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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CREATION, MERGER, ABOLITION & POWERS PART I

PART I:

LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS

CREATION,

MERGER,

ABOLITION

& POWERS

1.

Creation of

Local

Government

Units

2.

Presumption of Constitutionality

3.

Governmental

Powers/Functions

4.

Proprietary

Powers/Functions

1. CREATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

Patricio Tan et al. v. COMELEC (YEAR)

FACTS:

Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 (Act Creating Province of Negros del Norte), petitioners who are

residents of the Province of Negros Occidental filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of

preventing

COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite pursuant to the law.

Petitioners contend that BP 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in accordance with the LGC as well as

Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution regarding the requirements in land area and estimated annualincome. Petitioners

also

contend

that

the plebiscite conducted

did

not

comply

with

the requirements

off

law

as

it

was

confined

only

to

the

inhabitants of three cities and eight municipalities in Negros del Norte, to the

exclusion of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental.

COMELEC avers that the law is not unconstitutional. They claim that BP 885 does not infringe the Constitution

because

the

requisites

of

the

LGC have

been complied with.

They

submit

that

the

case

has

now

become

moot

and

academic

with the

proclamation of Negros del Norte as during the plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation

of the new province while only 30,400 were against it.

ISSUES:

WON the

new

Province

of

Negros

del

Norte

complied

with

the

requirements

as

to

land area? NO

WON the province complied with the plebiscite requirement? NO

HELD/RATIO:

The original

Parliamentary

Bill

no. 3644 expressly declared that the new province contained an area of 285,656 ha

more or less. However, when Parliamentary bill was enacted into BP 885, the province now comprised a

territory

of

4,019.95 square kilometers. The certification of the provincial treasurer also indicates that the

province

comprised

of a lesser area. Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the

relatively new municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact that the

area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the component units of the new province, was derived

from the City of San Carlos and

from the Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added thereto

was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of Murcia, Negros Occidental. This area if added to

2,685.2 square kilometers will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers.

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC1 is relevant. As so stated therein the "territoryneed not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular

provision of

the

LGC and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has

reference only

to

the mass of land area and excludes the waters ove r which the political unit exercises

control. Said sentence

states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical

contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent. "Contiguous", when

employed as an adjective, as in the

above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a

touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained

by

reference

to words

associated with or

related

to

them

in

the

statute.

Therefore,

in

the

context of the

sentence

above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CREATION, MERGER, ABOLITION & POWERS

Petitioners have also averred that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would

be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No

controversion

has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros

Occidental

will

be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills

which contribute to

the

economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del

Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned anddismembered. What was

involved

was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the

case of Negros what was

involved

was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec . 3 of Article XI of

the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary.

Re: the reliance on the case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al.: As in the prefatory

statements therein stating that said case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed

considerable leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or

units affected." The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to

exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the

Constitution should be

correctly interpreted. The ruling in the aforestated case should not be taken as a

doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners

do, that when certain Barangays

are

separated from

a

parent

municipality

to form

a

new

one,

all

the

voters

therein are affected."

On the

issue

of

the

interpretation

and

application

of

Article

XI,

Section

3

of

the

Constitution.

It

can

be

plainly

seen

that the constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a

majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged

and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of

the existing province

of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its

existing boundaries in

order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros de l Norte. Plain

and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent

province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity

would

be

composed

of

those

in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed

province of Negros del Norte. We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said

constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. Noone should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote

autonomy of local government units

but

at

the

same

time

transgress,

ignore

and disregard what the Constitution

commands in Article XI Section 3 thereo f We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when

Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said

enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas

affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected referred in the

fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities

comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality

that there

are

other people necessarily

affected.

The

court reversed

the

ruling

in

"territory" -- - - the physical mass of land area. There would arise no

need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace

not only land area but also territorial waters, It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first

paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous

with "land area" only. The words and

phrases used in

a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature. The sense in which the words are used

furnished the rule of construction. The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents

make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are

arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an

absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in

construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of

harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored.

Concurring Opinion, Teehankee:

The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of,

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viz. the

plebiscite,

the

proclamation

of

a

new

province

of

Negros

del

Norte

and

the

appointment

of

its

officials

are

equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided

by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of

Negros

Occidental

(namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of La

Castellana,

Isabela,

Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San

Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate

of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided orits boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units

affected. " It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of

the proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire

province of Negros

Occidental

have

to

participate

and

give

their

approval

in

the

plebiscite,

because

the

whole

province

is

affected by

its

proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite

to only the voters of the

areas

to

be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as

allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and

to

nullify

the

basic

principle

of majority

rule.

The

argument

of

fait

accompli

viz.

that

the

railroaded

plebiscite

of

January

3,

1986

was

held

and

can no longer be enjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte has

been constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of the challenged Act. This Court has always held that it "does not

look

with

favor

upon

parties

'racing

to

beat

an injunction or

restraining

order'

which they have reason to believe

might be forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and pendency of the appropriate petition therefor.

Where the restraining order or preliminary injunction are found to have been properly issued, as in the case

at bar, mandatory writs shall be issued by the Court to restore matters to the status quo ante." Where, as

in this

case,

there

was

somehow

a

failure

to properly

issue

the

restraining

order

stopping

the

holding

of

the

illegal

plebiscite,

the

Court

will issue

the

mandatory

writ

or

judgment

to restore matters to the status quo ante and

restore the territorial integrity of the province of Negros Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality of the

challenged Act and nullifying the invalid proclamation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte and the

equally

invalid appointment

of

its

officials.

Torralba vs.

Mun.

of

Sibagat,

147 SCRA 390.

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of BP Blg. 56, an Act creating the Municipality of Sibagat in Agusan

del Sur which allegedly violates Section 3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution. Under BP Blg. 56, sixteen barangays

from

Bayugan,

Agusan del Sur are separated to form the new municipality of Sibagat. Furthermore, the

supposed creation

of the new municipality must be ratified by majority of votes cast in a plebescite in theareas

affected

within

90

days

after

the

approval

of

the

said

Act.

It is petitioners theory that BP Blg. 56 violates Section 3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution (now Sec 10 Art X of the

1987 Consti) because there was no Local Government Code in existence during the time of the Acts

enactment.

They

submit that an LGC must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division,

merger, or

substantial

alteration

of

the

boundaries of local government units. Since there was no LGC when BP 56

was passed, said BP could not have possibly complied with any criteria when Sibagat was created. Hence,

said Act is null and void.

ISSUE:WON BP 56 is invalid due to the fact that there was no existing Local Government Code at the time of its

enactment

HELD/RATIO:

NO. The

absence

of

LGC

at

the

time

of

the

Acts

enactment

did

not

curtail

nor

was

it

intended

to

cripple

legislative

competence

to create municipal corporations. Section 3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not

proscribe or

prohibit

the

modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC.

The Constitution does not contain a requirement that the LGC is a condition sine qua non for the creation

of a

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municipality, in

the

same

manner

that

the

creation

of

a

municipality

does

not

preclude

the

enactment

of

the

LGC.

The Constitution only means that once the LGC is enacted, the creation or modification of territorial

boundaries

should

conform

with

criteria

laid

down . In the meantime, legislative power remains plenary except that

creation

of

the

new

municipality

should

be

approved

by

the

people

concerned.

In

this

case,

the

creation

of Sibagat

conformed

to

such requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people in the units affected endorsed and

approved the creation of the new local government unit. The officials of the new municipality have effectivelytaken

their

oaths of office and performing their functions. A de jure entity has been created.

Bai Sema vs.

COMELEC

(2008)

Prov.

Of

Shariff

Kaubugsuan

case

FACTS:

The first legislative district of the province of Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.

Maguindanao

is part of the ARMM. Cotabato City, however, voted against its inclusion in the

ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19,

Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the

Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.

Maguindanao voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City

passed Board Resolution No. 3999, requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view

of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province. In response to the query, COMELEC

issued

Resolution No. 07 -0407 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan

in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.

However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 electioons, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7845 stating that

Maguindanaos

first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA

Act

201.

On 10 May 2007, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the

legislative

district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of

Maguindanao with Cotabato City).

Bai Sandra Sema was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City. She prayed for

the

nullification of COMELEC Resolution 7902. She contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one

representative in Congress under Section 5 (3) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance

appended

to

the

Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether the

ARMM Regional

Assembly

Can

Create

the

Province

of

Shariff

Kabunsuan:

NO

HELD:There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the

power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10 Article X of the Constitution is followed.

However,

the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution

provides,

"Each city

with a

population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least

one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the

Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may

hereafter

increase

to

more

than

two

hundred

fifty

thousand

shall be entitled in the immediately following election to

at

least

one

Member

x

x

x."

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Clearly, a

province

cannot

be

created without

a

legislative

district

because

it

will

violate

Section 5

(3),

Article

VI

of

the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason,

a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the

power to

create

a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, require s also the power to

create a legislative

district.

Even the

creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to

create a legislative district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city automatically

becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of theOrdinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the

power to create a legislative

district.

Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress

Under the

present

Constitution,

as

well

as

in

past

Constitutions,

the

power

to

increase

the

allowable

membership

in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in

Congress.

Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent

membership through

the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress

can enact such a law . It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion

legislative

districts

for

a

national

legislature

like

Congress.

An inferior

legislative

body,

created by

a

superior

legislative

body,

cannot

change

the

membership

of the

superior legislative body.

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic

act, did

not

divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the

Constitution and the

ARMM Organic Act, as amended.

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to

create

or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054

amending

the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x

except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x."

Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a

legislative

district

whose

representative

is elected in national elections.

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a

Member

of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regional

legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers

extend only to its regional territory. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to

allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM's territorialjurisdiction.

The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional

Assembly

the

power

to create

provinces

and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section

20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

Only Congress

can

create

provinces

and

cities

because

the

creation

of

provinces

and

cities

necessarily

includes

the

creation of legislative districts. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district

because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM

Regional

Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of

Congress

because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial

jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.

Based on the foregoing, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of

Shariff

Kabunsuan was also declared void. On the other hand, COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the

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geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, was held valid. SC

declared that it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well

as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

The Prov. Of North Cotabato v. Government of Republic of the Philippines

(2008)

FACTS:

Facts that

Lead

to

the Filing

of

the Petition

The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late

Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari.

On 18 July 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities.

On 27 August 1998, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent.

In the end of 1999 up to 2000, MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In

response , President Estrada declared and carried out an all -out-war against the MILF.

When President Arroyo came in office, military offensive was suspended and the government sought a

resumption of the

peace

talks.

With the help of the Malaysian government, the MILF was convinced to return to the negotiating table.

The parties met in Kuala Lumpur and on 24 March 2001, MILF and the GRP signed the Agreement on the

General

Framework

for

the

Resumption

of

Peace

Talks

Between

the

GRP

and

the

MILF.

Formal peace talks were held in Tripoli, Libya in June 2001. The outcome was the GRP-MILF Agreement on

Peace (Tripoli Agreement on 2001) containing 3 aspects:

o Security Aspect

o Rehabilitation Aspect

o Ancestral Domain Aspect

A second round of peace talks was held in Malaysia in August 2001, and the parties ended up

signing the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement of 2001.

This was followed on May by the signing of the parties of the Implementing Guidelines on the

Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.

In 2005 , several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Malaysia eventually leading to thecrafting

of the draft MOA-AD.

On 05 August 2008 the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF were scheduled to sign a

Memorandum

of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA -AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement

on Peace of 2001 in Malaysia.

But did this not push through, because on 23 July 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and the City of

Zamboanga filed a petition for Mandamus, and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary

Injunction

and

TRO

because

of

this

the

Court

issued

a

Temporary

Restraining

Order

enjoining

the

GRP

from

signing

the MOA-AD.

The 2 petitions were followed by more petitions filed by various individuals, local government units and

interested sectors.

Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain and the Presidential

Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon Jr.

GRP moved

to

dismiss

the

petitions

since

they

stated

that

they

shall

thoroughly

review

the

MOA-AD.

Overview of

the

MOA-AD

The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.

Under the Terms of Reference (TOR), the MOA-AD includes 4 earlier agreements between the GRP and MILF but

also 2 agreements

between

the GRP and

the MNLF:

O The 1976 Tripoli Agreement and

O The Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.

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The MOA-AD identifies in its TOR several statutes:

O The organic act for the ARMM and

O The IPRA

O The ILO Convention No. 169. Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in

relation to

the

UN

Declaration

on

the

Rights

of the

Indigenous

Peoples

and

O The UN Charter.

The MOA -AD also includes as final TOR the generic category of compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime

of territory under compact and territory under peace agreement that partakes the nature of a

treaty

device.

This simply refers to all the other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government.

The main body of the MOA -AD is divided into 4 strands, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources and

Governance.

Concepts and Principles

Defines Bangsamoro People as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including

Palawan

and the Sulu archipelago at the time of the conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether

mixed or of full blood, including their spouses. This means that the term includes not only Moros but also all

indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands.

Mentions the Bangsamoro Homeland the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by

virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties agree that the ancestral domain does not form part

of the public domain.

It also mentions the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over

the Ancestral

Domain

and

Ancestral

Lands

of

the

Bangsamoro.

Territory

The Bangsamoro Homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and

alluvial

domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan

geographic region.

The core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM:

o Lanao del

Sur

o Maguindanaoo

Sulu

o Tawi-Tawi

o Basilan

o Marawi City

o Certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for the inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001

plebiscite.

Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays which are

groups

into: Category A and Category B (Special Intervention Areas).

The parties stipulate that the BJE shall havejurisdiction over the following:

o All natural resources Within its internal waters

o Joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources with the Central Government

Within its territorial waters

o Sharing of minerals between the BJE and the Central Government Within its territorial waters

Resources

The BJE can perform the following acts:

1. To enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and has the

option

to establish

trade

missions

in

those

countries.

2. To

enter

into environmental cooperation agreements.

3. Entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border

agreements or

protocols

for

environmental

protection

and

equitable sharing of

incomes

and

revenues.

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The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government.

The Central Government should ensure the BJEs participation in international meetings and events.

The BJE has the right of exploring for, producing and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum,

fossil,

fuel, mineral,

oil

and

natural

gas.

The total sharing between the Central Government and the BJE pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in

favor of the BJE. The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining

concessions, MPSA, IFMA, and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine Government including

those

issued

by

the

present ARMM.

Governance

The MOA-AD binds the parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the

implementation

of the Comprehensive Compact.

The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as associative.

The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall take effect

upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments.

ISSUES:

Procedural Issues

1) Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA-AD is ripe for adjudication.

2) Whether the petitioners have locus standi to file the petitions.

3) Whether the

petitions

have

become

moot

and

academic.

Substantive Issues

4) Whether respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the

right

to information

when

they

negotiated

and

later initialed the MOA -AD.

5) Whether the contents of the MOA -AD violate the Constitution and laws.

HELD:

1) YES.

2) YES.3) NO.

4) YES.

5) YES.

RATIO:

1) The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. An actual case or controversy

involves

a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite lega l claims, susceptible of judicia l resolution as

distinguished from

a

hypothetical

or

abstract

difference

or

dispute.

There

must

be a contrariety of legal rights that

can

be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. The court can decide the

constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for

judicial

determination.

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. For a case to be

considered

ripe

for

adjudication,

it

is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by

either

branch of the before a court may come into the picture and the petitioner must allege the existence of

an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.

Concrete acts

under

the

MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. That the law or act

in

question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or

prohibit/nullify, when proper,

acts

of

legislative

and executive officials.

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As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of the respondent that exceed their authority, by

violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions

make prima facie case for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for

adjudication exists.

When an

act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the

Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.

2) For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to

assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so

largely

depends

for

illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest

in the

execution of

the laws.

In any case, the Court has the discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the

liberal attitude it has exercised highlighted in the case of David v Macapagal-Arroyo, where technicalities of

procedure were

brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of

transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as

precedents.

3) The non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot

the

present

petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the

Courts issuance of a TRO. The petitions have not, therefore been rendered moot and academic simply by the

public disclosure of the MOA- AD. The manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP

Panel notwithstanding.

The MOA-AD is not a mere list of consensus points given its nomenclature and the need to have it

signed or

initialed by all the concerning parties.

Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD but to otherongoing and future

negotiations

and agreements

necessary

for

its

realization.

The assertion that the MOA -AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional

amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the

bench,

the

bar,

the

public

and in this

case

the

government

and its

negotiating

entity.

The MOA- AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The

present

MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of

the

Tripoli Agreement of 2001. In rendering a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate the

controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and most especially the government in

negotiating

with

the

MILF

regarding

the

Ancestral

Domain

is

necessary.

4) The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Matters of public concern covered by the

right to

information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract.

Intended as

a

splendid

symmetry

to

the

right

to

information

under

the

Bill of Rights (Sec. 7 , Art. III) is the policy of

public disclosure under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the

people

to demand information while

Sec.

28

recognizes

the

duty

of

officialdom

to give

information even if

nobody

demands

it.

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An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication

between the government and the people. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and

disclosure is the design for feedback mechanism.

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In fact, E.O. No. 3 (Defining the Policy and Administrative Structure for the Governmen ts comprehensive

Peace

Efforts) contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate continuing consultations,

contrary to

respondents position that plebiscite is more than sufficient consultation. It also establishes

petitioners right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and

disclosure.

Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Hermogenes Esperon, committed grave abuse of discretion when he

failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted

runs

contrary

to

and

in

excess

of the

legal

authority

and

amounts

to

a

whimsical,

capricious,

oppressive,

arbitrary

and

despotic

exercise thereof.

Petitioners assertion that the Local Government Code (Sec. 2 [c]) declares it a State policy to require all

national

agencies

and

offices

to

conduct

periodic

consultations

with

appropriate local

government

units,

non -

governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project

or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions is well-taken.

The MOA- AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the

Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of

a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non -compliance with the clear-

cut mechanisms ordained in said Act, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior

informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.

Notably, the

IPRA

does

not

grant

the

Executive

Department

or

any

government

agency

the

power

to

delineate

and

recognize an

ancestral

domain

claim

by

mere

agreement or compromise.

In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is

cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority.

5) Association is used in the MOA-AD to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.

The nature

of

the

"associative"

relationship

may

have

been

intended

to

be

defined

more

precisely

in

the

still

to

be

forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international

law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an

international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the

term

"associative"

in the

MOA -AD.

An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model,

one

state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its

international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and

independence.

In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of

former colonies on their way to full independence.

Back to the MOA -AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of

association,

specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with

foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and

events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central

Government over external defense.

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These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the

status of

an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State,

much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

Article II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution states that, "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous

cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development."

An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity

because of

the

associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of

Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence,

is certainly not conducive to national unity.

Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory

law,

among which are R.A. No. 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.

Bagabuyo v.

COMELEC

(2008)

FACTS:

In 2006, Rep. Jaraula of Cagayan de Oro sponsored a bill increasing the citys legislative district from one to

two. It eventually became a law causing COMELEC to promulgate a resolution that for the election of May 2007,

Cagayan

de

Oro's

voters

would be

classified as

belonging to

either

the first

or

the second

district,

depending on

their

place of residence. Bagabuyo filed a petition and argued that COMELEC cannot implement the act without

providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for

the division or conversion of a local government unit.

ISSUE:

WON a

plebiscite

is

required

in

the

case

at

bar

HELD/RATIO:

No. The Court upheld COMELECs arguments that the law merely increased the representation of CDO in

the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987

Constitution and that the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply

when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,

municipality, or barangay. In this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of

boundaries of a local government unit took place. Further, the law did not bring about any change in CDOs

territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

League of Cities v. COMELEC (2011)

FACTS:

During the 11th Congress, 33 bills were filed seeking to convert 33 municipalities into cities. Out of the

33 bills,

only

24 were not enacted into law. In the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was passed which amended

the Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement from 20 million to 100 million. Due to this

new law, Congress sought to enact a joint resolution exempting the 24 municipalities from the new income

requirement.

This

was however not approved. Sixteen out of the original 24 municipalities filed individual

cityhood bills. These

bills

were

enacted into law

between March to July

2007.

The

statutes contained a provision

which

exempted

the

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16 municipalities from the new income requirement. The League of Cities assailed the constitutionality of

these

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cityhood laws on two grounds: 1) The cityhood laws violate Article X, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution which states

that cities

can

be

created

only

in

accordance

with

the

local

government code

and

2) the

cityhood

laws

violate

the

equal protection clause as they put the municipalities at an advantage as against all other municipalities that

are similarly situated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cityhood laws are constitutional.

RULING:

The original case declared the laws unconstitutional. The MR reversed this decision and ruled in favor of their

constitutionality.

Upon a second MR, the Court again reversed itself. Finally, on the fourth ruling, the Supreme

Court

ruled that

the

laws

were

constitutional.

FIRST DECISION (Nov. 18, 2008 decision)

The cityhood

laws

violate

Article

X,

Section

10 of

the 1987 Constitution. Under this provision, the creation

of

cities

must

be

based on the Local Government Code and no other law. The legislature cannot prescribe different

criteria in another law, in violation of the predetermined requirements in the Local Government Code.

Allowing that would then render nugatory the entire purpose of having a Local Government Code. Since

the Local

Government

Code

determines

the

requirements,

if

there

are

indeed

exemptions, they too must be clearly

stated in the same Code. In the case of the 16 municipalities,no such exemption is written in their favor.

The said laws also violate Article X, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The provision states that local government

units

are

entitled to a

just

share

in the

national

income.

There

will

be

no just

share

if

the

criteria

are

not

uniform

for local government units. In the case of the cityhood laws, the cities involved, which earn only about 20 million,

will

get

the

same

share

as

those

who

actually

earn

the

100

million

requirement

in

the

law.

Along this

line,

the

laws

also violate

the

equal

protection clause. There was no substantial distinction which would

justify the favorable treatment accorded to the cities in the cityhood laws as opposed to every other city

earning

20 million pesos. The fact that they sought cityhood before the amendment of the LGC is not a substantial

distinction

SECOND DECISION ( Dec. 21, 2009)

The cityhood laws are constitutional

The power to create cities is legislative in character. Article X, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution only meant

that

Congress

alone can impose the criteria for the creation of cities, it did not limit the power of the

legislature. The said constitutional provision should be construed to mean that Congress can create cities so

long as it is done through a law. In other words, Congress can create cities through a codified set of laws as in the

LGC

or

through a single subject enactment as in the case of the cityhood laws. Moreover, the legislative

intent in making the

cityhood

laws was to exempt the cities involved from RA 9009. The said exemption

does not violate equal protection because it is based on substantial distinctions. The municipalities involved in

this

case

have

already

met

the

requirements for cityhood under the old LGC even before it was amended.

Allowing the amendmen t to apply

to

them

would

be

the same as changing the rules in the middle of the game.

THIRD DECISION (August 24, 2010)

The cityhood

laws

are

unconstitutional.

Article 10,

Sec.

10

of

the

1987

Constitution clearly states that the Local Government Code must be the basis for the

creation of cities. RA 9009 is an amendmen t of the LGC, therefore, the new income requirement prescribed

by it should

be

complied

with.

If

Congress truly intended that the municipalities involved in this case be exempt

from

RA

9009, it should have been stated in the law itself. The cityhood laws violate equal protection. First, there

was no

substantial

distinction between the municipalities in this case and all other municipalities similarly

situated. Second,

the said law is limited to specific conditions only, contrary to the requirement that a valid

distinction

must not

only apply to specific conditions but to future conditions as well. Third, the law does

not apply to all

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municipalities similarly

situated.

The

laws

give

advantage

to

certain

municipalities

on

the

basis

of

an

arbitrary

date.

FOURTH DECISION

(February 15,

2011)

The Cityhood

laws

are

constitutional

The legislative intent was to exempt the municipalities involved from the coverage of RA 9009. This intent

was

expressed

in

the exemption clause found in the cityhood laws. The enactment of these laws was in valid

exercise of the legislative power. In fact these cityhood laws can be deemed to have amended the LGC in thatthese laws

provided for

exemption.

FINAL RULING:

The cityhood

laws

are

constitutional. The municipalities involved are validly constituted as cities.

Navarro v.

Executive Secretary

(2010,

2011)

Dinagatan

Case

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned

for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the

Local GovernmentCode under Sec. 461.

ISSUE:

Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional?

10 February 2010 and 12 May 2010 Decisions UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Sec. 461 requires compliance with an income requirement of P20 million, which was met by the province.

However,

it

also

requires

compliance

with

either

the

population

OR

the

land

area

requirement.

The province did not comply with the population requirement. Based on the official NSO census

in 2000, the province only had 106,951 inhabitants, which is short of the 250,000 required by law. The province,

however,

held a special census that was monitored by a local NSO branch, but was NOT certified by the

NSO, stating that their population was 371,000. In an NSO national census conducted after the passage of the

Act, it was verified that the province only had 120,813 inhabitants,still short of the 250,000 requirement.

The province did NOT comply with the land area requirement. Sec. 461(a)(i) requires that the land area of a

province be contiguous and a minimum of 2,000 sq. km. However, Dinagat Islands did NOT meet the

statutory

requirement of 2,000 sq. km. Their argument is that since the Implementing Rules and Regulations

of the Loca l Government Code under Art. 9.2 provides an exception that the land area requirement does not apply

if the area is not contiguous. The exception for non -contiguity is provided for in Sec. 461(b). This exception

under the Local Government Code, does not include an exception to the land area requirement. The IRR of a law

should

always

be

consistent

with

the

law,

and

hence,

if

the

IRR

goes beyond what the law said, it is unconstitutional.

12 April

2011 Decision

CONSTITUTIONAL

Initially in the dissent of Justice Nachura in the earlier decisions, he mentioned that when Sec. 461 (b)created an

exception

on contiguity, it also carried along an exception to the land area requirement because

based on the phraseology of the provision, the land area requirement modifies contiguity.

The 2nd

Motion

for

Reconsideration

was

allowed

on

the

basis

of

intervention

of

movants

who

were

not

part

of

the

original

case.

They

were

elected officials

of

Surigao Del

Norte

who were adversely affected by the outcome of the

unconstitutionalityof Dinagat Islands.

Hence, the majority now looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of provinces. They

compared

the

LGC provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception

to the land area

requirement in the cases of non -contiguity. Therefore, it must have been the intent of the

legislators to extend

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such exception

to

provinces.

The idea is that land area requirement for island provinces is unfair because it will render them far

from the government

center. If it will be construed as it was in the original decision, it will seem as if the

Congress was partial

to contiguous

provinces

which is

against

the

equal

protection clause.

2.

PRESUMPTION OF

CONSTITUTIONALITY

Alvarez v.

Guingona

(1996)

FACTS:

RA 7720, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independednt Component

City

to be

known

as

the

City

of Santiago,"

was

signed

into

law

on

5

May

1994

Prior to the passage of the said law, two bills were separately filed in the Lower House and Senate leading

to the

passage of the law:

House Bill 8817 was approved upon third reading on 17 December 1993, and was transmitted to the

Senate on 18 January 1994.

Senate Bill 1243, a counterpart bill to HB 8817, was filed in the Senate on 19 May 1993. The

bill, though filed, was not acted upon until 23 February 1994, more than a month after HB 8817

was transmitted to the

Senate.

Sec 450, LGC sets a minimum average annual income of 20 Million in order for a municipality to be converted

into

a component city.

Municipality of Santiago's average annual income w/o IRA: Php 13.1M

Municipality of Santiago's average annual income w/ IRA: Php 20.9M

ISSUES:

1. WON

RA 7720 is unconstitutional for violating Sec 24, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution -- requiring a bill of

local

application to

originate exclusively from the House of Representatives

NO. HB 8817 was filed earlier than SB 1243, and is thus considered to be the bill that initiated the legislative

process.

The

Constitution does

not

prohibit

the

filing

of

a

duplicate

bill

in the

Senate

even before

the

Lower

House

version

is

transmitted,

for

as

long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House Bill.

2. WON the

IRA

is

to

be

included

in

the

computation

of

the

average

annual

income

of

a

muncipiality

for

purposes

of its

conversion into an independent

component

city

Yes. Sec 450 (c) of the LGC provides that "the average annual income shall include the incomeaccruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non- recurring income." The IRA s are

items of income because

they

form

part

of

the

general

funds

of

the

municipality, are

recurring, and

are

so

defined

in

the

LGC

as

to

clearly distinguish them from "special funds or transfers".

Important Principle: Presumption of Constitutionality

All laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, including laws of local application. They are considered valid and

effective until the courts declare them to be unconstitutional.

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"For RA

7720

to

be

nullified,

it

must

be

shown

that

there

is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not

merely

a

doubtful

and

equivocal

one;

in

other

words,

the

grounds

for

nullity

must

be

clear

and beyond reasonable

doubt. Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish

the

basis

that

will

justify

such a

declaration;

otherwise

the

petition must

fail."

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3.

GOVERNMENTAL

POWERS/

FUNCTIONS

Municipality of

San

Fernando

v.

Firme

(1991)

FACTS:

On 16-Dec 1965 at 7am, a three-vehicle collision occurred involving a dump truck of the Municipality of San

Fernando

La Union,

a gravel

and

sand

truck,

and a passenger jeepney. At the time of the accident, the dump

truck

of

the

municipality

driven by

its

regular

employee,

A.

Bislig,

was on its way to Naguilian River to get a load of

sand and gravel for the repair of the municipalitys streets. Laureano Baina Sr, a passenger of the jeepney,

died as a result of the injuries he sustained in the collision. Banias relatives instituted a complaint for damages

against the

driver

and owner of the passenger jeepney and the dump truck. In their answer, the municipality

raised four (4) grounds

for dismissal: lack of cause of action, the non -suability of the State w/o its consent,

prescription and negligence of the jeepney driver. Judge Firme set a hearing on the sole ground of lack of

jurisdiction but

deferred resolution

on

the

other

grounds

until trial. The

municipality

filed

a

motion

for

reconsideration

against

the

order

of

the

judge but denied. Soon after, the case was deemed submitted due to

both parties failure to file their respective memoranda. The case was dismissed against the Jeepney owner

and its driver but the court held the Municipality and its driver liable for actual damages, moral damages and

Atty.s

fees.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the

municipality

can

be

sued.

(2) If in

the

affirmative, WON it can be held liable for torts committed by its regular employee who was then

engaged in

the discharge of governmental powers.

HELD:

(1) Yes. Municipality

can

sue

and

be

sued.

Generally, the State may not be sued without its consent (Art. XVI Sec. 3). When the state does waive its sovereign

immunity,

whether

express

or

implied,

it

is

only

giving

the

plaintiff

the

chance

to

prove

that

the

defendant

is

liable.Express

consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the government

enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when

the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. Municipal corporations are suable because

their

charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued (express consent).

(2) No. The

municipality

cannot

be

held

liable

for

the

torts

committed

by

its

regular

employee,

who

was

then

engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity: Governmental and Proprietary. In its governmental function,

they

exercise the right springing from sovereignty and enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. In its

proprietary

function,

it exercises

a

private,

proprietary

or corporate right, arising from its existence as legal persons

and not as public agencies. The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the

municipality, was

performing

governmental

or

proprietary

functions.

It has already been remarked that municipa l corporations are suable because their charters grant them the

competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in

the

discharge

of

governmental

functions

and can only

be

held answerable

only

if

it

can be

shown that

they

were

acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to

show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the

case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed.

Hence,

We

rule

that

the

driver

of

the

dump

truck

was

performing

duties

or

tasks

pertaining to his office.

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Decision of the respondent court modified. Petitioner municipality absolved of any liability in favor of private

respondents.

4.

PROPRIETARY

POWERS/

FUNCTIONS

City of

Manila

v.

Intermediate Appellate Court (1989)

FACTS:

Respondent Irene

Sto.

Domingo's

husband Vivencio Sto.

Domingo died and was

buried on 6

June

1971

in Lot.

159,

Block

194

of

the

North Cemetery.

The lot was leased from 1971 to 2021 per Official Receipt. Full payment of said rental was P50.00. Apart from the

official receipt, no other document was executed to embody the lease terms. Believing in good faith that

Admin.

Order

No.

5

prescribed

uniform

rules

in

the

use

and

disposition

of

burial

lots,

the

lease

of

Vivencio

was

limited

to

5

years.

On the

5th

year, the North Cemetery authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains in the lot. The bones

were stocked

in

the

warehouse

of

the

cemetery.

On All Souls' Day, respondent was shocked when the resting place did not anymore bear the stone marker.

Also,

inside the warehouse, it was just impossible to locate the remains of her late husband.

TC: Granted respondent the right to use the lot for the unexpired term, and for the North Cemetery to give a

substitute lot to be chosen by the respondent.

CA: Reversed

the TC,

and

instead

ordered

North

Cemetery

to

pay

respondent

damages.

Petitioner North

Cemetery's

contentions:

North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose (Sec. 316, Compilation of

Ordinances of

City

of

Manila)

Since it is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from

tort

liability which may be caused by its public officers/subordinate employees.

Sec. 4, Art. I of the Revised Charter of Manila exempts the city from liability

The Charter, being a special law, cannot be defeated by the Human Relations part of the Civil Code

Respondent's contentions:

The City entered into a Contract of Lease which involves an exercise of proprietary functions

ISSUES/HELD:

1. WON petitioner

was

in

the

exercise

of

proprietary

functions?

YES.

Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and endowed with faculties of

municipalcorporations. It

may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with.

Its powers are twofold: governmental/political, and corporate/proprietary/private.

Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting public welfare,

and

they

include the legislative,

judicial,

public

and

political.

Proprietary

poers

on

the other

hand are

exercised for

the

special benefit and advantage of the community, and include those which are ministerial, private, and

corporate.

McQuillin: A municipal corporation proper has ... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as

it is an

agent

in government, and private insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for

its own

community (Torio v. Fontanilla)

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As in Torio v. Fontanilla, in cases of proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation

can be held liable to third persons ex contractu. Also, "municipal corporations under the conditions herein

stated... are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability coexist..."

Here, in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City by which a

resolution

by the Municipal Board was created to regulate its use. With such acts of dominion, there is no

doubt that the Cemetery is within the class of property private in character.

Moreover, the lot was leased in favor of respondents. Hence, the obligation arising from contracts have the

force of law between the contracting parties. Any breach of the contractual provision entitles the other

party to damages

even if

no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract (Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions

Inc.)

As regards the liability, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, petitioner is liable for the tortious act

committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duraction of the contract of lease.

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