let’s take a class vote. how many of you are registered to vote?

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Page 1: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?
Page 2: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered

to vote?

Page 3: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

How groups can best arrive at decisions (goals).

find an out come that “reflects the will of the people.”

What do you think is the best way for millions of people to make one decision?

Page 4: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Preference List Ballot (def)

A ballot consisting of a rank ordering of candidates.

Usually in the form of a vertical list with our most

preferred candidate on top.

No ties allowed.

Page 5: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Examples of Preference List Ballot

Australia uses it too!

Page 6: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

The Number of Voters Assumption (rule)

For the sake of avoiding excessive annoyances in the theory…

Throughout the chapter, we will assume that the number of

voters is odd. In reality, numbers of voters are often so

high that ties are unlikely anyways.

Page 7: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Majority RuleThe most obvious of voting methods…

3 desirable properties:

Page 8: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Do we take these simple traits for granted??

The first desirability fails in the system called a Dictatorship, where all ballots except the dictators are ignored…The second desirability fails in imposed rule, where a certain candidate wins regardless of who votes for whom …The third desirability fails in minority rule, where fewest votes win…

Page 9: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

May’s Theorem (Kenneth May, 1952)

Page 10: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Who would beat whom if two candidates faced an election 2 at

a time?

Rank Number of Voters (3)

first A B C

second B C A

third C A B

A would defeat B (2:1)

B would defeat C (2:1)

Page 11: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Condorcet’s Method (procedure)

Extending majority rule to three or more candidates…

Page 12: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Example- Condorcet’s Method

Rank 6 5 3 1

first GB AG RN PB

second AG RN AG GB

third PB GB GB AG

fourth RN PB PB RN

Number of voters (15) Amount of voters that voted in the same order.

Who is the winner using Condorcet’s Method?

AG

too good to be true. There is one tragic flaw…

Page 13: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Condorcet’s Voting Paradox

Page 14: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Remember this slide???

Rank Number of Voters (3)

first A B C

second B C A

third C A B

A would defeat B (2:1)

B would defeat C (2:1)

C would defeat A (2:1)

Page 15: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Explain why it’s impossible to have two winners using Condorcet’s method with an

odd amount of voters

By definition of the method, a person wins by beating all others in head to head elections.

Since amount of voters is odd, no one head-to-head election will have a tie.

How can B beat A if A has already been determined to beat all other candidates??

Page 16: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Plurality Voting

Can you see a potential problem with this method???

Page 17: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

1980 Senate Race in NY

22% 23% 15% 29% 7% 4%

D D H H J J

H J D J H D

J H J D D H

D- Alfonse D’Amato- ConservativeH- Elizabeth Holtzman- LiberalJ- Jacob Javitz- Liberal

Is there a Condorcet winner?

Who won using Plurality Voting?

Yes, Elizabeth Holtzman

Yes, Alfonse D’Amato

Page 18: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Condorcet Winner Criterion

Page 19: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Manipulability

Can you think of an example of this? It is a problem for Plurality voting, but not the Condorcet

Method

Page 20: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Which is your favorite to win the tournament?

Page 21: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Rank Methods (procedure)

Condorcet’s contemporary, Jean-Charles de Borda (1733-1799)

Page 22: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Borda Count (procedure)

How much is the last place vote worth??

Page 23: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Borda Count Failure

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)

if it is impossible for a candidate B to move from nonwinner status to winner status

unless at least one voter reverses the order in which he or she had B and the winning

candidate ranked.

Page 24: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

Page 25: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Show that the Borda Count Method does not

satisfy IIA.Rank Number of Voters (5)

first A A A C C

second B B B B B

third C C C A A

Rank Number of Voters (5)

first A A A B B

second B B B C C

third C C C A A

Page 26: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Sequential Pairwise Voting (procedure)

Start with an agenda and pair the first two candidates in a one-on-one

contest. The winner moves on to confront the third candidate in the list,

one-on-one. Losers are deleted. The candidate remaining at the end wins.

Page 27: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Example: Sequential Pairwise Voting

Rank NUMBER OF VOTERS (3)

first A C B

second B A D

third D B C

fourth C D A

Who Wins?

Anything wrong

with that?

Page 28: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Pareto Condition (failed by SPV method)

Page 29: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

The Hare System (procedure)

Repeatedly delete candidates that are “least preferred” in the sense of being at the top of the

fewest ballots. Number of Voters (13)

Rank 5 4 3 1first A C B B

second B B C A

third C A A C

B and C are both eliminated in the

first round

Page 30: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Hare SystemNumber of Voters (13)

Rank 5 4 3 1first A C B A

second B B C B

third C A A C

Suppose the voter in the last

column moved A up in his or her

vote. The only

change made is

favorable to A.

Page 31: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Hare System

Number of Voters (13)

Rank 5 4 3 1first A C B A

second B B C B

third C A A C

Reapply the Hare system and see that only B is eliminated in the first round.

Number of Voters (13)

Rank 5 4 3 1

first A C C A

second C A A CC wins!

Page 32: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Wait…what do you mean C won?!?!

A won the original election and the only change was favorable to A!

There is a failure in Monotonicity with the

Hare System

Page 33: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Plurality Runoff Method (procedure)

A runoff method (new election using the same ballots), where the two candidates with the most first place votes are pitted

head-to head. This method is not monotone.

Number of Voters (13)

Rank 4 4 3 2

first A B C D

second B A D C

third C C A A

fourth D D B B

A and B tie with four first

place votes each

Page 34: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Plurality RunoffNumber of Voters (13)

Rank 4 4 3 2

first A B A A

second B A B B

A wins. Who would have won with the Hare system??

Number of Voters (13)

Rank 4 4 3 2

first A B C C

second B A A A

third C C B B

In the first round only

D would have been

eliminated.

Page 35: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Practice Problems

pg. 408 1-7 (skills check)

also, exercises 5-10

Page 36: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

With so many different ways to count votes, and with so many different winners, how do

we tell who the true winner is???

Page 37: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Page 38: Let’s take a class vote. How many of you are registered to vote?

Approval Voting