CATHERINE & HENRY YU, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA, RESPONDENT.

PER CURIAM:On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a complaint[1]for disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa for alleged acts of defraudation, before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).[2]Complainants attached therewith their Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit[3]which they earlier filed before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati, charging the respondent and his co-accused (in the criminal case), with syndicatedestafaand violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).

The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:

Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. Uy) who introduced himself as the Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency trading.[4]Mr. Uy persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to invest a minimum amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said company. They were made to believe that the said company had the so-called "stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it to stop trading once the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions, would be reached. If, on the other hand, the company would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the investors the principal amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated checks covering the principal investments.[5]

It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketing's promises were false and fraudulent, and that the checks earlier issued were dishonored for the reason "account closed." The investors, including the complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketing's office. There, they discovered that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its operation and a new corporation was formed named Ur- Link Corporation (Ur-Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met the respondent. As Wealth Marketing's Chairman of the Board of Directors, respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would assume the obligations of the former company.[6]To put a semblance of validity to such representation, respondent signed an Agreement[7]to that effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to further deceive the investors.[8]This prompted the complainants to send demand letters to Wealth Marketing's officers and directors which remained unheeded. They likewise lodged a criminal complaint for syndicatedestafaagainst the respondent and his co-accused.[9]

Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has been successful in defying the law, to this date.

In an Order[10]dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio B. Vinluan required respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter failed to comply. Hence, the motion to declare him in default filed by the complainants.[11]The case was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the lawful orders of the Commission, respondent failed to attend the mandatory conference and to file his position paper. Respondent was thereafter declared in default and the case was heardex parte.

In his report,[12]the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketing's executives (which included respondent herein) conspired with one another in defrauding the complainants by engaging in an unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business where, in fact, no such business existed, as Wealth Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketing's financial status could not support the investors' demands involving millions of pesos. It also appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner likewise found that respondent had been previously suspended by this Court for committing similar acts of defraudation.[13]Considering the gravity of the acts committed, as well as his previous administrative case and defiance of lawful orders, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, the pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of the documents presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by the complainants involving the same respondent, and said decision of the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land, the undersigned commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa be disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys upon the approval of the Board of Governors and the Honorable Supreme Court.[14]In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioner's report and recommendation.[15]

This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.

Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined - whether in their professional or in their private capacity - for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.[16]

In the present case, two corporations were created where the respondent played a vital role, being Wealth Marketing's Chairman of the Board and Ur-Link's representative. We quote with approval the Commissioner's findings, thus:

As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati, it appears that the executive officers of Wealth Marketing Corporation conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the investors by engaging in unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business. The truth of the matter is that there was no actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is not duly licensed or authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission to perform such task.

In the General Information Sheet (Annex "I") of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation, the authorized capital stock is only P9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at the time of [in]corporation is (sic) only P605,000.00. Said corporation, as the records will show, has been dealing with investors with millions of pesos on hand, with the hope that their money would earn interests as promised. However, their company resources and financial status will show that they are not in the position to meet these demands if a situation such as this would arise.

x x x x

Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking for the return of their investments, said respondent even formed and made him part of a new company, Ur-Link Corporation, which according to the complainants, when they met the respondent, would assume the obligations of the defunct Wealth Marketing Corporation. It is also evident that respondent is frolicking with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the purpose of employing fraud.[17]To be sure, respondent's conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the same set of facts is still pending in court is of no moment. Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.[18]Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.[19]Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law.[20]The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.[21]

As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to be in order.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.

Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.[22]

The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from the practice of law inSamala v. Palaa[23]andSps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaa.[24]InSamala, respondent also played an important role in a corporation known as First Imperial Resources Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer. As in this case, respondent committed the same offense by making himself part of the money trading business when, in fact, said business was not among the purposes for which FIRI was created. Respondent was thus meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) years with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.[25]Likewise, inTejada, he was suspended for six (6) months for his continued refusal to settle his loan obligations.[26]

The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense.[27]

Finally, we note that respondent's case is further highlighted by his lack of regard for the charges brought against him. As inTejada,instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer and verified position paper, nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.[28]The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.[29]Verily, respondent's failure to comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities.[30]As a lawyer, he ought to know that the compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect of the Court.[31]By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court.[32]

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct herein-before mentioned for which he was penalized with a three- year suspension with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely; and another six-month suspension thereafter, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty --- disbarment.[33]Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.[34]

WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaa is herebyDISBARRED,and his name isORDERED STRICKENfrom the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. No. 7136 , August 1, 2007Facts:Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a sportscaster, to him as her friend who was married toMaryAnn Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondentcellphonecalls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet youat Megamall." He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not gohome from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. More so, complainant has seen Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene. Also, it was revealed that Irene gave birth to a girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.

In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterousrelationshipwith Irene, the truth of the matter being that theirrelationshipwas low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families. He also said that his specialrelationshipwith Irene is neither underscandalouscircumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment.

Issue:Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law.

Held:YES. The case at bar involves arelationshipbetween a married lawyer anda married womanwho is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between twounmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected bythe Constitutionand affirmed by ourlaws.

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law. Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

Advincula vs. Atty. Macabata AC No. 7204March 07, 2007Facts:The complainant, Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabata on the grounds ofGross Immorality. The complainant sought for legal advice from therespondent regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours which later failed tosettle its accounts with the complainant. Thus, thepossibility offiling a caseagainst Queensway Traveland Tours was discussed. After the meeting onFebruary 10, 2005, the respondent gave the complainant a ridehome. As the complainant gets off the car, the respondent allegedly held her arm, kissed her cheek and embraced her tightly. Again, after another meeting on March 06 2005, the respondent offered a ride. On the road, thecomplainant felt sleepy for noobvious reason.The respondent suddenly stopped the car in the vicinity of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. This time, therespondent forcefully held herface, kissed her lipsand held her breast. The complainant managed to escape and decided to hire another lawyer for her case. They had exchange of messages thru sms where the respondent apologized. The respondent admitted kissing the complainant on the lips however countered that there was no harassment, intimidation or lewdness instead everything was spontaneous.

Issues:Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension from the practice of law

Decision:The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, form of greetings, casual and customary. The actsof the respondent, though, in turning the head of the complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act,even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral. The complainant miserably failed to establish the burden of proof required of her. However, her efforts are lauded to stand up for her honor. The complaint for disbarment against the respondent, Atty.Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality is dismissed. However, he is reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in dealing with his clients.

CLARITA J. SAMALA,vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIABefore us is a complaint1dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.2The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda3and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation4dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.

In a minute Resolution5passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year.

We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the recommended penalty.

On serving as counsel for contending parties.Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga6by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.7In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000,8Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz9warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.

But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga10albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants.11Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdezand Albav. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property12and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment.13But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa.14Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.15He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.16It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.17One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.18The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client.19An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated.20The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either in the same case21or in a different but related action.22A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.23We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez24that the termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment.25Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.26In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdezand Albav. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required.

In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,27citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba,28we held that:

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.29Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated."

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.30From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court,31but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.

Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.32On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.

Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property.33During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore.34Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.

Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000,35before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.

Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 200236dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.

InYoung v. Batuegas,37we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients."38He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.39The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.40As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.41>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.

As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.42Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-443943and 01-03616244both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-430645for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-431846against Alvin Valencia47for trespass to dwelling.

We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.

On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age,48while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.49Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship50and does not consider the latter as his second family.51He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.52In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay lives.53It is of no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.54Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community.55That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. ValenciaGUILTYof misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He isSUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.

Donton vs Tansingco A.C 6057 June 27, 2006

Facts:

OnMay20,2003,PeterT.Donton (complainant) filed a criminal complaintforestafathrufalsification of public document against Duane O.Stier, Emelyn A. Maggay, and respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.Tansingco,asthenotarypublicwho notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

Subsequently, respondent Tansingco filed a counter-charge for perjury against complainant. The affidavit-complaint stated that: TheOCCUPANCYAGREEMENTdated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized under the following circumstances: A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time residentofareal property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street,Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City. B.Sometimein September1995,Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino. C.Mr.Stier,inthepresenceofMr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guaranteerecognitionofhimbeing the actual owner of the property despitethetransfer oftitleinthe name of Mr. Donton. D. For this purpose, Iprepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied upwithaloanwhichMr.Stierhad extended to Mr. Donton.

Thereafter,complainantprayedthat respondent be disbarred in violation ofthe Code for the act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite the knowledge that Stier was disqualified toownarealpropertyforbeinga foreign national.

On Oct 1, 2003 the Court referred the matter to the IBP for investigation and onFeb26,2004,CommissionerSan Juan found respondent liable for taking partinaschemetocircumventthe constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines and recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for 2 years and cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

OnApril16,2004,theIBPBoardofGovernors adopted the report with modification and recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for 6 months. Then on July 28, 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP stating that his practice of law is his only means of supporting his family and 6 minor children.

Issue:

WON respondent is guilty of violation of Canon I and Rule 1.02 of the CodeofProfessionalResponsibility.

Held:

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold. Respondents knowledge that Stier, a UScitizen, was disqualified from owning real property and his preparation of Occupancy Agreement that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the property, aided in circumventing the constitutionalprohibitionagainstforeignownershipoflands.Thus,heviolatedhisoathand the Code when he prepared and notarizedtheOccupancyAgreement. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.Quirino Tomlin II vs. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II 23 February 2006Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.FACTS:Atty. Salvador Moya II allegedly issued seven postdated checks to Quirino Tomlin II as partial payment for the P600,000.00 that the former borrowed from the latter.When Tomlin realized that all the said checks were dishonored by the bank, he made several demands to Moya but the latter still refused to pay his debt.Thereafter, the complainant filed seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan as well as an instant case for disbarment against Moya.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the administrative case for the respondents disbarment should be dismissed for violation of the rule on non-forum shopping; and

2. Whether or not Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation or the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:1. No.The instant petition for disbarment was not a violation of the rule against forum shopping.Forum shopping is only applicable to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.Furthermore, the main object of the seven criminal cases of the respondents violation of BP Blg. 22 is different from the administrative case at hand.The former refers to the issuance of bouncing checks, while the latter refers to the dishonesty of the respondent in the payment of his debts.

2. Yes. Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His refusal to pay his monetary obligations His refusal to pay his monetary obligations without justifiable cause, despite acknowledging said obligations and doing so without remorse, fails to comply with the expectation of lawyers to be honest in their dealings be it in their professional or private affairs. What is more, his failure to file his answer and verified position paper despite extensions of time is a manifestation of his disrespect for judicial authorities. For his acts, he was then sentenced to be suspended from practice for two years.

Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan vs Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa (A.C. No. 7360)

FACTS: Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00 (Esperon Case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder and later on November 23, 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgement of the Esperon Case.

Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Prosecutor Toribio for 30,000.00php and failed. Prosecutor Toribio excuted her affidavit on June 14, 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. On May 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case. 27776 for direct bribery on an NBI set-up entrapment operation, wherein, Atty. Silvosa demanded 15,000.00php from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas who was in detention for more than two years.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2. Whether or not a delay of the filing for an administrative complaint exonerate a respondent. 3. Whether or not crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment.

HELD:1. Yes, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Atty. Silvosa's attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of the said case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service." The Court agree with Commissioner Funa's finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03, when he entered his appearance in the motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of concern given after a full disclosure of facts." Atty. Silvosa's representation of conflicting interests merit at least the penalty of suspension.

2. No, delay of filing for an administrative complaint does not exonerate a respondent.

There is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than seven years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times expected of him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.

The Court says, mere delay in filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complaint of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring member of the bench and bar can not escape the disciplining arm of the Court. Atty. Silvosa's failed attempt at bribing Prosecutor Toribio also merit at least the penalty of suspension.

3. Yes, crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment.

Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans' judgement in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final.

Rule 138, Section 27 provides, A member of the bar may be disbarred by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, as ruled, in Magno vs COMELEC. The practice of Law is a priveledge, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise his privilege. Wherefore, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.

RURAL BANK OF SILAY, INC., vs.ATTY. ERNESTO H. PILLA

KAPUNAN,J.:

Rural Bank of Silay. Inc. (complainant) filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla (respondent) alleging deceit and gross misconduct on the part of the latter.The complaint alleges as follows:

1.That on July 23, 1975 the respondent executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the complainant over a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Sagay, Negros Occidental, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55380, purportedly as Attorney-in-Fact of the registered owners thereof, Pedro N. Torres and Oscar D. Granada.A copy of this Real Estate Mortgage is herewith attached as Annex A.

2.That together with the aforesaid Real Estate Mortgage the respondent submitted a Special Power of Attorney by virtue of which he was purportedly authorized and empowered by the registered owners Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of land in favor of the complainant.A copy of this Special Power of Attorney is herewith attached as Annex B.

3.That on the security of, among others, the aforesaid parcel of land over which the respondent represented that he is authorized to mortgage, complainant extended and released a loan to the respondent in the amount of P91,427.00.

4.That complainant subsequently and much later learned that the respondent was not at all authorized and empowered by the registered owner Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of land when it was joined as a defendant in a complaint filed by the aforesaid Oscar D. Grananda for removal of cloud on title with preliminary injunction and damages.A copy of this complaint is herewith attached as Annex C.

5.That in the aforesaid complaint as well as in the hearing conducted in connection therewith Oscar D. Granada specifically and categorically denied having executed and signed the Special Power of Attorney, Annex B, submitted by the respondent to the complainant in support of his application for a loan.

6.That the aforesaid civil case, Civil Case No. 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 60, was subsequently decided against the respondent wherein the aforesaid Court found that the Special Power of Attorney, Annex B, was indeed forged and falsified because the spouses Oscar D. Grananda and Lolita L. Granada have not signed the same and wherein the Court also made the finding that the defendant, considering that he has benefited from the said falsified document, is presumed to have a hand in the preparation of the same.A copy of this Decision is herewith attached as Annex D.

7.That the respondent has not appealed from the aforesaid Decision thereby making the findings of fact made therein final as against him.

8.That the foregoing acts of the respondent in presenting to the complainant Bank a forged and falsified Power of Attorney for the purpose of obtaining a loan is a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man and by his conduct herein has forfeited his right to continue further in the practice of law.[1]Upon the instance of the Court, respondent filed his comment refuting the charges of deceit and gross misconduct against him.Respondent denied employing any deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a loan from complainant rural bank.According to respondent, he did not know that the signature of Oscar Granada on the special power of attorney appointing him (respondent) as attorney-in-fact was forged.The special power of attorney purportedly authorized respondent to mortgaged the parcel of land in Sagay, Negros Occidental in favor of complainant rural bank.Respondent also claimed that if indeed said document was forged, he was not a party to the forgery.He cited the findings of the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, thus:

Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of the spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually benefited from the said falsified documents, he is presumed to have a hand on the same. (Decision, p. 20-annex D.)[2]Respondent maintained that he obtained the loan from complainant rural bank without depriving it of the opportunity to investigate his financial capacity as well as to ascertain the genuineness of the special power of attorney under which he acted as the mortgagor.Thus, respondent is of the view that, under the circumstances, it cannot be said that he employed deceit and gross misconduct against complainant rural bank.

After receipt of respondents comment, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.Both parties adduced their respective evidence before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.Upon agreement of the parties, the matter was resolved on the basis of their respective pleadings and the annexes attached thereto.From these pleadings, the IBP, through Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, established the following uncontroverted facts:

Purportedly acting as attorney-in-fact of a certain Pedro Torres andOscar D. Granada, by virtue of a special power of attorney, respondent applied for a loan and concomitantly executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the complainant bank covering the property of Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada.With such security, complainant extended to the respondent his loan in the amount of P91,427.00.In view of the failure of the respondent to pay the loan, the mortgaged property was foreclosed by the complainant bank.Later, Oscar Granada, the real registered owner of the mortgaged property filed a complaint against the respondent and the complainant for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and Special Power of Attorney.After the trial, the court declared null and void the said Special Power of Attorney as well as the Real Estate Mortgage for being products of forgery.This decision was not appealed by the defendants.

There is no showing that respondent, despite the adverse decision, returned or offered to return the money he took from the complainant bank.The bank then instituted this disbarment proceeding against the respondent.[3]The IBP found from the above facts that respondent violated his oath as a lawyer to do no falsehood, thus:

This office believes that the actuation of the respondent constitutes a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer.The findings of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental has persuasive effect in this proceeding.

As found by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental in its decision in Civil Case No. 1-C, entitled Spouses Oscar D. Granada and Lolita L. Granada vs. Ernesto H. Pilla, et al, the plaintiffs Granada spouses have not signed the questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of the respondent and the said spouses signatures as appearing in the Special Power of Attorney are not their true and genuine signatures for actually they have not executed nor granted a Special Power of Attorney in favor of herein respondent authorizing him to mortgage the one-third (1/3) share of the said spouses in the mortgaged property.The trial court stressed that:

Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of the spouses, Atty.Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually benefited from the said falsified documents, he is presumed to have a hand on the same.

Defendant Antonio Pura testified and in fact he admitted that he notarized the said documents, Exhibit A and B, with the assurance of Atty. Pilla that the signatures appearing in the said documents were the signatures of Atty. Oscar D. Granada and of Pedro Torres, registered owners of the property in question.

Antonio G. Pura, the notary public who notarized the questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of the respondent, testified in said Civil Case as follows:

Q Now, compaero, will you please relate to this Honorable Court the circumstances under which you notarized this Special Power of Attorney now marked as Exh. A on April 21, 1975?

A Yes, sir.I remember that on the same day, April 21, 1975, defendant Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla personally appeared before me and he brought along with him this Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor.He told me to notarize it.I asked him about the signature of Atty. Oscar D. Granada if this is his signature and he said Yes.I also asked him about the signature of the other principal and he said also Yes.With that assurance and being a brother lawyer I accommodated him.Knowing that he will not do anything that is illegal and I have confidence in him considering that he is a lawyer and he knows what he was doing, I accommodated him.

(TSN, Hearing March 15, 1993, pp. 22-23, Civil Case No. 1, RTC, Branch LX, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental)

If indeed, respondent is not responsible for the falsification of the Special Power of Attorney, why did he not explain before the trial court or before this office the circumstances on how he obtained the same.He did not even bother to identify his alleged client who provided him the forged Special Power of Attorney.Instead, respondent is banking on his defense that the complainant bank has not introduced any evidence to prove that he forged the Special Power of Attorney.He relied on the argument that his transaction with the complainant bank was purely commercial business and did not involve his capacity as a lawyer.Further, if it is truethat the respondent maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity as he asserted, why did he represent before the notary public that the signatures appearing in the Special Power of Attorney were the signatures of the real owners if he was not actually aware that the signatures were that of the real owners.

The office is convinced that the actuation of the respondent is misrepresentation constituting gross misconduct at the very least.This is a violation ofhis oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man.[4]In conclusion, Commissioner Elamparo recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five (5) years.The IBP, through Resolution No. XIV-00-175, dated 7 April 2000, of its Board of Governors, substantially adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Elamparo but modified the penalty.The IBP RESOLVED as follows:

to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as annex A, and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, said recommendation iswith modificationthat Respondent beSUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law forTHREE(3) years for misrepresentation.[5]We fully agree with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

As correctly pointed out by the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, since respondent actually benefited from the falsified document, he is presumed to have a hand in the falsification of the same.Respondent miserably failed to rebut this presumption with his barefaced denial that he had no knowledge of the forgery.The Court cannot give credence to respondents negative assertion that he did not know that the special power of attorney issued in his favor was falsified.As a lawyer, respondent knows or ought to know that parties to a public document must personally appear before the notary public to attest that the same is their own free act and deed.In utter disregard of this requirement, respondent caused the special power of attorney to be notarized without the parties appearing before the notary public.Thereafter, respondent presented the same to complainant rural bank in order to obtain a loan therefrom.It is thus apparent that respondent had a hand in the falsification of the document especially considering that it was he who chiefly benefited from it.Indeed, the settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.[6]Further, if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.[7]Respondents acts clearly fall short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 thereof, which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.The fact that the conduct pertained to respondents private dealings with complainant rural bank is of no moment.A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor.[8]Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.[9]Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years is approved.

WHEREFORE,the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla guilty of misconduct.He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES RAFOLS vs. ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOSPER CURIAM:The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyers oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Rivera v. Corral,A.C. No. 3548,July 4, 2002,384 SCRA 1.By its Board Resolution No. 1 dated March 7, 1998, the SouthCotabato-Sarangani-General Santos City (SOCSARGEN) Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resolved to refer to the IBP Board of Governors in Manila, for appropriate action and investigation, the purported anomaly involving JudgeTeodoroDizonJr. and Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.[1]Thus, onMarch 24, 1998, Atty.JoeffreyL.Montefrio, the SOCSARGENIBP Chapter President, transmitted the referral to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).

The matter involving JudgeDizon, Jr., which was docketed as Administrative Matter (AM) No.RTJ-98-1426entitledManuel C.Rafolsand Lolita C.Rafolsv. JudgeTeodoroDizon, Jr., RTC, General Santos City, Branch 37,[2]was resolved in apercuriamdecision promulgated on January 31, 2006,[3]whereby the CourtdismissedJudgeDizon, Jr. from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned and government -controlled corporations.

In the samepercuriamdecision, the Court reiterated its resolution ofOctober 21, 1998for the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct an investigation of the actuations of Atty. Barrios, Jr. (respondent), and to render its report and recommendation.

Hence, this decision.

AntecedentsThe anomaly denounced by the SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter was narrated in the joint affidavit dated March 3, 1998 of Spouses Manuel C.Rafols, Jr. and Lolita B.Rafols(complainants),[4]whose narrative was corroborated by the affidavit dated March 11, 1998ofLarrySevilla;[5]the affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of AllanRafols;[6]and the affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of DaisyRafols,[7]all of which were attached to the letter of the IBP Chapter President.Atty.ErlindaC.Verzosa, then Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, referred for appropriate action a copy of the letter and affidavits to then Court Administrator Alfredo L.Benipayo.

In turn, then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez filed with the Court an Administrative Matter for Agenda, recommending in relation to Atty. Barrios, Jr., as follows:

xxx5.The Office of the Bar ConfidantbeFURNISHED with a copy of the letter-note and its attachments so that it may conduct its own investigation in the matter with respect to the actuations of Atty. Ricardo Barrios, Jr.[8]xxxIn the resolution datedOctober 21, 1998, the Court approved the recommendations,[9]and directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to investigate the actuations of the respondent, and to render its report and recommendation thereon.

Proceedings of the OBCOnly the respondent appeared during the hearing before the OBC. Denying the charges against him, he sought the dismissal of the complaint and re-affirmed the contents of his comment. Despite notice, the complainants did not appear before the OBC. However, the complainants and the respondent had testified during the administrative hearing involving JudgeDizon, Jr. beforeCourt of Appeals Associate Justice JoseSabioJr. as the Investigating Justice. Also testifying thereat were the complainants witnesses, namely: AllanRafols, DaisyRafolsand LarrySevilla.A.Evidence for the ComplainantsThe complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6209 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) inGeneralSantosCity, wherein they sought the cancellation of a deed of sale. Civil Case No. 6209 was assigned to Branch 37 of the RTC, presided by JudgeDizon, Jr. The complainants were represented by the respondent, paying to himP15,000.00as acceptance fee.

OnDecember 22, 1997, at9:30 a.m., the respondent visited the complainants at their residence and informed complainant Manuel that the judge handling their case wanted to talk to him. The respondent and Manuel thus went to the East Royal Hotels coffee shop where JudgeDizon, Jr. was already waiting. The respondent introduced Manuel to the judge, who informed Manuel that their case was pending in hissala. The judge likewise said that he would resolve the case in their favor, assuring their success up to the Court of Appeals, if they could deliverP150,000.00to him. As he had no money at that time, Manuel told the judge that he would try to produce the amount. The judge then stated that he would wait for the money untilnoonof that day. Thus, Manuel left the coffee shop together with the respondent, who instructed Manuel to come up with the money beforenoonbecause the judge badly needed it. The two of them went to a lending institution, accompanied by AllanRafols, but Manuel was told there that onlyP50,000.00could be released the next day. From the lending institution, they went to the complainants shop to look forDitasRafols, Allans wife, who offered to withdrawP20,000.00from her savings account.

On their way to the bank, Manuel, Allan andDitasdropped off the respondent at the hotel for the latter to assure JudgeDizon, Jr. that the money was forthcoming. Afterwards,Ditasand Manuel withdrewP20,000.00andP30,000.00 from their respective bank accounts, and went back to the hotel with the cash. There, they saw the judge and his driver, who beckoned to them to go towards the judges Nissan pick-up then parked along the highway in front of the hotel. Manuel alighted from his car and approached the judge. Manuel personally handed the money to the judge, who told Manuel after asking about the amount that it was not enough. Thereafter, Manuel entered the hotels coffee shop and informed the respondent that he had already handed the money to the judge.

OnDecember 24, 1997, at about6:00 a.m., the respondent again visited the complainants. He was on board the judges Nissan pick-up driven by the judges driver. The respondent relayed to the complainants the message that the judge needed the balance ofP100,000.00in order to complete the construction of his new house in time for the reception of his daughters wedding. However, the complainants managed to raise onlyP80,000.00, which they delivered to the respondent on that same day.

OnJanuary 20, 1998, JudgeDizon, Jr. called up the complainants residence and instructed their son to request his parents to return his call, leaving his cell phone number. When Manuel returned the call the next day, the judge instructed Manuel to see him in his office. During their meeting in his chambers, the judge demanded the balance ofP30,000.00. Manuel clarified to the judge that his balance was onlyP20,000.00due to the previous amount given being alreadyP80,000.00. The judge informed him that the amount that the respondent handed was short. Saying that he badly needed the money, the judge insisted onP30,000.00, and even suggested that the complainants should borrow in order to raise that amount.

OnJanuary 22, 1998, JudgeDizon, Jr. called the complainants to inquire whethertheP30,000.00was ready for pick up. After Manuel replied that he was ready with the amount, the judge asked him to wait for 20 minutes. The judge and his driver later arrived on board his Nissan pick-up. Upon instructions of the judges driver, the complainants followed the Nissan pick-up until somewhere inside theDoaSoledad Estate,Espina,GeneralSantosCity. There, the judge alighted and approached the complainants and shook their hands. At that point, Manuel handedP30,000.00to the judge. The judge then told Manuel that the RTC judge inIloiloCitybefore whom the perpetuation of the testimony of SoledadElevencionado-Providowas made should still testify as a witness during the trial in hissalain order for the complainants to win. The judge persuaded the complainants to give money also to that judge; otherwise, they should not blame him for the outcome of the case.

The complainants were forced to give money to the judge, because they feared that the judge would be biased against them unless they gave in to his demands.But when they ultimately sensed that they were being fooled about their case, they consulted LarrySevilla, theirmediamenfriend, and narrated toSevillaall the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.They agreed that the details should be released to the media. Theexposwas published in theNewsmaker,a local newspaper.

Thereafter, the respondent and JudgeDizon, Jr. made several attempts to appease the complainants by sending gifts and offering to return a portion of the money, but the complainants declined the offers.

According to the complainants, the respondent demandedP25,000.00as his expenses in securing the testimony of SoledadElevencionado-ProvidoinIloiloCityto be used as evidence in their civil case. In addition, the respondent requested the complainants to borrowP60,000.00from the bank because he wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he needed to giveP11,000.00 to his nephew who was due to leave for work abroad.

B.Evidence for the RespondentIn his verified comment datedMarch 22, 2006,[10]the respondent confirmed that the complainants engaged him as their counsel in Civil Case No. 6209. His version follows.

OnDecember 22, 1997, the respondent introduced Manuel to JudgeDizon, Jr. inside the East Royal Hotels coffee shop. The respondent stayed at a distance, because he did not want to hear their conversation. Later, Manuel approached the respondent and gave himP2,000.00. When the respondent asked what the money was for, Manuel replied that it was in appreciation of the formers introducing the latter to the judge. The respondent stated that Manuel did not mention what transpired between the latter and the judge; and that the judge did not tell him (respondent) what transpired in that conversation.

Two days later, the respondent again visited the complainants at their house inGeneralSantosCityon board the judges Nissan pick-up driven by the judges driver, in order to receive theP80,000.00from the complainants. The amount was being borrowed by the judge for his swimming pool. Later on, the judge told the respondent to keepP30,000.00as a token of their friendship. After Manuel handed theP80,000.00, the respondent and the judges driver headed towardsDavaoCity, where, according to the judges instruction, they redeemed the judges wristwatch forP15,000.00 from a pawnshop. The driver brought the remaining amount ofP35,000.00to the judge in his home.

OnJanuary 27, 1998, JudgeDizon, Jr. visited the respondent at the latters house to ask him to execute an affidavit. Declining the request at first, the respondent relented only because the judge became physically weak in his presence and was on the verge of collapsing. Nonetheless, the respondent refused to notarize the document.

In that affidavitdatedJanuary 27, 1998,[11]the respondent denied that JudgeDizon, Jr. asked money from the complainants; and stated that he did not see the complainants handing the money to the judge. He admitted that he was the one who had requested the judge to personally collect his unpaid attorneys fees from the complainants with respect to their previous and terminated case; and that the judge did not ask money from the complainants in exchange for a favorable decision in their case.

OnJanuary 28, 1998, the respondent returned to the complainants residence, but was surprised to find complainant Lolita crying aloud. She informed him that the judge was again asking an additionalP30,000.00although they had given himP30,000.00 only the week before. She divulged that the judge had told her that their case would surely lose because: (a) they had engaged a counsel who wasmahinangklase; (b) the judge hearing Civil Case No. 5645 in Iloilo and the woman who had testified in Civil Case No. 6029 had not been presented; and (c) they would have to spend at leastP10,000.00for said judges accommodations in General Santos City.[12]OnJanuary 31, 1998, JudgeDizon, Jr. went to the house of the respondent, but the latter was not home. The judge left a note addressed to the complainants, and instructed the respondents secretary to deliver the note to the complainants along with a gift (imported table clock).[13]According to the respondent, the complainants consistently refused to accept the gift several times; it was later stolen from his house inCebuCity.

OnFebruary 1, 1998, the respondent delivered the note and gift to the complainants, but the latter refused to receive it, telling him that they were no longer interested to continue with the case. At the same time, the complainants assured him that they bore no personal grudge against him, because they had a problem only with JudgeDizon, Jr.

OnFebruary 24, 1998, the respondent went to the National Bureau of Investigation Regional Office, Region XI, and the Philippine National Police Regional Office, Region XI, both inDavaoCity, to request the investigation of the matter.[14]OnMarch 2, 1998, the respondent paid JudgeDizon, Jr. a visit upon the latters request.In that meeting, the respondent told the judge about the refusal of the complainants to accept the judges gift and about their decision not to continue with the case.[15]On the next day, JudgeDizon, Jr. sent a note to the respondent to inform him that the judge had raised the amount that he had borrowed from the complainants.[16]The judge requested the respondent to tell the complainants that he (Judge Dizon, Jr.) was going to return whatever he had borrowed from them. However, the complainants informed the respondent that he should tell the judge that they were no longer interested in getting back the money.

The respondent made a follow-up at the NBI and PNP Regional Offices inDavaoCityof his request for assistance after Manuel mentioned to him that he (Manuel) knew of many armed men ready at any time to help him in his problem with the judge

Report and Recommendation of the OBCIn its Report and Recommendation dated May 15, 2008,[17]the OBC opined that the administrative case against the respondent could not be dismissed on the ground of failure to prosecute due to the complainants failure to appear in the scheduled hearing despite due notice.

Based on the facts already established and identified, as rendered in the decision datedJanuary 21, 2006inManuelRafolsand Lolita B.Rafolsv. JudgeTeodoroA.Dizon,[18]the OBC rejected the respondents denial of any knowledge of the transaction between his clients and the judge.

The OBC recommended:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that respondent ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS, Jr. be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years with a stern warning that a repetition of similar act in the future will be dealt more severely.

Ruling of the CourtWe approve and adopt the report and recommendations of the OBC, which we find to be fully and competently supported by the evidence adduced by the complainants and their witnesses, but we impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, which we believe is the proper penalty.

ISection 27, Rule 138 of theRules of Court,which governs the disbarment and suspension of attorneys, provides:

Section 27.Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by the SupremeCourt; groundstherefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. Thepractice of soliciting cases at law for thepurpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers constitutemalpractice.

The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty.[19]As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.[20]

Here, the complainants successfully overcame the respondents presumed innocence and the presumed regularity in the performance of his duties as an attorney of the complainants. The evidence against him was substantial, and was not contradicted.

To begin with, the respondents denial of knowledge of the transaction between the complainants and JudgeDizon, Jr. was not only implausible, but also unsubstantiated. It was the respondent himself who had introduced the complainants to the judge. His act of introducing the complainants to the judge strongly implied that the respondent was aware of the illegal purpose of the judge in wanting to talk with the respondents clients. Thus, we unqualifiedly accept the aptness of the following evaluation made in the OBCs Report and Recommendation,viz:xxx Being the Officer of the Court, he must have known that meeting litigants outside the court is something beyond the bounds of the rule and that it can never be justified by any reason. He must have known the purpose of JudgeDizonin requesting him to meet the complainants-litigants outside the chamber of JudgeDizon. By his overt act in arranging the meeting between JudgeDizonand complainants- litigants in the Coffee Shop of the East Royal Hotel, it is crystal clear that he must have allowed himself and consented to JudgeDizonsdesire to ask money from the complainants-litigants for a favorable decision of their case which was pending before thesalaof JudgeDizon.[21]Secondly, the respondents insistence that he did not see the complainants act of handing the money to the judge is unbelievable. In his comment, the respondent even admitted having himself received theP80,000.00from the complainants, and having keptP30,000.00 of that amount pursuant to the instruction of the judge as a token of the friendship between him and the judge.[22]The admission proved that the respondent had known all along of the illegal transaction between the judge and the complainants, and belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the money to the judge.

Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the complainants had given the money to the judge as a loan, far from softening our strong impression of the respondents liability, confirmed his awareness of the gross impropriety of the transaction. Being the complainants attorney in the civil case being heard before the judge, the respondent could not but know that for the judge to borrow money from his clients was highly irregular andoutrightlyunethical. If he was innocent of wrongdoing, as he claimed, he should have desisted from havinganypart in the transaction. Yet, he did not, which rendered his explanation unbelievable. Compounding the unworthiness of his explanation was his admission of having retainedP30,000.00of the borrowedmoney upon the judges instruction.And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that the respondents act of requesting the NBI Regional Office inDavaoCityto investigate was an afterthought on his part. We agree with the OBC, for the respondent obviously acted in order to anticipate the complainants movesagainsthim and the judge. To be sure, the respondent sensed that the complainants would not simply forgive and forget the mulcting they had suffered at the hands of the judge and their own attorney from the time that the complainants assured him that they were no longer interested to get back their money despite their being very angry at the judges greed.

Overall, the respondent denials were worthless and unavailing in the face of theuncontradictedevidence showing that he had not only personally arranged the meeting between Manuel and JudgeDizon, Jr., but had also communicated to the complainants the judges illegal reason for the meeting. It is axiomatic that any denial, to be accepted as a viable defense in any proceeding, must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. This need derives from the nature of a denial as evidence of a negative and self-serving character, weightless in law and insufficient to overcome the testimony of credible witnesses on affirmative matters.[23]

IIThe practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions.[24]Theattorneyisavanguard of our legalsystem, and, as such, is expected to maintainnot only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in order that the peoples faith and confidence in the legal system are ensured.[25]Thus, he must conduct himself, whether in dealing with his clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all times.[26]Any violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition on the attorney of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.[27]Specifically, theCode of Professional Responsibilityenjoins an attorney from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful conduct.[28]Corollary to this injunction is the rule that an attorney shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.[29]The respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards of the Law Profession, which demanded of him as an attorney the absolute abdication of any personal advantage that conflicted in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his clients. For monetary gain, he disregarded the vow to delay no man for money or malice and to conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients that he made when he took the Lawyers Oath.[30]He also disobeyed the explicit command to him as an attorney to accept nocompensationin connection with his clients business exceptfrom him or with his knowledge and approval.[31]He conveniently ignored that the relation between him and his clients was highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character.[32]

Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, which is improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful incharacter, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.[33]Any gross misconduct of an attorney in his professional or private capacity shows him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.[34]The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced JudgeDizon, Jr. wereconspiratorsagainst the formers own clients, whom he was sworn to protect and to serve with utmost fidelity and morality, is inevitable for the Court to make in this administrative case. And, being conspirators, they both deserve the highest penalty. The disbarment of the respondent is in order, because such sanction is on par with the dismissal of JudgeDizon, Jr.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is disbarred.

This decision shall be entered in the records of Atty. Barrios, Jr. as a member of the Philippine Bar.

Copies of the decision shall be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of thePhilippinesfor record purposes; and to the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts nationwide.

SO ORDERED.

ESPINOSA vs. ATTY JULIETA OMANAThe CaseBefore the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) andMaximoA.Glindo(Glindo) against Atty.JulietaA.Omaa(Omaa).

The Antecedent FactsComplainants Espinosa andGlindochargedOmaawith violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife ElenaMarantal(Marantal) soughtOmaaslegal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983.Omaathen prepared a document entitled KasunduanNgPaghihiwalay (contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS

BAYAN NG GUMACA

LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA,mgaFilipino, maysapatnagulang, dating legalnamag-asawa,kasalukuyangnaninirahanat maypahatirangsulatsaBrgy.Buensoceso,Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC,Intramuros,Manilaayonsapagkakasunod sunod,mataposmakapanumpangnaaayonsabatasaynagpapatunayngnagkasundongmgasumusunod:

1.Nanaisnanamingmaghiwalayatmagkanya-kanyangamingmgabuhayngwalangpakialaman, kungkayatbawatisasaaminaymaaaringhumanapngmakakasamasabuhay;

2.NaangamingmgaanaknasinaAriel John Espinosa, 14nataonggulang;AizaEspinosa, 11taonggulangatAldrinEspinosa, 10taonggulangaynamilinakungkaninosasamasaamingdalawa. Si Ariel John atAizaEspinosa aysasamasakanilangama, Rodolfo Espinosa, atangbunso,AldrinEspinosa atsasamanamansainanasiElena;

3.NadahilsinaAriel John atAizaaynagsisipag-aralsakasalukuyansilaaypansamantalangmananatilisakanilangina,habangtinataposangkanilangpag-aaral. Sapasukansilaaymaaaringisamangama,salugarkungsaansiyaaynaninirahan;

4.Naangmgabataaymaaaringdalawinngsinomansaamingdalawatuwingmaypagkakataon;

5.NamagbibigayngbuwananggastusinosuportaangamakayAldrinatangkakulangansamgapangangailangannitoaypupunanngina;

6.NalahatngmgakasangkapansabahaytuladngT.V., gas stove,mgakagamitansakusinaayaking(Rodolfo)ipinagkakaloobkayElena athindinaakointeresadodito;

7.Nalahatngmaaaringmaipundarngsinomansaamindalawasamgapanahongdaratingayamingmgasari-sarilingpag-aarinaathindinapinagsamahano conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAYnglahatngito,nilagdaannaminitongayongika-17ngNobyembre, 1997,ditosaGumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)

ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA

NagkasundoNagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAANditosaharapkongayongika-17ngNobyembre, 1997,ditosaGumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA

Notary Public

PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97

Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;

Book No.XI;

Series of 1997.Complainants alleged thatMarantaland Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However,Marantaleventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainantGlindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed byOmaawas not valid. Espinosa andGlindothen hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint againstOmaabefore the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaaalleged that she knowsGlindobut she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admi