In Re: De Vera, [A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC, July 29, 2002]

In Re: De Vera, [A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC, July 29, 2002]Facts:Atty. De Vera made some remarks to the Philippine Daily Inquirer regarding a pending case involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. In one statement, he asked the SC to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional and that his group was greatly disturbed by the rumors. In another statement, he said that a decision in favor of the laws unconstitutionality would trigger mass actions and the people would not just swallow any SC decision that is basically wrong. Atty. De Vera admitted to making the statements but that these were factually accurate and that these are within his right to freedom of speech. Also, his second statement is allegedly historically correct (Marcos and Eraptimes) but that both statements are not to degrade the court, to destroy public confidence and to bring it into disrepute. The SC found that de Veras acts constitute indirect contempt and fined himP20, 000.Issue:Whether or not Atty. De Veras acts constitute a violation of the provisions ofthe Codeof Professional Responsibility.Held:Yes. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must be balanced with therequirementsof equally important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. De Vera is in abuse of his right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, forthe exerciseof said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect and confidence thereof. His statements are not fair criticisms of any decision of the Court, but are threats made against it to force the Court to decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk earning the ire of the public. It tends to promote distrust an undermines public confidence in the judiciary, by creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially, uninfluenced by public clamor and other extraneous influences.

ENBANC[G.R.No.159486-88.November25,2003]

ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN[SPECIAL DIVISION],Facts:Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent justices have violated Rule5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption ofVice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to thePresidency in violation of the1987 Constitution.

Rule5.10.Ajudgeisentitledtoentertain personalviewsonpolitical questions. Buttoavoidsuspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to partyfunds, publiclyendorsecandidatesfor political officeorparticipateinotherpartisanpoliticalactivities.

Petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged a case that wouldassail the legality of the attack on by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada vs Arroyo is a patent mockery of justice and due process. According to Atty. Paguia during the hearing for the Motion for Reconsideration on June 11, 2003, the three justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against the client. Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language when she blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto, remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion wouldresult inchaosand disorder.PromptedbytheallegedbiasandpartialattitudeoftheSandiganbayan justices, Atty. Paguia filed a motion for their disqualification on July 14, 2003. He also asked the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al.

last January 20, 2001 in: a.)goingtoEDSA2 b)authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground ofpermanentdisabilityeven without proof of compliance with correspoinding constitutional conditions such as a written declaration by either the President or majority of his cabinet; and c)) actually proclaiming Vice President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability.

In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice ArtemioV.Panganiban, hehas demanded,inaclearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court Ruled that the instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be Dismissed for gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief ofpetition for certiorari under Rule 65 of theRevised Rules of Civil Procedure.-In a resolution, dated 08 July2003, the Court strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, onpain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members.-Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.In fact, on the7th September 2003 issue of theDaily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say:

What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of law? It rendersthe decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were notobserved. There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, ChiefJusticeDavideandhis fellow justices had already committed to the other party-GMA- with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act? Issue:WON Atty. Paguia committed aviolation of theCode ofProfessional Responsibility.Held:-Criticism or comment made in goodfaith on thecorrectness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, ofa decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten the court andcontribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.) However, Attorney Paguiahas not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within the judicial forum. Indeed, he hasrepeated his assault on the Court in bothbroadcast and print media.

Rule 13.02 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making suchpublic statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion foror against a party. By his acts,Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed apotentially dangerous threatto theadministration ofjustice.

-It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context, relates to acts designedtocause thesuccessorthe defeatofaparticularcandidateorcandidateswhohavefiled certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no different from their appearance in suchother official functions asattending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President ofthe Philippines before the Legislative Department.-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.-Canon11oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitymandatesthatthelawyershouldobserveand maintain the respect due to thecourts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist onsimilar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members ofthe Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded inseeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

-The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.-WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer ofthe Court.Pobre vs Sen. SantiagoFacts:Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against Sen. Santiago on her speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of the Congress on the Senate floor insulting the Judicial Bar Council and Chief Justice Panganiban.

Issue:Was the speech of Sen. Santiago within constitutional bounds of freedom of speech?

Ruling:Yes. Although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.The Court, however, wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.YOUNG VS BATUEGASA.C. No. 5379 May 9, 2003 ( YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.)

Young filed a complaint for disbarment against respondents for committing deliberate falsehood in court & violating the lawyers oath. Young is the private prosecutor in the murder case, P vs. Arana. Batuegas& Llantino were counsels for accused,Counsels for accused filed a Manifestation w/Motion forBail alleging that their clientvoluntarilysurrendered to a person in authority on Dec 13,2000 but when infact accused was only in custody onDec 14, 2000, as shownby the Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief ofthe Security Management Division of the NBI.Clerk of court, Susa, also a respondent on this case filed the motion onDec 15, 2000 despite theirregularities of the case of (lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which was referred to in the Motion asAnnex). ISSUE:

WON the counsel isguilty of deliberate falsehood in declaring custody ofthe accused.

WON the prosecutor must begiven a reasonable notice of hearing.

WON the clerk of court would be held liable for wrong entry.

HELD:

YES, To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that the court strongly condemn. They violated their oathwhen they resorted to deception.Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation.In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice ofhearing of the motion for bailtwo days prior to the scheduled date.Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule.Verily, as lawyers, they areobliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.Clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it wasauthorized by the presiding judge. However, heis reminded that his administrative functions, although not involving the discretion orjudgment of a judge, arevital to the prompt and sound administration of justice.Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules ofprocedure.

Batuegas, Nazareno and LLantino suspended for 6 months.Complaint against Susa, dismissedfor lack ofmerit.In re: SottoJanuary 21, 1949

Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to show cause why he shouldnotbepunishedfor contempt inconnectionwithhiswritten statement of the Supreme Court's decision in the matter ofAngel Parazo's case, which was published in Manila Times and in other newspapers in the locality. Sotto was given ten daysmore besides the five originallygiven him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given himthe said answerwas admitted. He does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. He however, contends that under

section13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,whichconfersuponthis SupremeCourtthepowertopromulgaterulesconcerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the Supreme Court has has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can onlyimpose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the ChiefExecutive.He also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith andwith no intention of offending any of the majority of thehonorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneouslydecided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended toattack the honesty or integrity of any one.

Issue: Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt.

HELD:The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false imputations against its members.He accused them of such depravityastohavecommitted"blundersandinjustices deliberately."Hehasmaliciouslybrandedthemtobe incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to bethe opposite of those whowere the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needingalesson inlaw,toberendering anintolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better qualified Justices. Respondenthasnotpresentedanyevidenceorofferedanyto support his slanderous imputations, and no single word can befound in his answer showing that heever believed that theimputations arebased on fact.It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is underspecialobligationtoberespectfulinhisconductand communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or strickenfromtherollofattorneysasbeingguiltyofflagrant misconduct.Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No.102781)Facts:Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.Issue:Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courtsHeld:A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.