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8/8/2019 LOCGOV Case Digest

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2 | L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t ( G u a n z o n ) S . Y . 0 8 - 0 9 : 2 n d S e m .

SYLLABUS PART 1: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS;CREATION, MERGER, ABOLITION AND POWERS.

Creation of Local Government Units:

Patricio Tan et al. v. COMELEC

Facts: Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 (Act CreatingProvince of Negros del Norte), petitioners who are residentsof the Province of Negros Occidental filed with this Court acase for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping Comelecfrom conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and inimplementation of the law. Petitioners contend that BP 885 isunconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with theLGC as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution regardingthe requirements in land area and estimated annual income.Petitioners also contend that a number of voters wereexcluded since the plebiscite was confined only to theinhabitants of three cities and eight municipalities in Negrosdel Norte, to the exclusion of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental..Comelec contends that the law is not unconstitutional. Theyclaim that BP 885 does not infringe the Constitution becausethe requisites of the LGC have been complied with. Theysubmit that the case has now become moot and academicwith the proclamation of Negros del Norte as during the

plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of the newprovince while only 30,400 were against it.

Issue: WON the province complied with the plebisciterequirement

Held: No

Ratio: The more significant and pivotal issue in thepresent case revolves around in the interpretation andapplication in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of theConstitution. It can be plainly seen that the constitutionalprovision makes it imperative that there be first obtained"the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in theunit or units affected" whenever a province is created,divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of theboundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that theboundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidentalwould necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created theproposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simplelogic will demonstrate than that two political units would beaffected. The first would be the parent province of NegrosOccidental because its boundaries would be substantiallyaltered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province toconstitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite thatshould conform to said constitutional requirement buteliminates the participation of either of these two componentpolitical units. No one should be allowed to pay homage to asupposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee andpromote autonomy of local government units but at the

same time transgress, ignore and disregard what theConstitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained changemade when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted intoBatas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in saidenabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in theproposed new province which are the areas affected." Weare not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat theunit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can bediminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to citiesand municipalities comprising the new province, therebyignoring the evident reality that there are other peoplenecessarily affected. The court reversed the ruling in

Paredes vs Executive Secretary (same issue but concerbarangay).Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after tcreation of Negros del Norte, the province of NegrOccidental would be deprived of the long established Citiof Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality Victorias. No controversion has been made regardipetitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,6

hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mwhich contribute to the economy of the whole province. the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, thexisting territory and political subdivision known as NegrOccidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. Whwas involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree wthe petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involvwas a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantalteration of boundary.

Issue: WON the new Province of Negros del Norcomplied with the requirements as to land area

Held: No

Ratio: The original parliamentary bill no 3644 expresdeclared that the new province contained an area of 285,6ha. More or less. However, when Parliamentary bill wenacted into BP 885, the province now comprised a territoof 4,019.95 square kilometers. The certification of tprovincial treasurer also indicates that there the provincomprised of a lesser area. Although the certification statthat the land area of the municipality of Don Salvador wnot available, it appeared that such is only 80.2 kilomete

This area if added to 2,685.2 square kilometers will resultapproximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers.

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LG(requirements) is most revealing. As so stated therein t"territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or moislands." The use of the word territory in this particuprovision of the Local Government Code and in the very lasentence thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as there

used, has reference only to the mass of land area aexcludes the waters over which the political unit exerciscontrol. Said sentence states that the "territory need not contiguous."Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching aloall or most of one side; (c) near, text, adjacent."Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, asthe above sentence, is only used when it describes physiccontact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matt

The meaning of particular terms in a statute may ascertained by reference to words associated with or relatto them in the statute. Therefore, in the context of tsentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is t

1 SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may

created if it has a territory of at least three thousand fihundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hudred thousand persons, an average estimated annual come, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less thten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and creation shall not reduce the population and income of thmother province or provinces at the time of said creation less than the minimum requirements under this section. Tterritory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or moislands.

The average estimated annual income shall incluthe income alloted for both the general and infrastructurfunds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring come.




"territory" ---- the physical mass of land area. There wouldarise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguousif they had intended that the term "territory" embrace notonly land area but also territorial waters, It can be safelyconcluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area"only. The words and phrases used in a statute should begiven the meaning intended by the legislature. The sense inwhich the words are used furnished the rule of construction.

The distinction between "territory" and "land area" whichrespondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute arearrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made tobear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd orunjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statuteis the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. Aconstruction based on a forced or artificial meaning of itswords and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not tobe favored.

Teehankee, concurring: The challenged Act is manifestlyvoid and unconstitutional. Consequently, all theimplementing acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite, theproclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and theappointment of its officials are equally void. The limited

holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposednew province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to theexclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integralprovince of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of LaCastellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran,Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique,Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grosslycontravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI,section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that noprovince may be created or divided or its boundarysubstantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. " It isplain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed newprovince, comprise the units affected. It follows that thevoters of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental

have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite,because the whole province is affected by its proposeddivision and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limitthe plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to bepartitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd andillogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for thesecession that they demanded against the wishes of themajority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.

The argument of fait accompli viz. that the railroadedplebiscite of January 3, 1986 was held and can no longer beenjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte hasbeen constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of thechallenged Act. This Court has always held that it "does notlook with favor upon parties 'racing to beat an injunction orrestraining order' which they have reason to believe mightbe forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and

pendency of the appropriate petition therefor. Where therestraining order or preliminary injunction are found to havebeen properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writsshall be issued by the Court to restore matters to the statusquo ante." Where, as in this case, there was somehow afailure to properly issue the restraining order stopping theholding of the illegal plebiscite, the Court will issue themandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the statusquo ante and restore the territorial integrity of the provinceof Negros Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality of the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid proclamation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte and theequally invalid appointment of its officials.

Torralba v. Mun. of Sibagat (1987)

Facts: BP 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Provinof Agusan del Sur, is being challenged as violative of Secti3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution2. Petitioners aresidents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitionClementino Torralba, being a member of the SangguniaPanglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officeare the local public officials of the new Municipality.According to the petitioners, the Local Government Comust first be enacted to determine the criteria for tcreation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteratiof the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrand that since no Local Government Code had as yet beeenacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute counot have possibly complied with any criteria whrespondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null avoid.

Issue: WON BP 56 is invalid

Held: No

Ratio: The absence of the Local Government Code at ttime of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended cripple legislative competence to create municip

corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitutiodoes not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorand political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGCcontains no requirement that the LGC a condition sine qnon for the creation of a municipality, in much the same wthat the creation of a new municipality does not preclude tenactment of a LGC. What the Constitutional provisimeans is that once said Code is enacted, the creatiomodification or dissolution of local government units shouconform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnubefore the enactment of such Code, the legislative powremains plenary except that the creation of the new locgovernment unit should be approved by the peopconcerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.

The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creatiof the new local government unit. The officials of the neMunicipality have effectively taken their oaths of office aare performing their functions. A de jure entity has thus becreated.It is a long-recognized principle that the power to createmunicipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. the absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislatibody may create any corporation it deems essential for tmore efficient administration of government.The creation the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in tInterim Batasang Pambansa.

There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comeland in this case: in the Tan case, the LGC already existed the time that the challenged statute was enacted onDecember 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 8

in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed neprovince" to the exclusion of the voters in the remainiareas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate andthe LGC that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides forplebiscite "in the area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tacase, even the requisite area for the creation of a ne

2 "Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary sustantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria etablished in the Local Government Code, and subject to tapproval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in tunit or units affected."




province was not complied with in BP Blg. 885. No such issuein the creation of the new municipality has been raised here.And lastly, "indecent haste" attended the enactment of BPBlg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the

Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56 creating the Municipalityof Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of legislation,and the plebiscite was held within the period specified inthat law.

Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

Bai Sema v. Comelec (2008)

Facts: The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines apportioned 2 legislative districts forMaguindanao. The first consists of Cotabato City and 8municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM,created under its Organic Act, RA 6734, as amended by RA9054. Cotabato City, as part of Maguindanao’s firstlegislative district, is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII(having voted against its inclusion in November 1989plebiscite).On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMMRegional Assembly, exercising its power to create provincesunder Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim

Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating theProvince of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.Later, 3 new municipalities were carved out of the original 9,constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, resulting to total of 11.Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao. Maguindanaovoters ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in 29 October2006 plebiscite.On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board ResolutionNo. 3999, requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as partof Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.” Resolution No. 07-0407, adopted theCOMELEC’s Law Department recommendation under aMemorandum dated 27 February 2007. The COMELEC issuedon 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating thatMaguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902(subject of these cases), amending Resolution No. 07-0407by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly FirstDistrict of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”Meanwhile, the Shariff Kabunsuan creation plebiscite wassupervised and officiated by the COMELEC pursuant toResolution No. 7727. (Option Votes: In favor for creation

285,372; Against the creation 8,802) The following municipalities seceded from Maguindanao andformed the new province. All of them were from the firstlegislative district of Maguindanao. (Barira, Buldon, Datu

Blah T. Sinsuat, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, Upi) Kabuntalan waschosen as the capital of the new province. The province wasthe first to be created under Republic Act No. 9054 or theExpanded ARMM law.Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 whichcombined Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a singlelegislative district during the Philippine general election,2007. Sema lost to incumbent Congress representative of the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato district, DidagenDilangalen.

Issue: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly CanCreate the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

Ratio: The creation of any of the four local governmeunits - province, city, municipality or barangay - mucomply with three conditions. First, the creation of a locgovernment unit must follow the criteria fixed in the LocGovernment Code. Second, such creation must not conflwith any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express graof authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate

regional or local legislative bodies the power to create locgovernment units. However, under its plenary legislatpowers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies tpower to create local government units, subject reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises wany provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress hdelegated to provincial boards, and city and municipcouncils, the power to create barangays within th

jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteestablished in the Local Government Code, and tplebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of tConstitution. However, under the Local Government Cod"only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, citior municipalities.Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegatto the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to crea

provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within tARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenalegislative powers because the power to create locgovernment units is not one of the express legislatipowers granted by the Constitution to regional legislatbodies. In the present case, the question arises whether tdelegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangaconflicts with any provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts wthe delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 1Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, tcreation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city withpopulation of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or eaprovince, shall have at least one representative" in t

House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of tOrdinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Aprovince that may hereafter be created, or any city whopopulation may hereafter increase to more than two hundrfifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately followielection to at least one Member x x x."Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislatidistrict because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of tConstitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appendto the Constitution. For the same reason, a city withpopulation of 250,000 or more cannot also be creatwithout a legislative district. Thus, the power to createprovince, or a city with a population of 250,000 or morequires also the power to create a legislative district. Evthe creation of a city with a population of less than 250,0involves the power to create a legislative district becau

once the city's population reaches 250,000, the cautomatically becomes entitled to one representative undSection 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, tpower to create a province or city inherently involvethe power to create a legislative district.

Legislative Districts are Created or ReapportioneOnly by an Act of CongressUnder the present Constitution, as well as in paConstitutions, the power to increase the allowabmembership in the House of Representatives, and reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provid




that Congress of the exclusive power to create orreapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is anational legislature and any increase in its allowablemembership or in its incumbent membership through thecreation of legislative districts must be embodied in anational law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It wouldbe anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies tocreate or reapportion legislative districts for a nationallegislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created

by a superior legislative body, cannot change themembership of the superior legislative body.

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislativepowers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, didnot divest Congress of its exclusive authority to createlegislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution andthe ARMM Organic Act, as amended.Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitutionauthorizes autonomous regions, expressly orimpliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districtsfor Congress.On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amendingthe ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The Regional Assemblymay exercise legislative power x x x except on thefollowing matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x."Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power

to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create alegislative district whose representative is elected in nationalelections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating alegislative district, the first representative is always electedin the "next national elections" from the effectivity of thelaw.Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative toCongress is a national office, and its occupant, a Memberof the House of Representatives, is a national official. Itwould be incongruous for a regional legislative body like theARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when itslegislative powers extend only to its regional territory. Theoffice of a district representative is maintained by nationalfunds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of nationalfunds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislativepowers of every local or regional legislative body that it canonly create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can

never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a nationaloffice is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside theARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20,Article X of the Constitution which expressly limitsthe coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislativepowers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x."

The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress'power to create or reapportion legislative districts byabstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan.First . The issue in Felwa, among others, was whetherRepublic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao andproviding for congressional representation in the old and

new provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng]congressional districts without the apportionment providedin the Constitution." The Court answered in the negative.Pursuant to this Section, a representative district maycome into existence: (a) indirectly, through thecreation of a province â€” for "each province shallhave at least one member" in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of severalrepresentative districts within a province. Therequirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only tothe second method of creation of representative districts,and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only

from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, bualso, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeewhen a province is created by statute, thcorresponding representative district, comes inexistence neither by authority of that statute âwhich cannot provide otherwise â€” nor apportionment, but by operation of the Constitutiowithout a reapportionmen

Second . Sema's theory also undermines the composition aindependence of the House of Representatives. UndSection 19,Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM RegionAssembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMwith or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 46of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,0square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. Tfollowing scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembcan create 100 or more provinces and thus increase tmembership of a superior legislative body, the House Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise(2) The proportional representation in the House Representatives based on one representative for at lea

every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMRegional Assembly need not comply with the requirementSection 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province creatmust have a population of at least 250,000; a(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can becomthe majority in the House of Representatives through tARMM Regional Assembly's continuous creation of provincor cities within the ARMM.Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting thprovisions in Article X on regional autonomy,[37] nor Congrein enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastroconsequences that certainly would wreck the tri-bransystem of government under our Constitution. Clearly, tpower to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congreitself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.

The Constitution empowered Congress to create

reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblieSection 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which state"[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall bentitled in the immediately following election to at least oMember," refers to a province created by Congress itsthrough a national law. The reason is that the creation ofprovince increases the actual membership of the House Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decidIncidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in tHouse of Representatives. Since party-list members shconstitute 20 percent of total membership of the Housthere should at least be 50 party-list seats available in eveelection in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimwinners. This leaves only 200 seats for distrrepresentatives, much less than the 219 incumbent distr

representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress increase by law the allowable membership of the Houseven before Congress can create new province

The present case involves the creation of a local governmeunit that necessarily involves also the creation of legislative district. The Court will not pass upon tconstitutionality of the creation of municipalities abarangays that does not comply with the criteria establishin Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 1Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of sumunicipalities and barangays does not involve the creatiof legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issto an appropriate case.




In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly thepower to create provinces and cities, is void for beingcontrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article Xof the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinanceappended to the Constitution. Only Congress can createprovinces and cities because the creation of provinces andcities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts,a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article

VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinanceappended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assemblycannot create a province without a legislative districtbecause the Constitution mandates that every province shallhave a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM RegionalAssembly cannot enact a law creating a national office likethe office of a district representative of Congress becausethe legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assemblyoperate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided inSection 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule thatMMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly andcreating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the ConstitutionConsequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902,preserving the geographic and legislative district of the FirstDistrict of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it

merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of theOrdinance appended to the Constitution.

The Prov. Of North Cotabato et al v. Government(2008)

Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republicof the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through theChairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels,were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on theAncestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF TripoliAgreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March1984 when, under the leadership of the late SalamatHashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front(MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, amongothers, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoistorientations.[1]

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILFwas not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before thescheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a

Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signingthe same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiationand the concluding of several prior agreements between thetwo parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peacenegotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILFPeace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the GeneralFramework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.

The Solicitor General, who represents respondents,

summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained,among others, the commitment of the parties to pursuepeace negotiations, protect and respect human rights,negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacificsettlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threator force to attain undue advantage while the peacenegotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.[2]

Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going tobe any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process.

Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attackeda number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, inMarch 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan,Lanao del Norte.[3] In response, then President JosephEstrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the

MILF.When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, tmilitary offensive against the MILF was suspended and tgovernment sought a resumption of the peace talks. TMILF, according to a leading MILF member, initiaresponded with deep reservation, but when President Arroasked the Government of Malaysia through Prime MinistMahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Cent

Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventualdecided to meet with the GR

The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with ttalks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, tparties signing on the same date the Agreement on tGeneral Framework for the Resumption of Peace TaBetween the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereaftsuspended all its military actions.Formal peace talks between the parties were held in TripoLibya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was tGRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreeme2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on tfollowing aspects of the negotiation: Security AspeRehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. Wregard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in TripAgreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discuss

further by the Parties in their next meetingA second round of peace talks was held in CyberjayMalaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signinof the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of t

Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire stabetween the parties. This was followed by the ImplementiGuidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation aDevelopment Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, whiwas signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, MalaysNonetheless, there were many incidence of violenbetween government forces and the MILF from 2002 2003.Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passaway on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murawho was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Muradposition as chief peace negotiator was taken over Mohagher Iqbal

In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between tparties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, wset to be signed last August 5, 200

Held: The Memorandum of Agreement on the AncestDomain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peaof 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitutio

Ratio: The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure respondents to consult the local government units communities affected constitutes a departure respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreoverespondents exceeded their authority by the mere act guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleg

violation of the Constitution by any branch of governmenta proper matter for judicial revieAs the petitions involve constitutional issues which are paramount public interest or of transcendental importancthe Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-interventiand intervening respondents the requisite locus standikeeping with the liberal stance adopted in David Macapagal-Arroyo.Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the nosigning of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of tGRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Coufinds that the present petitions provide an exception to t"moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the graviolation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exception




character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c)the need to formulate controlling principles to guide thebench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the caseis capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreementsnecessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement onPeace signed by the government and the MILF back in June2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated oranother one drawn up that could contain similar or

significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamushave been rendered moot in view of the respondents' actionin providing the Court and the petitioners with the officialcopy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.

The people's right to information on matters of publicconcern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is insplendid symmetry with the state policy of full publicdisclosure of all its transactions involving public interestunder Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right toinformation guarantees the right of the people to demandinformation, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. Thecomplete and effective exercise of the right to informationnecessitates that its complementary provision on publicdisclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject

only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may beprovided by law. The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount publicconcern involving public interest in the highest order. Indeclaring that the right to information contemplates stepsand negotiations leading to the consummation of thecontract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to theexecutory nature or commercial character of the agreement.An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep acontinuing dialogue or process of communication betweenthe government and the people. Corollary to these twinrights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right topublic consultation was envisioned to be a species of thesepublic rights.At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutionalimperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right tobe consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace

agenda.One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuingconsultations on both national and local levels and for aprincipal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the dutyof the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conductregular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments,advice, and recommendations from peace partners andconcerned sectors of society.Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultationsbefore any project or program critical to the environmentand human ecology including those that may call for theeviction of a particular group of people residing in suchlocality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiarprogram that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownershipof a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could

pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora ordisplacement of a great number of inhabitants from theirtotal environment.Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous PeoplesRights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for therecognition and delineation of ancestral domain, whichentails, among other things, the observance of the free andprior informed consent of the Indigenous CulturalCommunities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute doesnot grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestraldomain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as adefense to the general right to information or the specificright to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal

respondents effectively waived such defense after unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draof the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutinIn sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Procecommitted grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carout the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. Thfurtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed acrafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authorit

and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressivarbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a groevasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform thduty enjoine

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the presConstitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but tvery concept underlying them, namely, the associatirelationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, aunconstitutional , for the concept presupposes that tassociated entity is a state and implies that the same is its way to independencWhile there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that tprovisions thereof inconsistent with the present legframework will not be effective until that framework amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusionprovisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associati

relationship between the BJE and the Central Government itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions Fro The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to tgovernment peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is wordeit virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in placNeither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an awould amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituepowers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Conventioor the people themselves through the process of initiativfor the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcomof the amendment process is through an undue influence interference with that procesWhile the MOA-AD would not amount to an internationagreement or unilateral declaration binding on tPhilippines under international law, respondents' act

guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatadefective.

Metro Manila Commission:

Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. v. Hon. Comelec (1985)

Facts: PD 824 or an act creating the Metropolitan Maniwas enacted to establish and administer program aprovide services common to" the cities of Manila, QuezoPasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities in tsurrounding area. This is in response to the sharp growth the population of Manila and the proliferation of commercfirms and industries, which resulted to the ever-increasiinability of the separate local governments to cope with t

ensuing serious problems. Metro Manila shall administered by the Commission.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of PD 824. They reon this provision: "No province, city, municipality, or barmay be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundasubstantially altered, except in accordance with the criteestablished in the local government code, and subject to tapproval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in tunit or units affected." The Local Government Code was nenacted until 1983.

Issue: WON PD 824 is unconstitutional as it was enacteprior to the creation of a local government code




Held: No

Ratio: The challenge does not suffice to call for adeclaration of unconstitutionality. The last vestige of doubthas been removed by the present constitutional provisionregarding the Batasang Pambansa. That provision clearlyrecognizes the existence of the Metropolitan Manila.

Justification as to PD 824. In PD 824, reference was madeto "the referendum held on February 27, 1975 wherein the

residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the Presidentto restructure the local governments into an integrated unitof the manager or commission form of government.” It wasthen pointed out that "the rapid growth of population andthe corresponding increase of social and economicrequirements in the contiguous communities has broughtinto being a large area that calls for development bothsimultaneous and unified. It "is vital to the survival andgrowth of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that aworkable and effective system be established for thecoordination, integration and unified management of suchlocal government services or functions" therein. There isnecessity for "the unified metropolitan services or functionsto be planned, administered, and operated [based on] thehighest professional technical standards." 15 The foregoingconstitutes the justification for and the objective of such

Presidential Decree.Application of Paredes vs Executive Secretary. InParedes vs Executive Secretary, the Court did came to theconclusion that the constitutional provision on the need for amajority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or unitsaffected would be satisfied even if "those voters who are notfrom the barangay to be separated were excluded in theplebiscite." It cannot be argued therefore that the plebisciteheld in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manilain the referendum on February 27, 1975 was not a sufficientcompliance with the constitutional provision. With the votersin such four cities and thirteen municipalities, nowcomposing Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will,the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners hasbeen satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no LocalGovernment Code.

Presidential Authority to Issue the PD. At that timethere was no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was thePresident who was entrusted with such responsibility. Thelegality of the law making authority by the President duringthe period of Martial Law was already established in Aquinovs Comelec.Sangguniang Bayan. The point has been raised, however,that unless Presidential Decree No. 824 be construed in sucha way that along with the rest of the other cities andmunicipalities, there should be elections for the SangguniangBayan, then there is a denial of the equal protectionprovision of the Constitution. The point is not well-taken. It isclear that under the equal protection clause, classification isnot forbidden. But classification on a reasonable basis, andnot made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. . . . Theclassification, however, to be reasonable must be based on

substantial distinction which make real differences; it mustbe germane to the purposes of the law; it must not belimited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally toeach member of the class." All such elements are present.

There is no need to set forth anew the compelling reasonsthat called for the creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is quiteobvious that under the conditions then existing - still presentand, with the continued growth of population, attended withmore complexity - what was done was a response to a greatpublic need. The government was called upon to act. PD 824was the result. It is not a condition for the validity of theSangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities andthirteen municipalities that the membership be identical with

those of other cities or municipalities. There is amp justification for such a distinctionBasis in the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 2 of tConstitution expressly recognized the juridical entity knowas Metropolitan Manila. Such express constitutionaffirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls fthe dismissal of these petitions, there being no leg

justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it the first time th

there has been acknowledgment in law of the creation Metropolitan Manila. (Election Code of 1978, PresidentDecree No. 1396 creating the Ministry of HumSettlements, Presidential Decree No. 824, creating tMetropolitan Manila Commission, Amendments to tConstitution, Ordinance)Control of the President. It is undeniable that tcreation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is free froany constitutional objection. There is, however, a questithat may arise in connection with the powers of tPresident over the Commission. According to PD 824: "TCommission, the General Manager and any official of tCommission shall be under the direct supervision and contof the President. Notwithstanding any provision in thDecree, the President shall have the power to revoke, ameor modify any ordinance, resolution or act of t

Commission, the General and the Commissioners." It mgive rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it confers tpower of control on the President. That control he certainexercises under the present Constitution over the ministrieHis power over local governments does not go that far.extends no further than general supervision. These doubhowever, do not suffice to nullify such a provision. Succincput, that construction that would save is to be preferred against one that will destroy.

To show fidelity to this basic principle of construction is lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that tconstitution enters into and forms part of every statuAccordingly, the presidential power of control over acts the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may considered national in character. There can be no vaobjection to such exercise of authority. That is a clerecognition that some of its attributes are those of a nation

character. Where, however, the acts of the Metro ManCommission may be considered as properly appertaining local government functions, the power of the President confined to general supervision. As thus construed, Secti13 clearly appears to be free from any constitutioninfirmity.

Abad Santos, dissenting. 1. The referendum of Februa27, 1975, did not satisfy the prohibition contained in Art. XSec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution. For one thing the provisispeaks of "the criteria established in the local governmecode." There was then no local government code so thewere no criteria. Also the grant of power to restructure thecities and 13 municipalities in the Greater Manila ar"under such terms and conditions as the President mdecide" was so broad that it was in fact not an intellige

decision on the part of the people. I submit that a grant power must be definite to be valid; it must not be nebuloand uncircumscribed so as to amount to a total abdicatithereof. Finally, the referendum did not include all of tpeoples of Bulacan and Rizal to ascertain if they were willito give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. Treferendum suffers from the same infirmity present in thcase of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, cited in the maopinion, where I dissented.2. The January 27, 1984, amendment to the Constitutiproviding for representation in the Batasang Pambansa awhich allocates representatives to "districts in MetropolitManila" cannot be construed to constitutionally validate P.No. 824 for the simple reason that the issue before t




people when the amendment was submitted for ratificationwas not the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

Presumption of constitutionality :

Alvarez v. Guingona (1996)

Facts: This concerns the validity of RA 7330 converting themunicipality of Santiago Isabela into an independentcomponent city to be known as the city of Santiago. The lawwas challenged mainly because the act did not allegedlyoriginate exclusively in the House of Representatives asmandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Consitution.Also, petitioner claims that the Municipality of Santiago hasnot met the minimum average annual income required underSection 450 of the LGC in order to be converted into acomponent city. Apparently, RA 7330 originated from HB8817 which was filed on April 18, 1993. After the thirdreading, the bill was transmitted to the Senate on January18, 1994. Meanwhile, a counterpart bill SB 1243 was filed onMay 19, 1993. On February 23, 1994, HB 8817 wastransmitted to the senate. The committee recommendedthat HB 8817 be approved without amendment, taking intoconsideration that the house bill was identical to the senatebill.

Issue: WON the IRAs are to be included in the computationof the average annual income of a municipality for thepurposes of its conversion into an independent componentcity

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify intoa component city because its average annual income for thelast two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant pricesfalls below the required annual income of P20,000,000 for itsconversion into a city. After deducting the IRA, ti appearsthat the average annual income arrived at would only beP13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices.Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually incomebut transfers and/or budgetary aid from the nationalgovernment and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease,depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.Petitioners asseverations are untenable because InternalRevenue Allotments form part of the income of LocalGovernment Units. It is true that for a municipality to beconverted into a component city, it must, among others,have an average annual income of at least Twenty MillionPesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by theDepartment of Finance.A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of theState which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be anintra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but notintended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the localgovernment unit is autonomous in the sense that it is givenmore powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.

The practical side to development through a decentralizedlocal government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increasedresponsibilities, a local government unit must now operateon a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn,entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty,responsibility and accountability in every local governmentunit is accompanied with a provision for reasonablyadequate resources to discharge its powers and effectivelycarry out its functions. Availment of such resources iseffectuated through the vesting in every local governmentunit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in nationaltaxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue

allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitabshare in the proceeds of the utilization and development the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.For purposes of budget preparation, which budget shoureflect the estimates of the income of the local governmeunit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the nationwealth utilization proceeds are considered items of incom

This is as it should be, since income is defined in the LocGovernment Code to be all revenues and receipts collect

or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the locgovernment unit.

The IRAs are items of income because they form part of tgross accretion of the funds of the local government un

The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the lotreasury without need of any further action on the part of tlocal government unit. 11 They thus constitute income whithe local government can invariably rely upon as the sourof much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fundtransfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaninall its own as used in the Local Government Code thunequivocally makes it distinct from special funds transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "fundisupport from the national government, its instrumentaliti

and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".

Issue: WON considering that Senate passed SB 1243, own version of HB 8817, RA 2770 can be sait to haoriginated in the House of Representatives

Held: Yes

Ratio: Although a bill of local application like HB No. 881should, by constitutional prescription, originate exclusivelythe House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners thRA 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB N1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable becausecannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in tSenate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their ow

admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 whSB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB N8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in questibut also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill thinitiated the legislative process that culminated in tenactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Secti24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible undthe circumstances attending the instant controversy.Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HNo. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and dutransmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB N8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading oDecember 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate

January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or oFebruary 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Loc

Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 124Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB N1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on t

Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filiin the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receiof the bill from the House, does not contravene tconstitutional requirement that a bill of local applicatishould originate in the House of Representatives, for as loas the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives tHouse bill.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: Nor does the Constitutiprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so lon




as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pendingreceipt of the House bill.

Every law, including RA No. 7720,has in its favor thepresumption of constitutionality It is a well-entrenched

jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies thepresumption of constitutionality. Consequently, for RA No.7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clearand unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a

doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds fornullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Thosewho petition this court to declare a law to beunconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basisthat will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petitionmust fail. Taking into consideration the justification of ourstand on the immediately preceding ground raised bypetitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720,the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failedto overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petitionis, therefore, inevitable.

Governmental powers/ functions:

Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme (1991)

Facts: Petitioner is a municipal corporation existing underand in accordance with the laws of the Republic of thePhilippines. At about 7 am of December 16, 1965, a collisionoccurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by BernardoBalagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, agravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and ownedby Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the petitionerand driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the

jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of theinjuries they sustained and 4 others suffered physicalinjuries.Private respondents instituted an action against Nieverasand Balagot before the CFI. The defendants filed a thirdparty complaint against petitioner and Bislig. The complaintwas then amended to implead petitioner and Bislig.Petitioner raised as defense lack of cause of action, nonsuability of the State, prescription and negligence of theowner and driver of the jeepney.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitionerand Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The owner and driver of the

jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed an MRwhich was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

Issue: WON the court committed grave abuse of discretionwhen it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in amotion to dismiss.

Held: Yes

Ratio: In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolutionof the defense of non-suability of the State until trial.However, the judge failed to resolve such defense,

proceeded with the trial and then rendered a decisionagainst the municipality and its driver. The judge did notcommit GAD when it arbitrarily failed to resolve the issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality.However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction whenin his decision he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.

The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expresslyprovided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Consti, to wit:"the State may not be sued without its consent." Expressconsent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.

The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts isfound in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to

enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quadelict. Consent is implied when the government enters inbusiness contracts, thereby descending to the level of tother contracting party, and also when the State filescomplaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when thare engaged in governmental functions and therefore shouenjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, thare subject to suit even in the performance of such functio

because their charter provided that they can sue and sued.A distinction should first be made between suability aliability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to sued, liability on the applicable law and the establishfacts. The circumstance that a state is suable does nnecessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it canever be held liable if it does not first consent to be sueLiability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state hallowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chanto prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liabfor the torts committed by its employee, the test of liabilof the municipality depends on whether or not the driveacting in behalf of the municipality, is performi

governmental or proprietary functions (Torio vs. FontanillAccording to City of Kokomo vs Loy(Indiana SC), municipcorporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions atwofold. In one they exercise the right springing frosovereignty, and while in the performance of the dutipertaining thereto, their acts are political and government

Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionarperforming a public service, and as such they are officeagents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity tmunicipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporaright, arising from their existence as legal persons and not public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performanof such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in thcorporate or individual capacity, and not for the state sovereign power."It has already been remarked that municipal corporations a

suable because their charters grant them the competence sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liabfor torts committed by them in the discharge governmental functions and can be held answerable only ifcan be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacitIn the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of tmunicipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguiliriver to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of SaFernando's municipal streets." In the absence of aevidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performanof official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Ru131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that tdriver of the dump truck was performing duties or taspertaining to his office.We already stressed in the case Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the DistrEngineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that "the constructi

or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the drivworked at the time of the accident are admittedgovernmental activities."After a careful examination of existing laws a

jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that tmunicipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed its regular employee, who was then engaged in tdischarge of governmental functions. Hence, the death the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetacompensation.

Proprietary powers/ functions:




City of Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court(1989)

Facts: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried inNorth Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto.Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021.

The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, howeverfrom the receipt, no other document embodied such leaseover the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years,the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation.On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorizedthe exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio. Hisbones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of thecemetery. The lot was also leased to another lessee. Duringthe next all souls day, the private respondents were shockedto find out that Vicencio’s remains were removed. Thecemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband inthe bodega.Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action fordamages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of theCity Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of theNorth Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter'spredecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial groundsowned and operated by the City Government of Manila. Thecourt ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to makeuse of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award

of damages in favor of the private respondents.

Issue: WON the operations and functions of a publiccemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietaryfunction of the City of Manila.

Held: Proprietary

Ratio: Petitioners alleged in their petition that the NorthCemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose asstated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is apolitical subdivision in the performance of its governmentalfunction, it is immune from tort liability which may be causedby its public officers and subordinate employees. Privaterespondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into acontract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietaryfunctions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officerstherefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.

The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as suchendowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to beexercised by and through its city government in conformitywith law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue andbe sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers aretwofold in character-public, governmental or political on theone hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on theother. Governmental powers are those exercised inadministering the powers of the state and promoting thepublic welfare and they include the legislative, judicial,public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand areexercised for the special benefit and advantage of thecommunity and include those which are ministerial, private

and corporate. In connection with the powers of a municipalcorporation, it may acquire property in its public orgovernmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity.

The New Civil Code divides such properties into property forpublic use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), andfurther enumerates the properties for public use asprovincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works forpublic service paid for by said provisions, cities ormunicipalities, all other property is patrimonial withoutprejudice to the provisions of special laws. Thus in Torio v.Fontanilla, the Court declared that with respect toproprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipalcorporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu.

Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence ofspecial law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property the City of Manila. The administration and government of tcemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order apolice of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of tsame are under the charge and responsibility of tsuperintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominiothere is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the cla

of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that tburial lot was leased in favor of the private respondentHence, obligations arising from contracts have the force law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contraexecuted by the lessor and lessee remains as the labetween them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provisientitles the other party to damages even if no penalty fsuch breach is prescribed in the contract.

Issue: WON the city is liable for damages

Held: Yes

Ratio: All things considered, even as the Cocommiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunate happeni

complained of and untimely desecration of the resting plaand remains of their deceased dearly beloved, it finds treliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual basUnder the aforementioned facts and circumstances, tmost that plaintiffs ran ask for is the replacement of subjelot with another lot of equal size and similar location in thNorth Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can make uof without paying any rental to the city government forperiod of forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleve(11) days corresponding to the unexpired portion of the terof the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978 when tremains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. weprematurely removed from the disputed lot; and to requthe defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder.As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease

grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the North Cemetery f50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputreasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the cgovernment, there is nothing in the record that justifies treversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and tIntermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receiptin itself a contract of lease. (Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio Fontanilla), petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortioact committed by its agents who failed to verify and chethe duration of the contract of lease. The contention of tpetitioner-city that the lease is covered by AdministratiOrder No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the Cof Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 19is not meritorious for the said administrative order cove

new leases. When subject lot was certified on January 21978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fif(50) years was still in full force and effect.




SYLLABUS PART 2: DECENTRALIZATION; LOCALAUTONOMY; POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

5. Local Government Units vis a vis National Government :

Power of general supervision:

Drilon v. Lim (1994)

Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality

of Section 187 of the Local Government Code3. The

Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companiesand a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (ManilaRevenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with theprocedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and forcontaining certain provisions contrary to law and publicpolicy.

The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustainedthe ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC asunconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the powerof control over LGUs in violation of the policy of localautonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretaryargues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional andthat the procedural requirements for the enactment of taxordinances as specified in the Local Government Code hadindeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed bythe Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of thedecision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider theconstitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC

Held: Yes

Ratio: BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdictionover all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation isincapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X,Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Courtappellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality orvalidity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,

ordinance, or regulation is in question.In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advisedto act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind theconsequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality uponthe stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court,including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposefulhesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on thetheory that the measure was first carefully studied by theexecutive and the legislative departments and determined

3Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances

And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. Theprocedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenuemeasures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this

Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted forthe purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,further, That any question on the constitutionality or legalityof tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised onappeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof tothe Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision withinsixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal:Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have theeffect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and theaccrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge leviedtherein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days afterreceipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day periodwithout the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, theaggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with acourt of competent jurisdiction.

by them to be in accordance with the fundamental labefore it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. Tpresumption of constitutionality can be overcome only the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction the Constitution.

Issue: WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional

Held: Yes

Ratio: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice review only the constitutionality or legality of the tordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or boththese grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets asidetax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his ow

judgment for the judgment of the local government thenacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside tManila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his owversion of what the Code should be.. What he found only wthat it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measuwas determine if the petitioners were performing thfunctions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribprocedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the graof powers to the city government under the LocGovernment Code. As we see it, that was an act not

control but of mere supervision.An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of aact. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, ordthe act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he meven decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover suauthority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees tothat the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay dowsuch rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify replace them.Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in tLocal Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in hopinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessivoppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flawould involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and nmerely an examination of whether or not the requiremenor limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it wou

smack of control rather than mere supervision. That powwas never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, tSecretary of Justice is not given the same latitude undSection 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain tconstitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without tright to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessivoppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on thmatter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the ManRevenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusitherein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-complianwith the prescribed procedure in its enactment. Thegrounds affected the legality, not the wisdom reasonableness, of the tax measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed proceduin the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is anothmatter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing,

publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearinno posting, no translation into Tagalog) Judge Palattao however found that all the procedurequirements had been observed in the enactment of tManila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had nbeen able to prove such compliance before the Secretaonly because he had given it only five days within which gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 2exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We agree with ttrial court that the procedural requirements have indebeen observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearinare found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B andshow that the proposed ordinances were published in t




Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993,respectively, and the approved ordinance was published inthe July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and inthe July 6, 1993 issue of Balita. The only exceptions are theposting of the ordinance as approved but this omission doesnot affect its validity, considering that its publication in threesuccessive issues of a newspaper of general circulation willsatisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the textof the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but

this requirement applies to the approval of localdevelopment plans and public investment programs of thelocal government unit and not to tax ordinances.

Solicitor General v. Metopolitan Manila Authority(1991)

Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West TrafficDistrict vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that theconfiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for trafficviolations was not among the sanctions that could beimposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm byLOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the publicstreets. It was there also observed that even the confiscationof driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directlyprescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to

be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners allegedthat Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of driver’s licenses and removal of license plates. Dir GeneralCesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that hisoffice had never authorized the removal of the license platesof illegally parked vehicles.Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued OrdinanceNo. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow andimpound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehiclesillegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in MetroManila." The Court issued a resolution requiring theMetropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submitseparate comments in light of the contradiction between theOrdinance and the SC ruling.

The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it wasadopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32(formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The SolGen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and voidbecause it represented an invalid exercise of a delegatedlegislative power. The flaw in the measure was that itviolated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does notpermit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of licenseplates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for trafficviolations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention,however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the saidordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.

Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of theGeneral Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC

Held: No

Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of

legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearingthat the requisites of such delegation are present. Theserequisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making thedelegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.

The measures in question are enactments of localgovernments acting only as agents of the nationallegislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflectand conform to the will of their principal. To test the validityof such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply theparticular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by theaccepted principles governing municipal corporations.According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1)must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) mustnot be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or

discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trad5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general aconsistent with public policy.A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that tmeasures under consideration do not pass the first criteribecause they do not conform to existing law. The pertinelaw is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses ftraffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There

nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizithe Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose susanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission wallowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" trafviolators only "in such amounts and under such penalties are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowheis the removal of license plates directly imposed by tdecree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by tCommission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly providthat "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall nbe confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to tMetropolitan Manila Authority and all other local politicsubdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including tMunicipality of Mandaluyong.`The requirement that the municipal enactment must n

violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisioare able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation legislative power from the national legislature. They amere agents vested with what is called the power subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, tlocal government unit cannot contravene but must obey all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, thenactments in question, which are merely local in origcannot prevail against the decree, which has the force aeffect of a statute.

To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates other ordinances amending and so violating national lawsthe guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could passed imposing additional requirements for the issuancemarriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracto forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter impostur

the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; aso on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end valid, would be ultra vires.

The measures in question do not merely add to trequirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions tdecree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effepartially repeal the law.We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that P1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is aexception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 4on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to puniviolations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with tsanction therein prescribed, including those here questione

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances weenacted with the best of motives and shares the concern

the rest of the public for the effective reduction of trafproblems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition aenforcement of more deterrent penalties upon trafviolators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the pubmisgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcemeof such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is ththere is no statutory authority for and indeed there isstatutory prohibition against the imposition of supenalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardleof their merits, they cannot be impose by the challengenactments by virtue only of the delegated legislatipowers.




It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its owndiscretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, eitherdirectly through a statute or by simply delegating authorityto this effect to the local governments in MetropolitanManila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective andcontinues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motorvehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43)and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations inMetropolitan Manila.

Ganzon v. Court of Appeals (1991)

Facts: The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from aseries of administrative complaints, ten in number, filedagainst him by various city officials sometime in 1988, onvarious charges, among them, abuse of authority,oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoralconduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution,and arbitrary detention. Finding probable grounds andreasons, the respondent (Sec of Local Government) issued apreventive suspension order for a period of sixty days. In theother case, respondent ordered petitioner's secondpreventive suspension for another sixty (60) days. Thepetitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC. The second preventivesuspension was not enforced.

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzoninstituted an action for prohibition against the respondent inthe RTC. Presently, he instituted an action for prohibition, inthe respondent CA. Meanwhile, the respondent issuedanother order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon foranother sixty days, the third time in twenty months, anddesignating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor asacting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced beforethe CA, a petition for prohibition. The CA rendered judgmentdismissing the cases.

Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as thePresident's alter ego, can suspend and or remove localofficials.

Issue: Yes

Ratio: It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspensionand/or removal over local officials. According to bothpetitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthenself-rule by local government units and second, by deletingthe phrase "as may be provided by law," to strip thePresident of the power of control over local governments. Itis a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debatesof the Constitutional Commission. The issue consists of threequestions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting thephrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest thePresident of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline,and or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitutionrepealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code?(3) What is the significance of the change in the

constitutional language?It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstandingthe change in the constitutional language, the charter didnot intend to divest the legislature of its right - or thePresident of her prerogative as conferred by existinglegislation to provide administrative sanctions against localofficials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may beprovided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscorelocal governments' autonomy from congress and to breakCongress' "control" over local government affairs. TheConstitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of localautonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority overmunicipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mistates out of local government units, as in the fedegovernments of the USA. Autonomy, in the constitutionsense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under tConstitution - and as the "supervision clause" itself suggesis to wean local government units from over dependence the central government.It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy"

not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among oththings, the passage of a local government code, a local tlaw, income distribution legislation, and a nationrepresentation law, and measures designed to realiautonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the locgovernment under the general supervision of the ExecutivIt is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress include in the local government code provisions for removof local officials, which suggest that Congress may exerciremoval powers, and as the existing Local Government Cohas done, delegate its exercise to the President.

The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional contof its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like t

power of local legislation. The Constitution did nothimore, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizthe President (through the Secretary of Local Government) proceed against local officials administratively, tConstitution contains no prohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powewhich supposedly excludes the power of investigation, adenied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinaauthority. It is a mistaken impression because legal"supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfupoint to the debates of the Constitutional Commission defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that tdeliberations are by themselves inconclusive, becaualthough Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude tpower of removal from the President, Commissioner Bl

Ople would not. The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the nConstitution has repealed the Local Government Code, BatBlg. 337. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are nincompatible terms and one may stand with the othnotwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomunder the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in forcand effect. As the Constitution itself declares, locautonomy means "a more responsive and accountable locgovernment structure instituted through a system decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, donothing more than to break up the monopoly of the nationgovernment over the affairs of local governments and as pby political adherents, to "liberate the local governmenfrom the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is n

meant to end the relation of partnership ainterdependence between the central administration alocal government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical steLocal governments, under the Constitution, are subject regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose thaprecisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-governmentAs we observed in one case, decentralization meadevolution of national administration - but not power - to tlocal levels. Thus:Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administratior decentralization of power. There is decentralization administration when the central government delegatadministrative powers to political subdivisions in order




broaden the base of government power and in the process tomake local governments "more responsive andaccountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partnersin the pursuit of national development and social progress."At the same time, it relieves the central government of theburden of managing local affairs and enables it toconcentrate on national concerns. The President exercises"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that

local affairs are administered according to law." He has nocontrol over their acts in the sense that he can substitutetheir judgments with his own.Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves anabdication of political power in the favor of localgovernments units declared to be autonomous, In that case,the autonomous government is free to chart its own destinyand shape its future with minimum intervention from centralauthorities. According to a constitutional author,decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"since in that event, the autonomous government becomesaccountable not to the central authorities but to itscontituency.

Issue: WON the several suspensions imposed upon MayonGanzon are proper

Held: No

Ratio: The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed onMayor Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers theCourt, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact thatsince the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, theMayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance inpublic office (assuming that Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance)but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him outof office.

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease withsuspensions, for the above reasons, and so also, because itis out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government.

The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, issimply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normalcause of the investigation with his influence and authorityover possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the recordsand other evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assistprosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erringlocal official. Under the Local Government Code, it can notexceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not beexactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwisesufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.Suspension finally is temporary, and as the LocalGovernment Code provides, it may be imposed for no morethan sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is unjustand unreasonable, and nothing less than tyranny. Wereiterate that we are not precluding the President, through

the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yetwe are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior isexercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, witha grave abuse of discretion.

Ganzon Supplement:Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a meredecentralization of administration, not of power, in whichlocal officials remain accountable to the centralgovernment in the manner the law may provide;

The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; The change in constitutional language (with respect to thesupervision clause) was meant but to deny legislativecontrol over local governments; it did not exempt the

latter from legislative regulations provided regulation consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;Since local governments remain accountable to thnational authority, the latter may, by law, and in thmanner set forth therein, impose disciplinary actioagainst local officials;"Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistenterms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which thPresident does not have);

The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve thsuspension so far ordered, but may no longer bsuspended for the offenses he was charged originallyprovided:that delays in the investigation of those charges "due this fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shanot be counted in computing the time of suspension[Supra, sec. 63(3)]that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventivsuspension, the petitioner commits another or othecrimes and abuses for which proper charges are fleagainst him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previoususpension shall not be a bar to his being preventivelsuspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Sectio63 of the Local Government Code.

MCIAA v. Marcos (1996)Facts: Petitioner was created by virtue of RA695mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficieand effective control, management and supervision of tMactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and tLahug Airport in Cebu City. Under Section 1: The authorshall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the NationGovernment or any of its political subdivisions, agencies ainstrumentalities.However, the Officer of the Treasurer of Cebu City demandpayment for realty taxes on parcels of land belonging petitioner. Petitioner objected invoking its tax exemption.also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the governmeperforming governmental functions, citing section 133 of tLGC which puts limitations on the taxing powers of LGU

The city refused insisting that petitioner is a GO

performing proprietary functions whose tax exemption wwithdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC.Petitioner filed a declaratory relief before the RTC. The trcourt dismissed the petitioner ruling that the LGC withdrethe tax exemption granted the GOCCs.

Issue: WON the City of Cebu has the power to impotaxes on petitioner

Held: Yes

Ratio: As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuseto be found only in the responsibility of the legislature whiimposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay it. Sintaxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are tlifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptiofrom taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thconstrued strictissimi juris against the taxpayers aliberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemptifrom tax payment must be clearly shown and based language in the law too plain to be mistaken.

There can be no question that under Section 14 RA 6958 tpetitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taximposed by the National Government or any of its politicsubdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Neverthelessince taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, texemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of thtaxing authority.




The LGC, enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article X of theconstitution provides for the exercise by LGUs of their powerto tax, the scope thereof or its limitations, and theexemption from taxation. Section 133 of the LGC prescribesthe common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs: (o)

Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the nationalgovernment, its agencies and instrumentalities and LGUs.Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real propertytax. Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from

payment of GOCCs, except as provided therein. On the otherhand, the LGC authorizes LGUs to grant tax exemptionprivileges. Reading together Section 133, 232 and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down inSecs 133 the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to thelevy of inter alia, "taxes, fees, and charges of any kind of theNational Government, its agencies and instrumentalties, andLGUs"; however, pursuant to Sec 232, provinces, cities,municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may imposethe real property tax except on, inter alia, "real propertyowned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of itspolitical subdivisions except when the beneficial usedthereof has been granted to a taxable person."As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presentlyenjoyed by natural or juridical persons, includinggovernment-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193

of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they arewithdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except upon theeffectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local waterdistricts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938,non stock and non-profit hospitals and educationalinstitutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. Thelatter proviso could refer to Section 234, which enumeratesthe properties exempt from real property tax. But the lastparagraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption in so far as the real property taxes areconcerned by limiting the retention only to thoseenumerated there-in; all others not included in theenumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of theLGC. Moreover, even as the real property is owned by theRepublic of the Philippines, or any of its political subdivisionscovered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, theexemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property

has been granted to taxable person for consideration orotherwise.Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocallywithdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions fromreal property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons,including GOCCs, except as provided in the said section, andthe petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-ownedcorporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption fromsuch tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No.6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary canonly be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under anyof the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not underSection 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, thesaid section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. In short, thepetitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section133.

It must show that the parcels of land in question, which arereal property, are any one of those enumerated in Section234, either by virtue of ownership, character, or use of theproperty. Most likely, it could only be the first, but not underany explicit provision of the said section, for one exists. Inlight of the petitioner's theory that it is an "instrumentality of the Government", it could only be within be first item of thefirst paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of theterms Republic of the Philippines" to embrace."instrumentalities" and "agencies."

This view does not persuade us. In the first place, thepetitioner's claim that it is an instrumentality of theGovernment is based on Section 133(o), which expresslymentions the word "instrumentalities"; and in the second

place it fails to consider the fact that the legislature used tphrase "National Government, its agencies ainstrumentalities" "in Section 133(o),but only the phra"Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisi"in Section 234(a).

The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "NatioGovernment" are not interchangeable. The former is boardand synonymous with "Government of the Republic of tPhilippines" which the Administrative Code of the 19

defines as the "corporate governmental entity though whithe functions of the government are exercised through at tPhilippines, including, saves as the contrary appears frothe context, the various arms through which politicauthority is made effective in the Philippines, whethpertaining to the autonomous reason, the provincial, cimunicipal or barangay subdivision or other forms of locgovernment." These autonomous regions, provincial, cimunicipal or barangay subdivisions" are the politicsubdivision. On the other hand, "National Governmenrefers "to the entire machinery of the central government, distinguished from the different forms of local Government

The National Government then is composed of the thrgreat departments the executive, the legislative and t

judicial. An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of tvarious units of the Government, including a departme

bureau, office instrumentality, or government-owned controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinunit therein;" while an "instrumentality" refers to "aagency of the National Government, not integrated withthe department framework, vested with special functions

jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporapowers, administering special funds, and enjoyioperational autonomy; usually through a charter. This terincludes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions agovernment-owned and controlled corporations".If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception thereinthe withdrawal of the exemption from payment of reproperty taxes under the last sentence of the said section the agencies and instrumentalities of the NationGovernment mentioned in Section 133(o), then it shouhave restated the wording of the latter. Yet, it did nMoreover, that Congress did not wish to expand the scope

the exemption in Section 234(a) to include real propeowned by other instrumentalities or agencies of tgovernment including government-owned and controllcorporations is further borne out by the fact that the sourof this exemption is Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 646, otherwiknown as the Real Property Tax Code.Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "aany government-owned or controlled corporation so exemby its charter" was excluded. The justification for threstricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: limit further tax exemption privileges, specially in light of tgeneral provision on withdrawal of exemption from paymeof real property taxes in the last paragraph of property taxin the last paragraph of Section 234. These polconsiderations are consistent with the State policy to ensuautonomy to local governments 33 and the objective of th

LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomto enable them to attain their fullest development as sereliant communities and make them effective partners in tattainment of national goals. 34 The power to tax is the moeffective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance asupport myriad activities of local government units for tdelivery of basic services essential to the promotion of thgeneral welfare and the enhancement of peace, progresand prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recthat the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemptiprivileges granted to government-owned and controllcorporations and all other units of government were thsuch privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion adistortions in the tax treatment of similarly situat




enterprises, and there was a need for this entities to share inthe requirements of the development, fiscal or otherwise, bypaying the taxes and other charges due from them.

The crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether theparcels of land in question belong to the Republic of thePhilippines whose beneficial use has been granted to thepetitioner, and (b) whether the petitioner is a "taxableperson". It may be reasonable to assume that the term"lands" refer to "lands" in Cebu City then administered by

the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of land therespondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real propertytaxes. This section involves a "transfer" of the "lands" amongother things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of thebeneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained bythe Republic of the Philippines.

This "transfer" is actually an absolute conveyance of theownership thereof because the petitioner's authorizedcapital stock consists of "the value of such real estate ownedand/or administered by the airports." Hence, the petitioner isnow the owner of the land in question and the exception inSec 234(c) of the LGC is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claimthat it was never a "taxable person" under its Charter. It wasonly exempted from the payment of real property taxes. Thegrant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusiveproof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person

subject to all taxes, except real property tax.Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxableperson for purposes of real property tax, in light of theforgoing disquisitions, it had already become even if it beconceded to be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of theGovernment, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which,as earlier adverted to, applies to the petitioner. Accordingly,the position taken by the petitioner is untenable. Reliance onBasco vs. Pagcor is unavailing since it was decided beforethe effectivity of the LGC. Besides, nothing can preventCongress from decreeing that even instrumentalities oragencies of the government performing governmentalfunctions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely tofulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy, no onecan doubt its wisdom.

Decentralization, local autonomy:

Limbona v. Mangelin (1989)

Facts: Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as amember of the Sangguniang Pampook, RegionalAutonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao delSur. He was then elected speaker of the regional legislativeassembly of central Mindanao, composed of 18 members.Later, Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of theCommittee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speakerof Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in hiscapacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a

conference. Petitioner then ordered Acting SecretaryAlimbuyao to inform the assemblymen that there will be nosession on said date as petitioner and Razul are attendingthe house committee hearing.

The Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice.After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-

Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motionto declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymenin attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chairdeclared said seat of the Speaker vacant.

The petitioner then went to court praying that judgment berendered declaring the proceedings held by respondentsduring the session as null and void and holding the electionof petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or

Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 vaand subsisting, and(e) Making the injunction permanent.

Issue: WON the expulsion of the petitioner (pendilitigation) has made the case moot and academic.

Ratio: We do not agree that the case has been rendermoot and academic by reason simply of the expulsiresolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion w

done purposely to make this petition moot and academand to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.On the ground of the immutable principle of due procealone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no forand effect. In the first place, there is no showing that tSanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuminthat there was an investigation, or otherwise given topportunity to do so. What appears in the records is admission by the Assembly that "since November, 1987 to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at tSangguniang Pampook." To be sure, respondents aver th"[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him come to Cotabato City," but that was "so that thdifferences could be threshed out and settled." Certainthat avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle,

matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute fthe notice and hearing contemplated by law.In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to bebare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against tpetitioner arising from what the former perceive to abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolutiospeaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitionebefore the Supreme Court . . . on question which should havbeen resolved within the confines of the Assembly ---- an awhich some members claimed unnecessarily and unduassails their integrity and character as representative of tpeople," an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Acceto judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, anunless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution thshould the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant h

removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in liwith the most elementary requirements of due process. Awhile it is within the discretion of the members of tSanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts anonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this Court the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abus

Issue: What is the extent of self-government given to ttwo autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

Ratio: The autonomous governments of Mindanao weorganized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree N1618. Among other things, the Decree established "internautonomy" in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of thnational sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Repub

of the Philippines and its Constitution," "with legislative aexecutive machinery to exercise the powers aresponsibilities"' specified therein.It requires the autonomous regional governments "undertake all internal administrative matters for trespective regions," except to "act on matters which awithin the jurisdiction and competence of the NationGovernment," "which include, but are not limited to, tfollowing:

1. National defense and security;2. Foreign relations;3. Foreign trade;4. Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchang

banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowin




5. Disposition, exploration, development, exploitationor utilization of all natural resources;

6. Air and sea transport;7. Postal matters and telecommunications;8. Customs and quarantine;9. Immigration and deportation;10. Citizenship and naturalization;11. National economic, social and educational planning;

and

12. General auditing."In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]hePresident shall have the power of general supervision andcontrol over the Autonomous Regions.Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administrationor decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegatesadministrative powers to political subdivisions in order tobroaden the base of government power and in the process tomake local governments "more responsive andaccountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partnersin the pursuit of national development and social progress."At the same time, it relieves the central government of theburden of managing local affairs and enables it toconcentrate on national concerns. The President exercises

"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure thatlocal affairs are administered according to law." He has nocontrol over their acts in the sense that he can substitutetheir judgments with his own.Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves anabdication of political power in the favor of localgovernments units declared to be autonomous. In that case,the autonomous government is free to chart its own destinyand shape its future with minimum intervention from centralauthorities. According to a constitutional author,decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"since in that event, the autonomous government becomesaccountable not to the central authorities but to itsconstituency.But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy toMuslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves,truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere

administration is a question foreign to this petition, sincewhat is involved herein is a local government unitconstituted prior to the ratification of the presentConstitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve thatcontroversy now, in this case, since no controversy in factexists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the propercase. Under the 1987 Constitution, local government unitsenjoy autonomy in these two sensesAn autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of thelatter category is subject alone to the decree of the organicact creating it and accepted principles on the effects andlimits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomousgovernment of the former class is, as we noted, under thesupervision of the national government acting through thePresident (and the Department of Local Government). If theSangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous

in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably, beyond thedomain of this Court in perhaps the same way that theinternal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines arebeyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the formercategory only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction.An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating theautonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us thatthey were never meant to exercise autonomy in the secondsense, that is, in which the central government commits anact of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in thefirst place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have thepower of general supervision and control over AutonomousRegions." 33 the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook,

their legislative arm, is made to discharge chieadministrative services.Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with moreason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

San Juan v. Civil Service Commission (1991)

Facts: The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) fRizal Province was left vacated. Petitioner, Gov. ReynalSan Juan informed Dir. Reynaldo Abella of the DBM that MDalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO and requestDir Abella to endorse the appointment of Santos. In a memhowever, Dir Abella appointed Cecilia Almajose as PBO Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all MunicipBudget Officers. According to Abella, Almajose was moqualified as she was a CPA. DBM Undersecretary NazaCabuquit signed the appointment papers of Almajose.In a letter, Petitioner reiterated his request for Santoappointment. DBM Regional Dir Agripino Galvez denied trequest as Santos was not qualified. When petitioner learnof Almajose’s appointment, he protested on the grounds thCabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized appoint the PBO; that Almajose lacks the required thryears work experience as provided in Local Budget CircuNo. 31; and that under EO 112, it is the Governor, not th

Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power recommend nominees for the position of PBO. The DBissued a memo ruling that petitioner’s protest is nmeritorious as the DBM validly exercised its prerogative filling-up the contested position since none of the petitionenominees met the prescribed requirements. The Caffirmed.

Issue: WON petitioner has the right and privilege recommend the nominees to the position of PBO

Held: Yes

Ratio: The tug of war between the Secretary of DBM anthe Governor of Rizal over a position involves the applicatiof a most important constitutional policy and principle, thof local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate local autonomy. Where a law is capable of twinterpretations, one in favor of centralized power Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, tscales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. The exerciby LGUs of meaningful power has been a national goal sinthe turn of the century. And yet, inspite of constitutionprovisions and legislation mandating greater autonomy flocal officials, national officers cannot seem to let go centralized powers. They deny or water down what litgrants of autonomy have so far been given to municipcorporations.President McKinley's Instructions to the Second PhilippiCommission ordered the new Government "to devote theattention in the first instance to the establishment municipal governments in which natives of the Islands, boin the cities and rural communities, shall be afforded t

opportunity to manage their own local officers to the fulleextent of which they are capable and subject to the leadegree of supervision and control which a careful study their capacities and observation of the workings of naticontrol show to be consistent with the maintenance of laorder and loyalty." In this initial organic act for tPhilippines, the Commission which combined both executiand legislative powers was directed to give top priority making local autonomy effective. The 1935 Constitution hno specific article on local autonomy. However, tConstitution clearly limited the executive power over locgovernments to "general supervision as may be provided law." The President controls the executive departments. Hhas no such power over local governments. He has on




supervision and that is both general and circumscribed bystatute. Pursuant to this principle under the 1935Constitution, legislation implementing local autonomy wasenacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264 (Local AutonomyAct) was enacted. The provisions of the 1973 Constitutionmoved the country further towards greater autonomy. Anentire article on Local Government was incorporated into theConstitution. It called for a local government code definingmore responsive and accountable local government

structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantialboundary alteration cannot be done except in accordancewith the local government code and upon approval by aplebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and tolevy taxes was specifically settled upon local governments.

The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more markedin the present Constitution (Art II Sec 25, Art X Sec 2-3).When the Civil Service Commission interpreted therecommending power of the Provincial Governor as purelydirectory, it went against the letter and spirit of theconstitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBMSecretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powersand ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds,the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and setback.

Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the locallevel and after completion are forwarded to the nationalofficials for review. They are prepared by the local officialswho must work within the constraints of those budgets. Theyare not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowingDBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whetheror not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is forthis reason that there should be a genuine interplay, abalancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposalsfrom both the local and national officials. It is for this reasonthat the nomination and appointment process involves asharing of power between the two levels of government. Itmay not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedurefollowed in the appointments of Justices and Judges. UnderArticle VIII of the Constitution, nominations for judicialpositions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council.DBM’s grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact

that Dir Galvez required the Governor to submit at leastthree other names of nominees better qualified than hisearlier recommendation. The appointment of Almajose wasformalized before the Governor was extended the courtesyof being informed that his nominee had been rejected. Thecomplete disregard of the LGUs prerogative and the smugbelief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, anddiscretion are manifest. In his work, Dean Vicente G. Sincostated that the value of LGUs as institutions of democracy ismeasured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. Hestated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute thestrength of free nations. A people may establish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipalinstitutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." Our nationalofficials should not only comply with the constitutionalprovisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the

spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.

Ganzon v. Court of Appeals (1991), supra.

Held: The 1987 Constitution did not divest the President[in this case acting through Sec of LocGov] of the power of supervision over LGUs. The change in the constitutionallanguage merely underscores local governments' autonomyfrom congress and to break Congress’ "control" over localgovernment affairs. The Constitution did not, however,intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive thelegislature of all authority over municipal corporations, inparticular, concerning discipline.Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the

US. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to tguiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit tlegislative responsibility under the Constitution and as t"supervision clause" itself suggest is to wean local LGfrom over-dependence on the central government.Under the Constitution, "local autonomy" is not instantly seexecuting, but subject to, among other things, the passagof a local government code, a local tax law, incomdistribution legislation, and a national representation la

and measures designed to realize autonomy at the loclevel. Also, despite the autonomy, the Constitution placthe local government under the general supervision of tExecutive. Finally, the Charter allows Congress to include the LGC provisions for removal of local officials, whisuggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and the existing LGC has done, delegate its exercise to tPresident.

The petitioners are under the mistaken impression that tConstitution has left the President mere supervisory powewhich supposedly excludes the power of investigation, adenied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinaauthority. Legally, "supervision" is not incompatible wdisciplinary authority."Control" = the power of an officer to alter or modify nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done

the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgmeof the former for test of the latter. "Supervision" overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see thsubordinate officers perform their duties. As we hehowever, "investigating" is not inconsistent w"overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".

Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA (1990)

Issue: Constitutionality of EO 220, dated July 15, 198which created the Cordillera Administrative Region - assailon the primary ground that the President pre-empts tenactment of an organic act by Congress and the approval such act through a plebiscite.

Held: EO 220 envisions the consolidation acoordination of the delivery of services of line departmenand agencies of the National Government in the arecovered by the administrative region as a step preparatoto the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does ncreate the autonomous region contemplated in tConstitution. It merely provides for transitory measures anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and tcreation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares tground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict wthe provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.

The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for tcreation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras whiundoubtedly, will take time. The President, in 1987 sexercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had nyet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantimthe organic act had not yet been passed.Petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CA

contravened the constitutional guarantee of the locautonomy for the provinces composing it. It must be clarifithat the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in tConstitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administratiautonomy of local government units or, in more techniclanguage, the decentralization of government authority. Othe other hand, the creation of autonomous regions Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to t1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of politicautonomy, not just administrative, to these regions. As saearlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agenthat would prepare the stage for political autonomy for tCordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process transforming a group of adjacent territorial and politic




subdivisions already enjoying local or administrativeautonomy into an autonomous region vested with politicalautonomy.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp, Inc. (1991)

Facts: In 1992, representatives from PPC maderepresentations with the Pagcor on the possibility of settingup a casino in Pryce Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro City. OnNovember 1992, the parties executed a contract of leaseinvolving the ballroom of the hotel which would be convertedinto a casino.Way back in 1950, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDOpassed Resolution 2295 prohibiting the establishment of agambling casino. Resolution 2673, dated October 19, 1992,reiterated this prohibition. On December 7, 1992, OrdinanceNo. 3353 was enacted prohibiting the issuance of businesspermits for the operation of a casino. On January 4, 1993,Ordinance 3375-93 was passed prohibiting the operation of casinos.PPC filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunctionagainst CDO before the CA. It prayed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Ordinance 3353. Pagcor intervenedclaiming that Ordinance 4475 was violative of the non-impairment of contracts and EP clauses. The CA declared theordinances unconstitutional and void.

Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panglungsod has theauthority to enact said ordinances

Held: No

Ratio: Petitioner’s Contention. CDO, like other localpolitical subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances forthe purposes indicated in the LGC. It is expressly vested withthe police power under what is known as the GeneralWelfare Clause now embodied in Section 16. In addition,Section 458 declares that the Sangguniang Panglungsod hasthe power to approve ordinances and pass resolutions forthe efficient and effective city government. The petitionersargue that by virtue of these provisions, the SangguniangPanlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos becausethey involve games of chance, which are detrimental to thepeople.

The adoption of the LGC, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only alater enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevailin case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, thepowers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expresslydiscontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform toits philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of itsrepealing clause. It is also maintained that assuming there isdoubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code onP.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of thepetitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Codecalling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the localgovernment units.Morality of Gambling Not Justiciable. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per

se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interestsof the people, there is nothing in the Constitutioncategorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for thatmatter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to dealwith the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its owndiscretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogetheror allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it mayconsider sufficient. The only question we can and shallresolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the SangguniangPanlungsod of CDO.Test of Validity. The tests of a valid ordinance are wellestablished. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be

valid, an ordinance must conform to the followisubstantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene tconstitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4)must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not unreasonable.We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the LGC, LGare authorized to prevent or suppress, among othe

"gambling and other prohibited games of chancObviously, this provision excludes games of chance whiare not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. Tpetitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Cocould have excluded such games of chance but did not. fact it does. The language of the section is clear aunmistakable. We conclude that since the word "gambling"associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," tword should be read as referring to only illegal gambliwhich, like the other prohibited games of chance, must prevented.Contravention of PD 1896. The apparent flaw in tordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 athe public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevePAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operaa casino in CDO. Petitioner deny that the ordinance chang

the PD, rather the LGC itself changed the PD. It seems to that the petitioners are playing with words. While insistithat the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they aactually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and uselefor all intents and purposes because the Code has shoPAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinoStrictly speaking, its operations may now be not onprohibited by the local government unit; in fact, tprohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by S458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to bgiven its accepted meaning. Local government units hanow no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, whiin the petitioners' view includes both legal and illeggambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they muall be prohibited by the local government units pursuant the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In th

situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only astoothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be abto exercise its powers as a prime source of governmerevenue through the operation of casinos.It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of tprovision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by tCode. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of theFurthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are nlightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakabshowing of such intention.Moreover, the petitioners' suggestion that the Coauthorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erathe distinction between these two forms of gambling withoa clear indication that this is the will of the legislature.

light of all the above considerations, we see no way arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners ththe ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we fithat the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has tcharacter and force of a statute, as well as the public poliexpressed in the decree allowing the playing of certagames of chance despite the prohibition of gambling general.Rationale for the rule that ordinances should ncontravene a statute. The rationale of the requiremethat the ordinances should not contravene a statute obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of tnational government. Local councils exercise only delegatlegislative powers conferred on them by Congress as t




national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior tothe principal or exercise powers higher than those of thelatter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local governmentunits can undo the acts of Congress, from which they havederived their power in the first place, and negate by mereordinance the mandate of the statute.Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive theirpowers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathesinto them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist.

As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it mayabridge and control. Unless there is some constitutionallimitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act,and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and sogreat a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipalcorporations in the State, and the corporation could notprevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as tothe corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so tophrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.Relationship between national legislature and localgovernment. This basic relationship between the nationallegislature and the local government units has not beenenfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitutionstrengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaningto detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congressretains control of the local government units although in

significantly reduced degree now than under our previousConstitutions. The power to create still includes the power todestroy. The power to grant still includes the power towithhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovationsin the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the localgovernment units of the power to tax, which cannot now bewithdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, thenational legislature is still the principal of the localgovernment units, which cannot defy its will or modify orviolate it.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree hasthe status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullifiedby a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for theSangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enactOrdinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for theoperation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibitingthe operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives,

these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the publicpolicy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires andvoid.

Padilla, concurring: I concur with the majority holding thatthe city ordinances in question cannot modify much lessrepeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintaingambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines underPresidential Decree No. 1869. However, despite the legalityof the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de OroCity by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view thatgambling in any form runs counter to the government's ownefforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moralcharacter which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion.

Davide, concurring: Wrong mode, not prohibition butdeclaratory relief. The issue that necessarily arises iswhether in granting local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the LocalGovernment Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869insofar as PAGCOR's general authority to establish andmaintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines isconcerned. I join the majority in holding that the ordinancescannot repeal P.D. No. 1869.

The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challengedordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is incontravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. Acontravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand

even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. Thcan be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as napplying to PAGCOR.

Taule v. Santos (1991)

Facts: On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed eleven (11) members convened with six members attendance for the purpose of holding the election of officers. The election proceeded with petitioner Rupe

Taule declared as president. The governor, Leandro Verceles sent a letter to respondeLuis Santos, Secretary of DILG protesting the election of tofficers of the FABC on the ground of certain irregularitie

Taule, as president of FABC, filed his comment on the proteof Governor denying the alleged irregularities adenouncing the governor’s acts of meddling and interveniin the election. Secretary Santos nullified the election of tofficers of FABC and ordered the conduct of a new one.In the present petitioner for certiorari, petitioner seeks treversal of the resolutions of the respondent Secretary.

Issue: WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over electicontests involving the election of officers of the FABC

Held: No

Ratio: Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Consthe Comelec shall exercise "exclusive original jurisdictiover all contests relating to the elections, returns, aqualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and cofficials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involvielective municipal officials decided by trial courts of gener

jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decidby trial courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987 Constitutiexpanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by grantingappellate jurisdiction over all contests involving electimunicipal officials decided by trial courts of gene

jurisdiction or elective barangay officials decided by trcourts of limited jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involvelective barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdictifrom decisions of the trial courts. The jurisdiction of tCOMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate. Aelection is the embodiment of the popular will, texpression of the sovereign power of the people. Specificalthe term "election," in the context of the Constitution, mrefer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and tcasting and counting of the votes which do not characterithe election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay.

Issue: WON the Secretary has jurisdiction over telections contests involving the FABC elections

Held: No

Ratio: The Secretary of Local Government is not vestwith jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving telection of officers of the FABC. There is no question that is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulatioas set forth in Section 222 of the LGC and the AdministratiCode.Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation said circular vests jurisdiction upon the respondeSecretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed relation thereto and consequently declare an election nand void.It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unleexpressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft




quasi- judicial powers.The jurisdiction of administrativeauthorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of thestatutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it uponthemselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity totheir determinations.

There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provisionexpressly or even by necessary implication conferring uponthe Secretary of Local Government the power to assume

jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the

katipunan ng mga barangay. Presidential power over localgovernments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs areadministered according to law." The general supervision isexercised by the President through the Secretary of LocalGovernment.Supervision vs Control: In administrative law, supervisionmeans overseeing or the power or authority of an officer tosee that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If thelatter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may takesuch action or step as prescribed by law to make themperform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means thepower of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set asidewhat a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former forthat of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief

Executive to wield no more authority than that of checkingwhether said local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governmentsso long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted withcontrol, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body;it does not include any restraining authority over such body.Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments,We hold that Secretary has no authority to pass upon thevalidity or regularity of the election of the officers of thekatipunan. To allow the Secretary to do so will give him morepower than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effectgive him control over local government officials for it willpermit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the

basic component of local governments so that the ultimategoal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his orderthat the new elections to be conducted be presided by theRegional Director is a clear and direct interference by theDepartment with the political affairs of the barangays whichis not permitted by the limitation of presidential power togeneral supervision over local governments.Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. To deny the Secretary of LocalGovernment the power to review the regularity of theelections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhancethe avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of localgovernments. The RTCs have the exclusive original

jurisdiction to hear the protest

Issue: WON the Governor has the personality to file the

protest

Held: Yes

Ratio: The Governor has the personality to file theprotest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code,the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consistsof the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of thesaid sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunangpanlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincialfederation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of thesangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer of thesagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has aninterest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its

elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If tpresident of the FABC assumes his presidency undquestionable circumstances and is allowed to sit in tsangguniang panlalawigan the official actions of tsanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validor legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party question the regularity of the elections of the officers of tFABC.

Issue: WON the election was valid

Held: No

Ratio: The elections were declared null and void primarfor failure to comply with Section 2.4 of DLG Circular No. 809 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or tVice-President shall preside over the reorganizationmeeting, there being a quorum." The rule specificaprovides that it is the incumbent FABC President or VicPresident who shall preside over the meeting. The wo"shall" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e.,must be imperative or mandatory and not merelypermissive, as the rule is explicit and requires no othinterpretation. If it had been intended that any other officshould preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did

the elections at the town and city levels as well as tregional level. It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABPresident nor the Vice-President presided over the meetiand elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of tBoard of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there wasclear violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. On thground, the elections should be nullified.In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Boarpresided over the elections. There was direct participation the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to whis dictated by the rules. Worse, there was no Board Election Supervisors to oversee the elections in view of twalk out staged by its two other members, the ProvincCOMELEC Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer. Tobjective of keeping the election free and honest wtherefore compromised.

Issue: WON the President’s appointment given to AugusAntonio as temporary representative of the FABC was valid

Held: No

Ratio: In the present controversy involving tsangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise explicit. To appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in tsangguniang panlalawigan is the president of the katipunapanlalawigan. The appointee must meet the qualificatioset by law. The appointing power is bound by law to compwith the requirements as to the basic qualifications of thappointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The President the Philippines or his alter ego, the Secretary of LoGovernment, has no authority to appoint anyone who donot meet the minimum qualification to be the president

the federation of barangay councils.Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. Hea member of the federation but he was not even preseduring the elections despite notice. The argument thAntonio was appointed as a remedial measure in texigency of the service cannot be sustained. Since Antondoes not meet the basic qualification of being president the federation, his appointment to the sangguniapanlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that suappointment is merely in a temporary capacity. If tintention of the respondent Secretary was to protect tinterest of the federation in the sanggunian, he should haappointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-ovcapacity. For even under the guidelines, the term of office




officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the dateof their election until their successors shall have been dulyelected and qualified, without prejudice to the terms of theirappointments as members of the sanggunian to which theymay be correspondingly appointed. Since the election is stillunder protest such that no successor of the incumbent hasas yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has no choice butto have the incumbent FABC President sit as member of thesanggunian. He could even have appointed petitioner since

he was elected the president of the federation but notAntonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the protegeof respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner'scharge of political interference by respondent Governor inthe organization. This should not be allowed. The barangaysshould be insulated from any partisan activity or politicalintervention if only to give true meaning to local autonomy.

Binay v. Domingo (1991)

Facts: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality,through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 (A resolutionto confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistanceprogram extending P500 to a bereaved family, funds to betaken out of unappropriated available funds existing in themunicipal treasury.) Metro Manila Commission approvedResolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary

certified a disbursement fired of P400,000 for theimplementation of the program.However, COA disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed inaudit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners’reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection orrelation between the objective sought to be attained and thealleged public safety, general welfare, etc of the inhabitantof Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a fewindividuals. Public funds should only be used for publicpurposes.

Issue: WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted underResolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a validexercise of police power under the general welfare clause

Held: Yes

Ratio: The police power is a governmental function, aninherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born withcivilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims,"Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi estsuprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the generalwelfare, comfort and convenience of the people.Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipalcorporations). Before a municipal corporation may exercisesuch power, there must be a valid delegation of such powerby the legislature which is the repository of the inherentpowers of the State. A valid delegation of police power mayarise from express delegation, or be inferred from the merefact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as ageneral rule, municipal corporations may exercise policepowers within the fair intent and purpose of their creationwhich are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers

expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on publiccorporations have been construed as empowering them todo the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirablefor the safety of the people.Municipal governments exercise this power under thegeneral welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothedwith authority to "enact such ordinances and issue suchregulations as may be necessary to carry out and dischargethe responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such asshall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,improve public morals, promote the prosperity and generalwelfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, andinsure the protection of property therein." And under

Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shexercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarimplied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and propfor governance such as to promote health and safeenhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peaand order in the local government unit, and preserve thcomfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."Police power is the power to prescribe regulations promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order

safety and general welfare of the people. It is the moessential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense itthe greatest and most powerful attribute of the governmen

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, ahas been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceethe duty to provide for the real needs of the people in thehealth, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently may be with private rights. It extends to all the great pubneeds, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation aalmost every function of the municipal government. It covea wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupiwith whatever affects the peace, security, health, moraand general welfare of the community, it is not limitthereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions whiexists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of tpeople by promoting public convenience or gene

prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservatiof comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, itdeemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition whishall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Pubpurpose is not unconstitutional merely because incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor Genera"the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towarstate policies to provide adequate social services, tpromotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 1Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human right

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a pubduty. The support for the poor has long been an acceptexercise of police power in the promotion of the commgood.

There is no violation of the equal protection clause

classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varyitreatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thustatutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to tdisabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondaof the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuinprogram of our government towards social justice. The BurAssistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though ncomplete. The loss of a member of a family is a painexperience, and it is more painful for the poor to financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. vivifies the very words of the late President RamMagsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more

law." This decision, however must not be taken as precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipgovernments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinadole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta (1983)

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shbe set aside for charity burial. For several years, the sectiof the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities bseven years after the enactment of the ordinance, tQuezon City Council passed the a resolution directing tCity Engineer to stop selling memorial park lots where th




owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% spacefor pauper burial.Respondent reacted by filing with the CFI a petition fordeclaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus withpreliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of theOrdinance in question The respondent alleged that the sameis contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, theLocal Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.

The Court declared the Section 9 null and void.

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent'sproperty is a valid and reasonable exercise of police powerand that the land is taken for a public use as it is intendedfor the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that theQuezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in theexercise of local police power. On the other hand, respondentcontends that the taking or confiscation of property isobvious because the ordinance permanently restricts the useof the property such that it cannot be used for anyreasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficialuse of his property.

Issue: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a validexercise of the police power

Held: No

Ratio: An examination of the Charter of Quezon City doesnot reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance inquestion except the provision granting police power to theCity. The power to regulate does not include the power toprohibit (. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not includethe power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not onlyconfiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorialpark cemetery.

There are three inherent powers of government by which thestate interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) policepower, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said toexist independently of the Constitution as necessaryattributes of sovereignty.Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promotingthe public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely

regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken forpublic use but rather to destroy in order to promote thegeneral welfare. In police power, the owner does not recoverfrom the government for injury sustained in consequencethereof. The police power being the most active power of thegovernment and the due process clause being the broadeststation on governmental power, the conflict between thispower of government and the due process clause of theConstitution is oftentimes inevitable.It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that policepower is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation orrestriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotionof the general welfare. It does not involve the taking orconfiscation of property with the exception of a few caseswhere there is a necessity to confiscate private property in

order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peaceand order and of promoting the general welfare as forinstance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,such as opium and firearms.It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118,Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulationbut an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of hisprivate property without due process of law, nay, evenwithout compensation.

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an privatecemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupersand the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, orthe general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a

taking without compensation of a certain area from a privacemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of tmunicipal corporation. Instead of building or maintainingpublic cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burdeto private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of tRevised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the ccouncil to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center

population of the city and to provide for their burial inproper place subject to the provisions of general laregulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the LocGovernment Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod m"provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in sumanner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simpauthorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or buy or expropriate private properties to construct pubcemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the pastcontinues to the present. Expropriation, however, requirpayment of just compensation. The questioned ordinancedifferent from laws and regulations requiring owners subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parkplaygrounds, and other public facilities from the land thesell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of pub

safety, health, and convenience are very clear from sarequirements which are intended to insure the developmeof communities with salubrious and wholesomenvironments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turare made to pay by the subdivision developer whindividual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fathe petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on aexpress provision of law as statutory basis of their exerciof power. The clause has always received broad and libeinterpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover tparticular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance wpassed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporatereceived necessary licenses and permits and commencoperating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetecannot even be considered as having been impliedacknowledged by the private respondent when it accept

the permits to commence operations.

Villanueva v. Castaneda (1987)

Facts: On November 7, 1961, the municipal council of SFernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some members of the Fernandino United Merchants and TradeAssociation to construct permanent stags and sell in the saplace. A protest was filed and the CFI decided that the laoccupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, wbeyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be tsubject of private occupancy. This decision was not enforcfor the petitioners were not evicted. In fact, the petitionepaid daily fees to the municipal government.On January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizeand Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for timmediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to resto

the subject property "to its original and customary use aspublic plaza. Vicente Macalino (officer in charge in the offiof the mayor) required the municipal treasurer and engineto demolish the stalls. Petitioners filed a prohibition with tCFI claiming that the disputed area was leased to them the municipal government. The CFI denied the petition/

Issue: WON the petitioners have a right to the said land

Held: No

Ratio: There is no question that the place occupied by tpetitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted ispublic plaza pursuant to the previous case. It does n




appear that the decision in this case was appealed or hasbeen reversed.A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and socannot be the subject of lease or any other contractualundertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this point wassettled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, wherethe Court declared as null and void the lease of a publicplaza of the said municipality in favor of a private person. InMuyot vs. de la Fuente, it was held that the City of Manila

could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta.Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of man. We rulethat the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupythe disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining therenow on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Theyshould have realized and accepted this earlier, consideringthat even before case was decided, the municipal councilalready adopted Resolution No. 29, declaring the area as theparking place and public plaza of the municipality.It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the saidresolution of the municipal council of San Fernando thatrespondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when heordered the demolition of the stags constructed in thedisputed area. As officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor,he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to itsintended use as a parking place and public plaza of the

municipality of San Fernando, conformably to the ordersfrom the court and the council. It is, therefore, not correct tosay that he had acted without authority or taken the law intohis hands in issuing his order.Neither can it be said that he acted whimsically in exercisinghis authority for it has been established that he directed thedemolition of the stalls only after, upon his instructions, themunicipal attorney had conducted an investigation, to lookinto the complaint filed by the Association of ConcernedCitizens and Consumers of San Fernando. There is evidencethat the petitioners were notified of this hearing, which theychose to disregard. Photographs of the disputed area, whichdoes look congested and ugly, show that the complaint wasvalid and that the area really needed to be cleared, asrecommended by the municipal attorney.Since the occupation of the place in question, it hasdeteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the

community in general. The proliferation of stags therein,most of them makeshift and of flammable materials, hasconverted it into a veritable fire trap, which, added to thefact that it obstructs access to and from the public marketitself, has seriously endangered public safety. The filthycondition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet items aresold, has aggravated health and sanitation problems,besides pervading the place with a foul odor that has spreadinto the surrounding areas. The entire place is unsightly, tothe dismay and embarrassment of the inhabitants, who wantit converted into a showcase of the town of which they canall be proud. The vendors in the talipapa have also spilledinto the street and obstruct the flow of traffic, therebyimpairing the convenience of motorists and pedestriansalike. The regular stallholders in the public market, who paysubstantial rentals to the municipality, are deprived of a

sizable volume of business from prospective customers whoare intercepted by the talipapa vendors before they canreach the market proper. On top of all these, the people aredenied the proper use of the place as a public plaza, wherethey may spend their leisure in a relaxed and even beautifulenvironment and civic and other communal activities of thetown can be held.

The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by thepetitioners are covered by the police power as delegated tothe municipality under the general welfare clause. Thisauthorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinancesand make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may benecessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers andduties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem

necessary and proper to provide for the health and safetpromote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, goorder, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and tinhabitants thereof, and for the protection of propertherein." This authority was validly exercised in this cathrough the adoption of Resolution No. 29, by the municipcouncil of San Fernando.Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, tresolution could have effectively terminated the agreeme

for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrenderor bargained away through the medium of a contract. In faevery contract affecting the public interest suffers congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservatiof the police power as a postulate of the existing legal ord

This power can be activated at any time to change tprovisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, fthe promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such act will not militate against the impairment clause, whichsubject to and limited by the paramount police power.

Republic v. Gonzalez (1991)

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of tw(2) parcels of land situated in Tañong Malabon, Metro Mani

This piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until toccupants thereof, among them appellants Policarp

Gonzales and Augusta Josue, started filling it.On 14 April 1955, then President Ramon Magsaysay issuProclamation No. 144, entitled "Reserving for StreWidening and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of tPublic Domain." Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawfrom sale or settlement and reserved for the purposmentioned in the Proclamation. The Municipality of Malabpassed Resolution authorizing the filing of ejectment casagainst appellants. Separate complaints were then filagainst them.Appellants disputed the right of the Government to recovthe lot as: (a) the already filed sales application with tBureau of Lands, (b) he had a municipal permit to construbuildings thereon, (c) the lot occupied was not needed widen the street and that the setting aside of the lots fparking space purposes does not redound to the pubbenefit. The trial court ordered appellants to reconvey thproperty to the government.

Issue: WON Proclamation 144 is invalid

Held: Yes

Ratio: Proclamation No. 144 was issued by then PresideRamon Magsaysay in response to several resolutions passby the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal, which hbecome particularly aware of the increasing vehicular trafand congestion along F. Sevilla Boulevard. The MunicipCouncil had proposed to widen F. Sevilla Boulevard and the same time, to reserve an area for parking space to eaup traffic problems, in anticipation of the completion of ththen proposed market and slaughterhouse located to twest of F. Sevilla Boulevard. In this day and age, it is hard

open to debate that the public has much to gain from tproposed widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard and froestablishment of a municipal parking area. Indiscriminaparking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other mathoroughfares was prevalent; this, of course, caused tbuild up of traffic in the surrounding area to the grediscomfort and inconvenience of the public who use tstreets.Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking designated areas along public streets or highways is allowwhich clearly indicates that provision for parking spacserves a useful purpose.Appellants, however, allege that the benefits, if any, thmay be derived from the proposed street-widening a




parking space will be confined to people who have cars,hence there would be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for public use or benefit. The conceptionurged by appellants is both flawed and obsolete since thenumber of users is not the yardstick in determining whetherproperty is properly reserved for public use or public benefit.In the first place, Section 83 above speaks not only of use bya local government but also of "quasi-public uses orpurposes." To constitute public use, the public in general

should have equal or common rights to use the land orfacility involved on the same terms, however limited innumber the people who can actually avail themselves of it ata given time. There is nothing in Proclamation No. 144 whichexcludes non-car-owners from using a widened street or aparking area should they in fact happen to be driving cars;the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open forthe public in general.Besides, the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do notdetermine either the validity or invalidity of Proclamation No.144. What is important are the long-term benefits which theproposed street widening and parking areas make availableto the public in the form of enhanced, safe and orderlytransportation on land. This is the kind of public benefitenvisioned by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal andwhich was sought to be promoted by the President in issuing

Proclamation No. 144. We believe and so hold thatProclamation No. 144 was lawful and valid.Proclamation No. 144 specifically provided that thewithdrawal of Lots No. 1 and 2 shall be subject to existingprivate rights, if any there be. Prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 144, appellants had applied formiscellaneous sales applications over the lots respectivelyoccupied by them. Insofar as appellant Policarpio Gonzales isconcerned, it is not disputed that he had acknowledged theownership of the National Government of the land appliedfor by him. The miscellaneous sales application, however, of appellant Policarpio Gonzales had not been approved by theBureau of Lands at the time Proclamation No. 144 wasissued; the land therefore retained its character as land of the public domain. Upon the other hand, the miscellaneoussales application of appellant Augusto Josue had alreadybeen rejected in an Order of the Director of Lands dated 8

January 1954.Appellants allege having built mixed residential andcommercial buildings on Lot 2. The evidence of recorddiscloses that appellants had secured the appropriatemunicipal permits or licenses therefor, that is, for theconstruction of said buildings as well as the carrying on of business therein. However, since the lease, sale or any otherform of concession or disposition and management of landsof the public domain was directly under the executive controlof the Director of Lands, and not of local governmentofficials, the Malabon Municipal Mayor must be held to haveexceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of thepublic domain to appellants by constructing thereoncommercial and residential use buildings, or any other kindof building for that matter.

Patalinghug v. CA (1994)Facts: On November 17, 1982, the SangguniangPanlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363, seriesof 1982 otherwise known as the "Expanded ZoningOrdinance of Davao City." Petitioner was able to obtain abuilding permit for the construction of a funeral parlor.

Thereafter, petitioner commenced the construction of hisfuneral parlor.Acting on the complaint of several residents of BarangayAgdao, Davao City that the construction of petitioner'sfuneral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363, since it wasallegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesiani Kristo Chapel and several residential structures, the

nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred G. Tepootonly 8 inches to the south.Private respondents filed a case for the declaration of nullof the building permit. After conducting an inspection, tcourt dismissed the complaint holding that (a) the chapel55.95 meters away from the funeral parlor and (b) tbuilding owned by Mr. Tepoot is being rented to Mr. Asiatwho devotes said place to his laundry business.On appeal, the CA reversed. It disagreed with the low

court's determination that Tepoot's building was commercand ruled that although it was used by Mr. Tepoot's lessee flaundry business, it was a residential lot as reflected in ttax declaration, thus paving the way for the application Ordinance No. 363.

Issue: WON petitioner's operation of a funeral homconstitutes permissible use within a particular district zone in Davao City.

Held: Yes

Ratio: In the case at bar, the testimony of City CounciVergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building was used for a dupurpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundbusiness was conducted. 8 But while its commercial aspe

has been established by the presence of machineries alaundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other thbeing declared for taxation purposes as such, was not fusubstantiated.

The reversal by the CA of the trial court's decision was bason Tepoot's building being declared for taxation purposes residential. It is our considered view, however, that a tdeclaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property fzoning purposes. A property may have been declared by owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes butmay well be within a commercial zone. A discrepancy mthus exist in the determination of the nature of property freal estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination ofproperty for zoning purposes.Needless to say, even if we are to examine the evidentiavalue of a tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Coda tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify t

same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration donot bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of tReal Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are bason the actual use irrespective of "any previous assessmeor taxpayer's valuation thereon," which is based on taxpayer's declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared bytaxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincialcity assessor as commercial because its actual use commercial.

The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's buildingcommercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, strengthened by the fact that the Sanggunian has declarthe questioned area as commercial. Consequently, even

Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes residential, once a local government has reclassified an aras commercial, that determination for zoning purposes mu

prevail. While the commercial character of the questionvicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, privarespondents have failed to present convincing arguments substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Ave, where tfuneral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zonUnquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constituta "commercial purpose," as gleaned from Ordinance 363.

The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thrumunicipal ordinance is an exercise of police power promote the good order and general welfare of the peoplethe locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promothe general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, wproperty, and with business and occupations. Thus, persomay be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burde




in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to thisfundamental aim of government, the rights of the individualmay be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates thelocation of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder.

Powers of municipal corporations/local governments

8.1 Police Power:

Binay v. Domingo ( 1991) – supra.

Ratio: The police power is a governmental function, aninherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born withcivilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims,"Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi estsuprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the generalwelfare, comfort and convenience of the people.Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipalcorporations). Before a municipal corporation may exercisesuch power, there must be a valid delegation of such powerby the legislature which is the repository of the inherentpowers of the State. A valid delegation of police power mayarise from express delegation, or be inferred from the merefact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a

general rule, municipal corporations may exercise policepowers within the fair intent and purpose of their creationwhich are reasonably proper to give effect to the powersexpressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on publiccorporations have been construed as empowering them todo the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirablefor the safety of the people.Municipal governments exercise this power under thegeneral welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothedwith authority to "enact such ordinances and issue suchregulations as may be necessary to carry out and dischargethe responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such asshall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,improve public morals, promote the prosperity and generalwelfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, andinsure the protection of property therein." And underSection 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shallexercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarilyimplied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and properfor governance such as to promote health and safety,enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peaceand order in the local government unit, and preserve thecomfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."Police power is the power to prescribe regulations topromote the health, morals, peace, education, good order orsafety and general welfare of the people. It is the mostessential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it isthe greatest and most powerful attribute of the government.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, andhas been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed,the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in theirhealth, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as

may be with private rights. It extends to all the great publicneeds, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation andalmost every function of the municipal government. It coversa wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupiedwith whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals,and general welfare of the community, it is not limitedthereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions whichexists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of thepeople by promoting public convenience or generalprosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservationof comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it isdeemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition whichshall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Chua Huat v. CA (1991)

Facts: First case is a petition for review on certiorari of tdecision of the CA and the second is a petition for prohibitiwith PI directed against the notices of condemnation ademolition orders issued by the City Engineer upon authorof the City Mayor.In a civil case, the CFI sentenced the petitioners to pay oUy certain sums of money as well as to vacate the properand surrender to the same Uy. The CA affirmed. Petitioneexcept Ong Choan, filed a petition for review on certiorawith the SC contending that the case is actually an unlawfdetainer case, and therefore the CFI had no jurisdiction ovit. The SC denied the petition. After the decision in the cicase became final and executory, the private respondenfiled a motion to execute the same. The court granted this.Petitioner Chua Huat filed with the CFI a complaint for tannulment of judgment on the ground that the CFI has n

jurisdiction over the civil case which was one for ejectmeand not for recovery of possession. Despite the case, the Cordered the execution of the judgment. The petitioners fila Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA to saside the order of execution of judgment and to prohibit trespondents from executing the judgment. The CA denithe petition for lack of merit. The CA invoked finality

judgment and res judicata. On appeal, petitioners conte

that there is no res judicata as there is no identity of causeof action (annulment of judgment, recovery of poseession)

Issue: WON the present action is barred by res judicata

Held: Yes

Ratio: The records of the two cases will bear it out that tissue of lack of jurisdiction (which is the cause of action Civil Case No. 119751) has been squarely ruled upon, nonly by the trial court in Civil Case No. 74634 but also by tCourt of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.Plaintiff-appellant further contends that since the issue

jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 74634 was raised in their Mbefore the CA in CA-G.R. No. 51337-R, the CA did not, in resolution denying said motion, pass on the same and appeal by petition for review to the Supreme Court in 47603 and L-48649, where the same issue among othewas raised, the High Court in its minutes' (sic) did not rusquarely on said issue. We find the same likewise untenabIssues raised by the parties in their brief and passed upsubsilencio by the appellate court in a decision which hbecome final and executory are considered closed and cno longer be revived by the parties in a subsequent litigatiwithout doing violence to the principle of res judicata.What more, neither the Supreme Court nor the AppellaCourt is duty bound to discuss the pros and cons appellant's argument.

Tatel v. Mun. of Virac (1992)

Facts: On the basis of the complaints received from tresidents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance causby the operation of the abaca bailing machine insipetitioner’s warehouse which emitted obnoxious odor adust, a committee was appointed by the municipal councilVirac to investigate the matter. The committee noted ththe warehouse was near residential houses and that tinflammable materials inside created danger to the lives aproperties of the people within the neighborhood. Resoluti29 was passed by the Municipal Council declaring twarehouse as a public nuisance within the purview of Artic694 of the CC. The petitioner’s MR was denied.Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with preliminainjunction with the CFI enjoining them from enforciResolution 29 of the Council. The municipal officials contethat the warehouse was constructed in violation




Ordinance No. 134, s 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion orbarrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives andproperties by accidental fire. Petitioner contends that saidordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due processand equal protection clause of the Constitution and null andvoid for not having been passed in accordance with law. Thecourt ruled in favor of the municipal council and held that

the ordinance was a legitimate and valid exercise of policepower by the municipal council.

Issue: WON the enactment was pursuant to a legitimateexercise of police power

Held: Yes

Ratio: Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed bythe Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its policepower. It is a settled principle of law that municipalcorporations are agencies of the State for the promotion andmaintenance of local self-government and as such areendowed with the police powers in order to effectivelyaccomplish and carry out the declared objects of theircreation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare

clause under the Administrative Code.For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within thecorporate powers of the municipality to enact but must alsobe passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, andmust be in consonance with certain well established andbasic principles of a substantive nature. These principlesrequire that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravenethe Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair oroppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) mustnot prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general andconsistent with public policy, and (6) must not beunreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, s1952, meets thesecriteria.In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulatedby the ordinance is the construction of warehouses whereininflammable materials are stored where such warehousesare located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of

houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. Thepurpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of firewhich is one of the primordial obligation of the government.Experience, however, will show that this is not uncommon inlaw making bodies in small towns where local authorities andin particular the persons charged with the drafting andpreparation of municipal resolutions and ordinances lacksufficient education and training and are not well groundedeven on the basic and fundamental elements of the Englishlanguage commonly used throughout the country in suchmatters.

The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real andsprings from simple error in grammar but otherwise, themeaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is theconstruction or maintenance of warehouses for the storageof inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from

a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios.And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life andproperty in case of accidental fire which is one of theprimordial and basic obligation of any government.As to the contention, that warehouses similarly situated asthat of the petitioner were not prosecuted, the mere factthat the municipal authorities have not proceeded againstother warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating

4 AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUC- TION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OFHOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARYDISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVESBY FIRE ACCIDENT.

Ordinance 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the laitself and the manner in which said law is implemented the agencies in charge with its administration/enforcemen

There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in tabsence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by hare operating in violation of the ordinance and that tcomplaints have been lodged against the bodegconcerned without the municipal authorities doing anythi

about it. The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purposewell within the objectives of sound government. No undrestraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storiinflammable products in the warehouse because of tdanger of fire to the lives and properties of the peopresiding in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concernethere can be no better policy than what has been conceivby the municipal government.

Power of Mayor to issue permits for rallies; BP 880

Bayan v. Ermita (2006)

Issue: They have, in fact, purposely engaged in pub

assemblies without the required permits to press their clathat no such permit can be validly required without violati

the Constitutional guarantee. PERMIT IS REQUIRED! SHOULD PLACE FREEDOM PARKS!

Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Theright as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly aexercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by tConstitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 whirequires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in tnational streets and parks.

There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peacefassembly to petition the government for a redress grievances and, for that matter, to organize or foassociations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as

engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights aguaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particulaSections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of ArticIX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds whallowed pronouncements defending and promoting tpeoples exercise of these rights.

There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteis peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under tcloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruleout and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmocalm though is not required. As pointed out in an eaPhilippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United Statv. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or ledisorder will mark the public assembly of the people protest against grievances whether real or imagina

because on such occasions feeling is always wrought tohigh pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance athe more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, wbe the disciplinary control of the leaders over thirresponsible followers." It bears repeating that for tconstitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To givfree rein to one’s destructive urges is to call fcondemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate

Held: In this Decision, the Court goes even one stfurther in safeguarding liberty by giving local governmentsdeadline of 30 days within which to designate specifreedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after th




period, no such parks are so identified in accordance withSection 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of themunicipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemedfreedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall berequired to hold an assembly therein. The only requirementwill be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office toallow proper coordination and orderly activities.

Disposition. Petition GRANTED and respondents are

DIRECTED comply with Section 15 of BP No. 880 throughthe establishment or designation of at least one suitablefreedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of thecountry. After 30 days from the finality of this Decision,subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permitshall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assembleand petition in the public parks or plazas of a city ormunicipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of thelaw. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR),insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is VOID. The constitutionality of BatasPambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.

8.2 Power of taxation: local taxes and real property tax

Local taxation:

Basco v. Phil Amusement and Gaming Corp (1991)

Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherentright to impose taxes. Congress has the power of controlover local governments. If Congress can grant Manila thepower to tax certain matters, it can also provide forexemptions or even take back the power.LGUs also have no power to tax instrumentalities of theNational Government. PAGCOR, being such, should be andactually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, merecreatures of the State can defeat national policies thruextermination of what local authorities may perceive to beundesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax asa tool for regulation.From class notes: LGU no inherent power to tax? Notexactly true, because there is constitutional basis (but can’tsay that it is inherent) BASCO IS NO LONGER GOODLAW!!!

Phil Petroleum Corp v. Mun. of Pililia (1991)

Facts: Petitioner is a business enterprise engaged in themanufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleumproduct, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pililla,Rizal. PPC owns and maintains an oil refinery including 49storage tanks for its petroleum products in Malaya, Pililla,Rizal. Under Section 142 of the NIRC of 1939, manufacturedoils and other fuels are subject to specific tax.On June 28, 1973, PD 231 (Local Tax Code) was issuedenacted. Sections 19 and 19 (a) provide that themunicipality may impose taxes on business, except on thosefor which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers,importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distillers,rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquors, distilledspirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule listedtherein.

The Secretary of Finance issued Provincial Circular No. 26-73(December 27, 1973) directed to all provincial, city andmunicipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local taximposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing inpetroleum products subject to the specific tax under theNIRC. Provincial Circular No. 26 A-73 (January 9, 1973)wasalso issued instructing all City Treasurers to refrain fromcollecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinances enactedbefore or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code, on thebusinesses of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or

dealing in, petroleum products subject to the specific tunder the NIRC.Respondent enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1, S-19otherwise known as "The Pililla Tax Code of 1974" which toeffect on July 1, 1974. Sections 9 and 10 of the saordinance imposed a tax on business, except for those fwhich fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code omanufacturers, importers, or producers of any article commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewe

distillers, rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquodistilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedufound in the Local Tax Code, as well as mayor's permsanitary inspection fee and storage permit fee fflammable, combustible or explosive substances, whSection 139 of the disputed ordinance imposed surchargand interests on unpaid taxes, fees or charges .On April 13, 1974, P.D. 436 was promulgated increasing tspecific tax on lubricating oils, gasoline, bunker fuel odiesel fuel oil and other similar petroleum products leviunder Sections 142, 144 and 145 of the NIRC, and grantinprovinces, cities and municipalities certain shares in tspecific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposon petroleum products. The questioned Municipal TOrdinance No. 1 was reviewed and approved by tProvincial Treasurer of Rizal, but was not implemented and/

enforced by the Municipality of Pililla because of its havinbeen suspended up to now in view of Provincial Circular No26-73 and 26 A-73.On June 3, 1977, P.D. 1158 otherwise known as the NationInternal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted, Section 153which specifically imposes specific tax on refined amanufactured mineral oils and motor fuels.Enforcing the provisions of the ordinance, the respondefiled a complaint against PPC for the collection of tbusiness tax from 1979 to 1986; storage permit fees fro1975 to 1986; mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fefrom 1975 to 1984. PPC, however, have already paid tlast-named fees starting 1985. The RTC rendered a decisiagainst petitioner.

Issue: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specitax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay (a) tax on busine

and (b) storage fees, considering Provincial Circular No. 6-7and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto trespondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, based on MunicipOrdinance No. 1

Held: Yes

Ratio: PPC contends that: (a) Provincial Circular No. 26declared as contrary to national economic policy timposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleuproducts as they are already subject to specific tax undthe National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the abodeclaration covers not only old tax ordinances but new oneas well as those which may be enacted in the future; (c) boProvincial Circulars (PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effectivhence, unless and until revoked, any effort on the part of t

respondent to collect the suspended tax on business frothe petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized; and (Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxon petroleum products.PC No. 26-73 and PC No. 26 A-73 suspended the effectivof local tax ordinances imposing a tax on business undSection 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code, with regard manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers or dealers in petroleuproducts subject to the specific tax under the NIRC, in vieof Section 22 (b) of the Code regarding non-imposition municipalities of taxes on articles, subject to specific tunder the provisions of the NIRC.

There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance N1 imposing the assailed taxes, fees and charges is va




especially Section 9 (A) which according to the trial court"was lifted in toto and/or is a literal reproduction of Section19 (a) of the Local Tax Code as amended by P.D. No. 426." Itconforms with the mandate of said law.But P.D. No. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed tohave repealed Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19(a), were carried over into P.D. No. 426 and no exemptionswere given to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, or

dealers in petroleum products.Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations mustbe in harmony with the provisions of the law. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementingrule or regulation, the former prevails. Furthermore, whileSection 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxeson petroleum products, said decree did not amend Sections19 and 19 (a) of P.D. 231 as amended by P.D. 426, whereinthe municipality is granted the right to levy taxes onbusiness of manufacturers, importers, producers of anyarticle of commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax onbusiness is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers, etc. inpetroleum products contravenes a declared national policy,it should have been expressly stated in P.D. No. 436.

The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is

ordained by the present Constitution. To allow the continuouseffectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. 26-73 (1)would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax bymere administrative issuances. Under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only guidelines and limitations thatmay be established by Congress can define and limit suchpower of local governments.Provincial Circular No. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipaltreasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage feeon flammable or combustible materials imposed in the localtax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPCfrom the payment of storage permit fee.

The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla's taxordinance is a fee for the installation and keeping in storageof any flammable, combustible or explosive substances.Inasmuch as said storage makes use of tanks owned not bythe municipality of Pililla, but by petitioner PPC, same is

obviously not a charge for any service rendered by themunicipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the sameCode.Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1prescribing a permit fee is a permit fee allowed underSection 36 of the amended Code.As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of themayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees, the trial courtdid not err in holding that "since the power to tax includesthe power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislativeprerogative, it follows that a municipal mayor who is anexecutive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such anexpression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax." Thewaiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. It is anancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed instrictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of

the taxing authority. Tax exemptions are looked upon withdisfavor. Thus, in the absence of a clear and expressexemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver cannotbe recognized. As already stated, it is the law-making body,and not an executive like the mayor, who can make anexemption. Under Section 36 of the Code, a permit fee likethe mayor's permit, shall be required before any individual or

juridical entity shall engage in any business or occupationunder the provisions of the Code.However, since the Local Tax Code does not provide theprescriptive period for collection of local taxes, Article 1143of the Civil Code applies. Said law provides that an actionupon an obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10)years from the time the right of action accrues. The

Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection the tax on business of petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 198and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976.

Floro Cement Corporation v. Gorospe (1991)

Facts: The municipality of Lugait filed with the SC verified complaint for collection of taxes against tdefendant Floro Cement Corporation. The taxes sought to collected by the plaintiff refers to "manufacturers" anexporter's "taxes for the period from January 1, 1974 September 30, 1975, inclusive, in the total amount P161,875.00 plus 25% thereof as surcharge. Plaintiff allegthat the imposition and collection of these taxes" is based its Municipal Ordinance No. 5, otherwise known as tMunicipal Revenue Code of 1974, which was passpursuant to PD 231 and also Municipal Ordinance No. passed pursuant PD 426,amending PD 231.Petitioner set up the defense that it is not liable to pmanufacturer's and exporter's taxes alleging among othethat the plaintiffs power to levy and collect taxes, feerentals, royalties or charges of any kind whatsoever defendant has been limited or withdrawn by Section 52 of P463. It also contended that the defendant was granted the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Certificate of Qualification for Tax Exemption, entitli

defendant to exemption for a period of 5 years from Ap30,1969 to April 29, 1974 from payment of all taxes, exceincome tax, and which Certificate was amended November 5, 1974 CQTE P.D. 463-22), entitling defendant exemption from all taxes, duties and fees except income tafor five (5) years from the first date of actual commerciproduction of saleable mineral products that is from May 11974 to January 1, 1978; and that RA 3823, as implementeby Mines Administrative Order No. V-25, and P.D. No. 46which are the basis for the exemption granted to defendaare special laws whereas, the municipal ordinanmentioned in the complaint which are based on P.D. No. 2and P.D No. 426, respectively, are general laws; and that itaxiomatic that a special law can not be amended and/repealed by a general law unless there is an express inteto repeal or abrogate the provisions of the special law. Thtrial court rendered a decision ordering defendant to pay tamount of P161,875 as manufacturer’s and exporter’s taxand surcharges.

Issue: WON Ordinances Nos. 5 and 10 of Lugait apply Floro Corporation notwithstanding the limitation on ttaxing power of local government as provided for in Sec. of P.D. 231 and Sec. 52 of P.D. 463.

Held: Yes

Ratio: Floro Cement Corporation holds that sinOrdinances Nos. 5 and 10 were enacted pursuant to P.D. N231 and P.D. No. 426, respectively, said ordinances do napply to its business in view of the limitation on the taxipower of local government provided in Sec. 5m of P.D. N231 [(m) Taxes on mines, mining operations and mine

products and their by-products when sold domestically the operator.]. Petitioner likewise contends that cement ismineral product, relying on the case of Cebu PortlaCement Company vs. CIR. Petitioner further contends ththe partial exemption was rendered absolute by Sec. 52 P.D. No. 463, which expressly prohibits the province, cmunicipality, barrio and municipal district from levying acollecting taxes, fees, rentals, royalties or charges of akind whatsoever on mines, mining claims and mineproducts, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.On other hand, while respondent municipality admits thpetitioner undertakes exploration, development aexploitation of mineral products, the taxes sought to collected were not imposed on these activities in view of t




mentioned prohibition under Sec. 52 of P.D. No. 463. Saidtaxes were levied on the corporation's business of manufacturing and exporting cement. The business of manufacturing and exporting cement does not fall underexploration, development nor exploitation of mineralresources as defined in Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 463, hence, it isoutside the scope of application of Sec. 52 of said decree.On the question of whether or not cement is a mineralproduct, this Court has held that it is not a mineral product

but rather a manufactured product. While cement iscomposed of 80% minerals, it is not merely an admixture orblending of raw materials, as lime, silica, shale and others. Itis the result of a definite process-the crushing of minerals,grinding, mixing, calcining adding of retarder or raw gypsumIn short, before cement reaches its saleable form, theminerals had already undergone a chemical change throughmanufacturing process. It appears that the foregoing casesoverruled the case of Cebu Portland Cement Company vs.CIR which was cited by petitioner.On the exemption claimed by petitioner, this Court has laiddown the rule that as the power of taxation is a highprerogative of sovereignty, the relinquishment is neverpresumed and any reduction or diminution thereof withrespect to its mode or its rate, must be strictly construed,and the same must be coached in clear and unmistakable

terms in order that it may be applied. More specificallystated, the general rule is that any claim for exemption fromthe tax statute should be strictly construed against thetaxpayer. He who claims an exemption must be able to pointout some provision of law creating the right; it cannot beallowed to exist upon a mere vague implication or inference.It must be shown indubitably to exist, for every presumptionis against it, and a well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim.

The petitioner failed to meet this requirement.As held by the lower court, the exemption mentioned in Sec.52 of P.D. No. 463 refers only to machineries, equipment,tools for production, etc., as provided in Sec. 53 of the samedecree. The manufacture and the export of cement does notfall under the said provision for it is not a mineral product. Itis not cement that is mined only the mineral productscomposing the finished product.Furthermore, by the parties' own stipulation of facts

submitted before the court a quo, it is admitted that FloroCement Corporation is engaged in the manufacturing andselling, including exporting of cement. As such, and since thetaxes sought to be collected were levied on these activitiespursuant to Sec. 19 of P.D. No. 231, Ordinances Nos. 5 and10, which were enacted pursuant to P.D. No. 231 and P.D. No.426, respectively, properly apply to petitioner.

Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA (1992)

Facts: On March 14, 1977, Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, adopted Resolution No. 95 SoonSaturnino Jurado sent his agent to the municipal treasurer'soffice to pay the license fee of P285 for thresher operators.Mapagu refused to accept the payment and required him tofirst secure a mayor's permit. For his part, Mayor Domingo

Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution 9

and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued. Jurado ignored the requirement. Instead, he sent the P285license fee by postal money order to the office of thetreasurer who, returned the said amount. The reason givenwas the failure of the respondent to comply with ResolutionNo. 9.

Jurado filed with the CFICagayan a special civil action formandamus with actual and moral damages to compel theissuance of the mayor's permit and license. He also filed a

5Find raising scheme to finance the construction of the

Sports and Nutrition Center Building by soliciting 1%donation form the thresher operators who will apply for apermit to thresh within the municipality.

declaratory judgment against the said resolution (and timplementing agreement) for being illegal either as donation or as a tax measure. The trial court upheld tchallenged measure. However, it dismissed the claims fdamages of both parties for lack of evidence. The Caffirmed, nevertheless, it found Tuzon and Mapagu to haacted maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Juradoapplication for the mayor's permit and licensConsequently, they were held liable to pay damages.

On appeal, petitioners stress that they were acting in theofficial capacity and therefore they should not be liable fdamages. Jurado claimed that the refusal to issue the permand license constituted bad faith on the part of petitioneAlso, he claimed that Resolution 9 contravened tlimitations on the taxing powers of LGUs under Section 5 the Tax Code.

Issue: WON the Resolution is valid

Held: Yes

Ratio: We need not concern ourselves at this time withe validity of Resolution 9 and the implementing agreemebecause the issue has not been raised in this petition as aassigned error of the respondent court. The measures ha

been sustained in the challenged decision, from which threspondent has not appealed. The decision is final abinding as to him. We may observe at this time that sustaining Resolution No. 9, the CA said no more than that:“It was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugin the lawful exercise of its legislative powers in pursuanto Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution whiprovided that: "Each local government unit shall have tpower to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxesubject to such limitation as may be provided by law." Aunder Article 4, Section 29 of PD 231 (Enacting a Local TCode for Provinces, Cities, Municipalities and Barrios), it provided that:Section 29. Contributions.In addition to the above specifitaxing and other revenue-raising powers, the barrio counmay solicit monies, materials, and other contributions frothe following sources: (c) Monies from private agencies a

individuals." That is an over simplification. The CA has not offered aexplanation for its conclusion that the challenged measurare valid nor does it discuss its own concept of the nature the resolution.While it would appear from the wording of the resolution ththe municipal government merely intends to "solicit" the 1contribution from the threshers, the implementiagreement seems to make the donation obligatory andcondition precedent to the issuance of the mayor's perm

This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act liberality and is never obligatory.If, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinancthen it must be shown in view of the challenge raised by tprivate respondents to have been enacted in accordanwith the requirements of the Local Tax Code. These wou

include the holding of a public hearing on the measure anits subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance, addition to the usual requisites for publication of ordinancin general.

Issue: WON petitioners are liable for damages

Held: No

Ratio: The private respondent anchors his claim fdamages on Article 27 CC (Refusal to Render Service). It hbeen remarked that one purpose of this article is to end t"bribery system, where the public official, for some flimexcuse, delays or refuses the performance of his duty un




he gets some kind of pabagsak." Official inaction may alsobe due to plain indolence or a cynical indifference to theresponsibilities of public service. The provision presupposesthat the refusal or omission of a public official to perform hisofficial duty is attributable to malice or inexcusablenegligence. In any event, the erring public functionary is

justly punishable under this article for whatever loss ordamage the complainant has sustained.In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the

Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act on the private respondent'sapplication was an attempt to compel him to resort tobribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot besaid either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer weremotivated by spite or were grossly negligent in refusing toissue the permit and license to Jurado.It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered toshow that the petitioners singled out the private respondentfor persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitionersstood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado themayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners werenot Jurado's business competitors nor has it beenestablished that they intended to favor his competitors. Onthe contrary, the record discloses that the resolution wasuniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipalitywithout discrimination or preference.

The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within thescope of their authority and in consonance with their honestinterpretation of the resolution in question. We agree that itwas not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a

judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have tobe presumed (in fact, both the trial court and the appellatecourt said there was nothing wrong with it). As executiveofficials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce itas long as it had not been repealed by the SangguniangBayan or annulled by the courts.

The private respondent complains that as a result of thepetitioners' acts, he was prevented from operating hisbusiness all this time and earning substantial profittherefrom, as he had in previous years. But as thepetitioners correctly observed, he could have taken theprudent course of signing the agreement under protest andlater challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to

"donate." Pendente lite, he could have continued to operatehis threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesantethat he now says was the consequence of the petitioners'wrongful act. He could have opted for the less obstinate butstill dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, orprofit.

Franchises

PLDT v. City of Davao (2001)

PLDT is liable for the local franchise tax. Section 137 doesnot state that it covers future exemptions. The grant of taxing powers to LGU's in the consti and the LGC does notaffect the power of Congress to grant exemptions in thefuture. The only legal effect of the constitutional grant tolocal governemnts: in interpreting statutory provisions on

municipal taxing powers, doubts should be resolved in favorof municipal corporations.

City Government of Q.C. v. Bayantel (2006)

Facts: Bayantel is a legislative franchise holder under RA3259 to establish and operate radio stations for domestictelecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting andtelecasting. Of relevance to this controversy is the taxprovision of Rep. Act No. 3259, embodied in Section 14thereof, which reads:SECTION 14. (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the sametaxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property,exclusive of the franchise, as other persons or corporationsare now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. (b) The

grantee shall further pay to the Treasurer of the Philippineach year, within ten days after the audit and approval the accounts as prescribed in this Act, one and one-half pcentum of all gross receipts from the business transactunder this franchise by the said grantee

The LGC took effect and granted the LGUS within MeManila the power to levy on real properties. On July 21992, barely few months after the LGC took effect, Congreenacted RA 7633, amending Bayantel's original franchis

The amendatory law contained an in lieu of taxes clau(3%).In 1993, the government of Quezon City, pursuant to ttaxing power vested on local government units by SectionArticle X of the 1987 Constitution, infra, in relation to Secti232 of the LGC, supra, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, 93, otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Co(QCRC), 5 imposing, under Section 5 thereof, a real propertax on all real properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating its Section 6, the withdrawal of exemption from real propertax under Section 234 of the LGC, supra. Furthermore, mulike the LGC, the QCRC, under its Section 230, withdrew texemption privileges in general.Conformably with the City's Revenue Code, new tdeclarations for Bayantel's real properties in Quezon Cwere issued by the City Assessor and were received

Bayantel on August 13, 1998, except one (Tax DeclaratiNo. 124-01013) which was received on July 14, 1999.Meanwhile, on March 16, 1995, Rep. Act No. 7925, otherwiknown as the "Public Telecommunications Policy Act of tPhilippines," envisaged to level the playing field amotelecommunications companies, took effect. Section 23 the Act provides an equality clause.On January 7, 1999, Bayantel wrote the office of the CAssessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties in thcity from the roll of taxable real properties. With its requehaving been denied, Bayantel interposed an appeal with tLBAA. And, evidently on its firm belief of its exempt statuBayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessagainst it by the Quezon City government.On account thereof, the Quezon City Treasurer sent onotices of delinquency for the total amount P43,878,208.18, followed by the issuance of seve

warrants of levy against Bayantel's properties preparatory their sale at a public auction set on July 30, 2002.

Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties, Bayanimmediately withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and instefiled with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for prohibitiwith an urgent application for a temporary restraining ord(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC threndered judgment exempting Bayantel from taxes.

Issue: WON Bayantel failed to exhaust administratiremedies

Held: No

Ratio: With the reality that Bayantel's real properties wealready levied upon on account of its nonpayment of re

estate taxes thereon, the Court agrees with Bayantel that appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedwithin the context of the aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 6

This is not to mention of the auction sale of said propertialready scheduled on July 30, 2002.Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to texhaustion-of-administrative remedies rule is when, as heonly legal issues are to be resolved. In fact, the Coucognizant of the nature of the questions presently involvegave due course to the instant petition. As the Court hsaid in Ty v. Trampe: . . . . Although as a rule, administratiremedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicaction can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cas




where the controversy does not involve questions of fact butonly of law. . . . .Lest it be overlooked, an appeal to the LBAA, to be properlyconsidered, required prior payment under protest of theamount of P43,878,208.18, a figure which, in the light of thethen prevailing Asian financial crisis, may have been difficultto raise up. Given this reality, an appeal to the LBAA may notbe considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It isthus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its

earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petitionfor prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief inCivil Case No. Q-02-47292. The remedy availed of byBayantel under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court mustbe upheld.

Issue: WON Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City are,under its franchise, exempt from real property tax.

Held: No.

Ratio: The lower court resolved the issue in the affirmative,basically owing to the phrase "exclusive of this franchise"found in Section 11 of Bayantel's amended franchise, Rep.Act No. 7633. To petitioners, however, the language of Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 is neither clear nor

unequivocal. The elaborate and extensive discussiondevoted by the trial court on the meaning and import of saidphrase, they add, suggests as much. It is petitioners' thesisthat Bayantel was in no time given any express exemptionfrom the payment of real property tax under its amendatoryfranchise.

There seems to be no issue as to Bayantel's exemption fromreal estate taxes by virtue of the term "exclusive of thefranchise" qualifying the phrase "same taxes on its realestate, buildings and personal property," found in Section14, supra, of its franchise, Rep. Act No. 3259, as originallygranted.

The legislative intent expressed in the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" cannot be construed other than distinguishingbetween two (2) sets of properties, be they real or personal,owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directlyand exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications

business, and (b) those properties which are not so used. Itis worthy to note that the properties subject of the presentcontroversy are only those which are admittedly fallingunder the first category.

To the mind of the Court, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259effectively works to grant or delegate to local governmentsof Congress' inherent power to tax the franchisee'sproperties belonging to the second group of propertiesindicated above, that is, all properties which, "exclusive of this franchise," are not actually and directly used in thepursuit of its franchise. As may be recalled, the taxing powerof local governments under both the 1935 and the 1973Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law. Absentsuch enabling law, local government units were withoutauthority to impose and collect taxes on real propertieswithin their respective territorial jurisdictions. While Section

14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 may be validly viewed as an implieddelegation of power to tax, the delegation under thatprovision, as couched, is limited to impositions overproperties of the franchisee which are not actually, directlyand exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.Necessarily, other properties of Bayantel directly used in thepursuit of its business are beyond the pale of the delegatedtaxing power of local governments. In a very real sense,therefore, real properties of Bayantel, save those exclusiveof its franchise, are subject to realty taxes. Ultimately,therefore, the inevitable result was that all realties which areactually, directly and exclusively used in the operation of itsfranchise are "exempted" from any property tax.

Bayantel's franchise being national in character, t"exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of Rep. Act N3259 applies to all its real or personal properties fouanywhere within the Philippine archipelago.However, with the LGC's taking effect on January 1, 199Bayantel's "exemption" from real estate taxes for propertiof whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area waby force of Section 234 of the Code, supra, expreswithdrawn. But, not long thereafter, however, or on July 2

1992, Congress passed Rep. Act No. 7633 amendiBayantel's original franchise. Worthy of note is that Secti11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 is a virtual reenacment of the tprovision, i.e., Section 14, supra, of Bayantel's originfranchise under Rep. Act No. 3259. Stated otherwise, Sectio14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 which was deemed impliedrepealed by Section 234 of the LGC was expressly reviveunder Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633. In concrete termthe realty tax exemption heretofore enjoyed by Bayanunder its original franchise, but subsequently withdrawn force of Section 234 of the LGC, has been restored Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633.

The Court has taken stock of the fact that by virtue Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, locgovernments are empowered to levy taxes. And pursuant this constitutional empowerment, juxtaposed with Secti

232 of the LGC, the Quezon City government enacted 1993 its local Revenue Code, imposing real property tax all real properties found within its territorial jurisdiction. Aas earlier stated, the City's Revenue Code, just like the LGexpressly withdrew, under Section 230 thereof, supra, all texemption privileges in general.

This thus raises the question of whether or not the CityRevenue Code pursuant to which the city treasurer Quezon City levied real property taxes against Bayantereal properties located within the City effectively withdrethe tax exemption enjoyed by Bayantel under its franchisas amended.Bayantel answers the poser in the negative arguing thonce again it is only "liable to pay the same taxes, as aother persons or corporations on all its real or personproperties, exclusive of its franchise." Bayantel's posturewell-taken. While the system of local government taxati

has changed with the onset of the 1987 Constitution, tpower of local government units to tax is still limited. As wexplained in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority:

The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congrehowever, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by loclegislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a vadelegation as before, but pursuant to direct authorconferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Undthe latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to sucguidelines and limitations as the Congress may proviwhich, however, must be consistent with the basic policy local autonomy.Clearly then, while a new slant on the subject of loctaxation now prevails in the sense that the former doctriof local government units' delegated power to tax had beeffectively modified with Article X, Section 5 of the 198

Constitution now in place, the basic doctrine on loctaxation remains essentially the same. For as the Coustressed in Mactan, "the power to tax is (still) primarvested in the Congress."

This new perspective is best articulated by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., himself a Commissioner of the 19Constitutional Commission which crafted the 19Constitution, thus:What is the effect of Section 5 on the fiscal position municipal corporations? Section 5 does not change tdoctrine that municipal corporations do not possess inherepowers of taxation. What it does is to confer municipcorporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwicreate sources of revenue. They no longer have to wait for




statutory grant of these powers. The power of the legislativeauthority relative to the fiscal powers of local governmentshas been reduced to the authority to impose limitations onmunicipal powers. Moreover, these limitations must be"consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy." Theimportant legal effect of Section 5 is thus to reverse theprinciple that doubts are resolved against municipalcorporations. Henceforth, in interpreting statutory provisionson municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor

of municipal corporations. It is understood, however, thattaxes imposed by local government must be for a publicpurpose, uniform within a locality, must not be confiscatory,and must be within the jurisdiction of the local unit to pass.In net effect, the controversy presently before the Courtinvolves, at bottom, a clash between the inherent taxingpower of the legislature, which necessarily includes thepower to exempt, and the local government's delegatedpower to tax under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution.Now to go back to the Quezon City Revenue Code whichimposed real estate taxes on all real properties within thecity's territory and removed exemptions theretofore"previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,whether natural or juridical . . . .," there can really be nodispute that the power of the Quezon City Government totax is limited by Section 232 of the LGC which expressly

provides that "a province or city or municipality within theMetropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem taxon real property such as land, building, machinery, and otherimprovement not hereinafter specifically exempted." Underthis law, the Legislature highlighted its power to thereafterexempt certain realties from the taxing power of localgovernment units. An interpretation denying Congress suchpower to exempt would reduce the phrase "not hereinafterspecifically exempted" as a pure jargon, without meaningwhatsoever. Needless to state, such absurd situation isunacceptable.For sure, in PLDT v. City of Davao, this Court has upheld thepower of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local government units to impose taxes. There, the Courtwrote:Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government unitsunder the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the

power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons,pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of theconstitutional grant to local governments simply means thatin interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxingpowers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipalcorporations.As we see it, then, the issue in this case no longer dwells onwhether Congress has the power to exempt Bayantel'sproperties from realty taxes by its enactment of Rep. Act No.7633 which amended Bayantel's original franchise. The moredecisive question turns on whether Congress actually didexempt Bayantel's properties at all by virtue of Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633.Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent tothe LGC. Perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawnBayantel's former exemption from realty taxes, Congress

opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under Section 11thereof, exactly the same defining phrase "exclusive of thisfranchise" which was the basis for Bayantel's exemptionfrom realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language, Section11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 states that "the grantee, itssuccessors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxeson their real estate, buildings and personal property,exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporationsare now or hereafter may be required by law to pay." TheCourt views this subsequent piece of legislation as anexpress and real intention on the part of Congress to onceagain remove from the LGC's delegated taxing power, all of the franchisee's (Bayantel's) properties that are actually,directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.

FELS Enregy v. Prov. Of Batangas (2007)

Facts: On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a leacontract with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3x30 MW diesel engipower barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batanga

The contract, denominated as an Energy ConversAgreement, was for a period of five years. Article 10 statthat NPC shall be responsible for the payment of taxe(other than (i) taxes imposed or calculated on the basis the net income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of employees and (ii) construction permit fees, environmenpermit fees and other similar fees and charges. Polar Enerthen assigned its rights under the Agreement to Fels despNPC’s initial opposition.FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on thpower barges from Provincial Assessor Lauro C. Andaya Batangas City. FELS referred the matter to NPC, remindingof its obligation under the Agreement to pay all real estataxes. It then gave NPC the full power and authority represent it in any conference regarding the real properassessment of the Provincial Assessor. NPC filed a petitiwith the LBAA. The LBAA ordered Fels to pay the real estataxes. The LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities, whthey may be classified as movable or personal property, anevertheless considered real property for taxation purpos

because they are installed at a specific location withcharacter of permanency. The LBAA also pointed out that towner of the barges–FELS, a private corporation–is the obeing taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making Nresponsible for the payment of all real estate taxes aassessments will not justify the exemption of FELS; suchprivilege can only be granted to NPC and cannot extended to FELS. Finally, the LBAA also ruled that tpetition was filed out of time.Fels appealed to the CBAA. The CBAA reversed and rulthat the power barges belong to NPC; since they aactually, directly and exclusively used by it, the powbarges are covered by the exemptions under Section 234of R.A. No. 7160. As to the other jurisdictional issue, tCBAA ruled that prescription did not preclude the NPC fropursuing its claim for tax exemption in accordance wSection 206 of R.A. No. 7160. Upon MR, the CBAA reverseitself.

Issue: WON the petition is time barred

Held: Yes

Ratio: Section 226 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known the Local Government Code of 1991, provides: SECTION 22Local Board of Assessment Appeals. – Any owner or pershaving legal interest in the property who is not satisfied wthe action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in tassessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days frothe date of receipt of the written notice of assessmeappeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the provinor city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribfor the purpose, together with copies of the tax declaratio

and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of tappeal.We note that the notice of assessment which the ProvincAssessor sent to FELS on August 7, 1995, contained reiteration of Section 226. Instead of appealing to the Boaof Assessment Appeals (as stated in the notice), NPC optto file a motion for reconsideration of the ProvincAssessor’s decision, a remedy not sanctioned by law.

The remedy of appeal to the LBAA is available from adverse ruling or action of the provincial, city or municipassessor in the assessment of the property. It follows ththat the determination made by the respondent ProvincAssessor with regard to the taxability of the subject re




properties falls within its power to assess properties fortaxation purposes subject to appeal before the LBAA.We fully agree with the rationalization of the CA, citing thecase of Callanta v. Office of the Ombudsman, where we ruledthat under Section 226 of R.A. No 7160, the last action of thelocal assessor on a particular assessment shall be the noticeof assessment; it is this last action which gives the owner of the property the right to appeal to the LBAA. The procedurelikewise does not permit the property owner the remedy of

filing a motion for reconsideration before the local assessor. To reiterate, if the taxpayer fails to appeal in due course, theright of the local government to collect the taxes due withrespect to the taxpayer’s property becomes absolute uponthe expiration of the period to appeal. [38] It also bearsstressing that the taxpayer’s failure to question theassessment in the LBAA renders the assessment of the localassessor final, executory and demandable, thus, precludingthe taxpayer from questioning the correctness of theassessment, or from invoking any defense that would reopenthe question of its liability on the merits.In fine, the LBAA acted correctly when it dismissed thepetitioners’ appeal for having been filed out of time; theCBAA and the appellate court were likewise correct inaffirming the dismissal. Elementary is the rule that theperfection of an appeal within the period therefor is both

mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure in this regardrenders the decision final and executory.

Issue: WON the action was barred by res judicata

Ratio: Res judicata pervades every organized system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied invarious maxims of common law, namely: (1) public policyand necessity, which makes it to the interest of the Statethat there should be an end to litigation – republicae ut sitlitium; and (2) the hardship on the individual of being vexedtwice for the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari et eademcausa. A conflicting doctrine would subject the public peaceand quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and preferthe regalement of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility andhappiness.

This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata whichhas the following elements: (1) the former judgment must befinal; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over thesubject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be onthe merits; and (4) there must be between the first and thesecond actions, identity of parties, subject matter andcauses of action. The application of the doctrine of res

judicata does not require absolute identity of parties butmerely substantial identity of parties. There is substantialidentity of parties when there is community of interest orprivity of interest between a party in the first and a party inthe second case even if the first case did not implead thelatter.

To recall, FELS gave NPC the full power and authority torepresent it in any proceeding regarding real propertyassessment. Therefore, when petitioner NPC filed its petition

for review docketed as G.R. No. 165113, it did so not only onits behalf but also on behalf of FELS. Moreover, the assaileddecision in the earlier petition for review filed in this Courtwas the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.67490, in which FELS was the petitioner. Thus, the decisionin G.R. No. 165116 is binding on petitioner FELS under theprinciple of privity of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC aresubstantially “identical parties” as to warrant the applicationof res judicata. FELS’s argument that it is not bound by theerroneous petition filed by NPC is thus unavailing.

Issue: WON forum shopping exists in this case

Ratio: Forum shopping exists when, as a result of adverse judgment in one forum, a party seeks another apossibly favorable judgment in another forum other than appeal or special civil action or certiorari. There is also forushopping when a party institutes two or more actions proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gambthat one or the other court would make a favorabdisposition.FELS alleges that there is no forum shopping since t

elements of res judicata are not present in the cases at bahowever, as already discussed, res judicata may be propeapplied herein. Petitioners engaged in forum shopping whthey filed G.R. Nos. 168557 and 170628 after the petition freview in G.R. No. 165116. Indeed, petitioners went from ocourt to another trying to get a favorable decision from oof the tribunals which allowed them to pursue their cases.It must be stressed that an important factor in determininthe existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similcases to claim substantially the same reliefs. The rationaagainst forum shopping is that a party should not be allowto pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filimultiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of couprocesses, which tends to degrade the administration

justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, a

adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets the courts. Thus, there is forum shopping when there exist: (a) identof parties, or at least such parties as represent the saminterests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted arelief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facand (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is suthat any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardleof which party is successful, would amount to res judicata the other.Having found that the elements of res judicata and forushopping are present in the consolidated cases, a discussiof the other issues is no longer necessary. Nevertheless, fthe peace and contentment of petitioners, we shall shlight on the merits of the case.

Issue: WON the petitioner may be assessed real proper

taxes

Held: Yes

Ratio: The CBAA and LBAA power barges are real propeand are thus subject to real property tax. This is also tinevitable conclusion, considering that G.R. No. 165113 wdismissed for failure to sufficiently show any reversible err

Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct amade in good faith, with the taxpayer having the burden proving otherwise. [48] Besides, factual findings administrative bodies, which have acquired expertise in thfield, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Couwe will not assume to interfere with the sensible exercise the judgment of men especially trained in appraisiproperty. Where the judicial mind is left in doubt, it is

sound policy to leave the assessment undisturbed. We fino reason to depart from this rule in this case.In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al.

The City of New York, et al., a power company brought aaction to review property tax assessment. On the citymotion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of New York held ththe barges on which were mounted gas turbine power plandesignated to generate electrical power, the fuel oil bargwhich supplied fuel oil to the power plant barges, and thaccessory equipment mounted on the barges were subject real property taxation.Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides th“[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are intendby their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on




river, lake, or coast” are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable propertyby destination, being in the nature of machinery and otherimplements intended by the owner for an industry or workwhich may be carried on in a building or on a piece of landand which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry orwork.Petitioners maintain nevertheless that the power barges areexempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (c) of R.A. No.

7160 because they are actually, directly and exclusivelyused by petitioner NPC, a government- owned and controlledcorporation engaged in the supply, generation, andtransmission of electric power.We affirm the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the ownerof the taxable properties is petitioner FELS, which in fine, isthe entity being taxed by the local government. Asstipulated under Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement:OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the PowerBarges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery andequipment on the Site used in connection with the PowerBarges which have been supplied by it at its own cost.POLAR shall operate, manage and maintain the PowerBarges for the purpose of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR intoelectricity.It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the

payment of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in Section234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160. Indeed, the law states that themachinery must be actually, directly and exclusively used bythe government owned or controlled corporation;nevertheless, petitioner FELS still cannot find solace in thisprovision because Section 5.5, Article 5 of the Agreementprovides:OPERATION. POLAR undertakes that until the end of theLease Period, subject to the supply of the necessary Fuelpursuant to Article 6 and to the other provisions hereof, itwill operate the Power Barges to convert such Fuel intoelectricity in accordance with Part A of Article 7.It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract havethe force of law between the parties. Not being contrary tolaw, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, theparties to the contract are bound by its terms andconditions.

Time and again, the Supreme Court has stated that taxationis the rule and exemption is the exception. The law does notlook with favor on tax exemptions and the entity that wouldseek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too plainto be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted.

Thus, applying the rule of strict construction of laws grantingtax exemptions, and the rule that doubts should be resolvedin favor of provincial corporations, we hold that FELS isconsidered a taxable entity.

The mere undertaking of petitioner NPC under Section 10.1of the Agreement, that it shall be responsible for thepayment of all real estate taxes and assessments, does not

justify the exemption. The privilege granted to petitionerNPC cannot be extended to FELS. The covenant is betweenFELS and NPC and does not bind a third person not privythereto, in this case, the Province of Batangas.

It must be pointed out that the protracted and circuitouslitigation has seriously resulted in the local government’sdeprivation of revenues. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its magnitude,acknowledging in its very nature no perimeter so thatsecurity against its abuse is to be found only in theresponsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on theconstituency who are to pay for it. The right of localgovernment units to collect taxes due must always beupheld to avoid severe tax erosion. This consideration isconsistent with the State policy to guarantee the autonomyof local governments and the objective of the LocalGovernment Code that they enjoy genuine and meaningfullocal autonomy to empower them to achieve their fullest

development as self-reliant communities and make theeffective partners in the attainment of national goals.In conclusion, we reiterate that the power to tax is the mopotent instrument to raise the needed revenues to finanand support myriad activities of the local government unfor the delivery of basic services essential to the promotiof the general welfare and the enhancement of peacprogress, and prosperity of the people.

Digitel v. Prov. Of Pangasinan (2007)Facts: The present petition stemmed from a Complaint fMandamus, Collection of Sum of Money and Damaginstituted by the Province of Pangasinan against Digi

Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. Section 137 Lwithdrew any exemption from the payment of franchise tby authorizing the LGUs to impose a franchise tax businesses at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the groannual receipts of the business. Section 232 lso authorizthe imposition of an ad valorem tax on real property by tLGUs within the Metropolitan Manila Area wherein the lanbuilding, machinery and other improvement not thereinaftspecifically exempted.Digitel was granted, under Provincial Ordinance No. 18-92provincial franchise to install, maintain and operate telecommunications system within Pangasinan. Under t

Sec 6 of the provincial franchise, the grantee is required pay franchise and real property taxes. The SangguniaPanlalawigan also enacted Provincial Tax Ordinance 1 (ReProperty Tax Ordinance of 1992). Section 4, howevexpanded the application of Sec. 6 of the provincial franchiof Digitel to include machineries and other improvemennot thereinafter exempted,. Provincial Tax Ordinance Nowas then enacted. Sections 4, 5 and 6 positively imposedfranchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise within tprovince of Pangasinan.

Thereafter, Digitel was granted by RA 7678 a legislatfranchise. Under its legislative franchise, particularly Secthereof, petitioner DIGITEL became liable for the paymenta franchise tax “as may be prescribed by law of all groreceipts of the telephone or other telecommunicatiobusinesses transacted under it by the grantee,” as well real property tax “on its real estate, and buildings “exclusiof this franchise.” Later, the Province of Pangasinan fouthat Digitel had a franchise tax deficiency for the years 1992, 1993 and 1994.In the interregnum, on 16 March 1995, Congress passed 7925, otherwise known as “The Public TelecommunicatioPolicy Act of the Philippines.” Section 23 of this law entitlEquality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industprovided for the ipso facto application to any previousgranted telecommunications franchises of any advantagfavor, privilege, exemption or immunity granted undexisting franchises, or those still to be granted, to accorded immediately and unconditionally to earlgrantees.

Thereafter, Digitel opposed Pangasinan’s claim on tground that prior to the approval of its legislative franchisits operation of a telecommunications system was do

under a Facilities Management Agreement it had previousexecuted with the DOTC. It clarified that since “the facilitiin Pangasinan are just part of the government ownfacilities awarded to DIGITEL,” not only did the DOTC retaownership of said facilities, the latter likewise “provided fthe budget for) expenses under its allocation from tgovernment;” hence, “all revenues generated from toperation of the facilities inured to the DOTC;” and all tfees received by petitioner DIGITEL were purely for servicrendered. Further, it argued that under its legislatifranchise, the payment of a franchise tax to the BIR woube “in lieu of all taxes” on said franchise or the earnintherefrom.




The Pronvince of Pangasinan filed a Complaint forMandamus, Collection of Sum of Money and Damages beforeBranch 68 of the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The trial courtdecided the Province. It ruled that Digitel’s legislativefranchise does not work to exempt the latter from paymentof provincial franchise and real property taxes. It ruled thatprovincial and legislative franchises are separate and distinctfrom each other. Moreover, it pointed out that LGH alreadywithdrew any exemption granted to anyone.

On the other hand, Digitel maintains that its legislativefranchise being an earlier enactment, by virtue of Section 23of Republic Act No. 7925, the ipso facto, immediate andunconditional application to it of the tax exemption found inthe franchises of Globe, Smart and Bell. Stated simply,Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925, in relation to thepertinent provisions of the legislative franchises of Globe,Smart and Bell, “the national franchise tax for which Digitelis liable to pay shall be ‘in lieu of any and all taxes of anykind, nature or description levied, established or collected byany authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial, or national,from which the grantee is hereby expressly granted.’

Issue: WON Digitel is exempt from the payment of provincial franchise tax in view of Section 23 of RA 7925 inrelation to the exemptions enjoyed by other telcos.

Held: No

Ratio: Prior to the enactment of its legislative franchise,Digitel did not enjoy and exemption from the payment of franchise and real property taxes. In fact the provincialfranchise made Digitel liable for the payment of such taxes.

The case at bar is actually not one of first impression.Indeed, as far back as 2001, this Court has had the occasionto rule against the claim for tax exemption under RA 7925. Inthe case of PLDT v. City of Davao, we already clarified theconfusion brought about by the effect of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925 – that the word “exemption” as usedin the statute refer’s or pertain’s merely to an exemptionfrom regulatory or reporting requirements of the DOTC or theNTC and not to the grantee’s tax liability. In said case, theCourt ruled that Congress did not intend Section 23 to

operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telcos. Moreover,tax exemptions must be expressed in the statute in clearlanguage that leaves no doubt of the intention of thelegislature to grant such exemption. And, even if it isgranted, the exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi

juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxingauthority. Moreover, it ruled that PLDT’s theory will leave theGovernment with the burden of having to keep track of allgranted telecommunications franchises, lest somecompanies be treated unequally. It is different if Congressenacts a law specifically granting uniform advantages, favor,privilege, exemption, or immunity to all telecommunicationsentities.R.A. No. 7925 is thus a legislative enactment designed to setthe national policy on telecommunications and provide thestructures to implement it to keep up with the technological

advances in the industry and the needs of the public. Thethrust of the law is to promote gradually the deregulation of the entry, pricing, and operations of all publictelecommunications entities and thus promote a levelplaying field in the telecommunications industry. There isnothing in the language of §23 nor in the proceedings of boththe House of Representatives and the Senate in enactingR.A. No. 7925 which shows that it contemplates the grant of tax exemptions to all telecommunications entities, includingthose whose exemptions had been withdrawn by the LGC.

The issue is then settled, the Court has no recourse but todeny Digitel’s claim for exemption from payment of provincial franchise tax. The foregoing pronouncementnotwithstanding, in view of the passage of RA 7716

abolishing the franchise tax imposed on telecommunicatiocompanies effective 1 January 1996 and in its place imposed a 10% VAT, the “in-lieu-of-all-taxeclause/provision in the legislative franchises of Globe, Smaand Bell, among others, has now become functus officmade inoperative for lack of a franchise tax. Therefotaking into consideration the above, from 1 January 199Digitel ceased to be liable for national franchise tax and its stead is imposed a 10% VAT in accordance with Secti

108 of the Tax Code.

Issue: WON Digitel is exempt from payment of real estatax under its legislative franchise.

Held: No

Ratio: Pertinent Provision: SECTION 5. Tax Provisions.The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its reestate, buildings, and personal property exclusive of thfranchise as other persons or corporations are now hereafter may be required by law to pay x x x.Owing to the phrase “exclusive of this franchise,” petitionDIGITEL stands firm in its position that it is equally exemfrom the payment of real property tax. It maintains that saphrase found in Section 5 qualifies or delimits the scope

its liability respecting real property tax –that real propertax should only be imposed on its assets that are actualdirectly and exclusively used in the conduct of its businepursuant to its franchise.According to the Province, however, “the phrase ‘exclusiof this franchise’ in the legislative franchise of Digitel did nspecifically or categorically express that such franchise graintended to provide privilege to the extent of impliedrepealing RA 7160.”

Thus, the question is, whether or not petitioner DIGITELreal properties located within the territorial jurisdiction respondent Province of Pangasinan are exempt from reproperty taxes by virtue of Section 5 of Republic Act N7678. We rule in the affirmative. However, it is with tcaveat that such exemption solely applies to those reproperties actually, directly and exclusively used by tgrantee in its franchise.

The present issue actually boils down to a dispute betwethe inherent taxing power of Congress and the delegatauthority to tax of the local government borne by the 198Constitution. In the PLDT v. City of Davao, we alreasustained the power of Congress to grant exemptions ovand above the power of the local government’s delegatetaxing authority notwithstanding the source of such power.Had Congress intended to tax each and every real properof Digitel, regardless of whether or not it is used in tbusiness or operation of its franchise, it would not haincorporated a qualifying phrase, which such manifestatiadmittedly is. And, to our minds, “the issue in this case longer dwells on whether Congress has the power exempt” Digitel’s properties from realty taxes by enactment of RA 7678 which contains the phrase “exclusiof this franchise,” in the face of the mandate of the Loc

Government Code. The more pertinent issue to consider whether or not, by passing Ra7678, Congress intended exempt Digitel’s real properties actually, directly aexclusively used by the grantee in its franchise.

The fact that Republic Act No. 7678 was a later piece legislation can be taken to mean that Congress, knowifully well that the Local Government Code had alreawithdrawn exemptions from real property taxes, chose restore such immunity even to a limited degree.In view of the unequivocal intent of Congress to exempt froreal property tax those real properties actually, directly aexclusively used by petitioner DIGITEL in the pursuit of franchise, respondent Province of Pangasinan can only lereal property tax on the remaining real properties of t




grantee located within its territorial jurisdiction not part of the above-stated classification. Said exemption, however,merely applies from the time of the effectivity of petitionerDIGITEL’s legislative franchise and not a moment sooner.

In fine, petitioner DIGITEL is found accountable torespondent Province of Pangasinan for the following taxliabilities: 1) as to provincial franchise tax, from 13November 1992 until actually paid; and 2) as to real property

tax, for the period starting from 13 November 1992 until 28December 1992, it shall be imposed only on the lands andbuildings of petitioner DIGITEL located within the subject

jurisdiction; for the period commencing from 29 December1992 until 16 February 1994, in addition to the lands andbuildings aforementioned, it shall similarly be imposed onmachineries and other improvements; and, by virtue of theNational Franchise of petitioner DIGITEL or Republic Act No.7678, in accordance with the Court’s ruling in theabovementioned Bayantel case, from the date of effectivityon 17 February 1994 until the present, it shall be imposedonly on real properties NOT actually, directly and exclusivelyused in the franchise of petitioner DIGITEL. In addition to theforegoing summary, pertinent provisions of law respectinginterests, penalties and surcharges shall also be made toapply to herein subject tax liabilities.

Real Property Taxation and Special Education Fund Tax

Sec of Finance v. Ilarde & Cipriano Cabaluna (2005)

Facts: Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., was the Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI of the DOF. He co-owns with his wifecertain properties in Jaro, Iloilo City Private respondent failedto pay the land taxes on Lot No. 12 and Lot No. 14 for theyears 1986 to 1992. For the years 1991 to 1992, taxes werealso unpaid on Lot No. 941-D-2, on the residential house, andon Lot No. 941-D-1. A breakdown of the computation of thedelinquent taxes showed that more than 24% of thedelinquent taxes were charged and collected from privaterespondent by way of penalties. Private respondent paid hisland taxes and the receipts were issued to him by the City

Treasurer’s Office with the notation “paid under protest.”Soon, Cabaluna retired. He then filed a formal protest withthe City Treasurer of Iloilo wherein he contends that thecomputation was erroneous since the rate of penalty exceed24% in contravention of Section 66 of P.D. No. 464,otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. TheAssistant City Treasurer Rizalina Tulio turned down theprotest, citing Sec. 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulations No.1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 of the DOF.Despite his labors to exhaust all administrative remedies,the denial of his protest and his MR compelled privaterespondent to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief withDamages assailing Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 which, according tohim, flouted Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 which fixed themaximum penalty for delinquency in the payment of realestate taxes at 24% of the delinquent tax. The respondent

judge declared as null and void the said regulations and

ruled that the total penalty must not exceed 24% of thedelinquent tax.

Issue: WON the Ministry of Finance could legally promulgateregulations prescribing a rate of penalty on delinquent taxesother than that provided for under PD 464, also known asthe Real Property Tax Code.

Ratio: Petitioner’s standpoint is devoid of basis in law or inlogic. The subject Regulations must be struck down forbeing repugnant to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the RealProperty Tax Code, which is the law prevailing at the timematerial to this case. Note that under Section 66 of P.D. No.464, the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment

of real property tax shall in no case exceed 24% of tdelinquent tax. Upon the other hand, Section 4(c) of tchallenged Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Loc

Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 issued by respondSecretary (formerly Minister) of Finance provides that “tpenalty of two percent (2%) per month of delinquency twenty-four percent (24%) per annum as the case may bshall continue to be imposed on the unpaid tax from the timthe delinquency was incurred up to the time that t

delinquency is paid for in full.” As adeptly observed by thtrial court, the penalty imposed under the assailRegulations has no limit inasmuch as the 24% penalty pannum shall be continuously imposed on the unpaid tax unit is paid for in full unlike that imposed under Section 66 the Real Property Tax Code where the total penalty is limitonly to twenty-four percent of the delinquent tax.

That such is the effect of an application of the Regulatiounder review is not disclaimed by the petitioner anywherehis pleadings. Petitioner, however, attempts to justify tissued Regulations’ departure from the Real Property TCode. Said Regulations, petitioner says, are sanctioned EO 73 and its implementing guidelines, Joint LocAssessment/Treasury Regulations No. 2-86. Joint LoAssessment/Treasury Regulations No. 2-86.

The Secretary of Finance avers in his petition that the la

paragraph of Section 1, Joint Local Assessment/TreasuRegulations No. 2-86, explicitly provides for a 2% per monpenalty without any limitation as to the maximum amouthereof, which is entirely consistent with the then existiRegulations, the now challenged Joint AssessmeRegulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 85. Petitioner further asserts that inasmuch as Joint LocAssessment/Treasury Regulations No. 2-86, which echoes tdisputed Regulations, was issued to implement E.O. No. 7private respondent’s recourse is to file a case questionithe validity of Joint Local Assessment/Treasury RegulatioNo. 2-86 in the same way that he has assailed JoAssessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local TreasuRegulations No. 2-85.Petitioner’s reasoning is, to our mind, but a futile attempt muddle the facts of the case and the issues involved. Recthat the present controversy cropped up when Cabalu

protested the payment of penalties on his delinquent taxfor being in excess of the 24% cap provided in p.d. No. 4or the Real Property Tax Code. In response to his letter protest, the Assistant Treasurer of Iloilo City justified tassessment by citing Sec. 4(c) of Joint AssessmeRegulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 85 issued by petitioner Minister (now Secretary) of Financ

This has lead to the filing of the present case by Cabaluna question the validity of the said regulations. It is the validof said regulations, not Joint Local Assessment/TreasuRegulations No. 2-86, that is sought to be resolved hereand petitioner should not depart from the issue on hand.

The Court harbors doubts on the veracity of petitionecontention that the Regulations at issue are sanctioned E.O. No. 73. The underlying principle behind E.O. No. 73, gleaned from the whereas clauses and Section 1 thereof

quoted above, is to advance the date of effectivity of tapplication of the Real Property Tax Values of 1984 from January 1988, the original date it was intended by E.O. N1019 to take effect for purposes stated therein, to

January 1987. E.O. No. 73 did not, in any way, alter tstructure of the real property tax assessments as providfor in P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code.Neither is this Court easily dissuaded by the submission the Secretary of Finance that E.O. No. 73, which provides Section 2 thereof that: “The Minister of Finance shpromulgate the necessary rules and regulations implement this Executive Order,” has the effect of accordipetitioner the blanket authority to tinker with the rates penalty on delinquency taxes as provided for in P.D. No. 46




the general law on real property taxation. The Court takesnotice that E.O. No. 73 did not touch at all on the topic of amendment of rates of delinquent taxes or the amendmentof rates of penalty on delinquent taxes. E.O. No. 73,particularly in Section 2 thereof, has merely designated theMinister of Finance to promulgate the rules and regulationstowards the implementation of E.O. No. 73, particularly onthe application of the Real Property Values as of 31December 1984, which is the general purpose for enacting

said executive order.In our mind, what is patent from Section 3 of E.O. No. 73 isthe repeal of E.O. No. 1019, not Section 66 of P.D. No. 464.Neither did E.O. No. 1019 directly or indirectly vest upon theDepartment of Finance the right to fiddle with the rates of penalty to be assessed on delinquency taxes as contained inthe Real Property Tax Code. Even assuming that E.O. No.1019 had vested the then Ministry of Finance with theauthority to impose new rates of penalty on delinquencytaxes, as petitioner would have us believe, such authoritywould have been automatically stripped off from it upon theexpress repeal of E.O. No. 1019 by EO No. 73 on the 25th of November 1986.Despite the promulgation of EO 73, PD 464 in general andSection 66 in particular, remained to be good law. To acceptpetitioner’s premise that EO 73 had accorded the Ministry of

Finance the authority to alter, increase, or modify the taxstructure would be tantamount to saying that EO 73 hasrepealed or amended PD 464. Repeal of laws should bemade clear and expressed. Repeals by implication are notfavored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberationand full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. Suchrepeals are not favored for a law cannot be deemed repealedunless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intendedit.[15] The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicatesthat the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless anirreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in theterms of the new and old laws. We find, as the trial courthas found, no such inconsistency or repugnancy between EO73 and Section 66 of PD 464. Jurisprudence thrives to theeffect that it is only Republic Act No. 7160 or the LocalGovernment Code of 1991, which repealed the Real Property

Tax Code or P.D. No. 464.

Assuming argumenti that E.O. No. 73 has authorized thepetitioner to issue the objected Regulations, suchconferment of powers is void for being repugnant to the well-encrusted doctrine in political law that the power of taxationis generally vested with the legislature.[ Yes, PresidentCorazon Aquino, at that time, was exercising both executiveand legislative powers. But, the power delegated to theexecutive branch, in this case the Ministry of Finance, to laydown implementing rules must, nevertheless, be germane tothe general law it seeks to apply. The implementing rulescannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it isdesigned to implement. Administrative regulations adoptedunder legislative authority by a particular department mustbe in harmony with the provisions of the law they areintended to carry into effect, which in this case is merely toantedate the effectivity of the 1984 Real Property Tax values

inasmuch as this is the raison d’être of E.O. No. 73.In a last-ditch effort to salvage the impugned Regulations,petitioner pushes on that Joint Local Assessment/TreasuryRegulations No. 2-86, or the so-called implementing rules of E.O. No. 73, is not contrary to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464inasmuch as the latter applies merely to simple delinquencyin the payment of real property taxes while the formercovers cases wherein there was failure to promptly pay thereal property tax due, including the increase in tax due anddemandable for the tax year as a result of the application of the 1984 New or Revised Assessment of the value of thesubject property.Such rationalization lacks legal traction. P.D. No. 464 makesno distinction as to whether it is simple delinquency or other

forms thereof. The Real Property Tax Code covers the wiilk of failure to promptly pay the real property taxes due ademandable for a particular period. Ubi lex non distingnec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does ndistinguish, we must not distinguish. Further, P.D. No. 4covers all real property titled to individuals who becomdelinquents in paying real estate tax. P.D. No. 464 is a law general application.On the second assigned error, the fact that priva

respondent Cabaluna was responsible for the issuance aimplementation of Regional Office Memorandum Circular N04-89 which implemented Joint Assessment Regulations N1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 does not phim in estoppel from seeking the nullification of saRegulations at this point. In the case at bar, howevpetitioner is suing as a plain taxpayer, he having alrearetired as Regional Director. His official acts as RegionDirector could not have stripped him of his rights astaxpayer. To be sure, the official acts of petitioner Regional Director cannot serve as estoppel for him to pursthe present course of action that he has taken as a taxpayeIn any event, a regulation which is in itself invalid for beicontrary to law cannot be validated by any act endorsement of any official, much less, by a subordinate the official who issued such regulation. Estoppel, certain

cannot make an invalid regulation valid.At bottom, the law applicable, in the case at bar, fpurposes of computation of the real property taxes due froprivate respondent for the years 1986 to 1991, including tpenalties and interests, is still Section 66 of the ReProperty Tax Code of 1974 or P.D. No. 464. the penalty thought to be imposed for delinquency in the payment of reproperty taxes should, therefore, be that provided for Section 66 of P.D. No. 464, i.e., two per centum on tamount of the delinquent tax for each month of delinquenor fraction thereof but “in no case shall the total penalexceed twenty-four per centum of the delinquent tax.”Accordingly, the penalties imposed by respondents C

Treasurer and Assistant City Treasurer of Iloilo City on tproperty of private respondent are valid only up to 24% the delinquent taxes. The excess penalties paid by tprivate respondent should, in view of that, be refunded

the latter.However, from 01 January 1992 onwards, the proper basfor the computation of the real property tax payabincluding penalties or interests, if applicable, must be ReAct No. 7160, known as the Local Government Code, whitook effect on the 1st of January 1992[23] inasmuch Section 534[24] thereof had expressly repealed P.D. No. 4or the Real Property Tax Code. Section 5(d) of Rep. Act N7160 provides that rights and obligations existing on tdate of effectivity of the new Code and arising out contracts or any source of prestation involving a locgovernment unit shall be governed by the original terms aconditions of the said contracts or the law in force at thtime such contracts were vested.

Benguet Corporation v. COA (1992), supra.

Realty taxes are national taxes collected by LGUs. WhLGU’s are charged with fixing the rate of real property taxeit does not necessarily follow from that authority tdetermination of whether or not to impose the tax. In faLGU’s have no alternative but to collect taxes as mandatin Sec. 38 of the Real Property Tax Code. It is thus clear thit is the national government, expressing itself through thlegislative branch, that levies the real property tax.

Consequently, when LGU’s are required to fix the rates, thare merely constituted as agents of the nationgovernment in the enforcement of the Real Property TCode. The delegation of taxing power is not even involvehere because the national government has already impos




realty tax in Sec. 38 leaving only the enforcement to be doneLGU’s.

National Development Co. v. Cebu City (1992)

Facts: National Development Company (NDC) is a GOCCauthorized to engage in commercial, industrial, mining,agricultural and other enterprises necessary or contributoryto economic development or important to public interest. Italso operates subsidiary corporations one of which isNational Warehousing Corporation (NWC).On August 10, 1939, the President issued Proclamation No.430 reserving Block no. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of CebuCity for warehousing purposes under the administration of NWC. Subsequently, in 1940, a warehouse with a floor areaof 1,940 square meters more or less, was constructedthereon. In 1947, EO 93 dissolved NWC with NDC takingover its assets and functions.In 1948, Cebu City assessed and collected from NDC realestate taxes on the land and the warehouse thereon. By thefirst quarter of 1970, a total of P100,316.31 was paid by NDC11 of which only P3,895.06 was under protest. NDC askedfor a full refund contending that the land and the warehousebelonged to the Republic and therefore exempt fromtaxation. The CFI ordered Cebu City to refund to NDC the realestate taxes paid by it.

Issue: WON the NDC is exempt from real estate taxes

Held: No

Ratio: As already adverted to, one of the principal issuesbefore Us is the interpretation of a provision of theAssessment Law, the precursor of the then Real Property TaxCode and the Local Government Code, where "ownership" of the property and not "use" is the test of tax liability. Section,3 par. (a), of the Assessment Law, on which NDC claims realestate tax exemption, provides Section 3. Property exemptfrom tax. The exemptions shall be as follows: (a) Propertyowned by the United States of America, the Commonwealthof the Philippines, any province, city, municipality atmunicipal district.

The same opinion of NDC was passed upon in NationalDevelopment Co. v. Province of Nueva Ecija where We heldthat its properties were not comprehended in Sec. 3, par (a),of the Assessment Law. Commonwealth Act No. 182 whichcreated NDC contains no provision exempting it from thepayment of real estate tax on properties it may acquire. NDCdoes not come under classification of municipal or publiccorporation in the sense that it may sue and be sued in thesame manner as any other private corporations, and in thissense, it is an entity different from the government, NPCmay be sued without its consent, and is subject to taxation.

That plaintiff herein does not exercise sovereign powersand, hence, cannot invoke the exemptions thereof but is anagency for the performance of purely corporate, proprietaryor business functions, is apparent from its Organic Act.We find no compelling reason why the foregoing ruling,although referring to lands which would eventually be

transferred to private individuals, should not apply equally tothis case.NDC cites Board of Assessment Appeals, Province of Lagunav. CTA and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority(NWSA). In that case, the properties of NWSA, a GOCC, wereexempt from real estate tax because Sec. 3, par (c), of R.A.470 did not distinguish between those possessed by thegovernment in sovereign/governmental/political capacityand those in private proprietary patrimonial character. Theconflict between NDC v. Nueva Ecija, supra, and BAA v. CTAand NWSA, , is more superficial than real. The NDC decisionspeaks of properties owned by NDC, while the BAA rulingconcerns properties belonging to the Republic

In the case at bar, no similar statement appears in tstipulation of facts, hence, ownership of subject propertishould first be established. For, while it may be stated ththe Republic owns NDC, it does not necessary follow thproperties owned by NDC, are also owned by Republic in tsame way that stockholders are not ipso facto owners of tproperties of their corporation.

The Republic may form a corporation with personality aexistence distinct from its own. The separate personal

allows a GOCC to hold and possess properties in its owname and, thus, permit greater independence and flexibilin its operations. It may, therefore, be stated that texemption of property owned by the Republic of tPhilippines "refers to properties owned by the Governmeand by its agencies which do not have separate and distinpersonalities (unincorporated entities).

The foregoing discussion does not mean that because NDlike most GOCC's engages in commercial enterprises properties of the government and its unincorporatagencies possessed in propriety character are taxabSimilarly, in the case at bar, NDC proceeded on the premithat the BAA ruling declared all properties owed by GOCCas properties in the name of the Republic, hence, exemunder Sec. 3 of the Assessment Law.

Issue: WON the property is exempt from payment of reestate taxes

Held: Yes

Ratio: To come within the ambit of the exemption providein Art. 3, par. (a), of the Assessment Law, it is important establish that the property is owned by the government its unincorporated agency, and once government ownershis determined, the nature of the use of the property, whethfor proprietary or sovereign purposes, becomes immateriWhat appears to have been ceded to NWC (later transferreto NDC), in the case before Us, is merely the administratioof the property while the government retains ownership what has been declared reserved for warehousing purposunder Proclamation No. 430.A reserved land is defined as a "[p]ublic land that has bee

withheld or kept back from sale or disposition." The laremains "absolute property of the government." Tgovernment "does not part with its title by reserving the(lands), but simply gives notice to all the world that it desirthem for a certain purpose." Absolute disposition of landnot implied from reservation; it merely means "a withdrawof a specified portion of the public domain from disposunder the land laws and the appropriation thereof, for ttime being, to some particular use or purpose of the genergovernment." As its title remains with the Republic, treserved land is clearly recovered by the tax exemptiprovision.CEBU nevertheless contends that the reservation of tproperty in favor of NWC or NDC is a form of disposition public land which, subjects the recipient (NDC ) to real estataxation under Sec. 115 of the Public Land Act.

The essential question then is whether lands reservpursuant to Sec. 83 are comprehended in Sec. 115 antherefore, taxable.Section 115 of the Public Land Act should be treated as exception to Art. 3, par. (a), of the Assessment Law. Whordinary public lands are tax exempt because title therebelongs to the Republic, Sec. 115 subjects them to reestate tax even before ownership thereto is transferred the name of the beneficiaries. Sec. 115 comprehends thre(3) modes of disposition of Lands under the Public Land Acto wit: homestead, concession, and contract.Liability to real property taxes under Sec. 115 is predicateon (a) filing of homestead application, (b) approval concession and, (c) signing of contract. Significantly, witho




these words, the date of the accrual of the real estate taxwould be indeterminate. Since NDC is not a homesteaderand no "contract" (bilateral agreement) was signed, it wouldappear, then, that reservation under Sec. 83, being aunilateral act of the President, falls under "concession"."Concession" as a technical term under the Public Land Act issynonymous with "alienation" and "disposition", and isdefined in Sec. 10 as "any of the methods authorized by thisAct for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of

the public domain other than timber or mineral lands."Logically, where Sec. 115 contemplates authorized methodsfor acquisition, lease, use, or benefit under the Act, thetaxability of the land would depend on whether reservationunder Sec. 83 is one such method of acquisition, etc. Terselyput, is reservation synonymous with alienation? Or, are thetwo terms antithetical and mutually exclusive? Indeed,reservation connotes retention, while concession (alienation)signifies cession.Section 8 and 88 of the Public Land Act provide that reservedlands are excluded from that may be subject of disposition.As We view it, the effect of reservation under Sec. 83 is tosegregate a piece of public land and transform it into non-alienable or non-disposable under the Public Land Act.Section 115, on the other hand, applies to disposable publiclands. Clearly, therefore, Sec. 115 does not apply to lands

reserved under Sec. 83. Consequently, the subject reservedpublic land remains tax exempt.However, as regards the warehouse constructed on a publicreservation, a different rule should apply because "[t]heexemption of public property from taxation does not extendto improvements on the public lands made by pre-emptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, oroccupants, at their own expense, and these are taxable bythe state . . ." Consequently, the warehouse constructed onthe reserved land by NWC (now under administration byNDC), indeed, should properly be assessed real estate tax assuch improvement does not appear to belong to theRepublic.Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax, theerroneous tax payments collected by CEBU should berefunded to NDC. This is in consonance with Sec. 40, par. (a)of the former Real Property Tax Code which exempted from

taxation real property owned by the Republic of thePhilippines or any of its political subdivisions, as well as anyGOCC so exempt by its charter.As regards the requirement of paying under protest before

judicial recourse, CEBU argues that in any case NDC is notentitled to refund because Sec. 75 of R.A. 3857, the RevisedCharter of the City of Cebu, requires payment under protestbefore resorting to judicial action for tax refund; that it couldnot have acted on the first demand letter of NDC of 20 May1970 because it was sent to the City Assessor and not to theCity Treasurer; that, consequently, there having been noappropriate prior demand, resort to judicial remedy ispremature; and, that even on the premise that there wasproper demand, NDC has yet to exhaust administrativeremedies by way of appeal to the Department of Financeand/or Auditor General before taking judicial action.

NDC does not agree. It disputes the applicability of thepayment-under-protest requirement is Sec. 75 of the RevisedCebu City Charter because the issue is not the validity of taxassessment but recovery of erroneous payments under Arts.2154 and 2155 of the Civil Code. It cites the case of EastAsiaticvs City of Davao which held that where the tax isunauthorized, "it is not a tax assessed under the charter of the City of Davao and for that reason no protest is necessaryfor a claim or demand for its refund."In the case at bar, petitioner, therefore, cannot be said tohave waived his right. He had no knowledge of the fact thatit was exempted from payment of the realty tax underCommonwealth Act No. 470. Payment was made througherror or mistake, in the honest belief that petitioner was

liable, and therefore could not have been made undprotest, but with complete voluntariness. In any case,taxpayer should not be held to suffer loss by his gointention to comply with what he believes is his legobligation, where such obligation does not really exist .

The fact that petitioner paid thru error or mistake, and tgovernment accepted the payment, gave rise to tapplication of the principle of solutio indebiti under Artic2154 of the New Civil Code, which provides that

something is received when there is no right to demand and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligatioto return it arises." There is, therefore, created a tie

juridical relation in the nature of solutio indebiti, expresclassified as quasi-contract under Section 2, Chapter I of TiXVII CC.

The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti is one of the concremanifestations of the ancient principle that no one shenrich himself unjustly at the expense of another . . . Hencit would seem unedifying for the government, that knowinghas no right at all to collect or to receive money for allegtaxes paid by mistake, it would be reluctant to return tsame . . . Petitioner is not unsatisfied in the assessment of property. Assessment having been made, it paid the reestate taxes without knowing that it is

Prov. of Tarlac v. Judge Alcantara (1992)Facts: Tarlac Enterprises Inc is the owner of a parcel of lain Mabini, Tarlac, an ice drop factory in said land, machineshed and other machinery. These properties were declarfor purposes of Taxation in the Provincial Assessor’s Offic

The Provincial Treasurer found that real estate taxes for tyears 1974 until 1992 in the amount of P532,435.including penalties were not yet paid. Therefore, tProvincial Treasurer Jose Meru filed a complaint praying ththe company pay the said sum as well as damages.

The company filed a motion to dismiss. But the lower coudenied the motion. Thereafter, petitioner set the auction saof the private respondent's properties to satisfy the reestate taxes due. This prompted the private respondent file a motion praying that petitioner be directed to desfrom proceeding with the public auction sale. The lower couissued an order granting said motion to prevent mootnessthe case considering that the properties to be sold were thsubjects of the complaint.

The company then filed an answer saying thunder Section 40(g) of PD46 in relation to PD 551, it wexempt from paying said tax. The court rendered tdecision dismissing the complaint. It ruled that P.D. No. 55expressly exempts private respondent from paying the reproperty taxes demanded, it being a grantee of a franchito generate, distribute and sell electric current for light. Tcourt held that in lieu of said taxes, private respondent hbeen required to pay 2% franchise tax in line with the inteof the law to give assistance to operators such as the privarespondent to enable the consumers to enjoy cheaper rate

Issue: WON Tarlac Enterprises, Inc. is exempt from tpayment of real property tax under Sec. 40 (g) of P.D. N

464 in relation to P.D. No. 551, as amended.

Held: No

Ratio: Sec. 40(g) of P.D. No. 464, the Real Property TaCode, provides: SEC. 40. Exemptions from Real Property Ta- The exemption shall be as follows: (g) Real properexempt under other laws.Private respondent contends that the "other laws" referred in this Section is P.D. No. 551 (Lowering the Cost Consumers of Electricity by Reducing the Franchise TPayable by Electric Franchise Holders and the Tariff on FuOils for the Generation of Electric Power by Public UtilitieIts pertinent provisions state: SECTION 1. Any provision




law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, thefranchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises togenerate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heatand power shall be two (2%) of their gross receipts receivedfrom the sale of electric current and from transactionsincident to the generation, distributionWe do not agree with the lower court that the phrase "in lieuof all taxes and assessments of whatever nature" in thesecond paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 551 expressly

exempts private respondent from paying real property taxes.As correctly observed by the petitioner, said proviso ismodified and delimited by the phrase "on earnings, receipts.income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale"which specifies the kinds of taxes and assessments whichshall not be collected in view of the imposition of thefranchise tax. Said enumerated items upon which taxes shallnot be imposed, have no relation at all to, and are entirelydifferent from. real properties subject to tax.If the intention of the law is to exempt electric franchisegrantees from paying real property tax and to make the 2%franchise tax the only imposable tax, then said enumerateditems would not have been added when PD 852 was enactedto amend P.D. No. 551. The legislative authority would havesimply stopped after the phrase "national or local authority"by putting therein a period. On the contrary, it went on to

enumerate what should not be subject to tax therebydelimiting the extent of the exemption.We likewise do not find merit in private respondent'scontention that the real properties being taxed, viz., themachinery for the generation and distribution of electricpower, the building housing said machinery, and the land onwhich said building is constructed, are necessary for theoperation of its business of generation, distribution and saleof electric current and, therefore, they should be exemptedfrom taxation. Private respondent apparently does not quitecomprehend the distinction among the subject matters orobjects of the taxes involved. It bears emphasis that P.D. No.551 as amended by P.D. No. 852 deals with franchise tax andtariff on fuel oils and the "earnings, receipts, income andprivilege of generation, distribution and sale of electriccurrent" are the items exempted from taxation by theimposition of said tax or tariff duty. On the other hand, the

collection complaint filed by petitioner specified only taxesdue on real properties. While P.D. No. 551 was intended togive "assistance to the franchise holders by reducing someof their tax and tariff obligations," to construe said decree ashaving granted such franchise holders exemption frompayment of real property tax would unduly extend the ambitof exemptions beyond the purview of the law.

The annexes attached to private respondent's comment onthe petition to prove by contemporaneous interpretation itsclaimed tax exemption are not of much help to it.Department Order No. 35-74 dated September 16, 1974 11regulating the implementation of P.D. No. 551 merelyreiterates the "in lieu of all taxes" proviso. Local TaxRegulations No. 3-75 12 issued by then Secretary of FinanceCesar Virata and addressed to all Provincial and City

Treasurers enjoins strict compliance with the directive that

"the franchise tax imposed under Local Tax Ordinancespursuant to Section 19 of the Local Tax Code, as amended,shall be collected from business holding franchises but notfrom establishments whose franchise contains the in lieu of all taxes' proviso," thereby clearly indicating that saidproviso exempts taxpayers like private respondent frompaying the franchise tax collected by the provinces underthe Local Tax Code. Lastly, the letter 13 of the then Bureauof Internal Revenue Acting Commissioner addressed to theMatic Law Office granting exemption to the latter's clientfrom paying the "privilege (fixed) tax which is an excise taxon the privilege of engaging in business" clearly excludesrealty tax from such exemption.

We also find misplaced the lower court's and the privarespondent's reliance on Butuan Sawmill. Inc. v. City Butuan. In that case, the questioned tax is a tax on the grosales or receipts of said sawmill while the tax involved hereis a real property tax. The City of Butuan is categoricaprohibited therein by Sec. 2(j) of the Local Autonomy Afrom imposing "taxes of any kind . . . on person payifranchise tax." On the other hand, P.D. No. 551 is not as aencompassing as said provision of the Local Autonomy A

for it enumerates the items which are not taxable by virtuof the payment of franchise tax.It has always been the rule that "exemptions from taxatiare construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer aliberally in favor of the taxing authority" primarily becau"taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt acertain availability is an imperious need." Thus, to exempted from payment of taxes, it is the taxpayer's duty

justify the exemption "by words too plain to be mistaken atoo categorical to be misinterpreted.; Private respondent hutterly failed to discharge this duty.

8.3 Shares of LGUS in national taxes

Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)

Facts: On December, 1997, the President issued AO 37

(Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998On December, 1998, President Estrada issued AO 4amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five perce(5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to withheld from the LGUs. Petitioner contends that by issuinAO 372, the President exercised the power of control ovLGUs. Moreover, withholding 10% of the IRA is contravention of Sec 286 LGC and of Sec 6 Article X of thConstitution, providing for the automatic release to each these units its share in the national internal revenue. The SGen claims that AO 372 was issued merely as an exercise the President’s power of supervision over LGUs.

Section 4 of Article X of the Consti confines the Presidenpower over local governments to general supervision. Thprovision has been interpreted to exclude the power control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the SC contrastsupervision and control, thus: "supervision meaoverseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see thsubordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter failneglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action step as prescribed by law to make them perform their dutieControl, on the other hand, means the power of an officer alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinaofficer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.In Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control asupervision was further delineated. Officers in control ldown the rules in the performance or accomplishment of act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in thdiscretion, order the act undone or redone by thsubordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On tother hand, supervision does not cover such authori

Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules afollowed, but they themselves do not lay down such rulenor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them.the rules are not observed, they may order the work done redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may nprescribe their own manner of execution of the act. Thumembers of the cabined and other executive officials amerely alter egos of the President. As such, they are subjeto the power of control of the President, at whose will abehest they can be removed from office; or their actions adecisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, theads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presiden




supervision only, not control, so long as their acts areexercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers.Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on thePresident's power over local governments is the state policyof ensuring local autonomy. In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsiveand accountable local government structure institutedthrough a system of decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the

national government over the affairs of local governments,x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership andinterdependence between the central administration andlocal government units x x x." Paradoxically, localgovernments are still subject to regulation, however limited,for the purpose of enhancing self-government.Decentralization simply means the devolution of nationaladministration, not power, to local governments. Localofficials remain accountable to the central government asthe law may provide. The difference betweendecentralization of administration and that of power wasexplained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin as follows:"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administrationor decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegatesadministrative powers to political subdivisions in order to

broaden the base of government power and in the process tomake local governments 'more responsive and accountable,'and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliantcommunities and make them more effective partners in thepursuit of national development and social progress.' At thesame time, it relieves the central government of the burdenof managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate onnational concerns. The President exercises 'generalsupervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairsare administered according to law.' He has no control overtheir acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgmentswith his own.Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the nationalgovernment has not completely relinquished all its powersover local governments, including autonomous regions. Onlyadministrative powers over local affairs are delegated topolitical subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to

make governance more directly responsive and effective atthe local levels. In turn, economic, political and socialdevelopment at the smaller political units are expected topropel social and economic growth and development. But toenable the country to develop as a whole, the programs andpolicies effected locally must be integrated and coordinatedtowards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for theentire country still lies in the President and Congress. As westated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipalgovernments are still agents of the national government.

Issue: WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs"LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% is valid

Held: Yes

Ratio: Under existing law, LGU, in addition to havingadministrative autonomy, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well.Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have thepower to create their own sources of revenue in addition totheir equitable share in the national taxes released by thenational government, as well as the power to allocate theirresources in accordance with their own priorities. It extendsto the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turnhave to work within the constraints thereof. They are notformulated at the national level and imposed on localgovernments, whether they are relevant to local needs andresources or not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both

local and national officials, who in any case are partners the attainment of national goals.Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any mannof national government intervention by way of supervisioin order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwisare consistent with national goals. Significantly, tPresident, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economand planning agency of the government, primarresponsible for formulating and implementing continuin

coordinated and integrated social and economic policieplans and programs for the entire country. However, undthe Constitution, the formulation and the implementation such policies and programs are subject to "consultations wthe appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, alocal government units." The President cannot do unilaterally.

There are therefore several requisites before the Presidemay interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanagpublic sector deficit of the national government; (consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate athe House of Representatives and the presidents of tvarious local leagues; and (3) the correspondirecommendation of the secretaries of the Department Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget aManagement. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotme

shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of tcollection of national internal revenue taxes of the thfiscal year preceding the current one.While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rathcommanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner ththe requirements of Section 284 of the LGC have not besatisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor generaassurance that the directive to "identify and implememeasures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is mereadvisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatoor binding order that interferes with local autonomy. Tlanguage used, while authoritative, does not amount tocommand that emanates from a boss to a subaltern. Raththe provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon locexecutives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint inperiod of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would

well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity ateamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understoohowever, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGand their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in thlight that we sustain the solicitor general's contention regard to Section 1.

Issue: WON withholding a part of LGUs IRA is valid

Held: No

Ratio: Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automarelease of the shares of LGUs in the national internrevenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitutio

The LGC specifies further that the release shall be ma

directly to the LGU concerned within 5 days after evequarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien holdback that may be imposed by the national governmefor whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a woof command that must be given a compulsory meaning. Tprovision is, therefore, imperative. Section 4 of AO 37however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 199of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment aevaluation by the Development Budget CoordinatiCommittee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the countSuch withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution athe law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdbacwhich means "something held back or withheld, ofttemporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retenti




by the national government does not matter. Any retentionis prohibited.In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as anadvisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectivelyencroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments.Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing hisOrder to withhold the LGUs’ IRA, but the rule of law requiresthat even the best intentions must be carried out within the

parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudablepurposes must be carried out by legal methods.

4 Abatement of Nuisance

Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. CA

Facts: A quonset was constructed by the AmericanLiberation Forces in 1944. It was purchased in 1946 byGregoria Francisco. It stands on a lot owned by the PPA andfaces the municipal wharf. By virtue of Proclamation No. 83issued by President Elpidio Quirino, said land was declaredfor the exclusive use of port facilities. The PPA issued to TanGin San, spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupythe lot where the building stands for a period of one (1) year,to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was usingthe quonset for the storage of copra.

On May 1989, the Mayor notified Tan Gin San to remove orrelocate its Quonset building citing Ordinance No. 147,noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; andstressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal squatters andunsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." Since thenotifications remained unheeded, the Mayor ordered thedemolition on 24 May 1989.Petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction andDamages before the RTC of Basilan. The RTC denied the writand upheld the power of the Mayor to order the demolitionwithout judicial authority pursuant to Ordinance 147. On 6September 1989, petitioner's quonset building wascompletely demolished. In its place sprang shanties and nipahuts.

The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that the mayor was notvested with power to order summarily without any judicialproceeding to demolish the Quonset building which was nota nuisance per se. However, upon reconsideration, the CAreversed itself and ruled that the deficiency was remediedwhen petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and injunctionand was heard on oral argument.

Issue: WON the Mayor could summarily, without judicialprocess, order the demolition of petitioner's quonsetbuilding.

Held: No

Ratio: Ordinance No. 147, enacted on 27 December 1977,and relied upon by respondents, is entitled "An OrdinanceEstablishing Comprehensive Zoning Regulations for theMunicipality of Isabela." It is not disputed that the quonsetbuilding, which is being used for the storage of copra, is

located outside the zone for warehouses. It is referred to inOrdinance as a non-conforming structure, which should berelocated. And in the event that an immediate relocation of the building can not be accomplished, Sec 16 of theOrdinance provides: A certificate of non-conformance for allnon-conforming uses shall be applied for by the owner oragent of the property involved within 12mo from theapproval of this Ordinance, otherwise the non-conforminguse may be condemned or removed at the owner's expense.Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificateof Non-conformance, the provision should not be interpretedas authorizing the summary removal of a non-conformingbuilding by the municipal government. For if it does, it must

be struck down for being in contravention of trequirements of due process, as originally held by the CA.Moreover, the enforcement and administration of tprovisions of the Ordinance resides with the ZoniAdministrator . It is said official who may call upon the CFiscal to institute the necessary legal proceedings to enforthe provisions of the Ordinance. And any person aggrievby the decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding tenforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board

Zoning Appeals. That a summary remedy can not be resorted to is furthevident from the penal provisions. Violation of a municipordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the LocGovernment Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with tviolation of ordinances".Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfaclause authorizing the abatement of nuisances witho

judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per or one which affects the immediate safety of persons anproperty and may be summarily abated under the undefinlaw of necessity. The storage of copra in the quonset buildinis a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort

the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not pse a nuisance warranting its summary abatement witho

judicial intervention. While the Sangguniang Bayan mprovide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local GovernmeCode, Sec. 149 (ee) ), it can not declare a particular thing a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisancan only be so adjudged by judicial determination.Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonsbuilding by virtue of a permit from the PPA when demolitiowas effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its properwas not of trifling value. It was entitled to an imparthearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether tquonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There wno compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows ththat the public officials of Isabela, Basilan, transcended thauthority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset buildin

They had deprived petitioner of its property without dprocess of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit fprohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cuthe defect, as opined by the CA, the demolition having beea fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolwithout a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.

Technology Developers, Inc v. CA (1991)

Facts: Petitioner received a letter from private respondeacting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of toperation of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, StMaria, Bulacan. The letter requested Plant Manager ArmanManese to bring with him to the office of the mayor oFebruary 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment aNatural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of oth

document.At the requested conference, petitioner undertook to compwith respondent's request for the production of the requiredocuments. Petitioner commenced to secure "Region DENR Anti-Pollution Permit," although among the permpreviously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plawas a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installatioissued by the then National Pollution Control Commissiand is now at a stage where the Environmental ManagemeBureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anpollution devise to be installed as part of petitioner's requefor the renewal of its permit.Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the office of t




mayor to secure the same but were not entertained. On April6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice uponpetitioner, respondent ordered the Municipality's stationcommander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant,thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.Petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition,mandamus with preliminary injunction against privaterespondent. The judge found that petitioner is entitled to theissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting of a

bond worth P50,000. During the MR, the ProvincialProsecutor presented his evidence prepared by MarivicGuina, “Due to the manufacturing process and nature of rawmaterials used, the fumes coming from the factory maycontain particulate matters which are hazardous to thehealth of the people. As such, the company should ceaseoperating until such a time that the proper air pollutiondevice is installed and operational." The lower court then setaside the order which granted a writ of preliminarymandatory injunction and dissolved the writ issued.

Issue: WON the writ of preliminary injunction should begranted

Held: No

Ratio: The matter of issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of thetrial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appealunless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction orin excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of itsdiscretion. By the same token the court that issued such apreliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as thecircumstances may warrant.

The following circumstances militate against themaintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought bypetitioner:1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true thatthe matter of determining whether there is a pollution of theenvironment that requires control if not prohibition of theoperation of a business is addressed to the National PollutionControl Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements,now the Environmental Management Bureau, it must be

recognized that the mayor of a town has as muchresponsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and byvirtue of his police power, he may deny the application for apermit to operate a business or otherwise close the sameunless appropriate measures are taken to control and/oravoid injury to the health of the residents of the communityfrom the emissions in the operation of the business.2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to thepollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensiveodor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affectthe health of the residents in the area," so that petitionerwas ordered to stop its operation until further orders and itwas required to bring the following: (1) Building permit; (2)Mayor's permit; and (3) Region III-DENR Anti-Pollutionpermit.3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the

complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor throughchannels. The NBI finding that some of the signatures in the4-page petition were written by one person, appears to betrue in some instances, (particularly as among members of the same family), but on the whole the many signaturesappear to be written by different persons. The certification of the barrio captain of said barrio that he has not received anycomplaint on the matter must be because the complaintwas sent directly to the Governor through the Acting Mayor.4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued onlyafter an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in herreport observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes

directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper apollution device has been installed.5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from tmunicipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a buildipermit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permto operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to M25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend

validate its permit much less to install any device to contthe pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of tresidents of the community.All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ preliminary injunction by the trial court and the appellacourt correctly upheld the action of the lower couPetitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must bstressed however, that concomitant with the need promote investment and contribute to the growth of teconomy is the equally essential imperative of protecting thealth, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterioeffect of the pollution of the environment.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA (1995)

Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the "Laguna La

Development Authority." This agency was supposed accelerate the development and balanced growth of tLaguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities atowns, in the act, within the context of the national aregional plans and policies for social and economdevelopment.PD 813 amended certain sections RA 4850 because of thconcern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, tsuburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bacombined with current and prospective uses of the lake fmunicipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, athe like.

To effectively perform the role of the Authority under 4850, the Chief Executive issued EO 927 further defined aenlarged the functions and powers of the Authority anamed and enumerated the towns, cities and provincencompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Alspertinent to the issues in this case are the followiprovisions of EO 927 which include in particular the shariof fees:Sec 2: xxx the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projecor activities in or affecting the said region includinavigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fienclosures, fish corrals and the like.SEC. 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereempowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water aits tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but nlimited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industriagricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste dispospurpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collecteand the sharing with other government agencies apolitical subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to t

approval of the President of the Philippines uprecommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpfee, which will be shared in the following manner: 20 perceof the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments,percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shbe administered by a Council and the remaining 75 perceshall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after timplementation within the three-year period of the LaguLake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan the sharing wbe modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to tProject Development Fund and the remaining 60 perceshall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the shaof LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall n




be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to theprovisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234.

Then came Republic Act No. 7160. The municipalities in theLaguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law tomean that the newly passed law gave municipalgovernments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishingprivileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160provides:"Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges (a)

Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grantfishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rentalfees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority toissue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpenoperators took advantage of the occasion to establishfishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority.Unregulated fishpens and fishcages occupied almost one-third the entire lake water surface area, increasing theoccupation drastically from 7,000 ha in 1990 to almost21,000 ha in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpensand fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policiesadopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the LagunaLake carrying capacity. In view of the foregoingcircumstances, the Authority served notice to the general

public that:“ 1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structuresin the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or towhich no application for registration and/or permit has beenfiled with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.2. All fishpens; fishcages and other aqua-culture structuresso declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition whichshall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for illegalFishpen and Illegal Fishing.3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culturestructures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice todemolition of their structures be criminally charged inaccordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 asamended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws.Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand

Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culturestructures declared as illegal in accordance with theforegoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their saidfishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures shouldnot be demolished/dismantled."One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to theconcerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them todismantle their respective structures within 10 days fromreceipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.

The fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied.Meanwhile, TRO/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction

were issued enjoining the LLDA from demolishing thefishpens and similar structures in question. Hence, thepresent petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. TheCA dismissed the LLDA’s consolidated petitions. It ruled that(A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) theLLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functionsinsofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of theLLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bayare concerned had been repealed by the Local GovernmentCode of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the powerto grant permits devolved to respective local governmentunits concerned.

Issue: Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or ttowns and municipalities comprising the region - shouexercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its enviroinsofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privilegesconcerned?

Held: LLDA

Ratio: Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 81

and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDshall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the uor all surface water for any projects or activities in affecting the said region, including navigation, constructioand operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals athe like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to thmunicipalities the exclusive authority to grant fisheprivileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan mgrant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, musseor other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definzone of the municipal waters.

The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the lawcreating the LLDA and granting the latter water righauthority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.

The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain aexpress provision which categorically expressly repeal t

charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there wno intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic ANo. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should made clear and expressed.It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDconstitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. It is basis basic in statutory construction that the enactment oflater legislation which is a general law cannot be construto have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in th

jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particulcase or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequestatute, general in its terms, provisions and applicatiounless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although tterms of the general law are broad enough to include tcases embraced in the special law." Where there isconflict between a general law and a special statute, tspecial statute should prevail since it evinces the legislati

intent more clearly that the general statute. The special lais to be taken as an exception to the general law in tabsence of special circumstances forcing a contraconclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favorand as much as possible, given to all enactments of thlegislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.Considering the reasons behind the establishment of tAuthority, which are enviromental protection, navigationsafety, and sustainable development, there is eveindication that the legislative intent is for the Authority proceed with its mission.We are on all fours with the manifestation of LLDA th"Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surfawater, the 8 major river tributaries and several other smal

rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km2 basin watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizprovinces, constitute one integrated delicate natuecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attainisustainable development. This is an exhaustible naturesource-a very limited one-which requires judiciomanagement and optimal utilization to ensure renewabiland preserve its ecological integrity and balance. Managinthe lake resources would mean the implementation ofnational policy geared towards the protection, conservatiobalanced growth and sustainable development of the regiwith due regard to the inter-generational use of its resourcby the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors




Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when theypassed this LLDA law-the special law designed to govern themanagement of our Laguna de Bay lake resources. Lagunade Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmentedconcepts of management policies where lakeshore localgovernment units exercise exclusive dominion over specificportions of the lake water. The implementation of a cohesiveand integrated lake water resource management policy,therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably

develop Laguna de Bay." The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearlygranted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the factthat Section 149 of the New Local Government Codeempowering local governments to issue fishing permits isembodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing AndOther Revenue Raising Power of LGUs.”On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grantpermits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culturestructures is for the purpose of effectively regulating andmonitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and forlake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, theleast limitable and the most demanding of all State powersincluding the power of taxation. Accordingly the charter of

the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of policepower should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens,fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna deBay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides forthe proper sharing of fees collected.In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is aquasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that,considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna LakeDevelopment Authority vs. Court of Appeals, there is noquestion that the Authority has express powers as aregulatory a quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution caseswith authority to issue a "cease a desist order" and onmatters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens,

fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna deBay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal tothe Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it mayonly be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot besustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legalquestions affecting the powers of the Authority as providedfor in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of theLLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, theAuthority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits forthe enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to theexclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authorityto exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

8.5 Power of Eminent Domain:

Moday et al v. Court of Appeals (1997)

Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89,"Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition forExpropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Modayfor the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and OtherGovernment Sports Facilities." The Resolution was approvedby Mayor Anuncio Bustillo and was transmitted to theSangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolutionand returned it with the comment that "expropriation is

unnecessary considering that there are still available lots Bunawan for the establishment of the government center."

The municipality filed a petition for eminent domain againPercival Moday before the RTC. The municipality then filedmotion to take or enter upon the possession of the land updeposit with the municipal treasurer of the required amou

The RTC granted the motion. It ruled that the SangguniaPanlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leavit effective. It added that the duty of the Sanggunia

Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances aresolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Secti208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and ththe exercise of eminent domain is not one of the acenumerated in Section 19 requiring the approval of tSangguniang Panlalawigan.Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorbefore the CA. The CA held that the public purpose for texpropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and thsince the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur dnot declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation petitioners' property could proceed. Meanwhile, tMunicipality had erected three buildings on the subjeproperty: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hathe Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and tBunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete

In the instant petition for review, petitioner seeks treversal of the decision and resolution of the CA anddeclaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality Bunawan is null and void.

Issue: WON a municipality may expropriate privaproperty by virtue of a municipal resolution which wdisapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Held: Yes

Ratio: Eminent domain, the power which the MunicipalityBunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamenState power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It government's right to appropriate, in the nature of compulsory sale to the State, private property for public uor purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislatu

the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated local governments, other public entities and public utilitieFor the taking of private property by the government to valid, the taking must be for public use and there must

just compensation. The Municipality's power to exercise the right of eminedomain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for BP 33the local Government Code in force at the time expropriatiproceedings were initiated. What petitioners question is tlack of authority of the municipality to exercise this rigsince the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved ResolutiNo. 43-89. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does nrender said resolution null and void. The law, Section 153 B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan tpower to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the so

ground that it is beyond the power of the SangguniaBayan or the Mayor to issue. Velazco v. Blas: The only ground upon which a provincboard may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order"beyond the powers conferred upon the council or presidemaking the same." Absolutely no other ground is recognizby the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincboard in its consideration of a municipal resolutioordinance, or order. The provincial disapproval of aresolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specificaupon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. Ifprovincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislati




function of the municipal council or president. Such has beenthe consistent course of executive authority. Thus, theSangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority todisapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for theMunicipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercisethe right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan thecapacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to theearlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it followsthat Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be

used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is allegedthat Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Bustillo when herefused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor inprevious elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbentMayor Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate byexpropriating their land even if there were other propertiesbelonging to the municipality and available for the purpose.Specifically, they allege that the municipality owns a vacantseven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land,evidenced by a sketch plan.

The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that theuse must be public, compensation must be made and dueprocess of law must be observed. The Supreme Court, takingcognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation,

necessity of the taking and the public use character or thepurpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a publiccharacter. Government may not capriciously choose whatprivate property should be taken.

Prov. Of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals (1993)

Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Surpassed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing theProvincial Governor to purchase or expropriate propertycontiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establisha pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agriculturalcrops and a housing project for provincial governmentemployees. Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province throughGovernor Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two cases for expropriationagainst Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on theground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property.In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss andauthorized the Province to take possession of the propertyupon the deposit of P5,714.00. The trial court issued a writ of possession. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief fromthe order and a motion to admit an amended motion todismiss. Both motions were denied.In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San

Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints forexpropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order datedDecember 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii)allowing the Province to take possession of the propertysubject of the expropriation and the order dated February26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motionto dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be

issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

The Province claimed that it has the authority to initiate theexpropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of LocalGovernment Code and that the expropriations are for apublic purpose. The Solicitor General stated that underSection 9 of the Local Government Code, there was no needfor the approval by the Office of the President of the exerciseby the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminentdomain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the viewthat the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure theapproval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan toexpropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housingproject.

The CA set aside the order of the court and ordered the trcourt to suspend the expropriation proceedings until tprovince shall have submitted the requisite approval of tDAR.

Issue: WON the expropriation was proper

Ratio: The CA did not rule on the validity of the questionresolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. Howeve

when the CA ordered the suspension of the proceedings unthe Province shall have obtained the authority of the DAR change the classification of the lands sought to expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, assumed that the resolution is valid and that texpropriation is for a public purpose or public use.Public Purpose. Modernly, there has been a shift from tliteral to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may exercised. The old concept was that the condemned propermust actually be used by the general public (e.g. roadbridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof cousatisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Undthe new concept, "public use" means public advantagconvenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to tgeneral welfare and the prosperity of the whole communit

like a resort complex for tourists or housing project. The expropriation of the property authorized by tquestioned resolution is for a public purpose. Testablishment of a pilot development center would inure the direct benefit and advantage of the people of tProvince of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the cenwould make available to the community invaluabinformation and technology on agriculture, fishery and tcottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmefishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housiproject also satisfies the public purpose requirement of tConstitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, "Housing isbasic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of staconcern since it directly and significantly affects pubhealth, safety, the environment and in sum the genewelfare."Eminent Domain vs CARL. It is the submission of t

Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of tCARL, particularly Section 65, which requires the approvalthe DAR before a parcel of land can be reclassified from aagricultural to a non-agricultural land. The CA, following trecommendation of the Solicitor General, held that tProvince of Camarines Sur must comply with the provisionSection 65 of the CARK and must first secure the approvalthe Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, while the Court sathat there was "no need under the facts of this petition rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior another purpose or engage in a balancing of competipublic interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting thpetitioners had failed to overcome the showing that t

taking of 8,970 sq m formed part of the resort complex.fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this Couviewed the power of expropriation as superior to the powto distribute lands under the land reform program.

The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact thLGUs exercise such power only by delegation. It is true thlocal government units have no inherent power of eminedomain and can exercise it only when expressly authorizby the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the powto expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the locgovernments. While such delegated power may be a limitauthority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, t




limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must beclearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power orin other legislations.Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least thatlocal government, units must first secure the approval of theDepartment of Land Reform for the conversion of lands fromagricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institutethe necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there isno provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

which expressly subjects the expropriation of agriculturallands by local government units to the control of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of lawthat the CA could cite to justify the intervention of the DAR inexpropriation matters is Section 65 of the CARL.

The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signalsthat it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarianreform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) yearsfrom its award."

The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987,cannot be the source of the authority of the DAR todetermine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land forthe purpose to which it would be devoted by theexpropriating authority. While those rules vest on theDepartment of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to

approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands forresidential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority islimited to the applications for reclassification submitted bythe land owners or tenant beneficiaries.Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to politicalsubdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted byimplication. To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean thatthe LGUs can no longer expropriate agricultural landsneeded for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the useof the lands with the DAR, because all of these projectswould naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, itwould then be the DAR to scrutinize whether theexpropriation is for a public purpose or public use.Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local governmentunit that shall determine whether the use of the propertysought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an

expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to suchlegislative determination and will intervene only when aparticular undertaking has no real or substantial relation tothe public use.

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, nomatter how broad their terms are, do not embrace thesovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned assubject thereto. The Republic of the Philippines, assovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisionsof law couched in general term.

The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on thebasis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared asunconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the justcompensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to

the condemned property either by the owners or theassessor, whichever was lower. As held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, the rules for determining justcompensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidenceon what they consider shall be the just compensation fortheir property.

Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor (2000)

Facts: Petitioner filed before the MTC of Talisay, Cebu aComplaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. Inan Order, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e) minent domain is anexercise of the power to take private property for public use

after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminedomain, therefore, the principal cause of action is texercise of such power or right. The fact that the action alinvolves real property is merely incidental. An action feminent domain is therefore within the exclusive origin

jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with tCourt."On appeal, the RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that action for eminent domain affected title to real proper

hence, the value of the property to be expropriated woudetermine whether the case should be filed before the MTor the RTC. The RTC concluded that the action should habeen filed before the MTC since the value of the subjeproperty was less than P20,000.Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raisia pure question of law. Respondents contend that tComplaint for Eminent Domain affects the title to possession of real property. Thus, they argue that the cashould have been brought before the MTC, pursuant to 129 as amended by Section 3 (3) of RA 7691. This laprovides that MTCs shall have exclusive original jurisdictiover all civil actions that involve title to or possession of reproperty, the assessed value of which does not excetwenty thousand pesos or, in civil actions in Metro Manififty thousand pesos exclusive of interest, damages

whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and cos

Issue: WON an expropriation suit is one incapable pecuniary estimation and is therefore within the jurisdictiof the RTC

Held: Yes

Ratio: "A review of the jurisprudence of this Couindicates that in determining whether an action is one tsubject matter of which is not capable of pecuniaestimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of fiascertaining the nature of the principal action or remesought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of monethe claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, awhether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in tcourts of first instance would depend on the amount of t

claim. However, where the basic issue is something oththan the right to recover a sum of money, or where tmoney claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, tprincipal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendaperform his part of the contract (specific performance) ain actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actioas cases where the subject of the litigation may not estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusiveby courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainthat the second class cases, besides the determination damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which tlaw has deemed to be more within the competence of couof first instance, which were the lowest courts of record the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary weenacted allocating jurisdiction.”

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involthe recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with texercise by the government of its authority and right to taprivate property for public use. In National PowCorporation v. Jocson, the Court ruled that expropriatiproceedings have two phases:"‘The first is concerned with the determination of tauthority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminedomain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of tfacts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not dismissal of the action, ‘of condemnation declaring that tplaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to condemned, for the public use or purpose described in tcomplaint, upon the payment of just compensation to




determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.’ Anorder of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one,of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leavesnothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too,would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafteras the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the

Trial Court, ‘no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed orheard.’

"The second phase of the eminent domain action isconcerned with the determination by the court of ‘the justcompensation for the property sought to be taken.’ This isdone by the Court with the assistance of not more than three(3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensationon the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, thecommissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to bedone by the Court regarding the issue. ’"It should be stressed that the primary consideration in anexpropriation suit is whether the government or any of itsinstrumentalities has complied with the requisites for thetaking of private property. Hence, the courts determine theauthority of the government entity, the necessity of theexpropriation, and the observance of due process. In themain, the subject of an expropriation suit is the

government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that isincapable of pecuniary estimation. True, the value of the property to be expropriated isestimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound todetermine the just compensation for it. This, however, ismerely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, thatamount is determined only after the court is satisfied withthe propriety of the expropriation.Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v.Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are within the

jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," the forerunners of theregional trial courts. The said case was decided during theeffectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 inrespect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance hadoriginal jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subjectof the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended

to change these jurisprudential precedents.We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument that thepresent action involves the title to or possession of a parcelof land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y.Feria, an eminent authority in remedial law, thatcondemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of real actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcelof land.

Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely todistinguish between real and personal actions. His discussionon this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the

jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, heemphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases isstill within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.

To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether thegovernment may expropriate private property under the

given set of circumstances. The government does notdispute respondents’ title to or possession of the same.Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right,for the government does not even claim that it has a title tothe property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign powerto "appropriate and control individual property for the publicbenefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare maydemand."

Mun. of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp (1998)

Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Parañaque filed aComplaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation,over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed

"for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of tunderprivileged by providing homes for the homelethrough a socialized housing project." Petitioner, pursuant its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 199previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale the property with private respondent, which the latter dnot accept.

The RTC authorized petition to take possession of the subjeproperty upon its deposit with the clerk of court of

amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) tcomplaint failed to state a cause of action because it wfiled pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, wbarred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On privarespondent's motion, its Answer was treated as a motion dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

Issue: WON the resolution is different from the ordinance

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioner contends that a resolution approved the municipal council for the purpose of initiating expropriation case "substantially complies with t

requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" a"resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowiauthority [on] the local government unit through its chexecutive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in courtthe exercise of the power of eminent domain." Petitionseeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule of the IRR of the Local Government Code, which provides: the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public uspurpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU mexpropriate said property through a resolution of tSanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiaexpropriation proceedings."

The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodgin the legislative branch of government, which may delegathe exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and pubutilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power expropriate private property only when authorized

Congress and subject to the latter's control and restrainimposed "through the law conferring the power or in othlegislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, whidelegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also ladown the parameters for its exercise. Thus, the followiessential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercithe power of eminent domain:1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative counauthorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, exercise the power of eminent domain or pursexpropriation proceedings over a particular private property2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public uspurpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and tlandless.3. There is payment of just compensation, as required undSection 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertine

laws.4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to towner of the property sought to be expropriated, but saoffer was not accepted.In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was compliance with the first requisite that the mayor authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites CamarinSur vs. CA to show that a resolution may suffice to suppothe exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This cashowever, is not in point because the applicable law at thtime was BP 337, 30 the previous Local Government Codwhich had provided that a mere resolution would enable




LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that theterms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. Amunicipal ordinance is different from a resolution. Anordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specificmatter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanentcharacter, but a resolution is temporary in nature.

Additionally, the two are enacted differently - a third readingis necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unlessdecided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunianmembers.If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminentdomain through a mere resolution, it would have simplyadopted the language of the previous Local GovernmentCode. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from theprevious Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160categorically requires that the local chief executive actpursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent isdetermined principally from the language of a statute. Wherethe language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the lawis applied according to its express terms, and interpretationwould be resorted to only where a literal interpretation wouldbe either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice."

34 In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from thisrule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at allimpossible, absurd, or unjust.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involvesa derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.35 Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislativelanguage - from "resolution" under the BP 337 to "ordinance"under RA 7160 - demands a strict construction. "No speciesof property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, andis guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously,than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When thelegislature interferes with that right and, for greater publicpurposes, appropriates the land of an individual without hisconsent, the plain meaning of the law should not beenlarged by doubtful interpretation."Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing

Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGUto exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced,because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevailsover said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It isaxiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling andcannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued forits implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems toindicate is a mere oversight in the wording of theimplementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, alsorequires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, thechief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to anordinance.

Issue: WON the complaint states a cause of action

Held: No

Ratio: In the first place, petitioner merely alleged theexistence of such an ordinance, but it did not present anycertified true copy thereof. In the second place, petitionerdid not raise this point before this Court. In fact, it wasmentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. Inany event, this allegation does not cure the inherent defectof petitioner's Complaint for expropriation filed onSeptember 23, 1993.

The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from theface of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on amere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizingthe same is equivalent to lack of cause of action.Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible

error in affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissethe expropriation suit.

Issue: WON the action is bared by res juridicata

Held: No

Ratio: All the requisites for the application of res judicaare present in this case. There is a previous final judgme

on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identicinterests, subject matter and cause of action, which hbeen rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of r

judicata, which finds application in generally all cases aproceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent expropriate private property. The very nature of eminedomain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that tright to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered eveby a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminedomain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach eveform of property which the State might need for public use"All separate interests of individuals in property are held the government under this tacit agreement or implireservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, teminent domain, the highest and most exact idea

property, remains in the government, or in the aggregabody of the people in their sovereign capacity; and thhave the right to resume the possession of the propewhenever the public interest requires it." Thus, the State its authorized agent cannot be forever barred froexercising said right by reason alone of previous nocompliance with any legal requirement.While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate tright of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does appto specific issues decided in a previous case. For examplefinal judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on tground that there was no prior offer precludes another suraising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power eminent domain over the same property. By the same tokeour ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegat

power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will nbar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the salegal requirement and, for that matter, all others aproperly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity reasoning, the same is also true of the principle of "law the case." In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that tpower of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domainnot diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgmeover the property to be expropriated has become the law the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agemay still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate thsame property, once all legal requirements are compliwith. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish tpower of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat soc

justice.

City of Cebu v. CA (1996)Facts: Merlita Cardeno is the owner of a parcel of land Sitio Sto. Nino, Alaska-Mambaling. The City of Cebu, filedcomplaint for eminent domain against Cardeno with the Rseeking to expropriate the said parcel of land. The complawas initiated pursuant to Resolution No. 404 and OrdinanNo. 1418, dated February 17, 1992, of the SangguniaPanlungsod of Cebu City authorizing the City Mayor expropriate the said parcel of land for the purpose providing a socialized housing project for the landless anlow-income city residents. Cardeno filed a motion to dismon the ground of lack of cause of action as there has beenegotiations for the purchase of the property withoresorting to expropriation, but said negotiations failed. Als




there was no compliance with the conditions to the exerciseof the power of eminent domain (valid and definite offermade to the owner and non acceptance). The RTC dismissedthe complaint. The CA affirmed the of the RTC. According tothe CA, an allegation of repeated negotiations made with theprivate respondent for the purchase of her property by thepetitioner, "cannot by any stretch of imagination, be equatedor likened to the clear and specific requirement that thepetitioner should have previously made a valid and definite

offer to purchase." It further added that the term"negotiation" which necessarily implies uncertainty, itconsisting of acts the purpose of which is to arrive at aconclusion, may not be perceived to mean the valid anddefinite offer contemplated by law.

Issue: WON expropriation may be granted

Ratio: An offshoot of the foregoing is the instant petition forreview on certiorari which has essentially become a battle of semantics being waged before this Court. While petitionerreiterates that paragraph VII of the complaint sufficientlystates compliance with the requirement of "a valid anddefinite offer", private respondent insists that the term"negotiations" is too broad to be equated with the saidrequirement. Elaborating, private respondent posited that by

definition, "negotiations run the whole range of actspreparatory to concluding an agreement, from thepreliminary correspondence; the fixing of the terms of theagreement; the price; the mode of payment; obligations of (sic) the parties may conceive as necessary to theiragreement." Thus, "negotiations" by itself may pertain toany of the foregoing and does not automatically mean themaking of "a valid and definite offer."At the outset, it must be said that without necessarilydelving into the parties' semantical arguments, this Courtfinds that the complaint does in fact state a cause of action.What may perhaps be conceded is only the relativeambiguity of the allegations in paragraph VII of thecomplaint. However, as We have previously held, acomplaint should not be dismissed upon a mere ambiguity,indefiniteness or uncertainty of the cause of action statedthereinfor these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss but

rather for a bill of particulars. In other words, a complaintshould not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appearsclearly from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is notentitled to any relief under any state of facts which could beproved within the facts alleged therein.

The error of both the RTC and respondent Court of Appeals inholding that the complaint failed to state a cause of actionstems from their inflexible application of the rule that: whenthe motion to dismiss is based on the ground that thecomplaint states no cause of action, no evidence may beallowed and the issue should only be determined in the lightof the allegations of the complaint. However, this rule is notwithout exceptions. In the case of Tan v. Director of Forestry,this Court departed from the aforementioned rule and heldthat, ". . . although the evidence of the parties were on thequestion of granting or denying the petitioner-appellant's

application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial courtcorrectly applied said evidence in the resolution of themotion to dismiss." Likewise, in Marcopper MiningCorporation v. Garcia, we sanctioned the act of the trial courtin considering, in addition to the complaint, other pleadingssubmitted by the parties in deciding whether or not thecomplaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

This Court deemed such course of action but logical wherethe trial court had the opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint, the answer with counterclaim, the petitioner'sanswer to the counterclaim and its answer to the request foradmission. The same liberality should be applied in theinstant case.

Furthermore, even on the face of the complaint alone, theis extant a cause of action. All documents attached tocomplaint, the due execution and genuineness of which anot detained under oath by the defendant, must considered as part of the complaint without need introducing evidence thereon. Additionally, the general ruis that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth the facts alleged in the complaint. Thus, Ordinance No. 14is not only incorporated into the complaint for emine

domain filed by petitioner, but is also deemed admitted private respondent. A perusal of the copy of said ordinanwhich has been annexed to the complaint shows that thfact of petitioner's having made a previous valid and definoffer to private respondent is categorically stated therei

Thus, the second whereas clause of the said ordinanprovides as follows: WHEREAS, the city government hmade a valid and definite offer to purchase subject lot(s) fthe public use aforementioned but the registered owner MMerlita Cardeno has rejected such offer.

The foregoing should now put to rest the long draargument over the alleged failure of the complaint to statecause of action. There is no longer any room for doubt thas alleged in the complaint, and as admitted by privarespondent, the petitioner had in fact complied with tcondition precedent of "a valid and definite offer" set forth

Sec. 19 of R.A. 7160. The rules of procedure are not to bapplied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of proceduare used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technicand rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim woube defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary importance are made to override the ends of justice; thtechnical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of thsubstantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot countenanced.

The doctrine finds compelling application in the case bench. For as correctly averred by petitioner, nothing elwas accomplished by the dismissal of the complaint feminent domain but a considerable delay in the proceeding

The dismissal of the complaint did not bar petitioner frofiling another eminent domain case and from correcting alleged error by the mere expedient of changing paragraVII thereof. Indeed, precious time has been wasted while t

salutary objectives of Ordinance No. 1418 of the City of Cehave been put on hold by a quarrel over technical matters.

Francia v. Mun. of Meycauyan (2008)

Facts: On February 6, 2003, the respondent filed complaint for expropriation against petitioners. Respondeneeded petitioners' 16,256 sq. m. idle property at t

junction of the North Expressway, Malhacan-Iba-Camamain road artery and the MacArthur Highway. It planned use it to establish a common public terminal for all types public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy truckIn their answer, petitioners denied that the property sougto be expropriated was raw land. It was in fact developeand there were plans for further development. For threason, respondent's offer price of P2,333,500 (or P111.9per square meter) was too low. After trial, the RTC ruled th

the expropriation was for a public purpose as the terminwould improve the flow of traffic during rush houMoreover, the property as the best site for the proposterminal because of its accessibility.Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the C

They claimed that the trial court issued the orders withoconducting a hearing to determine the existence of a pubpurpose. The partially granted the petition. Finding thpetitioners were deprived of an opportunity to controverespondent's allegations, the appellate court nullified torder of expropriation except with regard to the writ possession. According to the CA, a hearing was nnecessary because once the expropriator deposited t




required amount (with the Court), the issuance of a writ of possession became ministerial.

Issue: WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC's ordersthat, in expropriation cases, prior determination of theexistence of a public purpose was not necessary for theissuance of a writ of possession.

Held: No

Ratio: Section 19 of Republic Act 7160[9] provides:Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,through its chief executive and acting pursuant to anordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for publicuse, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws;Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and that such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon thefiling of the expropriation proceedings and upon making adeposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the

current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated;Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for theexpropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of thetaking of the property.Before a local government unit may enter into thepossession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must(1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form andsubstance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the saidcourt at least 15% of the property's fair market value basedon its current tax declaration. The law does not make thedetermination of a public purpose a condition precedent tothe issuance of a writ of possession.

Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes (1983)

Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaintswith the CFI of Cebu City for the expropriation of 282 ha of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, CebuCity for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potentialtourism value. The PTA will construct a sports complex, clubhouse, golf course, playground and picnic area on said land.An electric power grid will also be established by NPC as wellas deep well and drainage system. Complimentary supportfacilities (malls, coffee shops, etc) will also be created.

The defendants alleged that the taking is allegedly notimpressed with public use under the Constitution. Also,assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannotbe paramount to the determination of the land as a landreform area; that limiting the amount of compensation bylegislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that sincethe land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance, that

has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the PNB, an amountequivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant toPD1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizingPTA to take immediate possession of the premises anddirecting the issuance of writs of possession.

Issue: WON the public use requirement has been compliedwith

Held: Yes

Ratio: There are three provisions of the Constitutionwhich directly provide for the exercise of the power of

eminent domain. Sec 2, Article IV states that privaproperty shall not be taken for public use without jucompensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in tinterest of national welfare or defense and upon payment

just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilitiand other private enterprises to be operated by tgovernment. Section 13, Article XIV states that the BatasaPambansa may authorize upon payment of jucompensation the expropriation of private lands to

subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deservicitizens. While not directly mentioning the expropriation private properties upon payment of just compensation, tprovisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allothe exercise of police power together with the power eminent domain in the implementation of constitutionobjectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing private property is concerned. We cite all the aboprovisions on the power to expropriate because of tpetitioners' insistence on a restrictive view of the eminedomain provision. The thrust of all constitutional provisioon expropriation is in the opposite direction.As early as 1919, this Court in Visayan Refining Co. v. Samcategorized the restrictive view as wholly erroneous abased on a misconception of fundamentals. The petitionelook for the word "tourism" in the Constitutio

Understandably the search would be in vain. To freespecific programs like tourism into express constitutionprovisions would make the Constitution more prolix thanbulky code and require of the framers a prescience beyoDelphic proportions. In said case, this Court emphasizthat the power of eminent domain is inseparable frosovereignty being essential to the existence of the State ainherent in government even in its most primitive forms. Tonly purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is provide some form of restraint on the sovereign power. Itnot a grant of authority .

The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction adeclare that "public use" means literally use by the puband that "public use" is not synonymous with "pubinterest", "public benefit", or "public welfare" and much le"public convenience." The petitioners face two maobstacles. First, their contention which is rather sweeping

its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation unduly restrictive and outmoded. Second, no less than tlawmaker has made a policy determination that the power eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion adevelopment of Philippine tourism.

The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate fonation which circumscribes the scope of governmeactivities and public concerns and which possesses big acorrectly located public lands that obviate the need to taprivate property for public purposes. Neither circumstanapplies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faState. And the necessities which impel the exertion sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarpublic land or limited government resources.

There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditionpurposes as the construction of roads, bridges, por

waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunicatiosystems, hydroelectric power plants, markets aslaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government offibuildings, and flood control systems is valid. However, tconcept of public use is not limited to traditional purposeHere as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is striclimited to clear cases of "use by the public" has bediscarded.In the Philippines, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando haptly summarized the statutory and judicial trend as follow"The taking to be valid must be for public use. There wastime when it was felt that a literal meaning should attached to such a requirement. Whatever project undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case




streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. Itis not any more. As long as the purpose of the taking ispublic, then the power of eminent domain comes into play.As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, toremove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is theexpropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots forresale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer,through the exercise of this power, of utilities and otherprivate enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state

then that at present whatever may be beneficially employedfor the general welfare satisfies the requirement of publicuse."

The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism isnot "public use" because private concessioners would beallowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants,hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressedwith even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets,roadside restaurants, and other private businesses usingpublic streets and highways do not diminish in the least bitthe public character of expropriations for roads and streets.

The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built onexpropriated land does not make the taking for a privatepurpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to privateairlines and shipping companies are still for public use. Theexpropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban

development is for a public purpose even if the developedarea is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms,entertainment and service companies, and other privateconcerns.

The petitioners have also failed to overcome the deferencethat is appropriately accorded to formulations of nationalpolicy expressed in legislation. The rule in Berman v. Parker(supra) of deference to legislative policy even if such policymight mean taking from one private person and conferringon another private person applies as well as in thePhilippines. An examination of the language in the 1919cases of City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila andVisayan Refining Co. v. Camus, earlier cited, shows that fromthe very start of constitutional government in our country

judicial deference to legislative policy has been clear andmanifest in eminent domain proceedings. The expressions of national policy are found in the revised charter of the

Philippine Tourism Authority, PD 564.(Disregard of Land Reform Nature) According to them,assuming that PTA has the right to expropriate, theproperties subject of expropriation may not be taken for thepurposes intended since they are within the coverage of "operation land transfer" under the land reform program;that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level inthe order of priorities than other State policies like thoserelating to the health and physical well-being of the people;and that property already taken for public use may not betaken for another public use.

The petitioners, however, have failed to show that the areabeing developed is indeed a land reform area and that theaffected persons have emancipation patents and certificatesof land transfer.

The records show that the area being developed into a

tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares, almostall of which is not affected by the land reform program. Theportion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly andunproductive land where even subsistence farming of cropsother than rice and corn can hardly survive. And of the 282disputed hectares, only 8,970 square meters - less than onehectare - is affected by Operation Land Transfer. Of the 40defendants, only two have emancipation patents for the lessthan one hectare of land affected.(Non Impairment Clause) The non-impairment clause hasnever been a barrier to the exercise of police power andlikewise eminent domain. As stated in Manigault v. Springs"parties by entering into contracts may not estop thelegislature from enacting laws intended for the public good."

The applicable doctrine is expressed in Arce v. Genato whiinvolved the expropriation of land for a public plaza. Tissue of prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. Thclaim that since the necessity for the taking has not beepreviously established, the issuance of the ordeauthorizing the PTA to take immediate possession of tpremises, as well as the corresponding writs of possessiowas premature.Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as amended

Presidential Decree No. 1533, the government, its agency instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedinis authorized to take immediate possession, control adisposition of the property and the improvements, wpower of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of tissues before the court, upon deposit with the PhilippiNational Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the valof the property expropriated. The issue of immediapossession has been settled in Arce v. Genato. In answer the issue: ". . . condemnation or expropriation proceedingsin the nature of one that is quasi-in-rem, wherein the fathat the owner of the property is made a party is nessentially indispensable insofar at least as it concerns timmediate taking of possession of the property and tpreliminary determination of its value, including the amouto be deposited."

Makasiar: It appearing that the petitioners are not tenanof the parcels of land in question and therefore do not fwithin the purview of the Land Reform Code, the petitishould be dismissed on that score alone.

There is no need to decide whether the power of the PTA expropriate the land in question predicated on the polipower of the State shall take precedence over the soc

justice guarantee in favor of tenants and the landless. Twelfare of the landless and small land owners should prevover the right of the PTA to expropriate the lands just develop tourism industry, which benefit the wealthy onSuch a position would increase the disenchanted citizens adrive them to dissidence. The government is institutprimarily for the welfare of the governed and there are mopoor people in this country than the rich. The tourisindustry is not essential to the existence of the governmenbut the citizens are, and their right to live in dignity shou

take precedence over the development of the tourisindustry.

Filstream International Inc. v. CA (1998)

Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of the propertisubject of this dispute consisting of adjacent parcels of lasituated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. Petitionfiled an ejectment suit before the MTC against the occupanof the parcels of land (private respondents) on the grounof termination of the lease contract and non-payment rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC ordering privarespondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals petitioner. The RTC and CA affirmed.However, it appeared that during the pendency of tejectment proceedings private respondents, a complaint fAnnulment of Deed of Exchange against petitioner whi

was filed before the RTC. The City of Manila then approvOrdinance No. 7813, authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate tacquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or othlegal means certain parcels of land which formed part of tproperties of petitioner then occupied by privarespondents. The City approved Ordinance No. 78declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land situatalong Antonio Rivera and Fernando Ma. Guerero streets

Tondo, Manila which were owned by Mr. Enrique QuijaGutierez, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. The saproperties were to be sold and distributed to qualifitenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use DevelopmeProgram of the City of Manila.




The City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain. Thetrial court issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the citywhich ordered the transfer of possession over the disputedpremises to the City of Manila. Petitioner filed a motion todismiss but the court denied th emotion.Concerning the first case, the trial court issued an ordercommanding the demolition of the structure erected on thedisputed premises. To avert the demolition, privaterespondents filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 14, a

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for theissuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminaryinjunction. The TRO was granted which was later lifted. Thecourt the dismissed the case on the ground of forumshopping. On appeal, the CA found merit in privaterespondents’ allegations in support of their application of theissuance of the writ and granted the same.

The issue raised in G.R. No. 125218 is purely procedural andtechnical matter. Petitioner takes exception to theresolutions of the CA which ordered the dismissal of itsPetition for Certiorari for non-compliance with Sec. 2(a) of Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appealsby failing to attach to its petition other pertinent documentsand papers and for attaching copies of pleadings which areblurred and unreadable. Petitioner argues that respondentappellate court seriously erred in giving more premium to

form rather than the substance.We agree with the petitioner. A strict adherence to thetechnical and procedural rules in this case would defeatrather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in theviolation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake inthe appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights over the disputed premises which havebeen expropriated and have in fact been orderedcondemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, thedismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedingsbased on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to adeprivation of property without due process of law as itwould automatically validate the expropriation proceedingsbased on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to adeprivation of property without due process of law as itwould automatically validate the expropriation proceedingswhich the petitioner is still disputing. It must be emphasized

that where substantial rights are affected, as in this case,the stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxedif only to meet the ends of substantial justice.With regard to the other petition, G.R. No. 128077, petitionerFilstream objects to the issuance by respondent CA of therestraining order and the preliminary injunction enjoining theexecution of the writ of demolition issued in the ejectmentsuit as an incident to private respondents’ pending petitionassailing the dismissal by the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, of the consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by privaterespondents and the City of Manila on the ground of forumshopping.

The propriety of the issuance of the restraining order and thewrit of preliminary injunction is but a mere incient to theactual controversy which is rooted in the assertion of theconflicting rights of the parties in this case over the disputed

premises. In order to determine whether privaterespondents are entitled to the injunctive reliefs granted byrespondent CA, we deemed it proper to extract the source of discord.Petitioner anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership overthe properties and the existence of a final and executory

judgment against private respondents ordering the latter’sejectment from the premises. Private respondents’ claim onthe other hand hinges on an alleged supervening eventwhich has rendered the enforcement of petitioner’s rightsmoot, that is, the expropriation proceedings undertaken bythe City of Manila over the disputed premises for the benefitof herein private respondents. For its part, the City is merely

exercising its power of eminent domain within its jurisdictiby expropriating petitioner’s properties for public use.

There is no dispute as to the existence of a final aexecutory judgment in favor of petitioner ordering tejectment of private respondents from the properties subjeof this dispute. The judgment in the ejectment suit becamfinal after private respondents failed to interpose any appefrom the adverse decision of CA. Petitioner has every rigto assert the execution of this decision as it had alread

became final and executory.However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manhas an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminedomain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriaprivate property for public use is expressly granted to under Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code. Mospecifically, the City of Manila has the power to expropriaprivate property in the pursuit of its urban land reform ahousing program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Chartof the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409).In fact, the City of Manila’s right to exercise theprerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final aexecutory judgment over the property to be expropriathas been upheld by this Court in the case of PhilippiColumbian Association vs. Panis.Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriati

is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landestate. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought be expropriated in this case is less than the half a hectaonly.

Through the years, the public use requirement in eminedomain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced changing conditions. Public use now includes the broadnotion of indirect public benefit or advantage, includingparticular, urban land reform and housing.”We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform hbecome a paramount task in view of the acute shortage decent housing in urban areas. Nevertheless, despite texistence of a serious dilemma, local government units anot given an unbridled authority when exercising their powof eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these problem

The basic rules still have to be followed, which are follows: “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,

property without due process of law, nor shall any person denied the equal protection of the laws; private propeshall not be taken for public use without just compensation

Thus the exercise by local government units of the power eminent domain is not without limitations.Where on-site development is found more practicable anadvantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentionin this section shall not apply. The local government unshall give budgetary priority to on-site development government lands.Very clear from the provisions are the limitations wrespect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands ain resorting to expropriation proceedings as means acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same veexpropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only wh

the other modes of acquisition have been exhausteCompliance with these conditions must be deemmandatory because these are the only safeguards securing the right of owners of private property to dprocess when their property is expropriated for public use.Proceeding from the parameters laid out in the abodisquisitions, we now pose the crucial question: Did the cof Manila comply with the abovementioned conditions whit expropriated petitioner’s properties? We have carefuscrutinized the records of this case and found nothing thwould indicate the respondent City of Manila complied wiSec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A. 7279. Petitioners’ properties weexpropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition




other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have provedfutile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitionerFilstream’s right to due process which must accordingly berectified.Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has aparamount interest in exercising its power of eminentdomain for the general good considering that the right of theState to expropriate private property as long as it is forpublic use always takes precedence over the interest of

private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mindthat the exercise of this superior right cannot override theguarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilanceover compliance with the due process requirements is inorder.

Hagonoy Market Vendors Assn. v. Mun. of Hagonoy(2002)

Facts: On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28,which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors inHagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect uponapproval. The subject ordinance was posted from November

4-25, 1996.In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioner’smembers were personally given copies of the approvedOrdinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in

January, 1998. On December 8, 1997, the petitioner’sPresident filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justiceassailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitionerclaimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance.Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended that theordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that theordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law.Hence, it was pointed out that petitioner’s appeal, madeover a year later, was already time-barred.

The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the groundthat it was filed out of time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days fromthe effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996, asprescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local GovernmentCode

Issue: WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal

Held: Yes

Ratio: We find that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissingpetitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was formallydeficient. It is clear from the records that the petitionerexerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealedResolutions certified by the Department of Justice, but failedto do so on account of typhoon “Loleng.” Under thecircumstances, respondent appellate court should havetempered its strict application of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous event considering that litigation is not a gameof technicalities.

Issue: WON the petitioner should be dismissed

Held: Yes

Ratio: The petition should be dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice is already time-barred. The applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 LocalGovernment Code. The law requires that an appeal of a taxordinance or revenue measure should be made to theSecretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivityof the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In thecase at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in

October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in Decemb1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinanin 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissit for being time-barred. At this point, it is apropos to stathat the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of thelegal remedies before competent courts is not a “metechnicality” that can be easily brushed aside. The periostated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code amandatory.[10] Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measu

adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collepublic market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection revenues by the government is of paramount importanc

The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that tvalidity of revenue measures is not left uncertain forconsiderable length of time. Hence, the law provided a timlimit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenmeasures and tax ordinances.In a last ditch effort to justify its failure to file a timely appewith the Secretary of Justice, the petitioner contends that period to appeal should be counted not from the time tordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its membewere personally given copies of the approved ordinance November 1997. It insists that it was unaware of t

approval and effectivity of the subject ordinance in 1996 two (2) grounds: first, no public hearing was conducted prto the passage of the ordinance and, second, the approveordinance was not posted.We do not agree. Petitioner’s bold assertion that there wno public hearing conducted prior to the passage Kautusan Blg. 28 is belied by its own evidence. petitioner’s two (2) communications with the Secretary

Justice,[12] it enumerated the various objections raised its members before the passage of the ordinance in sevemeetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose. Theshow beyond doubt that petitioner was aware of tproposed increase and in fact participated in the pubhearings therefor. The respondent municipality likewsubmitted the Minutes and Report of the public hearinconducted by the Sangguniang Bayan’s Committee Appropriations and Market on February 6, July 15 and Augu

19, all in 1996, for the proposed increase in the stall rentalPetitioner cannot gripe that there was practically no pubhearing conducted as its objections to the proposed measuwere not considered by the Sangguniang Bayan. To be surpublic hearings are conducted by legislative bodies to allointerested parties to ventilate their views on a proposed laor ordinance. These views, however, are not binding on tlegislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt thsame. Sanggunian members are elected by the people make laws that will promote the general interest of theconstituents. They are mandated to use their discretion abest judgment in serving the people. Parties who participain public hearings to give their opinions on a proposordinance should not expect that their views would patronized by their lawmakers.On the issue of publication or posting, (Section 188 of th

Local Government Code), the records is bereft of aevidence to prove petitioner’s negative allegation that tsubject ordinance was not posted as required by law. contrast, the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of tMunicipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, presented evidence whiclearly shows that the procedure for the enactment of tassailed ordinance was complied with. Municipal OrdinanNo. 28 was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonon October 1, 1996. Then Acting Municipal Mayor MaGarcia Santos approved the Ordinance on October 7, 199After its approval, copies of the Ordinance were given to tMunicipal Treasurer on the same day. On November 1996, the Ordinance was approved by the SangguniaPanlalawigan. The Ordinance was posted during the peri




from November 4 - 25, 1996 in three (3) public places, viz:in front of the municipal building, at the bulletin board of theSta. Ana Parish Church and on the front door of the Office of the Market Master in the public market.[14] Posting wasvalidly made in lieu of publication as there was nonewspaper of local circulation in the municipality of Hagonoy.

This fact was known to and admitted by petitioner. Thus,petitioner’s ambiguous and unsupported claim that it wasonly “sometime in November 1997” that the Provincial Board

approved Municipal Ordinance No. 28 and so the postingcould not have been made in November 1996 wassufficiently disproved by the positive evidence of respondentmunicipality. Given the foregoing circumstances, petitionercannot validly claim lack of knowledge of the approvedordinance. The filing of its appeal a year after the effectivityof the subject ordinance is fatal to its cause.Finally, even on the substantive points raised, the petitionmust fail. Section 6c.04 of the 1993 Municipal RevenueCode and Section 191 of the Local Government Code limitingthe percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to taxrates, not rentals. Neither can it be said that the rates werenot uniformly imposed or that the public markets included inthe Ordinance were unreasonably determined or classified.

To be sure, the Ordinance covered the three (3) concretepublic markets: the two-storey Bagong Palengke, the burnt

but reconstructed Lumang Palengke and the more recentLumang Palengke with wet market. However, thePalengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon was excludedfrom the increase in rentals as it is only a makeshift,dilapidated place, with no doors or protection for security,intended for transient peddlers who used to sell their goodsalong the sidewalk.

Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals(2002)

Facts: Petitioner instituted expropriationproceedingscovering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos,Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operationand use of radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of thePhilippines” project. Petitioner took over the premises afterthe previous lessee, the “Voice of America,” had ceased itsoperations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being thereasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, ormore than nine years after the institution of theexpropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this ordercondemning the property and ordering the plaintiff to paythe defendants the just compensation for the property.

The bone of contention is the 76,589-square meter propertypreviously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. Itappears that the national government failed to pay torespondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoingdecision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion

seeking payment for the expropriated property.In the meantime, President Estrada issued Proclamation No.22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property tothe Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilitiesand another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for thepropagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portionwas retained by the PIA. This fact notwithstanding, anddespite the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs remainedunpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation andmotion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for theexpropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to suchfinal computation as might be approved by the court. This

time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation amotion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust tcompensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixin the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cauthe return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 Mar2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents anissued the assailed order, vacating its decision of February 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on t

ground of prescription. The CA denied the appeal (failure file during the reglementary period).

The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate aproperty within its territorial sovereignty for a pubpurpose. Fundamental to the independent existence ofState, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whoprovisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the dexercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, tpower is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, evethat of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches every form of property the State needs for public use and, an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals property are held under a tacit agreement or implireservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resum

the possession of the property whenever the public intereso requires it The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriatiproceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sensfor the condemning authority is not required to assert anconflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the actiothe condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is takititle and possession of the property, and the defendaasserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right possession, but to prove a right to compensation for ttaking.Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: firsthe taking must be for public use, and second, that jucompensation must be given to the private owner of tproperty. These twin proscriptions have their origin in trecognition of the necessity for achieving balance betwe

the State interests, on the one hand, and private righupon the other hand, by effectively restraining the formand affording protection to the latter. In determining “pubuse,” two approaches are utilized - the first is pubemployment or the actual use by the public, and the secois public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view thmatter as being subject to constant growth, which is to sathat as society advances, its demands upon the individual increases, and each demand is a new use to which tresources of the individual may be devoted.

The expropriated property has been shown to be for tcontinued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion therebeing ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the BulacState University and for the propagation of the Philippicarabao, themselves in line with the requirements of pubpurpose. Respondents question the public nature of t

utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointiout that its present use differs from the purpose originacontemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. Targument is of no moment. The property has assumedpublic character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is wwithin its rights to alter and decide the use of that propertthe only limitation being that it be for public use, whicdecidedly, it is.In insisting on the return of the expropriated properrespondents would exhort on the pronouncement Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villarowhere the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternatiremedy of recovery of the property there in question.




might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipalgovernment of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminentdomain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limitedapplication. The grant of the power of eminent domain tolocal governments under RA 7160 cannot be understood asbeing the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested inthe legislative branch of government. For local governmentsto be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, bedelegated to it by the national legislature, but even then,

this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictlyspeaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain oronly as broad or confined as the real authority would want itto be.

Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic[17] where the privatelandowners had remained unpaid ten years after thetermination of the expropriation proceedings, this Courtruled - “The points in dispute are whether such payment canstill be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have beenthe subject of expropriation proceedings. By final andexecutory judgment in said proceedings, they werecondemned for public use, as part of an airport, and orderedsold to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtueof the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as wellas the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs arenot entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots -

which are still devoted to the public use for which they wereexpropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.”

The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on theexpropriation proceedings provides not only for the paymentof just compensation to herein respondents but likewiseadjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner overwhich parties, as well as their privies, are bound. Petitionerhas occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes,exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the

judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as thecondemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partialcompliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, therebypreempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property onthe basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact thatthe right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an

unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding,condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation,the paramount title is in the public under a new andindependent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to adisputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicialprocess for securing better title against all the world thanmay be obtained by voluntary conveyance.Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did nottake into account that the same argument could likewiseapply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedingsfor payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five yearsafter the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusuallylong delay in bringing the action to compel payment againstherein petitioner would militate against them. Consistentlywith the rule that one should take good care of his own

concern, respondents should have commenced the properaction upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed,resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership andpossession of the property.

The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” isconsidered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by theseller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the propertyas between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, itfixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.

Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensationis deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case,the final compensation must include interests on its just

value to be computed from the time the property is taken the time when compensation is actually paid or depositewith the court. In fine, between the taking of the properand the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order place the owner in a position as good as (but not bettthan) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnati

proceedings and “took” the property in September 196 This allowance of interest on the amount found to be tvalue of the property as of the time of the taking computebeing an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum[2should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuatiand inflation of the value of the currency over time.[2Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currenat the time of the establishment of the obligation shall bthe basis for the payment when no agreement to tcontrary is stipulated, has strict application only contractual obligations.[30] In other words, a contractuagreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflatito be taken into account to alter the value of tcurrency.[31]All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dat

01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 197has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authorleft to it being to order its execution. Verily, privarespondents, although not entitled to the return of texpropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on tyet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by fin

judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.0per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% pannum computed from the date of "taking" of the properti.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall havbeen fully paid.

8.6 Reclassification of lands:

Fortich v. Corona (1999)

Facts: Concerns the MR of the court’s resolution dateNovember 17, 1998 and motion to refer the case to tCourt en banc. In previous case, the Court voted two-two the separate motions for reconsideration, as a result which the decision was affirmed.

The Court noted in a resolution dated January 27, 1999 ththe movants have no legal personality to seek redress befothe Court as their motion to intervene was already deniand that the motion to refer the case to the Court en bancakin to a second MR which is prohibited.In this motion, both respondents and intervenors prayed ththe case be referred to the case in banc inasmuch as theearlier MR was resolved by a vote of two-two, the requirnumber to carry a decision under the Constitution (3 votewas not met.

Issue: WON failure to meet the three votes justifies threferral of the case to the court en banc

Held: No

Ratio: A careful reading of the constitutional provisireveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinctibetween cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the othhand, such that cases are “decided” while matters, whiinclude motions, are “resolved”. Otherwise put, the wo“decided” must refer to “cases”; while the word “resolvemust refer to “matters”, applying the rule of reddendsingula singulis.With this interpretation, it is clear that only cases areferred to the Court en banc for decision whenever trequired number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, t




rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required threevotes is not obtained in the resolution of a MR. Hence, thesecond sentence of the provision speaks only of “case” andnot “matter”. The reason is simple. Article VIII, Section 4(3)pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is atie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way todispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc.On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by thedivision and the losing party files a MR, the failure of the

division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the votingdoes not leave the case undecided. There is still thedecision which must stand in view of the failure of themembers of the division to muster the necessary vote for itsreconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie,the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decisionis not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed.Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.

Issue: WON the referral to the court en banc is justified onthe ground that the issues are of first impression

Held: No

Ratio: The issues presented before us by the movants are

matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. The issue of whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject tothe approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having beendecided by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein weheld that local government units need not obtain theapproval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands fromagricultural to non-agricultural use.Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered wasarrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of theSecond Division of this Court. Stated otherwise, this SecondDivision is of the opinion that the matters raised by movantsare nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of theCourt en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in theresolution of movants’ motions for reconsideration would beinappropriate.

Issue: WON the referral to the court en banc partakes of the nature of a second MR

Held: Yes

Ratio: The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose of the earlier MR of theDecision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, thepresent MR necessarily partakes of the nature of a secondmotion for reconsideration which, according to the clear andunambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation toRule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, isprohibited.

True, there are exceptional cases when this Court mayentertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as

where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Eventhen, we have ruled that such second MRs must be filed withexpress leave of court first obtained. In this case, not onlydid movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but moreimportantly, they have been unable to show that there areexceptional reasons for us to give due course to their secondmotions for reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments forreferral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motionssubject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied inthe Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, theallegations contained therein have already been raisedbefore and passed upon by this Court in the said Resolution.

Issue: WON the Win-Win Resolution was valid

Held: No

Ratio: This refers to the resolution “by authority of tPresident” modifying the Decision dated 29 March 1996 the OP through Executive Secretary Ruben TorreNQSRMDC’s (Norberto Quisumbing) Application fConversion is approved only with respect to 44 hectares

recommended by the DA. The remaining 100 hectares fouto be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualififarmer beneficiaries (FBs) in accordance with RA 6657

The resolution is void and of no legal effect considering ththe March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the Presidehad already become final and executory even prior to tfiling of the MR which became the basis of the said “WiWin” Resolution. While it may be true that on its face tnullification of the “Win-Win” Resolution was grounded onprocedural rule pertaining to the reglementary period appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlyiconsideration therefor was the protection of the substantirights of petitioners. “Just as a losing party has the right file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning paralso has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of tresolution of his/her case.”

In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 ODecision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the landdispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnand other parts of the country who stand to be benefited the development of the property.Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feelnecessary to rule once and for all on the legal standing intervenors in this case. In their present motionintervenors insist that they are real parties in intereinasmuch as they have already been issued certificates land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they aseasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have beidentified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of tproperty. These arguments are, however, nothing new asfact they have already been raised in intervenors’ earlmotion for reconsideration of our April 24, 1998 DecisioAgain as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martine

intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonfarmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantiinterest over the subject land inasmuch as they have right to own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to

just share of the fruits of the land. Moreover, the “Win-WResolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries hayet to be carefully and meticulously determined by tDepartment of Agrarian Reform. Absent any definitifinding of the DAR, intervenors cannot as yet be deemvested with sufficient interest in the controversy as to qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuancethe CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisstanding in view of the nullity of the “Win-Win” ResolutionNo legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is nand void.

Melo: By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard bydivision when the required majority of at least 3 votes in tdivision is not obtained are to be heard and decided by thCourt En Banc. The deliberations of the 1986 ConstitutionCommission disclose that if the case is not decided indivision by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc anot to a larger division. In a situation where a division ofhas only 4 members, the 5th member having inhibithimself or is otherwise not in a position to participate, or hretired, a minimum of 3 votes would still be required befothere can be any valid decision or resolution by that divisio

There may, then, be instances when a deadlock may occi.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that undthe clear and unequivocal provisions of the 19




Constitution, if the required majority is not reached in adivision, the case should automatically go to Court En Banc.I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies tomotions for reconsideration because the provisioncontemplates “cases” or “matters” (which for me has nomaterial distinction insofar as divisions are concerned) heardby a division, and a motion for reconsideration cannot bedivorced from the decision in a case that it seeks to bereconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum

majority of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the motion forreconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, asmandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). Tosay that the motion is lost in the division on a 2-2 vote, is toconstrue something which cannot be sustained by a readingof the Constitution. To argue that a motion forreconsideration is not a “case” but only a “matter” whichdoes not concern a case, so that, even though the votethereon in the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is notrequired to elevated to the Court En Banc, is to engage in alot of unfounded hairsplitting.

Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals (1999)

Facts: This case involves 3 haciendas in Nasugbu,Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of theacquisition of these haciendas by the government under RA

6657 (CARL). Petitioner is a domestic corporation and is theregistered owner of three haciendas, namely, HaciendasPalico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipalityof Nasugbu, Batangas. President Aquino signed in on July1987, Proclamation 131 instituting a CARP and EO 229providing the mechanism to implement the program.Pursuant to this, Congress passed RA 6657, the CARL. Beforethe effectivity of the law, petitioner filed with DAR avoluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to theprovisions of EO 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad werelater placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR inaccordance with the CARL.Hacienda Palico. DAR, through Municipal Agrarian ReformOfficer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled“Invitation to Parties” to petitioner to discuss the results of the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was“scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year under theCARP.”Summary Investigation Reports were submitted by theMARO, representatives of the Barangay Agrarian ReformCommittee (BARC), Land Bank (LBP) and the ProvincialAgrarian Reform Officer (PARO) recommending that 270 haand 75.3 ha of the property be placed under compulsoryacquisition at a compensation of P8,109,739.00 andP2,188,195.47, respectively.DAR through Secretary Miriam Santiago sent a “Notice of Acquisition” to petitioner. Petitioner was informed that1,023.999 ha of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject toimmediate acquisition and distribution by the governmentunder the CARL; and the government was offeringcompensation of P3.4 million for 333.0800 hectares.Almost two years later, the DAR Regional Director sent to theLBP Land Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memorandaentitled “Request to Open Trust Account.” Each Memoranda

requested that a trust account representing the valuation of three portions of Hacienda Palico be opened in favor of thepetitioner in view of the latter’s rejection of its offered value.Meanwhile, petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. Despitepetitioner’s application for conversion, DAR proceeded withthe acquisition of the two Haciendas. The LBP trust accountsas compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced byrespondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. On October 22,1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda,DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA’s were distributed tofarmer beneficiaries.

Hacienda Banilad. DAR through the MARO of NasugBatangas sent a notice of acquisition to petitioner. Later, tMARO sent an “Invitation to Parties” again to Pimeninviting the latter to attend a conference to discuss tresults of the MARO’s investigation over Hacienda Banilad.

The Reports were discussed the conference. Present in tconference were representatives of the prospective farmbeneficiaries, the BARC, the LBP, and Jaime Pimentel behalf of the landowner. After the meeting, it w

recommended that 737.2590 ha under Tax Declaration No0236 and 0237 be likewise placed under compulsoacquisition for distribution.DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to petitiontwo (2) separate “Notices of Acquisition” over HacienBanilad. These Notices were sent on the same day as tNotice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notover Hacienda Palico, however, the Notices over HacienBanilad were addressed to Roxas y Cia. Limited in Makati.

The DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land ValuatiManager a “Request to Open Trust Account” in petitionename as compensation for 234.6493 hectares of HacienBanilad. A second “Request to Open Trust Account” was seon November 18, 1991 over 723.4130 hectares of saHacienda.On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of bo

Haciendas Palico and Banilad.Hacienda Caylawa. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntaroffered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 befothe effectivity of the CARL. DAR, through the RegionDirector for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separaResolutions accepting petitioner’s voluntary offer to sHacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos. T-44664 and 44663.Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. TSangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedauthorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway froagricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioninformed DAR that it was applying for conversion Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification

the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. TSecretary also denied petitioner’s withdrawal of the VOS the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specigrounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, orthe slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the landundeveloped.Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of HacienCaylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its applicatifor conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted Case No. N-00196-46 (BA) with the DARAB praying for the cancellation the CLOA’s issued by DAR in the name of several personPetitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, whethe haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zonthat the land is not suitable for agricultural production, athat the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified t

land to non-agricultural.DARAB submitted the case to the Office of the Secretary Agrarian Reform for determination. The CA filed a petition fbefore the CA questioning the expropriation of its propertiunder the CARL. Meanwhile, the petition for conversion the three haciendas was denied by the MARO. The CA thdismissed the petition.

Issue: WON the Court can take cognizance of this petitidespite petitioner’s failure to exhaust administratiremediesHeld: Yes




Ratio: Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in thecourts. There was a violation of its rights and to require it toexhaust administrative remedies before the DAR itself wasnot a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.DAR issued CLOAs to farmer beneficiaries over portions of petitioner’s land without just compensation to petitioner. ACLOA is evidence of ownership of land by a beneficiaryunder R.A. 6657. Before this may be awarded to a farmerbeneficiary, the land must first be acquired by the State from

the landowner and ownership transferred to the former. Thetransfer of possession and ownership of the land to thegovernment are conditioned upon the receipt by thelandowner of the payment or deposit by the DAR of thecompensation with an accessible bank. Until then, titleremains with the landowner. There was no receipt bypetitioner of any compensation for any of the lands acquiredby the government.

The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is alsospecific. The law provides that the deposit must be madeonly in “cash” or “LBP bonds.” DAR’s opening of trustaccount deposits in petitioner’s name with the Land Bankdoes not constitute payment under the law. Trust accountdeposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of thetrust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto curethe lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination

of this compensation was marred by lack of due process. Infact, in the entire acquisition proceedings, respondent DARdisregarded the basic requirements of administrative dueprocess. Under these circumstances, the issuance of theCLOA’s to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate

judicial action on the part of the petitioner.

Issue: WON the acquisition proceedings over the threehaciendas were valid and in accordance with law

Held: No

Ratio: Mode of Acquisition of Land Under RA 6657. Two (2) modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory andvoluntary.In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, thelandholding, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries

must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shallsend a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personaldelivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuousplace in the municipal building and barangay hall of theplace where the property is located. Within thirty days fromreceipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, hisadministrator or representative shall inform the DAR of hisacceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowneraccepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favorof the government and surrenders the certificate of title.Within 30 days from the execution of the deed of transfer,the LBP pays the owner the purchase price. If the landownerrejects the DAR’s offer or fails to make a reply, the DARconducts summary administrative proceedings to determine

just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBPrepresentative and other interested parties may submit

evidence on just compensation within fifteen days fromnotice. Within 30 days from submission, the DAR shalldecide the case and inform the owner of its decision and theamount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit thecompensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessiblebank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of theland and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of titlein the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shallthen be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any partymay question the decision of the DAR in the regular courtsfor final determination of just compensation.

For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two noticare required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter invitation to a preliminary conference sent to tlandowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmbeneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DARO. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisitiosent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.

The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, an

its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are stedesigned to comply with the requirements of administratidue process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercof the State’s police power and the power of eminedomain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retentilimits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police powfor the regulation of private property in accordance with tConstitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, towners are deprived of lands they own in excess of tmaximum area allowed, there is also a taking under tpower of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is nomere limitation of the use of the land. What is requiredthe surrender of the title to and physical possession of tsaid excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the ownerfavor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights providthat “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or proper

without due process of law.” The CARL was not intended take away property without due process of law. The exercof the power of eminent domain requires that due process observed in the taking of private property.

The notice requirements under the CARL are not confined the Notice of Acquisition set forth in Section 16 of the law

They also include the Notice of Coverage first laid downDAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989 and subsequently amendin DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A. O. No. 1, Seriof 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify tlandowner that his property shall be placed under CARP anthat he is entitled to exercise his retention right; it alnotifies him, pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 199that a public hearing shall be conducted where he arepresentatives of the concerned sectors of society mattend to discuss the results of the field investigation, tland valuation and other pertinent matters. Under DAR A.

No. 1, Series of 1993, the Notice of Coverage also informthe landowner that a field investigation of his landholdishall be conducted where he and the other representativmay be presentCompulsory Acquisition of Hacienda Palico anBanilad. In the case at bar, DAR claims that it, throuMARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of invitation entitl“Invitation to Parties” dated September 29, 1989 petitioner, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator Hacienda Palico. The invitation was received on the samday it was sent as indicated by a signature and the dareceived at the bottom left corner of said invitation. Wregard to Hacienda Banilad, DAR claims that Pimentadministrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was notified and sean invitation to the conference. Pimentel actually attendthe conference on September 21, 1989 and signed t

Minutes of the meeting on behalf of petitioner. The Minutwas also signed by the representatives of the BARC, the Land farmer beneficiaries. No letter of invitation was sent conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda Caylawbecause it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to DAR.When DAR, through the MARO, sent to the various partithe Notice of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAA. O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was already in effect more tha month earlier. The Operating Procedure in DAdministrative Order No. 12 does not specify how notices letters of invitation shall be sent to the landowner, trepresentatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmbeneficiaries and other interested parties. The proceduin the sending of these notices is important to comp




with the requisites of due process especially whenthe owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic corporation, and therefore, has apersonality separate and distinct from its shareholders,officers and employees.

Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary,cashier or director of petitioner corporation. Is he, asadministrator of the two Haciendas, considered an agent of the corporation?

The purpose of all rules for service of process on acorporation is to make it reasonably certain that thecorporation will receive prompt and proper notice in anaction against it. Service must be made on a representativeso integrated with the corporation as to make it a priorisupposable that he will realize his responsibilities and knowwhat he should do with any legal papers served on him, andbring home to the corporation notice of the filing of theaction. Petitioner’s evidence does not show the official dutiesof Pimentel as administrator of petitioner’s haciendas. Theevidence does not indicate whether Pimentel’s duties is sointegrated with the corporation that he would immediatelyrealize his responsibilities and know what he should do withany legal papers served on him. At the time the noticeswere sent and the preliminary conference conducted,petitioner’s principal place of business was listed in DAR’s

records as “Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes, Manila,” and “7

th

Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., 101 Aguirre St., Makati, MetroManila.” Pimentel did not hold office at the principal place of business of petitioner. Neither did he exercise his functionsin Plaza Cervantes, Manila nor in Cacho-Gonzales Bldg.,Makati, Metro Manila. He performed his official functions andactually resided in the haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, aplace over two hundred kilometers away from Metro Manila.Curiously, DAR had information of the address of petitioner’sprincipal place of business. The Notices of Acquisition overHaciendas Palico and Banilad were addressed to petitioner atits offices in Manila and Makati. These Notices were sentbarely three to four months after Pimentel was notified of thepreliminary conference. Why DAR chose to notify Pimentelinstead of the officers of the corporation was not explainedby the said respondent.Nevertheless, assuming that Pimentel was an agent of

petitioner corporation, and the notices and letters of invitation were validly served on petitioner through him,there is no showing that Pimentel himself was dulyauthorized to attend the conference meeting with the MARO,BARC and LBP representatives and farmer beneficiaries forpurposes of compulsory acquisition of petitioner’slandholdings. Even DAR’s evidence does not indicate thisauthority. On the contrary, petitioner claims that it had noknowledge of the letter-invitation, hence, could not havegiven Pimentel the authority to bind it to whatever matterswere discussed or agreed upon by the parties at thepreliminary conference or public hearing. Notably, one yearafter Pimentel was informed of the preliminary conference,DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued and this requiredthat the Notice of Coverage must be sent “to the landownerconcerned or his duly authorized representative.”

Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of theCARP coverage of its haciendas, the areas found actuallysubject to CARP were not properly identified before theywere taken over by DAR. The acquisition of the landholdingsdid not cover the entire expanse of the two haciendas, butonly portions thereof. Hacienda Palico has an area of 1,024hectares and only 688.7576 hectares were targetted foracquisition. Hacienda Banilad has an area of 1,050 hectaresbut only 964.0688 hectares were subject to CARP. Thehaciendas are not entirely agricultural lands. In fact, thevarious tax declarations over the haciendas describe thelandholdings as “sugarland,” and “forest, sugarland, pastureland, horticulture and woodland.”

Upon receipt of this notice, therefore, petitioncorporation had no idea which portions of its estawere subject to compulsory acquisition, whiportions it could rightfully retain, whether theretained portions were compact or contiguous, anwhich portions were excluded from CARP coverageEven respondent DAR’s evidence does not show thpetitioner, through its duly authorized representative, wnotified of any ocular inspection and investigation that w

to be conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is there prothat petitioner was given the opportunity to at least chooand identify its retention area in those portions to acquired compulsorily. The right of retention and how thright is exercised, is guaranteed in Section 6 of the CARLVoluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway. First of athe same E.O. 229, like Section 16 of the CARL, requires ththe land, landowner and beneficiaries of the land subject agrarian reform be identified before the notice acquisition should be issued. Hacienda Caylaway wvoluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a toarea of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titleIn two separate Resolutions both dated January 12, 198DAR, through the Regional Director, formally accepted tVOS over two of these four titles. The land covered by ttwo titles has an area of 855.5257 hectares, but on

648.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of R.6657. Petitioner claims it does not know where theportions are located.DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the lacovered by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and thpetitioner, as landowner, was not denied participatitherein. The results of the survey and the land valuatisummary report, however, do not indicate whether noticto attend the same were actually sent to and received petitioner or its duly authorized representative. To reiteratEO 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, muless the notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted DAR. Notice to the landowner, however, cannot dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process ais an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteunder the CARL.

Issue: Assuming the haciendas may be reclassified froagricultural to non-agricultural, WON this court has tpower to rule on this issue

Held: No

Ratio: It is petitioner’s claim that the three haciendas anot subject to agrarian reform because they have bedeclared for tourism, not agricultural purposes. In 1975, thPresident Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 declaring tmunicipality of Nasugbu, Batangas a tourist zone. LandsNasugbu, including the subject haciendas, were allegedreclassified as non-agricultural 13 years before teffectivity of RA 6657. In 1993, the Regional Director fRegion IV of the DA certified that the haciendas are n

feasible and sound for agricultural development. On Mar20, 1992, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, tSangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas adoptResolution No. 19 reclassifying certain areas of Nasugbu non-agricultural. This Resolution approved MunicipOrdinance No. 19, Series of 1992, the Revised ZoniOrdinance of Nasugbu which zoning ordinance was based a Land Use Plan for Planning Areas for New Developmeallegedly prepared by the University of the PhilippineResolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan was approvby the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas on March 1993.Petitioner claims that Proclamation No. 1520 was also upheby DAR in 1991 when it approved conversion of 1,8




hectares in Nasugbu into a tourist area known as the BatulaoResort Complex, and 13.52 hectares in Barangay Caylawayas within the potential tourist belt. Petitioner presentsevidence before us that these areas are adjacent to thehaciendas subject of this petition, hence, the haciendasshould likewise be converted. Petitioner urges this Court totake cognizance of the conversion proceedings and ruleaccordingly.We do not agree. DAR’s failure to observe due

process in the acquisition of petitioner’s landholdingsdoes not ipso facto give this Court the power toadjudicate over petitioner’s application forconversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged with the mandateof approving or disapproving applications forconversion is the DAR.At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion, theRules of Procedure governing the processing and approval of applications for land use conversion was the DAR A. O. No. 2,Series of 1990. Under this A. O., the application forconversion is filed with the MARO where the property islocated. The MARO reviews the application and itssupporting documents and conducts field investigation andocular inspection of the property. The findings of the MAROare subject to review and evaluation by the Provincial

Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The PARO may conductfurther field investigation and submit a supplemental reporttogether with his recommendation to the Regional AgrarianReform Officer (RARO) who shall review the same. For landsless than five hectares, the RARO shall approve ordisapprove applications for conversion. For lands exceedingfive hectares, the RARO shall evaluate the PARO Report andforward the records and his report to the Undersecretary forLegal Affairs. Applications over areas exceeding fiftyhectares are approved or disapproved by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does notwarrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve acontroversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged withan administrative body of special competence. DAR is in abetter position to resolve petitioner’s application forconversion, being primarily the agency possessing the

necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determinewhether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARLlies with the DAR, not with this Court.Finally, we stress that the failure of DAR to comply with therequisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings doesnot give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s alreadyissued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power isto short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet torun its regular course. DAR must be given the chance tocorrect its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmerbeneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, thesefarmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against thebasic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprivethese people, through no fault of their own, of the land they

till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property intrust for the rightful owner of the land.

8.7 Closure and Opening of Roads:

Cabrera v. CA (1991)

Facts: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adoptedResolution No. 158 (Closing the old road leading to the newCapitol Building and giving owners of properties traversed bythe new road an area form the old raod). Pursuant thereto,Deeds of Exchange were executed under which the Provinceconveyed to Remedios R. Bagadiong, Fredeswindo F. Alcala,Elena S. Latorre, Baldomero Tolentino, Eulogia T. Alejandro,Angeles S. Vargas, and Juan S. Reyes portions of the closed

road in exchange for their own respective properties, which was subsequently laid a new concrete road leading the Capitol Building.Learning about Resolution 158, the petitioner filed complaint with the CFI of Catanduanes for "Restoration Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment Resolutions and Documents with Damages." He alleged ththe land fronting his house was a public road owned by tProvince in its governmental capacity and therefore beyo

the commerce of man. He contended that Resolution No. 1and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was tclosure of the road.

The judge sustained the authority of the provincial board enact said Resolution. The CA affirmed and found that throad was not a public road but just a trail. Also, pursuant RA 5185, municipal authorities, subject to the approval the Provincial Board, can close thoroughfares pursusant Sec 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code.Petitioner insists that Sec. 2246 is not applicable becauResolution No. 158 is not an order for the closure of the roin question but an authority to barter or exchange it wprivate properties. He maintains that the public road wowned by the province in its governmental capacity anwithout a prior order of closure, could not be the subject obarter. Control over public roads, he insists, is with Congre

and not with the provincial board.

Issue: WON the Provincial Board can validly enact saresolution

Held: Yes

Ratio: Resolution 158 clearly says that it is "hereresolved to close the old road." The closure is as plain as dexcept that the petitioner, with the blindness of those wwill not see, refuses to acknowledge it. The Court has litpatience with such puerile arguments. They borddangerously on a trifling with the administration of justiand can only prejudice the pleader's cause.

The authority of the provincial board to close that road ause or convey it for other purposes is derived from tfollowing provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 in relation

Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code: sustained the subsequent sale of the land as being accordance not only with the charter but also with Artic422 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Property of pubdominion, when no longer intended for public use or fpublic service, shall form part of the patrimonial property the State." In the case of Favis v. City of Baguio, the power the City Council of Baguio City to close city streets awithdraw them from public use was also assailed. This Cousaid:5. So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city councact of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead efrom public use and converting the remainder thereof into aalley. These are acts well within the ambit of the power close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, the authority competent to determine whether or not

certain property is still necessary for public use.Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. Athe discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interferewith by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumeSo the fact that some private interests may be servincidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.While it is true that the cases dealt with city councils and nthe provincial board, there is no reason for not applying tdoctrine announced therein to the provincial board connection with the closure of provincial roads. Tprovincial board has, after all, the duty of maintaining suroads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from t




grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Provincefor the construction of provincial roads.

The lower court found the petitioner's allegation of injuryand prejudice to be without basis because he had "easyaccess anyway to the national road, for in fact the vehiclesused by the Court and the parties during the ocularinspection easily passed and used it, reaching beyondplaintiff's house." However, the CA ruled that the he "wasprejudiced by the closure of the road which formerly fronted

his house. He and his family were undoubtedlyinconvenienced by the loss of access to their place of residence for which we believe they should becompensated." On this issue, the governing principle waslaid down in Favis thus:. . . The general rule is that one whose property does notabut on the closed section of a street has no right tocompensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if hestill has reasonable access to the general system of streets.

The circumstances in some cases may be such as to give aright to damages to a property owner, even though hisproperty does not abut on the closed section. But to warrantrecovery in any such case the property owner must showthat the situation is such that he has sustained specialdamages differing in kind, and not merely in degree, fromthose sustained by the public generally.

Petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury hehas incurred, such as it is, is the price he and others like himmust pay for the welfare of the entire community. This is nota case where his property has been expropriated and he isentitled to just compensation. The construction of the newroad was undertaken under the general welfare clause. Asthe trial judge acutely observed, whatever inconveniencethe petitioner has suffered "pales in significance comparedto the greater convenience the new road, which is wide andconcrete, straight to the veterans fountain and down to thepier, has been giving to the public, plus the fact that the newroad adds beauty and color not only to the town of Virac butalso to the whole province of Catanduanes." For theenjoyment of those benefits, every individual in theprovince, including the petitioner, must be prepared to givehis share.

MMDA v. Bel Air Village Assn. Inc. (2000)

Facts: MMDA is a government agency tasked with thedelivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air VillageAssociation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whosemembers are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a privatesubdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner,through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to publicvehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. BAVA was apprisedthat the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from theadjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.On January 2, 1996, BAVA instituted against petitioner beforethe RTC a civil case for injunction. Respondent prayed for theissuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the

opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporaryrestraining order the following day. After due hearing, thetrial court denied the issuance of preliminary injunction.On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision on the merits of thecase finding that the MMDA has no authority to order theopening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road andcause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that theauthority is lodged in the City Council of Makati byordinance.

Issue: WON the MMDA has authority to open NeptuneRoad to the public

Held: No

Ratio: MMDA claims that it has the authority to opNeptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of thstate endowed with police power in the delivery of basservices in Metro Manila. One of these basic services traffic management which involves the regulation of the uof thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience awelfare of the general public. It is alleged that the poli

power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in tconsolidated cases of Sangalang v. IAC. From the premithat it has police power, it is now urged that there is no nefor the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptustreet to the public.Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It hbeen defined as the power vested by the Constitution in tlegislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinanceeither with penalties or without, not repugnant to tConstitution, as they shall judge to be for the good awelfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of tsame. The power is plenary and its scope is vast apervasive, reaching and justifying measures for pubhealth, public safety, public morals, and the general welfareIt bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in t

National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group body of individuals not possessing legislative power. TNational Legislature, however, may delegate this power the President and administrative boards as well as tlawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or locgovernment units. Once delegated, the agents can exercionly such legislative powers as are conferred on them by tnational lawmaking body.Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed several local government units - i.e., twelve (12) citiand five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of CaloocaManila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, QuezoMuntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzueand the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, S

Juan and Taguig. With the passage of RA 7924 in 199Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "specdevelopment and administrative region" and t

Administration of "metro-wide" basic servicaffecting the region placed under "a developmeauthority" referred to as the MMDA.

The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs aprojects is undertaken by the local government uninational government agencies, accredited peopleorganizations, non-governmental organizations, and tprivate sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For thpurpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contractmemoranda of agreement and other cooperatiarrangements with these bodies for the delivery of trequired services within Metro Manila.Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to thdelivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these transport and traffic management which includes tformulation and monitoring of policies, standards a

projects to rationalize the existing transport operationinfrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares apromotion of the safe movement of persons and goods.also covers the mass transport system and the institution a system of road regulation, the administration of all trafenforcement operations, traffic engineering services atraffic education programs, including the institution ofsingle ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violationUnder this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to sthe policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulathe implementation of all traffic management programs." addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a singticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penaltifor all traffic violations.




It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited tothe following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,setting of policies, installation of a system andadministration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924that grants the MMDA police power, let alonelegislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has notbeen delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislativebodies of the local government units, there is no provision in

R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriatefunds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of MetroManila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a"development authority." It is an agency created for thepurpose of laying down policies and coordinating with thevarious national government agencies, people’sorganizations, non-governmental organizations and theprivate sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All itsfunctions are administrative in nature and these areactually summed up in the charter itself Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v.Intermediate Appellate Court where we upheld a zoningordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC),the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power.

The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of thepetition, while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v.Court of Appeals.Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the two Sangalangcases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, bothinvolved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal councilof Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for theproposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in thenotice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner torespondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does notcite any ordinance or law, either by the SangguniangPanlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basisfor the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDAsimply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalizethe use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe andconvenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of

roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within thescope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as anexpress or implied grant of ordinance-making power, muchless police power. MisjurisSecondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as theMMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is theforerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of theMMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powerswhich were not bestowed on the present MMDA. JjlexIn 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan ManilaAuthority (MMA). The powers and functions of theMMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to bestressed, however, that not all powers and functions

of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA’spower was limited to the "delivery of basic urbanservices requiring coordination in MetropolitanManila." The MMA’s governing body, the MetropolitanManila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merelygiven the power of: (1) formulation of policies on thedelivery of basic services requiring coordination andconsolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutionsand other issuances, approval of a code of basicservices and the exercise of its rule-making power.Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government unitsbecame primarily responsible for the governance of theirrespective political subdivisions. The MMA’s jurisdiction

was limited to addressing common problems involvibasic services that transcended local boundaries. It did nhave legislative power. Its power was merely to provithe local government units technical assistance in tpreparation of local development plans. Any semblance legislative power it had was confined to a "review [legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies ensure consistency among local governments and with tcomprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and

"advise the local governments accordingly."When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manibecame a "special development and administratiregion" and the MMDA a "special developmeauthority" whose functions were "without prejudice the autonomy of the affected local governmeunits." The character of the MMDA was clearly definein the legislative debates enacting its charter.It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a locgovernment unit or a public corporation endowwith legislative power. It is not even a "specmetropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of"special metropolitan political subdivision" requires tapproval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in tpolitical units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was n

submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscit The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by tpeople, but appointed by the President with the rank aprivileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his functionto perform such other duties as may be assigned to him bthe President, whereas in local government units, tPresident merely exercises supervisory authority. Themphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not thsame entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlikthe MMC, the MMDA has no power to enaordinances for the welfare of the community. It is tlocal government units, acting through their respectilegislative councils, that possess legislative power and polipower. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution orderithe opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed openi

by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on tother issues as they are unnecessary. EsmsoWe stress that this decision does not make light of tMMDA’s noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic conditionMetro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecplague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevarand avenues are now crammed with cars while city streeare clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic hbecome a social malaise affecting our people’s productivand the efficient delivery of goods and services in tcountry. The MMDA was created to put some order in tmetropolitan transportation system but unfortunately tpowers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentiocannot justify the opening for public use of a private streeta private subdivision without any legal warrant. T

promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to thpreservation of the rule of law.

Sangalang v. IAC (1988)

MMDA claims that it has the authority to open NeptuStreet to public traffic because it is an agent of the staendowed with police power in the delivery of basic servicin Metro Manila. One of these basic services is trafmanagement which involves the regulation of the use thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfaof the general public. It is alleged that the police power MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated casof Sangalang v. IAC. From the premise that it has polipower, it is now urged that there is no need for the City




Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to thepublic.

Macasiano v. Diokno (1992)

Facts: On 13 June 1990, the Municipality of Paranaquepassed Ordinance 86, s. 1990 which authorized the closureof J. Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extensionand Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, MetroManila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. Thesaid ordinance was approved by the municipal councilpursuant to MCC Ordinance 2, s. 1979, authorizing andregulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets,roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sitesfor flea market and/or vending areas, under certain termsand conditions. On 20 July 1990, the Metropolitan ManilaAuthority approved Ordinance 86, s. 1990 of the municipalcouncil subject to conditions. On 20 June 1990, the municipalcouncil issued a resolution authorizing the Parañaque Mayorto enter into contract with any service cooperative for theestablishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On 8 August 1990, themunicipality and Palanyag, a service cooperative, enteredinto an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintainand manage the flea market with the obligation to remitdues to the treasury of the municipal government of

Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up byPalanyag on the said streets. On 13 September 1990 Brig.Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan

Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabrielle St. in Baclaran. Thesestalls were later returned to Palanyag. On 16 October 1990,Macasiano wrote a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the marketstalls shall be dismantled.On 23 October 1990, the municipality and Palanyag filedwith the trial court a joint petition for prohibition andmandamus with damages and prayer for preliminaryinjunction. On 17 December 1990, the trial court issued anorder upholding the validity of Ordinance 86 s. 1990 of theMunicipality of Parañaque and enjoining Macasiano fromenforcing his letter-order against Palanyag. Hence, a petitionfor certiorari under Rule 65 was filed by Macasiano thru theOSG.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed andset aside the 17 December 1990 decision of the RTC whichgranted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the PNPSuperintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command fromenforcing the demolition of market stalls along J. Gabrielle,G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Openastreets.

Ratio:Property of provinces, cities and municipalities;Property for public use. The property of provinces, citiesand municipalities is divided into property for public use andpatrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to property forpublic use, Article 424 of Civil Code provides that "propertyfor public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities,

consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares,fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works forpublic service paid for by said provinces, cities ormunicipalities. All other property possessed by any of themis patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, withoutprejudice to the provisions of special laws." In the presentcase, thus, J. Gabrielle G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. GaciaExtension and Opena streets are local roads used for publicservice and are therefore considered public properties of themunicipality.Properties for public service deemed public and underabsolute control of Congress. Properties of the localgovernment which are devoted to public service are deemedpublic and are under the absolute control of Congress

(Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, SCRA 1334 [1968]).Local governments have no authority to regulate uof public properties unless authority is vested upoby Congress; e.g. Closure of roads. Local governmenhave no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the uof public properties unless specific authority is vested upothem by Congress. One such example of this authority givby Congress to the local governments is the power to clo

roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the LocGovernment Code (BP 337), which states “A locgovernment unit may likewise, through its head actipursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Codclose any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, streealley, park or square. No such way or place or any pathereof shall be closed without indemnifying any persprejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn from pubuse may be used or conveyed for any purpose for whiother real property belonging to the local unit concernmight be lawfully used or conveyed."Legal provision should be read and interpreted accordance with basic principles already establisheby law; LGU has no power to lease a road available public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic. T

legal provision (Chapter II, Section 10 of the LGC) whigives authority to local government units to close roads aother similar public places should be read and interpretedaccordance with basic principles already established by la

These basic principles have the effect of limiting suauthority of the province, city or municipality to closepublic street or thoroughfare. Article 424 NCC lays down tbasic principle that properties of public dominion devoted public use and made available to the public in general aoutside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of leased by the local government unit to private personAside from the requirement of due process which should bcomplied with before closing a road, street or park, tclosure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing throad or other public property from public use whcircumstances show that such property is no longer intendor necessary for public use or public service. When it

already withdrawn from public use, the property thbecomes patrimonial property of the local government un(LGU) (Article 422 NCC; Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles, 66 SCR481 [1975]). It is only then that the LGU can "use or convthem for any purpose for which other real propebelonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully usor conveyed." However, those roads and streets which aavailable to the public in general and ordinarily used fvehicular traffic are still considered public property devoteto public use. In such case, the LGU has no power to usefor another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to privapersons.Related case, Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles. In Cebu Oxygv. Bercilles, the City Council of Cebu, through a resolutiodeclared the terminal road of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, CeCity as an abandoned road, the same not being included

the City Development Plan. Thereafter, the City Counpassed another resolution authorizing the sale of the saabandoned road through public bidding. The Court held ththe City of Cebu is empowered to close a city street and vacate or withdraw the same from public use. Suwithdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which cbe the object of an ordinary contractRelated case, Dacanay v. Asistio. In Dacanay v. Asistthe disputed areas from which the market stalls are sougto be evicted are public streets. A public street is properfor public use hence outside the commerce of man (Ar420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of manmay not be the subject of lease or other contra(Villanueva, et al. v. Castañeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 14




citing the Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602;Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; andMuyot v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860). The right of the publicto use the city streets may not be bargained away throughcontract. The interests of a few should not prevail over thegood of the greater number in the community whose health,peace, safety, good order and general welfare, therespondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.

The leases or licenses granted by the City Government to

stallholders are null and void for being contrary to law. TheExecutive Order issued by the acting Mayor authorizing theuse of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area forstallholders contravenes the general law that reserves citystreets and roads for public use. The Executive Order maynot infringe upon the vested right of the public to use citystreets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., asarteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.In gratia argumenti, ordinance cannot be validlyimplemented as municipality has not complied withconditions imposed by the MMA for the approval of the ordinance. Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, thatthe municipality has the authority to pass the disputedordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented becauseit cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan ManilaAuthority due to non-compliance by the municipality of the

conditions imposed by the former for the approval of theordinance. The allegations of the municipality that the closedstreets were not used for vehicular traffic and that themajority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea market on said streets are unsupported by anyevidence that will show that the first condition has been met.Likewise, the designation by the Municipality of a timeschedule during which the flea market shall operate isabsent (fourth condition).Baclaran area congested; establishment of fleamarket on municipality streets does not help solveproblem of congestionIt is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area arecongested with people, houses and traffic brought about bythe proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To licenseand allow the establishment of a flea market along J.Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and

Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving theproblem of congestion but rather leads to inconvenience tochildren as the normal transportation flow is disrupted, topollution and deterioration of health of residents due to thegarbage left by the vendors on the streets. Further,ambulances and fire engines are not able to use the roadsfor a more direct access to the fire area and thus losevaluable time that should have been spent in savingproperties and lives. And further, the ambulances and peoplerushing patients to St. Rita Hospital located along GG CruzStreet are delayed as they are unable to pass through saidstreet due to the stalls and vendors.Powers of local government unit not absolute. Thepowers of a local government unit are not absolute. They aresubject to limitations laid down by the Constitution and thelaws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such

powers should be subservient to paramount considerationsof health and well-being of the members of the community.Every local government unit has the sworn obligation toenact measures that will enhance the public health, safetyand convenience, maintain peace and order, and promotethe general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units.Based on this objective, the local government should refrainfrom acting towards that which might prejudice or adverselyaffect the general welfare.General public has legal right to demand therestoration of city streets to their specific publicpurpose. As in the Dacanay case, the general public have alegal right to demand the demolition of the illegallyconstructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials

of municipality have the corresponding duty arising fropublic office to clear the city streets and restore them their specific public purpose.Applicability of the Dacanay case; Contracts by LocGovernment governed by the original terms aconditions, and the law in force at time the righwere vested. As in the Dacanay case, both cases involve aordinance which is void and illegal for lack of basis aauthority in laws applicable during its time. However, BP 3

(Local Government Code), has already been repealed RA7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) which took effeon 1 January 1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code providthat rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivof the new Code and arising out of contracts or any othsource of prestation involving a local government unit shbe governed by the original terms and conditions of the sacontracts or the law in force at the time such rights wevested.




SYLLABUS PART 3: ELECTIVE OFFICIALS, VACANCIES,SUCESSION, DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

Qualifications

Abella v. COMELEC 201 SCRA 253

Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella wasallowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC todisqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residencein her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It wasalleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like herhusband who was earlier disqualified from running for thesame office.

The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when theCommission granted the decision, Larrazabal was alreadyproclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified,Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the saidarea, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.

The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision iserroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Codeto rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence toqualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. Sheopines that under "the Election Law, the matter of

determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anythingelse."In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physicaltransfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did notnecessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence,for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidencedby her continuous and regular acts of returning there in thecourse of the years, although she had physically resided atOrmoc City."

Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the secondhighest vote may be proclaimed as governor when thecandidate for such position was disqualified.

Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPCNo. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course tothe certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filedbefore Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains thatthe local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fidecandidate. The voters of the province voted for her in thesincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for theposition of governor. Her votes were counted and sheobtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is thatthe petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by theelectorate.As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI(Faypon v. Quirino:[M) ere absence from one's residence ororigin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, orpractice his avocation, is not sufficient to constituteabandonment or loss of such residence.' ... Thedetermination of a persons legal residence or domicile

largely depends upon intention which may be inferred fromhis acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims thata person has abandoned or left his residence or origin mustshow and prove pre-ponderantly such abandonment or loss.)In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that thepetitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What isclear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City withher husband and considers herself a resident therein. Theintention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residencein Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact that sheoccasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years doesnot signify an intention to continue her residence therein. Itis common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we

formerly resided specially so when we have left friends arelatives although for intents and purposes we have alreatransferred our residence to other places.

Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter Kananga, Leyte (the petitioner insists that she is suchregistered voter based on the following antecedents: 1 Scancelled her registration in Ormoc City on Nov 25, 198and 2 she then transferred her registration to Kanang

Leyte on November 25, 1987 by registering thereat and she later voted on election day (Feb 1, 1988) in KanangLeyte. )We find the version pressed by respondent unworthy belief. The story is marked by so many bizarre cirumtancnot consistent with the ordinary course of events or tnatural behavior of persons. Among these are:

The application for cancellation of registration by respondeAdelina Y. Larrazabal happened to be misplaced by a clerk the Election Registrar's Office for Ormoc City so it was nsent to the Board of Election Inspectors in a sealed envelop

The 'inadverterment' (sic) misplacement was discovered onon January 9,1988;

The voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without aendorsement or covering letter from the Election Registrar anybody else;

The election clerk delivered the application for cancellationly towards the last hour of the revision day, allegedly 4:30 P.M., January 9, 1988;All the members of the BEI had already signed the Minutindicating that no revision of the voter's list was made as 5:00 PM

The poll clerk and the third member prepared anothminutes stating that the election clerk had delivered tapplication for cancellation at 4:30 P.M. without areference to the minutes they had previously signed;Emeterio Larrazabal, who was supposed to have registerin Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga, was supposed to havfilled up an application for cancellation of his registration Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City at Precinct 17 concurrent whis registration. His application for cancellation was nevsubmitted in evidence.

The serial number of the voter's affidavits of the spous

Larrazabal in Precinct No. 17 are far removed from the sernumbers of the other new registrants in November 28, 19in the same precinct.

The most telling evidence is the list of voters, that tChairman and the poll clerk had written in Part II of tsame, closed by the signatures of both officials showing ththere were only 9 additional registered voters in Precinct 1petitioner was not there. It was only on February 15, 1988, two weeks after the election day that the same Registrcertified for the first time that there were two voters listthe first without the names of the Larrazabals and tsecond, which appeared only after February 1, submitted the Chairman of the Board for Precinct 17 which containthe spouses Larrazabals' names.Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registervoter of Kananga, Leyte, the petitioner poses an alternati

position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City wno impediment to her candidacy for the position of governof the province of Leyte.Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 1Article X of the Constitution one comes up with the followiconclusion: that Ormoc City when organized was not yethighly-urbanned city but is, nevertheless, considerindependent of the province of Leyte to which it geographically attached because its charter prohibits voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. Tquestion now is whether or not the prohibition against th'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officia




necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered voters to beelected as provincial officials. The argument is untenable.Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in thataside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whosecharters prohibit their voters from voting for provincialelective officials are independent of the province. In thesame provision, it provides for other component cities withina province whose charters do not provide a similarprohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City

whose charters prohibit their voters from voting forprovincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanizedcities which are outside the supervisory power of theprovince to which they are geographically attached. Thisindependence from the province carries with it theprohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters notto vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. Theresolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. TheCommission on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987applies to this case. While the cited case involves OlongapoCity which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the sameprinciple is applicable.Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective officesin the province of Leyte. We agree with the COMELEC en

banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled tovote in the election of the provincial governor and themembers of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte'connotes two prohibitions one, from running for and thesecond, from voting for any provincial elective official."

The petitioner takes exception to this interpretation. Sheopines that such interpretation is "wrong English" sincenowhere in the provision is there any reference to aprohibition against running for provincial elective office. Shestates that if the prohibition to run was indeed intended, theprovision should have been phrased "Shall not be qualified

TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A commashould have been used after the word qualified and after theword "vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in theelection of the provincial governor" is modified separatelyand distinctly by the words "not qualified" and the words"not entitled to vote."

The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation fallacious.In the case of Mapa v. Arroyo, the conjunction and betweenthe phrase shall not be qualified and entitled to vote refer totwo prohibitions as ruled by the COMELEC in relation to thedemonstrative phrase "in the election of the provincialgovernor and the members of the provincial board of theProvince of Leyte."Finally, the petitioner contends that the February 14, 1991decision of the COMELEC's second division is null and void onthe ground that on that date, the term of CommissionerAndres Flores, one of the signatories of the majority opinion(vote was 2-1) had already expired on February 2, 1991.Commissioner Flores was appointed for a three-year termfrom February 15, 1988 to February 15, 1991. In these threeyears he exercised his duties and functions as Commissioner.Granting in the absence of a statute expressly stating when

the terms of the COMELEC Chairman and memberscommence and expire, that his term expired on February 2,1991 to enable a faithful compliance with the constitutionalprovision that the terms of office in the COMELEC are on astaggered basis commencing and ending at fixed intervals,his continuance in office until February 15, 1991 has a colorof validity. Therefore, all his official acts from February 3,1991 to February 15, 1991, are considered valid.

Issue: WON Abella can assume position of governor byvirtue of Section 6 RA 6646

Ratio: Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases weremisapplied by the COMELEC. According to him these cases

are fundamentally different from SPC No. 88-546 in that thFrivaldo and Labo cases were petitions for a quo warranfiled under section 253 of the Omnibus Code, contesting teligibility of the respondents after they had been proclaimduly elected to the Office from which they were sought to unseated while SPC No. 88-546 which was filed befoproclamation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election Cosought to deny due course to Larrazabal's certificate candidacy for material misrepresentations and w

seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore, avers thsince under section 6 of Republic Act 6646 it is providtherein that: Any candidate who has been declared by fin

judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and tvotes case for him shall not be counted.

The votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained thighest number of votes are not considered counted makiher a non-candidate, he, who obtained the second highenumber of votes should be installed as regular Governor Leyte in accordance with the Court's ruling in G.R. N88004.While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petitito deny due course to the certificate of candidacy Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded w

Larrazabal considered as a bona-fide candidate. The voteof the province voted for her in the sincere belief that swas a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Hvotes were counted and she obtained the highest numbervotes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in telection. He was repudiated by the electorate. In the Frivaland Labo cases, this is precisely the reason why tcandidates who obtained the second highest number votes were not allowed to assume the positions vacated Frivaldo the governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, tposition of mayor in Baguio City. The nature of tproceedings therefore, is not that compelling. What matteis that in the event a candidate for an elected position whovoted for and who obtains the highest number of votes disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements the time of the election as provided by law, the candidawho obtains the second highest number of votes for t

same position can not assume the vacated position. It shoube stressed that in G.R. No. 88004, the Court set aside tdismissal of SPC No. 88-546, and directed the COMELEC conduct hearings to determine whether or not Larrazabwas qualified to be a candidate for the position of governin the province of Leyte. This is the import of the decision G.R. No. 88004. Thus, the Court ruled in the case of Labo, v. Commission on Elections:Finally, there is the question of whether or not the privarespondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replathe petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is thas he obtained only the second highest number of votes the election, he was obviously not the choice of the peopof Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case, t

candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected aftthe votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified asturncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregaas stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. Thdecision was supported by eight members of the Court thewith three dissenting and another two reserving their votOne was on official leave.... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as trepresentative of a constituency, the majority of which havpositively declared through their ballots that they do nchoose him.




Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled bythose who have received the highest number of votes cast inthe election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in allrepublican forms of government that no one can be declaredelected and no measure can be declared carried unless he orit receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast inthe election.

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highestnumber of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not

eligible for the office to which he was elected does notnecessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the secondhighest number of votes to be declared the winner of theelective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, ornon-eligible person may not be valid the vote the winner intooffice or maintain him there. However the absence of astatute which clearly asserts a contrary politics andlegislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in thesincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, oreligible, they should not be treated as stray, void ormeaningless.In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse andset aside the questioned decision and resolution of theCOMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in excessof jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.

Labo v. COMELEC (1989)FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in thePhilippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous.Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australianpassport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration(ACR). He later applied for a change in status fromimmigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, theCommission on Immigration and Deportation denied hisapplication for the cancellation of his ACR since he has notapplied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship.According to the records of the Australian Embassy (ascertified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still anAustralian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no directevidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes arenunciation of all other allegiance.Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the localelections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, LuisLardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging thatLabo is disqualified from holding public office on the groundsof alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation asMayor be annulled.

ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Courtconcerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Lardizabal'spetition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warrantowas not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the

jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship.However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case,

given that the issue is also of considerable importance (aforeign citizen holding public office in the Philippines), and inthe interest of the speedy administration of justice.

Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire intoLabo's citizenship?Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, asthe runner-up in the elections, replace him?

HELD/RATIO: Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warrantowas filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the

filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered tpetition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does nrequire the payment of such a fee. When the COMELreclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid tfiling fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-dperiod. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalitishould not hinder judicial decisions on significant issuesuch as the one being decided in this case.

Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippicitizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciatiof citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He hnot reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methoprescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (naturalization, and (3) repatriation.Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia dnot confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitutiexplicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to nationinterest.

The contention that his marriage to an Australian nationdid not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automaticaceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, h

Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upthe annulment of his Australian citizenship, when hmarriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.

The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contradecision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, andeven alleged to have been politically motivated. The lattcan be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata donot apply to questions of citizenship.

Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. Hwas not even a qualified voter when he was elected.

Despite getting the second highest number of voteLardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio CiLabo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to ta

office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.

*Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.):Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEand elevated to the SC for review, it is undeniable thatforeigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in tPhilippines. It is regrettable, however, that Labo should disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he halready achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during thpendency of the case.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996)

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governoelect and assume office in due time. The League Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition fannulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on t

ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having benaturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted tallegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defensthat his naturalization was merely forced upon himself asmeans of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by tMartial Law Dictator’s agent abroad.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of tPhilippines at the time of his election.

Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Coprovides that a qualified voter must be, among othqualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being




indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V,Section 1, of the Constitution.Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, suchforfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines thathe had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office arecontinuing requirements and must be possessed not only atthe time of appointment or election or assumption of officebut during the officer’s entire tenure.

Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines andtherefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of theProvince of Sorsogon.In the certificate of candidacy he filed, Frivaldo describedhimself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines,omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. Theevidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as acitizen of the United States in 1983 per the followingcertification from the United States District Court, NorthernDistrict of California, as duly authenticated by Vice ConsulAmado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in SanFrancisco, California, U.S.A.

This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, heexpressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earliernoted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government

through his agents in the United States. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitionerwas one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so,it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he wascoerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeblesuggestion that his naturalization was not the result of hisown free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable andmust be rejected outright.

There were many other Filipinos in the United Statessimilarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject togreater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor dothey claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherishedstatus as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance tothe United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnlydeclared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounceand abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have

heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his casethe Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquinoheads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who,unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenshipdespite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked theinternational law principle of effective nationality which isclearly not applicable to the case at bar. That case is notrelevant to the petition before us because it dealt with aconflict between the nationality laws of two states asdecided by a third state. No third state is involved in thecase at bar; in fact, even the United States is not activelyclaiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presentedto us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippinesunder our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. Wecan decide this question alone as sovereign of our own

territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Conventionproviding that "it is for each State to determine under its lawwho are its nationals." It is also worth noting thatNottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtensteinwhereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting hisnaturalization in the United States.If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship andreacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should havedone so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CANo. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippinecitizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, bynaturalization, or by repatriation.It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categoricalacts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of

candidacy he had, without more, already effectiverecovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formdeclaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenshpreviously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If tSpecial Committee had not yet been convened, what thmeant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until thwas done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicproceedings.Gutierrez Jr, Concurring: I concur in the pragma

approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the highinterests of the State are involved, the public good shousupersede any procedural infinities which may affectpetition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to show the Court could allow a person who by his owadmissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding toffice of Governor of any province.It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixby law for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional.As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul tpetitioner's election and proclamation should have been filwith ten days after the proclamation of election results. Tpurpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protesbeyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain andefinite time within which petitions against the results of

election should be filed and to provide summary proceedinfor the settlement of such disputes. The Rules of Court allothe Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranproceedings against any public officer who performs an awhich works a forfeiture of his office. However, where tSolicitor General or the President feel that there are no goreasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, the Coushould allow a person like Estuye or his league to bring thaction.I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limiteto a clear case of an alien holding an elective public officAnd perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on agresidence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.

The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that tCourt found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision

COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering ttotal lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrainto concur in the procedure pro hac vice.

Mercado v. Manzano (1999)

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set asithe resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declaManzano disqualified to hold the office of vice-mayor Makati City. Important details on Edu Manzano: boSeptember 4, 1955 in San Francisco, California, USA Filipino parents.

On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of MakaCity, 3 candidates competed for the post: Eduardo Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and Gabriel V. Daza

Manzano won the elections but his proclamation wsuspended due to a pending petition for disqualification filby a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging that Manzano was American citizen. On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of thCOMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Manzaon the grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies haccording to Sec.40(d) of the Local Government CodManzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado sougto intervene in the case for disqualification. Manzaopposed the motion to intervene. The motion wunresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en ba(with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed the SecoDivision’s ruling on the cancellation of the certificate




candidacy and directing the proclamation of Manzano aswinner, saying:

Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US citizenship byoperation of the US constitution and laws under principle of jus soli (basis is place of birth). Yet, by being born to Filipino parents, Manzano natural bornFilipino citizen, by operation of the 1935 PhilippineConstitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the right

of blood).Although he is registered as an alien with the PhilippineBureau of Immigration and holds and American passport, hehas not lost his Filipino citizenship since he has notrenounced it and has not taken an oath of allegiance to theUSA.Manzano, after the age of majority, registered himself as avoter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 Philippineelections which effectively renounced his US citizenshipunder American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer hadUS citizenship.

Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati City.

ISSUES:

WON petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suitconsidering that he was not an original party in the case fordisqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was his motionfor leave to intervene granted. Yes.WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so, WON heis disqualified from being a candidate for vice-mayor in

Makati City. No.

REASONS: Manzano argues that Mercado has neither legalinterest in the matter of litigation nor an interest to protectbecause he is “a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoraltypost of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent beultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.”

This assumes that at the time intervention was sought, therehad already been a proclamation of the election results forthe vice-mayoralty elections when in fact, there has notbeen such a proclamation. Certainly, the petitioner had, andstill has an interest in ousting private respondent from therace when he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.COMELEC only applies when the election of the respondent iscontested, and the question is WON the second placer maybe declared winner. If Mamaril was competent to bringaction, so was Mercado, being a rival candidate.Petitioner has right to intervene even if he filed the motionon May 20, 1998, when it was shown that the privaterespondent had the most votes. Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 provides that intervention may be allowed inproceedings for disqualification even after election if there has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion forintervention was tantamount to denial of the motion,

justifying this petition for certiorari.

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex , petitioner contendsthat through Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code (whichdeclares as “disqualified from running for elective localposition… Those with dual-citizenship”), Congress has“command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of personspossessing dual allegiance to hold elective office.”Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dualcitizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be anational by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a result of a person’s volition; it is a situation wherein a personsimultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two ormore states. Dual citizenship is an issue because a personwho has this raises a question of which state’s law must

apply to him/her, therefore posting a threat to a countrysovereignty. In Sec.5 Article IV of the Constitution Citizenship, the concern was not with dual citizenship per sbut with naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to thcountries of origin even after naturalization. Hence, “ducitizenship” in the aforementioned disqualification claumust mean “dual allegiance”. Therefore, persons with medual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidac

such persons with dual citizenships have elected thPhilippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. private respondent’s certificate of candidacy, he made thestatements under oath on March 27, 1998: “I am a Filipincitizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a permaneresident of , or immigrant to , a foreign country.” am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I wsupport and defend the Constitution of tPhilippines and will maintain true faith and allegiancthereto…” The filing of such certificate of candidasufficed to renounce his American citizenshieffectively removing any disqualification he mighave as a dual-citizen. In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, it was hethat “By laws of the United States… Frivaldo lost hAmerican citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor

1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to tPhilippine Government.” Therefore, petitioner Mercadocontention that the oath of allegiance contained in privarespondent’s certificate of candidacy is insufficient constitute his renunciation of his American citizenship. Alsequally without merit is his contention that, to be effectivsuch renunciation should have been made upon reaching tage of majority since no law requires the election Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.Plus, the fact that Manzano admitted that he was registeras an American citizen with the Philippine Bureau Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an Americpassport which he used for his last travel to the US dateApril 22, 1997should not be such a big deal. At the time said travel, the use of an American passport was simply assertion of his American nationality before the terminati

of his American citizenship. Admitting that he was registered alien does not mean that he is not still a Filipi( Aznar v. COMELEC).Manzano’s oath of allegiance, together with the fact he hspent his life here, received his education here, apracticed his profession here, and has taken part in paPhilippine elections, leaves no doubt of his election Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari, DISMISSED. *Ineligibilrefers to lack of qualifications prescribed.

Coquilla v. COMELEC (2002)

Nature: Petition for certiorari to set aside the resolutiodated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division of the COMELEordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy

petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and torder, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en badenying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.Special CiAction in the SC. Certiorari

Facts: February 17, 1938 – Coquilla was born of Filipiparents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and residthere until 1965, when he joined the US Navy. He wsubsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.1970-1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after hretirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in tU.S.




October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines andtook out a residence certificate, although he continuedmaking several trips to the U.S. the last of which took placeon July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A.No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization whichwas approved Nov. 7, 2000Nov. 10, 2000 – oath-taking as Filipino citizen; issuedCertificate of Repatriation No. 000737 and Bureau of

Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 three daysafterNovember 21, 2000 - applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. Approved by ElectionRegistration Board on January 12, 2001.February 27, 2001 – filed certificate of candidacy statingtherein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samarfor "two (2) years."March 5, 2001, Neil M. Alvarez—respondent, incumbentmayor of Oras and reelectionist—sought cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that thelatter had made a material misrepresentation in hiscertificate of candidacy by stating that he had been aresident of Oras for two years when in truth he had residedtherein for only about six months since November 10, 2000,when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

COMELEC unable to render judgment on the case before theelections on May 14, 2001 where petitioner won over privaterespondent’s by 379 votes.May 17, 2001 - petitioner proclaimed mayor of Oras by theMunicipal Board of Canvassers and subsequently took hisoath of office.

July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC grantedprivate respondent’s petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the basis therespondent’s frequent or regular trips to the Philippines andstay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from theU.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be added to his actual residencethereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to curehis deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or renderhim eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines.

The 1-yr residency requirement of Sec 39(a) of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 in relation to Secs 65 and 68 of

the Omnibus Election Code contemplates of the actualresidence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where heseeks to be elected.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motionwas denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002.Hence this petition.

Issues:WON the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motionfor reconsideration by petitioner.Private respondent contention: petition should be dismissedcause his motion for reconsideration was denied for beingpro forma and did not suspend the running of the 30-dayperiod for filing this petition, pursuant to Rule 19, §4 of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure, so and since the resolution

was received on July 28, 2001 and the petition in this casewas filed on February 11, 2002, the same should beconsidered as having been filed late and should bedismissed.Petitioner’s MFR and petition for certiorari were filed withinthe prescribed periods. 5-day period for filing MFR underRule 19, §2 should be counted from receipt of decision,resolution, order, or ruling of COMELEC. In this case,petitioner received a copy of COMELEC’s Second Division July19, ‘01 resolution on July 28, 2001. 5 days later, on Aug. 2,‘01, he filed his MFR. On Feb. 6, ‘02, he received a copy of the order, dated Jan. 30, ‘02, of the COMELEC en bancdenying his MFR. 5 days later, on Feb 11, 02, he filed thispetition for certiorari.

Contention that petitioner’s MFR did not suspend the runniof the period for filing this petition because the motion wpro forma and, thus, petition should’ve been filed on before Aug 27, 01 is not correct. It was actually filehowever, only on February 11, 2002. The MFR was not pforma and its filing did suspend the period for filing tpetition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration inmotion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the partiand passed upon by the court does not make a motion p

forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not bereconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some othremedy.In the cases where MFR was held to be pro forma, the motiowas so held becauseit was a second motion for reconsideration, orit did not comply with the rule that the motion must specthe findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law not supported by the evidence,orit failed to substantiate the alleged errors, orit merely alleged that the decision in question was contrato law, orthe adverse party was not given notice thereof.Petitioner’s MFR suffers from none of these defects, aCOMELEC erred in ruling that petitioner’s MFR was pro formbecause the allegations raised therein are a mere "rehas

of his earlier pleadings or did not raise "new matterHence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of t30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, earlier shown, was done within the reglementary periprovided by law.

WON COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide thcase notwithstanding the proclamation of petitionerR.A. No. 6646, Sec 6 & 7: Candidates who are disqualified final judgment before the election shall not be voted for athe votes cast for them shall not be counted. But thoagainst whom no final judgment of disqualification had berendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends thproclamation because the grounds for their disqualificatior cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are stronMeanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidat

or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacwhich have been begun before the elections, shoucontinue even after such elections and proclamation of twinners.In Abella v. COMELEC and Salcedo II v. COMELEC – the SC,the first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed tdecisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamationcandidates, not on the ground that the latter had bedivested of jurisdiction upon the candidates’ proclamatibut on the merits.

WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras, EasteSamar at least one (1) year before the elections heon May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificaof candidacy.No.

First, §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 716provides: An elective local official must be a citizen of tPhilippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipalicity, or province or, in the case of a member of tsangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to elected; a resident therein for at least 1 year immediatepreceding the day of the election; and able to read and wrFilipino or any other local language or dialect.“Residence" is to be understood as referring to "domicile" legal residence—the place where a party actually constructively has his permanent home, where he, no mattwhere he may be found at any given time, eventuaintends to return and remain (animus manendi).




A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It isusually the place where the child’s parents reside andcontinues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of newdomicile (domicile of choice).In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin inOras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.Navy in 1965. From then on and until Nov. 10, ‘00, when hereacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alienwithout any right to reside in the Philippines save as our

immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitoror as a resident alien.If immigration to the United States by virtue of a"greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in thatcountry, constitutes abandonment of domicile in thePhilippines (Caasi v. CA), much more does naturalization in aforeign country result in an abandonment of domicile in thePhilippines, as was the case with the petitioner.Petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, whichapplies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippinecitizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the US, but under R.A. No. 8171, which provides for therepatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who losttheir citizenship on account of political or economicnecessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having beennaturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with

it his residence in the Philippines and had not reacquired ituntil November 10, 00Second, petitioner did not reestablished residence in thiscountry in 1998 when he came back to prepare for themayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community TaxCertificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to histownmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run formayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.

The status of being an alien and a non-resident can bewaived either separately, when one acquires the status of aresident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or atthe same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. Asan alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under§13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and anImmigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive hisstatus as a non-resident.On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by

naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is aformer Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippinecitizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in whichcase he waives not only his status as an alien but also hisstatus as a non-resident alien.In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s statuswhen he entered the country on Oct and Dec ’98, Oct ‘99,and June ‘00 is the statement "Philippine Immigration (–)Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entryon Aug 5, ‘00, the stamp bore the added inscription "goodfor one year stay." Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An ActInstituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayanincludes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized ina foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippinesand, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entryto the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (§3(c)). It

would appear then that when petitioner entered the countryon the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayanvisitor whose stay as such was valid for 1-yr only. Hence,petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as analien and as a non-resident only on Nov 10, ‘00 upon takinghis oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171.He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for themayorship of OrasPetitioner cannot invoke the ruling in the cases Frivaldo v.Commission on Elections and Bengson as residency was notan issue in these.

Third, petitioner’s contends that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus

Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in tPhilippines for at least one year and in the city municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least smonths immediately preceding the election. But, registratias a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent caquestioning a candidate’s lack of residency (Nuval v. GurayFourth, petitioner was not denied due process because tCOMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to preseevidence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No. 664

(Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeIn any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum andManifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before tCOMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him this petition, which, contrary to petitioner’s claim, acomplete and intact in the records.

WON COMELEC was justified in ordering tcancellation of his certificate of candidacy since thstatement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy thhe had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar f"two years" at the time he filed such certificate is ntrue.

Yes. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fain his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificaliable to cancellation.Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a verifipetition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificaof candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on thground that any material representation contained therein required under Section 74 hereof is false.In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statemeconcerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for whihe filed the certificate of candidacy. This is misrepresentation of a material fact justifying tcancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. Tcancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in thcase is thus fully justified.

Judgment: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and t

resolution of the Second Division of the Commission Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated Janua30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc aAFFIRMED.

Disqualifications

Caasi v. CA (1990)

Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the locelections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, howevewas sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the grouthat under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code privarespondent was not qualified because he is a green caholder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States America, not of Bolinao.

Issues:1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder ispermanent resident of the United State2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status aspermanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to tlocal elections on January 18, 1988.

Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s application fimmigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. ahis possession of a green card attesting to such status aconclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the Udespite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiversuch immigrant status should be as indubitable as h




application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made anirrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered hisgreen card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ranfor mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18,1988, the Court’s conclusion is that he was disqualified torun for said public office, hence, his election thereto was nulland void.Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and

this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any publicofficer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country duringhis tenure shall be dealt with by law.In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the OmnibusElection Code of the Philippines provides:SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not bequalified to run for any elective office under this Code,unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordancewith the residence requirement provided for in the electionlaws.In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significantthat in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and AlienRegistration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting

and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before hisdeparture for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer toQuestion No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intendedstay ," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued bythe United States Department of Justice and Immigration andRegistration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear boldletters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, theupper portion, the following information is printed: Personidentified by this card is entitled to reside permanently andwork in the United States."Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to theUnited States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of hisdomicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not goto the United States merely to visit his children or his doctorthere; he entered the limited States with the intention tohave there permanently as evidenced by his application for

an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based onthat application of his, he was issued by the U.S.Government the requisite green card or authority to residethere permanently.Immigration is the removing into one place from another; theact of immigrating the entering into a country with theintention of residing in it. As a resident alien in the U.S.,Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., thecountry in which he resides. This is in return for theprotection given to him during the period of his residencetherein.Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which providesthat "any public officer or employee who seeks to change hiscitizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of anothercountry during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is notapplicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an

immigrant of the United States before he was elected topublic office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao,Pangasinan.Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinaoin the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as apermanent resident or immigrant of the United States?

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines,the law requires that the candidate who is a green cardholder must have "waived his status as a permanentresident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, hisact of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in thePhilippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his statusas a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.

The waiver of his green card should be manifested by somact or acts independent of and done prior to filing hcandidacy for elective office in this country. Without suprior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any electioffice"Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves thhe is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the UniteStates, but the records of this case are starkly bare of prothat he had waived his status as such before he ran f

election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 198We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to becomecandidate for that office.

The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Codenot hard to find. Residence in the municipality where intends to run for elective office for at least 1 year at ttime of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of tqualifications that a candidate for elective public office mupossess (Sec. 42, LGC). Miguel did not possess thqualification because he was a permanent resident of thUnited States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of onlymonths (not one year) after his return to the Philippines Nov 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipalon Jan 18, 1988.In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens ware permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign count

the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy excluding from the right to hold elective public office thoPhilippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegianc

The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who hacast their lot with our country "without mental reservatioor purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who aresident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of suentire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homelafor with one eye on their public duties here, they must keeanother eye on their duties under the laws of the foreigcountry of their choice in order to preserve their status permanent residents thereof.Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigratiand permanent residence in the United States, he nevreally intended to live there permanently, for all that wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Cou

believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. undfalse pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in tUnited States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Eveif that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a parto his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, agiving him the best of both worlds so to speak.Miguel's application for immigrant status and permaneresidence in the U.S. and his possession of a green caattesting to such status are conclusive proof that he ispermanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visto the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant statshould be as indubitable as his application for it. Abseclear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of thstatus or that he surrendered his green card to tappropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, o

conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said puboffice, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

Marquez v. COMELEC (1995)

Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodrigufiled his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge againhim for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft personal property was still pending before the MunicipCourt of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court fhis arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on privarespondent on account of his alleged “flight” from thcountry.Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation respondent’s certificate of candidacy on the ground of t




candidate’s disqualification was filed by petitioner, butCOMELEC dismissed the petition.Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedingsagainst private respondent before the COMELEC but thelatter dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of thefiling of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a

criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrantof arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice.”

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of theRules and Regulations implementing the Local GovernmentCode of 1991 provides:“Article 73. Disqualifications – The following persons shall bedisqualified from running for any elective local position:“(a) xxxx“(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political caseshere or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person whohas been convicted by final judgment.”It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice referonly to persons who has been convicted by final judgment.However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding onwhether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice

when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. TheCourt opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve andproceed with the case.

The Oversight Committee evidently entertained seriousapprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualification therein meantwere to be so taken as to embrace those who merely werefacing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed bySenator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameralconference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made this reservation: . . . de ipa-refinelang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a.

The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LocalGovernment Code of 1991. It provided:Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be

disqualified from running for any elective local position:(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political caseshere or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person whohas been convicted by final judgment .

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placedupon law by the officials in charge of its enforcementdeserves great and considerable weight . The Court certainlyagrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity andambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made toapply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulationcan neither expand nor constrict the law but must remaincongruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente, that Article73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LocalGovernment Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines theterm "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the

fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is aninordinate and undue circumscription of the law.Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definitefinding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a"fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted andapplied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission isunderstandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly thepetition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the OversightCommittee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thusconstrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for adetermination of this unresolved factual matter.

Davide, Concurring. The term "fugitive from justice" refenot only to those who flee after conviction to avopunishment but also to those who, after being charged, fleto avoid prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitfinds the definition given to it by the Oversight Committei.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," appearing in Article 73 of the Rules and RegulatioImplementing the Local Government Code of 1991, inordinate and as undue circumscription of the law. I agre

But this is only one side of the coin. I further submit thatalso unreasonably expands the scope of the disqualificatiin the 1991 Local Government Code because it disqualifiall those who have been convicted by final judgmeregardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and whether they have served or are serving their sentences have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail or leavinfor another country. The definition thus disregards the trand accepted meaning of the word fugitive. This ndefinition is unwarranted for nothing in the legislatidebates has been shown to sustain it and the clear languaof the law leaves no room for a re-examination of tmeaning of the term.I do not share the doubt of Mr. Justice Vitug on tconstitutionality of the disqualification based on tpresumption of innocence clause of the Bill of Rights. The

are certain fundamental considerations which do not suppothe applications of the presumptionFirstly, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes tauthority of Congress to determine who are disqualified froexercising the right of suffrage. Since the minimurequirement of a candidate for a public office is that he mube a qualified voter, it logically follows that Congress has tplenary power to determine who are disqualified to seelection for a public office. Secondly, a public office ispublic trust. Thirdly, the disqualification in question does nin reality, involve the issue of presumption of innocencElsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he presumed guilty by the filing of an information or crimincomplaint against him. He is disqualified because he is"fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought within t

jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evadarrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of t

court and was tried and convicted, he has successfuevaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight fro justice. In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is aindication of guilt, it may even be truly said that it is not thchallenged disqualifying provision which overcomes tpresumption of innocence but rather the disqualified pershimself who has proven his guilt.

Rodriguez v. COMELEC (1996)

Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was candidate for Governor in the Province of Quezon in the M8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said positiwas Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondePrivate respondent filed a petition for disqualification befothe COMELEC based principally on the allegation th

Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” Private responderevealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claimgrand theft and attempted grand theft of personal properis pending against the petitioner before the Los AngelMunicipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive fro

justice” which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibilunder Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Coaccording to Marquez.Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from tCommission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left tUS on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to tinstitution of the criminal complaint filed against him befothe Los Angeles Court.




The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court,on December 26, 1995, a report entitled "'EVIDENCE OF THEPARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein theCOMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declaredthat Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined inthe main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a180-degree turnaround from its finding in the ConsolidatedResolution. In arriving at this new conclusion, the COMELECopined that intent to evade is a material element of the

MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absentin Rodriguez' case because evidence has established thatRodriguez arrived in the Philippines long before the criminalcharge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court.But the COMELEC report did not end there. The poll bodyexpressed what it describes as its "persistent discomfort" onwhether it read and applied correctly the MARQUEZ Decisiondefinition of "fugitive from justice".

Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.”

Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a “fugitivefrom justice” includes not only those who flee afterconviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, beingcharged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus

indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factorthat animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. Andobviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecutionor punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeingsubject of an already instituted indictment or of apromulgated judgement of conviction.

The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is thecompelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular

jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent toevade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledgeby the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, orof a promulgated judgment of conviction.Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is nodispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995, preceded

the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court onNovember 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of thearrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five (5)months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to haveknown about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at thetime he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint andarrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at suchtime. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguezdeliberately running away from with his departure from theUS? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice"under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere tobe found in the circumstances of Rodriguez.

The circumstantial fact that it was 17 days after Rodriguez'departure that charges against him were filed cannotoverturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. Thesame suggests nothing more than the sequence of events

which transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner'spurpose cannot be inferred from the objective data at handin the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. Infact, the evidence of Rodriguez sufficiently proves that hiscompulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desireto join and participate vigorously in the political campaignsagainst former President Marcos. For indeed, not long afterpetitioner's arrival in the country, the upheaval wrought bythe political forces and the avalanche of events whichoccurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in thePhilippine history. And being a figure in these developments,Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-BoardMember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in1986. Then, he was elected Governor in 1988 and continues

to be involved in politics in the same capacity as re-electGovernor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in 199Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for petitionerperiod of relentless, intensive and extensive activity varied political campaigns first against the Marcgovernment, then for the governorship. And serving tpeople of Quezon province as such, the position entaabsolute dedication of one's time to the demands of toffice.

Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of tcharges to be filed against him at the time he left the UnitStates, it becomes immaterial under such construction determine the exact time when he was made aware thereWhile the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, donot countenance flight from justice in the instance thatperson flees the jurisdiction of another state after chargagainst him or a warrant for his arrest was issued or even view of the imminent filing and issuance of the sampetitioner's plight is altogether a different situation. When,good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not hown, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of chargfiled against him while in the relative peace and service his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify houtright as a fugitive from justice.

However, Marquez and the COMELEC seem to urthe Court to re-define "fugitive from justice". They espouthe broader concept of the term and culled from foreiauthoritie scited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., thone becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact thhe leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending againhim, regardless of whether or not the charge has alreabeen filed at the time of his flight.Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbithe Court to craft an expanded re-definition of "fugitive fro justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decisioand proceed therefrom in resolving the instant petition. Tvarious definitions of that doctrine have been laid down People v . Pinuila. To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguand Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is"fugitive from justice") are involved in the MARQUEDecision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decisi

was an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 (the Marquez' qwarranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petitiis also an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 although the COMELresolved the latter jointly with SPA No. 95-089 (Marqupetition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefowhat was irrevocably established as the controlling legal ruin the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petitioAnd we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive fro justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEDecision which highlights the significance of an intent evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with thproposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize. Besides, re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instabilin our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in thMARQUEZ Decision.

Torres, Jr: Petitioner returned to the Philippines from tUnited States on June 25, 1985 while the criminal complaiagainst him for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft aattempted grand theft of personal property was filed almo5 months later, or on November 12, 1985. Verily, it cannbe said that he fled to avoid prosecution for at the time left the United States, there was yet no case or prosecutioto avoid. That petitioner did not know of the imminent filiof charges against him and that he did not flee to avoprosecution are bolstered by the facts that: 1.) he returneto the United States twice: on August 14 and October 7 the same year but arrived in the Philippines on October 2likewise in the same year; 2.) he left his wife in the UniteStates; and 3.) his wife was later on arrested for the sam




charges. Had petitioner been aware of the imminent filing of charges against him, he would never have returned to theUnited States and he would not have left his wife in there.Petitioner is a citizen of this country. Why should he notcome home? Coming home to the Philippines was the mostnatural act of the petitioner, who happens to maintain hisresidence in the country. The fact that he remains here evenafter he was formally accused cannot be construed as anindication of an intent to flee, there being no compelling

reason for him to go to the United States and face hisaccusers. On the contrary, it is his official duty, as anincumbent Governor of Quezon, to remain in the country andperform his duties as the duly elected public official."Fugitive from justice" must be given a meaning in theinstant case having regard to "the circumstances and thetime it is used." Philosophers and jurists have triedunsuccessfully at an exact definition of such an abstruseterm as justice. Unfortunately, whether in the metaphysicalsense or otherwise, the question of justice is stillunanswered as it ever was albeit characterized by secularskepticism. If the question is asked: What standard of justiceshould we enforce? The American sense of justice or thePhilippine sense of justice? Undoubtedly, the forum in whichit is raised should be controlling. By way only of hypothesis,if an American flees to escape from Philippine Laws to the

United States, may we enforce in the United States ourstandard of justice based on Philippine Laws? I am temptedto ask these questions considering our zealousness to solvelegal problems in the light of laws obtaining in the UnitedStates.At any rate, an accused charged with a crime in thePhilippines cannot be a candidate and at the same time fleefrom prosecution. Once he goes campaigning his opponentwould have him arrested. For this and the reasons abovediscussed, the provision on disqualification of fugitive from

justice, being unnecessary and serving only to undermineone's constitutional right to equal access to opportunities forpublic service, should even be scantily considered.Finally, petitioner appears to have garnered 285,202 votes.According to the election results, petitioner won over privaterespondent by a majority of 140,000 votes more or less. As itis, to disqualify petitioner on the shaky ground of being a

"fugitive from justice" would amount to disenfranchising theelectorate in whom sovereignty resides.

De la Torre v. COMELEC (1996)

Facts: Rolando P. Dela Torre filed an instant petition forcertiorari seeks the nullification of resolutions issued by theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) allegedly with graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a casefor disqualification filed against him before the COMELEC.

The first assailed resolution dated 6 May 1995 declared dela Torre disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the 8 May 1995 elections, citing as theground therefor, Section 40(a) of RA 7160 (i.e. “Thosesentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moralturpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence”); the

other is the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the crime of fencing involves moralturpitude

Held: A crime involving moral turpitude is one which is“an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the privateduties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society ingeneral, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” The elementsof the crime of fencing (as gleaned from the definition of fencing in Section 2 of PD 1612, Anti-fencing Law) are: (1) Acrime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) The

accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquireconceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in amanner deals in any article, item, object or anything value, which have been deprived from the proceeds of tsaid crime; (3) The accused knows or should have knowthat the said article, item, object or anything of value hbeen derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery theft; and (4) There is, on the part of the accused, intent

gain for himself or for another.” Moral turpitude is deducibfrom the third element. Actual knowledge by the “fence” the fact that property received is stolen displays the samdegree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their venature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Thus, the COMELEdid not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground ththe offense of fencing of which he had been previouconvicted by final judgment was one involving moturpitude.

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actuknowledge by the “fence” of the fact that good morals.” Tduty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquireither by mistake or with malice is so basic it finexpression in some key provisions of the Civil Code

“Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti.Verily, circumstances normally exist to forewarn, finstance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of tproperty received is stolen displays the same degree malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that whianimated the robbery or theft which, by their very naturare crimes of moral turpitude. And although tparticipation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actuperpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peacedominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the proce“ private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society ” inmanner “contrary to x x x accepted and customary rule right and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x or sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of tsale, both of which may not be in accord with the usu

practices of commerce. The nature and condition of tgoods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regulaengaged in the business of selling goods may likewsuggest the illegality of their source, and therefore shoucaution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that “mere possession of agoods, x x x, object or anything of value which has been tsubject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidenof fencing”- a presumption that is, according to the Cou“reasonable for no other natural or logical inference carise from the established fact of x x x possession of th proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.” All told, tCOMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on tground that the offense of fencing of which he had bepreviously convicted by final judgment was one involvimoral turpitude.

Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that hprobation had the effect of suspending the applicability Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code, suffice it say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend thexecution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fenciwhich we have heretofore declared as a crime of moturpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualificatifound in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totaunaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact

judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attaifinality when the accused applies for probation, although itnot executory pending resolution of the application fprobation. Clearly then, petitioner’s theory has no merit.




Magno v. COMELEC (2002)

Facts: This is a petition for the disqualification of NestorMagno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecijaduring the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground thatpetitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter, petitioner appliedfor probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 uponorder of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. TheComelec ruled that petitioner was disqualified from runningfor the position of mayor by virtue of Section 12 of BP 881(Omnibus Election Code) (crime involving moral turpitude,shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.) According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as petitionerwas considered to have completed the service of hissentence on March 5, 1998, his five-year disqualification willend only on March 5, 2003. The MR was denied the byComelec.

Issue: WON direct bribery is a crime involving moralturpitude

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioner argues that direct bribery is not a crime

involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he cites Section 40 of RA 7160, which he claims is the law applicable to the case atbar, not BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code as claimed bythe COMELEC. Said provision reads: Section 40.Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Thosesentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moralturpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after servingsentence.Petitioner insists that he had already served his sentence asof March 5, 1998 when he was discharged from probation.Such being the case, the two-year disqualification periodimposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Codeexpired on March 5, 2000. Thus, petitioner was qualified torun in the 2001 elections.‘Moral turpitude’ is “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and womanor conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. Itfrequently depends on the circumstances surrounding theviolation of the law. In this case, we need not review thefacts and circumstances relating to the commission of thecrime considering that petitioner did not assail hisconviction. By applying for probation, petitioner in effectadmitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:the offender is a public officer;the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another ;such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be

received by the public officer with a view to committingsome crime, or in consideration of the execution of an actwhich does not constitute a crime but the act must beunjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is hisofficial duty to do; andthe act which the offender agrees to perform or which heexecutes is connected with the performance of his officialduties.Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. Thefact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift anddeliberately commits an unjust act or refrains fromperforming an official duty in exchange for some favors,denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender torenege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and

society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takadvantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trureposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrato the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty angood morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a criminvolving moral turpitude.

Issue: What law should apply in this case

Held: Local Government Code

Ratio: It is the second sub-issue which is problematic There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between tfive-year disqualification period provided in Section 12 of tOmnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualificatiperiod in Section 40 of the Local Government Code.It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 88was approved on December 3, 1985 while the LocGovernment Code (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 199It is basic in statutory construction that in case irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactmemust prevail, being the more recent expression of legislatiwill. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant . enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to haknowledge of the older law and intended to change

Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 71or the Local Government Code states that: (f) All general anspecial laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive order proclamations and administrative regulations, or part parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed have repealed Section 12 of BP 881. Furthermore, Articleof the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only subsequent ones, and not the other way around. Whensubsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.

The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualificatiperiod of candidates for local positions from five to two yeais evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all lawis to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. Treduction of the disqualification period from five to two yea

is the manifest intent. Therefore, although his crime of direbribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonethelecould not be disqualified from running in the 2001 electionArticle 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yieto Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 ahe was therefore under no such disqualification anymowhen he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the M14, 2001 elections.Unfortunately, however, neither this Court nor this case the proper forum to rule on (1) the validity of Sonia Lorenzoproclamation and (2) the declaration of petitioner as trightful winner. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had alreabeen proclaimed as the winning candidate, the legal remeof petitioner would have been a timely election protest.

Lingating v. COMELEC (2002)Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for the disqualification Sulong, pursuant to §40(b) of RA 7160 which disqualififrom running for any elective local position “those removefrom office as a result of an administrative case.” It appeathat Sulong had previously won as mayor of Lapuyan

January 18, 1988. In the May 11, 1992, and again in the M8, 1995 elections, he was reelected. In a petition fdisqualification, petitioner alleged that in 1991, during hfirst term as mayor of Lapuyan, Sulong, along withmunicipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other individuawas administratively charged with various offenses, athat, on February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang PanlalawiganZamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges a




ordered his removal from office. Petitioner claimed that thisdecision had become final and executory, and consequentlythe then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, took hisoath as mayor.

The comelec was unable to render judgment before theelections, Rulong was voted for in the elections and he wonas mayor. The comelec then rendered a decision declaringSulong disqualified as he was guilty of violating the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Sulong filed an MR

contending that the decision has not become final andexecutor as the final disposition thereof was overtaken bythe local elections of May 1992.

The comelec en banc, however, reversed. It ruled that whileit is true that one of the disqualifications from running in anelective position is removal from office as a result of anadministrative case, said provision no longer applies if thecandidate whose qualification is questioned got re-elected toanother term. The re-election of Sulong in the 1992 and1995 elections would be tantamount to a condonation of theSangguniang Panlalawigan decision which found him guiltyof dishonesty, malversation of public funds etc[.], grantingsaid decision has become final and executory.Moreover, the people of LAPUYAN have already expressedtheir will when they cast their votes in the recent electionsas evidenced by the results which found respondent Sulong

to have won convincingly.

Issue: WON Sulong was entitled to occupy the office thusvacated

Held: Yes

Ratio: We stated in Reyes: Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a publicofficial could not be removed for misconduct committedduring a prior term and that his reelection operated as acondonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to theextent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. Butthat was because in that case, before the petitionquestioning the validity of the administrative decisionremoving petitioner could be decided, the term of officeduring which the alleged misconduct was committed

expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term duringwhich the alleged misconduct was committed. If a publicofficial is not removed before his term of office expires, hecan no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected [for]another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases. The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here,the decision in the administrative case, was served onpetitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995,because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of thePresident. He was thus validly removed from office and,pursuant to §40(b) of the Local Government Code, he wasdisqualified from running for reelection.It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases weredecided there was no provision similar to §40(b) whichdisqualifies any person from running for any elective position

on the ground that he has been removed as a result of anadministrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991(R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.However, Reyes cannot be applied to this case because itappears that the 1992 decision of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public funds,has not until now become final. The records of this caseshow that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga delSur rendered judgment in AC No. 12-91 on February 4, 1992,a copy of which was received by respondent Sulong onFebruary 17, 1992; that on February 18, 1992, he filed a“motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal;” that onFebruary 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, required

Jim Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to commenand that the complainant in AC No. 12-91 has not filedcomment nor has the Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolvrespondent’s motion. The filing of his motion freconsideration prevented the decision of SangguniaPanlalawigan from becoming final.While R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on tfiling of a motion for reconsideration, the same cannot interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion f

reconsideration. Thus, it was held that a party in disbarment proceeding under Rule 139-B, §12(c) can mofor a reconsideration of a resolution of the Integrated Bar the Philippines although Rule 139-B does not so providAlthough Rule 139-B, §12(c) makes no mention of a motiofor reconsideration, nothing in its text or history suggesthat such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed . . Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouragbefore [an appeal is] resort[ed] to . . . as a matter exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agenrendering the judgment [an] opportunity to correct any errit may have committed through a misapprehension of facor misappreciation of evidence.

There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speof. As Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur WilfreCimafranca attested, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simp

considered the matter as having become moot aacademic because it was “overtaken by the local elections May [11,]1992.”Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, and the highest ranking municipcouncilor of Lapuyan, Romeo Tan, to the offices of mayor avice-mayor, respectively, be considered proof that tdecision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because appears to have been made pursuant to §68 of the LocGovernment Code, which makes decisions in administraticases immediately executory.Indeed, considering the failure of the SangguniaPanlalawigan to resolve respondent’s motion, it is unfair the electorate to be told after they have voted frespondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especiasince, at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, thdecision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had be

rendered nearly ten years ago.

Flores v. Drilon (1998)

Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion aDevelopment Act of 1992," under which Mayor RichardGordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and ChExecutive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Author(SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer fprohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restrainiorder. Under said provision, “for the first year of operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of thCity of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman anchief executive officer of the Subic Authority.” Petitioners, as taxpayers, contend that said provision unconstitutional as under the following constitutional a

statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of tConstitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall beligible for appointment or designation in any capacity any public officer or position during his tenure," because tCity Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and tsubject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of tConstitution, which provides that "[t]he President shappoint all other officers of the Government whoappointments are not otherwise provided for by law, athose whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", sinit was Congress through the questioned proviso and not tPresident who appointed the Mayor to the subject posand, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code.




Issue: WON the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227violates the constitutional proscription against appointmentor designation of elective officials to other government posts

Held: Yes

Ratio: The rule expresses the policy against theconcentration of several public positions in one person, sothat a public officer or employee may serve full-time with

dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of publicservices. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time

job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of anexecutive department described in Civil Liberties Union v.Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft Leagueof the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815, should be allowed toattend to his duties and responsibilities without thedistraction of other governmental duties or employment. Heshould be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attentionand energy among too many positions of responsibility,which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.In the case before us, the subject proviso directs thePresident to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is

precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks toprevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination toconclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art.IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higherinterest of the body politic is of no moment.It is argued that Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointmentof a local elective official to another post if so allowed by lawor by the primary functions of his office. But, the contentionis fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for nolegislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of theland. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGCis not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declaredunconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. Neither canwe invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authorityfor its validity.

In any case, the view that an elective official may beappointed to another post if allowed by law or by theprimary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cutdifference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7,Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraphauthorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointiveofficial when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringentby not providing any exception to the rule againstappointment or designation of an elective official to thegovernment post, except as are particularly recognized inthe Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of theeconomic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who maybe appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the

Judicial and Bar Council.

It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officioto the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, anexcepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v.Executive Secretary , where we stated that the prohibitionagainst the holding of any other office or employment by thePresident, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and theirdeputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided inSec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehendadditional duties and functions required by the primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to performthem in an ex officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor . Thisargument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congressdid not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex

officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phra"shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been tlegislative intent to make the subject positions ex officCongress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointeand, instead, "ex officio" would have been used. Even in tSenate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware th

subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-but they nevertheless passed the bill and decided to hathe controversy resolved by the courts. Indeed, the Senatowould not have been concerned with the effects of Sec. first par., had they considered the SBMA posts as ex officioCognizant of the complication that may arise from the wthe subject proviso was stated, Senator Rene Saguisremarked that "if the Conference Committee just said "tMayor shall be the Chairman" then that should foreclose tissue. It is a legislative choice."The Senator took a view ththe constitutional proscription against appointment elective officials may have been sidestepped if Congreattached the SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo Cinstead of directing the President to appoint him to the poWithout passing upon this view of Senator Saguisag, suffices to state that Congress intended the posts to

appointive, thus nibbling in the bud the argument that theare ex officio.Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on tappointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (ditself vests in the President the power to appoint tChairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designationa person, by the person or persons having authority therefto discharge the duties of some office or trust," or "[t]selection or designation of a person, by the person persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or pubfunction and discharge the duties of the same. In htreatise, Philippine Political Law, Senior Associate JustiIsagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection, by tauthority vested with the power, of an individual who is

exercise the functions of a given office." Considering thappointment calls for a selection, the appointing pownecessarily exercises a discretion. Indeed, the power choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointmeinvolves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; itnot a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to thappointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee isfundamental component of the appointing power.Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the powto appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same timlimit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Onthe power of appointment is conferred on the President, suconferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualificatioof the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of h

discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when thqualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates tdiscretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutan irregular restriction on the power of appointment.In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subjeposts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first yeof its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the provinevertheless limits the appointing authority to only oeligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Sinonly one can qualify for the posts in question, the Presideis precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whoto appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans t




essential element of choice, is no power at all and goesagainst the very nature itself of appointment.While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets thequalifications of the officer during the first year of operationsof SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it ismanifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribequalifications where only one, and no other, can qualify.Where, as in the case of Gordon, an incumbent electiveofficial was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to

other government posts, he does not automatically forfeithis elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by theConstitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent electiveofficial is not eligible to the appointive position, hisappointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in viewof his disqualification or lack of eligibility.As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon isineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of theBoard and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointmentthereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes theConstitution cannot be sustained. He however remainsMayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are notnecessarily null and void; he may be considered a de factoofficer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer,the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold validso far as they involve the interest of the public and third

persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . .under color of a known election or appointment, voidbecause the officer was not eligible, or because there was awant of power in the electing or appointing body, or byreason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, suchineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to thepublic . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment,by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before thesame is adjudged to be such.

Election Cases Involving Local Elective Officials

Galido v. COMELEC (1991)

Facts: Galido and private respondent Galeon werecandidates during the January 1988 local elections for mayorof Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed theduly-elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an electionprotest before the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheldthe proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealedthe RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First Division reversedthe RTC decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied thepetitioner’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed thedecision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that thefifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial“C” after the name “Galido” were marked ballots and,therefore, invalid.Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filedthe present petition for certiorari and injunction before theSupreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporaryrestraining order. In his comment to the petition, privaterespondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that “Final

decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in electioncontests involving elective municipal offices are final andexecutory, and not appealable.

Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it setsaside the trial court’s decision involving marked ballots, bebrought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari bythe aggrieved party?

Held: Yes

Ratio: The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of theCOMELEC in contests involving elective municipal andbarangay offices are final, executory and not appealable,

does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way ofspecial civil action of certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Sectio7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites, it is state“Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by laany decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may bbrought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrievparty within thirty days from receipt thereof.” We resolve thissue in favor of the petitioner.

The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate

appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the powof review of this Court. The COMELEC found that the writiof the letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the fifteen (1ballots of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof ofpattern or design to identify the ballots and/or voters. Thfinding should be conclusive on the Court.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusoriginal jurisdiction over all contests relating to the electionreturns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provinciand city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trcourts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangofficials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (ArticIX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution)In the present case, after a review of the trial courdecision, the respondent COMELEC found that fifteen (1

ballots in the same precinct containing the letter "C" aftthe name Galido are clearly marked ballots. May thCOMELEC decision be brought to this court by a petition fcertiorari by the aggrieved party (the herein petitioner)?Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, whipetitioner cites in support of this petition, it is state"(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by laany decision, order, or ruling of each (ConstitutionCommission may be brought to the Supreme Court certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days froreceipt of a copy thereof."On the other hand, private respondent relies on Article (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the Constitution whiprovides that decisions, final orders, or rulings of tCommission on Elections in contests involving electimunicipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory , anot appealable. (Emphasis supplied)

We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact thdecisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission Elections in contests involving elective municipal abarangay offices are final, executory and not appealabdoes not preclude a recourse to this Court by way ofspecial civil action of certiorari. The proceedings in tConstitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening.We do not, however, believe that the COMELEC committgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. It is settlthat the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an infercourt or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretiamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.As correctly argued by the COMELEC, it has the inherepower to decide an election contest on physical evidenc

equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudenin support of its findings and conclusions; and that textent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretiothe exercise of which should not be controlled unless sudiscretion has been abused to the prejudice of either partFinally, the records disclose that private respondent halready assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandas the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of tCOMELEC decision. The main purpose of prohibition is suspend all action and prevent the further performance the act complained of. In this light, the petition at bar habecome moot and academic.

Rivera v. COMELEC (1991)




Facts: Juan Garcia Rivera and Juan Mitre Garcia II werecandidates for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay,during the local elections in January 1988. The MunicipalBoard of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly electedMayor by a majority of 10 votes.Garcia filed an election protest with the RTC, which renderedits verdict finding Garcia to have obtained 6,376 votes asagainst Rivera's 6,222. On appeal to the Comelec, theComelec sustained with modification the judgment. It ruled

that Juan Garcia was the duly elected municipal mayor by amajority of 153 votes over Juan Rivera instead of plurality of 154 votes. Upon MR, the Comelec affirmed the decision.Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of Mayor of Guinobatan on 10 October 1990, by virtue of a writof execution implementing the COMELEC decision of 6September 1990. He continued as mayor until 10 November1990 when he was served notice of this Court's temporaryrestraining order, issued upon Rivera's motion.In this petition, Rivera prayed for the issuance of arestraining order arguing that the judgment had not yetbecome final and executory. He cites Article IX-C, Section 2,Par. (2) of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Part VII, Rule39, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He alsocontends that since the COMELEC decision has not yetbecome final and executory, the COMELEC has no authority

to issue the assailed order and writ of execution. Petitionermaintains further that he has a period of thirty (30) daysfrom 6 September 1990 or until 6 October 1990 within whichto elevate the COMELEC decision, on certiorari, to this Court,pursuant to Section 1, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He submits that the questioned COMELECdecision is not one that became final and executory unlessrestrained by this Court as provided under Section 3, Rule 39of the COMELEC Rules, as said rule applies only to "decisionsin pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due courseor to disqualify a candidate, and postpone or suspendelections." Lastly, according to petitioner, Section 13(a) of Rule 18 (finality of Comelec decisions or resolutions) andSection 1 of Rule 39 (review by the Supreme Court of Comelec decisions, orders and rulings) of the COMELECRules of Procedure, should be read in the context of Section7, Article IX-A of the Constitution (Supreme Court authority

to review on certiorari a Comelec decision, order or ruling).Garcia contends that the Constitution declares that theComelec decision on election contests involving electivemunicipal and barangay officials are to be final, executor andnot appealable.

Issue: WON the decisions of the COMELEC in electioncontests involving elective municipal and barangay officials,being final and executory and not appealable, preclude thefiling of a special civil action of certiorari

Held: Yes

Ratio: Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution,which petitioner cites in support of this petition, it is stated:"(U)nless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,

any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional)Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court oncertiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days fromreceipt of a copy thereof.” On the other hand, privaterespondent relies on Article IX, (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph2 of the Constitution which provides that decisions, finalorders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contestsinvolving elective municipal and barangay offices shall befinal, executory and not appealable.We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact thatdecisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission onElections in contests involving elective municipal andbarangay offices are final, executory and not appealable,does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a

special civil action of certiorari. The proceedings in tConstitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening.Flores vs Comelec: Obviously, the provision of Article IXSection 2(2) of the Constitution that "decisions, final ordeor rulings of the Commission on election contests involvinelective municipal and barangay offices shall be finexecutory, and not appealable" applies only to questions fact and not of law. That provision was not intended to divethe Supreme Court of its authority to resolve questions

law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by tConstitution. We eschew a literal reading of that provisithat would contradict such authority.Actually, the main thrust of the present petition for certioris that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse discretion when it affirmed the decision of its First Divisiopromulgated on 2 May 1990, annulling the proclamation the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of GuinobataAlbay and when it did not exclude from the total votes Garcia at least 10 votes which were allegedly misappreciatin Garcia's favor.We have closely scrutinized the challenged COMELdecision and find that the said decision was not arrived capriciously or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots wmade by the COMELEC en banc. In fact, fourteen (14) ballo

originally adjudicated in Garcia's favor were overruled by tCommission en banc, thus reducing the number of votes his favor to 894 votes out of the 2,445 contested ballots. Othe other hand, 16 ballots were added in Rivera's favor, thincreasing the votes in his favor to 1,087 votes. Moreovethe appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factudeterminations. It is settled that in a petition for certiorafindings of fact of administrative bodies are final unlegrave abuse of discretion has marred such factudeterminations. We find none in this case.

Regalado, concurring: What the foregoing observatioactually boil down to is that the decisions, orders, or rulinof said constitutional commissions are not subject appellate review, that is, with this Court acting in texercise of appellate jurisdiction and exercising its power review over alleged errors of law and, sometimes, of fact

both. Such decisions, orders or rulings are not, howevinvulnerable to an original civil action of certioraprohibition or mandamus invoking the original jurisdictionthis Court, under its power of control and supervision ovthe lower courts, to pass upon errors of jurisdiction imputeto said commissions. This is inevitable and justified becauno appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedythe ordinary course of law lies from said adjudications.

Narvasa, dissenting: It bears stressing that the finexecutory and unappealable character of the COMELECrulings, orders or decisions in election contests involvielective municipal and barangay offices, is pronounced nby statute or presidential issuance, but by the Constitutiitself. This is a relevant consideration because whCongress is granted by Section 2, Article VIII of t

Constitution the "power to define, prescribe, and apportithe jurisdiction of the various courts, . . . (it) may not deprithe Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumeratin Section 5" of the same Article VIII; and said Sectiondeclares it to be one of the powers of the Supreme Court "(r)eview, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certioraas the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgmenand orders of lower courts in . . . (specifically listed casesIt is in truth this fundamental limitation on the legislativprerogative to "define, prescribe, and apportion t

jurisdiction" of courts which is, that the Supreme Court mnot be deprived by law of jurisdiction over certain particucases that underlay this Court's doctrines allowing review the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65




judgments and final orders of the National Labor RelationsCommission under the Labor Code, and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, from which no appeal is prescribed bylaw.It cannot be gainsaid however that while Congress may notdeprive the Supreme Court of its constitutionally statedpowers, that self-same Constitution may itself effect thatdeprivation; and this appears to be precisely the purposeand intent of said Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution

as written: to remove from this Court's power to review,revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari final

judgments and orders of the COMELEC in "election contestsinvolving elective municipal and barangay offices."

Rivera v. COMELEC (2007)

Facts: In the May 2004 Synchronized National and LocalElections, Marino Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat. On January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. On January 10, petitioners filed before theComelec a petition to cancel Morales’ certificate of candidacy on the ground that the was elected and hadserved three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat contrary to RA 43(b) of RA 7160.Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat

for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first

term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but heserved the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer”because he was not validly elected as his proclamation asmayor was declared void by the RTC and thereafter, he waspreventively suspended by the ombudsman.

The Comelec ruled that Morales was disqualified to run forpublic office. Morales’ MR was however granted. TheComelec ruled that his proclamation before was void andthat the discharge of the duties is that of a de facto mayor.In the other case filed by Anthony Dee: After Morales wasproclaimed as the duly elected mayor, Anthony Dee filed apetition for quo warranto before the RTC. Dee reiterated theprevious arguments of petitioners. The RTC dismissed Dee’spetition for quo warranto on the ground that Morales did notserve the three-term limit since he was not the duly electedmayor of Mabalacat, but Dee in the May 1998 elections forthe term 1998 to 2001. Comelec affirmed.

Issue: WON Morales is disqualified from running for mayor

Held: Yes

Ratio: This Court, through Mr. Justice Cancio C. Garcia,resolved the same issue in Ong v. Alegre with identical facts,thus:For the three-term limit for elective local governmentofficials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur,to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected forthree (3) consecutive terms in the same local governmentpost, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutiveterms.We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for

Francis, “service for the full term,” and should be counted asa full term served in contemplation of the three-term limitprescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions,supra, barring local elective officials from being elected andserving for more than three consecutive terms for the sameposition.It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled inElection Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’ opponent(Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and,therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente.However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was withoutpractical and legal use and value, having been promulgatedafter the term of the contested office has expired. PetitionerFrancis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in

the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was undprotest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. Hproclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of SaVicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralelection coupled by his assumption of office and hcontinuous exercise of the functions thereof from start finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a fterm in contemplation of the three-term rule.

The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view

not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean thAlegre would-under the three-term rule-be considered having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningleelectoral protest ruling, when another actually served suterm pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after election. It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited abovFrancis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of tmayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutiterms. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 19election was declared void by the RTC of Daet, CamarinNorte in its Decision dated July 4, 2001. As ruled by tCourt, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the futerm. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to himIndeed, there is no reason why this ruling should not alapply to respondent Morales who is similarly situated.

Here, Morales invoked not only Lonzanida v. COMELEC, balso Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections which is likewiinapplicable. In Borja, the Court held that Capcoassumption of the office of mayor upon the death of tincumbent may not be regarded as a “term” under Sectio8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. N7160 (the Local Government Code). He held the positifrom September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992, a period of lethan three years. Moreover, he was not elected to thposition.Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC, this Court ruled th

assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for thremaining term is not the “term” contemplated undSection 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). As the Couobserved, there was a “break” in the service of privarespondent Ramon T. Talanga as mayor. He was a “priva

citizen” for a time before running for mayor in the recelections.Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998

June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entperiod notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in telectoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting h(respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute interruption in serving the full term. Section 8, Article X the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit-Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He hbeen mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any bresince July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 200he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (1continuous years.

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitutiospecifically included an exception to the peoplefreedom to choose those who will govern them order to avoid the evil of a single persoaccumulating excessive power over a particulterritorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stain the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for tposition of city mayor after having served for thrconsecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviousdefeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote thexception. Should he be allowed another three consecutiterm as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then possibly holding office as chief executive over the samterritorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighte




consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to beavoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

This is the very situation in the instant case. Moralesmaintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001)only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer.”Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and itspurpose defeated when an official serves in the sameposition for three consecutive terms. Whether as“caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the powers

and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him“to stay on indefinitely”. Morales should be promptly oustedfrom the position of mayor of Mabalacat.Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate

of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should becancelled. In the light of the foregoing, Morales can not beconsidered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not beinga candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BECOUNTED and must be considered stray votes.Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuingto serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the instant petition for quowarranto has become moot.

Issue: WON it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee whoshall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007term.

Held: Yes

Ratio: In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that asecond place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitutewinner. As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, apermanent vacancy in the contested office hasoccurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor inaccordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

Montebon v. Comelec ( 2008)

Facts: Montebon, Ondoy and Potencioso, Jr. werecandidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of

Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections. Petitionersand other candidates filed a petition for disqualificationagainst respondent with the COMELEC alleging thatrespondent had been elected and served three consecutiveterms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for thesame position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourthconsecutive term. Respondent admitted having beenelected, but claimed that the service of his second term in2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when hesucceeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is notdisqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilorin the 2007 elections. Petitioners, on the other handcontended that voluntary renunciation of the office shall notbe considered an interruption in the continuity of service forthe full term for which the official concerned was elected.

The comelec denied the petition for disqualification. Onappeal, the Comelec en banc affirmed and ruled that therewas no voluntary renunciation of office, but rather, an

effective disruption in the full service of his second term ascouncilor.

Issue: WON respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term asmunicipal councilor.

Held: Yes

Ratio: In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections the Courtheld that the two conditions for the application of thedisqualification must concur: 1) that the official concernedhas been elected for three consecutive terms in the samelocal government post; and 2) that he has fully served three

consecutive terms. In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Electionthe Court emphasized that the term limit for elective officiamust be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, fthe disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the offichas been elected three consecutive times; he must alhave served three consecutive terms in the same position.While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipcouncilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies

whether he is deemed to have fully served his second terin view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburon January 12, 2004.Succession in local government offices is by operation law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise knowas the Local Government Code, provides that if a permanevacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the higheranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice MayMendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipcouncilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It is cletherefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his offias municipal councilor.In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Co

explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as follow The second sentence of the constitutional provision undscrutiny states, `Voluntary renunciation of office for alength of time shall not be considered as an interruption the continuity of service for the full term for which he welected.' The clear intent of the framers of the constitution bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit byvoluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respethe people's choice and grant their elected official fservice of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntarenunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced terin the computation of the three term limit; converseinvoluntary severance from office for any length time short of the full term provided by law amounto an interruption of continuity of service.

Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his off

as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in tservice of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to habeen by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was operation of law. Succession by law to a vacated governmeoffice is characteristically not voluntary since it involves tperformance of a public duty by a government official, tnon-performance of which exposes said official to possibadministrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duand neglect in the performance of public functions. It therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather thvoluntary.

Borja v. COMELEC (1991)

Facts: Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros o January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of la

upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of thryears which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, was reelected mayor for another term of three years endi

June 30, 1998. Jose Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. BenjamBorja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sougCapco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter wouhave already served as mayor for three consecutive termby June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to servfor another term after that.Comelec ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capdisqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Patero




On motion, the Comelec en banc reversed the decision anddeclared Capco eligible to run for mayor. It ruled thatCapco’s succession into office is not counted as one term forpurposes of the computation of the three term limitationunder the Constitution and Local Government Code.Capco was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558votes against petitioner’s 7,773 votes and was proclaimedelected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

Issue: WON Capco is eligible to run for mayor

Held: Yes

Ratio: (Purpose of the three term rule) First, to preventthe establishment of political dynasties is not the only policyembodied in the constitutional provision in question. Theother policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of thepeople. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardlessof how the official concerned came to that office – whetherby election or by succession by operation of law – would beto disregard one of the purposes of the constitutionalprovision in question.

Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X,§8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of theConstitutional Commission were as much concerned with

preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they werewith preventing the monopolization of political power.Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by CommissionerEdmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutiveterms or nine years there should be no further reelection forlocal and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted thealternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod thatsuch officials be simply barred from running for the sameposition in the succeeding election following the expirationof the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against“prescreening candidates (from) whom the people willchoose” as a result of the proposed absolutedisqualification, considering that the draft constitutionprovision “recognizing people’s power.”

Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of theproceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first isthe notion of service of term, derived from the concern about

the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay inoffice. The second is the idea of election, derived from theconcern that the right of the people to choose those whomthey wish to govern them be preserved.It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, thedrafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption thatthe officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection.Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy isthat the people should be allowed to choose whom theyplease to govern them. To bar the election of a local officialbecause he has already served three terms, although thefirst as a result of succession by operation of law rather thanelection, would therefore be to violate this principle.Second, not only historical examination but textual analysisas well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive

terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of “the term of office of elective local officials” and bars “suchofficial[s) ” from serving for more than three consecutiveterms. The second sentence, in explaining when an electivelocal official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that “voluntary renunciation of the office forany length of time shall not be considered as an interruptionin the continuity of his service for the full term for which hewas elected.” The term served must therefore be one “forwhich (the official concerned) was elected.” The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitationon the number of terms an elective official may serve.Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he waselected because he is simply continuing the service of the

official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntarenunciation of office prior to its expiration.Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas’ comment Art. VI, §7, which similarly bars members of the House Representatives from serving for more than three termCommissioner Bernas states that “if one is electRepresentative to serve the unexpired term of another, thunexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered o

term for the purpose of computing the number of successiterms allowed.” This is actually based on the opiniexpressed by Commissioner Davide: “Yes, because we speof “term” and if there is a special election, he will serve onfor the unexpired portion of that particular term plus onmore term for the Senator and two more terms for tMembers of the Lower House.”

There is a difference, however, between the case of a vicmayor and that of a member of the House Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resignbecomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vicmayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. Othe other hand, the Representative is elected to fill tvacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representatiserves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be electe

and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired termrightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what wbelieve to be the intendment of Art. X, §8 with regard elective local officials, the case of a Representative wsucceeds another confirms the theory.Petitioner also cites Art. VII, §4 of the Constitution whiprovides for succession of the Vice-President to tPresidency in case of vacancy in that office. This provisisays that “No person who has succeeded as President anhas served as such for more than four years shall qualified for election to the same office at any timePetitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor shoulikewise be considered to have served a full term as mayorhe succeeds to the latter’s office and serves for tremainder of the term.

The framers of the Constitution included such a provisibecause, without it, the Vice-President, who simply steps in

the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run fPresident even if he has occupied that office for more thfour years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, on elective local officials throws in bold relief the differenbetween the two cases. It underscores the constitutionintent to cover only the terms of office to which one mhave been elected for purpose of the three-term limit local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose serviby automatic succession.

There is another reason why the Vice-President wsucceeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for mothan four years is ineligible for election as President. TVice-President is elected primarily to succeed the Presidein the event of the latter’s death, permanent disabiliremoval or resignation. While he may be appointed to tcabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the goo

graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their pathe electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidawho they think can fill the Presidency in the event becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for mothan four years may rightly be considered as service forfull term.

This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the locGovernment Code, he is the presiding officer of tsanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functionsuccession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therebeing only one of them. It cannot be said of him, as much of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in t




Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks themayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence,his service in that office should not be counted in theapplication of any term limit.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials mustbe taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as theright to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, itis not enough that an individual has served three

consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must alsohave been elected to the same position for the same numberof times before the disqualification can apply.

Borja Supplement:Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomesmayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Sixmonths before the next election, he resigns and is twiceelected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the nextelection.

Yes, because although he has already first served asmayor by succession and subsequently resigned fromoffice before the full term expired, he has not actuallyserved three full terms in all for the purpose of applyingthe term limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the

continuity of his service for the full term only if the term isone “for which he was elected.” Since A is onlycompleting the service of the term for which the deceasedand not he was elected. A cannot be considered to havecompleted one term. His resignation constitutes aninterruption of the full term

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during hisfirst term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a totalof 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run forone more term in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full termssuccessively.In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelectionbecause the two conditions for the application of thedisqualification provisions have not concurred, namely,that the local official concerned has been elected threeconsecutive times and that he has fully served threeconsecutive terms. In the first case, even if the localofficial is considered to have served three full termsnotwithstanding his resignation before the end of the firstterm, the fact remains that he has not been elected threetimes. In the second case, the local official has beenelected three consecutive times, but he has not fullyserved three consecutive terms.

Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomesmayor by succession involves a total failure of the twoconditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X §8.Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualifiedto run again in the next election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayorin the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by

operation of law. Neither had he served the full termbecause he only continued the service, interrupted by thedeath , of the deceased mayor.

To consider C in the third case to have served the firstterm in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time forreelection would be not only to falsify reality but also tounduly restrict the right of the people to choose whomthey wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out tobe a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation bysimply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on theother hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be noway the people can return him to office (even if it is justthe third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of

the first term is counted as one of the purpose of applyinthe term limit.

To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accorwith the understanding of the Constitutional Commissiothat while the people should be protected from the evithat a monopoly of political power may bring about, carshould be taken that their freedom of choice is not undulcurtailed.

Adorneo v. COMELEC (2002)

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were the oncandidates for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 20elections. Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-199In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In trecall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served tunexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.Petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial ElectiSupervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter welected and had served as city mayor for three (consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of M1992, where he served the full term; (2) in the election May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3)

the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only tunexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in t1998 election. Petitioner contended that Talaga’s candidaas Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of t1987 Constitution.On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that was not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive termbut only for two (2) consecutive terms. He pointed to hdefeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defethe consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupteand thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive termof three years each. Respondent added that his service froMay 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months aeighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplatioof the law and the Constitution.

The Comelec found Talaga disqualified for the position of c

mayor. The Comelec en banc reversed and ruled that respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive termbecause he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) thhe was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in trecall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections wnot considered a term of office and is not included in the term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serthe three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuof his service as Mayor of Lucena City.

Issue: WON Talaga is disqualified to run for mayor

Held: No

Ratio: The issue before us was already addressed

Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 1(1998), where we held,

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials mube taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as tright to serve in the same elective position. Consequentlyis not enough that an individual has served thrconsecutive terms in an elective local office, he must alhave been elected to the same position for the same numbof times before the disqualification can apply. This point cbe made clearer by considering the following case situation:Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his fiterm, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of

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year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for onemore term in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively . To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accordwith the understanding of the Constitutional Commissionthat while the people should be protected from the evils thata monopoly of political power may bring about, care shouldbe taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.

Likewise, in the case of

Lonzanida vs. COMELEC,

311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), we said, This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the officialconcerned has been elected for three consecutive terms inthe same local government post and 2) that he has fullyserved three consecutive terms. Accordingly, COMELEC’sruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3)consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two yearshe was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorshipwas disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.Patently untenable is petitioner’s contention that COMELECin allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998election violates Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. Tobolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr.

Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member,stating that in interpreting said provision that “if one is

elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will beconsidered one term for the purpose of computing thenumber of successive terms allowed.”As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas’comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there isno recall election provided for members of Congress.Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election bedeemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitutionas “voluntary renunciation” for clearly it is not. In

Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said:

…The second sentence of the constitutional provision underscrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption inthe continuity of service for the full term for which he was

elected.” The clear intent of the framers of the constitutionto bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by avoluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respectthe people’s choice and grant their elected official fullservice of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntaryrenunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced termin the computation of the three term limit; conversely,involuntary severance from office for any length of timeshort of the full term provided by law amounts to aninterruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacatedhis post a few months before the next mayoral elections, notby voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legalprocess of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to thateffect. Such involuntary severance from office is aninterruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitionerdid not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

Socrates v. COMELEC (2002)

Facts: On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of theincumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesaconvened into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate therecall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates (mayor). Themembers of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn,president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interimchair of the PRA. The PRA passed a Resolution declaring itsloss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall.Socrates filed a petition to deny due course to the RecallResolution but the Comelec en banc dismissed the case forlack of merit.

Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy fmayor in the recall election.Ma. Flores F. Adovo and Merly Gilo filed a petition before the COMELEC, to disqualHagedorn from running in the recall election and to canchis certificate of candidacy. The petitions were all anchoron the ground that “Hagedorn is disqualified from running fa fourth consecutive term, having been elected and haviserved as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive fterms immediately prior to the instant recall election for t

same post.” The Comelec declared Hagedorn qualified run in the recall election.G.R. No. 154512. Socrates sought to nullify the COMELEen banc resolution which gave due course to the RecResolution and scheduled the recall election on Septemb7, 2002. Socrates cites the following circumstances as leginfirmities attending the convening of the PRA and issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of tPRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (the proof of service of notice was palpably and legadeficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselvseeking a new electoral mandate from their respecticonstituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exerciswith grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedinwere conducted in a manner that violated his and tpublic’s constitutional right to information.

G.R. No. 154683. Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. sought to annCOMELEC Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the recelection on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates onlyten-day campaign period. He prayed that the COMELEC enjoined from holding the recall election on September 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates least an additional 15 days to campaign. The court gave thcandidates an additional 15 days within which to campaig

Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to Septemb24, 2002.G.R. Nos. 155083-84. Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollaassail the COMELEC’s resolutions declaring Hagedoqualified to run for mayor in the recall election. The Coordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming awinning candidate in the recall election until further ordefrom the Court. In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered thighest number of votes in the recall election with 20,23

votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtain17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.

Issue: WON the recall resolution was valid

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELcommitted grave abuse of discretion in upholding the RecResolution despite the absence of notice to 130 Pmembers and the defective service of notice to other PRmembers. The COMELEC, however, found that tproponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor VictoriDennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRto the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the LocGovernment Code. Notices of the convening of the Puer

Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 2names of provincial elective officials, print and broadcamedia practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regionand national officials, and DILG officials].

The Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC matters within the competence and expertise of tCOMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous. In tinstant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that tCOMELEC’s findings of fact are patently erroneous.Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authorto adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 becausemajority of PRA members were seeking a new electomandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 12002. This argument deserves scant considerati

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considering that when the PRA members adopted the RecallResolution their terms of office had not yet expired. Theywere all de jure sangguniang barangay members with nolegal disqualification to participate in the recall assemblyunder Section 70 of the Local Government Code.Socrates bewails that the manner private respondentsconducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutionalright to information on matters of public concern. Socrates,however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of

even sending his representative and counsel who werepresent during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of therecall election submitted to the COMELEC the RecallResolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRAmembers, and authenticated master list of barangay officialsin Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine andcopy all these public records in the official custody of theCOMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that theCOMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis inSocrates’ claim that respondents violated his constitutionalright to information on matters of public concern.

Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuseof discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolutionand in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.

Issue: WON Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in therecall election

Held: No

Ratio: The constitutional and statutory provisions havetwo parts. The first part provides that an elective localofficial cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms.

The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count indetermining the three-term limit rule. The second partstates that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clearintent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and preventsthe service before and after the interruption from being

joined together to form a continuous service or consecutiveterms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local officialcannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. Theprohibited election refers to the next regular election for thesame office following the end of the third consecutive term.Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longercovered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, asubsequent election like a recall election is no longer animmediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second,the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruptionin the continuity of service.When the framers of the Constitution debated on the termlimit of elective local officials, the question asked waswhether there would be no further election after three terms,or whether there would be “no immediate reelection”after three terms. What the Constitution prohibits is animmediate reelection for a fourth term following three

consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does notprohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long asthe reelection is not immediately after the end of the thirdconsecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the termfollowing the third consecutive term is a subsequent electionbut not an immediate reelection after the third term.Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred fromseeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequentelection involving the same term of office. What theConstitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Thedebates in the Constitutional Commission evidently showthat the prohibited election referred to by the framers of theConstitution is the immediate reelection after the thirdterm, not any other subsequent election.

If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to aelection within the three-year full term following the threterm limit, then Senators should also be prohibited frorunning in any election within the six-year full term followitheir two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the telimit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit elective local officials. The framers of the Constitution thclarified that a Senator can run after only three yeafollowing his completion of two terms. The frame

expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refeonly to the immediate reelection, and not to asubsequent election, during the six-year period following ttwo term limit. The framers of the Constitution did nintend “the period of rest” of an elective official who hreached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeediterm.In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall electioon September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection afthis third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 200

The immediate reelection that the Constitution barHagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 20elections. Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive termin the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full hthree consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Und

the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedocould no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. TConstitution and the Local Government Code disqualifiHagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limfrom running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. ThuHagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 electionSocrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in t2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on Ju30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recelection of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votover his closest opponent, Socrates.From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on Septemb24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was SocrateDuring the same period, Hagedorn was simply a privacitizen. This period is clearly an interruption in tcontinuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because his voluntary renunciation, but because of a leg

prohibition. Hagedorn’s three consecutive terms ended June 30, 2001. Hagedorn’s new recall term from Septemb24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannstitch together Hagedorn’s previous three-terms with his nerecall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive terbecause factually it is not. An involuntary interruptioccurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 whibroke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedornservice as mayor.In Hagedorn’s case, the nearly 15-month period he was oof office, although short of a full term of three yeaconstituted an interruption in the continuity of his service mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intentthat interruption “for any length of time,” as long as t

cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective locofficial’s continuity of service. Adormeo established the rule that the winner in threcall election cannot be charged or credited with thfull term of three years for purposes of counting thconsecutiveness of an elective official’s terms office. In the same manner, Hagedorn’s recall term does nretroact to include the tenure in office of SocrateHagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the Septemb24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroato June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitua fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorn’s recterm as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 32001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only la




September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannotdeclare as consecutive or successive terms of office whichhistorically and factually are not.Worse, to make Hagedorn’s recall term retroact to June 30,2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedomof the people to choose their leaders through popularelections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of thesovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their ownchoosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the

fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the peopleA necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption.An official elected in recall election serves the unexpiredterm of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. Thisis clear from the following discussion in the ConstitutionalCommission. Although the discussion referred to specialelections for Senators and Representatives of the House, thesame principle applies to a recall election of local officials.Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall termcan serve for more than nine consecutive years comprisingof the recall term plus the regular three full terms. A localofficial who serves a recall term should know that the recallterm is in itself one term although less than three years.

This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and

winning in the recall election.

Davide, concurring and dissenting. The ponencia is thencorrect when it holds that the three-term limit bars animmediate reelection for a fourth term. But I disagree whenit rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek animmediate reelection for a fourth term because he was not acandidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgetsthat what would have been his fourth term by virtue of theMay 2001 election was for the period from 30 June 2001 to30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparentconfusion between term and election, the root cause of which is the attempt to distinguish “voluntary renunciation”of office from “involuntary severance” from office and theterm of office to which it relates.I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates onthe issue of “no immediate reelection” after three

consecutive terms for members of Congress clearly indicatedthat the “no immediate reelection” after the 3-term limitwould equally apply to the elective local officials. Thisaccounted for the immediate acceptance by the Committeeon Local Governments of the aforementioned Amendment of Commissioner Davide, which is now Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. These debates clearly showed the Intent of the Commission that the ban against an immediatereelection after three consecutive terms applies to the fourthterm, i.e., the term immediately following the threeconsecutive terms, to be filled up by the regular election forsuch fourth term. For one to be able to run again after threeconsecutive terms, he has to rest for the entire immediatelysucceeding fourth term. On the next fifth term he can runagain to start a new series of three consecutive terms.

The dichotomy made in the ponencia between “voluntary

renunciation of the office” as used in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and“involuntary severance from office” is unnecessary, if notmisplaced. From the discussion in the ponencia, the latter ismade to apply to the banned term, i.e., the fourth termimmediately following three consecutive terms. Speakingnow of Hagedorn, he cannot have suffered “involuntaryseverance from office” because there was nothing to besevered; he was not a holder of an office either in a de jureor de facto capacity. He knew he was disqualified fromseeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is,definitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance.Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an actwhich interrupts the continuity of a term for purposes of

applying the three-term principle the rule laid down Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609), cited in t ponencia, page 17, is not applicable in the case of Hagedor The involuntary severance referred to in that case was othat took place during any of the three terms; hence, tterm during which it occurred should be excluded in tcomputation. In the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntaseverance took place during any of his three terms brougabout by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 a

1998.More importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) R.A. No. 7160 is one that takes place at any time durieither the first, second, or third term of the thrconsecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which reads: “shnot be considered as an interruption in the continuity of hservice for the full term for which he was elected.” Tpurpose of the provision is to prevent an elective locofficial from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpoof circumventing the rule on the belief that the term duriwhich he resigned would be excluded in the counting of tthree-term rule. In short, the provision excluded is intendeto impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule or makemockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applyi

it in the case of Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned his third term, he would still be barred from seekireelection in the May 2001 election.Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vCOMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002) because that case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid, for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in trecall election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier statefully served three successive terms.

Mendoza v. COMELEC (2002)

For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioneMelanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, seeking to set asithe resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated Augu15, 2001, in EPC No. 2001-5 and to declare respondeLeonardo B. Roman’s election as governor of Bataan on M14, 2001 as null and void for allegedly being contrary to AX, §8 of the Constitution, which provides that:

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangofficials, which shall be determined by law, shall be threyears and no such official shall serve for more than thrconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office any length of time shall not be considered as an interruptiin the continuity of his service for the full term for which hwas elected.After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS tpetition:

VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted

dismiss the petition. He contended that as revealed by trecords of the Constitutional Commission, the Constitutienvisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service fthree full terms before the proscription applies. Therefo

not being a full term, a recall term should not be counted used as a basis for the disqualification whether served pr(as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) the nine-year, full three-term limit.

MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joine

voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that, accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 2SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, O6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999and Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002term during which succession to a local elective office takplace or a recall election is held should not be counted determining whether an elective local official has servmore than three consecutive terms. He argued that t

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Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials fromserving for more than three consecutive terms because, infact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in thecontinuity of service, so long as such interruptions are notdue to the voluntary renunciation of the office by anincumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Romanserved as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall electionheld in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001

respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan foronly two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), hiselection on that day was actually only his third term for thesame position.

PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to

dismiss the petition. He argued that a recall term should notbe considered as one full term, because a contraryinterpretation would in effect cut short the elected official’sservice to less than nine years and shortchange hisconstituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of politicalpower should be balanced against the need to uphold thevoters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, isRoman who received 97 percent of the votes cast. Heexplained that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clearchoice of the electorate, because in a democracy the peopleshould, as much as legally possible, be governed by leaders

freely chosen by them in credible elections. He concludedthat, in election cases, when two conflicting legal positionsare of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should betilted in favor of the people’s overwhelming choice.

AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to

dismiss, arguing that it is clear from the constitutionalprovision that the disqualification applies only if the termsare consecutive and the service is full and continuous.Hence, service for less than a term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count to disqualify anelective local official from running for the same position.

This case is different from Socrates, where the full threeconsecutive terms had been continuously served so thatdisqualification had clearly attached.

On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.,

with whom DAVIDE, JR., C.J., and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ. concurred, holds the view thatthe recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising theperiod June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be consideredas one term. Since he thereafter served for two consecutiveterms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, hiselection on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term andcontravenes Art. X, §8 of the Constitution. For this reason,she voted to grant the petition and to declare respondent’selection on May 14, 2001 as null and void.

CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO MORALES, J., also

dissented and voted to grant the petition. He held that arecall term constitutes one term and that to totally ignore arecall term in determining the three-term limit would allowlocal officials to serve for more than nine consecutive yearscontrary to the manifest intent of the framers of the

Constitution. He contended that respondent Roman’selection in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three-termlimit imposed by the Constitution.

Tenure of Office

Osmena v. COMELEC (2002)

Facts: The petition) calls for a determination of thevalidity and constitutionality of Republic Act 7056, "An ActProviding for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pavethe Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous ElectionsBeginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,"which was signed into law on June 20, 1991. The suit wasinstituted by Governor Emilio M. Osmeña (Cebu), Gov

Roberto Pagdanganan on behalf of the League of Governoof the Philippines, Representatives Pablo P. Garcia (3District-Cebu), Raul V. del Mar (North District-Cebu CitAntonio T. Bacaltos (1st District-Cebu), Wilfredo G. Caing(3rd District-Zamboanga del Norte) and Romeo Guanz(lone District-Bacolod City), by way of a petition fProhibition, mandamus and Injunction with temporarestraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent timplementation of said Republic Act 7056 and t

consequent expenditure of public funds and to compel tComelec to immediately and with all deliberate speed set the machinery and make the necessary preparation for tholding of synchronized national and local elections on tsecond Monday of May, 1992.

The petitioners' claim they have actual and material leginterest in the subject matter of this case not only becausas public officials, they have taken an oath to support adefend the Constitution but also because, as taxpayers, thhave an interest in seeing to it that public funds are propeand, more importantly, lawfully disbursed. They pray for thCourt to declare Republic Act No. 7056 as unconstitutionand, therefore, invalid and inoperative because: 1. RepubAct 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for tholding of synchronized national and local elections on tsecond Monday of May 1992.

2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provinccity and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 31992 and shall serve until their successors shall have beeduly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XV(Transitory Provision) of the Constitution.3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 705which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of locofficials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 19violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaiperiods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorelections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX undthe title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution.5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountabproblems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchroniznational and local elections set by the Constitution on t

second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much lesvalid justification for postponing the local elections to tsecond Monday of November 1992, and in the proceviolating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can deviways and means, within the parameters of the Constitutioto eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if thstill, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correctimechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment revision.

The Solicitor General prays for the denial of the petition the ground that the question is political in nature and ththe petitioners are merely asking for an advisory opinifrom the court, there being no justiciable controversy fresolution. On the merits of the case, the Solicitor Genecontends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise legislative power by Congress and that the regular amendi

process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to transitory provisions.

Issue: WON the Court has competence to act on tmatter at bar

Held: Yes

Ratio: What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdoof RA 7056. And even if we were to assume that the isspresented before us is political in nature, We would still nbe precluded from resolving it under the expand

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question is not solely and exclusively political (as when theExecutive extends recognition to a foreign government) butone which really necessitates a forthright determination of constitutionality, involving as it does a question of nationalimportance.On the other procedural issues raised, We held as early as inthe Emergency Power Cases that where seriousconstitutional questions are involved, "the transcendentalimportance to the public of these cases demands that they

be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if wemust, technicalities of procedure."It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is anappropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent theenforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We areleft with no choice then; we must act on the matter.

To summarize, on the procedural issue, We hold in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to usin the case at bar, is justiciable rather than political. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still comewithin our powers of review under the expanded jurisdictionconferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987Constitution, which includes the authority to determinewhether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess orlack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch orinstrumentality of the government. As for the other alleged

procedural flaws lack of court standing, etc., assuming theexistence of such flaws, the same may be brushed aside,conformably with existing doctrine so that the importantconstitutional issue raised may be addressed.Accordingly, We are left with no other alternative but touphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present cases. Itgoes without saying that We do this not because the Court issuperior to the Executive and/or Legislative but simplybecause the Executive, the Legislative and this Court aresubject to the Constitution as the supreme law.

Issue: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional

Held: Yes

Ratio: It is evident from the wording of Article XVIII,Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution that the term of

synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holdingsimultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminatingtheir Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. Thiscommon termination date will synchronize future elections toonce every three years.

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art.XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election forPresident and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) islikewise evident from the following records of theproceedings in the Constitutional Commission. It thusbecomes very evident that the Constitution has mandated asynchronized national and local election prior to June 30,1992 or more specifically as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec.5-on the second Monday of May, 1992.On this point, it has to be stressed that the term of office of

elective local officials, except barangay officials, is fixed bythe Constitution at three years (Sec. 8, Art. X). Theincumbent local officials were elected in January 1988.

Therefore, their term would have expired on February 2,1991. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of June30, 1992. The reason for the said adjustment, as well asthose of the Senators, members of the House of Representatives, President and Vice-President, is the same tosynchronize the national and local elections.Upon the other hand, and contrary to the express mandateof the 1987 Constitution, RA 7056 provides for two (2)separate elections in 1992 as follows: Sec. 2. Start of Synchronization To start the process of synchronization of

election in accordance with the policy hereinbefore declarthere shall be held:(a) An election for President and Vice-President of tPhilippines, twenty four (24) Senators and all electiMembers of the House of Representatives on the secoMonday of May, 1992, and(b) An election of all provincial, city and municipal electiofficials on the second Monday of November, 1992.

The purpose of Republic Act 7056 is as stated in Section

thereof under the heading "Statement of Policy". . . to start, as much as practicable, the synchronization the elections so that the process can be completed in t1995 elections with the result that beginning 1995 theshall be only one (1) simultaneous regular elections fnational and local elective officials every three (3) years.With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hosynchronized (simultaneous) national and local elections the second Monday of May, 1992, the inevitable conclusiwould be that Republic Act 7056 is clearly violative of thConstitution because it provides for the holding of desynchronized election. Stated differently, Republic A7056 particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenArticle XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution.But this is not all. There are other provisions of tConstitution violated by RA 7056. For one, there is Section

Article XVIII of the Constitution which provides that the locofficial first elected under the Constitution shall serve unnoon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, theincumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 31992 and shall serve until their successors shall have beeduly elected and qualified. It has been held that:It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term officers by providing that they shall hold over until thsuccessors are elected and qualified where the constitutiohas in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term awhen the Constitution fixes the day on which the officterm shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continthe office beyond that period, even though the successofail to qualify with the time.If the local election will be held on the second Monday November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will serving for only two years and seven months, that is, fro

November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years provided for by the Constitution.

Then also, Section 9, Article IX of the Constitution providthat: Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in speccases, the election period shall commence ninety dabefore the day of election and shall end thirty dathereafter. Under this provision the filing of the CertificateCandidacy and the ensuing campaign period must embraced or circumscribed within that election period ninety days, except when in special cases, the Comelec (nCongress) alters the period. But RA 7056 provides fordifferent campaign period, as follows: Sec. 8.

(a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections ohundred thirty (130) days before the day of election.(b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the dof the election, and

(c) For the election of Members of the House Representatives and local elective provincial, city amunicipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of telections.All these the postponement of the holding of a synchroniznational and local election from 1992 to 1995; the hold-ovprovision for incumbent local officials; the reduction of tterm of office of local officials to be elected on the secoMonday of November 1992 and the change in the campaiperiods, are violative of the 1987 Constitution.

The contention of the Solicitor General that the method amendment or revision prescribed by the Constituti(Article XVIII) does not apply to the Transitory Provisiobecause in the nature of things Transitory Provisions are




be carried out as soon as practicable, and Congress can, inthe exercise of its legislative power enact the neededlegislation, in this case RA 7056, deserves no considerationat all. The 1987 Constitution has stated in clear andcategorical language that "the six-year term of theincumbent President and Vice-President elected in theFebruary 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronizationof elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992(Article XVIII, Sec. 5)." As discussed earlier, the elections

referred to, to be synchronized with the election of thePresident and Vice-President on the second Monday of May1992, is the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and local officials.It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General evaded the issueof the constitutionality of RA 7056. Although he made alengthy discussion on the procedural issues and on thelegislative power of Congress, he failed to refute thearguments of the petitioners that RA 7056 violated severalprovisions of the 1987 Constitution more importantly, theprovision on synchronization of election.

Vacancies and Succession

Jainal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147927 (2007)

Facts: Petitioner Jainal Julhatab J. Talib were duly certified

candidates for Mayor of Indanan, Sulu in the 10 May 2004elections. During the canvassing, Talib objected to theinclusion of certain returns before the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC). On 20 May 2004, petitioner wasproclaimed by the MBC as the winning candidate with amargin of 1,018 votes. On May 23, Talib filed a preproclamation case iwith the Comelec praying for theannulment of election returns pertaining to 21 precintsrepresenting 2788 votes. He alleged that the watchers wereasked to leave the precincts before the counting andpreparation of the election returns. Also, the returns werenot signed by the members of the board of electioninspectors. Also, the number of votes exceeded the numberof voters in two precincts.Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the case contendingthat the allegations are not the proper subject of an electionprotest. The comelec annulled the election returns in nineprecincts. The proclamation of Jainal was also annulled.Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, including HussiAhajan as private respondent in his capacity as Vice-Mayorwho, under the provisions of the Local Government Code,will fill up the vacancy created by the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation.

Issue: WON Talib should have followed the procedureoutlined in Section 20 of RA 7166 for contesting electionreturnsHeld: NoRatio: Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166 provides for the steps,outlined below, to be undertaken by a party contesting theinclusion or exclusion of any election return:Submitting oral objections and thereupon entering theobjections in the form for written objections to be prescribed

by the COMELEC;Submitting evidence in support of the objections withintwenty-four (24) hours;Informing the MBC of his intention to appeal from the MBCruling on his objections;Filing with the MBC a written and verified notice of appealwithin forty-eight (48) hours from suspension of the canvass,and taking an appeal to the COMELEC within an inextendibleperiod of five (5) days from filing the notice of appeal.However, the provision also requires the MBC to performcertain acts, to wit:Recording the oral objections in the minutes of the canvass;Automatically deferring the canvass of the contested returnsand proceeding to canvass the uncontested returns;

Summarily and immediately ruling on the objections upreceipt of the evidence;Entering its ruling in the prescribed form and authenticatithe same;Entering in the minutes of the canvass a party’s signifieintention to appeal the ruling to the COMELEC;Suspending the canvass after canvassing all the uncontestreturns and ruling upon the contested returns; andMaking an appropriate report to the COMELEC immediate

upon receipt of the notice of appeal, elevating therewith tcomplete records and evidence submitted in the canvasand furnishing the parties with copies of the report.Petitioner does not state in what respect and on what bas

Talib failed to comply with Sec 20 of RA 7166. It is incumbeupon petitioner to prove the alleged non-compliance. In tabsence of such proof, there is no aspect in the proceedinbefore the MBC which legally precludes Talib from filing hpetition before the COMELEC in accordance with tCOMELEC Rules of Procedure. In fact, petitioner did not evraise this issue of non-compliance with Sec. 20 of R.A. N7166 in his Answer and Memorandum filed before tCOMELEC.

The general rule is that a pre-proclamation case before tCOMELEC is, logically, no longer viable after a proclamatiohas been made. However, this rule admits of exceptions,

when the proclamation is null and void. The proclamation petitioner in this case is void for three (3) reasons: (1) it wbased on a canvass that should have been suspended wirespect to the contested election returns; (2) it was dowithout prior COMELEC authorization which is required view of the unresolved objections of Talib to the inclusion certain returns in the canvass; and (3) it was predicated oncanvass that included unsigned election returns involvisuch number of votes as will affect the outcome of telection. In this regard, it has long been recognized thamong the reliefs that the COMELEC may grant is to nullifyproclamation or suspend the effects of one.Assuming, however, that Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166 was ncomplied with, Talib cannot be faulted or made to suffer fsuch non-compliance as it was the MBC who did not compwith its duties under Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166. When Tamade his objections to the inclusion of the contest

election returns, there was no other recourse for the MBexcept to rule on the objections, suspend the canvass of tcontested election returns, and suspend the proclamation petitioner, in that sequence. Instead of doing so, the MBafter ruling on the objections, included the contested returin the canvass and immediately proclaimed petitioner.

These actions of the MBC rendered it impossible for Talib comply with Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166 any further. It shoube noted that the forty-eight (48)-hour period for filingverified notice of appeal with the MBC is reckoned frosuspension of the canvass. The appeal to the COMELECalso reckoned five (5) days from suspension of the canvasUnderstandably, Talib had no other recourse but to directly to the COMELEC. It is worthy of note that what wfiled with and resolved by the poll body is a pre-proclamaticase. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any questi

pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by aregistered political party or coalition of political partbefore the board or directly with the Commission, or amatter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custoand appreciation of election returns.

Issue: WON the order of the RTC of Jolo, Sulu in ElectiProtest Case No. 5-4-04 upholding petitioner’s proclamatias Mayor of Indanan, Sulu precludes the COMELEC froissuing the assailed resolutionsHeld: No




Ratio: Note that Election Protest Case No. 5-4-04 is anelection protest case filed by Isnaji, the third candidate forthe position of Mayor against petitioner and Talib. Being anelection protest or a post-proclamation case, it is markedlydifferent from the case filed by Talib before the COMELECwhich is a pre-proclamation case.Verily, the order of the trial court in the election protest casedoes not conflict with nor diminish the legal effect of theCOMELEC en banc Resolution, invalidating eight (8) of the

nine (9) questioned election returns. Particularly, the order isnot inconsistent with the directive of the COMELEC to theElection Officer of Indanan to convene the BEI in theconcerned precincts for a recount, after notice to the partiesand after ensuring that the integrity of the ballot boxes arenot compromised. The order of the trial court directed adismissal of the election protest on a technicality, that is, forfailure of Isnaji as protestant to prosecute the protest. Noelection returns were examined and no ballots revised. Thequestioned election returns could not have been examinedbefore the trial court because they were already with theCOMELEC at that time in connection with Talib’s pre-proclamation case. The trial court perfunctorily consideredthe report of the Revision Committee and on that basisconcluded that it was no longer necessary to continue withthe case because of petitioner’s "enormous lead" over Isnaji,

not Talib.Although denominated as a respondent in Election ProtestCase No. 5-4-04, Talib could not be expected to participatetherein because of his pending pre-proclamation case withthe COMELEC. Had he participated in the election protest, hispre-proclamation case would have been deemed abandonedbecause the general rule is that the filing of an electionprotest or a petition for quo warranto precludes thesubsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, oramounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed. Without adoubt, the dismissal of Election Protest Case No. 5-4-04could not have cast an adverse or prejudicial effect on Talib’spending pre-proclamation case.

Issue: WON the Comelec observed the procedure outlinedin Section 235 of BP 881Held: Yes

Ratio: Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the COMELECfully complied with this Court’s exhortation in Dagloc v.COMELEC that the provision be followed to ascertain the willof the electorate. Indeed, the COMELEC did notinstantaneously nullify the questioned election returns asclaimed by petitioner. Utilizing the first procedure containedin the first sentence of Sec. 235, the COMELEC used othercopies of said suspect election returns, namely the electionreturns submitted by Talib. When this was not enough, iteven resorted to an examination of the COMELEC copies.And when it was evident that the election returns for thenine precincts were manufactured or fabricated because theprinted names and signatures of the members of the BEIwere absent, it was only then that the COMELEC annulledthe said election returns and petitioner’s proclamation. TheCOMELEC thereafter ordered the Election Officer of Indanan

to convene the BEI in the concerned precincts for a recount,if possible, or to report to the COMELEC the impossibility of arecount so that a special election can be immediatelyscheduled. Clearly, the issuances of the COMELEC can hardlybe described as precipitate and premature.

Issue: WON it was proper for Comelec to pierce the veil of election returnsHeld: NoRatio: It is a well-entrenched rule in jurisprudence that ina pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers andthe COMELEC are not to look beyond or behind electionreturns which are on their face regular and authentic returns.In Chu v. COMELEC, aside from reiterating the rule against

piercing the veil of returns, this Court intimated that a prproclamation case is the proper remedy if the defects anirregularities are apparent from a physical inspection of telection returns.In the case at bar, the COMELEC did not have to look other evidence to conclude that the election returns wemanufactured because the defects were apparent on tface of the election returns themselves. In fact, a detaildescription of each questioned election return was provid

in the Resolution of the COMELEC (2nd Division).

Forum Shopping: The relief sought in the Extreme UrgeEx-Parte Manifestation is basically the same as the prayer fa temporary restraining order in the present petition whiwas still pending resolution by this Court at the time tExtreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation was filed before tCOMELEC. However, for as long as the present petitioincluding the prayer for injunctive relief, pends before thCourt, the assailed COMELEC resolutions remapresumptively valid. With the filing of the present petitioonly this Court has jurisdiction to nullify the COMELresolutions or suspend their enforcement.Another violation of the ban against forum-shopping lies petitioner’s failure to inform this Court of its filing of thExtreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with the COMELE

What is worse than petitioner’s forum-shopping is the pbody’s favorable action on petitioner’s Extreme Urgent EParte Manifestation despite knowledge of the pendipetition with this Court. Such action on the part of COMELEshould not be countenanced and deserves disapprobation.

Position of Municipal Mayor: The Local Government Codeclear on the matter of succession. Sec. 44 of R.A. No. 716and Art. 83, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of the LocGovernment Code governing vacancies and successioquoted below, apply:Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the GovernoVice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. ─ If a permanevacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayothe vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shbecome the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacanoccurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor

vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, case of his permanent inability, the second highest-rankisanggunian member, shall become the governor, vigovernor, mayor or vice mayor as the case may bSubsequent vacancies in the said office shall be fillautomatically by the other sanggunian members accordito their ranking as defined herein:(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punobarangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangmember or, in case of his permanent inability, the seconhighest ranking sanggunian member, shall become tpunong barangay.(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunimembers shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only tunexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy ariswhen an elective local official fills a higher vacant officrefuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removefrom office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanentincapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.For purposes of succession as provided in this Chaptranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basof the proportion of votes obtained by each winnicandidate to the total number of registered voters in eadistrict in the immediately preceding local electio[Emphasis supplied.]Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of petitioneproclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy amay be qualified as a "permanent incapacity to discharg




the functions of his office." Ahajan’s assumption of the officeof Mayor should be understood as subject to the result of therecount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of the COMELEC. Thus, there is an immediate need for theCOMELEC to speedily ascertain the true will of the electoratein the eight (8) precincts whose election returns werenullified.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC (1992), supra.

The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. Modes of losing Philippine citizenship –naturalization in a foreign country, express renunciation of citizenship, subscribing to an oath of allegiance to supportthe Constitution or laws of a foreign country. The annulmentof Labo’s Australian citizenship as a result of the finding thathis marriage to an Australian national was bigamous did notautomatically restore is Philippine citizenship.

Menzon v. Petilla 197 SCRA 251 (1991)

Facts: On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that noGovernor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, theSecretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated theVice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. On March 25, 1988, Aurelio D. Menzon, a seniormember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also

designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo.

The Provincial Administrator, Tente U. Quintero inquired fromthe Undersecretary of the DILG as to the legality of theappointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. Undersecretary Rubllar stated that since B.P. 337 hasno provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointmentof the petitioner as the temporary Vice- Governor is notnecessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarilyperforming the functions of the Governor, could concurrentlyassume the functions of both offices.As a result of the foregoing communications between TenteU. Quintero and Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., the SangguniangPanlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989,

issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid theappointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. The petitioner through the acting LDP RegionalCounsel, Atty. Zosimo Alegre, sought clarification fromUndersecretary Rubillar, Jr. regarding the June 22, 1989opinion. Undersecretary Rubillar replied and explained hisopinion: “On the basis of the foregoing and considering thatthe law is silent in case of temporary vacancy, in the Officeof the Vice-Governor, it is our view that the peculiar situationin the Province of Leyte, where the electoral controversy inthe Office of the Governor has not yet been settled, calls forthe designation of the Sangguniang Member to act as vice-governor temporarily.”In view, of the clarificatory letter of Undersecretary Rubillar,the Regional Director of the DILG, Region 8, ResurreccionSalvatierra, on July 17, 1989, wrote a letter addressed to theActing-Governor of Leyte, Leopoldo E. Petilla, requesting thelatter that Resolution No. 505 of the SangguniangPanlalawigan be modified accordingly. Despite these severalletters of request, the Acting Governor and the SangguniangPanlalawigan, refused to correct Resolution No. 505 andcorrespondingly to pay the petitioner the emolumentsattached to the Office of Vice-Governor. Thus, petitioner filedbefore this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Thepetition sought the nullification of Resolution No. 505 and forthe payment of his salary for his services as the acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed theGovernor of the province of Leyte.

Issue: WON there was a vacancy

Held: Yes

Ratio: The law on Public Officers is clear on the matte There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied bylegally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there isvacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized assume and exercise at present the duties of the offic

Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was levacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petiwas appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, toffice to which he was elected was left barren of a legaqualified person to exercise the duties of the office of thVice-Governor.

There is no satisfactory showing that Petilla, notwithstandihis succession to the Office of the Governor, continued simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. Tnature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a futime occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacanis for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automaassumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in tvacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that tSecretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint t

petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during tperiod it was vacant. The Department Secretary had tdiscretion to ascertain whether or not the ProvincGovernor should devote all his time to that particular officMoreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilateraacting, may revoke an appointment made by a highauthority.

Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government had tauthority to designate the petitioner.

Held: Yes

Ratio: The Local Government Code is silent on the mode succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in the Offiof the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law munot be understood to convey that a remedy in law

wanting. The circumstances of the case reveal that there indeed a necessity for the appointment of an acting VicGovernor. For about two years after the governatorelections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor fthe province of Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at thtime, had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending electicase before the Commission on Elections.

The two-year interregnum which would result from trespondents' view of the law is disfavored as it would caudisruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to tpeople and in the proper management of the affairs of tlocal government of Leyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensibthat to leave the situation without affording any remedy wever intended by the Local Government Code.Under the circumstances of this case and considering tsilence of the Local Government Code, the Court rules tha

in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, actithrough her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Governmenmay remedy the situation. We declare valid the temporaappointment extended to the petitioner to act as the VicGovernor. The exigencies of public service demandnothing less than the immediate appointment of an actinVice-Governor.It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 anthe Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President empowered to make temporary appointments in certapublic offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeboth laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointipositions. However, in the absence of any contrary provisi




in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedurethus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied inthe present case. The respondents contend that theprovincial board is the correct appointing power. Thisargument has no merit. As between the President who hassupervision over local governments as provided by law andthe members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the

President, until the law provides otherwise.A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds noapprobation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their ownlocal government.In a republican form of government, the majority rulesthrough their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitatedor absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs tothat extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be aconsequent delay in the delivery of basic services to thepeople of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor ismissing.

The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accordwith the intent behind the Local Government Code. There isno question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to

provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of theVice-Governor.By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, themode of succession provided for permanent vacancies maylikewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in thesame office. In this case, there was a need to fill thevacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of theSangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest numberof votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly inextending the temporary appointment.In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid thesalary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor isindubitable. The compensation, however, to be remuneratedto the petitioner, following the example in CommonwealthAct No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code, andpursuant to the proscription against double compensationmust only be such additional compensation as, with his

existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by lawfor the Office of the Vice-Governor.And finally, even granting that the President, acting throughthe Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power toappoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is ade facto officer entitled to compensation.

There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. Asrevealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by noless than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of officebefore Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Departmentof Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra.Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. Therespondents themselves acknowledged the validity of thepetitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was

only when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passedby the same persons who recognized him as the acting Vice-Governor that the validity of the appointment of thepetitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn.

The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the dutiesattached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He wasacclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principleof public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based andbasic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitousto now deny him the salary due him for the services heactually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of theprovince of Leyte.

Docena v. Sang. Panlalawigan of Eastern Sama(1991)

Facts: Luis Capito, elected and serving as member of tSangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) died in office. PetitionAgustin Docena was appointed to succeed Capito. Thappontment was issued by Department of LocGovernment Secretary Santos on November 19, 199November 27: For unknown reasons, respondent SocrateAlar was also appointed by Secretary Santos to the positialready occupied by Docena. December 18: the SP passResolution No. 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena legitimate successor of the late Capito. December 1Secretary Santos sent a letter to Alar, informing the latter the prior appointment of Docena and recalling Alaappointment

Issue: WON Docena should be the appointed member the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

Held: Yes

Ratio: The pertinent legal provision is Section 50, LGC:SEC. 50. Permanent Vacancies in Local Sanggunians. Excefor the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall comfrom the political party of the sanggunian member wh

caused the vacancy, and shall serve the unexpired term the vacant office.1. From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena November 19, 1990, there is no question that it wintended to be permanent. Petitioner's appointment halready become complete and enforceable at the time it wsupposed to have been "superseded" by the appointmentfavor of Alar.Docena had already acquired security of tenure in tposition and could be removed therefrom only for any of tcauses, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by tLocal Government Code. These requirements could not circumvented by the simple process of recalling happointment.2. The respondents are ambivalent about the power of thSecretary of Local Government to recall his appointments.

They described the December 19 recall of Alar "whimsical, capricious and wishy-washy" for lack of previous hearing (although they had no similar complainabout the recall of Docena's appointment although almade without hearing).

Appointive Local Officials Common to all MunicipalitiCities and Provinces

De Rama v. CA (2001)

Facts : Petitioner Conrado L. de Rama, Mayor of PagbilaQuezon, wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commissi(dated July 13, 1995) seeking the recall of the appointmenof fourteen (14) municipal employees. Petitioner de Ram

justified his recall request on the allegation that tappointments of said employees were “midnighappointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abedone in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 19Constitution.

Three of the said employees, namely: Elsa Marino, MorAyala, and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim fpayment of their salaries, alleging that although thappointments were declared permanent by Conrado GuliDirector II of the CSC Field Office based in Quezon, petitonde Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and benefpursuant to Office Order No. 95-01.

Based on the documents submitted by Marino, Ayala aOriazel, the Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division of the Cissued an Order finding that since the claimants-employe




had assumed their respective positions and performed theirduties pursuant to their appointments, they are entitled toreceive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to theirpositions. The CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division ruledthat the said employees cannot be deprived of their salariesand benefits by the unilateral act of the newly-assumedmayor.

CSC denied petitoner’s request for the recall of

appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit,and declared that the appointments of the said employeeswere issued in accordance with pertinent laws, and cannotbe withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority untildisproved by the CSC. Furthermore, CSC dismissedpetitioner’s allegation that these were midnightappointments. Constitutional provision prohibits only thoseappointments made by an outgoing President and cannotapply to local elective officials.

CSC upheld the validity of the appointments, and petitioner’sfailure to present evidence would warrant the revocation orrecall of the said appointments.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CSC’sResolution, averring that the CSC was without jurisdiction:

(1) to refuse to revoke the subject appointments; and (2) touphold the validity of said appointments, even assumingthere was failure to present eveidence.

Issue : Whether or not Article VII, Section 15 of theConstitution covers local elective officials.

Decision : No. Records reveal that when the petitionerbrought the matter of recalling the appointments of thefourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only

justification he gave was that these were “midnightappointments” that are forbidden under Article VII, Section15 of the Constitution. The CSC ruled, and correctly so, thatthe said prohibition applies only to presidentialappointments. In truth, there is no law that prohibits localelective officials from making appointments during the last

days of his or her tenure.

DISSENTING OPINION: Mendoza. What the majorityoverlooks is that Article VII, Section 15 is simply anapplication of a broader principle that after the appointingauthority has lost the elections, his is the duty of a prudentcaretaker of the office, and therefore, he should not fillpositions in the government unless required by theimperatives of public service.

Leagues of Local Barangay Units and Elective Officials

David v. COMELEC (1997)

Facts: In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ngmga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Alex L. David filed a petition for

prohibition to prohibit the holding of the barangay electionscheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapterrepresented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed apetition "to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare asunconstitutional:1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows: (c)

The term of office of barangay officials and members of thesangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, whichshall begin after the regular election of barangay officials onthe second Monday of May 1994.2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the dateof the holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997and other activities related thereto;

3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million containedRepublic Act No. 8250 otherwise known as the GeneAppropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the costs aexpenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections:Both petitions though worded differently raise the samultimate issue: How long is the term of office of barangofficials? Petitioners contend that under Sec. 2 of RA 665"(t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (years . . ." This is reiterated in RA 6679. Petitioners furth

aver that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term office of all local elective officials to three years, sureduction does not apply to barangay officials because (RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays whRA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other locgovernment units; (2) RA 7160 does not expressly impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangofficials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 19constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at thryears, the same provision states that the term of barangofficials "shall be determined by law"; and (4) thus, it followthat the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officiaany term, except three years; otherwise, "there would be rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to excebarangay officials from the three year term found in Sec(of) Article X of the Constitution."

Comelec maintains that RA 7160 repealed all other speclaws relied upon by the petitioner.

Issue: WON the term of the barangay officials should limited only to three years

Held: Yes

Ratio: In light of the brief historical background, the inteand design of the legislature to limit the term of barangaofficials to only three (3) years as provided under the LocGovernment Code emerges as bright as the sunlight. Tcardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertaand give effect to the intent of the law. And three years the obvious intent.First. RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enactlater than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of

irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintagethe later enactment prevails. Legis posteriores priorcontrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later larepeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative wIt is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older laand intended to change it. In enacting the older law, tlegislators could not have known the newer one and hencould not have intended to change what they did not knoUnder the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequeones and not the other way around.Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangofficials was fixed at "three (3) years which shall begin aftthe regular election of barangay officials on the secoMonday of May 1994." This provision is clearly inconsistewith and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states thsuch "term shall be for five years." Note that both laws ref

to the same officials who were elected "on the secoMonday of May 1994."Second. RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect sevkagawads and the candidate obtaining the highest numbof votes shall automatically be the punong barangay. 6653 empowers the seven elected barangay kagawads select the punong barangay from among themselves. On tother hand, the Local Autonomy Code mandates a direvote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangelectorate, separately from the seven kagawads. Hencunder the Code, voters elect eight barangay officianamely, the punong barangay plus the seven kagawadUnder both RA 6679 and 6653, they vote for only sevkagawads, and not for the barangay chairman.




Third. During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994(second Monday), the voters actually and directly electedone punong barangay and seven kagawads. If we agree withthe thesis of petitioners, it follows that all the punongbarangays were elected illegally and thus, Petitioner AlexDavid cannot claim to be a validly elected barangaychairman, much less president of the national league, of barangays which he purports to represent in this petition. Itthen necessarily follows also that he is not the real party-in-

interest and on that ground, his petition should be summarilydismissed.Fourth. In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997,Congress appropriated the amount of P400 million to coverexpenses for the holding of barangay elections this year.Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that ageneral registration of voters shall be held "immediatelyafter the barangay elections in 1997." These are clear andexpress contemporaneous statements of Congress thatbarangay officials shall be elected this May, in accordancewith Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.Fifth. In Paras vs. Comelec, this Court said that "the nextregular election involving the barangay office concerned isbarely seven (7) months away, the same having beenscheduled in May, 1997." This judicial decision, per Article 8of the Civil Code, is now a "part of the legal system of the

Philippines."Sixth. Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679, being aspecial law, should prevail over RA 7160, all alleged generallaw pursuant to the doctrine of generaila specialibus nonderogant. Petitioners are wrong. RA. 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. Itspecifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that "theterm of office of barangay officials . . . shall be for threeyears." It is a special provision that applies only to the termof barangay officials who were elected on the secondMonday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provisioncannot be deemed a general law. Petitioner may be correctin alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they areincorrect in stating (without however giving the reasonstherefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. It is aspecial law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing clause, RA 7160 states

that "all general and special laws . . . which are inconsistentwith any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealedor modified accordingly." There being a clear repugnanceand incompatibility between the two specific provisions, theycannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thusprevail in accordance with its repealing clause. When asubsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former enactments, the latter is deemed repealed.

Issue: WON the three year term is in accord with theconstitution

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petetioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon CityChapter posits that by excepting barangay officials whose

"term shall be determined by law" from the general provisionfixing the term of "elective local officials" at three years, theConstitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress fromlegislating a three year term for such officers. We find thistheory rather novel but nonetheless logically and legallyflawed.Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibitCongress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials.It merely left the determination of such term to thelawmaking body, without any specific limitation orprohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretionto fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of publicservice. It must be remembered that every law has in itsfavor the presumption of constitutionality. 38 For a law to be

nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear aunequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. 3

To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must beclear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamenlaw prohibits, the statute permits. The petitioners hamiserably failed to discharge this burden and to show cleathe unconstitutionality they aver.

There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. 43-c of R7160 is constitutional. Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitutio

limiting the term of all elective local officials to three yeaexcept that of barangay officials which "shall be determineby law" was an amendment proposed by ConstitutionCommissioner (now Supreme Court Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. According to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., tamendment was "readily accepted without much discussiand formally approved." Indeed, a search into the Record the Constitutional Commission yielded only a few pages actual deliberations.

Issue: WON petitioners are Estopped From Challengi Their Three-Year Terms

Held: Yes

Ratio: Respondent Commission on Elections submitted

Annex "A" of its memorandum, 43 a machine copy of tcertificate of candidacy of Petitioner Alex L. David in the M9, 1994 barangay elections, the authenticity of which wnot denied by said petitioner. In said certificate of candidache expressly stated under oath that he was announcing h"candidacy for the office of punong barangay for Barang77, Zone 7" of Kalookan City and that he was "eligible fsaid office." The Comelec also submitted as Annex "B" 44 its said memorandum, a certified statement of the votobtained by the candidates in said elections.If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 667then (1) Petitioner David should not have run and could nhave been elected chairman of his barangay because undRA 6679, there was to be no direct election for the punobarangay; the kagawad candidate who obtained the highenumber of votes was to be automatically elected barangchairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong barang

should have been Ruben Magalona, who obtained thighest number of votes among the kagawads 150, whiwas much more than David's 112; (3) the electorate shouhave elected only seven kagawads and not one punobarangay plus seven kagawads. In other words, followipetitioners' own theory, the election of Petitioner David well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitionewas illegal.

The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners' theorythat barangay officials are estopped from asking for aterm other than that which they ran for and were elected tunder the law governing thie very claim to such officenamely, RA 7160, the Local Government Code. Petitionebelated claim of ignorance as to what law governed theelection to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under A3 of the Civil Code, "(i)gnorance of the law excuses no o

from compliance therewith."

Private Counsel/Lawyers for elective local officials

Alinsug v. RTC and Mayor Ponseca (1993)

Facts: Zonsayda Alinsug, had been a regular employee the municipal government of Escalante, Negros Occidentwhen she received a permanent appointment as Clerk III the office of the Municipal Planning and DevelopmeCoordinator of the same municipality. Mayor Rolando Ponsidetailed her to the Office of the Mayor. On 19 June 199Zonsayda absented herself from work allegedly to attend family matters. She had asked permission from tpersonnel officer but not from the mayor.




Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspendingZonsayda for one month and one day commencing on 24

June 1992 for "a simple misconduct which can also becategorized as an act of insubordination." The order alsostated that the suspension "carries with it forfeiture of benefits such as salary and PERA and leave credits duringthe duration of its effectivity."Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition for injunction withdamages. She alleged that her suspension was an act of

political vendetta. Mayor Ponsica, through privatepractitioner Samuel SM Lezama, claimed that Zonsayda hadnot yet exhausted administrative remedies and that hersuspension was in accordance with law.

The foregoing elicited a motion from the petitioner, prayingthat the answer be disregarded and expunged from therecord, and that the respondents be all declared in defaulton the ground that since the respondents were sued in theirofficial capacities, "not including their private capacities,"they should have been represented by either the municipallegal officer or the provincial legal officer or prosecutor asprovided for by Sec. 481 (b) (i) and (3) of the LocalGovernment Code. It also cited Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 10 andArt. 177 of the RPC which penalizes usurpation of publicauthority.

The respondents opposed the motion. Manifesting that the

municipality of Escalante has no legal officer, they assertedthat both the Local Government Code and the AdministrativeCode of 1987 do not have any provision "relative to the dutyof any provincial legal officer or prosecutor to represent amunicipality or its officials in suits filed against them by anemployee or a private individual." They contended that itwas "unnecessary to provide such a provision because there(exist) administrative and judicial rulings sustaining thevalidity of the employment of a private counsel by municipalofficials.

The lower court issued the Order denying the motion on thethesis that since the appointment of a legal officer wasoptional on the part of the municipal government (Art. 481,third paragraph, Local Government Code) and themunicipality of Escalante had not, in fact, designated anysuch legal officer, petitioner's move to declare respondentsin default "for having retained a private counsel" was not

thereby legally sustainable.

Issue: WON a private counsel may represent municipalofficials sued in their official capacities

Ratio: It appears that the law allows a private counsel tobe hired by a municipality only when the municipality is anadverse party in a case involving the provincial governmentor another municipality or city within the province. Thisprovision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v.The Auditor General where the Court held that themunicipality's authority to employ a private attorney isexpressly limited only to situations where the provincialfiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it. WithSec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis, theCourt therein cited Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez which

enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal isdisqualified to represent in court a particular municipality; if and when original jurisdiction of case involving themunicipality is vested in the Supreme Court, when themunicipality is a party adverse to the provincial governmentor to some other municipality in the same province, andwhen, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, orchild, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor orotherwise.

Thereafter, in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled thata municipality may not be represented by a private law firmwhich had volunteered its services gratis, in collaborationwith the municipal attorney and the fiscal, as suchrepresentation was violative Sec. 1683 of the old

Administrative Code. This strict coherence to the letter of tlaw appears to have been dictated by the fact that "tmunicipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiria private lawyer" and that "the interests of the municipalwould be best protected if a government lawyer handles litigations."But would these proscriptions include public officials? Nnecessarily. It can happen that a government officiostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in th

capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority. On tone hand, his defense would have then been underwritteby the people's money which ordinarily should have been hpersonal expense. On the other hand, personal liability cattach to him without, however, his having had the benefitassistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI Bulacan, 10 the Court held that in the discharge governmental functions, "municipal corporations aresponsible for the acts of its officers, except if and whethe only to the extent that, they have acted by authority the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof."In such instance, this Court has sanctioned threpresentation by private counsel. In one case, We held thwhere rigid adherence to the law on representation of locofficials in court actions could deprive a party of his right redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private couns

would be proper. And, in Albuera v. Torres, this Court alsaid that a provincial governor sued in his official capacmay engage the services of private counsel when "tcomplaint contains other allegations and a prayer for mordamages, which, if due from the defendants, must satisfied by them in their private capacity."

The key then to resolving the issue of whether a logovernment official may secure the services of privacounsel, in an action filed against him in his official capacilies on the nature of the action and the relief that is soughtWhile the petition below was filed against respondents public officials, its allegations were also aimed at questionicertain acts that can well bring the case beyond the meconfines of official functions; thus2.12 These actuations of the respondent mayor in detailipetitioner to his office and eventually suspending her frowork, particularly the latter are no doubt respondent mayo

political vendetta of petitioner, a vengeance unleased on hfor her children's and family's not going with and voting fhim in the May 11, 1992 election and instead supporting tcandidacy of their relative-candidate (Mr. Barcelona) in saelection, who was his greated (sic) worry at that time.2.13 The aforesaid acts of respondent mayor are clearapparently and obviously a political harassment apersecution, appreasive (sic), acts of vindictiveness, a graabuse of executive discretion, despotic, unjust, unwarrantecondemnable and actionable; the indefinite detail order anespecially the suspension, were not done in good faith, nfor a valid cause, and done without giving petitionopportunity to be heard, hence, null and void for beiviolative of petitioner's legal and constitutional right to dprocess. .

The petition then went on to claim moral and exempla

damages, as well as litigation expenses, as shown by prayer. Moral damages cannot generally be awarded unlethey are the proximate result of a wrongful act or omissioExemplary damages, on the other hand, are not awardedthe defendant had not acted in a wanton, oppressive malevolent manner nor in the absence of gross or recklenegligence. A public official, who in the performance of hduty acts in such fashion, does so in excess of authority, ahis actions would be ultra vires that can thereby result in incurrence of personal liability.

Municipality of Pililia, Rizal v. CA (1994)

Facts: The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitionMunicipality of Pililla, Rizal, against private responde




Philippine Petroleum Corporation, ordering therein defendantto pay said plaintiff (1) the amount of P5,301,385.00representing the tax on business due from the defendantunder Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of saidmunicipality for the period from 1979 to 1983. The SCaffirmed the judgment with modification .Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality with the RTC for the examination of defendantcorporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and

1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing the tax onbusiness imposed under the Local Tax Code, as amended.

The corporation filed a manifestation to the effect that themayor already received the sum as evidenced by the releaseand quitclaim documents executed by said mayor. The courtbelow issued an order denying plaintiff municipality's motionfor examination and execution of judgment on the groundthat the judgment in question had already been satisfied.When Atty. Mendiola ffiled a petition for certiorari with theSC, PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's authorityto represent petitioner municipality. The CA dismissed thepetition for having been filed by a private counsel inviolation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice tothe filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pilillathrough the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.

Issue: WON Atty. Mendiola has authority to file a petitionin behalf of the municipality

Held: No

Ratio: The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty.Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of and inthe name of the Municipality of Pililla. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney hasbeen settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., andreiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate AppellateCourt, et al., where we ruled that private attorneys cannotrepresent a province or municipality in lawsuits.Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3,Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only theprovincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent aprovince or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is

mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a privatelawyer is expressly limited only to situations where theprovincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For theaforementioned exception to apply, the fact that theprovincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality'scase must appear on record. In the instant case, there isnothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal isdisqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla onappeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel iswithout authority of law.

The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broadenough to include situations wherein the provincial fiscalrefuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. The fiscal'srefusal to represent the municipality is not a legal

justification for employing the services of private counsel.Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline

employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functionson grounds not provided for by law without violating his oathof office. Instead of engaging the services of a specialattorney, the municipal council should request the Secretaryof Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of theprovincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute itscase in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the RevisedAdministrative Code.

It is also significant that the lack of authority of hereincounsel, Atty. Mendiola, was even raised by the municipalityitself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's motionfor execution of his lien, which was filed with the court a quoby the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said municipality.

The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondecannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authorto represent the municipality is untenable. The legality of hrepresentation can be questioned at any stage of tproceedings. In the cases hereinbefore cited, the issue lack of authority of private counsel to represent municipality was only raised for the first time in tproceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for servicrendered in the particular case, after the decision in th

case had become final and executory and/or had been duexecuted.Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of tmunicipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, saauthority is deemed to have been revoked by tmunicipality when the latter, through the municipal mayand without said counsel's participation, entered into compromise agreement with herein private respondent wregard to the execution of the judgment in its favor athereafter filed personally with the court below twpleadings entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction

Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim".

A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion himself, is considered to have impliedly dismissed his lawyeHerein counsel cannot pretend to be authorized to continrepresenting the municipality since the latter is entitled

dispense with his services at any time. Both at common laand under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a cliemay dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of tproceedings, and there is nothing to prevent a litigant froappearing before the court to conduct his own litigation.

The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a swithout the intervention of his lawyer. 22 Even the lawyeright to fees from their clients may not be invoked by thlawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving or holdiin abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. Tlawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the propcourt in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with tRules of Court, but said rights may not be used to prevethe approval of the compromise agreement.

The apprehension of herein counsel that it is impossible ththe municipality will file a similar petition, considering ththe mayor who controls its legislative body will not take th

initiative, is not only conjectural but without factual basContrary to his pretensions, there is presently manifestation and motion pending with the trial court filby the aforesaid municipal mayor for the withdrawal of t"Satisfaction of Judgment" and the "Release and Quitclaim"previously filed in the case therein as earlier mentioned.

Ramos v. CA (1997)

Facts: On April 18, 1990, petitioners filed a petition befothe court a quo for the Declaration of Nullity of MunicipOrdinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990) and the contraof lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in tmunicipality of Baliuag, Bulacan. Meanwhile, the provincFiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filan Answer on behalf of respondent municipality.At the pre-trial conference, Atty. Roberto B. Romanil

appeared, manifesting that he was counsel for tmunicipality. On the same date, Atty. Romanillos filed motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit Amended Answer with motion to dismiss. The provincattorney appeared as collaborating counsel of AtRomanillos. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was AtRomanillos who submitted the Reply to petitioneOpposition to respondents' motion to dissolve injunction.was also Atty. Romanillos who submitted a written formoffer of evidence for the municipality.Despite the hearing, petitioners questioned the personalof Atty Romanillos to appear as counsel of the municipalitMeanwhile, Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joistating that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel f




respondent municipality and that Atty. Regalado, as hiscollaborating counsel for respondent municipality, isadopting the entire proceedings participated in/undertakenby Atty. Romanillos. The judge denied the petitioners’ motionto disqualify.

Issue: Who is Authorized to Representa Municipality in itsLawsuits?

Ratio: In the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs.CA, this Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, set inclear-cut terms the answer to the question of who maylegally represent a municipality in a suit for or against it,thus: . . . The matter of representation of a municipality by aprivate attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. CA, et al.,and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. IAC, et al., where weruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province ormunicipality in lawsuits.Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:Sec. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces andprovincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal shallrepresent the province and any municipality or municipaldistrict thereof in any court, except in cases whereof (sic)original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or incases where the municipality or municipal district in question

is a party adverse to the provincial government or to someother municipality or municipal district in the same province.When the interests of a provincial government and of anypolitical division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscalshall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscalis disqualified to serve any municipality or other politicalsubdivision of a province a special attorney may beemployed by its council.Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, RA2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only provincial fiscal and themunicipal attorney can represent a province or municipalityin their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. Themunicipality's authority to employ a private lawyer isexpressly limited only to situations where the provincialfiscal is disqualified to represent it. For the aforementionedexception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal wasdisqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear

on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the recordsto show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act ascounsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence theappearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law.

The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer and adviserfor the civil cases of a province and corollarily, of themunicipalities thereof, were subsequently transferred to theprovincial attorney.

The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show thatonly the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipalattorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Onlyin exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired bya municipality to represent it in lawsuits.

These exceptions are enumerated in the case of Alinsug vs.RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, to wit:

Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to behired by a municipality only when the municipality is anadverse party in a case involving the provincial governmentor another municipality or city within the province. Thisprovision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v.

The Auditor General where the Court held that themunicipality's authority to employ a private attorney isexpressly limited only to situations where the provincialfiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it. WithSec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis, theCourt therein cited Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez whichenumerated instances when the provincial fiscal isdisqualified to represent in court a particular municipality; if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the

municipality is vested in the Supreme Court, when tmunicipality is a party adverse to the provincial governmeor to some other municipality in the same province, anwhen, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor otherwise.

Thereafter, in Ramos vs. CA, the Court ruled thatmunicipality may not be represented by a private law firwhich had volunteered its services gratis, in collaborati

with the municipal attorney and the fiscal, as surepresentations was violative of Sec. 1683 of the oAdministrative Code. This strict coherence to the letter of tlaw appears to have been dictated by the fact that "tmunicipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiria private lawyer" and that the interests of the municipalwould be best protected if a government lawyer handles litigations.None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case.may be said that Atty. Romanillos appeared for respondemunicipality inasmuch as he was already counsel of KriCorporation which was sued with respondent municipalitythis same case. The order of the trial court dated Septemb19, 1990, stated that Atty. Romanillos "entered happearance as collaborating counsel of the provincprosecutor and the provincial attorney." This collaboration

contrary to law and hence should not have been recognizas legal. It has already been ruled in this wise: The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal asupposed to collaborate with a private law firm does nlegalize the latter's representation of the municipality Hagonoy in Civil Case No. 5095-M. While a privaprosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an analogoarrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein municipality is the plaintiff.As already stated, private lawyers may not represemunicipalities on their own. Neither may they do so even collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This anchored on the principle that only accountable pubofficers may act for and in behalf of public entities and thpublic funds should not be expanded to hire private lawyerPetitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning tlegality of the appearance of Atty. Romanillo

notwithstanding that they questioned the witnesses respondent municipality during the hearing of its motion dissolve the preliminary injunction. Municipality of PililRizal vs. Court of Appeals held that the legality of trepresentation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised any stage of the proceedings.Elementary fairness dictates that parties unaware of tunauthorized representation should not be held in estopp

just because they did not question on the spot the authorof the counsel for the municipality. The rule on appearancof a lawyers is that until the contrary is clearly shown, aattorney is presumed to be acting under authority of tlitigant whom he purports to represent. His authority appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not havibeen questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file t

complaint and appear for his client.

Issue: Would the adoption by Atty. Regalado of tproceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos validate suproceedings?

Held: Yes

Ratio: It does not appear that the adoption of proceedinparticipated in or undertaken by Atty. Romanillos when hwas private counsel for the respondent municipality Baliuag such as the proceedings on the motion to dissolthe injunction, wherein petitioners had even cross-examinthe witnesses presented by Atty. Romanillos in support




said motion and had even started to present their witnessesto sustain their objection to the motion would have resultedin any substantial prejudice to petitioners' interest. As Weesee it, to declare the said proceedings null and voidnotwithstanding the formal adoption thereof by Atty.Regalado as Provincial Attorney of Bulacan in court and torequire trial anew to cover the same subject matter, to hearthe same witnesses and to admit the same evidenceadduced by the same parties cannot enhance the promotion

of justice. This Court believes that conferring legitimacy to theappearance of Atty. Romanillos would not cause substantialprejudice on petitioners. Requiring new trial on the merelegal technicality that the municipality was not representedby a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interestof justice. After all, this Court does not see any injusticecommitted against petitioners by the adoptions of the workof private counsel nor any interest of justice being served byrequiring retrial of the case by the duly authorized legalrepresentative of the town.In sum, although a municipality may not hire a privatelawyer to represent it in litigations, in the interest of substantial justice however, we hold that a municipality mayadopt the work already performed in good faith by suchprivate lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1) provided

that no injustice it thereby heaped on the adverse party and(2) provided further that no compensation in any guise ispaid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer.Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyers workcannot bind the municipality.

Issue: WON Joint Motion Need Not Comply with Rule 15

Held: Yes

Ratio: We also agree with the justification of publicrespondent than a motion to withdraw the appearance of anunauthorized lawyer is a non-adversarial motion that neednot comply with Section 4 Rule 15 as to notice to theadverse party. The disqualification of Atty. Romanillos waswhat petitioners were really praying for when theyquestioned his authority to appear for the municipality. The

disqualification was granted, thereby serving the relief prayed for by petitioners. such being the case, no "noticedirected to the parties concerned and served at least 3 daysbefore the hearing thereof" 30 need be given petitioners, thequestioned motion not being contentious. Besides, whatpetitioners were questioning as to lack of authority wasremedied by the adoption of proceedings by an authorizedcounsel, Atty. Regalado. The action of the trial court allowingthe motion of respondent municipality effectively grantedpetitioners motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos. In Peoplevs. Leviste, we ruled that:While it is true any motion that does not comply with therequirements of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filingand, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, this Courthas likewise held that where a rigid application of the rulewill result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,

technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve thecase. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided onthe merits and not on technicalities. As this Court held inGalvez vs. Court of Appeals, "an order of the court grantingthe motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularityin the proceedings . . . which cannot deprive a competentcourt of jurisdiction over the case."It should be remembered that rules of procedure are buttools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, suchthat when rigid application of the rules tend to frustraterather than promote substantial justice, this Court isempowered to suspend their operation.

Salalima v. Guingona 257 SCRA 55 (1996)

Facts: This refers to the administrative complaint filagainst Albay Governor Romeo Salalima, Vice-GovernDanilo Azafla, Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Membe

Juan Victoria, Lorenzo Reyeg, Jesus Marcellana, Arturo OsClenio Cabredo, Ramon Fernandez, Jr., Masikap FontanilVicente Go, Sr., and Nemesio Baclao relative to the retaincontract for legal services entered into between the Provinof Albay, on the one hand, and Atty. Jesus R. Cornago athe Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other, and tdisbursement of public fund in payment thereof.

The complaint alleges that by entering into the retainagreement with private lawyers and paying P7, 380, 410.to the said private lawyers, respondents violated seveprovisions of law which warrants the imposition administrative penalties against them. It is to be noted threspondents Victoria, Reyeg, Cabredo, Marcellana and Oswere not yet members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigwhen Resolution No. 129 was passed. However, tcomplaint alleges that these respondents were named in tcomplaint because they approved the supplemenbudget/appropriation ordinances providing for the paymeof the attorney’s fees.

Issue: WON respondents have incurred administrati

liability in entering into the retainer agreement with AtCornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in makipayments pursuant to said agreement for purposes of tcase filed by NPC with the Supreme Court against tProvince.

Held: Yes

Ratio: Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code (R.A. N7160) requires the appointment of a legal officer for tprovince whose functions include the following: Represethe local government unit in all civil actions and specproceedings wherein the local government unit or any officthereof, in his official capacity is a party; Provided, That, actions or proceeding where a component city municipality is a party adverse to the provincial governmeor to another component city or municipality, a special legofficer may be employed to represent the adverse party.

The Supreme Court has ruled in Municipality of Bocaue, al. v. Manotok, that local government units cannot represented by private lawyers and it is solely the ProvincFiscal who can rightfully represent them. This ruling applisquarely to the case at hand because Sec. 481 of the LocGovernment Code is based on Sec. 1681 of the RevisAdministrative Code which was the subject of interpretatiin the case of Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok.hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albarespondents exceeded their authority and violated tabovequoted section of the Local Government Code and tdoctrine laid down by the Supreme Court.qMoreover, the entire transaction was attended irregularities. First, the disbursements to the lawyeamounting to P7,380,410.31 were disallowed by t

Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were mawithout the prior written conformity of the Solicitor Generand the written concurrence of the Commission on Au(COA) as required by COA Circular No. 86-25 5 dated 2 Ap1986.

The respondents attempted to dispute this finding presenting the Solicitor General’s conformity dated 15 Ju1993. This conformity was, however obtained after tdisbursements were already made in 1990 and 1992. Whis required by COA Circular No. 86-255 is a prior writtconformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General.Another irregularity in the transaction concerns the lawyeResolution No. 0 1-90 authorized the respondent Governorsign and confirm a retainer contract for legal services wi




the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm at 202 E. Rodriguez Sr. Blvd.,Quezon City. The retainer contract signed by respondentGovernor was, however, not only with the Cortes & ReynaLaw Firm but also with Atty. Jesus R. Cornago of JameccaBuilding, 280 Tomas Morato Avenue, Quezon City. That Atty.

Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm are twoseparate entities is evident from the retained contract itself.In entering into a retainer agreement not only with theCortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Jose R. Cornago,

respondent Governor exceeded his authority underResolution No. 01-90.Complicating further the web of deception surrounding thetransaction is the fact that it was only Atty. Cornago whoappeared as collaborating counsel of record of the Provincein the Supreme Court case. Even the Solicitor General, in hisletter to respondent Governor dated 15 July 1993, noted thatthe Province is represented in the Supreme Court by Attys.Ricafort Cornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes& Reyna Law Firm.Furthermore, the memorandum with the Supreme Court filedfor the Province was signed by Atty. Cornago and not by theCortes & Reyna Law Firm. Consequently, the Cortes & ReynaLaw Firm was not counsel of record of the Province in G.R.No. 87479. And yet, six of the ten checks paid by theProvince and amounting to more than P3.6 million were

issued in favor of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm through Atty.Antonio Jose Cortes. In other words, respondents disbursedmoney to the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm although the latterdid not appear as counsel for the Province in the SupremeCourt in G.R. No. 87479.Finally, the attorney’s fees agreed upon by respondentSalalima and confirmed by the other respondents are notonly unreasonable but also unconscionable. The contingentfee of 18% of the ”P2l4 million” claim of the Province againstNPC amounts to P38.5 million. The word “unconscionable,”as applied to attorney’s fee, “means nothing more than thatthe fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplainedwould be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage hadbeen taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been takenof the client, or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated onhim.”

The Province has a legal officer, Atty. Ricafort, who had

already filed a comment on NPC’s petition against theProvince. The comment filed by Atty. Ricafort already coversthe basic issues raised in the petition. When Atty. Cornagofiled an appearance and subsequently a memorandum forthe Province, the petition was already been given due courseby the Supreme Court and the only pleading to be filed bythe parties before the Court would issue its decision was amemorandum. Surely, one memorandum could not be worthP38.5 million.Furthermore, the professional character and social standingof Atty. Cornago are not such as would merit a P38.5 millionfee for the legal services rendered for the Province. Duringthe hearing, respondent Governor admitted that he hadhired Atty. Cornago because they were schoolmates at SanBeda College.It is evident that respondent Governor hired Atty. Cornago

not on the basis of his competency and standing in the legalcommunity but purely for personal reasons. Likewise, thestanding of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm is not such aswould merit P38.5 million for one memorandum, which, inthis case, it had not even filed because it was not thecounsel of record. Hence, considering the labor and timeinvolved, the skill and experience called for in theperformance of the services and the professional characterand social standing of the lawyers, the attorney’s fee of P38.5 million is unconscionable. By allowing suchscandalously exorbitant attorney’s fees which is patentlydisadvantageous to the government, respondents betrayed apersonal bias to the lawyers involved and committed abuseof authority.

Disciplinary Actions

Ganzon v. CA (1991), supra.

Facts: DLG Secretary issued against Mayor Ganzon separate orders of 60-day preventive suspensions datAug11 1988, Oct11 1988, and May3 1990. A fourth ordwas issued on July3, 1991.On August 5, 1991, SC issued order that the first suspensions are affirmed provided that Ganzon may not made to serve future suspensions on account of any of tremaining admin charges against him. Ganzon filed petition for mandamus with "manifestation and compliancealleging that he had already fully served the suspensiorders issued against him, in compliance with the AugustSC Order, and that he should be allowed to re-assume hoffice starting September 4 1991.

Held: Simultaneous service of the 3rd and 4th orders suspension can be allowed Under the bizarre circumstancof CAB, It would work in favor of Ganzon, an elective officiand it presumably will favor the local constituency acertainly lessen if not offset the harsh effects of whatevmotive may be behind the intriguing action of DLG Sec issuing the successive suspension orders especially when

could have pursued a consolidated effort.SC takes judicial notice of recently-approved LGC whprovides, under Sec63 as to imposition of preventisuspensions, thatSec63 (b). . . that, any single preventive suspension of locelective official shall not extend beyond sixty (60) dayProvided, further that in the event that severadministrative cases are filed against an elective official,cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (9days within a single year on the same ground or groundexisting and known at the time of the first suspension."

Espiritu v. Melgar (1992)

Facts: Ramir Garing filed a sworn letter-complaint wSecretary Luis Santos of DILG charging Mayor Nelson Melgof Naujan. Oriental Mindoro, with grave miscondu

oppression. abuse of authority, culpable violation of tConstitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest the public service. Melgar allegedly assaulted Garing aordered his arrest and detention in the municipal jail Naujan without filing any charges until his released tfollowing day. An identical letter complaint was filed Garing with Provincial Governor of Oriental MindoBenjamin Espiritu, accusing Melgar of the same violationsthird complaint filed by Garing with the Presidential ActiCenter, OP.Mayor Melgar submitted his answer wherein he said thwhile he was delivering a speech during a graduaticeremony, Garing suddenly clapped causing disturbance the part of the audience. When the Mayor ended his speeche instructed a policeman to investigate Garing. It appearthat Garing was drunk. The mayor also presented mediccertificate proving that Garing was not hurt. A balison wthen taken from Garing. The mayor informed Garing to ghome (he had sobered up), but he refused to go and only dso the following morning.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passResolution No 55, recommending to the Provincial Governthat the Mayor be preventively suspended for 45 dapending the investigation of the administrative complaiWhen the mayor received the order of suspension, he filed"Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayfor Restraining Order" in the RTC of Oriental Mindoalleging that "the order of suspension was an arrogadespotic and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor. TRTC judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoini




Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of suspension against Mayor MelgarOn appeal, petitioner contends that the trial judge erred ingranting the preliminary injunction since the Governor isempowered under Sec 63 LGC to place an elective municipalofficial under preventive suspension pending decision of anadministrative case against the elective municipal official.Also, under Sec 61 LGC, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has

jurisdiction over the complaints against any municipal

official, while Section 19(c) of the Judiciary ReorganizationAct of 1930 withdrew from RTCs jurisdictions over suchcases. Also, the mayor has a remedy of appeal under Sec 66LGC.

Issue: WON the governor has the power to suspend themayor

Held: Yes

Ratio: Under Section 63 LGC, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to preventivelysuspend the municipal mayor of Naujan at anytime after theissues had been joined and any of the following groundswere shown to exist:When there is reasonable ground to believe that the

respondent has committed the act or acts complained of;When the evidence of culpability is strong;When the gravity of the offense so warrants; orWhen the continuance in office of the respondent couldinfluence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety andintegrity of the records and other evidence.

There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before thecharges against him are heard and before he is given anopportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension isallowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normalcourse of the investigation through the use of his influenceand authority over possible witnesses.Since the mayor believed that his preventive suspension wasunjustified and politically motivated, he should have soughtrelief first from the Secretary of DILG, not from the courts.Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts withoutexhausting administrative remedies was premature. The RTC

had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. R-5003 andgravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case.

There may exist honest differences of opinion with regard tothe seriousness of the charges, or as to whether theywarrant disciplinary action. However, as a general rule, theoffice or body that is invested with the power of removal orsuspension should be the sole judge of the necessity andsufficiency of the cause. So, unless a flagrant abuse of theexercise of that power is shown, public policy and abecoming regard for the principle of separation of powersdemand that the action of said officer or body should be leftundisturbed.However, in this particular case. since the 60-day preventivesuspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the

Temporary Restraining Order which we issued on August 6,1991, and therefore has already been served, he is deemed

reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him.

Aguinaldo v. Santos (1992)

Facts: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of theprovince of Cagayan. Shortly after the December 1989 coupd'etat was crushed, the Secretary of Local Government senta telegram and a letter, to petitioner requiring him to showcause why he should not be suspended or removed fromoffice for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48)hours from receipt thereof. A sworn complaint for disloyaltyto the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution wasfiled by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep,the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and

Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the lattcommitted during the coup.In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning the coup or actively participating in its execution, though admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebsoldiers. The Secretary suspended petitioner from office 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the forminvestigation. During the hearing, petitioner did not preseany evidence and instead moved that the Secretary inhi

himself, which motion was denied. Later, the Secretarendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged aordering his removal from office. The Vice Governor, MelvVargas was installed as Governor.In this appeal, the power of the Secretary to suspend officiawas repealed by the 1987 Constitution and that the act disloyalty committed by petitioner was not proven beyonreasonable doubt.While the case was pending before the SC, petitioner filehis certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filagainst him on the ground that he had been removed frooffice. The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this wreversed on the ground that the decision of the Secretahas not yet attained finality and is still pending review withe Court. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in t

elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventuproclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

Issue: WON the Secretary has the power to suspend remove local government officials as alter ego of tPresident

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pendibefore Us moot and academic. It appears that after tcanvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most numbervotes among the candidates for governor of Cagayprovince. As held by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec et a‘the reelection to office operates as a condonation of tofficer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right

remove him therefor. The Court should never removepublic officer for acts done prior to his present term of offic

To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their rigto elect their officers. When the people have elected a mto office, it must be assumed that they did this wknowledge of his life and character, and that thdisregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he habeen guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of sucfault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of tpeople.’Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not removed for administrative misconduct committed duringprior term, since his re-election to office operates ascondonation of the officer's previous misconduct to textent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. Tforegoing rule, however, finds no application to crimin

cases pending against petitioner for acts he may hacommitted during the failed coup. The power of respondent Secretary to remove logovernment of officials is anchored on both the Constitutioand a statutory grant from the legislative branch. Tconstitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President tpower of control over all executive departments, bureaand offices and the power of general supervision over locgovernments, and by the doctrine that the acts of tdepartment head are presumptively the acts of the Presideunless expressly rejected by him. 4 The statutory grafound in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, havibeen enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant




Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2. A similarprovision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987Constitution.Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature toenact a local government code, which provides for themanner of removal of local government officials, is found inthe 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution,then it can not be said that BP337 was repealed by theeffectivity of the present Constitution. Moreover, in

Bagabuyo et al. v. Davide, Jr., BP 337 remained in forcedespite the effectivity of the Constitution, until such time asthe proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved.

The power of he Secretary of the DILG to remove localelective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337. As to petitioner's argument of the want of authorityof the Secretary to appoint Melvin Vargas as Governor, Weneed but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 to show thefallacy of the same. Equally without merit is petitioner'sclaim that before he could be suspended or removed fromoffice, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuchas he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to theRepublic which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the RPC. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally underthe provisions of the RPC, but administratively with the endin view of removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor

of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republicwhere the quantum of proof required is only substantialevidence.

Reyes v. COMELEC (1996)

Facts: G.R. No. 120905. Renato Reyes was theincumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, OrientalMindoro. An administrative complaint was filed against himwith the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. Itwas alleged, that petitioner exacted and collectedP50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the BongabongPublic Market. Also, that certain checks issued to him by theNational Reconciliation and Development Program of theDILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer norreflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; andthat he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattledispersal program after the latter had reared and fattenedthe cattle for seven months. The Sangguniang Panlalawiganfound petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered hisremoval from office.Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition andinjunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, thePresiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ViceGovernor Pedrito Reyes, issued an order for petitioner tovacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over theoffice to the incumbent vice mayor. But service of the orderupon petitioner was also refused.Meanwhile, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy wit theComelec. Rogelio de Castro sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the LGC. TheComelec canceled petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong,apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the

COMELEC, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor. TheComelec en banc affirmed. Invoking the ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that his election onMay 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.G.R. No. 120940. Julius Garcia, who obtained the highestnumber of votes next to Reyes intervened, contending thatbecause Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled tobe proclaimed mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. TheComelec en banc denied Garcia’s prayer since a candidatewho obtains the second highest number of votes in anelection cannot be declared winner

Issue: WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigis not yet final because he has not been served a cothereof.

Held: No

Ratio: The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. As t

secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzstated in his certification, repeated attempts had been mato serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registermail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision.If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party freasons attributable to him, service is deemed completeand the judgment or decision will be considered validserved as long as it can be shown that the attempt to delivit to him would be valid were it not for his or his counserefusal to receive it.Indeed that petitioner's counsel knew that a decision in thadministrative case had been rendered is evident in heffort to bargain with the counsel for the SangguniaPanlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him ahis client while their petition for certiorari in the RTC wpending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefor

be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of tdecision. The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that tparty being served with the pleading, order or judgment duly informed of the same so that he can take steps protect his interests, enable a party to file an appeal or appfor other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomfinal.Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decisioPrudence required that, rather than resist the service, should have received the decision and taken an appeal the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 716§ 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decisibecame final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first serviupon petitioner.

The net result is that when the elections were held on May 1995, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan h

already become final and executory. The filing of a petitifor certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent tadministrative decision from attaining finality. An originaction of certiorari is an independent action and does ninterrupt the course of the principal action nor the running the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal actiduring the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, themust be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunctifrom the appellate court directed to the lower court. In tcase at bar, although a temporary restraining order wissued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunctiwas subsequently issued. The temporary restraining ordissued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, thewas no more legal barrier to the service of the decision uppetitioner.

Issue: WON petitioner’s reelection rendered tadministrative charges against him moot and academic

Held: No

Ratio: The case at bar is the very opposite of Aguinaldo Comelec. Here, although Reyes brought an action question the decision in the administrative case, the TRissued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result ththe decision was served on petitioner and it thereaftbecame final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus valid




removed from office and, pursuant to § 40(b) of the LGC, hewas disqualified from running for reelection.It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases weredecided there was no provision similar to § 40(b) whichdisqualifies any person from running for any elective positionon the ground that he has been removed as a result of anadministrative case. R.A. No. 7160 could not be givenretroactive effect.Furthermore, the decision has not yet attained finality. As

indicated earlier, the decision of the then Secretary of LocalGovernment was questioned by the petitioner in this Courtand that to date, the petition remains unresolved.All in all, herein Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian aperiod of sixty one (61) days to file his verified answerhowever, he resorted to dilatory motions which in the endproved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed norfurnished the complainant a copy of his answer. Failure of the respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen (15)days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered awaiver of his rights to present evidence in his behalf ((1).Art. 126 of Rules and Regulations implementing the LocalGovernment Code of 1991). All persons shall have the rightto a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of theConstitution).

Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficientopportunity to file his answer. He failed to do so.Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would bepresenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would thenhave the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But onthe date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that thiswas because he had filed a motion for postponement andwas awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the patternof delay he employed to render the case against him mootby his election.

Issue: WON Julius Garcia should be declared mayor in viewof the disqualification of Renato Reyes

Held: No

Ratio: That the candidate who obtains the second highest

number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case thewinning candidate is disqualified is now settled. Tosimplistically assume that the second placer would havereceived the other votes would be to substitute our

judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is justthat, a second placer. He lost the elections. He wasrepudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. Hecould not be considered the first among qualified candidatesbecause in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate,the conditions would have substantially changed. We are notprepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated iswithout merit. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed tohave been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and forthat reason can not be treated as stray, void, ormeaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified

cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as toinvalidate the votes cast for him.As for Garcia's contention that the COMELEC committed agrave abuse of discretion in not deciding the case before thedate of the election, suffice it to say that under R.A. No.6646, § 6, the COMELEC can continue proceedings fordisqualification against a candidate even after the electionand order the suspension of his proclamation whenever theevidence of his guilt is strong. For the same reason, we findno merit in the argument that the COMELEC should haveseen right away that Reyes had not exhaustedadministrative remedies by appealing the decision of theSangguniang Panlalawigan and, therefore, should havedisqualified him before the elections.

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole (1995)

Facts: Criminal and administrative complaints were filagainst respondents (Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-MayPaterno Cañete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member RafaMayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue CCouncilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede) Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for tVisayas. The respondents were charged with having violatR.A No. 3019, as amended; Articles 170 and 171 RPC; aR.A. No. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred threspondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused talteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 increasing the allocated appropriation therein froP3,494,364.57 to P7M without authority from tSangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspensiorespondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaon the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereof jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative cafiled against them since, under Section 63 LGC, the power investigate and impose administrative sanctions against salocal officials, as well as to effect their preventisuspension, had now been vested with the Office of t

President. Dionson and Bercede argued that the LGC counot have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified tpertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to tOmbudsman the power to investigate cases against public officials and that, in any case, the power of tOmbudsman to investigate local officials under tOmbudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisioof the Local Government Code of 1991.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro Guido, until the administrative case would have been finaresolved by the Ombudsman.A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminainjunction and temporary restraining order, was filed respondent officials with the RTC. Acting favorably on tpleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him froenforcing and/or implementing the questioned order preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.

Issue: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the ca

Held: Yes

Ratio: The general investigatory power of the Ombudsmis decreed by Section 13(1,) Article X1, of the 19Constitution, while his statutory mandate to act administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officiawho could be subject to the disciplinary authority of tOmbudsman. Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of RNo. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of t

Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decrpreventive suspension on any public officer or employunder investigation by it.Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that tdisciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officiamust be deemed to have been removed by the subsequeenactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 whivests the authority to investigate administrative chargelisted under Section 60 thereof, on various offices In the caspecifically of complaints against elective officials provinces and highly urbanized cities.

Thus, respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of tLocal Government Code, preventive suspension can only imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is




elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or anindependent component city; . . ."

There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed,whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matterin question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable,as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down theother. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws byimplication are not favored, and that courts must generally

assume their congruent application. The two laws must beabsolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof mustsurface, before the inference of implied repeal may bedrawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare etconcordare leqibus esf optimus interpretendi, i e, everystatute must be so interpreted and brought into accord withother laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thefundament is that the legislature should be presumed tohave known the existing laws on the subject and not to haveenacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must beresolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should beexerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws onthe subject.Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injusticeto the very reason that underlies the creation of theOmbudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate

said office from the long tentacles of officialdom." Quiteinterestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present LocalGovernment Code run almost parallel with the provisionsthen existing under the old code.

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and toimpose preventive suspension over elective provincial or cityofficials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of LocalGovernment until it became concurrent with theOmbudsman upon the enactment of R.A No. 6770,specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extentof the common grant The Local Government Code of 1991(R.A No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from whatalready prevailed, the modification being only in thesubstitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of LocalGovernment by the Office of the President.Respondent local officials contend that the 6-monthpreventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the

Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-daypreventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the LocalGovernment Code to even now maintain its application. Thetwo provisions govern differently. In order to justify thepreventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a)the charge against the officer or employee should involvedishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect inthe performance of duty; (b) that charges should warrantremoval from the service; or (c) the respondent's continuedstay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. TheOmbudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspensionto all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who areunder investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing theshorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspensionprescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an

elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined),it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground tobelieve that the respondent has committed the act or actscomplained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,(c)the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuancein office of the respondent could influence the witnesses orpose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records andother evidence.

The contention is without merit. The records reveal thatpetitioner issued the order of preventive suspension afterthe filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on themotion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that,

not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspensican be decreed on an official under investigation aftcharges are brought and even before the charges are heaNaturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior any finding of guilt or innocence.Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put preventive suspension only after petitioner had found, consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier, ththe evidence of guilt was strong.

Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the SolicitGeneral that respondent officials' petition for prohibitiobeing an application for remedy against the findings petitioner contained in his 21 September 1992 order, shounot have been entertained by the trial court.

Salalima v. Guingona (1996), supra.

In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categoricaruled that the Office of the President is without any power remove elected officials, since the power is exclusivevested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in tlast paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC. It further invalidatArticle 125, Rule XIX of IRR. The Court nullified the rule sinthe Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules aRegulations of the Local Government Code exceeded authority when it granted to the disciplining authority t

power to remove elective officials, a power which the laitself granted only to the proper courts.

Grego v. COMELEC 274 SCRA 481 (1997)

Facts: On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from hposition as Deputy Sheriff by the Court Court upon a findiof serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodgby Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidafor Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manduring the 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingassumed office.After his term, he sought reelection in the 1992 election. Hagain won. However, a case for quo warranto was filed Cenon Ronquillo (Candidate for councilor), who allegBasco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaints were filed before t

Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG. In 1995, Basran again for councilor.William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of PrecinNo. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELECpetition for disqualification, praying for Bascodisqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, afor the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duelected Councilor of Manila's Second District. The ManBOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilof the Second District of Manila.In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motioseeking to annul the illegal proclamation. The Comeldismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that tadministrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco wwiped away and condoned by the electorate who electhim.

Issue: WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 appretroactively to those removed from office before it toeffect on January 1, 1992

Held: No

Ratio: Petitioner submits that although the Code toeffect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) munonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied Basco's dismissal from office which took place in 1981. It stressed that the provision of the law as worded does nmention or even qualify the date of removal from office the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that




long as a candidate was once removed from office due to anadministrative case, regardless of whether it took placeduring or prior to the effectivity of the Code, thedisqualification applies. We do not, however, subscribe topetitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive applicationto the provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issueand there exist no compelling reasons for us to departtherefrom.Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the

power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair theobligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, itis equally true that statutes are not to be construed asintended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pendingproceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared orclearly and necessarily implied from the language of theenactment. There is no provision in the statute which wouldclearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. It,therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the LocalGovernment Code is not applicable to the present case."

Issue: WON private respondent's election to office as CityCouncilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 electionswipe away and condone the administrative penalty againsthim, thus restoring his eligibility for public office

Ratio: At first glance, there seems to be a prima faciesemblance of merit to petitioner's argument. However, theissue of whether or not Basco's triple election to office curedhis alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point becausethe argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in thefirst place disqualified when he ran in the three previouselections. This assumption, of course, is untenableconsidering that Basco was NOT subject to anydisqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the LocalGovernment Code which, as we said earlier, applies only tothose removed from office on or after January 1, 1992. Inview of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner,there is no more reason for the Court to still dwell on thematter at length.Anent Basco's alleged circumvention of the prohibition in

Tordesillas against reinstatement to any position in thenational or local government, including its agencies and

instrumentalities, as well as government-owned or controlledcorporations, we are of the view that petitioner's contentionis baseless. Neither does petitioner's argument that the term"any position" is broad enough to cover without distinctionboth appointive and local positions merit any consideration.Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas decision didnot bar Basco from running for any elective position. (Andwith prejudice to reinstatement..)In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term "reinstatement." Under the former Civil ServiceDecree, 16 the law applicable at the time Basco, a publicofficer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term"reinstatement" had a technical meaning, referring only toan appointive position. In light of these definitions, there is,therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barredfrom running for an elective position inasmuch as what is

contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas isreinstatement to an appointive position.

Issue: WON private respondent's proclamation as sixthwinning candidate on May 17, 1995, while thedisqualification case was still pending consideration byCOMELEC is void ab initio?

Ratio: The inapplicability of RA 7166 Section 20(i) to thepresent case is very much patent on its face considering thatthe same refers only to a void proclamation in relation tocontested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of acandidate.

RA 6646 Section 6 does not support petitioner's contentiothat the COMELEC, or more properly speaking, the ManCity BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The uof the word "may" indicates that the suspension of proclamation is merely directory and permissive in natuand operates to confer discretion. What is merely mamandatory, according to the provision itself, is tcontinuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to t

COMELEC, the question of whether or not evidence of guiltso strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfetherewith and substitute its own judgment unless sudiscretion has been exercised whimsically and capricious

The COMELEC, as an administrative agency andspecialized constitutional body charged with tenforcement and administration of all laws and regulatiorelative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiativreferendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise its field that its findings or conclusions are generarespected and even given finality. The COMELEC has nfound any ground to suspend the proclamation and trecords likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a differeconclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no amp

justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused

discretion.Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks implement, employed the word "may," it is, therefoimproper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have usinstead the word "shall" in its rules.Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC shounot have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning CCouncilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in telection returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassinand proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory aministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned count the votes based on such returns and declare tresult.Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, suprcited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable to tfactual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpo

than to muddle the real issue. These three cases do not any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from tmere pendency of a disqualification case.

Issue: WON Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, legally declared a winning candidate

Held: No

Ratio: Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In tfirst place, Basco was a duly qualified candidate pursuant our disquisition above. Furthermore, he clearly received twinning number of votes which put him in sixth place. Thupetitioner's emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC, whewe laid down a possible exception to the rule that a seconplacer may not be declared the winning candidate, finds

application in this case. The exception is predicated on tconcurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one wobtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awarenewithin the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless catheir votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Boassumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioneallegation that Basco was well-known to have bedisqualified in the small community where he ran as candidate is purely speculative and conjectural, unsupportas it is by any convincing facts of record to show notoriety his alleged disqualification.




In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition fordisqualification as not having been attended by grave abuseof discretion. There is then no more legal impediment forprivate respondent's continuance in office as City Councilorfor the Second District of Manila.

Joson v. Executive Secretary Torres 290 SCRA 279(1998)

Facts: Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecijawhile Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C.Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon G. Interior aremembers of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The privaterespondents filed with the Office of the President a complaintcharging Governor Eduardo Joson with grave misconduct andabuse of authority. Allegedly, Joson belligerently barged intothe Hall and angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Halland uttered threatening words at private respondents duringa scheduled session. Private respondents claim that thisincident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pendinglegislative measure supported by petitioner that Nueva Ecijaobtain a loan of P150 million from the PNB. Joson’s acts wereintended to harass them into approving this loan, whichprivate respondents opposed the loan because the provincehad an unliquidated obligation of more than P70 millionincurred without prior authorization from the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan. Private respondents prayed for the suspensionor removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of theprovincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of theproposed loan in light of the financial condition of theprovince,

Joson failed to file his answer despite numerous grant of extension. Thus, DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchezissued an order declaring Joson in default. Later, Joson, thrucounsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the lettercomplaint was not verified and that the DILG has no

jurisdiction over the case and has no authority to require himto answer the complaint. Executive Secretary Torres issuedan order placing Joson under preventive suspension for 60days pending investigation of the charges against him. Also,the Motion to Dismiss was denied. Secretary Barbersdirected the PNP to assist the implementation of the order of preventive suspension. Also, Vice Governor Oscar Tinio wasappointed as Acting Governor.

Joson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CAchallenging the preventive suspension and default order. TheCA dismissed the case. Joson claimed that there was nothingin his conduct that threatened the members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to theemployees. He said that like Vice-Governor Tinio, he wasalways accompanied by his official security escortswhenever he reported for work. He also alleged that the

joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perezwas false. Escombien was purportedly not inside the sessionhall during the incident but was at her desk at the office andcould not in any way have seen petitioner in the hall.

Issue: WON the filing of a letter complaint before theOffice of the President was proper

Held: Yes

Ratio: Administrative disciplinary proceedings againstelective local officials are governed by the Local GovernmentCode of 1991.In all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23, theRules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply ina suppletory character.Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the LGCenumerates the grounds for which an elective local officialmay be disciplined, suspended or removed from office. Whenan elective local official commits an act that falls under thegrounds for disciplinary action, the administrative complaintagainst him must be verified and filed under Section 61.

In the instant case, Joson is an elective official of tprovince of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against hwas therefore properly filed with the Office of the PresidenAccording to petitioner, however, the letter-complaint failto conform with the formal requirements set by the CodHe alleges that the complaint was not verified by privarespondents and was not supported by the joint affidavit the two witnesses named therein; that private respondenlater realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted t

verification and sworn statement while the complaint wstill pending with the Office of the President.We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. Tabsence of the document, page or book number of tnotarial register of the subscribing officer is insufficient prove petitioner's claim. The lack of these entries mconstitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribinofficer in complying with the requirements for notarizatiand proper verification. They may give grounds for trevocation of his notarial commission. But they do nindubitably prove that the verification was inserted intercalated after the letter-complaint was filed with tOffice of the President.Nor is the fact of intercalation sufficiently established by taffidavit of Solita Santos. Santos was one of the signatorto the letter-complaint. In her affidavit, she prayed that s

be dropped as one of the complainants since she had ju joined the political party of Joson. She decided to reveal tintercalation because she was disillusioned with the "dirtactics" of Vice-Governor Tinio to grab power from petition

Joson. Santos cannot in any way be considered an unbiaswitness. Her motive and change of heart render her affidasuspect.Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint wunverified when submitted to the Office of the President, tdefect was not fatal. The requirement of verification wdeemed waived by the President himself when he acted the complaint. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictionrequisite. Verification is mainly intended to secure assurance that the allegations therein made are done good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculatio

The lack of verification is a mere formal defect. The coumay order the correction of the pleading, if not verified,

act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstancare such that a strict compliance with the rule may dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may served.

Issue: WON the DILG has jurisdiction over the case

Held: Yes

Ratio: The Disciplining Authority is the President of tPhilippines, whether acting by himself or through tExecutive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and LocGovernment is the Investigating Authority, who may act himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. TSecretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusiInvestigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, t

Disciplining Authority may designate a Special InvestigatiCommittee. The power of the President over administrative disciplinacases against elective local officials is derived from hpower of general supervision over local governments. Tpower of supervision means "overseeing or the authority an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform theduties. If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill thduties, the official may take such action or step prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. ThPresident's power of general supervision means no mothan the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executeor that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervisionnot incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipli




and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must beconstrued to authorize the President to order aninvestigation of the act or conduct of local officials when inhis opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The power to discipline evidently includes the power toinvestigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President hasthe power derived from the Constitution itself to investigatecomplaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23,however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a

Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted bythe Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation,contrary to Joson's claim. The President remains theDisciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power toinvestigate, not the power to discipline.Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigateadministrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principleor the doctrine of qualified political agency. This doctrine iscorollary to the control power of the President. Control issaid to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. Ashead of the Executive Department, the President, however,may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet membersexcept when he is required by the Constitution to act inperson or the exigencies of the situation demand that heacts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and inbehalf of the President in certain matters because the

President cannot be expected to exercise his control (andsupervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of adepartment is, and must be, the President's alter ego in thematters of that department where the President is requiredby law to exercise authority.In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretaryusurped the power of the President when he requiredpetitioner to answer the complaint. Undisputably, the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President but it wasthe DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer.Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did notcomply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office shouldhave first required petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter,the complaint and the answer should have been referred tothe Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be thatas it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of theanswer is necessary merely to enable the President to make

a preliminary assessment of the case. The President foundthe complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant itsfurther investigation. The judgment of the President on thematter is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: WON Joson was properly placed under preventivesuspension

Held: Yes

Ratio: In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to fileanswer, the DILG did not err in recommending to theDisciplining Authority his preventive suspension during theinvestigation. Preventive suspension is authorized underSection 63 of the LGC. Preventive suspension may be

imposed at any time after the issues are joined, that is, afterrespondent has answered the complaint, when the evidenceof guilt is strong and, given the gravity of the offense, thereis a great possibility that the continuance in office of therespondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat tothe safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

The failure of respondent to file his answer despite severalopportunities given him is construed as a waiver of his rightto present evidence in his behalf. The requisite of joinder of issues is squarely met with respondent's waiver of right tosubmit his answer. The act of respondent in allegedlybarging violently into the session hall of the SangguniangPanlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutesgrave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are

bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of tSangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chexecutive of the province is in a position to influence twitnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontationpolitics in the province dictates that extreme precautionameasures be taken.'Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites fthe imposition of preventive suspension had been compliwith. Petitioner's failure to file his answer despite seve

opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of hright to file answer and present evidence; and as a result this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joine

The Executive Secretary also found that the evidence petitioner Joson's guilt was strong and that his continuanin office during the pendency of the case could influence twitnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of tevidence against him.

Issue: WON the Resolution finding Joson guilty aimposing on him the penalty of suspension from office for smonths without pay was proper

Held:

Ratio: Settled is the rule that in administrative proceeding

technical rules of procedure and evidence are not stricapplied. The essence of due process is to be found in treasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidenone may have in support of one's defense. To be heard donot only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heaalso through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heaeither through oral arguments or pleadings, is accordethere is no denial of procedural due process. Thus, whrespondent failed to submit his position paper as directand insisted for the conduct of formal investigation, he wnot denied of his right of procedural process.

The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct FormInvestigation is erroneous. Petitioner's right to a forminvestigation is spelled out in the following provisions of A.No. 23. The records show that on August 27, 1997, petitionsubmitted his Answer Ad Cautelam where he disputed ttruth of the allegations that he barged into the session h

of the capitol and committed physical violence to harass tprivate respondents who were opposed to any move for thprovince to contract a P150 million loan from PNB. In hOrder of October 8, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez admittepetitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam but treated it as a positipaper. On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion Conduct Formal Investigation. Petitioner reiterated thmotion on October 29, 1997. Petitioner's motion was denion November 11, 1997. Secretary Barbers found petitionguilty as charged on the basis of the parties' position papeOn January 8, 1998, Executive Secretary Torres adoptSecretary Barbers' findings and recommendations aimposed on petitioner the penalty of six (6) montsuspension without pay.

The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigatidenied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O. No.

provides that at the preliminary conference, tInvestigating Authority shall summon the parties to considwhether they desire a formal investigation. This provisidoes not give the Investigating Authority the discretion determine whether a formal investigation would conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motifor formal investigation. As respondent, he is accordseveral rights under the law.An erring elective local official has rights akin to tconstitutional rights of an accused. These rights aessentially part of procedural due process. The local electiofficial has the (1) right to appear and defend himself person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and crosexamine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right




compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in theRules Implementing the LGC and in A.O. No. 23. Petitioner'sright to a formal investigation was not satisfied when thecomplaint against him was decided on the basis of positionpapers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code andits Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23that provide that administrative cases against elective localofficials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O.

No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may requirethe parties to submit their respective memoranda but this isonly after formal investigation and hearing. A.O. No. 23 doesnot authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with ahearing especially in cases involving allegations of factwhich are not only in contrast but contradictory to eachother. These contradictions are best settled by allowing theexamination and cross-examination of witnesses. Positionpapers are often-times prepared with the assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation can make the discoveryof truth difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in itsorder denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigationapplies to appointive officials and employees.Administrative disciplinary proceedings against electivegovernment officials are not exactly similar to those againstappointive officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to

elective local officials are separate and distinct fromappointive government officers and employees. This can begleaned from the LGC itself.In the LGC, the entire Title II of Book I of the Code is devotedto elective officials. It provides for their qualifications andelection, vacancies and succession, local legislation,disciplinary actions, and recall. Appointive officers andemployees are covered in Title III of Book I of the Codeentitled "Human Resources and Development." All matterspertinent to human resources and development in localgovernment units are regulated by "the civil service law andsuch rules and regulations and other issuances promulgatedthereto, unless otherwise provided in the Code." The"investigation and adjudication of administrative complaintsagainst appointive local officials and employees as well astheir suspension and removal" are "in accordance with thecivil service law and rules and other pertinent laws," the

results of which "shall be reported to the Civil ServiceCommission."It is the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V onthe Civil Service, that primarily governs appointive officialsand employees. Their qualifications are set forth in theOmnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Code. Thegrounds for administrative disciplinary action in Book V aremuch more in number and are specific than thoseenumerated in the Local Government Code against electivelocal officials. The disciplining authority in such actions is theCivil Service Commission although the Secretaries and headsof agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities andmunicipalities are also given the power to investigate anddecide disciplinary actions against officers and employeesunder their jurisdiction. When a complaint is filed and therespondent answers, he must "indicate whether or not he

elects a formal investigation if his answer is not consideredsatisfactory." If the officer or employee elects a formalinvestigation, the direct evidence for the complainant andthe respondent "consist[s] of the sworn statement anddocuments submitted in support of the complaint andanswer, as the case may be, without prejudice to thepresentation of additional evidence deemed necessary x x x,upon which the cross-examination by respondent and thecomplainant, respectively, is based." The investigation isconducted without adhering to the technical rules applicablein judicial proceedings." Moreover, the appointive official oremployee may be removed or dismissed summarily if (1) thecharge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2)

when the respondent is a recidivist; and (3) when trespondent is notoriously undesirable.

The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions againelective local officials are markedly different from appointiofficials. The rules on the removal and suspension elective local officials are more stringent. The procedurerequiring position papers in lieu of a hearing administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect appointive officials but not to those elected. An electi

official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to tcommunity that elected him. The official has a definite teof office fixed by law which is relatively of short duratioSuspension and removal from office definitely affects ashortens this term of office. When an elective official suspended or removed, the people are deprived of tservices of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of telective official of their choice. Suspension and removal athus imposed only after the elective official is accorded hrights and the evidence against him strongly dictates thimposition.

Conducto v. Monzon (1998)

Facts: Complainant filed a complaint with the SangguniaPanlungsod of San Pablo City against Benjamin Maghiran

the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo Citfor abuse of authority, serious irregularity and violation law as Maghirang appointed his sister-in-law, Mrs. FloriMaghirang, to the position of barangay secretary in violatiof Section 394 of the LGC. At the same time, complainafiled a complaint for violation of Article 244 RPC with tOffice of the City Prosecutor against Maghirang, which wahowever, dismissed on the ground that Maghirang’s sister-law was appointed before the effectivity of the LGC, whiprohibits a punong barangay from appointing a relatiwithin the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity barangay secretary. The order of dismissal was submitted the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.Complainant obtained an Opinion from Dir. Jacob Montesa the DILG declaring the appointment of Maghirang void. TOffice of the Deputy Ombudsman dismissed the case bordered Maghirang to replace his sister in law as barangsecretary. Later, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsmgranted the MR and ordered the filing of an information funlawful appointment against Maghirang.With prior leave from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsmathe City Prosecutor filed, in Criminal Case No. 26240,motion for the suspension of Maghirang pursuant to Secti13 of R.A. No. 3019. The judge denied the motion and rulthat since Maghirang was reelected as barangay chairmathe offenses committed during the previous term are ncauses for removal.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommendthat the judge liable for ignorance of the law and that he reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severe

The OCA said that it is well settled in Section 13 of RA 301that the court suspends any public officer against whom

valid information was filed against him.

Issue: WON the judge was grossly ignorant of the law

Held: Yes

Ratio: All things considered, while concededly, responde Judge manifested his ignorance of the law in denycomplainant’s Motion for Suspension of Brgy. ChairmMaghirang, there was nothing shown however to indicathat he acted in bad faith or with malice. Be that as it mait would also do well to note that good faith and lack malicious intent cannot completely free respondent froliability.




The findings and conclusions of the Office of the CourtAdministrator are in order. However, the penaltyrecommended, i.e., reprimand, is too light, in view of the factthat despite his claim that he has been “continuouslykeeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development(sic) in law” ever since he passed the Bar Examinations in1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recall thatas early as 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez this Court explicitlyruled that the re-election of a public official extinguishes only

the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred byhim during his previous term of office, thus:

The ruling, therefore, that -- “when the people have electeda man to his office it must be assumed that they did thiswith knowledge of his life and character and that theydisregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he hadbeen guilty of any” -- refers only to an action for removalfrom office and does not apply to a criminal case, because acrime is a public wrong more atrocious in character thanmere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a publicofficer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not onlyto a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole.

This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised PenalCode, which enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as oneof them, at least insofar as a public officer is concerned.

Also, under the Constitution, it is only the President who maygrant the pardon of a criminal offense. There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. Thebasis of the investigation which has been commenced here,and which is sought to be restrained, is a criminal accusationthe object of which is to cause the indictment andpunishment of petitioner-appellant as a private citizen;whereas in the cases cited, the subject of the investigationwas an administrative charge against the officers thereininvolved and its object was merely to cause his suspensionor removal from public office. While the criminal casesinvolves the character of the mayor as a private citizen andthe People of the Philippines as a community is a party tothe case, an administrative case involves only his actuationsas a public officer as (they) affect the populace of themunicipality where he serves.

Then on 20 June 1969, in Luciano v. The Provincial Governor,

et al.,[20) this Court likewise categorically declared thatcriminal liabilities incurred by an elective public officialduring his previous term of office were not extinguished byhis re-election, and that Pascual v. Provincial Governor andLizares v. Hechanova referred only to administrativeliabilities committed during the previous term of an electiveofficial.Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual v.Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija that "each term is separatefrom other terms and that the reelection to office operatesas a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to theextent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor" ismisplaced. The Court has in subsequent cases made it clearthat the Pascual ruling (which dealt with administrativeliability) applies exclusively to administrative and not tocriminal liability and sanctions. Thus, in Ingco v. Sanchez the

Court ruled that the reelection of a public officer for a newterm does not in any manner wipe out the criminal liabilityincurred by him in a previous term.Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense againstthe State and the body politic. The small segment of thenational electorate that constitutes the electorate of themunicipality of Antipolo has no power to condone a crimeagainst the public justice of the State and the entire bodypolitic. Reelection to public office is not provided for inArticle 89 of the Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officerprior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of the Anti-Graft Act imposes as one of the penalties in case of conviction perpetual disqualification from public office and

Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that supenalty of perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivatiof the public offices and employments which the offendmay have held, even if conferred by popular election."It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officer's faor misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of hreelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apponly to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt. Asuccinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associa

Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's memorandum for the State, "hold that petitioner's reelection erased his criminal liabilwould in effect transfer the determination of the criminculpability of an erring official from the court to which it wlodged by law into the changing and transient whim acaprice of the electorate. This cannot be so, for while hconstituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt officby returning him back to office, a criminal action initiatagainst the latter can only be heard and tried by a court

justice, his nefarious act having been committed against tvery State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey auphold. A contrary rule would erode the very system upwhich our government is based, which is one of laws and nof men."While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions this Court is a commendable virtue of judges -- and,

course, members of the Bar -- comprehending the decisiois a different matter, for it is in that area where onecompetence may then be put to the test and proven. Thuit has been said that a judge is called upon to exhibit mothan just a cursory acquaintance with statutes aprocedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant wibasic legal principles and aware of well-settled aauthoritative doctrines.[23) He should strive for excellencexceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he the personification of justice and the Rule of Law. Needleto state, respondent was, in this instance, wanting in tdesired level of mastery of a revered doctrine on a simpissue.

Pablico v. Villapando (2002)

Facts: Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernand(members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San VicenPalawan) filed with the Sangguniang PanlalawiganPalawan an administrative complaint against MayAlejandro A. Villapando for abuse of authority and culpabviolation of the Constitution. Villapando allegedly enterinto a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape (defeatmayoralty candidate) which amounted to an appointment a government position within the prohibited one year periunder the Constitution. Villapando claimed that he did nappoint Tiape, but he merely hired him and a consultadoes not constitute an appointment to a government offior position as prohibited by the Constitution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found respondeguilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him tpenalty of dismissal from service. The Office of the Presideaffirmed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.Villapando filed a certiorari and prohibition before the C

seeking to annul the decision of the Office of the Presiden The CA declared void the decision of the OP and tSangguniang Panlalawigan.

Issue: WON local legislative bodies and/or the Office of tPresident, on appeal, can validly impose the penalty dismissal from service on erring elective local officials

Held: No

Ratio: The pertinent portion of Section 60 of the LocGovernment Code of 1991 provides:




Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An electivelocal official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed fromoffice on any of the following grounds:An elective local official may be removed from officeon the grounds enumerated above by order of theproper court.It is clear from the last paragraph of the provision that thepenalty of dismissal from service upon an erring electivelocal official may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in

Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al we held that "[t]he Officeof the President is without any power to remove electedofficials, since such power is exclusively vested in the propercourts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of theaforequoted Section 60."Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Local Government Code, however, addsthat "(b) An elective local official may be removed fromoffice on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of thisArticle [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, LocalGovernment Code of 1991] by order of the proper courtor the disciplining authority whichever first acquires

jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other." Thedisciplining authority referred to pertains to theSangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Officeof the President. As held in Salalima, this grant to the

"disciplining authority" of the power to remove elective localofficials is clearly beyond the authority of the OversightCommittee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No ruleor regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the LGC. Implementing rules should conform,not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulationwhich operates to create a rule out of harmony with thestatute is a nullity. Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., theprincipal author of the Local Government Code of 1991,expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIXof the implementing rules.It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erringelective local officials from service is lodged exclusively withthe courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules andRegulations Implementing the Local Government Code,insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" toremove from office erring elective local officials, is void for

being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of theLocal Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension orremoval of elective public officials must be strictly construedand applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmostgood faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary publicofficial but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not beput to naught by the caprice or partisanship of thedisciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority isgiven only the power to suspend and not the power toremove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law byusurping the power to remove. As explained by the Court inLacson v. Roque:"the abridgment of the power to remove or suspend anelective mayor is not without its own justification, and was,

we think, deliberately intended by the lawmakers. The evilsresulting from a restricted authority to suspend or removemust have been weighed against the injustices and harms tothe public interests which would be likely to emerge from anunrestrained discretionary power to suspend and remove."

Removal only by courts

Sangguaning Barangay of Don Mariano v. PunongBarangay Martines (2008)

Facts: Severino Martinez was administratively chargedwith Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitionerthrough the filing of a verified complaint before theSangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over

elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 64 of 7160. The complaint was later amended for DishonesMisconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft aCorrupt Practices Act. Petitioner alleged that Martincommitted the following acts:

1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barang Treasurer the income of their solid waste managemproject since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derivfrom composting.

2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer tsale of recyclable materials taken from garbage collection.

3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes lihauling sand and gravel for private persons withomonetary benefit to the barangay because no income frothis source appears in the year end report even if paymenwere collected x x x.

4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasolinlubricants, wheels and other spare parts of the garbage truinstead of using the money or income of said truck from tgarbage fees collected as income from its Sold WasManagement Project. x x x.

5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/LakbaAral in 2003 because although a cash advance was made the respondent for the said purpose, he, however, did nattend said seminar because on the dates when he w

supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the barangayx x.6. That several attempts to discuss said problem duri

sessions were all in vain because respondent declined discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x.For failure to file an Answer, Martinez was declared in defauand was placed under preventive suspension for 60 day

Thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decisiwhich imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal frooffice. The decision was conveyed to the mayor Bayombong, Nueva Ecija. The mayor, however, issuedMemo wherein he stated that the Sangguniang Bayan has power to order Martinez’ removal from office. However, tdecision remains valid until reversed. Martinez then filedspecial civil action for certiorari before the RTC. The coudeclared the decision void and maintained that the propcourts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove

elective official from office.

Issue: WON the Sanggunian may remove Martinez, elective local official, from office.

Held: No

Ratio: Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferrupon the courts the power to remove elective local officiafrom office. During the deliberations of the Senate on tLocal Government Code,[16] the legislative intent to confito the courts, i.e., RTCs, the Sandiganbayan and tappellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving tremoval of elective local officials was evident.In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categoricaruled that the Office of the President is without any power

remove elected officials, since the power is exclusivevested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in tlast paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC. It further invalidatArticle 125, Rule XIX of IRR. The Court nullified the rule sinthe Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules aRegulations of the Local Government Code exceeded authority when it granted to the disciplining authority tpower to remove elective officials, a power which the laitself granted only to the proper courts. Thus, it is clear thunder the law, the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with tpower to remove Martinez.Petitioner contends that administrative cases involvielective barangay officials may be filed with, heard adecided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sanggunia




Bayan concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from office. It further claims that the courts aremerely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after theSangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that apenalty of removal is warranted.

The aforementioned position put forward by the petitionerwould run counter to the rationale for making the removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. In Pablicov. Villapando, the court declared that:The law on suspension

or removal of elective public officials must be strictlyconstrued and applied, and the authority in whom suchpower of suspension or removal is vested must exercise itwith utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just anordinary public official but one chosen by the people throughthe exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their willmust not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority isgiven only the power to suspend and not the power toremove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law byusurping the power to remove. (Emphasis supplied.)

The rule which confers to the proper courts the power toremove an elective local official from office is intended as acheck against any capriciousness or partisan activity by thedisciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body withthe power to decide whether or not a local chief executive

may be removed from office, and only relegating to thecourts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, wouldstil l not free the resolution of the case from thecapriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority.

Thus, the petitioner’s interpretation would defeat the clearintent of the law.Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courtsto nothing more than an implementing arm of theSangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This wouldbe an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the courts under the orders of thelegislative bodies of local governments. The courts would bestripped of their power of review, and their discretion inimposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thusleft to be exercised by political factions which stand tobenefit from the removal from office of the local electiveofficial concerned, the very evil which Congress sought to

avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local GovernmentCode.As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Codeprovides for the procedure for the filing of an administrativecase against an erring elective barangay official before theSangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However,the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannotorder the removal of an erring elective barangay official fromoffice, as the courts are exclusively vested with this powerunder Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if theacts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of agrave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with theregional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, itretains jurisdiction over the case even if it would besubsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less

than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand,the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsodor Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring electivebarangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removalof the official from service is warranted, then it can resolvethat the proper charges be filed in court.Petitioner alleged that an interpretation which gives the

judiciary the power to remove local elective officials violatesthe doctrine of separation of powers. This allegation runscontrary to the 1987 Constitution itself, as well as

jurisprudence.The doctrine of separation of powers is notabsolute in its application; rather, it should be applied inaccordance with the principle of checks and balances. Theremoval from office of elective officials must not be tainted

with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the votipublic. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a moimpartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the locgovernment units are not deprived of the right to disciplilocal elective officials; rather, they are prevented froimposing the extreme penalty of dismissal.Petitioner questions the Decision of the trial court fallowing the petition filed before it as an exception to tdoctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If, indee

the Sangguniang Bayan had no power to remove Martinfrom office, then Martinez should have sought recourse frothe Sangguniang Panlalawigan. This Court upholds the ruliof the trial court. The doctrine of exhaustion administrative remedies, which is based on sound pubpolicy and practical consideration, is not inflexible. There ainstances when it may be dispensed with and judicial actimay be validly resorted to immediately. Among theexceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of tparty invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challengadministrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack

jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay or officinaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; where the amount involved is relatively small as to make trule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raisis purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by th

courts of justice; 6) where judicial intervention is urgent; where its application may cause great and irreparabdamage; 8) where the controverted acts violate due proces9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administratiremedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there is nother plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when stropublic interest is involved; and 13) in quo warranproceedings.As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until administrative remedies have been exhausted. Howevthis rule is not applicable where the challengadministrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack

jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved aessentially judicial. In this case, it is apparent that tSangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction whenissued the assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removiMartinez from office. Such act was patently illegal an

therefore, Martinez was no longer required to avail himselfan administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order the Sangguniang Bayan.[24] Thus, his direct recourse regular courts of justice was justified.

Disciplinary actions over Local Appointive Officials

Mendez v. Civil Service Commission (1991)

Facts: The Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon CVicente N. Coloyan filed an administrative complaint againthe petitioner, a legal research assistant in the Quezon COffice of the City Attorney, for Gross Misconduct aDishonesty, allegedly for having torn off a portion of TC209287 from the registry book of Quezon City and for havipocketed it.After three months of investigation, Quezon City May

Adelina Rodriguez dismissed the said complaint against tpetitioner for insufficiency of evidence.Coloyan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Boawhich reversed the decision and ruled that Mendez is guilas charged and therefore dismissed from service. The CSaffirmed on appeal.

Issue: WON the exoneration made by the mayor unappealable

Held: Yes

Ratio: The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideratioassailing the reversal of the city mayor's decision by t




MSPB and the CSC on the ground that Coloyan is not anaggrieved party or "party adversely affected by the decision"allowed by law to file an appeal. Moreover, the petitionerclaimed that his exoneration by the city mayor isunappealable pursuant to Section 37, paragraph (b) of P.D.807.It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutoryprivilege and may be exercised only in the manner and inaccordance with the provision of law.

A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "ThePhilippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law does notcontemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers oremployees from administrative charges. The phrase "partyadversely affected by the decision" refers to the governmentemployee against whom the administrative case is filed forthe purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal ordismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan who filedthe appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved partybecause he is not the respondent in the administrative casebelow.Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, thecity mayor, as head of the city government, is empowered toenforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties likesuspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary

equivalent to one month against erring employees.By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may beavailed of only in a case where the respondent is foundguilty of the charges filed against him. But when therespondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case,there is no occasion for appeal.

Macalingag and Carlos v. Chang (1992)

Facts: Lorinda Carlos signed a formal administrativecharge approved by Victor Macalincag accusing RobertChang of dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial tothe best interest of the service. They are for: (a) disbursingthe amount of P30,000 to Ms. Marisa Chan during the localelections, (b) disbursing certain funds allegedly as financialassistance to bereaved families, (c) disbursing funds formerienda of the employees, (d) incurring overdrafts, (e)transferring certain amounts from the treasurer’s safe to therealty tax division’s safe, and (f) remitting to the Bureau of

Treasury the national collection.Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive Suspension againstChang. Chang filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC against Macalinlag andCarlos. The judge sustained the power of the Secretary of Finance to issue the Order of Preventive Suspension. UponMR, the court set aside its decision and ordered thepetitioners to cease and desist from enforcing the order of preventive suspension.

Issue: WON the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction toissue an Order of Preventive Suspension against the actingmunicipal treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila.

Held: Yes

Ratio: Chang contends that a government officer is notsuspended until someone has assumed the post and theofficer subject of the suspension order has ceasedperforming his official function; that the implementation of the questioned suspension order was overtaken by theissuance of EO 392 creating the Metropolitan ManilaAuthority and that the power to discipline is vested solely onthe person who has the power to appoint.It is very apparent from the records that Chang wasadministratively charged on October 6, 1989 for dishonesty,neglect of duty and acts Prejudicial to the best interest of theservice. It was signed by Carlos, Executive Director, Bureauof Local Government and approved by Macalincag,

Undersecretary of Finance, then acting SecretaSimultaneous with the charge, Chang was preventivesuspended which caused him to file a complaint fProhibition with preliminary injunction in the lower court. Tlower court pointed out that in order that a preventsuspension will be implemented, there are two steinvolved, viz : 1) service of a copy of said order on trespondent and 2) designation of his replacement. The trcourt ruled that until an acting municipal treasurer

appointed to replace the respondent, the order of preventisuspension dated October 6, 1989 is incomplete and cannbe said to have taken effect. This ruling of the trial court untenable.Preventive Suspension is governed by Sec. 41 of P.D. 807 the Civil Service Law. It will be noted that under the ladesignation of the replacement is not a requirement to gieffect to the preventive suspension. On the contrary, BatPambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the LocGovernment Code, provides in Section 156, Article Chapter 3, Title II thereof for the automatic assumption the assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer case of suspension of the municipal treasurer.Accordingly, there appears to be no question that: the Ordof Preventive Suspension of respondent Chang becameffective upon his receipt thereof, which is presumed whe

he filed a complaint in the trial court preventing timplementation of such Order of Suspension. Otherwstated, the designation of the OFFICER-IN-CHARGE to replaChang is immaterial to the effectivity of the lattesuspension. A contrary view would render nugatory the vepurpose of preventive suspension.Among others, Chang argued that EO 392 gave rise to tcreation of the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) avested in the President of the Republic of the Philippines tpower to appoint municipal treasurers in Metro Manila. the power to suspend and remove a municipal official is incident of the power to appoint, he maintained that it is tPresident who may suspend or remove him. Earlier, prior EO 392, the power to appoint the aforesaid public officiawas vested in the Provincial Treasurers and Assessors of tMunicipalities concerned, under PD 477 and later transferrto the Commissioner of Finance under PD 921, but und

both decrees, the power of appointment was made subjeto Civil Service Laws and the approval of the Secretary Finance. Verily, the intention of the aforesaid legislations follow the Civil Service Laws, Rules and Regulations unmistakable. Correspondingly, the power to discipline specifically vested under Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 in heads departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces achartered cities who have original jurisdiction to investigaand decide on matters involving disciplinary action. Statdifferently, they are the proper disciplining authority referrto in Sec. 41 of the same law.

The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably undthe Department of Finance as provided for in Sec. 3, P.D. N477. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the propdisciplining authority to issue the preventive suspensiorder. More specifically acting Secretary of Financ

Macalincag, acted within his jurisdiction in issuing the ordeBy and large, even assuming that the power to appoiincludes the power to discipline as argued by Chang, actiSecretary Macalincag as Secretary of Finance is an alter eof the President and therefore, it is within his authority, as alter ego, to preventively suspend Chang.

Garcia v. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan (2002)

Facts: Sebastian Garcia is an employee at the C Treasurer’s Office, Dagupan City. He was ordered suspendby City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro and directed the withholdiof his salary because of the Formal Charge filed against himHowever, Pajaro continued reporting for work because he dnot honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer act




as the complainant and that there was no complaint againsthim from the Office of the City Mayor.

Juanito Pajaro, the City Treasurer of Dagupan City, claimedthat Garcia has been rating unsatisfactory in hisperformance for several semesters, which is the reason whyhe was formally charged. Garcia was preventivelysuspended for ninety days since the charge is a majoroffense. An investigation was scheduled but Garcia failed toappear and testify. Garcia also did not answer the subpoena.

So, Pajaro proceeded with an ex parte investigation. TheBureau of Local Government Finance favorably approved thesuspension. This was affirmed by the Regional Director. “Affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that privaterespondent was vested with legal power and authority toinstitute disciplinary action against subordinate officers andemployees.

The appellate court further held that the requisites of administrative due process had been fully observed byPajaro while investigating petitioner. But despite beinginformed of the charges against him and being given theopportunity to be heard in a formal investigation, petitionerchose not to answer those charges.

Issue: WON the City Treasurer has disciplinary powers overthe petitioner

Ratio: At the outset, it should be pointed out that underthe old and the present Local Government Codes, appointiveofficers and employees of local government units arecovered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules, regulationsand other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto,unless otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation andthe adjudication of administrative complaints againstappointive local officials and employees, as well as theirsuspension and removal, shall be in accordance with theCivil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.

The Administrative Code of 1987, -- specifically Book V onthe civil service -- is the primary law governing appointiveofficials and employees in the government. They may beremoved or dismissed summarily “(1) [w]hen the charge isserious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen therespondent is a recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the

respondent is notoriously undesirable.” Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; due processin the administrative context cannot be fully equated withthat in the strict judicial sense.

The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47of the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments,agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On theother hand, the power to commence administrativeproceedings against a subordinate officer or employee isgranted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules ImplementingBook V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of adepartment, the head of office of equivalent rank, the headof a local government unit, the chief of an agency, theregional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio,disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or

employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85,which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27,1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance, theregional director, and head of a local treasury or anassessment office to start administrative disciplinary actionagainst officers or employees subordinate to them.In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper discipliningauthority referred to in Section 47 of the Administrative Codeof 1987. The term “agency” refers to any of the various unitsof the government including a department, a bureau, anoffice, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlledcorporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of theOffice of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue

collector, was an officer under him. Thus, the city treasuris the proper disciplining authority who could investigapetitioner and issue a preventive suspension order againhim.Petitioner’s contention that it is only the city mayor who mdiscipline him is not persuasive. Section 455 (b-1-x) of t1991 Local Government Code states that the city may“may cause to be instituted administrative or judicproceedings against any official or employee of the cit

This rule is not incongruent with the provisions of the 19Administrative Code, which authorizes the heads of agencito discipline subordinate employees. Likewise, the old LocGovernment Code does not vest in city mayors the sopower to discipline and to institute criminal or administratiactions against any officers or employees under th

jurisdiction. In fact, there is no provision under the preseLocal Government Code expressly rescinding the authoritythe Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authorover its employees. By the same token, there is nothing thprohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint againpetitioner.As a corollary, the power to discipline evidently includes tpower to investigate. In the present case, Pajaro wauthorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension Ordagainst petitioner, because the latter was charged with gro

neglect of duty, refusal to perform official duties afunctions, and insubordination -- grounds that allowed tissuance of such Order, as provided by Section 51 of th1987 Administrative Code. Clearly, the city treasurer actwithin the scope of his power when he commenced tinvestigation and issued the assailed Order.

Issue: WON Garcia was denied due process

Held: No

Ratio: In an administrative proceeding, the essence due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s sidSuch process requires notice and an opportunity to be heabefore judgment is rendered. One may be heard, not soleby verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also -- aperhaps even many times more creditably and practicably

through pleadings. So long as the parties are given topportunity to explain their side, the requirements of dprocess are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, thconstitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an actior a ruling.In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings weconducted in accordance with the procedure set out in t1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws. Firpetitioner was furnished a copy of the May 30, 1990 formcharge against him. Second , Pajaro requested the approvof the Order of Preventive Suspension in his June 1, 199letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finanregional director, who approved the Order in the FiIndorsement dated June 4, 1990. Third , a subpoena dat

July 31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to test

during an investigation on August 15, 1990. However, admittedly refused to attend the investigation; thus, it wconducted ex parte. Fourth, the Department of Finanaffirmed Respondent Pajaro’s findings in its August 1, 19Decision,.We need only to reiterate that parties who choose not avail themselves of the opportunity to answer chargagainst them cannot complain of a denial of due procesPetitioner’s refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despdue notice, was at his own peril. He therefore cannot validclaim that his right to due process was violated.As to petitioner’s claim for damages, the extant rule is thatpublic officer shall not be liable by way of moral aexemplary damages for acts done in the performance




official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith,malice or gross negligence. There was no such showing inthe present case.

RECALL

Rivera v. COMELEC (2007), supra.

It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited above,Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of themayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutiveterms. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998election was declared void by the RTC of Daet, CamarinesNorte in its Decision dated July 4, 2001. As ruled by thisCourt, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the fullterm. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to him.Indeed, there is no reason why this ruling should not alsoapply to respondent Morales who is similarly situated.Here, Morales invoked not only Lonzanida v. COMELEC, but

also Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections which is likewiseinapplicable. In Borja, the Court held that Capco’sassumption of the office of mayor upon the death of theincumbent may not be regarded as a “term” under Section8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No.7160 (the Local Government Code). He held the positionfrom September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992, a period of less

than three years. Moreover, he was not elected to thatposition.Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC, this Court ruled that

assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for theremaining term is not the “term” contemplated underSection 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). As the Courtobserved, there was a “break” in the service of privaterespondent Ramon T. Talanga as mayor. He was a “privatecitizen” for a time before running for mayor in the recallelections.Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to

June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served asmayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entireperiod notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in theelectoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him(respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute aninterruption in serving the full term. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit.Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He hasbeen mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any breaksince July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007,he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)continuous years.

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitutionspecifically included an exception to the people’sfreedom to choose those who will govern them inorder to avoid the evil of a single personaccumulating excessive power over a particularterritorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stayin the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for theposition of city mayor after having served for three

consecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviouslydefeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote thisexception. Should he be allowed another three consecutiveterm as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then bepossibly holding office as chief executive over the sameterritorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteenconsecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to beavoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

This is the very situation in the instant case. Moralesmaintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001)only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer.”Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and itspurpose defeated when an official serves in the sameposition for three consecutive terms. Whether as

“caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the poweand enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables h“to stay on indefinitely”. Morales should be promptly oustfrom the position of mayor of Mabalacat.Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certifica

of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should cancelled. In the light of the foregoing, Morales can not considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not beia candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT B

COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuito serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the instant petition for qwarranto has become moot.

Evardone v. COMELEC (1991)

Facts: Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samhaving been elected to the position during the 1988 locelections. He assumed office immediately aftproclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall Evardone with the Office of the Local Election RegistrMunicipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolutiapproving the the recommendation of Election RegistVedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recagainst Evardone. Evardone filed a petition for prohibiti

with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or writ preliminary injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, tComelec nullified the signing process for being violative the TRO of the court. Hence, this present petition.

Issue: WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by tCOMELEC by virtue of its powers under the Constitution anBP 337 (Local Government Code) was valid

Held: Yes

Ratio: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of t1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there waduring the period material to this case, no local governmecode enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 19Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject recall of elected government officials, Evardone contenthat there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 athat the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.

The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision donot refer only to a local government code which isfuturum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the guidelinwhich Congress will consider in amending the provisions the present LGC. Pending the enactment of the amendatolaw, the existing Local Government Code remains operativeArticle XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expreprovides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 19Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealor revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the LocGovernment Code of 1991, approved by the President on 1October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as providin Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Governme

Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 atherefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to tenactment of the new Local Government Code, teffectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in tproceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Wtherefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by tCOMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the tCOMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recand set the date for the signing of said petition.

Issue: WON the TRO issued by this Court rendernugatory the signing process of the petition for recall hepursuant to Resolution No. 2272.




Held: No

Ratio: In the present case, the records show that Evardoneknew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or about 21February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt;yet, he was not vigilant in following up and determining theoutcome of such notice. Evardone alleges that it was only onor about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the

Resolution of the COMELEC setting the signing of the petitionfor recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer forthe issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition forprohibition only on 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a

TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recalltook place just the same on the scheduled date through nofault of the COMELEC and Apelado. The signing process wasundertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulatand its Election Registrar in good faith and withoutknowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. Asattested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs.Executive Secretary there is no turning back the clock.

The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect orappoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on

the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct andelastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicatedupon the idea that a public office is "burdened" with publicinterests and that the representatives of the people holdingpublic offices are simply agents or servants of the peoplewith definite powers and specific duties to perform and tofollow if they wish to remain in their respective offices.Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence inthe incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to therealm of politics where only the people are the judge. "Lossof confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his officepreviously bestowed on him by the same electorate. Theconstituents have made a judgment and their will to recallEvardone has already been ascertained and must beafforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process heldlast 14 July 1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of

said municipality is valid and has legal effect.However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. TheConstitution has mandated a synchronized national and localelection prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, asprovided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximatelyseven (7) months before the regular local election will beviolative of the above provisions of the applicable LocalGovernment Code

Garcia v. COMELEC (1993)

Facts: Enrique Garcia was elected governor of theprovince of Bataan. Some mayors, vice-mayors andmembers of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12)municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a

Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable Oscar, de losReyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable LucilaPayumo, were chosen as Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and hemoved that a resolution be passed for the recall of thepetitioner on the ground of "loss of confidence." The motionwas "unanimously seconded."

Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to deny duecourse to the Resolution for failure to comply with therequirements under the LGC. The comelec dismissed thepetition and scheduled the recall election. Petitioners filed apetition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC on the

ground that section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall througthe initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) tpeople have the sole and exclusive right to decide whethor not to initiate proceedings, and (2) it violated the right elected local public officials belonging to the politicminority to equal protection of law. They also argued that tproceedings followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution Nosuffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which wthe deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to sixt

five (65) members of the assembly.

Issue: WON all the members of the Preparatory RecAssembly were notified of its meeting

Held: Yes

Ratio: The failure to give notice to all members of thassembly, especially to the members known to be politicallies of Garcia was admitted by both counsels of trespondents. They did not deny that only those inclined agree with the resolution of recall were notified as a mattof political strategy and security. They justified theselective notices on the ground that the law does nspecifically mandate the giving of notice. We reject thsubmission of the respondents. The due process clause

the Constitution requiring notice as an element of fairnessinviolable and should always be considered as part aparcel of every law in case of its silence. The need for notito all the members of the assembly is also imperative fthese members represent the different sectors of telectorate of Bataan. To the extent that they are not notifiof the meeting of the assembly, to that extent is tsovereign voice of the people they represent nullified. Tresolution to recall should articulate the majority will of tmembers of the assembly but the majority will can genuinely determined only after all the members of tassembly have been given a fair opportunity to express twill of their constituents. Needless to stress, the requiremeof notice is indispensable in determining the collectiwisdom of the members of the Preparatory Recall AssembIts non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution recall petitioner Garcia as Governor of the province

Bataan.

Issue: WON the alternative mode of allowing a preparatorecall assembly to initiate the process of recall unconstitutional

Held: No

Ratio: A reading of the legislative history of these recprovisions will reveal that the idea of empowering preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from offiof local elective officials, originated from the House Representatives and not the Senate. The legislative recorreveal there were two (2) principal reasons why thalternative mode of initiating the recall process thru assembly was adopted, viz : (a) to diminish the difficulty

initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (to cut down on its expenses. Our lawmakers took note of tundesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in tCity of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt recall the city mayor failed. Former Congressman WilfreCainglet explained that this initiatory process by direaction of the people was too cumbersome, too expensiand almost impossible to implement. Consequently, olegislators added in the a second mode of initiating the recof local officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. Thbrushed aside the argument that this second mode mcause instability in the local government units due to imagined ease.




Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision of theConstitution that will sustain this submission. To be sure,there is nothing in the Constitution that will remotelysuggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right todecide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." TheConstitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a singlemode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit theadoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. Themandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is

for Congress to "enact a local government code which shallprovide for a more responsive and accountable localgovernment structure through a system of decentralizationwith effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, andreferendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congresswas clearly given the power to choose the effectivemechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The powergiven was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the

judgment of the electorate. Congress was notstraightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiatingrecall elections. What the Constitution simply required is thatthe mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to bechosen by Congress should be effective. Using itsconstitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wiseto enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to

supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. Congress has made its choice as called for bythe Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court tosupplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous buteven then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek itsamendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines thenecessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.Petitioners also positive thesis that in passing Resolution 1,the Bataan Preparatory Recall Assembly did not only initiatethe process of recall but had de facto recalled Garcia fromoffice, a power reserved to the people alone. Again, thecontention cannot command our concurrence. Petitionershave misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the view thatinitiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is amisimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by

the people, albeit done indirectly through theirrepresentatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible forthe people to act through their elected representatives.Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting ourConstitution is delegated by the people to theirrepresentatives, elected either to act as a constitutionalconvention or as a congressional constituent assembly. Theinitiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is norhyme or reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercisedby the elected representatives of the people. More far out ispetitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the recallitself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of recall merely, starts the process. It is part of the process butis not the whole process. This ought to be self evident for aPRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to the COMELECfor validation will not recall its subject official. Likewise, a

PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in theelection called for the purpose bears no effect whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the officialconcerned to appear before the tribunal of the people so hecan justify why he should be allowed to continue in office.Before the people render their sovereign judgment, theofficial concerned remains in office but his right to continuein office is subject to question. This is clear in section 72 of the Local Government Code which states that "the recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon theelection and proclamation of a successor in the person of thecandidate receiving the highest number of votes cast duringthe election on recall."

Issue: WON petitioners were denied equal protection the laws

Held: No

Ratio: Petitioners' argument does not really assail the labut its possible abuse by the members of the PRAC whiexercising their right to initiate recall proceedings. Mospecifically, the fear is expressed that the members of t

PRAC may inject political color in their decision as they mainitiate recall proceedings only against their politicopponents especially those belonging to the minority. careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably shothat it does not give an asymmetrical treatment to locaelected officials belonging to the political minority. First to considered is the politically neutral composition of tpreparatory recall assembly, all mayors, vice-mayors asangguniang members of the municipalities and componecities are made members of the preparatory recall assembat the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned political parties. No significance is given to the politicaffiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recassembly, at the provincial level includes all the electofficials in the province concerned. Considering thnumber, the greater probability is that no one political par

can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code providthat the only ground to recall a locally elected public officis loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAare in the PRAC not in representation of their political partibut as representatives of the people. By necessaimplication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on medifferences in political party affiliation. Indeed, oConstitution encourages multi-party system for the existenof opposition parties is indispensable to the growth anurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against locofficials belonging to the minority.

The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may dominated by a political party and that it may use its powto initiate the recall of officials of opposite politicpersuasions, especially those belonging to the minority,not a ground to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

be sure, this argument has long been in disuse for there cbe no escape from the reality that all powers are susceptibof abuse. The mere possibility of abuse cannot, howeveinfirm per se the grant of power to an individual or entity. deny power simply because it can be abused by the grantis to render government powerless and no people need aimpotent government. There is no democratic governmethat can operate on the basis of fear and distrust of officials, especially those elected by the people themselveOn the contrary, all our laws assume that officials, whethappointed or elected, will act in good faith and will perforthe duties of their office. Such presumption follows tsolemn oath that they took after assumption of office, faithfully execute all our laws.

There is only one ground for the recall of local governmeofficials: loss of confidence. This means that the people m

petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly may resolve recall any local elective officials without specifying aparticular ground except loss of confidence. There is no nefor them to bring up any charge of abuse or corruptiagainst the local elective officials who are the subject of arecall petition.Petitioners also contend that the resolution of the membeof the preparatory recall assembly subverted the will of thelectorate of the province of Bataan who elected Garcia wa majority of 12,500 votes. Again, the contention proceefrom the erroneous premise that the resolution of recallthe recall itself. It refuses to recognize the reality that tresolution of recall is a mere proposal to the electorate Bataan to subject petitioner to a new test of faith. T




proposal will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorateof Bataan. As this judgment has yet to be expressed, it ispremature to conclude that the sovereign will of theelectorate of Bataan has been subverted. The electorate of Bataan may or may not recall petitioner Garcia in anappropriate election. If the electorate re-elects Garcia, thenthe proposal to recall him made by the preparatory recallassembly is rejected. On the other hand, if the electoratedoes not re-elect Garcia, then he has lost the confidence of

the people which he once enjoyed. The judgment will writefinis to the political controversy. For more than judgments of courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people isfinal for "sovereignty resides in the people and allgovernment authority emanates from them."In sum, the petition at bench appears to champion thesovereignty of the people, particularly their direct right toinitiate and remove elective local officials thru recallelections. If the petition would succeed, the result will be areturn to the previous system of recall elections whichCongress found should be improved. The alternative mode of initiating recall proceedings thru a preparatory recallassembly is, however, an innovative attempt by Congress toremove impediments to the effective exercise by the peopleof their sovereign power to check the performance of theirelected officials. The power to determine this mode was

specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed by theConstitution.

Quaison, Concurring: The intent is clear that the 1987Constitution leaves it to Congress to provide the recallmechanism without any pre-ordained restrictions. The broadpowers of Congress in pescribing the procedure for recallinclude the determination as to the number of electorsneeded to initiate the recall, the method of voting of theelectors, the time and place of the voting and whether theprocess includes the election of the successor of the recalledofficial. In the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160),Congress adopted an alternative procedure for initiating therecall and made it as a mere stage of the recall process.Congress also deigned it wise to give the electorate achance to participate in the exercise twice: first, in theinitiation of the recall; and secondly, in the election of the

person to occupy the office subject of the recall. This is incontrast with the first recall statute in the Philippines, theFestin Law (Com. Act No. 560) where the participation of theelectorate were denied the opportunity to vote for theretention of the official subject of the recall.In a sense, the members of the PRA can be considered asconstituting a segment of the electorate because they are allregistered voters of the province. If they constitute less thanone per cent of the voters in the province, that minisculenumber goes to the policy, not the validity of the law and theremedy to correct such a flaw is left with t he legislature, notwith the judiciary.

Vitug, Concurring: It may not be amiss, however, tocaution against any idea of omnipotence in wielding the"power of recall" conferred to the "Preparatory Recall

Assembly." Clearly implicit in any grant of power, like anyother right, is an assumption of a correlative duty to exerciseit responsibly. When it, therefore, becomes all too evidentthat there has been an abuse of that authority, appropriate

judicial recourse to, and corrective relief by, this Court willnot be denied.

Davide Jr, Dissenting: In both B.P. Blg. 337 and the LocalGovernment Code of 1991, our Legislature fixed it at 25% of the total number of registered voters in the localgovernment unit concerned during the election in which thelocal official sought to be recalled was elected. It followsthen that said power cannot be shared with any other groupof persons or officials. The reason why the initiation phase

can and must be done only by the electorate is not difficuto understand. If it can also be done by another body, sucas the PRA in this case, the exclusiveness or indivisibility the power is necessarily impaired or negated. In such a casthe electorate is by passed and the resulting recall petitioor resolution can by no means be an authentic, free, avoluntary act of the electorate, which characteristics aindicia of the exercise of a power. The power to initiabeing a component of the power or recall, necessar

includes the power not to initiate. The power to initiabecomes meaningless if another body is authorized to dofor the electorate. Worse, since the second component of tpower of recall, i.e., the recall election, does not come inplay without the recall petition, it follows that where tpetition is not done through the initiative of the electorabecause the latter chooses not to exercise its power to recor finds no reason therefor, that election becomes, as to telectorate would in effect be compelled to participate inpolitical exercise it neither called for nor decided to have.Hence, the fullness of the power of recall precludes tdelegation of the corresponding authority to initiate it to aentity other than the electorate, especially where tdelegation unduly infringes upon and impairs such power in this case.I might add that since Congress decided to retain the 25

requirement for the traditional method of initiating recwhich is the method in full accord and perfect harmony withe true essence of recall the provision for an alternatimethod, i.e., recall resolution by a mere majority of the PRis subtly designed to negate, if not altogether defeat, tpower of the electorate and to substitute the will of a vesmall group for the will of the electorate.

Paras v. COMELEC (1997)

Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangof Pula, Cabanatuan City. A petition for his recall as PunonBarangay was filed by the registered voters of the barang

The Coelec scheduled the petition signing on October 11995, and set the recall election on November 13,1995. least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petitioabove the 25% requirement provided by law. To prevent tholding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTpetition for injunction. After conducting a summary hearinthe trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed tpetition and required petitioner and his counsel to explawhy they should not be cited for contempt fmisrepresenting that the barangay recall election wwithout COMELEC approval.

The Comelec again re-scheduled the recall election, henthe instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer finjunction.

Issue: WON the recall election to be held on January 11996 is barred by the SK election to be held on May 1996.

Ratio: Petitioner's argument is simple and to the poinCiting Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwiknown as the Local Government Code, which states that "

recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date the official's assumption to office or one (1) yeimmediately preceding a regular local election", petitioninsists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall electionnow barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election wset by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of M1996, and every three years thereafter.

The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an electilocal official to recall election once during his term of officParagraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) meredesignates the period when such elective local official mbe subject of a recall election, that is, during the second yeof his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioneinterpretation of the phrase regular local election to includ




the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provisionof the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removalof public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808to be held every three years from May 1996 were to bedeemed within the purview of the phrase "regular localelection", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then norecall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recallprovision of the LGC.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start withthe assumption that the legislature intended to enact aneffective law, and the legislature is not presumed to havedone a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Aninterpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which astatute or provision being construed is defeated, or asotherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that astatute should be interpreted in harmony with theConstitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of theLocal Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a localgovernment code which shall provide for a more responsive

and accountable local government structure institutedthrough a system of decentralization with effectivemechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normalworking of the local government unit necessitating additionalexpenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recallelection one year immediately preceding the regular localelection. The proscription is due to the proximity of the nextregular election for the office of the local elective officialconcerned. The electorate could choose the official'sreplacement in the said election who certainly has a longertenure in office than a successor elected through a recallelection. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with theintent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regularlocal election as one referring to an election where the officeheld by the local elective official sought to be recalled will becontested and be filled by the electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possiblebecause of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of theCode considering that the next regular election involving thebarangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away,the same having been scheduled on May 1997.Davide, Concurring: I wish to add another reason as towhy the SK election cannot be considered a "regular localelection" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991. The term "regular local election"must be confined to the regular election of elective localofficials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are thePresident, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. Theelective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of citiesand municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of

provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays andmembers of the sangguniang barangays, and the electiveregional officials of the Autonomous Region of MuslimMindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemedrecognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution,which provides:A regular election, whether national or local, can only referto an election participated in by those who possess the rightof suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and whoare registered voters. One of the requirements for theexercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of theConstitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a

registered voter pursuant to the rules on registratiprescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118)Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages rangifrom 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 199Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to voin a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 1In no manner then may SK elections be considered a reguelection (whether national or local).

Malonzo v. COMELEC (1997)Facts: Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor, winning ovformer Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into hterm, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangmembers and SK chairmen, constituting a majority of tmembers of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted fthe approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution N01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, acalling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him

The Comelec declared the recall proceedings to be in ordMayor Malonzo filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer f

TRO assailing the Comelec’s resolution. The Petition, in tmain, raises the issue of the validity of the institution anproceedings of the recall, putting to fore the propriety of tservice of notices to the members of the Preparatory Rec

Assembly, and the proceedings held, resulting in tissuance of the questioned Resolution.

Issue: WON notices were properly sent to the members the PRA

Held: Yes

Ratio: The Commission regards the sending of notice othing, and the completion of service thereof another, findeed, the requirement of notice can only be fully satisfieif there was not only service, but also completion of servithereof. Thus, we were obliged to inquire more closely inthe records and we found. Personal services weacknowledged by receipts signed, if not by the addressehimself, then, as indicated thereon, by his or her spousnearest relative or a person of sufficient discretion in thmember 's residence or office. Service by registered mwas evinced by the return card duly signed by the addresseor by persons acting for him. There were instances whenotices were served but were refused, this fact noted in tacknowledgment receipt by the server and his witnesse

The circumstances being thus, we hold that there wcomplete service of the notices as contemplated in Secti8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

That it was Alex David, President of the LIGA ng mBarangay who sent the notices is of no moment. We haearlier determined that as member of the PRA, he can legaexercise the prerogatives attached to his membership in tPreparatory Recall Assembly, sending notices to the othmembers of its scheduled convening. It is evident from tforegoing and, therefore, the Commission so holds that trequirements of notice had been fully complied wi

Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices seto the PRA members is factual in nature, and tdetermination of the same is therefore a function of tCOMELEC. In the absence of patent error the Court shounot disturb the same.

Issue: WON the proceedings held by the PRA are valid

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recproceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes th"respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is n




an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. Thebarangays are represented in the Liga by the barangaycaptains as provided under Section 492 LGC. It also providesthat the Kagawad may represent the barangay in theabsence of the barangay chairman." The Liga ng mgaBarangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from thePreparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that thepersonalities representing the barangays in the Liga are thevery members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the

majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, afterdeliberation reported in the record, in accordance with theexisting law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and SangguniangBarangay members convened and voted as members of thePreparatory Recall Assembly of Caloocan, and not asmembers of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recallproceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on thisground. Any doubt as to the propriety of the proceedingsheld during the recall assembly should be laid to rest. As theCOMELEC pertinently observes: The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there was a sessionheld. Attendees constitute the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Assembly, as we shall later on establish.Rules of procedure, simple they may be were formulated.Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which was

that of petitioner's recall. The members were given theopportunity to articulate on their resolve about the matter.More importantly, their sentiments were expressed throughtheir votes signified by their signatures and thumbmarksaffixed to the Resolution. No proof was adduced by Petitionerto substantiate his claim that the signatures appearingthereon represented a cause other than that of adopting theresolution.

The charges of graft and corruption, violence andirregularities, before and during the session of thepreparatory recall assembly are largely uncorroborated, andcannot override the substantiated findings of the respondentCOMELEC.

Claudio v. COMELEC (2000)

Facts: Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of PasayCity in the May 11, 1998. On May 19, 1999, severalbarangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for thepurpose of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula wasdesignated chair. The members of the PRA adoptedResolution No. 01, S-1999, initiating Claudio’s recall. Thepetition for recall was filed on the Office of the City Mayor.

The comelec also posted the petition on the bulletin boardsof certain public places. Oppositions to the petition werefiled by Jovito Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L.Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in thepetition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolutionwere actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting;(2) most of the signatories were only representatives of theparties concerned who were sent there merely to observethe proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took placewithin the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case,filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the

annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio asmayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recallproceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) therecall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all themembers of the PRA, considering that 10 were actuallydouble entries, were not duly accredited members of thebarangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials hadwithdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executedaffidavits of retraction.

The COMELEC granted the petition and dismissed theopposition. It ruled that the 1,073 members who attendedthe May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary toconstitute the PRA, considering that its records showed thetotal membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics

of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILshowed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. either case, since only a majority is required to constituthe PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support the recall resolution. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of §74 of tLocal Government Code Includes the Convening of tPreparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Rec

Resolution

Held: Yes

Ratio: We can agree that recall is a process which begiwith the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or tgathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registervoters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to thfiling of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, tverification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of tdate of the recall election, and the holding of the election the scheduled date.[5) However, as used in paragraph (b) § 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of whicvoters decide whether they should retain their local officor elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited support of this conclusion.

First, § 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. Itin fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the other han§69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised bthe registered voters of a local government unit to which tlocal elective official belongs." Since the power vested othe electorate is not the power to initiate recproceedings[6) but the power to elect an official into officthe limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to tentire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall"paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding tconvening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recwith the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.

Thus, there may be several PRAs held or petitions for recfiled with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on tnumber of times such processes may be resorted to. Theare merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating

recall. The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of tpower of recall which is vested in the registered voters. Itthis - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of §74 seeto limit by providing that no recall shall take place within oyear from the date of assumption of office of an electilocal official.

The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (refers to recall election is to be found in the purpose of tlimitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take plawithin one year from the date of assumption of office of tofficial concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take plawithin one year immediately preceding a regular locelection.

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonab

basis for judging the performance of an "The only logicreason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors wait one year before petitioning for a recall election is prevent premature action on their part in voting to removenewly elected official before having had sufficient time evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." Tone-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petitifor recall because the Municipal Code involved in that caexpressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filagainst any officer or until he has actually held office for least twelve months." But however the period of prohibitiis determined, the principle announced is that the purposethe limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluatithe performance of an elective local official. Hence, in th




case, as long as the election is held outside the one-yearperiod, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can beheld even before the end of the first year in office of a localofficial.

Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) asincluding the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officialswould be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speechand of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be

asked on the day of the election to decide on theperformance of their officials. The crystallization andformation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold,therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includesthe holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas andopinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the mostcherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong toassume that such assemblies will always eventuate in arecall election. To the contrary, they may result in theexpression of confidence in the incumbent.

To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to therecall election and not to the preliminary proceedings toinitiate recall -Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which,according to §69, is a power which shall be exercised by theregistered voters of a local government unit. Since the

voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it isclear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibitedwithin the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) isto provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an electivelocal official, and final judging is not done until the day of theelection; and Because to construe the limitation in paragraph(b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings wouldunduly curtail freedom of speech and of assemblyguaranteed in the Constitution.As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000,more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayorof that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on thatdate.

Issue: WON the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the SameParagraph (b) of §74 of the LGC includes the Election Period

for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election

Ratio: The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n) o recallshall take place within . . . one (1) year immediatelypreceding a regular local election." Had Congress intendedthis limitation to refer to the campaign period, which periodis defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could haveexpressly said so.Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit theperiod during which a recall election may be held. Actually,because no recall election may be held until one year afterthe assumption of office of an elective local official,presumably on June 30 following his election, the free periodis only the period from July 1 of the following year to aboutthe middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the

second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaignperiod would reduce this period to eight months. Such aninterpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalizethe right of recall which is designed to make localgovernment units" more responsive and accountable."Indeed, there is a distinction between election period andcampaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, unlessotherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election periodcommences ninety (90) days before the day of the electionand ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to followpetitioner's interpretation that the second limitation inparagraph (b) includes the "election period" wouldemasculate even more a vital right of the people.

To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, §74 imposlimitations on the holding of recall elections. First, paragra(a) prohibits the holding of such election more than onduring the term of office of an elective local official. Seconparagraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election withone year from the date the official assumed office. And thiparagraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election withone year immediately preceding a regular local election. succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC, "[p) aragraph (

construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates tperiod when such elective local official may be subject recall election, that is, during the second year of office."

Issue: WON the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking tannulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering thholding of a recall election. He contends that a majority the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtainebecause 74 members did not really sign the recall resolutioAccording to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names

pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendanand not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the toof the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin.

This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is beinraised for the first time in this case. It was not raised befothe COMELEC. Although the word "Attendance" appears the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lindrawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for tattendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absuto believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed trecall resolution signified their attendance at the meetitwice. It is more probable to believe that they signed pag94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution which the pages in question are part. The other point raiseby petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELE

was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, wnotarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for PasCity but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, thissue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannotherefore, be raised now.

HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT

Practice of Profession by Mayors, Governors and othelective officials

Javellana v. DILG and Santos 212 SCRA 475

Facts: Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected CCouncil or of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City EngineErnesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case again

Javellana.Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana h

continuously engaged in the practice of law without securiauthority for that purpose from the Regional DirectDepartment of Local Government, as required by DMemorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DMemorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same departmenthat on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javieand Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City EngineErnesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissand Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in pubridicule: that Javellana also appeared as counsel in sevecriminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG MemoranduCircular No. 80-38




Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative caseagainst him on the ground mainly that DLG MemorandumCircular Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional becausethe Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority toregulate the practice of law. The motion to dismiss wasdenied.A few months later, the LGC was enacted which provides:"SEC. 90. Practice of Profession."(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions,

engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except duringsession hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who arealso members of the Bar shall not:"(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil casewherein a local government unit or any office, agency, orinstrumentality of the government is the adverse party;"(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein anofficer or employee of the national or local government isaccused of an offense committed in relation to his office:"(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrativeproceedings involving the local government unit of which heis an official; and"(4) Use property and personnel of the Government exceptwhen the sanggunian member concerned is defending theinterest of the Government.”

Javellana thereupon filed this petition for certiorari praying

that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 andSection 90 of RA 7160 be declared unconstitutional and nulland

Issue: WON the Memorandum Circulars and Section 90 of RA 7160 are unconstitutional

Held: No

Ratio: In the first place, complaints against public officersand employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest forby express constitutional mandate, a public office is a publictrust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero andCatapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect acomplaint against the City Government of Bago City, theirreal employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman.

Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia, wouldactually be a judgment against the City Government. Byserving as counsel for the complaining employees andassisting them to prosecute their claims against CityEngineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated MemorandumCircular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713)prohibiting a government official from engaging in theprivate practice of his profession, if such practice wouldrepresent interests adverse to the government.Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum CircularNo. 90-81 violate Article VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution iscompletely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circulartrenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority toprescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local GovernmentCode and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply

prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoidconflicts of interest between the discharge of their publicduties and the private practice of their profession, in thoseinstances where the law allows it.Section 90 of the Local Government Code does notdiscriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to allprovincial and municipal officials in the professions orengaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly providesthat sanggunian members "may practice their professions,engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except duringsession hours." If there are some prohibitions that applyparticularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions,the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, oraffect, the area of public service.

LOCAL BOARDS AND COUNCILS

Osea v. Malaya (2002)

Facts: Petitioner filed Protest Case with the Civil ServiCommission. She averred that she was appointed as Officein-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Camarines Sur, by DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, upthe endorsement of the Provincial School Board Camarines Sur. However, President Ramos appointrespondent to the position of Schools DivisiSuperintendent of Camarines Sur. Respondent’s appointmewas made without prior consultation with the ProvincSchool Board, in violation of Section 99 of the LocGovernment Code of 1991. Hence, petitioner prayed threspondent’s appointment be recalled and set aside fbeing null and void.

The CSC dismissed the protest complaint and held thSection 99 of the Local Government Code of 19contemplates a situation where the DECS issues tappointments, whereas respondent’s appointment was maby no less than the President, in the exercise of happointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondeas Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga C

were in the nature of reassignments, in which caconsultation with the local school board was unnecessary.

Issue: WON Petitioner is entitled to the position of Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendeof Camarines Sur

Ratio: Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 19applies to appointments made by the Department Education, Culture and Sports. This is because at the timethe enactment of the Local Government Code, schoodivision superintendents were appointed by the Departmeof Education, Culture and Sports to specific division location. In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issuMemorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1994, placing tpositions of schools division superintendent and assistaschools division superintendent within the career executiservice. Consequently, the power to appoint persons career executive service positions was transferred from tDECSto the President. The appointment may not be specias to location. The prerogative to designate the appointeto their particular stations was vested in the DECS Secretapursuant to the exigencies of the service, as provided DECS Order No. 75, Series of 1996.In the case at bar, the appointment issued by PresideRamos in favor of respondent to the Schools DivisiSuperintendent position on September 3, 1996 did nspecify her station. It was Secretary Gloria who, in Memorandum dated November 3, 1997, assigned adesignated respondent to the Division of Camarines Sur, apetitioner to the Division of Iriga City.We agree with the Civil Service Commission and the CourtAppeals that, under the circumstances, the designation

respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of CamarinSur was not a case of appointment. Her designation partoof the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where spreviously exercised her functions as Officer-in-ChargSchools Division Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Cleartherefore, the requirement in Section 99 of the LoGovernment Code of 1991 of prior consultation with the locschool board, does not apply. It only refers to appointmenmade by the Department of Education, Culture and SportSuch is the plain meaning of the said law. The “plameaning rule” or verba legis in statutory construction is thapplicable in this case. Where the words of a statute aclear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given




literal meaning and applied without attemptedinterpretation.Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. Anappointment may be defined as the selection, by theauthority vested with the power, of an individual who is toexercise the functions of a given office. When completed,usually with its confirmation, the appointment results insecurity of tenure for the person chosen unless he isreplaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.

On the other hand, a reassignment is a movement of anemployee from one organizational unit to another in thesame department or agency which does not involve areduction in rank, status or salary and does not require theissuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designationconnotes merely the imposition of additional duties on anincumbent official.Petitioner asserts a vested right to the position of SchoolsDivision Superintendent of Camarines Sur, citing herendorsement by the Provincial School Board. Herqualification to the office, however, lacks one essentialingredient, i.e., her appointment thereto. While she wasrecommended by Secretary Gloria to President Ramos forappointment to the position of Schools DivisionSuperintendent of Camarines Sur, the recommendation wasnot acted upon by the President. Petitioner’s designation as

Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent,was expressly made subject to further advice from theDepartment of Education, Culture and Sports. Thus, herdesignation was temporary. In fact, there was a need torecommend her to the President for appointment in apermanent capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied her positiononly temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or reassignedto other positions without violating her right to security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the positionof Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

Barangay conciliation and mediation

Morata v. Go (1983)

Facts On August 5, 1982, Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed acomplaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. LuisaMorata for recovery of a sum of money plus damagesamounting to P49,400.00. On the basis of the allegation inthe complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing asgrounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege prioravailment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliationprocess required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of acertification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that noconciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties.

The judge denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that theprovision of Sec 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizableby the inferior courts mentioned in Secs 11 and 12 of thelaw.

Issue: WON the complaint should be dismissed for failure

to comply with PD 1508

Held: Yes

Ratio: Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.No complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided inSection 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there hasbeen a confrontation of the parties before the LuponChairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or thePangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat

Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiateHowever, the parties may go directly to court in tfollowing cases:[1] Where the accused is under detention;[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personliberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of person property and support pendente lite; and

[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by tStatute of LimitationsSECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. TLupon of each barangay shall have authority to brintogether the parties actually residing in the same city municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision instrumentality thereof;[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and thdispute relates to the performance of his official functions;[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 3days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Ministmay in the interest of justice determine uprecommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister

Local Government.

Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 a6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle amicaball types of disputes involving parties who actually reside the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes ndistinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of cidisputes that should be compromised at the barangay levein contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupby paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authorover criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authoriSection 2 of said law employed the universal acomprehensive term "all", to which usage We should neithadd nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentaprecept in statutory construction that "where the law donot distinguish, We should not distinguish. 2 By compellithe disputants to settle their differences through t

intervention of the barangay leader and other respectmembers of the barangay, the animosity generated protracted court litigations between members of the sampolitical unit, a disruptive factor toward unity acooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that thconciliation process at the barangay level is likewdesigned to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in couin order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in tprocess, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thuto say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to caseexclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sigof this objective. Worse, it would make the law a sedefeating one. For what would stop a party, say in an actifor a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, frobloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond t

jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid t

mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeeshould the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets onin inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts whethe log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, tlawmakers could not have intended such half-measure aself-defeating legislation.

There can be no question that when the law conferred upothe Lupon "the authority to bring together the partactually residing in the same city or municipality famicable settlement of all disputes, ... ," its obviointendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad acomprehensive an authority as possible as would bring abothe optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. Theobjectives would only be half-met and easily thwarted if th




Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within theexclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict itscoverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts,then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof thefollowing rule on Venue, to wit:Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve realproperty or any interest therein shall be brought in theBarangay where the real property or and part thereof is

situated.for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically,

jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any interesttherein, except forcible entry and detainer cases, has alwaysbeen vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trialcourt].But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections11, 12, and 14, of the law speak of the city and/or municipalcourts as the forum for the nullification or execution of thesettlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. We holdthat this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the Lupon. As heretofore stated, theauthority of the Lupon is clearly established in Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon byrespondent judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the

barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city andmunicipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolvepetitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon,regardless of the amount involved or the nature of theoriginal dispute. But there is nothing in the context of saidsections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliationprocess in other types of cases applies exclusively to saidinferior courts.Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled byCircular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando,regarding the implementation of the KatarungangPambarangay Law. It is significant that the above-quotedcircular embodying the directive "to desist from receivingcomplaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in casesfalling within the authority of said Lupons," has beenaddressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts,

but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance,circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts andcourts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trialcourts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted bypresident Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation,dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of whichreads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of allgovernment offices involved in the investigation, trial andadjudication of cases, it is hereby ordered that immediateimplementation be made by all government officials andoffices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputesat the barangay level as provided for in the KatarungangPambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]."

Uy v. Contreras (1994)

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of theRules of Court assailing the decision of herein respondent

judge which denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss casesfiled for slight physical injuries. The motion to dismiss wasbased on the failure of herein private respondents to complywith the requirement on prior referral to the Lupong

Tagapamayapa. The court found the motion to be withoutmerit whereas the barangay conciliation proceedingsbetween the parties had started but nothing has beenachieved by the barangay. The trial court also stated thatthe accused and her witnesses had already filed theircounter-affidavits and documents which implied waiver onthe part of the accused to claim her right to a reconciliationproceedings before the barangay. Further, the court held

that the complainants may go directly to the court sintheir complaint was about to prescribe or be barred statute of limitations.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdictiowhen he denied the motion to dismiss for failure of tprivate respondents to comply with the mandatorequirement on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa

Held: Yes

Ratio: The Court granted the petition. The filing of tcases herein assailed was premature and the motion dismiss should have been granted. The trial courcontention that the action is about to prescribe was alunmeritorious since upon the filing of the complaint to tLupon Tagapamayapa, the prescriptive period shall automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixdays. Furthermore, having brought the dispute before tLupon, the private respondents are estopped frodisavowing the authority of the body which they themselvhad sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of tlupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the schedulmediation hearings and instead filing the complaint rig

away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system

In the proceeding before the court a quo, the petitioner athe respondent had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. Tpetitioner further invoked the Section 18. None knew of trepeal of the decree by the Local Government Code of 199Even in her instant petition, the petitioner invokes tdecree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on SummaProcedure. However, the private respondents, realizing tweakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they drefer their grievances to what might be a wrong forum undthe decree, changed tack. In their Comment, they assert thon 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a complaint against petitionbefore the barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela, Makain compliance with the requirement of the KatarungaPambarangay Law under the Local Government Code." Y

in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor, thassert that the said law is not applicable to their casbefore the court a quo because (a) the petitioner arespondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in tsame city or municipality; (b) the law does not apply whethe action, as in the said cases, may otherwise be barred the statute of limitations; and (c) even assuming that the laapplies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has substantiacomplied with it.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should haexerted enough diligence to inquire from the privarespondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessabefore filing the informations.Respondent judge did not do any better. His tounawareness of the Local Government Code of 1991, mo

specifically on the provisions on the Katarungan pambarangay , is distressing. He should have taken judicnotice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 12of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required to ta

judicial notice of "the official acts of the legislative, executiand judicial departments of the Philippines." We have rulethat a judge is called upon to exhibit more than justcursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rule21 He should have applied the revised katarungan pambarangay law under the Local Government Code 1991. Had he done so, this petition would not have reachus and taken valuable attention and time which could havbeen devoted to more important cases.




In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at thefirst scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which themediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slightphysical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makatiat any time before such date. The filing then of CriminalCases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a),Section 412 of the Local Government Code, respondent

Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss

the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by takingrefuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly,Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991)which states that the parties may go directly to court wherethe action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlierstated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code,the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for amaximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when theprivate respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati.Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents areestopped from disavowing the authority of the body whichthey themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with theauthority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend thescheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the

complaint right away with the trial court cannot becountenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on thebarangay conciliation system. Granting arguendo that thepetitioner did inflict the alleged physical injuries, the offensefor which she may be liable would only be slight physicalinjuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised PenalCode, considering that per the medical certificates theinjuries sustained by the private respondents would "heal" innine days "in the absence of complication" and there is noshowing that the said injuries incapacitated them for labor orwould require medical attendance for such period. Thepenalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine notexceeding 200 pesos and censure." These penalties are light under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and wouldprescribe in two months pursuant to Article 90.Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged inCriminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly

inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period thereforwould have expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, itsrunning was tolled by the filing of the private respondents'complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days,or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could bereached within the said period of suspension and,accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the privaterespondents would still have fifty-six days within which to filetheir separate criminal complaints for such offense.Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by therespondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph(b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the Judge thatthe petitioner "had already waived the right to areconciliation proceedings before the barangay of

Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the accused and thecomplainant are residents of different barangays." Thepetitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedingsbefore the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to itand attended the scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993and invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in hercounter-affidavit.Nor would this Court accept the contention of the privaterespondent that the parties could not agree on acompromise and that they had to request the barangaycaptain to issue a certification to file action. The request isdated 23 June 1993, or nearly one and a half months afterCriminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with thecourt a quo. Evidently, this was done to support their

contention in the said court that, in any event, there wsubstantial compliance with the requirement of referral the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondentafter failing to appear at the initial confrontation and loafter the criminal cases were filed, had no right to demanthe issuance of a certification to file action.

The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse discretion in refusing to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 1452and 145234. Before closing these cases, this Court wishes

emphasize the vital role which the revised katarungan pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at tbarangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and progretherein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensiand wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable the lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the remediprovided by that law, government prosecutors shouexercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with and trial courts should not hesitate to impose tappropriate sanctions for non-compliance thereof.

Wingarts v. Mejia (1995)

Facts: The administrative complaints filed against JudMejia were an offshoot of three criminal cases decided the judge and involving the Wingarts and Col. Rodulfo MunComplainant Johan L.H. Wingarts was the accused in crimin

cases for malicious mischief and grave threats. The first twcriminal cases were initiated by Col. Munar as the privacomplainant therein. Thereafter, the Wingarts made counter-charge against Col. Munar resulting in the thcriminal case for usurpation of authority docketed in tsame court as Criminal Case No. 2696 with Col. Munar as taccused.

The judge is charged with malicious delay in administration of justice. The case allegedly dragged for oyear and four months in respondent's sala and wultimately dismissed in a decision dated June 8, 1994 aftan ocular inspection of the burned premises was conducteby the court personnel. As for the second complaint, t

judge was charged with incompetence and gross ignoranof the law for taking cognizance of the case for grave threadespite the lack of barangay conciliation. The third complacharges the judge with rendering an unjust decision.

The judge explained that he took cognizance of the grathreats case for he believed that there had been substantcompliance with the requirements of the KatarungaPambarangay Law since a certification of the barangcaptain regarding a confrontation of the parties, the fact thno amicable settlement was reached by them, and that was endorsing the filing of the case in court, had been dusubmitted to respondent judge. With regard to tcomplaint for malicious delay, the judge contended th"(t)he proceedings were continuous until the complainawas acquitted of the crime charged against him. The cawas decided one (1) month and three (3) days after it wsubmitted for decision. As to the third complaint, he claimthat the decision as a result of his honest findings aconclusion based on the evidence and the law in the heariof the case.

The OCA ruled that the first charge is meritorious for failuto remand the case to the lupon and instead, takicognizance of the case. In the second charge, the delay donot appear to be malicious nor deliberate. Also, the Oruled that it does not appear that the judge was motivatby an evil or corrupt motive in rendering the decision.

Issue: WON the judge is liable for incompetence aignorance of the law

Held: Yes

Ratio: Although there is no clear proof of malice, bad faitbias or partiality on his part, respondent judge should ha




exercised the requisite prudence, especially under theenvironmental circumstances of the aforesaid criminal casewhere personal liberty was involved. He should havecarefully examined all relevant facts and issues and avoidedthe improvident issuance of the warrant of arrest without acircumspect review of the case which, after all, did notexhibit abstruse factual matters or complicated legalquestions. The present controversy could have been avoidedhad he kept faith with the injunction that a member of the

bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments because the learning processin law never ceases.In the present case, assuming that he did not act with.malice or bad faith and that he subsequently issued an orderto recall the warrant or prevent the arrest of complainant,such considerations can mitigate but will not altogetherexculpate him from the charge of incompetence andignorance of the law, which accordingly warrants theimposition of an appropriate penalty on him. If judgeswantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, therewill not only be confusion in the administration of justice buteven oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of dueprocess.Moreover, judges are directed to desist from improvidentlyreceiving and desultorily acting on complaints, petitions,

actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the Lupon Tagapamayapa. We have repeatedly ruled thatthe proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to thefiling of any action or proceeding in court or othergovernment office. Such an initiatory pleading, if filedwithout compliance with the precondition, may be dismissedon motion of any interested party on the ground that it failsto state a cause of action.As to the charge of malicious delay in the administration of

justice, we agree with the observation of the Office of theCourt Administrator that while there was some delay inhearing the case, the same does not appear to be maliciousnor deliberate. Respondent judge should not be unfairlysubjected to liabilities, for contretemps which were broughtabout by the parties and their lawyers. Complainants couldnot have been unaware that the delay of the hearing wasdue to postponements sought and obtained by the parties

and their respective counsel. Litigants should not blame a judge for the delay which was not of his own making.However, the Court finds this as an appropriate occasion toonce again remind the members of the judiciary to adoptmeasures to prevent unnecessary delays in the disposition of their cases. A judge should administer justice not onlyimpartially but also without delay. As expressly mandated bythe Code of Judicial Conduct, he shall dispose of the court'sbusiness promptly and decide cases within the requiredperiods.In connection with his decision in Criminal Case No. 2696,after a careful analysis of the assailed decision, we find noshowing that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith,fraud, dishonesty or corruption in rendering the same."An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is notsupported by the evidence, or both. The source of an unjust

judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all fora mere error. It is well-settled that a judicial officer, whenrequired to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liablecriminally for any error which he commits, provided he actsin good faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the samewas unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciouslyand must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred,envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. Asinterpreted by Spanish Courts, the term "knowingly" meanssure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do aninjustice. Mere error therefore in the interpretation orapplication of the law does not constitute the crime.

In a recent administrative case decided by this Court, it wreiterated that in order to hold a judge liable, it must shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjuand that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent do an injustice. The complainants in the present case hadismally failed to convince us that respondent judge knethat his challenged judgment is unjust, even assuming it be so.In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriate

penalized for his regrettably erroneous action in connectiwith Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court. We have repeatedstressed that a municipal trial judge occupies the forefrontthe judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public serves, and he must accordingly act at all times with greconstancy and utmost probity. 20 Any kind of failure in tdischarge of this grave responsibility cannot countenanced in order to maintain the faith of the public the judiciary, especially on the level of courts to which moof them resort for redress.

Corpuz v. CA (1997)

Facts: Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer again Juanito Alvarado with the MTC for recovery of possession

the room being occupied by the latter, which Corpuchildren allegedly needed for their own use. Alvarado anCorpuz were two of the tenants of a certain LorenBarredo who, in May 1988, decided to sell his property to ttenants. Due to economic difficulties, Alvarado and tother lessees executed an "Affidavit of Waiver" grantiBarredo the right to sell his house to any person who cafford to purchase the same. Consequently, Barredo sold hhouse to Corpuz for P37,500. As a result of the sale,tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz aAlvarado.In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarademanding that he vacate the room which he was occupyibecause the children of Corpuz needed it for their own useAlvarado refused to vacate the room as demandeprompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment.In his answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (the alleged "Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him aBarredo was a forgery; and (2) the dispute was not referreto the Lupong Tagapayapa. The MTC ordered Alvarado vacate the room. The RTC reversed ruling that the sabetween Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a pendicase before the NGA. Also, the Affidavit of Waiver wasforgery. The CA affirmed.

Issue: WON Corpuz' unlawful detainer suit filed before tMTC against Alvarado should be suspended until tresolution of the case lodged in the NHA impugning the saof said property

Held: No

Ratio: The MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectme

cases. As the law now stands, the only issue to be resolvein forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physicor material possession over the real property, that possession de facto.Refugia v. CA: “The inferior court may look into the evidenof title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as saevidence would indicate or determine the nature possession. It cannot, however, resolve the issue ownership, that is, by declaring who among the parties is ttrue and lawful owner of the subject property, because thresolution of said issue would effect an adjudication ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action funlawful detainer. With this as a premise and taking inconsideration the amendment introduced by BP 129, it m




be suggested that inferior courts are now conditionallyvested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title orownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit."Consequently, since the petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with the issue of ownership (i.e., thecontroversy pending in the NHA), the doctrinalpronouncement in Refugia is applicable. Parentheticallyspeaking, the issue raised in this petition is far from novel.

The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the

annulment of sale, title or document do not abate anyejectment action respecting the same property.

The underlying reason for the above rulings is for thedefendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit, which issummary in nature, by the simple expedient of assertingownership thereon. Thus, the controversy pending beforethe NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailingthe authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannotdeter the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suitmerely for the purpose of determining who has a betterpossessory right among the parties.It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. Wehave ruled that a judgment rendered in an ejectment caseshall not bar an action between the same partiesrespecting title to the land or building nor shall it beconclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between

the same parties upon a different cause of action involvingpossession.

Issue: WON the ejectment suit was not referred to theLupon Tagapayapa as required by PD 1508

Held: No

Ratio: We are not persuaded. This defense was onlystated in a single general short sentence in Alvarado'sanswer. We have held in Dui v. Court of Appeals that failureof a party to specifically allege the fact that there was nocompliance with the Barangay conciliation procedureconstitutes a waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado'sanswer reveals that no reason or explanation was given tosupport his allegation, which is deemed a mere generalaverment.

In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewithcannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court hadalready acquired over the subject matter and the partiestherein.

Bonifacio Law Office v. Judge Bellosillo (2002)

Facts: In a letter-complaint, Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr. of the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge ReynaldoB. Bellosillo of the MTC of QC, with ignorance of the law,grave abuse of discretion, and obvious partiality. In anejectment suit, the judge referred the case back to thebarangay conciliation despite the fact that it was alleged inthe verified complaint that the case was already referred tothe barangay and a copy of the Certification to File Motionwas attached to the verified coplaint. Atty Salomon filed a

compliance with respondent’s court attaching therewith acopy of his complaint filed before the barangay and theminutes of the proceedings held thereat.After the filing of said compliance, no action was taken bythe court despite the fact that the case falls under the Ruleon Summary Procedure and the judge has still to come upwith a determination as to whether summons should beissued or not. He then inquired personally with the courtabout the status of the case and he was told that no actioncould be taken unless the Order of April 2, 1996 had beencomplied with. Dismayed by the Court’s insistence of referring the case to the barangay though it had alreadygone through all the requisite proceedings thereat, hedecided not to pursue the case and filed a notice to withdraw

complaint. Said withdrawal however was denied respondent on the basis of the action already taken thereas contained in the questioned Order. He then filed a Notof Dismissal but the same was still unacted upon respondent.It was only after a year from the time the complaint was filthat respondent ordered that summons be served defendants. When defendants failed to file an Answer, (complainant) filed a Motion to Render Judgment

accordance with the provisions of Sec.5 of the Rule Summary Procedure. However, instead of renderi

judgment, respondent merely required defendants comment on the motion to render judgment. Aftdefendants filed their comment, respondent still did not aon the said motion.

The judge, however, said that since there was a failure settlement of mediation proceedings before the BarangChairman, it is necessary for the Pangkat to be constituteanew so that parties may have a second opportunity amicably settle their dispute.

The OCA found respondent either ignorant or negligentreferring the case back to the barangay despite the presenof what it considered to be a valid Certification to FAction. It also faulted him for disregarding the Rules Summary Procedure by (1) calling for a prelimina

conference, (2) directing the defendants to submit thComment to complainant’s Motion to Render Judgment, a(3) failing to render judgment within the reglementaperiod.

Issue: WON the judge was grossly ignorant of the lawhen it ordered the parties to submit to another barangaconciliation

Held: No

Ratio: The records reveal that such Certification wimproperly and prematurely issued. In what appears to bepre-printed standard form thereof, the “x” before the secoenumerated statement clearly shows that no personconfrontation before a duly constituted Pangkat nTagapagkasundo took place. Respondent’s position that t

Pangkat was not constituted, and that no face to faconciliation of the parties had taken place before it substantiated by the Minutes submitted by complainanEvidently, complainant failed to complete the barangconciliation proceedings.We also note that the Complaint before the barangay wdated February 16, 1996. Records show that the heariwas scheduled for February 26, 1996 and was reset fFebruary 29, 1996. And yet, the Certification to File Actiwas issued on March 1, 1996, less than fifteen days after tfirst scheduled hearing before the barangay chairman.Evidently, the barangay failed to exert enough efforequired by law to conciliate between the parties and settle the case before it. Hence, respondent judge was nincorrect in remanding the case to it for completion of tmandated proceedings. We cannot fault him for seeking

promote the objectives of barangay conciliation and ftaking to heart the provisions of Supreme Court Circular N14-93. His referral of the case back to the barangay cannbe equated with gross ignorance of the law. Neither doesconstitute grave abuse of discretion or obvious partiality.

Thereafter, complainant filed a Motion praying that tproceedings already held before the barangay be consideras substantial compliance with the requirements of the lawActing on the Motion, the judge issued the summons anopted to continue with the court proceedings withoinsisting on strict compliance with the mandated barangproceedings. He did so after noting that complainant wapparently not making any move to complete the barangproceedings after the case had been remanded to t




barangay, and that the case fell under the Rules onSummary Procedure.Section 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, however,provides that such cases may be revived only after therequirement for conciliation has been complied with.Nevertheless, the judge’s error is judicial in nature andcannot be corrected in administrative proceedings. At anyrate, because he chose to continue with the proceedings of the case, and because respondents failed to answer the

ejectment Complaint on time, he should have rendered judgment within thirty (30) days from the expiration of theperiod to file an answer.Complainant filed a Motion to Render Judgment dated March25, 1997. Refusing to heed the Motion, respondent insteadcalled a preliminary conference and directed the defendantsto submit their Comment. The OCA correctly arrived at thefollowing findings:“x x x (T) he Judge’s resolution (to) the complainant’s Motionto Render Judgement casts serious doubt on hisunderstanding of the law. The express language of the lawstates that when an Answer has not been filed within thereglementary period, the judge, motu proprio, or on motion,‘shall render judgment as may be warranted by the factsalleged in the complaint’ (Section 6, Revised Rule onSummary Procedure). This provision cannot, by any stretch

of the imagination, be construed to mean anything otherthan what the words themselves communicate: that therendition of judgment is mandatory, and that the judgmentshould be based only on what is contained within the fourwalls of the complaint.“By calling for a preliminary conference and directing thedefendants to submit their Comment to the complainant’sMotion, the Judge went beyond the bounds set by the law xx x. Moreover, when he finally resolved the motion – afterthe defendants had submitted their Comment – he merelyordered that the case be ‘deemed submitted for decision.’Needless to say, ‘submission for decision’ is a far cry from‘rendition of judgment,’ the character of immediacy implicitin the latter does not exist in the former. And in this case,supposedly to be resolved under the Summary Rule,immediacy is the defining characteristic. x x x.”Respondent rendered judgment on the case only on January

7, 1998, almost a year from the time the case had beendeemed submitted for resolution. Unacceptable is hisexplanation that he waited for the defendants to availthemselves of their right to appeal the Order deeming thecase submitted for resolution. He has no duty to wait,because the law mandates him to act and decide the casepromptly. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines thepeople’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judgesare enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure todo so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants theimposition of administrative sanctions on them.

Mendova v. Judge Afable (2002)

Facts: Mendova alleged in his affidavit-complaint that onFebruary 18, 1998 he filed with the Office of the BarangayChairman of Poblacion San Julian, Eastern Samar a

complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert Palada.Barangay Chairman Ronie Quintua, in his Certificationconfirmed such fact. Pangkat Chairman Eufemia Cabagoalso certified in an undated “Minutes In Settling Disputes”that the case was set for hearing on March 16, 22 and 29,1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.Mendova then filed with the MTC a complaint for slightphysical injuries against Palada.

The judge dismissed the complaint on grounds of prescription as the complaint was filed on April 20, 1998 wasfiled with this Court on May 4, 1998. However, thealleged offense took place on February 15, 1998. From the date of the commission of the allegedoffense, more than two months have elapsed.

Mendova filed with the OCA an administrative complaagainst the judge. He alleged that in dismissing the case, t

judge showed his ignorance of the law when he did not appthe provisions of Section 410(c) of Ra. 7160 (60 dainterruption of running of prescription).In its Evaluation and Recommendation, the OCA, throuDeputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, fourespondent guilty as charged and recommended that he fined P3,000.00 with a warning that a commission of simil

acts will be dealt with more severely, thus:

Issue: WON the judge is liable administratively fdismissing Criminal Case No. 2198-98 on the ground prescription.

Held: Yes

Ratio: It is axiomatic, as this Court has repeatedly stressethat an administrative complaint is not the appropriaremedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decisiissued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, suas a motion for reconsideration, or an appeal. Fobviously, if subsequent developments prove the judgechallenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion proceed against him at all. Besides, to hold a jud

administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would nothing short of harassment and would make his positidoubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to rend

judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try tfacts or interpret the law in the process of administerin

justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is only where terror is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred wievident bad faith that administrative sanctions may imposed against the erring judge.What we said in Flores vs. Abesamis is illuminating:“As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicremedies against errors or irregularities being committed a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinaremedies against errors or irregularities which may regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation admission of evidence, or in construction or application

procedural or substantive law or legal principlinclude a motion for reconsideration (or after renditiona judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), aappeal. The extraordinary remedies against error irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special ciactions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motifor inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the camay be.Now, the established doctrine and policy is thdisciplinary proceedings and criminal actions again

Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, norsubstitute for, these judicial remedies, whethordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustioof these judicial remedies, as well as the entry

judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, apre-requisites for the taking of other measuragainst the persons of the judges concerned, whethof civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only aftthe available judicial remedies have been exhausteand the appellate tribunals have spoken with finalitthat the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil administrative liability may be said to have openeor closed.Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, withopressure or influence from external forces or factorthey should not be subject to intimidation, the fear civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acthey may do and dispositions they may make in th




performance of their duties and functions; and it issound rule, which must be recognized independentlyof statute, that judges are not generally liable foracts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and ingood faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of a

judge can be had only if ‘there be a final declarationby a competent court in some appropriate proceedingof the manifestly unjust character of the challenged

judgment or order , and x x x also evidence of malice

or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, onthe part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order ’ or under the stringent circumstances set out inArticle 32 of the Civil Code.”In the present case, we noticed from the records before usthat the complainant did not bother at all to file a motion forreconsideration of respondent judge’s decision dismissingthe criminal case. No reason was advanced by complainantwhy he failed to do so. Thus, following our settledpronouncements cited above, his instant administrativecomplaint is premature.According to complainant, Robert Palada committed thecrime of slight physical injuries on February 15, 1998. OnFebruary 18, 1998, complainant filed his complaint with theOffice of the Barangay Chairman at Poblacion, San Julian,Eastern Samar. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 410(c)

of The Local Government Code of 1991, quoted earlier, suchfiling interrupted the prescriptive period and started to runagain upon receipt by the complainant of theCertification to File Action issued by the PangkatSecretary. Here, records fail to show when complainantreceived the Barangay Certification to File Action. Theundated certification he submitted merely states that thecase was set for hearing before the barangay on March 16,22 and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicablesettlement. When he filed on May 4, 1998 Criminal Case No.2198-98 for slight physical injuries with respondent's court,until the dismissal of the case on November 3, 1998, he stillfailed to present proof of his receipt of the BarangayCertification to File Action. Clearly, he cannot now faultrespondent judge for dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not

be considered ignorance of the law. If at all, it can only bean error of judgment.Finally, we noted that the complaint does not allege any badfaith or malice on the part of respondent judge when hedismissed the criminal case.

Sangguniang Kabataan

Monteclaros v. COMELEC (2002)

Facts: The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) is a youthorganization originally established by Presidential Decree684 as the Kabataang Barangay (KB). The KB was composedof all barangay residents who were less than 18 years old,without specifying the minimum age. The KB was organizedto provide its members with the opportunity to express theirviews and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.

The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited SK membership to those youths “at least 15 butnot more than 21 years of age.” The SK remains as a youthorganization in every barangay tasked to initiate programs“to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural,intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the youth.” The SK in every barangay is composed of achairperson and 7 members, all elected by the Katipunan ngKabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every barangay iscomposed of all citizens actually residing in the barangay forat least 6 months and who meet the membership agerequirement. The first SK elections took place on 4December 1992. RA 7808 reset the SK elections to the firstMonday of May of 1996 and every three years thereafter. RA

7808 mandated the Comelec to supervise the conduct of tSK elections under rules the Comelec shall promulgatAccordingly, the Comelec on 4 December 2001 issuResolutions 4713 and 4714 to govern the SK elections onMay 2002. On 18 February 2002, Antoniette VMontesclaros sent a letter to the Comelec, demanding ththe SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 200Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her lettwithin 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she w

seek judicial relief. On 20 February 2002, Alfredo Benipayo, then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters the Speaker of the House and the Senate President abothe status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay electionIn his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it w“operationally very difficult” to hold both electiosimultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairmexpressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon thproposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 apostpone the SK elections to November 2002. 10 dalapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter Montesclaros. Subsequently, Montesclaros, et. al. receivedcopy of Comelec En Banc Resolution 4763 dated 5 Februa2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of tSK elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangelections in May 2002 as scheduled. On 6 March 2002, th

Senate and the House of Representatives passed threspective bills postponing the SK elections. On 11 Mar2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee of the Senaand the House came out with a Report recommendiapproval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill 20and House Bill 4456. The Bicameral Committeeconsolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to 1

July 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. On 11 Mar2002, Montesclaros filed the petition for certioraprohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporarestraining order or preliminary injunction, seeking prevent the postponement of the SK elections originascheduled 6 May 2002, and also to prevent the reduction the age requirement for membership in the SK. On 11 Mar2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committeeconsolidated bill and on 13 March 2002, the House

Representatives approved the same. The President signthe approved bill into law on 19 March 2002.

Issue: Whether there is actual controversy in the case whiseeks to prevent a postponement of the 6 May 2002 Selections, and which seeks to prevent Congress froenacting into law a proposed billlowering the membership age in the SK.

Held: At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of tfollowing events that have transpired sinceMontesclaros filed the petition: (1) The 6 May 2002 elections and 13 May 2002 Barangay elections were not heas scheduled; (2) Congress enacted RA 9164 which providthat voters and candidates for the SK elections must be “least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of t

election.” RA 9164 also provides that there shall besynchronized SK and Barangay elections on 15 July 2002. ( The Comelec promulgated Resolution 4846, the rules aregulations for the conduct of the 15 July 2002 synchronizSK and Barangay elections. The Court’s power of judicreview may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all tfollowing requisites are complied with, namely: (1) texistence of an actual and appropriate case or controvers(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raisithe constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial revieis pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) tconstitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Hereithere is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of tpower of judicial review. While seeking to prevent




postponement of the 6 May 2002 SK elections, Montesclaros,et. al. are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than 15 July 2002. RA 9164has reset the SK elections to 15 July 2002, a date acceptableto them. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there istherefore no actual controversy requiring judicialintervention. Further, their prayer to prevent Congress fromenacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membershipage in the SK does not present an actual justiciable

controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial reviewbecause it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right andimposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. Aproposed bill, having no legal effect, violates noconstitutional right or duty. The Court has no power todeclare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutionalbecause that would be in the nature of rendering an advisoryopinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicialreview cannot be exercised in vacuo. The second paragraphof Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice tosettle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether ornot there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the Government." Thus, there can be no

justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of aproposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicialreview only after a law is enacted, not before. Absent a clearviolation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannotexercise its power of judicial review over the internalprocesses or procedures of Congress.

Issue: WON SK membership is a “property right within themeaning of the Constitution”

Held: No

Ratio: Congress exercises the power to prescribe thequalifications for SK membership. One who is no longerqualified because of an amendment in the law cannotcomplain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK

membership. Only those who qualify as SK members cancontest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifyingthem from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protectedby the Constitution because it is a mere statutory rightconferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the lawto change or even withdraw the statutory right.A public office is not a property right. As the Constitutionexpressly states, a “[P]ublic office is a public trust.” No onehas a vested right to any public office, much less a vestedright to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejov. Gabriel , decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:”Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a“property.” It is, however, well settled x x x that a

public office is not property within the sense of the

constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but isa public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of thegovernment x x x is that of a popular representativegovernment, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has aproprietary or contractual right to an office, but where everyofficer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the lawand holds the office as a trust for the people he represents.”Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office,should realize from the very start that no one has aproprietary right to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local governmentlegislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners aproprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in

local legislative councils. The constitutional principle ofpublic office as a public trust precludes any proprietary clato public office. Even the State policy directing “equaccess to opportunities for public service” cannot bestow petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youthinvolvement in public affairs, this policy refers to those wbelong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congre

has the power to define who are the youth qualified to jothe SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who not qualify because they are past the age group defined the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. government service, once an employee reaches mandatoretirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to clito his office. In the same manner, since petitioners are nopast the maximum age for membership in the SK, thcannot invoke any property right to cling to their membership.

The petition must also fail because no grave abuse discretion attended the postponement of the SK electionRA No. 9164 is now the law that prescribes the qualificatioof candidates and voters for the SK elections. This law afixes the date of the SK elections. Petitioners are not evassailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. RA No. 91

enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and will apply the July 15, 2002 SK elections.

The Municipality

Muñez v. Ariño 241 SCRA 478 (1995)

Doctrine: Municipal Mayors cannot conduct preliminainvestigations and issue warrants of arrest. Section 143 the former LGC (BP 447) has been abrogated, renderfunctus officio by the 1987 Consti which took effect Feb. 1987.

Facts: Mayor Irisari of Agusan del Sur summoncomplainant Muñez to his office for a conference regardingland dispute with the latter and Tirso Amado. As complainafailed to attend, the Mayor issued a warrant of arrest againhim. No investigation was later conducted. Muñez filedcomplaint for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicfunction. Initially Judge Arino denied the mayor’s motion quash on the ground that the power of mayors to isswarrants of arrest ceased to exist when the 1987 Consti toeffect. For its part, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found thmayor guilty and suspended him for 8 months without paOn appeal, DILG reversed saying the warrant was merely a“invitation.” Mayor Irisari filed an MR using DILG resolutiand Judge Arino correspondingly, dismissed the case. Wsubsequently find out that the Jusge made a serious errand SC said he “showed poor judgement and groignorance of basic legal principles.”

Held: It cannot be alleged that Mayor Irisari mereintended to invite or summon Muñez to his office because had already done this the day before, under the pretense

a conference. Thus, the next day a warrant was issued givthat complainant did not show up for the conference despthe mayor’s summons. The Judge mrely relied on the DILopinion which was grossly erroneous. A 5k fine is imposed the errant judge.

Greater Balanga v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataa(1994)

Facts: GBDC applied with the Office of the Balanga Mayfor a business permit its property, certain portions of whias been "unlawfully usurped and invaded" by Balanga, whihad "allowed/tolerated/abetted" the construction of shantiand market stalls while charging market fees and markentrance fees from the occupants and users of the are




Mayor issued a Mayor's Permit granting GBDC the privilegeof a "real estate dealer/privately-owned public marketoperator" under the registered trade name of Balanga PublicMarket.However, the Sangguniang Bayan passed a Resolutionannulling the Mayor's permit issued to GBDC and advisingthe Mayor to revoke the permit. Mayor revoked the permitinsofar as it authorized the operation of a public market.GBDC filed this petition claiming that it had not violated any

law/ordinance, thus there’s no reason to revoke the Mayor'spermit. The EO and the resolution in question were quasi-

judicial acts and not mere exercises of police power.Respondent also failed to observe due process in revokingthe permit. Balanga argues that Mayor may issue, deny orrevoke municipal licenses and permits. Resolution and EOwere legitimate exercise of local legislative authority. GBDCviolated Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Codewhen it failed to disclose the true status of the area involvedin the permit when it did not secure separate permits for itstwo businesses.

Held: No. There was no ground for revocation. Theapplication for Mayor's permit requires the applicant to statewhat type of business, profession, occupation and/or callingprivileges is being applied for. Petitioner left this entry bank

in its application form. Leaving an entry blank is not equal tofalse statement. There must be proof of willfulmisrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a falsestatement. The absence of the material info in theapplication form was nonetheless supplied in the face of thepermit signed and issued by Mayor Banzon himself.Applying for two businesses in one permit is also not aground for revocation. Par 2 Section 3A-06(b) does notexpressly require two permits for their conduct of two ormore businesses in one place, but only that separate fees bepaid for each business. The powers of municipalcorporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris(strictly in its legal terms) and any doubt orambiguity must be construed against the municipalityGranting, however, that separate permits are actuallyrequired, the application form does not contain any entry asregards the number of businesses the applicant wishes to

engage in.

The City

Lim and Garayblas v. CA (2002)

Doctrine: City mayors have authority to issue businesslicenses and permits, and collorarily make suspend, revokeand even refuse the same, but due process must always beobserved in exercising these powers which means that themayor must give applicant or licensee notice andopportunity to be heard.

Facts:Policemen under Mayor Lim’s instructions inspected andinvestigated Bistro Pigalle’s license as well as the workpermits and health certificates of its staff causing the

stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurantoperations. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application fora business license, as well as the work permit applications of Bistro’s staff, for the year 1993.Bistro filed before the trialcourt a petition against Manila Mayor Lim..

Held: The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l),Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila andSection 455 (3) (iv) of the LGC is clear that the power of themayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarilyincludes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or evenrefuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend orrevoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on

the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenseSimilarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses apermits is premised on non-compliance with tprerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permi

The mayor must observe due process in exercising thepowers, which means that the mayor must give tapplicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.

True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investiga

private commercial establishments for any violation of tconditions of their licenses and permits. However, tmayor has no power to order a police raid on theestablishments in the guise of inspecting or investigatithese commercial establishments

The Province

Rivera v. Malolos (1957)

Facts: Sometime in August 1949 the municipality Malolos, called for bids for the supply of road constructimaterials to repair the road of the municipality. At the pubbidding, the petitioners bid was the lowest. On the samday, the acting municipal treasurer informed the petitionthat the contract had been awarded to him and requestehim to call at his office for the execution of the contract. T

contract was then signed. It was stipulated that for and consideration of the sum of P19, 235 the petitioner was furnish and deliver to the municipality 2,700 cubic meters crushed adobe stone and 1,400 cubic meters of gravel. compliance with the contract, the petitioner delivercrushed adobe stone and gravel to the municipality.On 29 July, 1950 the petitioner wrote to the municiptreasurer, through the provincial auditor, calling his attentito the fact that the sum of P19,339.56 due him as paymefor the value of crushed adobe stone and gravel deliveredthe municipality had not yet been paid and that as the fiscyear 1949-1950 had already expired, he requested that tsum be included in the appropriations for the incoming fiscyear 1950-1951 as an outstanding obligation. The municipcouncil passed Resolution No. 68 ratifying the public biddicalled by the municipal treasurer for the supply of roconstruction materials, and the contract entered into by tmunicipality.Later, the petitioner filed a complaint against tmunicipality of Malolos in the Court of First Instance Bulacan to collect the sum of P19,235 for the value crushed adobe stone and gravel delivered by the petitionunder the contract. The CFI dismissed the complaiPetitioner sought the intervention of the PresidentComplaints and Committee, which forwarded the petitioneclaim on the ground that as there was no sum of monappropriated to meet the obligation incurred before texecution of the contract, as required by section 607 of tRevised Administrative Code, the said contract is void, provided in section 608 of the same Code; and that eventhere was such sum appropriated to meet such obligatiothe alleged deliveries of crushed adobe stone and gravcould no longer be verified by the Provincial Auditor

Bulacan or his representative.

Issue: WON the contract between the municipality and tpetitioner is void

Held: Yes

Ratio: Before a contract may be entered into validly bymunicipality, the law requires that there should be appropriation of municipal funds to meet the obligativalidly passed by the municipal council and approved by tmunicipal mayor. In answer to the statement of the SolicitGeneral that there is no provision of law which authorizesmunicipal mayor to enter into a contract with a priva




contractor for furnishing the municipality with public worksmaterials, the petitioner cites sections 2165 and 2196 of theRevised Administrative Code. Section 2165 provides that"Municipalities .. are endowed with the faculties of municipalcorporations to be exercised by and through their respectivemunicipal governments in conformity with law." It shall becompetent for them, in their proper corporate name, .. tocontract and be contracted with, .." The power or authorityconferred upon municipal corporations must be exercised in

conformity with law, and the law provides that suchcontracts must be entered into by the district engineer. Thepetitioner contends, however, that section 1920 of theRevised Administrative Code must be read in connectionwith sections 1912 and 1913 of the same Code andconcludes that section 1920 does not abrogate the generalrule that a municipal council may designate an officer of themunicipal corporation to execute such a contraction behalf of the municipality. Section 1912 refers to investigation andsurvey by the district engineer for a proposed constructionor repair of public works and submission by him to the mayorto reports and estimates of the cost of such construction orrepair with his recommendations, and to the preparation of plans and specifications for such public works andsupervision of the construction or repair of the same. Theprovisions of sections 1912 and 1913 of the Revised

Administrative Code do not refer to contracts entered into bythe municipality for the supply of road constructionmaterials.If the law requires that before a contract involving theexpenditure of P2,000 or more may be entered into orauthorized, the municipal treasurer must certify to the officerentering into such contracts that funds have been dulyappropriated for such purpose and that the amountnecessary to cover the proposed contract-is available forexpenditure on account thereof; and that purported contractentered into contrary to the requirements just stated iswholly void, the petitioner's claim that there is no longer anyquestion as to the validity of the contract entered into byand between the petitioner and the municipal mayor of Malolos is not correct.Likewise, if the law provides that the provincial auditor or hisrepresentative must check up the deliveries made by a

contractor pursuant to a contract lawfully and validlyentered into, and there was no such check up, thepetitioner's claim that there is no longer an issue as towhether the road construction materials have been actuallydelivered by the petitioner and received by the respondent isgroundless. The Auditor General is not in duty bound to passand allow in audit the sum claimed by the petitioner if he orhis authorized representative did not check up the deliveryof the crushed adobe stone and gravel. To say that thepurpose and aim of this checking requirement is to forestallfraud and collusion is to state what is obvious.

The petitioner enlisted the aid of the Presidential Complaintsand Action Committee to request the Auditor General to passin audit and authorize the payment of the petitioner's claim.

The Auditor General had no alternative but to comply withthe provisions of the law and as the contract entered into by

the municipal mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, was not inaccordance with law, the Auditor General was correct indenying the petitioner's claim.Section 73, Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the MotorVehicle Law, as amended by section 2, Republic Act No. 314,invoked by the petitioner, merely allocates 10 per cent of themoney collected under its provisions to the road and bridgefunds of the different municipalities in proportion topopulation as shown in the latest available census, for therepair, maintenance and construction of municipal roads.

This alone is not sufficient appropriation and authority todisburse part of the 10 per cent collected under the MotorVehicle Law for the purpose of paying the claim of the

petitioner. Section 608 of the Revised Administrative Coaffords the petitioner a remedy.

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

Disomancop v. Datumanong (2004)

Facts: Challenged in the instant petition for certioraprohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporarestraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction are tconstitutionality and validity of Republic Act No. 89entitled “An Act Establishing An Engineering District in tFirst District of the Province of Lanao del Sur aAppropriating Funds Therefor,” and Department of PubWorks and Highways (DPWH) Department Order No. 119 the subject, “Creation of Marawi Sub-District EngineeriOffice.”Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act N6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled “An Act Providing for An OrganAct for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,” wenacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. The lacalled for the holding of a plebiscite in the provinces Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao dSur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan KudarSulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga dSur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, Gene

Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa aZamboanga. In the plebiscite, only four (4) provinces votefor the creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao dSur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provincbecame the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindan(ARMM). The law contains elaborate provisions on tpowers of the Regional Government and the areas

jurisdiction which are reserved for the National GovernmePresident Aquino issued E.O. 426, entitled “Placing tControl and Supervision of the Offices of the DPWH withthe ARMM under the Autonomous Regional Government, afor other purposes.”Nearly nine (9) years later, then DPWH Secretary GregorioVigilar issued D.O. 119 (Creation of Marawi Sub-DistrEngineering Officewhich shall have jurisdiction over national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWwithin Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.)Almost two years later, President Estrada approved asigned into law R.A. 8999 (establishing engineering district lanao del sur).Congress later passed R.A. 9054, entitled “An Act Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the AutonomoRegion in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the PurpoRepublic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for tAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended.”On 23 July 2001, petitioners addressed a petition to DPWSecretary Simeon Datumanong, seeking the revocation D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999. action, however, was taken on the petition.[Petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuof discretion and that it violates the constitutional autonomof the ARMM. They point out that the challenged DepartmeOrder has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Offi

with functions that have already been devolved to tDPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.Petitioners also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece legislation that was not intelligently and thoroughly studieand that the explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.995) from which the law originated is questionabPetitioners assert as well that prior to the sponsorship of tlaw, no public hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMwas made. The House Committee on Public Works aHighways (Committee) failed to invite a single official frothe affected agency. Finally, petitioners argue that the lawas skillfully timed for signature by former President JosepE. Estrada during the pendency of the impeachmeproceedings.




Issue: Preliminaries

Ratio: In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and theexecutive department on the ground that they contravenethe Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciablecontroversy.

The challenge to the legal standing of petitioners cannotsucceed. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a

personal and substantial interest in the case such that theparty has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term“interest” means a material interest, an interest in issueaffected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere interestin the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to takecognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy therequirement of legal standing when paramount interests areinvolved. In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberalstance on the locus standi of a petitioner where thepetitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendentalsignificance to the people.It is not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creationof and appropriation of funds to the First Engineering District

of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will affect thepowers, functions and responsibilities of the petitioners andthe DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently beenendowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likelythat petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their materialand substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by theenforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is directand immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge thevalidity of the enactments subject of the instant case.

Issue: WON Republic Act No. 8999 was valid

Held: No

Ratio: The challenged law never became operative and

was superseded or repealed by a subsequent enactment. The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regionalautonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, theOrganic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because theyenjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisionsthereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such asR.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to besubmitted to a plebiscite.Although R.A. 9054 was enacted later, it reaffirmed theimperativeness of the plebiscite requirement. In fact, R.A.9054 itself, being the second or later ARMM Organic Act, wassubjected to and ratified in a plebiscite.

The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented byE.O. 426, devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMMwhich includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time)to the Regional Government. By creating an office with

previously devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in essence, soughtto amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory law should thereforefirst obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM before itcould validly take effect. Absent compliance with thisrequirement, R.A. 8999 has not even become operative.From another perspective, R.A. 8999 was repealed andsuperseded by R.A. 9054. Where a statute of later dateclearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature toabrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must begiven effect. R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution.It advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailingthe powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao delSur and Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction overregional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however,

ventures to reestablish the National Governmen jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao del SR.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, anddestroys the latter law’s objective.Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts, R.A. 6734 and R9054. The kernel of the antagonism and disharmony lies the regional autonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts ordapursuant to the Constitution. On the other hand, R.A. 89

contravenes true decentralization which is the essence regional autonomy.Regional Autonomy Under R.A. 6734 and R.A. 905

The idea behind the Constitutional provisions autonomous regions is to allow the separate developmentpeoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. Thecultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness the Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, aeven religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine socieof the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationapproach. Policies emanating from the legislature ainvariably assimilationist in character despite channels beiopen for minority representation. As a result, democrabecomes an irony to the minority group.

The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the ca

of the Filipino Muslims and the Cordillera people who havbeen fighting for it. Their political struggle highlights theunique cultures and the unresponsiveness of the unitasystem to their aspirations. The Moros’ struggle for sedetermination dates as far back as the Spanish conquest the Philippines. Even at present, the struggle goes on.However, the creation of autonomous regions does nsignify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from thof the Republic, as it can be installed only “within tframework of this Constitution and the national sovereignas well as territorial integrity of the Republic of tPhilippines.”

The objective of the autonomy system is to perdetermined groups, with a common tradition and sharsocial-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their wayslife and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge their own business. This is achieved through t

establishment of a special governance regime for certamember communities who choose their own authorities frowithin the community and exercise the jurisdictionauthority legally accorded to them to decide interncommunity affairs.In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies tcultivation of more positive means for national integrationwould remove the wariness among the Muslims, increatheir trust in the government and pave the way for tunhampered implementation of the development programin the regionA necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralizatioDecentralization is a decision by the central governmeauthorizing its subordinates, whether geographically functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areasinvolves decision-making by subnational units. It is typica

a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses delegate certain authority to more local governmenFederalism implies some measure of decentralization, bunitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralizatidiffers intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units thhave been authorized to act (by delegation) do not posseany claim of right against the central government.Decentralization comes in two forms—deconcentration adevolution. Deconcentration is administrative in nature;involves the transfer of functions or the delegation authority and responsibility from the national office to tregional and local offices. This mode of decentralizationalso referred to as administrative decentralization.




Devolution, on the other hand, connotes politicaldecentralization, or the transfer of powers, responsibilities,and resources for the performance of certain functions fromthe central government to local government units. This is amore liberal form of decentralization since there is an actualtransfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to grantgreater autonomy to local government units in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, andto improve their administrative and technical capabilities.

The diminution of Congress’ powers over autonomousregions was confirmed in Ganzon v. CA wherein this Courtheld that “the omission (of “as may be provided by law”)signifies nothing more than to underscore localgovernments’ autonomy from Congress and to breakCongress’ ‘control’ over local government affairs.”

This is true to subjects over which autonomous regions havepowers, as specified in Sections 18 and 20, Article X of the1987 Constitution. Expressly not included therein are powersover certain areas. Worthy of note is that the area of publicworks is not excluded and neither is it reserved for theNational Government.E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of theDPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government(ARG). More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054transferred and devolved the administrative and fiscal

management of public works and funds for public works tothe ARG.In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims inMindanao are to be given freedom and independence withminimum interference from the National Government. Thisnecessarily includes the freedom to decide on, build,supervise and maintain the public works and infrastructureprojects within the autonomous region. The devolution of thepowers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and transferof the administrative and fiscal management of public worksand funds to the ARG are meant to be true, meaningful andunfettered. This unassailable conclusion is grounded on aclear consensus, reached at the Constitutional Commissionand ratified by the entire Filipino electorate, on the centralityof decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel of deliverance for Muslim Filipinos and the ultimate unity of Muslims and Christians in this country.

With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, andthe National Government takes control again. The hands,once more, of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tiedup.

The challenged law creates an office with functions andpowers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previouslydevolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District inLanao del Sur. E.O. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of thecontrol and supervision of the offices of the DPWH within theARMM, including their functions, powers and responsibilities,personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets to the ARG.Among its other functions, the DPWH-ARMM, under thecontrol of the Regional Government shall be responsible forhighways, flood control and water resource developmentsystems, and other public works within the ARMM. Its scopeof power includes the planning, design, construction and

supervision of public works. According to RA 9054, the reachof the Regional Government enables it to appropriate,manage and disburse all public work funds allocated for theregion by the central government. The use of the word“powers” in EO 426 manifests an unmistakable case of devolution.It is clear from the foregoing provision of law that except forthe areas of executive power mentioned therein, all othersuch areas shall be exercised by the Autonomous RegionalGovernment (“ARG”) of the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao. It is noted that programs relative to infrastructurefacilities, health, education, women in development,agricultural extension and watershed management do notfall under any of the exempted areas listed in the provision

of law. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that all thespheres of executive responsibility have been transferred the ARG.R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and renderregional autonomy illusory with respect to infrastructuprojects. The Congressional Record shows, on the othhand, that the “lack of an implementing and monitoribody within the area” has hindered the speeimplementation, of infrastructure projects. Apparently, in t

legislature’s estimation, the existing DPWH-ARMengineering districts failed to measure up to the task. Butit was indeed the case, the problem could not be solvthrough the simple legislative creation of an incongruoengineering district for the central government in the ARMAs it was, House Bill No. 995 which ultimately became R.8999 was passed in record time on second reading (not mothan 10 minutes), absolutely without the usual sponsorshspeech and debates. The precipitate speed whicharacterized the passage of R.A. 8999 is difficult comprehend since R.A. 8999 could have resulted in tamendment of the first ARMM Organic Act and, therefocould not take effect without first being ratified in plebiscite. What is more baffling is that in March 2001, barely two (2) months after it enacted R.A. 8999 in Janua2001, Congress passed R.A. 9054, the second ARMM Organ

Act, where it reaffirmed the devolution of the DPWH ARMM, including Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, to tRegional Government and effectively repealed R.A. 8999.

Issue: WON DPWH Department Order No. 119 was valid

Ratio: D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-DistrEngineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructuprojects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issupursuant to R.A. 6734—which initiated the creation of tconstitutionally-mandated autonomous region and whidefined the basic structure of the autonomous governmenE.O. 426 sought to implement the transfer of the control asupervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to tAutonomous Regional Government. In particular, it identififour (4) District Engineering Offices in each of the four (

provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu a Tawi-Tawi.[89) Accordingly, the First Engineering District the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over thpublic works within the province.

The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially tsame powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM FiEngineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegof E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes bapowers which have been previously devolved under the saexecutive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions E.O. 426. The DPWH’s order, like spring water, cannot rihigher than its source of power—the Executive.

The fact that the department order was issued pursuant E.O. 124—signed and approved by President Aquino in hresidual legislative powers—is of no moment. It is a fineimbedded principle in statutory construction that a spec

provision or law prevails over a general one.[90) Lspecialis derogant generali. As this Court expressed in tcase of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[9“another basic principle of statutory construction mandatthat general legislation must give way to special legislatioon the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as embrace only cases in which the special provisions are napplicable, that specific statute prevails over a genestatute and that where two statutes are of equal theoreticapplication to a particular case, the one designed therefspecially should prevail.”E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general lareorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways whE.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control a




supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to theAutonomous Regional Government. The latter statutespecifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 shouldtherefore give way to E.O. 426 in the instant case.In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification ina plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124. In case of anirreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages,the later enactment prevails because it is the laterlegislative will.

Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that “alllaws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and otherissuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with thisOrganic Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, itnecessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functusofficio by the ARMM Organic Acts.

Abbas v. COMELEC (1989)

Facts: The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, theAgreement Between the Government of the Republic of thePhilippines and the Moro National Liberation Front with theparticipation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission,Members of the Islamic Conference and the SecretaryGeneral of the Organization of Islamic Conference. Itprovided for the establishment of autonomy in the southern

Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorialintegrity of the Republic of the Philippines and enumeratedthe thirteen provinces comprising the areas of autonomy.In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified which for the firsttime provided for regional autonomy. Pursuant to thisconstitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted andsigned into law.Petitioner Abbas argues that R. A. No. 6734 unconditionallycreates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to theprovisions of the Constitution on the autonomous regionwhich makes the creation of such region dependent upon theoutcome of the plebiscite.

Issue: Whether certain provisions of RA 6734 conflict withthe Tripoli Agreement.

Held: We find it neither necessary nor determinative of thecase to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and itsbinding effect on the Philippine Government whether underpublic international or internal Philippine law. In the firstplace, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for thecreation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. Thestandard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution.

Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have theeffect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act.Assuming for the sake of argument that the TripoliAgreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, itwould then constitute part of the law of the land. But asinternal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, anenactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it wouldbe in the same class as the latter. Thus, if at all, R.A. No.

6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being asubsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A.No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in thegranting of the reliefs sought.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and itscomposition needs to be clarified. First, the questionedprovision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article Xof the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessaryfor the creation of the autonomous region. The reference tothe constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for itclearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous regionshall take place only in accord with the constitutionalrequirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the

Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which

incorporates substantially the same requirements embodiin the Constitution and fills in the details. Thus, under thConstitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of tautonomous region shall take effect only when approved a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units inplebiscite, and only those provinces and cities wheremajority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wheresuch a majority is not attained shall not be included in t

autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomoregion is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces annine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. N6734 shall be included therein. The single plebisccontemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 wtherefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be aautonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) whiprovinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. N6734, shall compromise it.If the framers of the Constitution intended to requapproval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscthey would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, sectio27, it is provided that "[t) his Constitution shall take effeimmediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votcast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing thwith the provision on the creation of the autonomous regio

it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomoregion is made to depend, not on the total majority vote the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of thconstituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if tintention of the framers of the Constitution was to get tmajority of the totality of the votes cast, they could hasimply adopted the same phraseology as that used for thratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of tautonomous region shall be effective when approved bymajority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for tpurpose."It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution issimple majority of votes approving the organic Act individual constituent units and not a double majority of thvotes in all constituent units put together, as well as in thindividual constituent units.More importantly, because of its categorical language, this

also the sense in which the vote requirement in tplebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must habeen understood by the people when they ratified tConstitution.Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitionMama-o, on the other hand, maintain that only those arewhich, to his view, share common and distinctive historicand cultural heritage, economic and social structures, aother relevant characteristics should be properly includwithin the coverage of the autonomous region. He insisthat R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only tprovinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanadel Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi aCotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nin(9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess suconcurrence in historical and cultural heritage and oth

relevant characteristics. By including areas which do nstrictly share the same characteristics. By including arewhich do not strictly share the same characteristic as tothers, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded tscope of the autonomous region which the constitution itshas prescribed to be limited.Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution ladown the standards by which Congress shall determiwhich areas should constitute the autonomous regioGuided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment Congress of the areas that share common attributes is withthe exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any revieof this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom




the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence tothe separation of governmental powers.After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in theOrganic Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would thenadopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas inMindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that sincethe Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its scopeshould be further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim

areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, andtherefore is violative of the Constitution.Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very sameconstitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Anydetermination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao shouldcompromise the autonomous region, taking into accountshared historical and cultural heritage, economic and socialstructures, and other relevant characteristics, wouldnecessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. Asearlier stated, such determination by Congress of whichareas should be covered by the organic act for theautonomous region constitutes a recognized legislativeprerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by thisCourt.Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 onthe ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on

free exercise of religion. The objection centers on a provisionin the Organic Act which mandates that should there be anyconflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code (stillbe enacted) on the one had, and the national law on theother hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Actshould apply national law. Petitioners maintain that theislamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, whichmakes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected toany "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports thisobjection by enumerating possible instances of conflictbetween provisions of the Muslim Code and national law,wherein an application of national law might be offensive toa Muslim's religious convictions.In the present case, no actual controversy between reallitigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving theapplication of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may

not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceivedpotential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Codeand national law.According to petitioners, said provision grants the Presidentthe power to merge regions, a power which is not conferredby the Constitution upon the President. That the Presidentmay choose to merge existing regions pursuant to theOrganic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X,Section 10 of the Constitution. It must be pointed out thatwhat is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the NationalCapital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguousprovinces for administrative purposes. Administrativeregions are not territorial and political subdivisions likeprovinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. While thepower to merge administrative regions is not expressly

provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which hastraditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate theexercise of the power of general supervision over localgovernments. There is no conflict between the power of thePresident to merge administrative regions with theconstitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the mergerof local government units because the requirement of aplebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces,cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrativeregions.Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in theOrganic Act which create an Oversight Committee tosupervise the transfer to the autonomous region of thepowers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the

regional government by the organic Act. Said provisiomandate that the transfer of certain national governmeoffices and their properties to the regional government shbe made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the OversigCommittee, and that such transfer should be accomplishwithin six (6) years from the organization of the regiongovernment.It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions aunconstitutional because while the Constitution states th

the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upapproval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing aOversight committee tasked with supervising the transfer powers and properties to the regional government would effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomoregion hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if tOrganic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation the autonomous region immediately takes effect delay tcreation of the autonomous region.Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomoregion hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if tOrganic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation the autonomous region immediately takes effect. T

questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversigCommittee to supervise the transfer do not provide fordifferent date of effectivity. Much less would the organizatiof the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to toperation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed effecting a smooth transition period for the regiongovernment. The constitutional objection on this point thcannot be sustained as there is no bases therefor.Every law has in its favor the presumption constitutionality. Those who petition this Court to declarelaw, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establithe basis for such a declaration. otherwise, their petitimust fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Coufinds that petitioners have failed to overcome tpresumption. The dismissal of these two petitions therefore, inevitable.

Pandi v. CA (2004)

Facts: On August 9, 1993, Macacua, in her capacity Regional Director and as Secretary of the DOH of the ARMissued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was thDOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as Officer-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office-AmPakpak General Hospital (IPHO-APGH) Lanao del Sur. In tsame Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr. Mamasao Sathen the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Landel Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City.Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issueOffice Order No. 07 designating Dr. Amer Saber also Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.Sani filed a complaint with the RTC challenging the memoMacacuao. Saber filed with the CA a petition for q

warranto claiming that he is the lawfully designated officer charge of IPHO-APGH.President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO 133 transferring tpowers and functions of the DOH in the region to tRegional Government of the ARMM. Macacua, again, issua Memorandum reiterating Pandi’s designation as Officer-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, as well as Sandetail to the Regional Office of the DOH-ARMM in CotabaCity.

The CA ruled that that Saber is the lawfully designatOfficer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. The Cruled that Lanao del Sur Governor Mutilan has the power anauthority to appoint the provincial health officer undSection 478[10] of the Local Government Code of 1991.




The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, and the Memorandum of Agreement entered between the DOH of the NationalGovernment and the ARMM pursuant to Executive Order No.133, did not render moot and academic the issues raised inthe proceedings before it.Neither did the Court of Appeals give credence to Pandi andMacacua’s argument that the passage of the ARMM LocalCode puts to rest the issues in the instant case. The Court of

Appeals maintained that the Organic Act of 1989 and theARMM Local Code could not prevail over the 1991 LGU Code.

The Court of Appeals interpreted Section 457 (b) and (d) of the ARMM Local Code to mean that it is the ARMM RegionalGovernor, and not the Provincial Governor, who exercises arecommendatory prerogative in the appointment of theprovincial health officer.

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that there is nothing inSection 18,[15] Chapter 5, Title IX, Book IV of the RevisedAdministrative Code of 1987 which explicitly or evenimpliedly vests in Macacua, as DOH-ARMM Secretary, thepower to make such an appointment or designation.

Issue: WON an incumbent provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur can be assigned to another province and if so,who can order such assignment.

Second, who can designate the Officer-in-Charge in theprovincial health office of Lanao del Sur - the ProvincialGovernor or the ARMM Secretary of Health.

Third, who is empowered to appoint the provincial healthofficer of Lanao del Sur - the Provincial Governor, theRegional Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health.

The passage of the Organic Act of 2001 means that thepowers and functions of a Provincial Governor under the1991 LGU Code are now enjoyed, as a minimum, by aProvincial Governor in the ARMM. Thus, the ProvincialGovernor appoints the provincial health officer if the latter’ssalary comes from provincial funds. If the provincial healthofficer’s salary comes mainly from regional funds, then theARMM Local Code applies, in which case the RegionalGovernor is the appointing power but he must appoint onlyfrom among the three nominees of the Provincial Governor.Moreover, the Provincial Governor exercises supervision and

control over the provincial health officer because the ARMMLocal Code has classified him as a provincial governmentofficial. This is now the present state of the law on theappointment of provincial health officers in the ARMM. Thisis actually the same as the law after the effectivity of theARMM Local Code but prior to the passage of the Organic Actof 2001. The only difference is that the Regional Assemblycannot amend the ARMM Local Code to reduce or diminishthis power of the Provincial Governor because this devolvedpower, emanating from the 1991 LGU Code, is now part of the Organic Act of 2001.Application of the law to the designation of Saber. Lanao delSur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan designated Saberas Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, onSeptember 15, 1993. On this date the provincial healthofficer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government

official paid entirely from national funds. The provincialhealth officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincialhealth officer. The Secretary of Health was also the officialauthorized by law to assign the provincial health officer toany province within the region. Indisputably, on September15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power todesignate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanaodel Sur. Consequently, the designation of Saber as suchOfficer-in-Charge is void.

The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became aprovincial government official only after the effectivity of theARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional

Assembly on January 25, 1994 and approved by the RegionGovernor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Cobut after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, tRegional Governor appointed the provincial health officwhile the Regional Secretary of Health could assign tprovincial health officer to any province within the ARM

The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or evdesignate the Officer-in-Charge of the provincial heaoffice.

The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Section 478 of the 19LGU Code as Provincial Governor Mutilan’s authority appoint Saber is misplaced. Section 478 of the 1991 LGCode, which provides that “[T]he appointment of a healofficer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and municipgovernments,” is not a grant of power to governors amayors to appoint local health officers. It is simplydirective that those empowered to appoint local heaofficers are mandated to do so. In short, the appointment local health officers, being essential for public services, ismandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law wthe power to appoint them. Moreover, as explained earlithe 1991 LGU Code did not amend the Organic Act of 1989Application of the law to the appointment and transfer SaniSani was appointed provincial health officer by th

Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon on January 1, 198He was appointed as “Provincial Health Officer (R-05 5Step), Office of the Regional Health Director, Regional HeaOffice No. XII, Cotabato City.” Sani was appointed provinchealth officer in Region XII since at that time Executive OrdNo. 119, the charter of the Department of Health, expressstated that provincial health officers were to be appointed a region. The Secretary of Health, upon recommendation the Regional Director, could assign provincial health officeto any province within the region. Consequently, Sacannot claim any security of tenure as provincial heaofficer of Lanao del Sur because he was never appointed that office.Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and ARMSecretary of Health, detailed Sani to the DOH-ARMRegional Office in Cotabato City on August 9, 1993. As that date, the powers and functions of the Department

Health were not yet transferred to the Regional Governmeand the Secretary of Health of the National Government sexercised the power to assign the provincial health officers the ARMM. Consequently, the August 9, 1993 directive Macacua detailing or assigning Sani to the Regional OfficeCotabato City is void.However, on November 6, 1993, Macacua issued anothMemorandum reiterating Sani’s detail or assignment to tRegional Office in Cotabato City. This second Memoranduwas issued after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1which expressly transferred “supervision and control over functions and activities of the Regional Department Health” to “the Head of the Regional Department of HealthIn Gen. Renato de Villa vs. City of Bacolod, this Court rulethat the power of administrative control encompasses tpower to transfer personnel who under the law may

reassigned to other stations. The second detail assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato, issuon November 6, 1993, is within the authority of Macacua Regional Secretary of Health. Thus, the second detail of Sais valid.Application of the law to the designation of PandiMacacua, as Regional Director and Regional Secretary Health, designated Pandi Officer-in-Charge of the IPHAPGH, Lanao del Sur, on August 9, 1993 and again November 6, 1993. The designation dated August 9, 1993void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not yexercise supervision and control over the provincial heaoffices of the ARMM. However, the designation of Pandi November 6, 1993 is valid since at that time Executive Ord




No. 133 had already been issued vesting in the RegionalSecretary of Health supervision and control over all functionsand activities of the Department of Health in the ARMM. Thedesignation of Pandi, however, while valid is only temporaryin nature, good until a new designation or a permanentappointment is made.As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to exercisesupervision and control over all provincial health offices in

the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of ExecutiveOrder No. 133, assumed the administrative powers andfunctions of the Secretary of Health of the NationalGovernment with respect to provincial health offices withinthe ARMM. The official exercising supervision and controlover an office has the administrative authority to designate,in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if theoffice becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had theauthority on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Surpending the appointment of the permanent provincial healthofficer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, theRegional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make sucha designation.Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officerbecame for the first an official of the provincial government

even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor anddraws his salary from regional funds. The ARMM Local Codevests in the Provincial Governor the power to “exercisegeneral supervision and control over all programs, projects,services, and activities of the provincial government.” Uponthe effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of supervision and control over the provincial health officerpassed from the Regional Secretary to the ProvincialGovernor. From then on the Provincial Governor began toexercise the administrative authority to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office pending theappointment of a permanent provincial health officer.

Bai Sema v. Comelec (2008), supra.

The creation of any of the four local government units -province, city, municipality or barangay - must comply withthree conditions. First, the creation of a local governmentunit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local GovernmentCode. Second, such creation must not conflict with anyprovision of the Constitution. Third, there must be aplebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grantof authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate toregional or local legislative bodies the power to create localgovernment units. However, under its plenary legislativepowers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies thepower to create local government units, subject toreasonable standards and provided no conflict arises withany provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress hasdelegated to provincial boards, and city and municipalcouncils, the power to create barangays within their

jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteriaestablished in the Local Government Code, and the

plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of theConstitution. However, under the Local Government Code,"only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, citiesor municipalities.Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegatedto the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to createprovinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within theARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenarylegislative powers because the power to create localgovernment units is not one of the express legislativepowers granted by the Constitution to regional legislativebodies. In the present case, the question arises whether thedelegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to

create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangaconflicts with any provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts wthe delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 1Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, tcreation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city withpopulation of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or ea

province, shall have at least one representative" in tHouse of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of tOrdinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Aprovince that may hereafter be created, or any city whopopulation may hereafter increase to more than two hundrfifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately followielection to at least one Member x x x."Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislatidistrict because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of tConstitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appendto the Constitution. For the same reason, a city withpopulation of 250,000 or more cannot also be creatwithout a legislative district. Thus, the power to createprovince, or a city with a population of 250,000 or morequires also the power to create a legislative district. Evthe creation of a city with a population of less than 250,0

involves the power to create a legislative district becauonce the city's population reaches 250,000, the cautomatically becomes entitled to one representative undSection 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, tpower to create a province or city inherently involvethe power to create a legislative district.

Ordillo v. COMELEC (1990)

Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provincesBenguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and KalingApayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebischeld pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An AProviding for an Organic Act for the Cordillera AutonomoRegion." The official COMELEC results of the plebiscshowed that the creation of the Region was approved by

majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and woverwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of tprovinces and city above-mentioned.Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issueResolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for tRegion has been approved and/or ratified by majority of thvotes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On March 8, 199Congress enacted RA 6861 setting the elections in the CAof Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, tExecutive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of tCordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera RegionAssembly created under Executive Order No. 220.On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition wCOMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic A

for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition. Tpetitioners maintain that there can be no valid CordilleAutonomous Region in only one province as the Constitutiand Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region composed of more than one constituent unit.

Issue: WON the province of Ifugao can validly constituCAR

Held: No

Ratio: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constituthe Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in Article Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:




"Sec 15. There shall be created autonomous regions inMuslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areassharing common and distinctive historical and culturalheritage, economic and social structures, and other relevantcharacteristics within the framework of this Constitution andthe national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of theRP.”

The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and

geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in itsordinary sense means two or more provinces. This issupported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions intowhich the Philippines is divided for administrative purposesare groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a provinceby itself. To become part of a region, it must join otherprovinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It

joins other units because of their common and distinctivehistorical and cultural heritage, economic and socialstructures and other relevant characteristics. TheConstitutional requirements are not present in this case.Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisionsof RA 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that theRegion cannot be constituted from only one province. ArticleIII, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera

Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordilleragovernment consisting of the Regional Government and localgovernment units. From these sections, it can be gleanedthat Congress never intended that a single province mayconstitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would befaced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials,a set of provincial officials and another set of regionalofficials exercising their executive and legislative powersover exactly the same small area.Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest thelegislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose membersshall be elected from regional assembly districts apportionedamong provinces and the cities composing the AutonomousRegion.If we follow the respondent's position, the members of suchCordillera Assembly shall then be elected only from theprovince of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of

having two legislative bodies the Cordillera Assembly andthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercising their legislativepowers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is oneof the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise,it would have too many government officials for so fewpeople.Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planningand Development Board composed of the CordilleraGovernor, all the provincial governors and city mayors ortheir representatives, two members of the CordilleraAssembly, and members representing the private sector. TheBoard has a counterpart in the provincial level called theProvincial Planning and Development Coordinator. TheBoard's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic ActNo. 6766) are almost similar to those of the ProvincialCoordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220

(4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 Local Government Code). If ittakes only one person in the provincial level to perform suchfunctions while on the other hand it takes an entire Board toperform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it couldonly mean that a larger area must be covered at the regionallevel. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Regionbeing made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of

Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to the RegionalGovernment for its initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province.

These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a oneprovince Cordillera Autonomous Region was nevercontemplated by the law creating it.

The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the topopulation of the areas enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, MountaProvince, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has tsecond smallest number of inhabitants from among tprovinces and city above mentioned. The Cordillepopulation is distributed in round figures as follows: Abr185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; KalingApayao, 214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and Bagu

City, 183,000; Total population of these five provinces aone city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census.`There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 whiare either violated or which cannot be complied with. Secti16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (members coming from different provinces and cities in tRegion. Under the respondents' view, the Commission wouhave a Chairman and only one member. It would never haa quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet memberas far as practicable, to come from various provinces acities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a systeof tribal courts for the various indigenous cultucommunities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requirthe development of a common regional language basupon the various languages and dialects in the region whi

regional language in turn is expected to enrich the nationlanguage. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the CordilleAutonomous Region is infused with provisions which ruagainst the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Regio

To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondewould not only violate the letter and intent of tConstitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also impractical and illogical.`Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, is not applicabin the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary

Justice.The Abbas case established the rule to follow which provinces and cities shall comprise the autonomoregion in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the samrule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in tCordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas decisiowhich deals with the issue on whether an autonomo

region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exdespite the fact that only one province or one city is constitute it. Stated in another way, the issue in this casewhether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legaconstitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue not whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in tCordillera Autonomous Region. It is the first issue which tCourt answers in the instant case.

Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA (1990), supra.

Ratio: We have seen earlier that the CAR is not tautonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated by tConstitution. Thus, we now address petitioners' assertithat E.O. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creatingnew territorial and political subdivision. After carefuconsidering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it d

not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merexisting ones into a larger subdivision.Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial apolitical subdivision. It does not have a separate juridicpersonality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalitieNeither is it vested with the powers that are normagranted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the powto create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earliethe CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planninand implementation of programs and services in the coverareas.

The creation of administrative regions for the purpose expediting the delivery of services is nothing new. T




Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made aspart of the law of the land by virtue of PD 1, established11regions, later increased to 12, with definite regionalcenters and required departments and agencies of theExecutive Branch of the National Government to set up fieldoffices therein. The functions of the regional offices to beestablished pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) toimplement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules andregulations of the department or agency in the regional

areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effectiveservice to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate withregional offices of other departments, bureaus and agenciesin the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units inthe area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may beprovided by law.CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regionscreated under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No.220 the operation of the CAR requires the participation notonly of the line departments and agencies of the NationalGovernment but also the local governments, ethno-linguisticgroups and non-governmental organizations in bringingabout the desired objectives and the appropriation of fundssolely for that purpose.

Issue: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the

constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for theprovinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao andMountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose theCAR.

Held: No

Ratio: It must be clarified that the constitutionalguarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to theadministrative autonomy of local government units or, castin more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy is not unique to the1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973Constitution. And while there was no express guaranteeunder the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the LocalAutonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act(R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march

towards further enlargement of local autonomy in thecountry.On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions inMuslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of politicalautonomy and not just administrative autonomy to theseregions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for anautonomous regional government with a basic structureconsisting of an executive department and a legislativeassembly and special courts with personal, family andproperty law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions.As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitorycoordinating agency that would prepare the stage forpolitical autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resultinggap in the process of transforming a group of adjacentterritorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or

administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vestedwith political autonomy.

The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority and LGUs

MMDA v. Bel Air Village Assoc. Inc. (2001), supra.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units - i.e., twelve (12) citiesand five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan,Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon,Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela,and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San

Juan and Taguig. With the passage of RA 7924 in 1995,Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special

development and administrative region" and tAdministration of "metro-wide" basic servicaffecting the region placed under "a developmeauthority" referred to as the MMDA.

The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs aprojects is undertaken by the local government uninational government agencies, accredited peopleorganizations, non-governmental organizations, and tprivate sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For th

purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contractmemoranda of agreement and other cooperatiarrangements with these bodies for the delivery of trequired services within Metro Manila.Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to thdelivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these transport and traffic management which includes tformulation and monitoring of policies, standards aprojects to rationalize the existing transport operationinfrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares apromotion of the safe movement of persons and goods.also covers the mass transport system and the institution a system of road regulation, the administration of all trafenforcement operations, traffic engineering services atraffic education programs, including the institution ofsingle ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violation

Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to sthe policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulathe implementation of all traffic management programs." addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a singticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penaltifor all traffic violations.It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulatioimplementation, preparation, management, monitorinsetting of policies, installation of a system aadministration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 792that grants the MMDA police power, let alolegislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has nbeen delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislatibodies of the local government units, there is no provisionR. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropria

funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of MetManila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,"development authority." It is an agency created for tpurpose of laying down policies and coordinating with tvarious national government agencies, peopleorganizations, non-governmental organizations and tprivate sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All ifunctions are administrative in nature and these aactually summed up in the charter itself

MMDA v. Garlin (2005)

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving tDante Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violati

receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license confiscated for parkiillegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila. Tfollowing statements were printed on the TVR: You ahereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic OperatioCenter Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date apprehension for disposition/appropriate action thereoCriminal case shall be filed for failure to redeem license aft30 days. Valid as temporary DRIVER’S license for seven dafrom date of apprehension.Garin sent a letter to MMDA Chairman Prospero Orerequesting the return of his license and his preference for hcase to be filed in court. When there was not reply, Gafiled a complaint for preliminary injunction in the Rcontending that the absence of an IRR of RA 7924 grants t




MMDS unbridled power to deprive motorists of their license,thereby violating the due process clause. Also, there isundue delegation of legislative authority to the MMDA.For its part, the MMDA pointed out that the powers grantedto it by Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 are limited to the fixing,collection and imposition of fines and penalties for trafficviolations, which powers are legislative and executive innature; the judiciary retains the right to determine thevalidity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the

doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude“admixture” of the three powers of government inadministrative agencies. The trial court rendered a decisionin favor of respondent and ordered the MMDA to desist fromconfiscating licenses without first giving the driver theopportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through itsChairman Bayani Fernando, implemented MemorandumCircular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures forthe use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme.Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, whichcan be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers mayno longer confiscate drivers’ licenses as a matter of coursein cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed

TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and

redeem their license or vehicle plates. It would seem,therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie caseto enjoin the petitioner from confiscating drivers’ licenses isconcerned, recent events have overtaken the Court’s needto decide this case, which has been rendered moot andacademic by the implementation of Memorandum CircularNo. 04, Series of 2004.

Issue: WON the state in the exercise of its police powercan validly withhold a motorist’s license

Held: Yes

Ratio: A license to operate a motor vehicle is not aproperty right, but a privilege granted by the state, whichmay be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and

welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements.State ex. Rel. Sullivan: “Since motor vehicles areinstruments of potential danger, their registration and thelicensing of their operators have been required almost fromtheir first appearance. The right to operate them in publicplaces is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilegesubject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, inthe interest of the public safety and welfare. The power tolicense imports further power to withhold or to revoke suchlicense upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions.”Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.Funk : “The Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe howand by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on thehighways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the

Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed tothe promotion of public safety and is well within the policepower.”

The legislature, in the exercise of police power, which hasthe power and responsibility to regulate how and by whommotor vehicles may be operated on the state highways.

Issue: WON MMDA is vested with police power

Held: No

Ratio: In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-AirVillage Association, Inc., we categorically stated that Rep.

Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, alone legislative power, and that all its functions aadministrative in nature. Police power, as an inhereattribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by tConstitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establiall manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes aordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnato the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the gooand welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects

the same. Having been lodged primarily in the NationLegislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body individuals not possessing legislative power. The Legislatuhowever, may delegate this power to the president aadministrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies municipal corporations or LGUs. Once delegated, the agencan exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred them by the national lawmaking body.Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in tLocal Government Code of 1991.Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of sevelocal government units. With the passage of Rep. Act N7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "specdevelopment and administrative region" and tadministration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting tregion placed under "a development authority" referred to

the MMDA. Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit government. The power delegated to the MMDA is thgiven to the Metro Manila Council to promulgaadministrative rules and regulations in the implementation the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare the inhabitants of the metropolis. Therefore, insofar as Se5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower couand by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses withoneed of any other legislative enactment, such is unauthorized exercise of police power.

Issue: WON Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.

Ratio: Section 5 of RA7924 enumerates the “Functions a

Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority.” Tcontested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner sh“install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impoand collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoviin nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivelicenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws aregulations, the provisions of RA4136 and PD 1605 to tcontrary notwithstanding,” and that “(f)or this purpose, tAuthority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and mdeputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of logovernment units, duly licensed security guards, members of non-governmental organizations to whom mbe delegated certain authority, subject to such conditioand requirements as the Authority may impose.”

Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation valienacted by the legislature or those agencies to wholegislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manilathis case), the petitioner is not precluded – and in fact duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivelicenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport atraffic management, as well as the administration aimplementation of all traffic enforcement operations, trafengineering services and traffic education programs.

This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDAa development authority created for the purpose of layidown policies and coordinating with the various nationgovernment agencies, people’s organizations, no




governmental organizations and the private sector, whichmay enforce, but not enact, ordinances.

This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutoryconstruction that a statute is to be read in a manner thatwould breathe life into it, rather than defeat it, and issupported by the criteria in cases of this nature that allreasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of theconstitutionality of a statute.

LIABILITY

Ultra Vires Act

San Diego v. Municipality of Naujan, OrientalMindoro

Facts: Following a public bidding conducted by themunicipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro for the lease of itsmunicipal waters, Resolution 46 was passed awarding theconcession of the Butas River and the Naujan Lake toBartolome San Diego. A contract was entered into betweenthe said San Diego and the municipality, for a period of leasefor 5 years.

The lessee then requested for a five year extension of theoriginal lease period, this was granted by the municipalcouncil. After the resolution had been approved by theProvincial Board of Oriental Mindoro, the lessor and the

lessee, contracted for the extension of the period of thelease. The contract was approved and confirmed onDecember 29, 1951 by Resolution 229 of the municipalcouncil of Naujan whose term was then about to expire.Pursuant to the said contract, the lessee filed a surety bondof P52,000 and then reconstructed his fish corrals andstocked the Naujan Lake with bangus fingerlings.On January 2, 1952, the municipal council of Naujan, thistime composed of a new set of members, adoptedResolution 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222, seriesof 1951. On the same date, the new council also passedResolution 11, revoking Resolution 229 of the old councilwhich confirmed the extension of the lease period. Thelessee requested for reconsideration and recall of Resolution3, on the ground, among others, that it violated the contractexecuted between him and the municipality on December23, 1951, and, therefore, contrary to Article III, section 1,clause 10 of the Constitution. The request, however, was notgranted.

The lessee instituted proceedings to annul the Resolution. The defendant asserted that the original lease contract,reducing the lease rentals and renewing the lease are nulland void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

The trial court upheld the validity of the lease contract.

Issue: WON Resolution No. 3, series of 1952, revokingResolution 222, series of 1951, of the municipal council of Naujan is valid

Held: No

Ratio: The law (Sec. 2323 of the Revised AdministrativeCode) requires that when the exclusive privilege of fishery or

the right to conduct a fish-breeding ground is granted to aprivate party, the same shall be let to the highest bidder inthe same manner as is being done in exploiting a ferry, amarket or a slaughterhouse belonging to the municipality.

The requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting competition and to guard against favoritism, fraudand corruption in the letting of fishery privileges. There is nodoubt that the original lease contract in this case wasawarded to the highest bidder, but the reduction of therental and the extension of the term of the lease appear tohave been granted without previous public bidding.Furthermore, it has been ruled that statutes requiring publicbidding apply to amendments of any contract alreadyexecuted in compliance with the law where such

amendments alter the original contract in some vital aessential particular. Inasmuch as the period in a lease isvital and essential particular to the contract, we believe ththe extension of the lease period in this case, which wgranted without the essential requisite of public bidding,not in accordance with law. And it follows the Resolution 22series of 1951, and the contract authorized therebextending the original five-year lease to another five yeaare null and void as contrary to law and public policy.

We agree with the defendant in that the question Resoluti3 is not an impairment of the obligation of contract, becauthe constitutional provision on impairment refers only contract legally executed. While, apparently, Resolutiontended to abrogate the contract extending the lease, legaspeaking, there was no contract abrogated because, as whave said, the extension contract is void and inexistent.

The lower court, in holding that the defendant-appellamunicipality has been estopped from assailing the validitythe contract into which it entered on December 23, 195seems to have overlooked the general rule that the doctriof estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipcorporation to validate a contract which it has no power make or which it is authorized to make only under prescribconditions, within prescribed limitations, or in a prescribmode or manner, although the corporation has accepted t

benefits thereof and the other party has fully performed hpart of the agreement, or has expended large sums preparation for performance. A reason frequently assignfor this rule is that to apply the doctrine of estoppel againa municipality in such case would be to enable it to indirectly what it cannot do directly. Also, where a contractviolative of public policy, the municipality executing it cannbe estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract which hceded away, controlled, or embarrassed its legislative government powers.As pointed out above, "public biddings are held for the beprotection of the public and to give the public the bepossible advantages by means of open competition betwethe bidders." Thus, contracts requiring public bidding affepublic interest, and to change them without complying wthat requirement would indeed be against public poli

There is, therefore, nothing to plaintiff-appellee's contenti

that the parties in this case being in pari delicto should left in the situation where they are found, for "although tparties are in pari delicto, yet the court may interfere agrant relief at the suit of one of them, where public polirequires its intervention, even though the result may be tha benefit will be derived by a plaintiff who is in equal guwith defendant. But here the guilt of the parties is nconsidered as equal to the higher right of the public, and tguilty party to whom the relief is granted is simply tinstrument by which the public is served."In consonance with the principles enunciated abovResolution 59, series of 1947, reducing the rentals by 20%the original price, which was also passed without pubbidding, should likewise be held void, since a reduction the rental to be paid by the lessee is a substantalternation in the contract, making it a distinct and differe

lease contract which requires the prescribed formality public bidding.

Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos (1957), supra.

Doctrine: Before a contract can be entered into by an LGthe following must be present:

1. Funds have been appropriated2. Amount necessary to cover expenditures

available.If both requirements are not present, the contract it is voidAlso, the provincial auditor or his representative must chedeliveries made by a contractor pursuant to a contralawfully and validly entered into; and when there is no cheup to show that materials have been actually delivered, t




Auditor General is not duty bound to pass and allow in auditthe sum claimed by the contractor.

Rivera v. Maclang (1963)

Facts: The municipality of Malolos called for bids forfurnishing and delivering materials to be used in themaintenance and repair of barrio roads. Appellant won in thebidding and was asked by the Municipal Treasurer to come tohis office for execution of the corresponding contract. Thecontract was signed by appellant and by Carlo P. Maclang inhis capacity as Municipal Mayor of Malolos. Pursuant theretoappellant subsequently delivered to the municipality graveland adobe stones valued at P19,235.00. The municipalcouncil of Malolos passed a resolution approving thecontract, but in spite of repeated demands by appellant theprice of the materials was not paid.In 1954 appellant sought the intervention of the PresidentialComplaint and Action Commission, which referred the matterto the General Auditing Office. That office turned down theclaim for payment, whereupon appellant filed in this Court apetition for review. The Court sustained the action of theGeneral Auditing Office and held that the contract inquestion was void as far as Malolos was concerned on theground that no money had been appropriated to meet theobligation prior to the execution of the contract, as required

by section 607, RAC. However, in the same decision thisCourt indicated that section 608 of the same Code affordedappellant a remedy. Consequently, he filed the presentaction against defendant in his personal capacity pursuant tothe said provision.

The trial court dismissed the complaint since the contracthad been declared null and void by this Court, "it cannotproduce any legal effect for which thereafter no recovery canbe made."

Issue: WON the dismissal was proper

Held: No

Ratio: Our ruling in the previous case is that the contract wasnull and void visa-vis Malolos, by reason of non-compliancewith the requirement of section 607 RAC, which states that"except in the case of a contract for supplies to be carried instock, no contract involving the expenditure by any province,municipality, chartered city, or municipal district of twothousand pesos or more shall be entered into or authorizeduntil the treasurer of the political division concerned shallhave certified to the officer entering into such contract thatfunds have been duly appropriated for such purpose andthat the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract isavailable for expenditure on account thereof."It should be noted that the present action is againstdefendant in his personal capacity on the strength of section608 of the same code, which provides as follows:SEC. 608. Void contract Liability of officer. A purportedcontract entered into contrary to the requirements of thenext preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and theofficer assuming to make such contract shall be liable to the

Government or other contracting party for any consequentdamage to the same extent as if the transaction had beenwholly between private parties.

The position of defendant, as the officer who signed thecontract with appellant in violation of Sec 607, comessquarely under the provision just quoted. His liability ispersonal, as it the transaction had been entered into by himas a private party. We take it that the intention of the law inthis respect is to ensure that public officers entering intotransactions with private individuals calling for theexpenditure of public funds observe a high degree of cautionso that the government may not be the victim of ill-advisedor improvident action by those assuming to represent it.

Liability on Torts (Quasi-Delict)

Palafox et., al v. Province of Ilocos Norte (1958)

Facts: Sabas Torralba was employed as driver of ProvincGov’t of Ilocos Norte detailed to the Office of DistrEnginner.While driving his truck in compliance with his duties, he rover Proceto Palafox killing him. Palafox was convicted homicide through reckless imprudence. Heirs bagproceedings for damages against provincial gov’t.

Issue: WON Prov’l Gov’t is liable

Held: NO

Ratio: To attach liability to the state, a declaration must made that Torralba was a special agent within the scope Art 1903 par 5. But this principle applies only to the InsulGov’t as distinguished from prov’l or municipal gov’ts.

The heirs of Palafox invoked the doctrine of respondesuperior , that the master shall answer, as illustrated Mendoza case concerning liability of municipal corporatiofor negligent acts of its employees. Mendoza held that if tnegligent employee was engaged in the performance governmental duties as distinguished from proprietary

business functions, the government is not liable. The construction or maintenance of roads in which the drivworked at the time of the accident is admittedgovernmental activities. Hence, Gov’t is not liable.

Mendoza v. De leon (1916)

Facts: This is an action for damages against the individumembers of the municipal council of the municipality Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff undthe provisions of Act No. 1643 of the Philippine CommissioAfter use of a little more than one year, the plaintiff wforcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adoptby the defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferto another person.

Issue: WON the defendants are liable for damages

Held: Yes

Ratio: Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organizunder the Municipal Code have both governmental acorporate or business functions. Of the first class are tadoption of regulation against fire and disease, preservatiof the public peace, maintenance of municipal prisonestablishment of primary schools and post-offices, etc. the latter class are the establishment of municipwaterworks for the use of the inhabitants, the constructiand maintenance of municipal slaughterhouses, markestables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries, afisheries. Act No. 1643 provides that the use of each fisherfish-breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, aslaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or townshshall be let to the highest bidder annually or for such longperiod not exceeding five years as may have been previousapproved by the provincial board of the province in whicthe municipality or township is located.

The two fold character of the powers of a municipality undour Municipal Code is so apparent and its private corporate powers so numerous and important that we fino difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the geneprinciples governing the liability of such entities to applicabto it. The distinction between governmental powers on tone hand, and corporate or proprietary or business poweon the other, as the latter class is variously described in threported cases, has been long recognized in the UnitStates and there is no dissent from the doctrine.




The distinction is also recognized by Dillon in his work onMunicipal Corporations (5th ed.) section 38 and 39. “As isindicated in some of the above quoted cases, themunicipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or agentsin the performance of its governmental functions.Governmental affairs do not lose their governmentalcharacter by being delegated to the municipal governments.Nor of the municipality which, for convenience the stateallows the municipality to select, change their character. To

preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of thecommunity and so on to administer government, whether itbe done by the central government itself or is shifted to alocal organization. And the state being immune for injuriessuffered by private individuals in the administration of strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed bythe municipality in the performance of the same duties,unless it is expressly made liable by statute.In Claussen vs. City of Luverne: “It is elementary that neitherthe state nor any of the subdivisions, like a municipality,through which it operates, is liable for torts committed bypublic officers, save in definitely excepted classes of cases.

The exemption is based upon the sovereign character of thestate and its agencies, and upon the absence of obligation,and not on the ground that no means for remedy have beenprovided. "The government," said Mr. Justice Story, "does not

undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of theofficers or agents whom it employs, since that would involvein all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficultiesand losses, which would be subversive of the publicinterest." This general exemption has been applied tomunicipal corporations in so far as the acts complained of were, in the language of the memorandum of the trial court,"done in exercising powers for the public at large as agoverning agency." While so acting, the city cannot be heldliable for misfeasance; and ... the rule of respondeat superiorhas no application.”Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged withthe performance of governmental duties which are in theirnature legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for theconsequences of their official acts, unless it be shown thatthey act willfully and maliciously, and with the expresspurpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff. If they exercise

their honest judgment in the performance of their duties,their errors cannot be charged against them. So it may besaid that in so far as its governmental functions areconcerned, a municipality is not liable at all, unless expresslymade so by statute; nor are its officers, so long as theyperform their duties honestly and in good faith. The mostcommon illustration of both phrases of this rule is the actionfor false imprisonment so often brought either against amunicipality or a municipal police officer. So, in Field vs. Cityof Des Moines, it was held that a municipality, acting underauthority given it by the central government to destroyhouses in the path of a conflagration, was not liable indamages in the absence of a statute expressly making it so.From what has already been said, it should be clear that amunicipality is not exempt from liability for the negligentperformance of its corporate or proprietary or business

functions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, itis to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so faras its liability to third persons on contract or in tort isconcerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may beenforced and damages may be collected from it for the tortsof its officers or agents within the scope of their employmentin precisely the same manner and to the same extent asthose of private corporations or individuals. As to suchmatters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is forthese purposes that the municipality is made liable to suitsin the courts.Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contractsand in tort. In a previous chapter we have considered atlength the authority of such corporations to make contracts,

the mode of exercising, and the effect of transcending tpower. This leaves but little to add in this place respectitheir liability in actions ex contractu. Upon an authorizcontract that is, upon a contract within the scope of tcharter or legislative powers of the corporation and dumade by the proper officers or agents they are liable in tsame manner and to the same extent as privacorporations or natural persons. (Dillon)But questions such as these do not arise in the case at ba

Here is it clear that the leasing of a municipal ferry to thhighest bidder for a specified period of time is not governmental but a corporate function. Such a lease, whvalidly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessewhich the municipality is bound to respect. The matter thus summed up by Dillon on Municipal Corporations:Ordinances made by municipalities under charter legislative authority, containing grants to water and ligcompanies and other public service corporations of the rigto use the streets for pipes, mains, etc., upon the conditiof the performance of service by the grantee, are, aftacceptance and performance by the grantee, contracprotected by the prohibition of the Federal Constitutiagainst the enactment of any State law impairing tobligation of contracts.It seems clear, therefore, that under the provisions

Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, above referred to, tplaintiff had a vested right to the exclusive operation of tferry in question for the period of his lease. Were tmunicipality a party to this action, it would be patent that

judgment for damages against it for the rescission of tcontract would be proper. This, be it said, is the usumethod of exacting damages, either ex contractu or delicto arising from the exercise of corporate powers municipalities. But the present action is against tmembers of the municipal council personally, and tquestion arises: Are they liable? In administering tpatrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal counoccupies, for most purposes, the position of a board directors of a private corporation. In disposing of the locpublic utilities, if the term may be used, such as the fishiand ferry rights, etc., they must exercise considerab

judgment. It required some considerable amount of busine

acumen to compel performance on the part of lessees these privileges in accordance with the terms of their leasand in a manner which will not cause the property deteriorate. Questions must continually arise which are nexpressly provided for in contracts and which must settled, if possible, in a manner that will preserve the juclaims of the municipality. Indeed, it is not at all improbabthat on occasion the councilors may have reason to beliethat a particular contract has been rescinded by the othparty or has never been legally entered into, in both of whicases, decisive steps must be taken to safeguard the intereof the municipality. Thus, in Municipality of Moncada vCajuigan, the lessee of a municipal fishery was evicted ffailing to pay his quarterly rents. The municipal authoritirightly held that the contract was rescinded but forcibevicted the lessee instead of resorting to the courts. Henc

in an action by the municipality against the lessee and hbondsmen to recover rent arrears, damages were allowthe lessee on his counterclaim for the loss caused by tforcible eviction. Nevertheless, we do not think tcouncilors could have been held personally liable for theerror in resorting to forcible eviction of the lessee. Theirs wan error of judgment, and honest mistake on their part as the rights of the municipality in the premises. We think trule of personal liability should be with municipal counciloin such matters as it is with the directors or managers of ordinary private corporation.Under the rule that directors are not liable for mistakes

judgment, it follows naturally that they are not liable for tmismanagement of the corporate affairs where su




mismanagement is a mistake of judgment. The wisdom of this rule is not only approved by common experience but bylaw writers and all courts. A rule so rigid as to hold directorspersonally liable for honest mistakes in corporatemanagement would deter all prudent business men fromaccepting such positions. The remedy of stockholders in allsuch cases is by a change in the directory. ... The rule is thatcourts will not interfere even in the doubtful cases. Butdirectors and managing officers may be liable for

mismanagement to warrant the interposition of a courteither as against the contemplated action of the directors, ora majority of the stockholders, or to give relief by way of damages after the action as been taken; a case must bemade out which plainly shows that such action is so faropposed to the true interests of the corporation itself as tolead to clear inference that no one thus acting could havebeen influenced by any honest desire to secure suchinterests, but that he must have acted with an intent tosubserve some outside purpose, regardless of theconsequences to the corporation, and in a mannerinconsistent with its interests.In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence thatthere was any justifiable reason for forcibly evicting theplaintiff from the ferry which he had leased. On the contrary,the defendant councilors attempted to justify their action on

the ground that the ferry which he was operating was notthe one leased to him; this, in spite of the fact that the vice-president had personally placed him in possession of it morethan a year before, and the fact that he had operated thisferry for over year, evidently with the knowledge of thedefendants. The evidence is so clear that the ferry of whichthe plaintiff was dispossessed was the one which he leasedthat no reasonable man would entertain any doubt whateverupon the question. Hence, we cannot say that in rescindingthe contract with the plaintiff, thereby making themunicipality liable to an action for damages for no validreason at all, the defendant councilors were honestly actingfor the interests of the municipality. We are, therefore, of theopinion that the defendants are liable jointly and severallyfor the damages sustained by the plaintiff from therescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege inquestion. In reaching this conclusion, we have not failed to

take into consideration the rule enunciated in Dennison vs. The Moro Province, nor the distinction made by the courts inthe United States between the liability of a municipalcorporation, made such acceptance of a village or citycharter, and the involuntary quasi corporations known ascounties, towns, school districts, and especially thetownships of New England. Upon the question of the amountof damages sustained, we accept the findings of the lowercourt.

Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme (1991),supra.

Ratio: The doctrine of non-suability of the State isexpressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Consti,to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a

special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued incase of money claims involving liability arising fromcontracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may bepassed to enable a person to sue the government for analleged quasi-delict. Consent is implied when thegovernment enters into business contracts, therebydescending to the level of the other contracting party, andalso when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to acounterclaim.Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when theyare engaged in governmental functions and therefore shouldenjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, theyare subject to suit even in the performance of such functions

because their charter provided that they can sue and sued.A distinction should first be made between suability aliability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to sued, liability on the applicable law and the establishfacts. The circumstance that a state is suable does nnecessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it canever be held liable if it does not first consent to be sueLiability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state h

allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chanto prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liabfor the torts committed by its employee, the test of liabilof the municipality depends on whether or not the driveacting in behalf of the municipality, is performigovernmental or proprietary functions (Torio vs. FontanillAccording to City of Kokomo vs Loy(Indiana SC), municipcorporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions atwofold. In one they exercise the right springing frosovereignty, and while in the performance of the dutipertaining thereto, their acts are political and government

Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionarperforming a public service, and as such they are office

agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity tmunicipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporaright, arising from their existence as legal persons and not public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performanof such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in thcorporate or individual capacity, and not for the state sovereign power."It has already been remarked that municipal corporations asuable because their charters grant them the competence sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liabfor torts committed by them in the discharge governmental functions and can be held answerable only ifcan be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacitIn the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of tmunicipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguiliriver to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of SaFernando's municipal streets." In the absence of a

evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performanof official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Ru131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that tdriver of the dump truck was performing duties or taspertaining to his office.We already stressed in the case Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the DistrEngineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that "the constructior maintenance of roads in which the truck and the drivworked at the time of the accident are admittedgovernmental activities."After a careful examination of existing laws a

jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that tmunicipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed its regular employee, who was then engaged in tdischarge of governmental functions. Hence, the death the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may

imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetacompensation.

Fernando v. CA and City of Davao (1992)

Facts: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao PubMarket filed a requisition request with the Chief of Properof the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of tseptic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, FederiBolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. Bascon wnotified and he signed the purchase order. However, befosuch date, bidder Bertulano with four other companionamely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernanand Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tan




The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learnedthat the five victims entered the septic tank withoutclearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of themarket master. In fact, the septic tank was found to bealmost empty and the victims were presumed to be the oneswho did the re-emptying.

The heirs of the deceased filed an action against the City of Davao. The trial court dismissed the case. The IAC reversedand ordered the City to pay compensatory and moral

damages. However, upon MR, the IAC reversed anddismissed the case.

Issue: WON the City of Davao is guilty of negligence

Held: No

Ratio: Negligence has been defined as the failure toobserve for the protection of the interests of another personthat degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which thecircumstances justly demand, whereby such other personsuffers injury. Under the law, a person who by his omissioncauses damage to another, there being negligence, isobliged to pay for the damage done. As to what wouldconstitute a negligent act in a given situation, the case of Picart v. Smith provides: The test by which to determine the

existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a givensituation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, isalways necessary before negligence can be held to exist.Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determiningthe existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful toanother was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing theconduct or guarding against its consequences.

To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from thenegligence of another, a claimant must establish the relationbetween the omission and the damage. He must proveunder Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that thedefendant's negligence was the immediate and proximatecause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined as thatcause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbrokenby any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, andwithout which the result would not have occurred. Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if theclaimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant. However, where the resulting injury was theproduct of the negligence of both parties, there exists adifficulty to discern which acts shall be considered theproximate cause of the accident. In Taylor v. Manila ElectricRailroad and Light Co, this Court set a guideline for a

judicious assessment of the situation: Difficulty seems to beapprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shallbe considered immediate causes of the accident. The test issimple. Distinction must be made between the accident andthe injury, between the event itself, without which therecould have been no accident, and those acts of the victimnot entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to hisown proper hurt.Petitioners fault the city of Davao for failing to clean a septictank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulationof hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers. Theycontend that such failure was compounded by the fact thatthere was no warning sign of the existing danger and noefforts exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or

render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submthat the public respondent's gross negligence was tproximate cause of the fatal incident.We do not subscribe to this view. While it may be true ththe public respondent has been remiss in its duty to rempty the septic tank annually, such negligence was notcontinuing one. Upon learning from the report of the markmaster about the need to clean the septic tank of the pubtoilet in Agdao Public Market, the public responde

immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for suservice. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest biddeBascon. The city, therefore, lost no time in taking remedial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failuto re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the markhave been using the public toilet for their personnecessities but have remained unscathed.Petitioners made a lot of fuss over the lack of any ventilatipipe in the toilet to emphasize the negligence of the cigovernment and presented witnesses to attest on this lacHowever, this strategy backfired on their faces. Thwitnesses were not expert witnesses. On the other hanEngineer Demetrio Alindada of the city government testifiand demonstrated by drawings how the safety requiremenlike emission of gases in the construction of both toilet a

septic tank have been complied with. He stated that tventilation pipe need not be constructed outside the buildias it could also be embodied in the hollow blocks as usually done in residential buildings. The petitionesubmitted no competent evidence to corroborate their otestimonies or rebut the testimony given by Engr. AlindadaWe also do not agree with the petitioner's submission thwarning signs of noxious gas should have been put up in ttoilet in addition to the signs of "MEN" and "WOMEN" alreain place in that area. Toilets and septic tanks are nnuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New CiCode which would necessitate warning signs for tprotection of the public. While the construction of thepublic facilities demands utmost compliance with safety asanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is none of those requirements.In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that

accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. Taccident in the case at bar occurred because the victims their own and without authority from the public respondeopened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task emptying a septic tank especially one which has not becleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person shouundoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims ano exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in thkind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of t

job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to taprecautionary measures for their safety was the proximacause of the accident. In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co., Phil. Motors Corporation, We held that when a person holhimself out as being competent to do things requiriprofessional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if

fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled the particular work which he attempts to do. The faaccident in this case would not have happened but for thvictims' negligence.Petitioners further contend that the failure of the markmaster to supervise the area where the septic tank is locatis a reflection of the negligence of the public respondent. Wdo not think so. The market master knew that work on thseptic tank was still forthcoming. It must be rememberthat the bidding had just been conducted. Although twinning bidder was already known, the award to him wstill to be made by the Committee on Awards. Upon tother hand, the accident which befell the victims who are nin any way connected with the winning bidder happen




before the award could be given. Considering that the casewas yet no award to commence work on the septic tank, theduty of the market master or his security guards to supervisethe work could not have started. Also, the victims could nothave been seen working in the area because the septic tankwas hidden by a garbage storage which is more or less ten(10) meters away from the comfort room itself. Thesurreptitious way in which the victims did their job withoutclearance from the market master or any of the security

guards goes against their good faith. Even their relatives orfamily members did not know of their plan to clean theseptic tank.Finally, petitioners' insistence on the applicability of Article24 of the New Civil Code cannot be sustained. We approveof the appellate court's ruling that "(w)hile one of the victimswas invited to bid for said project, he did not win the bid,therefore, there is a total absence of contractual relationsbetween the victims and the City Government of Davao Citythat could give rise to any contractual obligation, much less,any liability on the part of Davao City." The accident wasindeed tragic and We empathize with the petitioners.However, the herein circumstances lead Us to no otherconclusion than that the proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence.Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from

the public respondent.

Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA and Jurado (1992), supra.

Ratio: The private respondent anchors his claim fordamages on Article 27 CC (Refusal to Render Service). It hasbeen remarked that one purpose of this article is to end the"bribery system, where the public official, for some flimsyexcuse, delays or refuses the performance of his duty untilhe gets some kind of pabagsak." Official inaction may alsobe due to plain indolence or a cynical indifference to theresponsibilities of public service. The provision presupposesthat the refusal or omission of a public official to perform hisofficial duty is attributable to malice or inexcusablenegligence. In any event, the erring public functionary is

justly punishable under this article for whatever loss ordamage the complainant has sustained.In the present case, it has not even been alleged that theMayor Tuzon's refusal to act on the private respondent'sapplication was an attempt to compel him to resort tobribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot besaid either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer weremotivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent inrefusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered toshow that the petitioners singled out the private respondentfor persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitionersstood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado themayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners werenot Jurado's business competitors nor has it beenestablished that they intended to favor his competitors. Onthe contrary, the record discloses that the resolution wasuniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipalitywithout discrimination or preference.

The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within thescope of their authority and in consonance with their honestinterpretation of the resolution in question. We agree that itwas not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a

judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have tobe presumed (in fact, both the trial court and the appellatecourt said there was nothing wrong with it). As executiveofficials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce itas long as it had not been repealed by the SangguniangBayan or annulled by the courts.

The private respondent complains that as a result of thepetitioners' acts, he was prevented from operating hisbusiness all this time and earning substantial profittherefrom, as he had in previous years. But as the

petitioners correctly observed, he could have taken tprudent course of signing the agreement under protest alater challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation"donate." Pendente lite, he could have continued to operahis threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesanthat he now says was the consequence of the petitionewrongful act. He could have opted for the less obstinate bstill dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, profit.

Torio v. Fontanilla (1978)

Facts: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinapassed Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to manathe 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 222, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passcreating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta ExecutiCommittee" which in turn organized a sub-committee entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairmathe council appropriated the amount of P100 for tconstruction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and anothfor the cancionan Jose Macaraeg supervised the constructiof the stage.During the zarzuela, the stage collapsed and VicenFontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinnunderneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos Gener

Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following da The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint to recovdamages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all tindividual members of the Municipal Council in 1959. Thdefense was that the holding of a town fiesta was exercise of governmental functions. The councilocontended that they were merely acting as agents of thmunicipality.

The judge ruled that the defendants exercised due diligenin the construction of the stage. Also, the collapse of tstage was due to force majeure. Hence, the complaint wdismissed. The CA reversed and ordered the defendants pay moral and actual damages.

Issue: WON celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking the excercise of a municipality's governmental or pubfunction or is it or a private or proprietary character

Held: Governmental

Ratio: Under Philippine laws municipalities are politicbodies corporate and as such are endowed with the facultof municipal corporations to be exercised by and throutheir respective municipal governments in conformity wlaw, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter asue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Tpowers of a municipality are twofold in character pubgovernmental or political on the one hand, and corporatprivate, or proprietary on the other. Governmental poweare those exercised by the corporation in administering tpowers of the state and promoting the public welfare anthey include the legislative, judicial public, and politic

Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for thspecial benefit and advantage of the community and incluthose which are ministerial private and corporate.In Mendoza v. de Leon 1916, the Supreme Court, relyinmainly on American Jurisprudence classified certain activitiof the municipality as governmental, e.g.: regulatioagainst fire, disease, preservation of public peacmaintenance of municipal prisons, establishment of schoopost-offices, etc. while the following are corporate proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterwork, slaughthouses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharveferries, and fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf coursecemeteries and airports among others, are also recognizas municipal or city activities of a proprietary character.




If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of agovernmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule, canbe. had from the municipality unless there is an existingstatute on the matter, 10 nor from its officers, so long asthey performed their duties honestly and in good faith orthat they did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respectto proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipalcorporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract orex delicto.

The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private orproprietary function of the municipality.Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the RevisedAdministrative Code simply gives authority to themunicipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does notimpose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta evenif the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historicalevent of the town is in essence an act for the special benefitof the community and not for the general welfare of thepublic performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. Themere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secureprofit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to thetown inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, themaintenance of parks is not a source of income for thenonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from

the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like whichare for public service. There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the circumstances of a particular case are tobe considered and will be decisive. The basic element,however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, isthat it is governmental in essence, otherwise, the functionbecomes private or proprietary in character. Easily, nogovernmental or public policy of the state is involved in thecelebration of a town fiesta.

Issue: WON petitioners are liable

Held: Yes

Ratio: It follows that under the doctrine of respondent

superior, the municipality is to be held liable for damages forthe death of Fontanilia if that was attributable to thenegligence of the municipality's officers, employees, oragents. On this point, the Court of Appeals found and heldthat there was negligence. It appeared that the front portionof the stage was not supported by any braces. The CA alsofound that the stage was not strong enough considering thatonly P100 was appropriate for the construction of two stagesand while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of woodenplanks, the Post and braces used were of bamboo materialWe likewise observe that although the stage was describedby the Petitioners as being supported by "" posts,nevertheless there were only 4 in front, 4 at the rear, and 5on each side. Where were the rest?

The "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed duringthe town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an association of

Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Co. in Caloocan,and that when the Municipality of Malasiqui accepted thedonation of services and constructed precisely a "zarzuelastage" for the purpose, the participants in the stage showhad the right to expect that the Municipality through its"Committee on entertainment and stage" would build or putup a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weightor burden of the performance and take the necessarymeasures to insure the personal safety of the participants.Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evadeability and/or liability under the c that it was Jose Macaraegwho constructed the stage. The municipality acting throughits municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of thesub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the

construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted mereas an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent actinwithin his assigned tasks.

Issue: WON the municipal councilors who enacted tordinance were liable

Held: No

Ratio: We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeaerred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against the fthis particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or noperformance by a public officer of his official duty; it donot apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carryiout an official duty.

The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review hethat the celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld thruling. The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipalstands on the same footing as an ordinary privacorporation with the municipal council acting as its board directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation ha personality, separate and distinct from its office

directors, or persons composing it 26 and the latter are nas a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporationemployees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faior gross or wanton negligence on their part.

The ordinary doctrine is that a director, merely by reason his office, is not personally Stable for the torts of hcorporation; he Must be shown to have personally voted for otherwise participated in them Officers of a corporati'are not held liable for the negligence of the corporatimerely because of their official relation to it, but because some wrongful or negligent act by such officer amounting a breach of duty which resulted in an injury ... To make officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of tcorporation there must have been upon his part suchbreach of duty as contributed to, or helped to bring abothe injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in th

wrongful act.Directors who merely employ one to give a fireworAmbition on the corporate are not personally liable for tnegligent acts of the exhibitor. On these people We absolUse municipal councilors from any liability for the death Vicente Fontanilla. The records do not show that sapetitioners directly participated in the defective constructiof the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permittspectators to go up the platform.

Liability by Express Provision of Law and contracts

City of Manila v. Teotico (1968)

Facts: Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of a "loadinand unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him dowtown. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed

hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he steppedown from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a festeps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basor manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hthe rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causinbroken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As bloflowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons camto his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One them brought Teotico to the PGH. In addition to the laceratwound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upplip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region.

Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, c




treasurer and chief of police. The trial court dismissed thecomplaitn. The CA affirmed, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damagesin the aggregate sum of P6,750.00.

Issue: Should RA 409 prevail over Art 2189 of the CC

Held: No

Ratio: RA 409: The city shall not be liable or held fordamages or injuries to persons or property arising from thefailure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other cityofficer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any otherlaw or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing orattempting to enforce said provisions.Art 2189 CC: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall beliable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,bridges, public buildings, and other public works under theircontrol or supervision.It is true that, insofar as its territorial application isconcerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the CivilCode a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic

Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons orproperty arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforcethe provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, orfrom negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, orother officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce saidprovisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the CivilCode constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces,cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the deathof, or injury suffered by any person by reason "specifically"of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, publicbuildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liabilityarising from negligence, in general, regardless of the objectthereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action isbased upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said

Article 2189 is decisive thereon.It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to

Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving himtook place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon anallegation of fact not made in the answer of the City.Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in hisamended complaint, that his injuries were due to thedefective condition of a street which is "under thesupervision and control" of the City. In its answer to theamended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "thestreets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the stormdrains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant

and zealous in the performance of their respective functionsand duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the Cityhad, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and isunder its control and supervision.Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is anational highway was made, for the first time, in its motionfor reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals.Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, whichhad not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be setup, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the renditionof the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for thereconsideration thereof.At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is notnecessary for the liability therein established to attach that

the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What saarticle requires is that the province, city or municipality haeither "control or supervision" over said street or road. Eveif P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, thcircumstance would not necessarily detract from its "contor supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 40

This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dat

May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act goverthe disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and tgiving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalitiin the construction of roads and streets within threspective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 mereimplements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 91concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highwfunds. Moreover, it provides that "the constructiomaintenance and improvement of national primary, nationsecondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall accomplished by the Highway District Engineers aHighway City Engineers under the supervision of tCommissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed frosuch appropriations as may be authorized by the Republicthe Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."

Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burg

Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, connection with the maintenance of said road, which wedecided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subjectour review.

Abella v. Municipality of Naga (1952)

Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of FirInstance of Camarines Sur sentencing the municipality Naga, now Naga City, to pay the plaintiff, now appelleP300 damages resulting from the closing of a municipstreet.

The complaint alleged two causes of action and the partisubmitted in the court below an agreed statement of facon both. As the second cause of action was dismissed anthe plaintiff did not appeal, and as the stipulated facts along and somewhat involved in many or most of them habecome irrelevant to the issues formulated in this appeal,will suffice to state for the purpose of these issues, that thdefendant municipality by resolution ordered the closing that part of a municipal street which ran between the pubmarket and the plaintiff's property, and used the closthoroughfare to expand the market. "As a consequence this resolution, and immediately after the passage of tsame, says the agreement permanent, semi-permanent, well as temporary constructions were allowed by tdefendant municipality of Naga along the sidewalk Plaintiff's property and abutting to said property, facing Prieto Street, and extending out in the middle of the samstreet, hence depriving the plaintiff's property of access said street, and consequently retarding her reconstruction"It was further stipulated "that if all the damages is to

awarded the plaintiff, the same should not exceed the suof Three hundred pesos (P300)."

The appellant is the municipality of or city of Naga and tburden of its contention is that "it acted and exercised police power" "prompted to preserve the peace and goorder of the community and promote the general welfareand this being the case, it believes that it is not liable fdamages.

Held: The appellant misses the point. The municipality city of Naga was not charged with any unlawful act, or wacting without authority, or with invasion of plaintifproperty rights; the basis of the lower court's decision Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code copied




appellant's brief, which provides that no municipal road,street, etc. or any part thereof "shall be closed withoutindemnifying any person prejudiced thereby."

The question then for determination by the court below wasreduced to whether the plaintiff was prejudiced by defendantmunicipality's action. That she was economically damaged,the stipulation of facts admits; and that the indemnityassessed is within the bounds of the damages suffered,there is no dispute. As a matter of fact, the damages

awarded seem to be nominal judged by the description of the plaintiff's interests adversely affected by the conversionof P. Prieto Street into a market.

Satisfying/Executing Judgment Against MunicipalCorporations

Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo (1927)

Facts: The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being the purchase priceof two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of 592 sq. m., and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59sq. m., which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated forwidening said street. The CFI Iloilo sentenced the saidmunicipality to pay the Tantoco the amount so claimed, plusthe interest. Said judgment was appealed, and was affirmed

by the Supreme Court.On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo wasunable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had awrit of execution issue against the property of the saidmunicipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two autotrucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrolautomobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Moloand Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with thecorresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, andMandurriao. After notice of the sale of said property hadbeen made, and a few days before the sale, the provincialfiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI praying that theattachment on the said property be dissolved, that the saidattachment be declared null and void as being illegal andviolative of the rights of the municipality. By order of 12August 1925, the Court declared the attachment levied uponthe aforementioned property of the municipality null andvoid, thereby dissolving the said attachment. From this order

Tantoco has appealed by bill of exceptions.Held/Ratio: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgmentappealed from with costs against Tantoco.Municipalities’ capacity to sue and to be sued;Capacity to acquire property

The municipal law, section 2165 of the Administrative Code,provides that "Municipalities are political bodies corporate,and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipalcorporations, to be exercised by and through their respectivemunicipal government in conformity with law. It shall becompetent for them, in their proper corporate name, to sueand be sued, to contract and be contracted with, to acquireand hold real and personal property for municipal purposes,and generally to exercise the powers hereinafter specified orotherwise conferred upon them by law." The Administrative

Code does not specify the kind of property that amunicipality may acquire.Property of provinces and municipalitiesArticle 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of provinces and (municipalities) into property for public useand patrimonial property. According to article 344 of theCode, provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets,fountains, and public waters, drives and publicimprovements of general benefit built at the expense of thesaid towns or provinces, are property for public use. All otherproperty possessed by the said towns and provinces ispatrimonial and shall be subject to the provision of the CivilCode except as provided by special laws.

Distinction according to Manresa; of little practicimportance in view of different principles undAmerican RuCommenting upon article 344, Manresa says that accordance with administrative legislation" (Spanish) wmust distinguish, as to the patrimonial property of the town"between that of common benefit and that which is privaproperty of the town. The first differs from property for pubuse in that generally its enjoyment is less, as it is limited

neighbors or to a group or class thereof; and furthermorsuch use, more or less general, is not intrinsic with this kinof property, for by its very nature it may be enjoyed though it were private property. The third group, that private property, is used in the name of the town or provinby the entities representing it and, like any private propergiving a source of revenue." Such distinction, however, is little practical importance in this jurisdiction in view of thdifferent principles underlying the functions of a municipalunder the American rule.Property of public domain applies to municipproperty for public use; both not within the commerof ma

The principle governing property of the public domain of tState is applicable to property for public use of tmunicipalities as said municipal property is similar

character. The principle is that the property for public use the State is not within the commerce of man anconsequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescriptioLikewise, property for public use of the municipality is nwithin the commerce of man so long as it is used by thpublic and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.US Law and Jurisprudence: Municipal properties fpublic use, but not properties for quasi-privapurposes, exempted from attachment and executioAs expounded by McQuillin in Municipal Corporations (Vol.par.1160): State statutes often provide that court house

jails other buildings owned by municipalities and the lots which they stand shall be exempt from attachment aexecution. But independent of express statutory exemptioas a general proposition, property, real and personal, held municipal corporations, in trust for the benefit of thinhabitants, and used for public purposes, is exempt. Pub

buildings, school houses, streets, squares, parks, wharveengines and engine houses, and the like, are not subject execution. So city waterworks, and a stock of liquors carriin a town dispensary, are exempt. The reason for texemption is obvious. Municipal corporations are created fpublic purposes and for the good of the citizens in thaggregate or public capacity. That they may propedischarge such public functions corporate property arevenues are essential, and to deny them these means tvery purpose of their creation would be materially impedeand in some instances practically destroy it. There something very repugnant to the moral sense in the idthat a municipal corporation should contract debts, and thhaving no resources but the taxes which are due to it theshould not be subjected by legal process to the satisfactioof its creditors. This consideration, deduced from t

principles of moral equity has only given way to the moenlarged contemplation of the great and paramouinterests of public order and the principles of governme

Thus, tt is generally held that property owned bymunicipality, where not used for a public purpose but fquasi private purposes, is subject to execution on

judgment against the municipality, and may be sold. Thrule applies to shares of stock owned by a municipcorporation and the like. But the mere fact that corporaproperty held for public uses is being temporarily used fprivate purposes does not make it subject to executioAs stated in Corpus Juris (Vol. 23, p. 355), “the rule is thproperty held for public uses, such as public buildingstreets, squares, parks, promenades, wharves landi




places, fire engines, hose and hose carriages. engine houses,public markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and generallyeverything held for governmental purposes, is not subject tolevy and sale under execution against such corporation. Therule also applies to funds in the hands of a public officer.Likewise it has been held that taxes due to a municipalcorporation or county cannot be seized under execution by acreditor of such corporation. But where a municipalcorporation or county owns in its proprietary, as

distinguished from its public or governmental capacity,property not useful or used for a public purpose but for quasiprivate purposes, the general rule is that such property maybe seized and sold under execution against the corporation,precisely as similar property of individuals is seized and sold.But property held for public purposes is not subject toexecution merely because it is temporarily used for privatepurposes, although if the public use is wholly abandoned itbecomes subject to execution. Whether or not property heldas public property is necessary for the public use is apolitical, rather than a judicial question. Where property of amunicipal or other public corporation is sought to besubjected to execution to satisfy judgments recoveredagainst such corporation, the question as to whether suchproperty is leviable or not is to be determined by the usageand purposes for which it is held."

US Law and Jurisprudence: Insurance money derivedfrom destroyed municipal property exempt fromexecution likewise exemptedIf municipal property exempt from execution is destroyed,the insurance money stands in lieu thereof and is alsoexempt (McQuillin).US Law and Jurisprudence: Members or inhabitantsnot personally liable for debts of the municipality

The members or inhabitants of a municipal corporationproper are not personally liable for the debts of themunicipality, except that in the New England States theindividual liability of the inhabitant is generally maintained(McQuillin).US Jurisprudence: Wharf a property for public use andnot subject to attachmentIn City of New Orleans vs. Louisiana Construction Co., Ltd.(140 U. S., 654; 35 Law. ed., 556), it was held that a wharf

for unloading sugar and molasses, open to the public, wasproperty for the public use of the City of New Orleans andwas not subject to attachment for the payment of the debtsof the said city. In Klein vs. City of New Orleans (98 U S., 149;25 Law. ed., 430), it was held that a public wharf on thebanks of the Mississippi River was public property and notsubject to execution for the payment of a debt of the City of New Orleans where said wharf was located. It was held thatland was public property as necessary as a public street andwas not subject to execution on account of the debts of thecity. It was further held that the fees collected were alsoexempt from execution because they were a part of theincome of the city.Tufexis v. Olaguera; Special concession of the right tousufruct in a public market cannot be attached likeany ordinary right

It was held in Tufexis v. Olaguera, where the public markethad been levied upon by virtue of the execution arising fromthe debt of the municipality of Guinobatan, that “eventhough a creditor is unquestionably entitled to recover out of his debtor's property, yet when among such property there isincluded the special right granted by the Government of usufruct in a building intended for a public service, and whenthis privilege is closely related to a service of a publiccharacter, such right of the creditor to the collection of adebt owed him by the debtor who enjoys the said specialprivilege of usufruct in a public market is not absolute andmay be exercised only through the action of a court of

justice with respect to the profits or revenue obtained underthe special right of usufruct enjoyed by debtor. The special

concession of the right to usufruct in a public market cannbe attached like any ordinary right, because that would be permit a person who has contracted with the state or withe administrative officials thereof to conduct and manageservice of a public character, to be substituted, without tknowledge and consent of the administrative authorities, one who took no part in the contract, thus giving rise to thpossibility of the regular course of a public service beindisturbed by the more or less legal action of a grantee,

the prejudice of the state and the public interests. Tprivilege or franchise granted to a private person to enjthe usufruct of a public market cannot lawfully be attachand sold, and a creditor of such person can recover his deonly out of the income or revenue obtained by the debtfrom the enjoyment or usufruct of the said privilege, in tsame manner that the rights of the creditors of a railrocompany can be exercised and their creditors collected onout of the gross receipts remaining after deduction has bemade therefrom of the operating expenses of the road. “Character of property for public use basis wproperty of a municipality necessary fgovernmental purposes may not be attache

The movable and immovable property of a municipalnecessary for governmental purposes, may not be attachand sold for the payment of a judgment against t

municipality. The supreme reason for this rule is tcharacter of the public use to which such kind of propertydevoted. The necessity for government service justifies ththe property of public use of the municipality be exemfrom execution just as it is necessary to exempt certaproperty of private individuals in accordance with secti452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.Municipal income exempt from levy and executioEven the municipal income is exempt from levy aexecution. In Municipal Corporations by Dillon (Vol. 1, 467), it was stated that "municipal corporations ainstituted by the supreme authority of a state for the pubgood. They exercise, by delegation from the legislatureportion of the sovereign power. The main object of thcreation is to act as administrative agencies for the statand to provide for the police and local government of certadesignated civil divisions of its territory. To this end they a

invested with certain governmental powers and charged wcivil, political, and municipal duties. To enable thebeneficially to exercise these powers and discharge theduties, they are clothed with the authority to raise revenuechiefly by taxation, and subordinately by other modes, as licenses, fines, and penalties. The revenue of the pubcorporation is the essential means by which it is enabled perform its appointed work. Deprived of its regular aadequated supply of revenue, such a corporation practically destroyed, and the ends of its erection thwarteBased upon considerations of this character, it is the settldoctrine of the law that not only the public-property but althe taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannbe seized under execution against them, either in ttreasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered ftaxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands

officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless declared by statute. The doctrine of the inviolability of tpublic revenues by the creditor is maintained, although tcorporation is in debt, and has no means of payment but ttaxes which it is authorized to collect."

Municipality of Makati v. CA (1990)

This is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondenPrivate respondents now want to get the just compensatifrom Makati. General Rule: In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the ruthat public funds are not subject to levy and executiounless otherwise provided for by statute. In the instant cas




there is already an account specifically opened for theexpropriation proceedings of the subject property pursuantto PD No. 42.Remedy where there is no law appropriating fundsyet: Note that, where a municipality fails or refuses, without

justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of theremedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment andapproval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the

corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefore.

Pasay City Government v. CFI of Manila (1984)

Facts: On August 12, 1964, V.D. Isip, Sons & Associatesrepresented by Vicente David Isip entered into a contractwith the City of Pasay represented by the then Mayor PabloCuneta. The contract entitled "Contract and Agreement" wasfor the construction of a new Pasay City Hall at F.B. HarrisonSt., Pasay City. Pursuant to the contract, the respondentproceeded with the construction of the new Pasay City Hallbuilding as per duly approved plans and specifications. Therespondent accomplished under various stages of construction the amount of work (including supplies andmaterials) equivalent to an estimated value of P1,713,096 of the total contract price of P4,914,500.80.

The appellants paid only the total amount of P1,100,000 to

the respondent leaving an amount of P613,096 immediatelydue from the petitioner to the respondent. Notwithstandingdemands for payment thereof, the petitioner failed to remitthe amount of P613,096.00 to the respondent.On May 16, 1968, respondent filed an action for specificperformance with damages against herein petitioners-appellants before the respondent Court.

The parties arrived at a draft of amicable agreement whichwas submitted to the Municipal Board of Pasay City for itsconsideration. Protracted pre-trial hearings and conferenceswere held where the respondent Court suggested andadvised that "under the principle of quantum meruit, theplaintiff is forthwith entitled to at least that which is due tohim for defendants under the contract and that publicinterest must perforce require the continuity of constructionof a public work project.” The Municipal Board of Pasayenacted Ordinance No. 1012 which approved theCompromise Agreement and also authorized and empoweredthe incumbent City Mayor Jovito Claudio to represent theappellant Pasay City Government, subject to the finalapproval of the respondent Court herein. The court approvedthe compromise agreement.On April 10, 1969, the appellants filed an urgent motionseeking a declaration of legality of the original contract andagreement dated August 4, 1964 from the Court. On May 10,1969, the Court issued an order declaring that the originalcontract is legal and valid. On July 9, 1969, an application forand notice of garnishment were made and effected upon thefunds of appellant Pasay City Government with the PhilippineNational Bank. On July 11, 1969, the appellant filed anurgent motion to set aside the respondent Court's order of

June 21, 1969 and to quash the writ of execution issuedpursuant thereto upon the following grounds: 1) that the

execution sought was then still premature, the period of 90days stipulated not having elapsed as yet; 2) that theobligations of the parties under the Compromise Agreementwere reciprocal and the appellee not having put up a newperformance bond in the sufficient amount equivalent to20% of the remaining cost of construction as per agreement,the appellants cannot be obliged to pay the sum dueappellee as yet; 3) that the Sheriff has no power or authorityto levy or garnish on execution the general funds, especiallymore so, the trust funds of the defendant Pasay City. On July19, 1969, the respondent Court issued an order stating thatinasmuch as the defendant has not yet paid the plaintiff asof this date then "the writ of execution and of garnishmentare declared to be again in full force and effect.

Ratio: The two purposes of a compromise agreement aenunciated in Article 2028 of the New Civil Code. The firpurpose - "to avoid a litigation" - occurs when there isthreat of an impending litigation. At this point, no case hyet reached the courts. The moment a case has been filedcourt then the second purpose - "to put an end to oalready commenced" - applies.In the herein case, We are concerned with the seco

purpose. The latter purpose is given effect in Article 2037 the New Civil Code which reads: "Article 2037. compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority res judicata; but there shall be no execution except compliance with a judicial compromise."A compromise agreement not contrary to law, public ordepublic policy, morals or good customs is a valid contrawhich is the law between the parties themselves.

judgment on a compromise is a final and executory. Itimmediately executory in the absence of a motion to set tsame aside on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress.It is obvious that the respondent did not only succeed enforcing the compromise but said plaintiff likewise wants rescind the said compromise. It is clear from the languagethe law, specifically Article 2041 CC that one of the partiesa compromise has two options: 1) to enforce t

compromise; or 2) to rescind the same and insist upon horiginal demand. The respondent in the case herein befoUs wants to avail of both of these options. This can not bdone. The respondent cannot ask for rescission of tcompromise agreement after it has already enjoyed the fioption of enforcing the compromise by asking for a writ execution resulting thereby in the garnishment of the PasCity funds deposited with the PNB which eventually wdelivered to the respondent.Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the petitioneappellants moved for its quashal alleging among oththings the exemption of the government from executio

This move on the part of the petitioner-appellant is at figlance laudable for "all government funds deposited with tPhilippine National Bank by any agency or instrumentality the government, whether by way of general or specdeposit, remain government funds and may not be subject

garnishment or levy. But, inasmuch as an ordinance halready been enacted expressly appropriating the amount P613,096.00 of payment to the respondent, then the herecase is covered by the exception to the general rule statedthe case of Republic vs. Palacio: "Judgments against a Stain cases where it has consented to be sued, generaoperate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's claim the absence of express provision; otherwise they cannot enforced by processes of the law; and it is for the legislatuto provide for the payment in such manner as sees fit."Having established that the compromise agreement wfinal and immediately executory, and in fact as alreaenforced, the respondent court was in error where it sentertained the supplemental complaint filed by trespondent-appellee for by then the respondent Court hno more jurisdiction over the subject matter. When

decision has become final and executory, the court no longhas the power and jurisdiction to alter, amend or revoke, anits only power thereof is to order its execution.

What is crucial in sub-paragraph B of paragraph 1 of tcompromise agreement are the words "in proportion." If tparties really intended the legal rate of 20% performanbond to refer to the whole unfinished work, then tprovision should have required the plaintiff contractor submit and file a new performance bond to cover tremaining value/cost of the unfinished work of tconstruction. Using the words in proportion then significanchanged the meaning of the paragraph to ultimately mean




performance bond equal to 20% of the next stage of work tobe done.And, We note that in the Contract and Agreement, therespondent-appellee was allowed to file a performance bondof P222,250.00 which is but 5% of the total bid of P4,914,500.80. A security bond was likewise filed with anamount of P97,290.00. The sum total of bond then filed wasP320,540.00 which is just 6.5% of the total bid. It is rathercurious why all of a sudden the petitioners-appellants are

insisting on a 20% performance bond of the entire unfinishedwork when they were quite content with a bond just 5% of the entire work. For Us to allow the petitioners-appellants toadamantly stick to the 20% performance bond would betantamount to allowing them to evade their obligation in thecompromise agreement. This cannot be allowed. The bond of a contractor for a public work should not be extendedbeyond the reasonable intent as gathered from the purposeand language of the instrument construed in connection withthe proposals, plans and specifications, and contract.

The premium of the bond will be sizeable and will eat up theprofit of the contractor, who is faced with the fluctuation of prices of materials due to inflation and devaluation. Rightnow, many contractors cannot proceed with theimplementation of their contracts because of theextraordinary rise in cost of materials and labor. No

contractor would be willing to bid for public works contractsunder the oppressive interpretation by petitioners-appellants.

Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois(1955)

Facts: Teodoro Manaois having obtained a judgmentagainst the municipality of Paoay, Judge De Guzman of saidprovince issued a writ of execution against the municipality.In compliance with said writ the Provincial Sheriff of IlocosNorte levied upon and attached the following properties:

The amount of One thousand seven hundred twelve pesosand one centavo (P1,712.01) in the Municipal Treasury of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, representing the rental paid by Mr.Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot belonging to the defendantmunicipality;About forty fishery lots leased to thirty-five different personsby the Municipality.

The municipality asked for the dissolution of the attachmentsince they are properties for public use. It is thereforenecessary to ascertain the nature and status back a fewyears, specifically, to the year 1937.

Issue: WON the properties can be levied

Held: No (but the revenues can be levied upon)

Ratio: There can be no question that properties for publicuse held by municipal corporation are not subject to levy andexecution. The authorities are unanimous on this point. ThisCourt in the case of Viuda de Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo after citing Manresa, the works of McQuillin and Dillonon Municipal Corporations, and Corpus Juris, held that

properties for public use like trucks used for sprinkling thestreets, police patrol wagons, police stations, public markets,together with the land on which they stand are exempt fromexecution. Even public revenues of municipal corporationsdestined for the expenses of the municipality are alsoexempt from the execution. The reason behind thisexemption extended to properties for public use, and publicmunicipal revenues is that they are held in trust for thepeople, intended and used for the accomplishment of thepurposes for which municipal corporations are created, andthat to subject said properties and public funds to executionwould materially impede, even defeat and in some instancesdestroy said purpose.

Property however, which is patrimonial and which is held municipality in its proprietary capacity is treated by greweight of authority as the private asset of the town and mbe levied upon and sold under an ordinary execution. Tsame rule applies to municipal funds derived fropatrimonial properties, for instance, it has been held thshares of stocks held by municipal corporations are subjeto execution. If this is true, with more reason should incomor revenue coming from these shares of stock, in the form

interest or dividends, be subject to execution? The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, IlocNorte, which had been parceled out or divided into lots alater let out to private persons for fishing purposes at annual rental are clearly not subject to execution. In the fiplace, they do not belong to the municipality. They may wbe regarded as property of State. What the municipality Paoay hold is merely what may be considered the usufruct the right to use said municipal waters, granted to it section 2321 of the Revised Administrative CodeNow, is this particular usufruct of the municipality of Paoaover its municipal waters, subject to execution to enforce

judgment against the town? We are not prepared to answthis question in the affirmative because there are powerreasons against its propriety and legality. In the first placeis not a usufruct based on or derived from an inherent rig

of the town. It is based merely on a grant, more or letemporary, made by the Legislature. Take the right of fisheover the sea or marine waters bordering a certamunicipality. These marine waters are ordinarily for pubuse, open to navigation and fishing by the people. TLegislature thru section 2321 of the Administrative Code, already stated, saw fit to grant the usufruct of said mariwaters for fishery purpose, to the towns bordering sawaters. Said towns have no visited right over said mariwaters. The Legislature, for reasons it may deem valid or a matter of public policy, may at any time, repeal or modsaid section 2321 and revoke this grant to coastal towns aopen these marine waters to the public. Or the Legislatumay grant the usufruct or right of fishery to the provincconcerned so that said provinces may operate or administthem by leasing them to private parties.All this only goes to prove that the municipality of Paoay

not holding this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent absolute manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or to alloit to be taken away from it as its property through executioAnother reason against subjecting this usufruct or right fishery over municipal waters, to execution, is that, if thwere to be allowed and this right sold on execution, tbuyer would immediately step into the shoes of t

judgment-debtor municipality. Such buyer presumably buonly the right of the municipality. He does not buy the fisheitself nor the municipal waters because that belongs to tState. All that the buyer might do would be to let out or reto private individuals the fishery rights over the lots inwhich the municipal waters had been parceled out divided, and that is, after public bidding. This, he must because that is the only right granted to the municipality bthe Legislature, a right to be exercised in the mann

provided by law, namely, to rent said fishery lots after pubbidding. Then, we shall have a situation rather anomalous be sure, of a private individual conducting public biddinrenting to the highest bidders fishery lots over municipwaters which are property of the State, and appropriatinthe results to his own private use. The impropriety, if nillegality, of such a contingency is readily apparent. But this not all. The situation imagined implies the deprivation the municipal corporation of a source of a substantincome, expressly provide by law. Because of all this, whold that the right or usufruct of the town of Paoay over municipal waters, particularly, the forty odd fishery loincluded in the attachment by the Sheriff, is not subject execution.




But we hold that the revenue or income coming from therenting of these fishery lots is certainly subject to execution.It may be profitable, if not necessary, to distinguish this kindof revenue from that derived from taxes, municipal licensesand market fees are provided for and imposed by the law,they are intended primarily and exclusively for the purposeof financing the governmental activities and functions of municipal corporations. In fact, the real estate taxescollected by a municipality do not all go to it. A portion

thereof goes to the province, in the proportion provided forby law. For the same reason, municipal markets areestablished not only to provide a place where the peoplemay sell and buy commodities but also to provide publicrevenues for the municipality. To many towns, market feesconstitute the bulk of their assets and incomes. Theserevenues are fixed and definite, so much so that the annualappropriations for the expenses of the municipalities arebased on these revenues. Not so with the income derivedform fisheries. In the first place, the usufruct over municipalwaters was granted by the Legislature merely to help orbolster up the economy of municipal government. There aremany towns in the Philippines, specially in the interior, whichdo not have municipal waters for fishery purpose and yetwithout much source of revenue, they can function, whichgoes to prove that this kind of revenue is not indispensable

for the performance of governmental functions. In thesecond place, the amount of this income is far from definiteor fixed. It depends upon the amounts which prospectivebidders or lessees are willing to pay. If fishing on thesemarine water, lakes and rivers in the municipality is good,the bids would be high and the income would be substantial.If the fish in these waters is depleted or, if for some reasonsor another, fishing is not profitable, then the income wouldbe greatly reduced. In other words, to many municipalitiesengaged in this business of letting out municipal waters forfishing purposes, it is a sort of sideline, so that even forfishing purposes, it is sort of sideline, so that even without it