let’s take a class vote. how many of you are registered to vote?
TRANSCRIPT
Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered
to vote?
How groups can best arrive at decisions (goals).
find an out come that “reflects the will of the people.”
What do you think is the best way for millions of people to make one decision?
Preference List Ballot (def)
A ballot consisting of a rank ordering of candidates.
Usually in the form of a vertical list with our most
preferred candidate on top.
No ties allowed.
Examples of Preference List Ballot
Australia uses it too!
The Number of Voters Assumption (rule)
For the sake of avoiding excessive annoyances in the theory…
Throughout the chapter, we will assume that the number of
voters is odd. In reality, numbers of voters are often so
high that ties are unlikely anyways.
Majority RuleThe most obvious of voting methods…
3 desirable properties:
Do we take these simple traits for granted??
The first desirability fails in the system called a Dictatorship, where all ballots except the dictators are ignored…The second desirability fails in imposed rule, where a certain candidate wins regardless of who votes for whom …The third desirability fails in minority rule, where fewest votes win…
May’s Theorem (Kenneth May, 1952)
Who would beat whom if two candidates faced an election 2 at
a time?
Rank Number of Voters (3)
first A B C
second B C A
third C A B
A would defeat B (2:1)
B would defeat C (2:1)
Condorcet’s Method (procedure)
Extending majority rule to three or more candidates…
Example- Condorcet’s Method
Rank 6 5 3 1
first GB AG RN PB
second AG RN AG GB
third PB GB GB AG
fourth RN PB PB RN
Number of voters (15) Amount of voters that voted in the same order.
Who is the winner using Condorcet’s Method?
AG
too good to be true. There is one tragic flaw…
Condorcet’s Voting Paradox
Remember this slide???
Rank Number of Voters (3)
first A B C
second B C A
third C A B
A would defeat B (2:1)
B would defeat C (2:1)
C would defeat A (2:1)
Explain why it’s impossible to have two winners using Condorcet’s method with an
odd amount of voters
By definition of the method, a person wins by beating all others in head to head elections.
Since amount of voters is odd, no one head-to-head election will have a tie.
How can B beat A if A has already been determined to beat all other candidates??
Plurality Voting
Can you see a potential problem with this method???
1980 Senate Race in NY
22% 23% 15% 29% 7% 4%
D D H H J J
H J D J H D
J H J D D H
D- Alfonse D’Amato- ConservativeH- Elizabeth Holtzman- LiberalJ- Jacob Javitz- Liberal
Is there a Condorcet winner?
Who won using Plurality Voting?
Yes, Elizabeth Holtzman
Yes, Alfonse D’Amato
Condorcet Winner Criterion
Manipulability
Can you think of an example of this? It is a problem for Plurality voting, but not the Condorcet
Method
Which is your favorite to win the tournament?
Rank Methods (procedure)
Condorcet’s contemporary, Jean-Charles de Borda (1733-1799)
Borda Count (procedure)
How much is the last place vote worth??
Borda Count Failure
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
if it is impossible for a candidate B to move from nonwinner status to winner status
unless at least one voter reverses the order in which he or she had B and the winning
candidate ranked.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Show that the Borda Count Method does not
satisfy IIA.Rank Number of Voters (5)
first A A A C C
second B B B B B
third C C C A A
Rank Number of Voters (5)
first A A A B B
second B B B C C
third C C C A A
Sequential Pairwise Voting (procedure)
Start with an agenda and pair the first two candidates in a one-on-one
contest. The winner moves on to confront the third candidate in the list,
one-on-one. Losers are deleted. The candidate remaining at the end wins.
Example: Sequential Pairwise Voting
Rank NUMBER OF VOTERS (3)
first A C B
second B A D
third D B C
fourth C D A
Who Wins?
Anything wrong
with that?
Pareto Condition (failed by SPV method)
The Hare System (procedure)
Repeatedly delete candidates that are “least preferred” in the sense of being at the top of the
fewest ballots. Number of Voters (13)
Rank 5 4 3 1first A C B B
second B B C A
third C A A C
B and C are both eliminated in the
first round
Hare SystemNumber of Voters (13)
Rank 5 4 3 1first A C B A
second B B C B
third C A A C
Suppose the voter in the last
column moved A up in his or her
vote. The only
change made is
favorable to A.
Hare System
Number of Voters (13)
Rank 5 4 3 1first A C B A
second B B C B
third C A A C
Reapply the Hare system and see that only B is eliminated in the first round.
Number of Voters (13)
Rank 5 4 3 1
first A C C A
second C A A CC wins!
Wait…what do you mean C won?!?!
A won the original election and the only change was favorable to A!
There is a failure in Monotonicity with the
Hare System
Plurality Runoff Method (procedure)
A runoff method (new election using the same ballots), where the two candidates with the most first place votes are pitted
head-to head. This method is not monotone.
Number of Voters (13)
Rank 4 4 3 2
first A B C D
second B A D C
third C C A A
fourth D D B B
A and B tie with four first
place votes each
Plurality RunoffNumber of Voters (13)
Rank 4 4 3 2
first A B A A
second B A B B
A wins. Who would have won with the Hare system??
Number of Voters (13)
Rank 4 4 3 2
first A B C C
second B A A A
third C C B B
In the first round only
D would have been
eliminated.
Practice Problems
pg. 408 1-7 (skills check)
also, exercises 5-10
With so many different ways to count votes, and with so many different winners, how do
we tell who the true winner is???
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Approval Voting