AD-A240 002 SEMINAR ON

LOGISTICS

IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

STUDIES, CONCEPTS, AND ANALYSIS

DIVISION

J-4 DIRECTORATE

ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (OJCS)

91-09354

*19 NOVEMBER 1986

St. A per Col. Stanley Akins, TheJoint Staff, ATIN: SCAD/J-4, Wash;DC 695-9212

Per phonecon 29 Aug 91 JK

A SEMINAR REPORT

LOGISTICSIN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT '\< ,,

19 November 1986

Conducted byStudies, Concepts, and Analysis DivisionJ-4 DirectorateOrganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

0b

PREFACE

On 19 November ;986 the J-4 Studies, Concepts, and AnalysisDivision of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staffheld a one-day seminar on logistics in low intensityconflict. The seminar provided an opportunity to examinelogistic problems the United States must cope with indeveloping and providing support capabilities in lowintensity conflict. Participants included representatives ofService headquarters plus representatives of several commandsand agencies which had requested to participate in theseminar.

The seminar was productive in exchanging information amongthe Services on current initiatives, studies, and otherdevelopment efforts. In addition to logistic programs beingdeveloped to support operations in low intensity conflict,other initiatives have been undertaken that are not labeled"low intensity uonflict" but will have a significantinfluence on supportability and capabilities of militaryforces operating in this lower end of the spectrum ofconflict.,.The seminar began with a review of the low intensity conflictenvironment to establish a basic understanding of the issuesand problems involved. It identified several logisticconcerns that must be addressed in low intensity conflictplanning.

This summary of the seminar discussions is provided to assistlogistic planners in developing the required logisticconcepts, procedures, and systems to meet the challenges oflow intensity conflict. OJCS/J-4 will continue to provideassistance to the joint logistic community in this endeavor.However, discussions summarized in this report do notnecessarily reflect the position of any Service, agency, ordepartment.

RICHARD L. STONERBrigadier General, USAFDeputy Director for Plans, Concepts,

and Analysis, J-4

i

0~DCONTENS

PREFACE i

SEMINAR REPORT 1

Overview 1

Understanding Low Intensity Conflict 1Low Intensity Warfare Conference 1DIA Symposium 2Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project 2Center for Low Intensity Conflict 2Definition 3

Joint Initiatives 4USSOUTHCOM Symposium 4Logistic Systems Development Guide 4Special Operations Forces Logistics Conference 5Other Joint Initiatives 5IDA Study 6

Service Initiatives 6Field Circular 100-20 6Operational Concept 6Air Force Doctrine 7Wartime Contingency Contracting Handbook 7LICNET 7Materiel Programs 7Army Seminar 8Other Studies and Articles 8

Other Discussion 8

Characteristics 8Issues 9Conclusion 10

APPENDICESAppendix A, AqendaAppendix B, AttendanceAppendix C, Seminar Briefing SlidesAppendix D, Definition of Low Intensity ConflictAppendix E, Extracts of Joint Low Intensity Conflict

Final ReportAppendix F, Fact Sheet, Center for Low Intensity ConflictAppendix G, Briefing, Center for Low Intensity ConflictAppendix H, Briefing, Center for Low Intensity Conflict:

Peace Through ActionAppendix I, Distribution

ii

SEMINAR REPORT

Overview, A seminar on logistics in low intensity conflictwas held with Service representatives on 19 November 1986 bythe Studies, Concepts, and Analysis (SCAD) Division ofOJCS/J-4. The agenda is at Appendix A.

Approximately 20 people attended the seminar. In addition torepresentatives from the Service staffs and the Organizationof the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), other participantsincluded representatives of the Air Force LogisticsManagement Center; the US Army Logistics Center; the USArmy-US Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict; AiLUniversity Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, andEducation; and the Army Materiel Command. Two unifiedcommands -- US Central Command and US Southern Command --also provided representatives. An attendance roster is atAppendix B.

The meeting was held to discuss ideas concerning the role oflogistics in low intensity conflict and explore opportunitiesthat could lead to enhanced joint and combined logisticwarfighting capabilities. The session was also held toestablish contacts, coordinate efforts, and exchangeinformation about current initiatives being taken by theServices and the US Army-US Air Force Center for LowIntensity Conflict. Slides used in discussing the seminar'sobjectives and goals are included in the set of seminarslides at Appendix C.

UNDERSTANDING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTTo develop an understanding of issues involving low intensityconflict, the seminar began by reviewing results of previousconferences, research projects, and other related efforts.

Low Intensity Warfare Conference, A Low Intensity WarfareConference was sponsored by the Department of Defense atNational Defense University, Fort McNair, Washinqton, DC,durinq 14-15 January 1986. Prinipal speakers includedSecretary of Defense Weinberger, Secretary of State Shultz,Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and General Gorman (USA, Ret.).Conference sessions focused on the low intensity threat andmilitary response, domestic political considerations in lowintensity conflict, and civic action in low intensity

conflict. Proceedings of the conference have been publishedby the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International SecurityAffairs.

DIA Symp0niU. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) helda symposium on low intensity conflict at the DefenseIntelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base,Washington, DC, from 13 to 16 May 1986. The symposium washeld as a forum to discuss the intelligence component of lowintensity conflict. Major topics were policy and p1anningperspectives, lessons resulting from recent low intensityconflict situations, and concerns of the unified andspecified commands. A classified report of the symposium hasbeen published by DIA. Agencies interested in obtaining acopy should refer to report #DDB-2300-21-86, September 1986.

Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, on 1 July 1985 theUS Army Chief of Staff directed that the Training andDoctrine Command (TRADOC) undertake a Joint Low IntensityConflict Project. The goal was to examine low intensityconflict issues with a focus on Central America to:

O Develop a common low intensity conflict data base,

0 Develop lessons learned, and

a Identify the implications for national strategiesand their impact on military operations for low intensityconflict.

The project report was published in two volumes on 1 August1986. Volume I presents background on the environment,threat, and US policy and strategy concerning low intensityconflict. It also discusses the various types of lowintensity conflict operations and contains an analyticalreview by functional area (including logistics). Volume IIdiscusses specific recommendations for more than 60 issues.The project also established the Joint Low Intensity ConflictResource Data Base. The data base provides reference toresearch efforts, including books, articles and papers.

The chapter in Volume I of the project report that discussesthe logistic analyses, issues, and recommendations isincluded in Appendix E.

Center for Low Intensity Conflict, The US Army-US AirForce Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) was activatedat Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, on 30 January 1986. Itsformation as an Air Force center was recommended by the AirForce Innovation Task Force in February 1985 and an agreementbetween the US Air Force Chief of Staff and the US Army Chief

2

O of Staff in September 1985 led to its development as anArmy-Air Force center.

The mission of the CLIC is to improve the Army and Air Forceposture for engaging in low intensity conflict, to elevateawareness through both services of the role of military powerin low intensity conflict, and to provide an infrastructurefor eventual transition to a joint or interagency activity.Approximately 30 personnel are assigned to the CLIC to:

O Act as the Army and Air Force focal points for lowintensity conflict;

° Develop operational concepts and conduct operationalanalyses for both services; and

0 Propose initiatives for improved equipment, man-power, testing, tactics, and training.

The CLIC includes experts in several functional areas such asintelligence, security assistance, and politico-militaryaffairs. It also includes a logistics branch which addresseslogistic issues and problems. Activities of the CLIC aredirected by an Army and Air Force executive council composedof three general officers from Tactical Air Command, MilitaryAirlift Command, and Training and Doctrine Command. A factsheet on the CLIC is at Appendix F. A briefing on the CLICpresented by Major Furr is at Appendix G. An copy of anotherCLIC briefing which is included in this report for additionalinformation on the CLIC and its activities is at Appendix H.

At the meeting of the Joint Logistic Techniques andProcedures Board (JLTPB) on 29-30 October 1986 at the BelmontConference Center in Elkridge, Maryland, a briefing waspresented by the CLIC on its organization, mission, andactivities. During the meeting, the JLTPB directed that theStudies, Concepts, and Analysis Division of OJCS/J-4 maintaincontact with the CLIC in the development of joint logisticsdoctrine for low intensity conflict. Minutes of the JLTPBmeeting have been disseminated by the Logistic PlanningDivision of OJCS/J-4.

The CLIC executive committee will meet in December and mayconsider a proposal for the CLIC to develop an initialconcept for logistics in low intensity conflict that expandsthe logistics doctrine recently developed by the US Air Forceand the initial operational logistic concept developed by theUS Army Logistics Center.

Definition, The seminar also discussed various definitions

of the term "low intensity conflict," including the one which

3

was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 Ncvember 1985(see Appendix D) which is as follows:

low intensity conflict: A limited politico-militarystruggle to achieve political, social, economic, orpsychological objectives. It is often protracted andranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocialpressures through terrorism and insurgency.Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to ageographic area and is often characterized byconstraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level ofviolence. Also called LIC.

JOINT INITIATIVES

USSOUTHCOM Symposium. US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) issponsoring witi the Army Materiel Command a Low IntensityConflict Symposium during 3-5 March 1987 at the NavalTraining Center, Orlando, Florida. The symposium will beconducted with administrative support of the American DefensePreparedness Association (ADPA) and will be held as aplanning session for industry.

USSOUTHCOM's goals for the symposium are to solicitindustry's resources and innovation for developing technologyfor low intensity conflict. Specific objectives are toreview the threat, explain the nature of low intensityconflict, articulate US and allied needs, and identifyindustry opportunities.

OJCS/J-4 will discuss "Logistics Initiatives for Meeting LowIntensity Conflict Challenges" at the symposium. USSOUTHCOMhas also requested presentations from its component commands,the Army Materiel Command, the Office of the Secretary ofDefense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the StateDepartment, and other agencies on such topics as: Global LowIntensity Conflict Threat; Latin American Experience;Doctrine, Training, and Combat Development Initiatives;Security Assistance Implications; and Materiel Implications.ADPA will publish a symposium brochure when USSOUTHCOM hascompleted the agenda and other arrangements. Agenda andregistration information can be obtained from ADPA, 1700 N.Moore Street, Suite 900, Arlington, VA 22209-1942 or bycalling (703) 522-1820.

Logistic Systems Development Guide For International Use,OJCS/J-4 is sponsoring a project that has been undertaken bythe US Army Logistics Center to prepare a guide for use by USfriends and allies in examining and improving their logistic

4

systems. The guide will also be useful in assistingdeveloping nations in determining their requirements forlogistic systems or improving their procedures. Manydeveloping countries face similar problems in logisticmanagement, training, system design, procedures, planning,documentation, and command emphasis. It will emphasize theimportance of logistics and will present basic tasks,principles, support concepts, and common data elements.

A draft has been prepared that is now being coordinated withthe Services, commands, logistic schools, and agencies thatare concerned with international logistic activities. Whenpublished, it will fill a major shortcoming in adviceavailable from the United States. It will be translated intoSpanish, French, and Arabic and used internationally as aguide for developing or improving logistic systems and fortraining personnel in basic logistic concepts.

Special Operations Forces Logistics Conference, A SpecialOperations Forces (SOF) Logistics Conference, jointlysponsored by the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) andOJCS/J-4 was held at the Pentagon from 10 to 12 September1986. The purpose of the conference was to provide a forumfor updating the SOF community on logistic support for SOFand to open a dialogue to seek solutions to common logisticproblems. Major issues identified during the conferenceincluded:

0 The need for more logisticians with a specialoperations background;

a Procurement leadtime for critical special opera-

tions materiel;

O Scheduling special operations airlift assets forexercises;

0 Fencing SOF operational projects stored in thecontinental US and the need for prepositioned trainingweapons; and

O Sources and procedures for obtaining nonstandardspecial operations materiel.

Minutes of the conference have been provided by the LogisticResources Division, OJCS/J-4, to the Services and commands.

Other Joint Initiatives. Other OJCS activities werereviewed, including participation with other federal agencies

05

on studies, concepts, strategies, and definitions concerninglow intensity conflict. Initiatives were discussed that havebeen directed by recent Congressional action such as thereorganization of special operations forces, establishing anAssistant Secretary of Defense for Speciai Operations and LowIntensity Conflict, and creating a Board for Low IntensityConflict in the National Security Council.

IDA Study, The Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) hasundertaken for the Secretary of Defense a research project onlong-term threats to national security from adversaries otherthan the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations. Thisexamination of "lesser adversaries" aims at the following:

O To formulate a statement of relevant nationalsecurity policies and strategy;

o To determine implications for Department of Defenseprograms, including research and development and forcestructure; and

O To identify relationships which exist or shouldexist between Defense Department programs and those under thepurview of other Departments or agencies, such as securityassistance or intelliegence exchanges.

SERVICE INITIATIVESThe seminar then reviewed several current initiatives of theServices. These include concepts, handbooks, programs,information networks, and studies.

Field Circular 100-20, The US Army Combined Arms Centerhas published Field Circular 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict.The document -rovides basic principles for operations at thelower end of the spectrum of conflict and augments existingdoctrine. It discusses basic missions in low intensityconflict, provides worksheets for use as planning tools, andlists related publications that provide additionalinformation.

Operational Concept, The US Army Logistics Center ispreparing an Interim Operational Concept for LogisticsSupport in Low Intensity Conflict. A draft of the concept isbeing coordinated within the Army. The final document shouldbe published in mid-1987. It will provide guidance for theemployment of logistical support f:r US Army forces in lowintensity conflict. Its objective is to provide a basicdocument from which organizations, procedures, and equipment

6

Ouan be defined to enhance the capability of logisti.c elements

in low intensity conflict.

The concept is di.*ded into four parts:

O Terrorism Counteraction,a Peacekeeping Operations,a Foreign Internal Defense, andO Peacetime Contingency Operations.

The concept discusses loqistic subjects such as supply andservices, maintenance, and transportation in general termsfcr each part -,nd emphasises those logistical applicationsthat differ from existing doctrine.

Air Force Doctrine, In December 1985, Air Force Manual(AFM) 2-15, "Combat Surport Doctrine," was published by theUS Air Force. The manial establishes doctrine for the comnbatsupport (logistic support) c' Air Force forces and (1escribesthe nature of logistic support and its relationship toaerospace power. This document is being used to develop adraft joint logistic doctrine punlication by the LogisticPlanning Division, OJCS/J-4. Copies of AFM 2-15 car, beobtained from HQ T'AF/LEXY, Washington, DC 20330.. The Air Force is developing an adjunct of AFM 2-15 to addresslogistic doctrine for low intensity conflict. Thisinitiative will be conducted with related activitiesinvolving the other Services and commands and should be readyfor coordination within the next six months.

Wartimp Contingency Contractina Handbook, The Air ForceLogistics Marigement Center (AFLMC) has published a handbookto guide contracting officers in supporting deployed units.It outlines legal authorities; discusses funding issues; andpresents contingency contracting procedures, responsibili-ties, and practices. It also includes a checklist ofessential items that contingency contracting officers mustconsider. Copies of the handbook can be obtained from theAFLMC.

LICNET, The US Army Command and General Staff College hasdeveloped a computer network to exchange information andassist in coordinating low intensity conflict activities.Access requires a modem. Additional information can beobtained from LTC Thompson, Autovon 552-2347.

Materiel Programs, Army initiatives also include. develkping scenario-based logistic programs for low intensityconflict and testing field requisitioning systems. OtherArmy programs for low intensity conflict include the Logis-

7

tics Civil Augmentation Program kLOGCAP) and the Local AreaMateric' and Services (LAMS) program. In addition, the ArmyMateriel Command is also developing research and developmentprograms to test new ~coms with application in low intensityconflict.

Army Seminar, A seminar on low intensity conflict will beheld on 6 December 1986 at the Defense Systems ManagementCollege, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. It will be sponsored by the2070th US Army Reserve Forces School and will address thespecial operations command, lessons of Afghanistan, lowintensity conflict doctrine, special forces capabilities, andother t..pics. Further information can be obtained at Autovon354-1711 or (703) 664-1171.

Other Studies and Articles, The Air Force LogisticsCommand (AFLC) is sponsoring a research project, "SupportingThird World Nations in Low Intensity Conflict Logistically."The project is being conducted by the AFLC-sponsored researchassociate at the Air University Center for AerospaceDoctrine, Research, and Education. The project will becompleted by mid-1987.

The Summer i986 issue of the Air Force Journal of Logisticshas several articles that focus on logistic issues in lowintensity conflict. These articles include "The Advantageso- Predetermined Palletization During Low Intensity Conflict"and "Low Intensity Conflict: Thinking Beyond the SOF."

USSOUTHCOM is also developing a paper to address thedifferences of logistics in its commandA and to explore someof its unique support problems. This study will be completedin 1987.

OTHER DISCUSSION

Characteristics. The seminar discussed variouscharacteristics of low intensity conflict that are importantto logistic planning. These include:

° Duration -- can be a long-term, protracted process;o Arena -- usually involves developing countries;o Importance -- has regional and global security

imnlications;° Participants -- often includes multiple partici-

pants with numerous supporters;force; °

o Intensity -- ranges from subversion to use of armed

8

o Constraints -- limit weaponry and tactics which, inturn, may increase the use of logistical support as a meansof response.

Issues, Several major issues were identified during the

seminar and key points discussed include the following:

o Fundamental logistic principles apply across thespectrum of conflict, but grPater flexibility in applyingthem in low intensity conflict may be required because of itsunique characteristics and environment.

o The use of military sales and security assistancemust be tailored to provide more appropriate technology.Equipment must be within the ability of the recipient to useand maintain. It must also be appropriate to respond to thethreat posed to the receiving nation.

a Technologically sophisticated weapons and equipmentmay not be suitable for low intensity conflict because theymay be too complicated to operate and maintain for theenvironment. Support for indigenous forces must becommensurate with their needs and capabilities.

o Interoperability of logistic systems and proceduresis necessary to respond effectively to challenges in lowintensity conflict.

o Coordination among the Services is needed indeveloping logistic handbooks, guidebooks, and concepts forlow intensity conflict to take advantage of previousexperience and to gain other insights.

o Logistic preparation of the battlefield is aprerequisite to the introduction of combat troops in lowintensity conflict. An adequate logistic infrastructure isneeded before operations can be conducted.

O Logistic planning is a key element of any planningfor low intensity conflict. Time sensitivity and securityrestrictions should not preclude logistic considerations forlow intensity conflict activities.

a US presence in host nations needs to include stronglogistic expertise to meet the support requirements in lowintensity conflict.

" US training provided to friends and allies mustinclude emphasis on logistic techniques, systems, concepts,and procedures.

9

0 Strengthening the logistic infrastructure of ThirdWorld nations can assist in developing greater indigenouscapabilities to support low intensity conflict operations.

Conclusion, Low intensity conflict is one of the mostimportant challenges facing the United States. As the JointLow Intensity Conflict Project Final Report noted, logisticsoften becomes "the nose, not the tail, of any direct UnitedStates involvement."

The participants concluded that the seminar was beneficial inproviding an exchange of information on current initiativesand projects. Several logistic programs are being developedwhich are not labeled "low intensity conflict" but will havea significant influence on the supportability of lowintensity conflict operations. The participants agreed thatthe seminar was a worthwhile initiative and requested anothersession in early 1987.

APPENDICESA. AgendaB. Attendance RosterC. Seminar Briefing SlidesD. SM-793-85, 21 November 1985, "Definition of Low IntensityConflict"E. Extracts of Joint Low Intensity Conflict Final ReportF. Fact Sheet, Army/Air Force Center for Low IntensityConflict, 30 July 1986G. Briefing, Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity ConflictH. Briefing, Army/Air Force Center for Low IntensityConflict, Peace Through ActionI. Distribution

10

*Appendix A

AGENDA

AGENDA

0820-0830 Convene in OJCS/J-4 Conference Room

0830-0845 Purpose and Objectives

0845-0910 Understanding Low Intensity Conflict

0910-0930 Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project

0930-1000 Center for Low Intensity Conflict

1000-1030 Joint Staff Initiatives

1030-1130 Service Initiatives

1130-1200 Other Initiatives and Current Studies

1200-1245 Lunch

1245-1315 Low Intensity Conflict Issues Involving Logistics

1315-1345 Logistic Problems in Low Intensity Conflict

1345-1430 Logistic Concepts for Low Intensity Conflict

1430-1500 Future Directions

1500 Adjourn

A-i

*Appendix B

ATTENDANCE ROSTER

ATTENDANCE ROSTER

Organization Name AUTOVONOJCS/J-4 SCAD LTC George Alexander 225-9212

LTC Ray Linville 225-9234

J-4 SMD LTC Joe Berardino 227-4711

J-5 PD LTC Dave Crowell 224-3681

HQ DA/DALO-PLO LTC T. K. Keller 227-1537

HQ USAF/LERX LTC Claude Cavender 227-0126LEXY LTC Tom McDaniel 225-6787LEXY Wg Cdr Alex Buchan, RAF 225-6798LEXX LTC Fred Smith 227-2831

CNO/OP-402C Cdr John McWilliam 225-3293

HQ USMC/LP Lt Col Tom Hayden 224-1917Lt Col Jim Butler 224-1917

USCINCCENT/CCJ-4/7-PL Maj Bob Lehman, USA 968-6433

USCINCSO/SCJ-4-LPP Maj Costa, USMC (313) 282-3709

CLIC/CLO Maj Bill Furr, USAF 574-2630

USALOGC (HQ AMC/AMCGS-L) Col Bill Norman 284-9678USALOGC/ATCL-CFV Maj Michael Gentile 687-4355

AFLMC/LGX Capt Robert L. Fuller 446-3535

AU CADRE/RIC Maj Pettersen 875-6628

Ft Belvoir RD&E Mr Michael Jennings 354-6873Center/STRBE-POLIC

ICAF LTC Hal Burch, USA 335-1861

* B-i

0

*Appendix C

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*Appendix D

DEFINITION OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

* ir~ Tme .JOINT C1IEFs O3F brAFw

21 No euber 1995

MEZ40RANOUK4 MR TU0ICO ol8A

Subject: Dot inition of Low-Intenelty Coilict

on 20 movembe: 1985P the Joint Chieft at Staff approved.the following definition foe Lnalusion, La jCS Pub lv<

low-intensity conflict-A aLmted pelitico-e1it-struggle to acbieve politicalv oiA.eosmcipsychiological objectives. It is ofte peotatranges from diplomatier e@@iiuntwo £fl~ Ix.pressures theauqh teevotiso an& I xzinyintensity conflict is geftetalLy cmsdkde*to aarea and is often chavactetized byr 00estra tweaponry, tactics* and the level of vial .A~called LIC. -

Foc the Joint C lois ou- fa

DAVW- NACOCZColonel, OSMCSecretary

Action assigned toJ-1. per 03

JCS 1373/690Rw s -

* Appendix E

EXTRACTS OF THE JOINT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT FINAL REPORT

CHAPTER 13

LOGISTICS

GENERAL

Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out themovement and maintenance of forces. It incorporates supply andservices, maintenance, transportation, ammunition, construction,and medical services. This chapter covers logistics supportto United States forces only. An even more important aspectof logistics is that of training of host nation forces andsupport for development. These emerging roles are the basisfor a new logistics concept. Developmental aspects oflogistics are discussed in Chapter 11.

Logistics is a critical part of any operation. As onemilitary historian noted:

The more I see of war, the more I realizehow it all depends on administration andtransportation. It-takes little skill orimagination to see where you would like yourarmy to be and when; it takes much knowledgeand hard work to know where you can placeyour forces and whether you can maintainthem there. A real knowledge of supply andmovement factors must be the basis of everyleader's plan; only then can he know how andwhen to take risks with those factors andbattles are won only by taking risks.1

Mao Tse Tung and General Vo Nguyan Giap reiterated the beliefthat logistics has a decisive impact on the outcome of militarycampaigns. After the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu,General Giap said, "A strong rear is always the decisive factorfor victory in a revolutionary war." 2

The importance of logistics was demonstated during theearly stages of the Vietnam conflict. As early as 1962,the establishment of a centralized United States logisticalorganization was proposed but disapproved. Had a system beenestablished in country to help develop and strengthen theVietnamese logistical system, United States combat forces maynever have been required. Not until 1 April 1965 did theUnited States activate the 1st Logistical Command in Saigonto support United States forces. Prior to this, logisticalsupport in Vietnam was fragmented. Once the command wasactivated, it found that the ports and airfields were

O E-1

inadequate and that no logistics organization for supply,transportation, or maintenance troops existed in country.Logistical planning was further complicated because toestablish an adequate logistics base, logistics troops andunits were deployed at the same time rather than in advanceof tactical forces.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The logistics function is a key element in the developmentof a United States response to low-intensity conflict. It hasa vital and innovative role to play in support of host nationdevelopmental activities and in its traditional role ofsupporting United States forces. An operational concept needsto be developed to provide the basis for development of boththese roles.

Recent experiences have emphasized the importance oflogistics. We must include logisticians early in the planningof any operation to ensure that the operations plan is effec-tively supported. During Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, nologisticians at either the JCS level or from the Joint Deploy-ment Agency were involved in the planning of the operation.Consequently, the services had to fend for themselves, causingconfusion and duplication-of effort. Vice Admiral WilliamCowhill, JCS Director of Logistics at the time of the Grenadaoperation, said, "You've got to get the logistics in early.You get different forces from different services and it causesoverlaps and shortages. Unless you get the staffs togetherearly, you can't do the proper coordinating." 3

In low-intensity conflict, United States combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) elements will play a majorrole. They will most likely support joint or combinedoperations and may provide support to, or receive support from,other United States government agencies. United States logis-tics elements must be task-organized to support the variety ofmissions included in low-intensity conflict.

Security assistance programs designed to develop and trainhost country CS/CSS elements will reduce the need for directinvolvement of United States forces in combat operations.The United States will be successful when it can achieve itsnational objectives without the protracted commitment of forcesin a combat role.

E-2

TECHNOLOGY

Technology must be appropriate to the environment.User-friendly, lightweight equipment that is highly reliableand easy to maintain and transport is required. The respectiveservices are examining equipment needs. For instance, the ArmyMateriel Command's Minor and Unconventional Warfare Project istasked with identifying equipment requirements in low-intensityconflict. We must recognize, however, that high technologydoes not always ensure success.

During the Vietnam conflict, United States reliance onhigh-technology weapons and our inability to resort to"primitive tactics" caused serious problems. These facts werekey to our reaction to the tunnel warfare in Vietnam. Thetunnels represented a key logistical network for the NorthVietnamese. They housed arms factories, rice stores, hospitals,conference rooms, and headquarters. The tunnels enabled th-guerrillas to pre-position arms and supplies, to assembletroops, to take cover from bombing attacks, and to literall,disappear from view.

The United States attitude initially was that technologicalinferiority, poverty, and stupidity somehow came togetherinside the tunnels.4 Rather, the tunnels reduced the enemy'slogistical signature and prevented the United States fromdenying the enemy its logistical base--a critical factor in.winning in counterinsurgency.

SUPPORTING UNITED STATES FORCES

In addressing logistics support to United States forces,five basic issues emerge:

o The use of CS and CSS as the lead elements in lov-intensity conflict operations to pave the way for combat forces.

o The use of intelligence preparation of the battle-field (IPB) to support battlefield logistics functions.

o The feasibility of local resupply as an alternativeor as a supplement to the austere organic support capabilityof United States forces operating in undeveloped theaters.

o The effect of inadequate joint logistics doctrineon logistics support to deployed United States forces.

o The requirements for direct requisitioning of logis-tics support to a joint task force operating for an extendedperiod.

E-3

Section F, Volume II, discusses in detail the ccncept forloqistical support to United States iorces. Chapter 11 andSection D deal with further ideas for the logistics role inan overall program for low-intensity conflict.

COMBAT SUPPORT/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

The latest concept -f "logistics preparation of thebattlefield" provides new roles for CS/CSS. Logistics takeson an added dimension. No longer is it in its traditional andmore passive role of the supporting force. Rather, it takes onan active role as the lead element into the theater, becomingthe supported fcrce or the logistical "nose" as opposed to thetraditional logistical "tail."

This new role of "preparing the battlefield" is two-dimensional. The first, or direct ro],, is that of emplacingthe logistics system and upgrading the area to prepare for thepossible arrival of United Scates forces. Early deployment ofCS/CSS is optimal in count-rinsurienc eperations and in prepa-ration for an exercise involving United States forces. Thesecond, or indirect role, iz that of assisting the host countryto develop its own logistical base, to provide training toindigenous forces, and to assist the host country in developingits infrastructure. This second role is discussed in moredetail in Chapter 11.

Issue Fl, The Use of Combat Support/Combat Service Supportas the Lead Elements in Low-Intensity Conflict Operations,recommends doctrine be developed to suppD.t. this latest conceptand calls for testi'ng of the emerging do, trine during exercisesin Central America.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTlYFIELD

Viable logistics intelligence is essential in low-intensityconflict. The United States Army Logistics Center (USALOGC)has developed a system to provide this data. A computer model,called "Foraging," provides the framework for logistics intelli-gence. The program is currently available but has not beenincorporated into contingency planning.

Issue F2, The Use of Intelligence Preparation of theBattlefield (IPB) To SQpport Battlefield Logistics Functions,makes recommendations concerning--

o Responsibility for implementing the program.

o Training on use of the system.

o Incorporating the Foraging Model in contingencyplanning.

E-a

LOCAL RESUPPLY

Local support offers unique opportunities in low-intensityconflict. While military supplies and services may not beavailable on the local enconomy, the option needs to beexploiced ahen possible to conserve critical air and sea assetsduring deployment. To do so requires assignment of qualifiedcontracting personnel, flexibility in adapting procedures, andiucluding this option in contingency and exercise planning.Problems in this area were demonstrated in Operation URGENTFURY.

Issue F3, The Feasibility of Local Resupply in Undeveloped2heaters, recommends--

o Modifying the -ederal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) toprovide the flexibility needed in contingency operations.

o Amending the joint planning process to provide forcontracting.

o Continuing present United States Army LogisticsCenter efforts to provide for contracting.

o Providing necessary training procedures forcontracting.

. JOINT LOGISTICS DOCTRINE

A central theme throughout this report is joint operationsin low-intensity conflict. Future conflicts will almost cer-tainly require a coordinated effort from two or more services.Currently, ni joint logistics doctrine exists. Logistics isa service responsibility and the planning is often accomplishedin a vacuum. The result is often confasion and a duplicationof effort.

Issue F4, The Need for Joint Logistics Doctrine forLow-Intensity Conflict, examines this issue and one specificdoctrinal issue--the extended JTF. It makes recommendationsconcerning--

O Developing oiit doctrine.

o Es'ablishing uniformity in JTF assignment policies.

o The need for unit fill in JTFs.

0

DIRECT REQUISITIONING

Recent experiences in logistically supporting Army elementsof a joint task force for extended periods highlight doctrinaldeficiencies in the way the Army sustains itself in an austeretheater. Supplies, especially repair parts, ordered throughthe existing supply system were not received in a timely manner.This affected the CONOS-based units deploying to JTF-B inHonduras in the performance of their mission. The Armylogistics community is developing and testing a direct-supplyrequisitioning capability to provide needed supplies with theminimum order ship time. Much has been accomplished to date,but further refinement is needed to make this system deployableworldwide.

Issue F5, The Need To Improve Logistics Doctrine To Supporta Joint Task Force Operating for an Extended Period, discussesdirect requisitions and makes recommendations.concerning--

o Examining performance of the remote area supportpipeline.

o Determining the adequacy of current logisticsprocedures.

o Developing doctrine for support of United Statesforces in low-intensity conflict.

SUMMARY

The importance of logistics throughout low-intensityconflict is best summed up in the thought that military powercan only achieve its full potential when operations and support(logistics) come together in unison. Strategy cannot succeedunless it can be executed tactically, and the tactics cannotsucceed without modern and sustainable systems. Therefore,the strategy and tactics of combat operations depend on combatlogistical support. In essence, they are inseparable.

E-6

NOTES

iMartin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics fromWallenstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge University Press,1977).

2GEN Vo Nguyan Giap, People's War, People's Army (Hanoi:Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961).

3Michael Duffy, "Grenada: Rampant Confusion," MilitaryLogistics Forum (July-August 1985): 20.4john Margold and John Penycate, The Tunnels of Cu Chi (NewYork: Random House, 1985).

E-7

*Appendix F

FACT SHEETARMY/AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

FACT SHEET

CLICLt Col BrothersAV 574-459330 Jul 86

SUBJECT: Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC)

PURPOSE.

To provide information on the activation, mission and charter of the CLIC.

FACTS.

1. The CLIC activated 30 Jan 86 at Langley AFB, Virginia.

2. The CLIC's mission statement and charter are:

a. To improve the Army/Air Force posture for engaging in low intensityconflict (LIC), elevate awareness throughout the Army/Air Force of the roleof the military power in low intensity conflict -- including the capabilitiesneeded to realize that role -- and provide an infrastructure for eventualtransition to a joint and, perhaps, interagency activity.

b. The CLIC will serve as the Army/Air Force focal point for mattersrelating to military operations in low intensity conflict and civil-militaryactivities related thereto. The CLIC will propose initiatives to optimizeArmy/Air Force force structure for tailored responses in low intensityconflict. The organization will, in coordination with the MACOMs/MAJCOMs,develop joint operations concepts, identify requirements, assess currentArmy/Air Force capabilities in low intensity conflict, identify shortfalls,and forward recommendations to the DCSOPS/DCS P&O for approval. The Centerwill:

(1) Advise Army/Air Force decision makers and educate Servicepersonnel in the principles of military force employment in low intensityconflict, in both cofbatant and noncombatant roles.

(2) Orchestrate MACOM/MAJCOM operational test and evaluation effortsto refine current and validate new capah .lities for low intensity conflict.

(3) Represent the Army/Air Force in joint and interagency lowintensity conflict fora.

(4) Minimize duplication of effort through cooperative use ofexisting Army/Air Force operational, analytical, and academic resources.

3. The JCS approved definition of LIC is:

A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social,economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted andranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures throughterrorism and insurgency. Low intensity conflict is generally confinedto a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints onweaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. Also called LIC.

F-1

4. Operaticnally, the CLIC interprets LIC to include the following activities:

a. Insurgencyb. Counterinsurgencyc. Peacekeepingd. Peacetime Contingencye. Terrorism Counteractionf. Drug Interdiction

In essence, LIC incorporates all those situations involving the use of or thethreatened use of force short of direct, sustained combat between conventionalforces.

5. The CLIC is located in Building 714, Langley AFB, Virginia, 23665-5000.Phone numbers are per attachment. Message address is: CLIC LANGLEY A.nVA//CC//. For more specific addressing, replace *CC" with three letter officesymbol per attachment.

Clonel, USAF 1 AtchCommander POC List

F-2

COM (804)764- OFFICE

TITLE NAME AV 574- SYMBOL

Commander Col Bosse 5804/5805 CCDeputy Commander 5804/5805 CV

Reserve Advisor 5804/5805 CR

Public Affairs Maj Angelle 2630/2631 CPA

Chief, Airlift Br Maj Clem 2630/2631 CAB

Chief, CAS & Test Br Maj Parsons 4593/4594 CAS

Chief, C3CM Br Capt Zelms 4654/4655 CCM

Doc/Trng & Exercise Ofc LtCol Yedinak 4594/4595 CEX

Foreign Internal Def LtCol Turner 7661/7662 CFI

Health Services Ofc Maj(P) Thornton 7661/7662 CHS

Historical Ofc 4654/4655 CHO

Chief, Intel Br LtCol Walters 2756/2758 CIBCapt Ely

Chief, Logistics Br Maj(P) Furr 2630/2631 CLOMaj Ayers

Chief, Long Range LtCol Brothers 4593/4594 CLRInterdiction Br

Chief, Pol-Mil/Sec Asst LtCol Glynn 7661/7662 CPM

Chief, Spec Ops Br Maj(P) Berger 4703/4704 CSOMaj YangMaj TownsendMaj Brunk

Chief, TAC Interdict Br Maj Butler 4593/4594 CTI

Administration MSgt Gross 5805/5740 CCA

F-3

Appendix G

CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Briefingby Major Bill Furr

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* Appendix I

DISTRIBUTION

DISTRIBUTION

OJCS, Wash DC 20301J-4 SCAD

SMDLRDLPD

J-5 PD

AM~4HQ DA/DALO-PLOWash DC 20310-0500

USALOGC/ATCL-CFVFt Lee, VA 23801

AMC/AMCGS-LAlexandria, VA 22333

AMC/AMCDE-SM-LICAlexandria, VA 22333

Ft Belvoir RD&E Center/STRBE-POLICFt Belvoir, VA 22060

USACGSC/ATZL-SWJ-CLFt Leavenworth, KS 66207-6900

HQ TRADOC/ATDO-SFt Monroe, VA 23651

AIR FORCEHQ USAF/LERX

LEXYLEXYLEXX

Wash DC 20330-5130

AFLMC/LGXGunter AFS, AL 36114-6693

. AU CADRE/RICMaxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532

I-I

AU LibraryMaxwell AFB, AL 36112

NAVYCNO/OP-402CWash DC 20350-2000

MARINE CORPSHQ USMC/LPArlington VA 22209

COMMNSUSCINCLANT/J-4Norfolk, VA 23511

USCINCCENT/CCJ-4/7-PLMacDill AFB, FL 33608

USCINCEUR/ECJ4/7APO, NY 09128

USCINCMAC/LGScott AFB, IL 62225

USCINCPAC/J-4Camp Smith, Hawaii 96816-5025

USCINCRED/RCJ-4MacDill AFB, FL 33608

USCINCSO/SCJ-4APO Miami, FL 34003-0190

HQ SAC/LGOffutt AFB, NE 68113

USCINCSPACE/J-4/6Peterson AFB, CO 80914-5001

OTHERCLIC/CLOLangley AFB, VA 23665-5000

1-2