican-Americanpopulation are exceptionally friendly. In 1970, Nuevo Laredohad a population of 151,253 and an annualgrowth rate that hasaveraged about 4.5 percent during the past 20 years. Over 33percent of Nuevo Laredo's population are migrants who havebeen attracted to the border city because of the comparativelybetter jobs and living conditions available there and theopportunities to attain legal or illegal jobs in the United States.Laredo has a strong mayor-council form of government witheight aldermen elected for four-year terms. The city is domi-nated by a traditional political machine, called the IndependentClub, which has controlled local politics for almost a century.In this city of chronically high unemployment, the IndependentClub wins elections because it controls patronage in the publicsphere and influences the job market in the privatesector. Thepresent mayor, J. C. "Pepe" Martin, was elected to his sixthfour-year term in April 1974, receiving 5,170 votes against hisopponent's 783 votes. There is no majorpolitical opposition toMayor Martin, but there is growing criticism from progressivebankers, businessmen, and the Laredo Times-especially sincethe closing in September 1973 of the local U.S. Air ForceBase-that the city administration ought to modernize itself inorder to promote the economic growth that Laredo sodesperately needs.


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Sloan,WestJ TWOBORDERCITIES 4551The municipio of Nuevo Laredo is located in the state ofTamaulipas and is governed by a popularly elected municipal

president (mayor) and six councilmen, all- of whom serve fornonrenewable three-year terms. As is true in most of Mexico,local elections are usually won by the official party of theMexican revolution, the Institutional Revolutionary Party(PRI). Seats on the municipal council are usually apportionedamong the three sectors of the corporate-based PRI: thepeasants, labor, and the popular sector. As is well known, localgovernment in Mexico is severely restricted by the national andstate governments.The economies of both Laredos are dominated by twofactors: poverty and geographical location.3 In Laredo, lowwages, high unemployment, and poor schooling combine tokeep many families at the poverty level. Wages are kept low bythe lack of jobs, the availability of both legal and illegal cheaplabor from Mexico, and the lack of effective unions. Theunemployment rate, usually the highest in the state of Texas,fluctuates widely between a rate of 10 percent when Laredo'smigratory workers are away engaged in their seasonal employ-ment, and 15 or 20 percent when they return.< he 1970 Censusreported that of the 14,535 families in Laredo, 30.4 percenthad incomes that were below the poverty level. The lack of anadequate tax base due to such a high percentage of itspopulation living below the poverty level, means that the cityhas difficulty in'raising sufficient revenue to provide some ofthe most elementary urbanservices. For example, almost half ofthe city's 210 miles of streets are unpaved.In Nuevo Laredo, according to the Mexican Census of 1970,less than 4 percent of the economically active population earns$400 a month. The unemployment rate is somewhere between20 and 30 percent. However, wages and living conditions arebetter in Nuevo Laredo than in the interior of Mexico; thus, thecity continues to attract a steady stream of migrants. Moreover,many of the residents in Nuevo Laredo work in Laredo, wherethey earn wages that are frequently considerably higher thanthe usual wages in Mexico. According to Dillman (1970), 31percent of the wages earned by the residents of Nuevo Laredo


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[456] JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSare earned as workers in Laredo. In short, the job-scarceeconomy of Nuevo Laredo is dependent upon having access tothe jobs and higher wages availablein Laredo.The wealth generated in both Laredoscomes from their beinggateways along the Pan American Highway to their respectivenations. Their location makes them interdependent; no othercity with a population of more than 50,000 lies within 100miles of either of the two Laredos. The elites of both cities areaware that they would be literally stranded in the desert ifcommerce and tourism were blocked across the InternationalBridge that connects them. The magnitudeof these transactionsis reflected by the fact that there were 10,235,864 people whopaid tolls to cross the bridge from Laredo to Nuevo Laredo in1973. The Laredo Bridge Commission was thus able tocontribute $842,892 of its profits to the tax-starved Laredotreasury-a sum which constitutes almost one-fifth of the city's1973-1974 budget. Obviously the border is the life-sustainingartery of both Laredos, and Laredo, in cooperation with theMexicangovernment, is now building a second bridge.Less well known is the fact that Laredo is the United States'number one landlocked port in annual value of importations,while Nuevo Laredo is the major port of entry for U.S. goodsbeing exported to Mexico. In 1967, the value of imports fromMexico passingthrough Laredo totaled $206 million; by 1973 ithad reached $723 million. Similarly, the value of imports fromthe United States passing through Nuevo Laredo had increasedfrom $469,844 in 1965 to $1,020,084,468 in 1973 (Secretariode Industriay Comercio, 1974: 69). In 1973 the port of Laredohandled 108,000 railroad cars for the Missouri Pacific Railroadand the Texas-Mexican Railway, and over 2,000 trucks perweek (Mantrop, 1974). This trade grew steadily throughout the1960s and is expected to double within the next three years. Toexpedite this growth, business leaders on both sides of theborder in early 1974 created the Los Dos Laredos PortCommission. There are also plans to make use of the abandonedU.S. Air Force Base so that Laredo can become a major aircargocenter for the entire WesternHemisphere.


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Sloan, West / TWO BORDER CITIES [457]Laredo's location has also helped the city to become aleading retail shopping center for residents from all of North-

western Mexico and a service center (motels, gas stations,restaurants) for U.S. tourists on their way to Mexico. Merchantsin Laredo advertise in Mexican newspapers, accept pesos, andcan even promise delivery within Mexico. The combination ofMexican shoppers and U.S. tourists helps Laredo retail stores tohave more dollar volume per square foot of floor space thanmost stores in major cities such as New York, Dallas, orHouston. In 1974, Laredo retailers employed 20 percent of thelabor force and were expected to do $250 million worth ofbusiness while contributing more than $2 million in sales taxesto the city treasury.Nuevo Laredo's most obvioussource of income is derived fromU.S. tourists, who stream across the bridge and spend theirdollars in curio shops, liquor stores, restaurants, bars, andbrothels.4 In 1973, 376,634 tourists visited Nuevo Laredo.These tourists generate the bulk of the demand for the 1,448commercial establishments, which employ 12,391 persons-thelargestsource of employment in Nuevo Laredo.In summary, we can make the following generalizationsabout the two Laredos. These contiguous cities have separatepolitical systems but the mutual acceptability of each nation'scurrency, reciprocal trade, tourism, and employment practiceshave created a highly integrated economy which encompassesboth cities. In Laredo the poverty and unemployment rates arehigh for the United States, while in Nuevo Laredo the rates arerelatively low for Mexico. Most important, the wealth withinthis integrated economy is dependent on uninhibited commerceand tourist trade across the Rio Grande.

The EliteCommunications Network

The above economic factors create incentives to cooperateacross the border, and cooperation requires communication.One of our research tasks, therefore, was to enumerate the


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[458] JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSprocesses and patterns of contact among twin-city publicofficials which facilitate such cooperation between jurisdic-tionally distinct political systems. Our questionnaire was de-signed to answer the following questions. What is the extent,mode, and subject of contacts between public officials in bothcities? What is the role of professional, social, business, andpersonal associations as an arena for promoting better com-munity relations between the two cities? And, finally, to whatextent are officials on one side of the border awareof municipalactivities on the other side?Evidence of direct official communication between twin-cityofficials is important as an indicator of transgovemmentalrelations and as a potential integrative mechanism. All 129 ofthe elected and appointed officials interviewed in the twoLaredos were asked whether they personally had had any phonecalls, face-to-face meetings, or mail correspondence with sister-city officials in the course of their work within the last year.Table 1 reports their responses. Seventy-eight, or 60 percent,had personal dealings in the course of their work with officialsfrom the sister city. The primary mode of contact is inface-to-face meetings and phone conversations, with mailcorrespondence occurring ess frequently.

TABLEPersonal Contact with Sister City Officials inthe Course of Work for Officials of Each Jurisdiction

LAREDO NU) LAREDO BOMMDEF (XINKNICATION Yes No Yes No Yes NoPhone conversations with 49% 51% 57% 43% 52% 48%officials in sister city (38) (40) (29) (22) (67) (62)Face-to-face meetings 51% 49% 55% 45% 53% 47%with officials in sister (40) (38) (28) (23) (68) (61)cityMail correspondence with 31% 69% 31% 69% 31% 69%officials in sister city (24) (54) (16) (35) (40) (89)Extent of contact with 59% 41% 63% 37% 60% 40%sister city* (46) (32) (32) (19) (78) (51)

*Respondents were included in this category if they indicated contact via any of thethree modes of communication.


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Sloan, West / TWOBORDER CITIES [4591For each relationship mentioned by twin-city officials, theywere asked how frequently they had been in contact with their

counterparts within the past year. Table 2 reports the responsesto this question. Seventy-eight percent of the relations occurredmore than once; half (49 percent) of these occurred more oftenthan 12 times within the last year. Laredo officials perceivedthat the source of initiation came as often from the Laredosideas the Nuevo Laredo side. Nuevo Laredo officials, on the otherhand, perceived the initiation of contact coming from their sidemore often than from the Laredo side.Respondents who had been in contact with sister-cityofficials were asked about assistance matters, social festivities,law enforcement, immigration (legal and illegal), the inter-national bridge, personal and business concerns, health, educa-tion, and fire control. When asked whether, in previous years,they or someone in their office had been in contact withofficials in the sister city on the same or similar types ofsubjects, 93 respondents (85 percent) said there had beencontact on these subjects in other years. Thus, the overallpattern of intergovernmental activity within the Laredo-NuevoLaredo metropolitan area cannot accurately be characterizedasad hoc, since interjurisdictional relationships in various func-tional areas are frequent, and the contacts deal with relatedsubjects which recur over time.

TABLEFrequency of Personal Contact Between Governmental Officials in LaradoandNuevo Laredo in the Course of Work in the Last YearFREQUENCY LAREDO NUEMOAREDO TOTAL* PERCENTOnly once 5 4 9 12%Upon two occasions 4 6 10 13%Six or fewer occasions 11 5 16 21%Twelve or fewer occasions 2 2 4 5%More often than twelve 23 14 37 49%

TOTALS 45 31 76 100%*The difference in the total N for Tables 1 and 2 is explained by the failure of tworespondents to specify the frequency of their contact.


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[460] JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSTo assess the integrative role of professional and govern-mental associations, officials in both cities were asked whether

they were members of, or active in, any professional interestassociations or general municipal organizations in which theymet with sister-city officials. Approximately one-fourth of oursample in each city indicated activity in such organizations; andof those who were active, three-fourths had attended one ormore activities of these groups during the past 12 months. Arelated question was asked concerning membership and activityin social, civic, or fraternal organizations in which officials metwith people working in the other government. Over half of theLaredo respondents and 40 percent of the Nuevo Laredoofficials were members or active in social, civic, or fraternalgroups. Over three-fourths of the officials in both cities whobelonged and participated in such groups had attended groupactivities in the past year in which they met with sister-cityofficials. Apparently social organizationsprovide the setting forexchange among twin-city officials more often than do profes-sional or municipal associations.Many of our informants claimed that this web of social andpersonal relationships is a crucial factor in explaining theachievement of public cooperation. For example, the LaredoCity Secretary said, "We [officials from both cities] are able toget together on a social basis, and, through this, we can meetpeople and work out problems that might arise in matterspertaining to municipal business." A narcotics officer in theWebb County Sheriff's office made a similar point: "If youpersonally know who to go to on the other side, then, when aproblem comes up, you contact them." A Laredo civic leadersuggested, however, that it was not sufficient to know the nameof the relevant officials in the neighboring city: "It is good forbusiness as well as good for friendship to know and be tied toinfluential people on the other side. It is not just knowing theguy's name, but being part of the family." In addition, hestressed, "you have to know the rules of Mexico and how tooperate within these rules." The most important of these rulesis that one does not call upon a friend only when there is aproblem.


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Sloan, West / TWO BORDER CITIES [4611The structured and open interviews revealed that both elitesconsciously employed social relations to promote a pro-business

sense of community. The emphasis on community solidaritywas institutionalized beginning in 1897 with the annualcelebrations of George Washington's birthday (February 22), inwhich officials and prominent citizens from Nuevo Laredo areinvited to cross the river and participate, and Mexico'sIndependence Day (September 16) when the reverse is true.These elaborate celebrations are important to both elites; theywere mentioned more often than any other example ofcooperation between the two elites. Everyone agreed that thefestivities helped promote good personal relations betweenprominent citizens. In the words of a county official, "Socialrelations create good will, and good will stimulates business."Officials in both cities were asked whether they tried to keeptrack of current municipal government activities in the sistercity. In reply, nearly two-thirds of the officials in each city saidthey do. Table 3 reports the sources of information most oftenrelied upon in keeping track of municipal activities across theborder. According to their importance they are: (1) newspapers,radio, and television reports; (2) discussions and privateconversations with people who live in the sister city; -(3)personal inspections; (4) information made by one's own cityofficials; and (5) published reports of the sister city.

Because they keep track of each other's activities, over 60percent of the officials we interviewed could identify at leastone official or influential citizen across the river. Moreimportant, they had some understanding of how each other'spolitical system operates. In many of our interviews withLaredo officials they would explain to us some complexphenomenon such as how the spoils system works in NuevoLaredo in which every three years there would be a virtuallycomplete turnover in top-level personnel and correspondingerratic shifts in policy emphasis and rule interpretations.Similarly, our Mexican interviewers were impressedwhen publicofficials in Nuevo Laredo could explain to them that the delayin the construction of the second international bridge was notthe fault of Laredo officials, but was due to the bureaucratic


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[462] JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSsquabbling among different agencies in Washington. In brief,this knowledge helped both elites to be acutely sensitive towardeach other's problems and thus fostered policy cooperation.The Vulnerabilityof Laredo and Nuevo Laredo

The previous section has described an elite communicationsnetwork which transcends the border in much the same way asthe economy. Because of this network, the elites in both citiesare knowledgeable about their economic interdependence andhow vulnerable they are to anything that might inhibit the freeflow of commerce, and tourism. In our interviews we werestruck by how often members of the elite would use the samephrase or quote the same statistics concerning either commerceor tourism. Elites in both cities frequently told us "We are bothin the same boat" or "We'd be a cow-town without goodrelations across the river." Both elites knew how many U.S.tourists traveled across the bridge last year, how dependentLaredo retailers were on Mexican customers, how many NuevoLaredoans were working in Laredo, and what percentage of the

TABLESources of Information Used by Officials in KeepingTrack of Municipal Activities in Sister CityaSOURCE LAREDO NUEVOAREDOTOTAL PERCENTNewspaper, radio, and TV 43 22 65 37%reportsInformation made by your 12 7 19 11%own city's officialsPublished reports of sister 10 5 15 8%cityDiscussions and private con-versations with people wholive in sister city 43 9 52 30%Personal inspections 19 7 26 15%

TOTALS 127 50 177 101%a. Respondents were allowed to select more than one answer.


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Sloan, West / TWO BORDER CITIES [463]wages earned by Mexican laborers who commute across thebridge each day to work in Laredo were eventually spent inLaredo. They also knew they were vulnerableto external forcesover which they could exercise little control. This vulnerabilitywas ably expressed to us by an elderly former city attorney whostressed that "We live dangerously here in Laredo. We aresubject to floods, droughts, the Mexican government and theUnited States government." What frightened both elites is thebelief that outsiders-especially policy makers in Washington,D.C. and Mexico City-do not understand the uniqueness of theborder. The elites were fearful that risingeconomic nationalismin Mexico and growing U.S. concern about illegal aliens anddrug smuggling might cause national policy makers to makedecisions that would have disastrous consequences for thehighly interdependent and vulnerable economies of the twoLaredos. In recognition of this vulnerability, one particularlysuccessful Laredo politician emphasized that intelligent borderpolitics required one not only to have nurturedstrong personalties across the river, but also to both state capitals and thenational governments in Washington,D.C. and Mexico City.This shared sentiment of vulnerability explains why bothelites displayed an acute sensitivity about criticizing eachother's government. Indeed, one of our problems was that mostof our informants were extremely reluctant to admit that therewere any disputes between the two cities. Whenwe questionedan editor at the Laredo Times about this, he replied, "You willnever read any criticism of Mexico or Nuevo Laredo in theLaredo Times. We have one-third of our circulation in Mex-ico.... Most of our advertisers are very dependent uponMexicans." Several informants emphasized that they hadlearned that criticizing the other side's government or policieswas simply counterproductive in achieving cooperation. Whenthere were disputes over such issues as the bridge or U.S. effortsto stop drug smuggling, the blame for their existence wasusually placed on "outside" policy makers in Washington,D.C.or Mexico City.The crucial point is that both elites recognize that their citiesare more economically and socially integrated with one another


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[464] JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSthan they are with their respective nations. The combination ofrecognized interdependence and recognized vulnerability havecreated great incentives to develop communication channels inorder to achieve the cooperation necessary for both elites toprosper.

The Level of CommunityWhile both cities maintain their separate-political existence,the elites of each city, through a combination of economicinterdependence, a well-developed communications network',and shared feelings of vulnerability, have developed a sense ofcommunity that transcends the two political jurisdictions. Thelevel of community is first reflected in the number of informalagreements covering a variety of policy areas between publicofficials in both cities.The agreements which result from interlocal governmentalnegotiations are frequently reflected in informal operatingprocedures and practicesratherthan in'more formalized writtenagreements of interlocal contracts. The development of writtenagreements between the two municipal governments is compli-cated by the presence of the international boundary and thedifferent legal systems in each nation. When interviewers were

asked to rank three factors (personalities, cultural restraints,an'd egal restraints) that they believe impeded-the extension ofpolicy cooperation between the two cities, respondents in bothcities ranked legal restraints as the most significant obstacle. InNuevo Laredo,' 59 percent of officials ranked legal restraints asthe most significant, 28 percent said cultural restraints were themost important, and 13 percent said personalities were thegreatest obstacle to cooperation. Laredo officials overwhelm-ingly (76 percent) agreed that legal restraints were mostsignificant, but they ranked personalities (18 percent) ahead ofculturalrestraints(6 percent).To circumvent legal impediments, both elites have avoidedformal bicity institutions and formal agreements and relied oninformal agreements or "stable understandings." These agree-


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Sloan, West / TWOBORDER CITIES [4651ments evolved within various functional or service areasof localgovernment and are viewed as binding by parties on both sidesof the border. The most frequently mentioned examples of suchagreements were in the areas of fire control, law enforcement,education, and health care. When the fire department in onecity requests aid from fire fighters across the border, it is sentwithout delay. The Laredo fire chief estimated that he had sentmen and equipment across the border in response to a requestmore than six times in the past year, and that Nuevo Laredofiremen had been sent to assist him three or four times in thelast 12 months. Typically Laredo needed help in containinggrass fires, while Nuevo Laredo frequently requested aid toassist with large warehouse fires. Prior to 1973, there werepotential legal problems concerning the coverage of pensionsand death benefits for firemen who were injuredor killed whileperforming their duties across the border. However, speciallegislation passed in 1973 by the Texas legislature, andbuttressed by an opinion of the Texas Attorney General,insuresthat firemen are eligible for coverage and benefits under thesecircumstances. The mutual aid between departments has notbeen limited to emergencies;it has also involved trainingcoursesin first aid, fire fighting techniques, handling of dangerouschemicals, and fire prevention. Fire department representativeson both sides of the border claimed that they had never beenrefused any assistance from their counterparts across theborder.Mutual aid "understandings"or agreements also evolved inthe area of law enforcement. The type of aid differs dependingon the nature of the law enforcement problem and thecooperation is likely to involve officials from various levels ofgovernment on both sides of the border. A few examplesillustrate how these agreements operate. When U.S. fugitivesescape into Mexico, American officials contact their Mexicancounterparts and pass on relevant information concerning theoffense. Mexican officials apprehendthe fugitive-and arrangetoturn him over on the international bridge. He is releasedin thecustody of U.S. officials and prosecuted in this country.Another pattern is that U.S. officials gain intelligence on illegal


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[466] JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSactivities in Mexico. This information is conveyed to Mexicanofficials who obtain warrantsand conduct raids with whateverassistance U.S. officials can give. A major problem along theborder is the retrieval from Mexico of stolen property whichranges from petty shoplifting by juveniles to well-organizedrings of car thieves. The Laredo police and U.S. insurancefirmshave worked out informal agreements whereby the NuevoLaredo police help retrieve the stolen property and in returnreceive a mordida (bribe) in the form of either cash ($25 to$200) or firearms (which are terribly expensive in Mexico). Ingathering intelligence about smugglingand stolen property, U.S.undercover agents work across the border as do informersreporting to U.S. authorities. A final example in which informalagreements are evident is in the area of immigration. A numberof Central Americans enter Mexico legally and then attempt toenter illegally the United States. While Mexico is not legallycompelled to take back such aliens, they have agreedwith U.S.officials to do so, thereby saving the United States the expense oftransporting the aliens back to their country of origin. Theseexamples indicate that, in addition to an extradition treatybetween the United States and Mexico, there are a number ofroutinized procedures, informal agreements, or "stable under-standings" which influence the working relationships of lawenforcement officials on both sidesof the border.

In addition to exchanging information and law vialators, lawenforcement officials in both cities occasionally loan or borrowequipment and personnel. Laredo officials mentioned loaningthe following items when they were requested by sister-cityofficials: walkie-talkies, binoculars, firearms, tear gas, radios,and automobiles. On occasion, U.S. helicopters and airplaneshave been requested to assist with a search for fugitives oraccident victims and, at other times, highly qualified personnel(e.g., fingerprint teams and photographic experts) have crossedthe borderto aidthe sistercity.In health care, it is estimated that over 50 percent ofLaredo's physicians were trained in Mexico, and that about 10percent of their patients come from Nuevo Laredo. Laredo'slargest hospital follows a policy of treating anyone who needs


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Sloan, West / TWO BORDER CITIES [4671service, regardless of citizenship or city of residence. Onoccasion, physicians from one city will refer patients ormedications to physicians across the border. A few physiciansacknowledged that some of their cooperation with colleaguesacross the border was extralegal, but they felt it was necessaryin selected instances. While not an example of an informalagreement per se, it is interesting to note that the firstinternational "Dr. Dial" program in preventive dentistry wasimplemented in the two Laredos. The major concept underlyingthe "Dr. Dial" program is the utilization of communitychannels-television, radio, newspaper, telephone, and person-to-person-for public education on dental health. News mediaencourage the public to call "Dr. Dial" for a recorded healthmessage, available night and day. The Laredo dentist whohelped develop the international program, in cooperation withthe Director of Dentistry of the Mexican Ministryof Health anda Nuevo Laredo dentist, said, "The bi-cultural programsdeveloped by the cooperative efforts of dentists from twonations, joining hands in a common effort to improve thequality of life for their countrymen, shallfremain as a model ofinternational health in practice."We considered it particularly significant that public healthofficials in Laredo frequently help pregnantwomen from NuevoLaredo who try to have their baby delivered in Laredo so thattheir child will be a U.S. citizen, yet there were no publiccomplaints from physicians or taxpayers. Considering thepoverty of Laredo, this is a real test of community "inclusive-ness." Similarly, many parents in Nuevo Laredo, utilizing falseaddresses of relatives or friends, send their children to thepublic schools of Laredo. The Laredo Independent SchoolDistrict's stated policy until recently was to charge $40 permonth tuition for Nuevo Laredo students who attend Laredoschools; however, overcrowding has led them to refuse admis-sion to tuition-paying students. The Laredo JuniorCollege from1954 to 1972 charged resident tuition to Nuevo Laredostudents. But pressure from a state auditor led to minimaltuition increases for out-of-district students from Nuevo La-redo. Other examples of mutual "understandings" or agree-


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[4681 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSments in education relate to student and teacher exchangeprogramsin the 'public schools and negotiations for new courseofferings to serve Nuevo Laredo student needs at Laredo JuniorCollege. In addition to the agreements mentioned above arethose relating to interlibrary loans, administration and opera-tion of the international bridge, periodic resale or transfer ofused furniture and equipmen.t from. one city to another,-'exchange of information and statistics between governmentagencies, and so forth.In brief, although there was no policy. cooperation in theareas of planning, housing, labor, taxes, or road-building, therewas considerable cooperation in the fields of customs, lawenforcement, health, education, social festivities, banking, andtourism. Officials who were questioned about why there wascooperation in their respective subject areas responded differ-ently. In the fields of customs, law, fire control, and,health, themost persistent. response was simply "mutual necessity"; theycooperated because they had to.- The primary motivation ofeducation officials, on the other hand, appeared to be a matterof normative choice. They wanted to increase cooperationamong themselves because they believed it- was good for thestudents and the community. They were the only group ofofficials who were consciously trying to expand their coopera-tive efforts. Finally, the major motivation for cooperation inthe fields of banking, promoting tourism, and celebrating eachother's holidays was utilitarian-it was good for the.businesselites of both cities. The twin-city social festivities have becomeelaborate, community rituals whose latent function -is topromote both good personal relations among public officials(with the rapid turnover of offilcials in Nuevo Laredo this isespecially important) and commercial profit.Second, the level of community is reflected in the fact thatthe overwhelming majority (more than 90 percent in each city)of the public officials who had been in regular contact withtheir counterparts in the sister city characterizedtheir personalfeelings toward such counterparts as either "friendly". or "veryfriendly." Not one single respondent characterized his feelingstoward his counterparts as "unfriendly" or "very unfriendly."


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Sloan, West / TWO BORDER CITIES [469]In brief, transactions between public officials did not causefriction; instead, they promoted friendly attitudes toward oneanother.Third, we found that the bulk of the public officials (morethan 90 percent in each city) who had been in regular contactwith their counterparts described their personal feelings towardpeople in the sister city as either '"friendly"' r "very friendly."Again, not one single respondent characterized his feelingstoward the residents of the other.city as being "unfriendly" or"very unfriendly." Over half of the respondents in each citytold us that they had close personal friends across the riverandthat the parties they gave or attended frequently includedpeople from both cities. In short, social cohesion among thetwin-city elites was not restricted by the border.Fourth,. the elites in both cities bltieved that the policy goalsof the two cities were essentially compatible. When asked toidentify the major problems of their respective cities, both eliteslisted similar problems: poverty, lack of industry, high unem-ployment, inadequate tax base, low education levels, insuffi-cient public services, and a rising crime rate. The most pressingproblem mentioned by both elites was the need for a newinternational bridge. When asked to identify the major goals ofthe twin-city area, officials in both cities tended to relate theirgoals to the problems previously listed. Respondents were thenasked -whether they. thought officials in the sister city wouldgenerally agree with their assessment. Ninety-three percent ofthe officials from both cities replied that they thought theircounterparts would agree with the twin-city goals they hadjustidentified. Over 95 percent of the respondents from both citiesthought they would need cooperation from sister-city officialsto accomplish these goals, and almost as many (92 percent)-feltthey could get the needed assistance from their counterpartstoaccomplish twin-city goals. In short, the elites in both citieswere compatible in their views toward the major problems ofthe twin cities and believed that their counterparts would beresponsivein confronting these problems.Fifth, the elites in both cities believed that the well-beingofthe two cities is inter-dependent. This belief is revealed in the


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[470] JOURNALOFINTERAMERICANTUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRSprevious paragraph where 95 percent of the public officialsacknowledged that they would need cooperation from theircounterparts in order to confront their common problems.While interdependence can be a source of friction if either sidebelieves that the other is taking unfair advantage during theirtransactions, this is not the case in the two Laredos. When weasked officials whether they believed that public officials in theneighboring city ever unfairly took advantage of them in theirmutual transactions, -over three-fourths of the officials inter-viewed said no.An example that illustrates the interdependence of the twocities is the U.S. government's short-lived "OperationIntercept"program. This program was designed to curtail the volume ofmarijuanaand dangerous drugs smuggledinto the United Statesfrom Mexico, and included extensive searches of every vehicle-crossing the border. Operation Intercept went into effect onSeptember 21, 1969 and, within an hour, traffic began to backup at all major border entry points. Massive resentment toOperation Intercept quickly built up in Mexico. The Confedera-tion' of Mexican Chambers of Commerce sponsored a counter-movement-Operation' Dignity 'to' protest the procedures ofOperation Intercept. Operation Dignity, which was strictlyvoluntary, called for Mexicans not to cross into the U.S. borderclties.

Tensions between sister cities along the border began toincrease. In Ciudad Acuna, Mexico, officials told Del Rioofficials that they had stopped all preparations for the annualfestival of friendship-between the two cities because of the drugcrackdown at the border. In Juarez, supporters of OperationDignity stationed near the international bridge urged Mexicansto stay home and to buy in Juarez. In Piedras Negras, an irateMexican built his own barricade to prevent crossings. Fourhundred Mexican citizens marched across the bridgeat Browns-ville-Matamoros shouting "Viva Mexico!" in a countermove toOperation Intercept.The two Laredos were also adversely affected by OperationIntercept as evidenced by traffic jams and delays in crossingtheinternational bridge, a decline in bridge crossings, and a drop in


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Sloan, West / TWO BORDER CITIES [4711retail sales, tourists, and hotel and motel business. Unlike otherborder cities, however, the reaction against Operation Interceptwas not as intense in Laredo-Nuevo Laredo. Employees werenot fired for being late to work because of the bridgeslowdown. Furthermore, there were no incidents caused byangry motorists waiting in the lines. The situation in the twoLaredos was calm, given the circumstances. A Laredo Chamberof Commerce official commented that "Laredo and NuevoLaredo have gone through a lot of hardships together-floods,drought, and now Intercept. As always, the two cities areworking to make the best of a bad situation." The Presidentofthe Nuevo LaredoChamberof Commerce stated that "Weknowthe people of Laredo, Texas, are not responsible for thissituation, but are caught by it just as we are. This is a federalgovernment measure." Nuevo Laredo did join Operation Dig-nity, but only on a limited basis. The Nuevo Laredo Chamber ofCommerce President explained that "Our participation is ..actually symbolic as a protest against the inspection proceduresnow in effect on the U.S. side of the international bridge,not asa retaliatory measure. This is against the inspection methodsand not against the people of Laredo, who we see as hurt by itas much as we are." Thus, despite the adverse effects on thelocal economies of both cities caused by the rigid searches,there was a sense of community prevailing throughout theentire ordeal, a situation that appeared to be atypical of theother twin cities along the border.

Summary and Conclusio-nIn conclusion, our study found that the two Laredos areeconomically interdependent, that an elite communications

network has been created across the river, and that both elitesrecognize this economic interdependence and feel vulnerabletothe caprices of external policy makers. The two cities are moreeconomically and socially integrated with each other than theyare with their respective nations. The two elites engage inpatterns of contact that are numerous, complex, friendly, and


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(4721 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSthat cover a wide range of subjects. As a result of thesecontacts, both elites are knowledgeable and sensitive about eachcity's political system. Both elites consciously use informalrather than formal agreements to achieve policy cooperation.Similarly, both elites consciously employ social interactions andcelebrations, such as Washington's Birthday, to promote goodrelations. The chief consequence of this interaction is that.theelites in both cities have learned to cooperate with each other insuch fields as law enforcement, fire control, health careprograms, educational policies, business and banking relations,and celebrating each other's principal holiday. Perhaps ourstudy can be summarized by the statement of one influentialLaredoan who explained the relationship between the twoLaredosby saying:

The two Laredos avedeveloped s aninsular ultureof necessitysincethey are 150 miles romnowhere.Theresno wayto leave, opeoplehaveturned nward.Becauseof the geographicalituation,they pull closer together to unite against adversity.... The twoLaredos re one town dividedby a river-it is an inconvenience.fthe river s an inconveniencendthe bordera formalityt is onecommunity.The two elites have thus created a community whichtranscends an international border. The two Laredosconstitutea community in the sense that, although they maintainseparatepolitical systems, they share a "we" feeling; they believe thatwhat is good for one city is good for the other, and they actaccordingly. The result of this interaction and policy coopera-tion has been friendly personal feelings toward counterpartofficials and the population across the river, which, in turn,facilitate further attempts and successes in policy cooperation.It is significant that even policy failures have not caused a

decline in the usual friendly relations that prevail between thetwo cities. The minimization of conflict over "OperationIntercept" in the two Laredos in comparison with other bordercities indicates that the level of community prevailing here hasreal and beneficial consequences.


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Sloan, West / TWO BORDER CITIES [4731However, there,are costs involved in the type of communitythat has been created in the two Laredos. Given the type of

elites in both cities, it is not surprisingthat they have created apro-business community. Our normative criticism of this com-munity integration is that it helps to maintain a way of life inboth cities but does not improve it rapidly enough for the bulkof the cities' populations who remain poor. There is now a needto move beyond a development based on tourism, retail trade,and a fortunate geographical location (in terms of commercebetween Mexico and the United States). There is some doubtwhether- the two elites will be able to generate sufficientpolitical and administrative capabilities to promote the greaterlevels of cooperation necessary to develop industry.In any case, the elites in Laredo and Nuevo Laredo havecreated and maintained a community that transcends aninternational border. Given their location in a semiarid land,their economic interdependence, and their vrulnerability toexternal policy makers, they know they must cooperate toprosper, and they do. Consideringhow few people, cities, andnations leam how to cooperate when it is evident that they"4must," his is no small accomplishment.

NOTES1. For example, see Applegateand Bath (1974), Baerresen 1971), Cardenas(1963),, Dillman(1970), Klappand Padgett(1960), Price (1973), Samora(1971),Schmitt(1974), andStoddard 1973).2. In Nuevo Laredo, the Mexican team used the Spanish version of ourquestionnairewhichwaspretestedon Chicano tudentsat the University f Houston.They conducted51 interviews n Nuevo Laredo. n Laredo, he U.S. teamconducted78 interviews in English.Telephone books, newspapers,and initial contacts withinfluentialelites providedboth teamswith a completelistingof alldepartments ndpublicoffices. An effort then wasmadeto interviewall of the department eadsandpublic officials in both'cities. Wheredepartmentheads were unavailable,we were

usuallyableto interviewanotherhigh-rankingepresentativeromthe department. nLaredo our sample comes close to including the entire universeof elected andappointed officials, while in Nuevo Laredo the Mexican team succeeded ininterviewing bout70 percentof theirdesignated ist of publicofficials.3. This may change in the near future because large gas reserves have beendiscoverednearLaredo.4. We did not study Nuevo Laredo'sessobvioussourceof incomethat it derivesfromillegalcommerce.


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[474] JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRSREFERENCES

ALISKY,M. (1965) "Thegovernorsof Mexico."SouthwesternStudiesMonograph12, Vol. III,No. 4.APPLEGATE,G. and C. R. BATH (1974) Air Pollution Along the UnitedStates-MexicoBorder.El Paso:TexasWesternPress.BAERRESEN,D. (1971) The BorderIndustrialization rogram f Mexico.Lexing-ton, Massachusetts: exingtonBooks.CARDENAS,L. (1963) "The municipalityof Northern Mexico." SouthwesternStudies1, Vol. I.D'ANTONIO,W. and W. H. FORM(1965) Influentials n Two Border Cities: AStudy on CommunityDecision-Making.outh Bend,Ind.: Univ.of Notre DamePress.DILLMAN,C. D. (1970) "Urbangrowth along Mexico'snorthernborderand theMexicannationalborderprogram." . of DevelopingAreas4 (July):480-501.FRIESEMA,H. P. (1971) MetropolitanPoliticalStructure. owa City:Univ.of IowaPress.KLAPP, E. and V. PADGETT 1960) "Powerstructureand decision-makingn aMexicanbordercity." Amer.J. of Sociology65 (January): 00406.MANTROP,. (1974) TheJournalof CommerceJune20).PRICE,J. A. (1973) Tijuana:Urbanizationn A BorderCulture.NotreDame,Ind.:Univ.of Notre DamePress.SAMORA, . (1971) Los Mojados:The WetbacksStory. Notre Dame,Ind.: Univ.ofNotreDamePress.SCHMITT,K. (1974) Mexicoandthe UnitedStates.New York:JohnWiley.Secretariode Industriay Comercio(1974) Zonas Fronterizosde Mexico: PerfilSocioeconomico.MexicoCity.STODDARD,E. (1973) MexicanAmericans.NewYork:RandomHouse.

John W.Sloan is AssociateProfessorof PoliticalScienceat the University fHouston. He has publishedarticles on Latin American integration,Inter-Americanpolitics,and Colombian olitics.Jonathan P. West is Assistant Professor of Public Administrationat theUniversity of Arizona. He is coauthor of the forthcoming Politics ofComprehensiveHealthPlanning nd has publishedarticleson healthpolicy inInquiry and Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law. Previously he wasAssistant Director, Institute for UrbanStudies and Assistant ProfessorofPoliticalScienceat the University f Houston.

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