CATHERINE & HENRY YU, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA, RESPONDENT.

PER CURIAM:

On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed

a complaint[1]

for disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K.

Palaa for alleged acts of defraudation, before the Commission on

Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP).[2]

Complainants attached therewith their Consolidated

Complaint-Affidavit[3]

which they earlier filed before the City

Prosecutor's Office of Makati, charging the respondent and his co-

accused (in the criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).

The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:

Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U.

Uy (Mr. Uy) who introduced himself as the Division Manager of

Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation (Wealth

Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency trading. [4]

Mr. Uy

persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to invest

a minimum amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said

company. They were made to believe that the said company had the

so-called "stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it to stop trading once

the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total

contributions, would be reached. If, on the other hand, the company

would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the investors the

principal amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further,

Wealth Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued,

postdated checks covering the principal investments.[5]

It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketing's promises were false

and fraudulent, and that the checks earlier issued were dishonored

for the reason "account closed." The investors, including the

complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketing's office. There, they

discovered that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its operation

and a new corporation was formed named Ur- Link Corporation (Ur-

Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the

former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met

the respondent. As Wealth Marketing's Chairman of the Board of

Directors, respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would

assume the obligations of the former company.[6]

To put a semblance

of validity to such representation, respondent signed an

Agreement [7]

to that effect which, again, turned out to be another

ploy to further deceive the investors.[8]

This prompted the

complainants to send demand letters to Wealth Marketing's officers

and directors which remained unheeded. They likewise lodged a

criminal complaint for syndicatedestafa against the respondent and

his co-accused. [9]

Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into

hiding and has been successful in defying the law, to this date.

In an Order[10]

dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline

Rogelio B. Vinluan required respondent to submit his Answer to the

complaint but the latter failed to comply. Hence, the motion to

declare him in default filed by the complainants.[11]

The case was

thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the

Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the

lawful orders of the Commission, respondent failed to attend the

mandatory conference and to file his position paper. Respondent

was thereafter declared in default and the case was heardex parte.

In his report,[12]

the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketing's

executives (which included respondent herein) conspired with one

another in defrauding the complainants by engaging in an unlawful

network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency

trading business where, in fact, no such business existed, as Wealth

Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking. This was

bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketing's financial status could

not support the investors' demands involving millions of pesos. It also

appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to

perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner

likewise found that respondent had been previously suspended by

this Court for committing similar acts of defraudation.[13]

Considering

the gravity of the acts committed, as well as his previous

administrative case and defiance of lawful orders, the Commissioner

recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law,

the pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of

the documents presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by

the complainants involving the same respondent, and said decision

of the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land, the

undersigned commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty.

Antoniutti K. Palaa be disbarred and his name be stricken off the

Roll of Attorneys upon the approval of the Board of Governors and

the Honorable Supreme Court.[14]

In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors

adopted and approved the Commissioner's report and

recommendation.[15]

This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.

Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As

vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not

only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,

integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people's faith and

confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be

disciplined - whether in their professional or in their private capacity -

for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good

demeanor.[16]

In the present case, two corporations were created where the

respondent played a vital role, being Wealth Marketing's Chairman of

the Board and Ur-Link's representative. We quote with approval the

Commissioner's findings, thus:

As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati, it

appears that the executive officers of Wealth Marketing Corporation

conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the investors by engaging

in unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in

foreign currency trading business. The truth of the matter is that

there was no actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is

not duly licensed or authorized by the Securities and Exchange

Commission to perform such task.

In the General Information Sheet (Annex "I") of Wealth Marketing

and General Services Corporation, the authorized capital stock is

only P9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at the time of

[in]corporation is (sic) only P605,000.00. Said corporation, as the

records will show, has been dealing with investors with millions of

pesos on hand, with the hope that their money would earn interests

as promised. However, their company resources and financial status

will show that they are not in the position to meet these demands if a

situation such as this would arise.

x x x x

Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking

for the return of their investments, said respondent even formed and

made him part of a new company, Ur-Link Corporation, which

according to the complainants, when they met the respondent, would

assume the obligations of the defunct Wealth Marketing Corporation.

It is also evident that respondent is frolicking with the Securities and

Exchange Commission for the purpose of employing fraud.[17]

To be sure, respondent's conduct falls short of the exacting

standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the

same set of facts is still pending in court is of no moment.

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that

administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.

They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of

criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial

question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in

the administrative proceedings. [18]

Besides, it is not sound judicial

policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a

complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court

will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and

continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole

period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the

objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.[19]

Disciplinary

proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for

private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the

public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official

ministration of persons unfit to practice law.[20]

The attorney is called

to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.[21]

As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to

be in order.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office

as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or

other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by

reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for

any violation of the oath which he is required to take before

admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order

of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an

attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.

Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe

form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must

always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative

reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and

moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a

member of the bar.[22]

The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing

an administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from

the practice of law inSamala v. Palaa[23]

and Sps. Amador and

Rosita Tejada v. Palaa.[24]

In Samala, respondent also played an

important role in a corporation known as First Imperial Resources

Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer. As in this case,

respondent committed the same offense by making himself part of

the money trading business when, in fact, said business was not

among the purposes for which FIRI was created. Respondent was

thus meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) years with a

warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt

with more severely.[25]

Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six

(6) months for his continued refusal to settle his loan obligations.[26]

The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service

upon him of the warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his

criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense.[27]

Finally, we note that respondent's case is further highlighted by his

lack of regard for the charges brought against him. As

in Tejada, instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did

not bother to file an answer and verified position paper, nor did he

participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his

conduct.[28]

The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity

of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies

the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the

evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that

degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of

him.[29]

Verily, respondent's failure to comply with the orders of the

IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial

authorities. [30]

As a lawyer, he ought to know that the compulsory bar

organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the

investigation of complaints against lawyers. In short, his

disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect of

the Court.[31]

By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent

exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the

Court.[32]

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of

his prior misconduct herein-before mentioned for which he was

penalized with a three- year suspension with a warning that a

repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more

severely; and another six-month suspension thereafter, the

contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which

grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition

of a much graver penalty --- disbarment. [33]

Of all classes and

professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.

He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to

repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to

ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position

and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and

dangerous elements of the body politic. [34]

WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaa is

hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from

the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his

record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served

on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the

Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. No. 7136 , August 1, 2007 Facts: Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath." The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a sportscaster, to him as her friend who was married to Mary Ann Tantoco with whom he had three children. After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. More so, complainant has seen Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene. Also, it was revealed that Irene gave birth to a girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.

In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families. He also said that his special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalouscircumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment. Issue: Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law. Held: YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law. Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect

for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

Advincula vs. Atty. Macabata AC No. 7204March 07, 2007 Facts: The complainant, Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabata on the grounds of Gross Immorality. The complainant sought for legal advice from the respondent regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours which later failed to settle its accounts with the complainant. Thus, the possibility of filing a case against Queensway Traveland Tours was discussed. After the meeting on February 10, 2005, the respondent gave the complainant a ridehome. As the complainant gets off the car, the respondent allegedly held her arm, kissed her cheek and embraced her tightly. Again, after another meeting on March 06 2005, the respondent offered a ride. On the road, the complainant felt sleepy for no obvious reason. The respondent suddenly stopped the car in the vicinity of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. This time, the respondent forcefully held her face, kissed her lips and held her breast. The complainant managed to escape and decided to hire another lawyer for her case. They had exchange of messages thru sms where the respondent apologized. The respondent admitted kissing the complainant on the lips however countered that there was no harassment, intimidation or lewdness instead everything was spontaneous. Issues: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension from the practice of law Decision: The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, form of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of the respondent, though, in turning the head of the complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral. The complainant miserably failed to establish the burden of proof required of her.

However, her efforts are lauded to stand up for her honor. The complaint for disbarment against the respondent, Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality is dismissed. However, he is reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in dealing with his clients.

CLARITA J. SAMALA, vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA

Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J.

Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

2

The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda

3 and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation

4 dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent

guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.

In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year.

We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the recommended penalty.

On serving as counsel for contending parties.

Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga

6 by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.

7

In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000,

8 Presiding

Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from

repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.

But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga

10 albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in

behalf of the tenants. 11

Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and

Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property

12 and it was

only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. 13

But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa.

14 Thus, the filing of

Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.

15 He may not also undertake to discharge

conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.

16 It springs from the relation of attorney and client

which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

17

One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.

18

The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client.

19

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated.

20 The bare attorney-client relationship with a client

precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either in the same case

21 or in a different but

related action. 22

A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.

23

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24

that the termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment.

25 Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the

severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.

26

In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required.

In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27

citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba,

28 we held that:

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.

29

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated."

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.

30

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court,

31 but the same will

not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.

Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication

befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.

32

On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.

Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property.

33 During the hearing

before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore.

34 Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the

truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.

Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000,

35 before RTC, Branch

273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.

Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he

mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002

36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment.

What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.

In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients."

38He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his

high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.

39 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect

only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.

40 As such, he should make himself more an

exemplar for others to emulate.41

>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S.

No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.

As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.

42

Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43

and 01-036162 44

both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306

45 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318

46 against

Alvin Valencia 47

for trespass to dwelling.

We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.

On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age,

48 while his first

wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.

49Respondent further

admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair

with Lagmay as a relationship 50

and does not consider the latter as his second family.

51 He reasoned that he was not staying with

Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.

52

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay lives.

53 It is of no moment that

respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.

54 Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate

to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community.

55 That respondent

subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.

Donton vs Tansingco A.C 6057 June 27, 2006 Facts: On May 20, 2003, Peter T. Donton (complainant) filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of public document against Duane O.Stier, Emelyn A. Maggay, and respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.Tansingco, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement. Subsequently, respondent Tansingco filed a counter-charge for

perjury against complainant. The affidavit-complaint stated that:

The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was

prepared and notarized under the following circumstances: A. Mr.

Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property

located at No. 33 Don Jose Street,Bgy. San Roque, Murphy,

Cubao, Quezon City. B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier

a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his

name agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr.

Donton, a Filipino. C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton,

requested me to prepare several documents that would

guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the

property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton. D.

For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY

AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed use of

the property for his residence and business operations. The

OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied

up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.

Thereafter, complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred in violation of the Code for the act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite the knowledge that Stier was disqualified to own a real property for being a foreign national. On Oct 1, 2003 the Court referred the matter to the IBP for investigation and on Feb 26, 2004, Commissioner San Juan found respondent liable for taking part in a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines and recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for 2 years and cancellation of his commission as Notary Public. On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report with modification and recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for 6 months. Then on July 28, 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP stating that his practice of law is his only means of supporting his family and 6 minor children. Issue: WON respondent is guilty of violation of Canon I and Rule 1.02 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility. Held: A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold. Respondents knowledge that Stier, a US citizen, was disqualified from owning real property and his preparation of Occupancy Agreement that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the property, aided in circumventing the constitutionalprohibition against foreign ownershipof lands. Thus, he violated his oathand the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.

Quirino Tomlin II vs. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II 23 February 2006 Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J. FACTS: Atty. Salvador Moya II allegedly issued seven postdated checks to Quirino Tomlin II as partial payment for the P600,000.00 that the former borrowed from the latter. When Tomlin realized that all the said checks were dishonored by the bank, he made several demands to Moya but the latter still refused to pay his debt. Thereafter, the complainant filed seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan as well as an instant case for disbarment against Moya. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the administrative case for the respondents disbarment should be dismissed for violation of the rule on non-forum shopping; and

2. Whether or not Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation or the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

1. No. The instant petition for disbarment was not a violation of the rule against forum shopping. Forum shopping is only applicable to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. Furthermore, the main object of the seven criminal cases of the respondents violation of BP Blg. 22 is different from the administrative case at hand. The former refers to the issuance of bouncing checks, while the latter refers to the dishonesty of the respondent in the payment of his debts.

2. Yes. Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His refusal to pay his monetary obligations His refusal to pay his monetary obligations without justifiable cause, despite acknowledging said obligations and doing so without remorse, fails to

comply with the expectation of lawyers to be honest in their dealings be it in their professional or private affairs. What is more, his failure to file his answer and verified position paper despite extensions of time is a manifestation of his disrespect for judicial authorities. For his acts, he was then sentenced to be suspended from practice for two years.

Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan vs Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa (A.C. No. 7360)

FACTS: Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00 (Esperon Case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder and later on November 23, 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgement of the Esperon Case.

Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Prosecutor Toribio for 30,000.00php and failed. Prosecutor Toribio excuted her affidavit on June 14, 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. On May 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case. 27776 for direct bribery on an NBI set-up entrapment operation, wherein, Atty. Silvosa demanded 15,000.00php from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas who was in detention for more than two years. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2. Whether or not a delay of the filing for an administrative complaint exonerate a respondent. 3. Whether or not crime involving moral turpitude can be a

ground for disbarment. HELD: 1. Yes, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Atty. Silvosa's attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of the said case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service." The Court agree with Commissioner Funa's finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03, when he entered his appearance in the motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of concern given after a full disclosure of facts." Atty. Silvosa's representation of conflicting interests merit at least the penalty of suspension.

2. No, delay of filing for an administrative complaint does not exonerate a respondent.

There is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than seven years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times expected of him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect. The Court says, mere delay in filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complaint

of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring member of the bench and bar can not escape the disciplining arm of the Court. Atty. Silvosa's failed attempt at bribing Prosecutor Toribio also merit at least the penalty of suspension.

3. Yes, crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment.

Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans' judgement in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Rule 138, Section 27 provides, A member of the bar may be disbarred by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, as ruled, in Magno vs COMELEC. The practice of Law is a priveledge, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise his privilege. Wherefore, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.

RURAL BANK OF SILAY, INC., vs. ATTY. ERNESTO H. PILLA

KAPUNAN, J.:

Rural Bank of Silay. Inc. (complainant) filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla (respondent) alleging deceit and gross misconduct on the part of the latter. The complaint alleges as follows:

1. That on July 23, 1975 the respondent executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the complainant over a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Sagay, Negros Occidental, covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-55380, purportedly as Attorney-in-Fact of the registered owners thereof, Pedro N. Torres and Oscar D. Granada. A copy of this Real Estate Mortgage is herewith attached as Annex A.

2. That together with the aforesaid Real Estate Mortgage the respondent submitted a Special Power of Attorney by virtue of which he was purportedly authorized and empowered by the registered owners Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of land in favor of the complainant. A copy of this Special Power of Attorney is herewith attached as Annex B.

3. That on the security of, among others, the aforesaid parcel of land over which the respondent represented that he is authorized to mortgage, complainant extended and released a loan to the respondent in the amount of P91,427.00.

4. That complainant subsequently and much later learned that the respondent was not at all authorized and empowered by the registered owner Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of land when it was joined as a defendant in a complaint filed by the aforesaid Oscar D. Grananda for removal of cloud on title with preliminary injunction and damages. A copy of this complaint is herewith attached as Annex C.

5. That in the aforesaid complaint as well as in the hearing conducted in connection therewith Oscar D. Granada specifically and categorically denied having executed and signed the Special Power of Attorney, Annex B, submitted by the respondent to the complainant in support of his application for a loan.

6. That the aforesaid civil case, Civil Case No. 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 60, was subsequently decided against the respondent wherein the aforesaid Court found that the Special Power of Attorney, Annex B, was indeed forged and falsified because the spouses Oscar D. Grananda and Lolita L. Granada have not signed the same and wherein the Court also made the finding that the defendant, considering that he has benefited from the said falsified document, is presumed to have a

hand in the preparation of the same. A copy of this Decision is herewith attached as Annex D.

7. That the respondent has not appealed from the aforesaid Decision thereby making the findings of fact made therein final as against him.

8. That the foregoing acts of the respondent in presenting to the complainant Bank a forged and falsified Power of Attorney for the purpose of obtaining a loan is a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man and by his conduct herein has forfeited his right to continue further in the practice of law.

[1]

Upon the instance of the Court, respondent filed his comment refuting the charges of deceit and gross misconduct against him. Respondent denied employing any deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a loan from complainant rural bank. According to respondent, he did not know that the signature of Oscar Granada on the special power of attorney appointing him (respondent) as attorney-in-fact was forged. The special power of attorney purportedly authorized respondent to mortgaged the parcel of land in Sagay, Negros Occidental in favor of complainant rural bank. Respondent also claimed that if indeed said document was forged, he was not a party to the forgery. He cited the findings of the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, thus:

Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of the spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually benefited from the said falsified documents, he is presumed to have a hand on the same. (Decision, p. 20-annex D.)

[2]

Respondent maintained that he obtained the loan from complainant rural bank without depriving it of the opportunity to investigate his financial capacity as well as to ascertain the genuineness of the special power of attorney under which he acted as the mortgagor. Thus, respondent is of the view that, under the circumstances, it cannot be said that he employed deceit and gross misconduct against complainant rural bank.

After receipt of respondents comment, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Both parties adduced their respective evidence before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Upon agreement of the parties, the matter was resolved on the basis of their respective pleadings and the annexes attached thereto. From these pleadings, the IBP, through Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, established the following uncontroverted facts:

Purportedly acting as attorney-in-fact of a certain Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada, by virtue of a special power of attorney, respondent applied for a loan and concomitantly executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the complainant bank covering the property of Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada. With such security, complainant extended to the respondent his loan in the amount of P91,427.00. In view of the failure of the respondent to pay the loan, the mortgaged property was foreclosed by the complainant bank. Later, Oscar Granada, the real registered owner of the mortgaged property filed a complaint against the respondent and the complainant for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and Special Power of Attorney. After the trial, the court declared null and void the said Special Power of Attorney as well as the Real Estate Mortgage for being products of forgery. This decision was not appealed by the defendants.

There is no showing that respondent, despite the adverse decision, returned or offered to return the money he took from the complainant bank. The bank then instituted this disbarment proceeding against the respondent.

[3]

The IBP found from the above facts that respondent violated his oath as a lawyer to do no falsehood, thus:

This office believes that the actuation of the respondent constitutes a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer. The findings of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental has persuasive effect in this proceeding.

As found by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental in its decision in Civil Case No. 1-C, entitled Spouses Oscar D. Granada

and Lolita L. Granada vs. Ernesto H. Pilla, et al, the plaintiffs Granada spouses have not signed the questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of the respondent and the said spouses signatures as appearing in the Special Power of Attorney are not their true and genuine signatures for actually they have not executed nor granted a Special Power of Attorney in favor of herein respondent authorizing him to mortgage the one-third (1/3) share of the said spouses in the mortgaged property. The trial court stressed that:

Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of the spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually benefited from the said falsified documents, he is presumed to have a hand on the same.

Defendant Antonio Pura testified and in fact he admitted that he notarized the said documents, Exhibit A and B, with the assurance of Atty. Pilla that the signatures appearing in the said documents were the signatures of Atty. Oscar D. Granada and of Pedro Torres, registered owners of the property in question.

Antonio G. Pura, the notary public who notarized the questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of the respondent, testified in said Civil Case as follows:

Q Now, compaero, will you please relate to this Honorable Court the circumstances under which you notarized this Special Power of Attorney now marked as Exh. A on April 21, 1975?

A Yes, sir. I remember that on the same day, April 21, 1975, defendant Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla personally appeared before me and he brought along with him this Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor. He told me to notarize it. I asked him about the signature of Atty. Oscar D. Granada if this is his signature and he said Yes. I also asked him about the signature of the other principal and he said also Yes. With that assurance and being a brother lawyer I accommodated him. Knowing that he will not do anything that is illegal and I have confidence in him considering that he is a

lawyer and he knows what he was doing, I accommodated him.

(TSN, Hearing March 15, 1993, pp. 22-23, Civil Case No. 1, RTC, Branch LX, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental)

If indeed, respondent is not responsible for the falsification of the Special Power of Attorney, why did he not explain before the trial court or before this office the circumstances on how he obtained the same. He did not even bother to identify his alleged client who provided him the forged Special Power of Attorney. Instead, respondent is banking on his defense that the complainant bank has not introduced any evidence to prove that he forged the Special Power of Attorney. He relied on the argument that his transaction with the complainant bank was purely commercial business and did not involve his capacity as a lawyer. Further, if it is true that the respondent maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity as he asserted, why did he represent before the notary public that the signatures appearing in the Special Power of Attorney were the signatures of the real owners if he was not actually aware that the signatures were that of the real owners.

The office is convinced that the actuation of the respondent is misrepresentation constituting gross misconduct at the very least. This is a violation of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man.

[4]

In conclusion, Commissioner Elamparo recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five (5) years. The IBP, through Resolution No. XIV-00-175, dated 7 April 2000, of its Board of Governors, substantially adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Elamparo but modified the penalty. The IBP RESOLVED as follows:

to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as annex A, and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws

and rules, said recommendation is with modification that Respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for THREE(3) years for misrepresentation.

[5]

We fully agree with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

As correctly pointed out by the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, since respondent actually benefited from the falsified document, he is presumed to have a hand in the falsification of the same. Respondent miserably failed to rebut this presumption with his barefaced denial that he had no knowledge of the forgery. The Court cannot give credence to respondents negative assertion that he did not know that the special power of attorney issued in his favor was falsified. As a lawyer, respondent knows or ought to know that parties to a public document must personally appear before the notary public to attest that the same is their own free act and deed. In utter disregard of this requirement, respondent caused the special power of attorney to be notarized without the parties appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, respondent presented the same to complainant rural bank in order to obtain a loan therefrom. It is thus apparent that respondent had a hand in the falsification of the document especially considering that it was he who chiefly benefited from it. Indeed, the settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.

[6] Further, if a person had in his possession a falsified

document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.

[7]

Respondents acts clearly fall short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 thereof, which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The fact that the conduct pertained to respondents private dealings with complainant rural bank is of no moment. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor.

[8] Possession of good moral character is not only a

good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.

[9]

Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years is approved.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla guilty of misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES RAFOLS vs. ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS

PER CURIAM:

The primary objective of administrative cases

against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline

the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard

the administration of justice by protecting the courts

and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and

to remove from the legal profession persons whose

utter disregard of their lawyers oath has proven

them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed

in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be

disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in

his professional or private capacity, which shows

him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,

probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue

as an officer of the court.

Rivera v. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002, 384

SCRA 1.

By its Board Resolution No. 1 dated March 7, 1998, the

South Cotabato-Sarangani-General Santos City (SOCSARGEN)

Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resolved to

refer to the IBP Board of Governors in Manila, for appropriate action

and investigation, the purported anomaly involving

Judge Teodoro Dizon Jr. and Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.[1]

Thus,

on March 24, 1998, Atty. Joeffrey L. Montefrio, the

SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter President, transmitted the referral to the

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).

The matter involving Judge Dizon, Jr., which was docketed

as Administrative Matter (AM) No. RTJ-98-1426 entitledManuel

C. Rafols and Lolita C. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro Dizon, Jr., RTC,

General Santos City, Branch 37,[2]

was resolved in

a per curiam decision promulgated on January 31, 2006,[3]

whereby

the Court dismissed Judge Dizon, Jr. from the service, with forfeiture

of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-

employment in the government or any of its subdivisions,

instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned and

government -controlled corporations.

In the same per curiam decision, the Court reiterated its

resolution of October 21, 1998 for the Office of the Bar Confidant

(OBC) to conduct an investigation of the actuations of Atty. Barrios,

Jr. (respondent), and to render its report and recommendation.

Hence, this decision.

Antecedents

The anomaly denounced by the SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter

was narrated in the joint affidavit dated March 3, 1998 of Spouses

Manuel C. Rafols, Jr. and Lolita B. Rafols (complainants),[4]

whose

narrative was corroborated by the affidavit dated March 11,

1998 of Larry Sevilla;[5]

the affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of

Allan Rafols;[6]

and the affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of

Daisy Rafols,[7]

all of which were attached to the letter of the IBP

Chapter President. Atty. Erlinda C.Verzosa, then Deputy Clerk of

Court and Bar Confidant, referred for appropriate action a copy of the

letter and affidavits to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo.

In turn, then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L.

Suarez filed with the Court an Administrative Matter for Agenda,

recommending in relation to Atty. Barrios, Jr., as follows:

xxx

5. The Office of the Bar

Confidant be FURNISHED with a copy of the letter-

note and its attachments so that it may conduct its

own investigation in the matter with respect to the

actuations of Atty. Ricardo Barrios, Jr.[8]

xxx

In the resolution dated October 21, 1998, the Court approved

the recommendations,[9]

and directed the Office of the Bar Confidant

to investigate the actuations of the respondent, and to render its

report and recommendation thereon.

Proceedings of the OBC

Only the respondent appeared during the hearing before the

OBC. Denying the charges against him, he sought the dismissal of

the complaint and re-affirmed the contents of his comment. Despite

notice, the complainants did not appear before the OBC. However,

the complainants and the respondent had testified during the

administrative hearing involving Judge Dizon, Jr. before Court of

Appeals Associate Justice Jose Sabio Jr. as the Investigating

Justice. Also testifying thereat were the complainants witnesses,

namely: Allan Rafols, Daisy Rafols and Larry Sevilla.

A. Evidence for the

Complainants

The complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6209

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in General Santos City, wherein

they sought the cancellation of a deed of sale. Civil Case No. 6209

was assigned to Branch 37 of the RTC, presided by Judge Dizon, Jr.

The complainants were represented by the respondent, paying to

him P15,000.00 as acceptance fee.

On December 22, 1997, at 9:30 a.m., the respondent visited

the complainants at their residence and informed complainant

Manuel that the judge handling their case wanted to talk to him. The

respondent and Manuel thus went to the East Royal Hotels coffee

shop where Judge Dizon, Jr. was already waiting. The respondent

introduced Manuel to the judge, who informed Manuel that their case

was pending in his sala. The judge likewise said that he would

resolve the case in their favor, assuring their success up to the Court

of Appeals, if they could deliver P150,000.00 to him. As he had no

money at that time, Manuel told the judge that he would try to

produce the amount. The judge then stated that he would wait for the

money until noon of that day. Thus, Manuel left the coffee shop

together with the respondent, who instructed Manuel to come up with

the money before noon because the judge badly needed it. The two

of them went to a lending institution, accompanied by Allan Rafols,

but Manuel was told there that only P50,000.00 could be released

the next day. From the lending institution, they went to the

complainants shop to look for Ditas Rafols, Allans wife, who offered

to withdrawP20,000.00 from her savings account.

On their way to the bank, Manuel, Allan and Ditas dropped off

the respondent at the hotel for the latter to assure Judge Dizon, Jr.

that the money was forthcoming. Afterwards, Ditas and Manuel

withdrew P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 from their respective bank

accounts, and went back to the hotel with the cash. There, they saw

the judge and his driver, who beckoned to them to go towards the

judges Nissan pick-up then parked along the highway in front of the

hotel. Manuel alighted from his car and approached the judge.

Manuel personally handed the money to the judge, who told Manuel

after asking about the amount that it was not enough. Thereafter,

Manuel entered the hotels coffee shop and informed the respondent

that he had already handed the money to the judge.

On December 24, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m., the respondent

again visited the complainants. He was on board the judges Nissan

pick-up driven by the judges driver. The respondent relayed to the

complainants the message that the judge needed the balance

of P100,000.00 in order to complete the construction of his new

house in time for the reception of his daughters wedding. However,

the complainants managed to raise only P80,000.00, which they

delivered to the respondent on that same day.

On January 20, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called up the

complainants residence and instructed their son to request his

parents to return his call, leaving his cell phone number. When

Manuel returned the call the next day, the judge instructed Manuel to

see him in his office. During their meeting in his chambers, the judge

demanded the balance of P30,000.00. Manuel clarified to the judge

that his balance was only P20,000.00 due to the previous amount

given being already P80,000.00. The judge informed him that the

amount that the respondent handed was short. Saying that he badly

needed the money, the judge insisted on P30,000.00, and even

suggested that the complainants should borrow in order to raise that

amount.

On January 22, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called the

complainants to inquire whether the P30,000.00 was ready for pick

up. After Manuel replied that he was ready with the amount, the

judge asked him to wait for 20 minutes. The judge and his driver later

arrived on board his Nissan pick-up. Upon instructions of the judges

driver, the complainants followed the Nissan pick-up until

somewhere inside the Doa Soledad

Estate, Espina, General Santos City. There, the judge alighted and

approached the complainants and shook their hands. At that point,

Manuel handed P30,000.00 to the judge. The judge then told Manuel

that the RTC judge in Iloilo City before whom the perpetuation of the

testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido was made should still

testify as a witness during the trial in his sala in order for the

complainants to win. The judge persuaded the complainants to give

money also to that judge; otherwise, they should not blame him for

the outcome of the case.

The complainants were forced to give money to the judge,

because they feared that the judge would be biased against them

unless they gave in to his demands. But when they ultimately sensed

that they were being fooled about their case, they consulted

Larry Sevilla, their mediamen friend, and narrated to Sevilla all the

facts and circumstances surrounding the case.They agreed that the

details should be released to the media. The expos was published

in the Newsmaker, a local newspaper.

Thereafter, the respondent and Judge Dizon, Jr. made

several attempts to appease the complainants by sending gifts and

offering to return a portion of the money, but the complainants

declined the offers.

According to the complainants, the respondent

demanded P25,000.00 as his expenses in securing the testimony of

Soledad Elevencionado-Provido in Iloilo City to be used as evidence

in their civil case. In addition, the respondent requested the

complainants to borrow P60,000.00 from the bank because he

wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he needed

to give P11,000.00 to his nephew who was due to leave for work

abroad.

B. Evidence for the

Respondent

In his verified comment dated March 22, 2006,[10]

the

respondent confirmed that the complainants engaged him as their

counsel in Civil Case No. 6209. His version follows.

On December 22, 1997, the respondent introduced Manuel

to Judge Dizon, Jr. inside the East Royal Hotels coffee shop. The

respondent stayed at a distance, because he did not want to hear

their conversation. Later, Manuel approached the respondent and

gave him P2,000.00. When the respondent asked what the money

was for, Manuel replied that it was in appreciation of the formers

introducing the latter to the judge. The respondent stated that

Manuel did not mention what transpired between the latter and the

judge; and that the judge did not tell him (respondent) what

transpired in that conversation.

Two days later, the respondent again visited the

complainants at their house in General Santos City on board the

judges Nissan pick-up driven by the judges driver, in order to

receive the P80,000.00 from the complainants. The amount was

being borrowed by the judge for his swimming pool. Later on, the

judge told the respondent to keep P30,000.00 as a token of their

friendship. After Manuel handed the P80,000.00, the respondent and

the judges driver headed towards DavaoCity, where, according to

the judges instruction, they redeemed the judges wristwatch

for P15,000.00 from a pawnshop. The driver brought the remaining

amount of P35,000.00 to the judge in his home.

On January 27, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. visited the

respondent at the latters house to ask him to execute an affidavit.

Declining the request at first, the respondent relented only because

the judge became physically weak in his presence and was on the

verge of collapsing. Nonetheless, the respondent refused to notarize

the document.

In that affidavit dated January 27, 1998,[11]

the respondent

denied that Judge Dizon, Jr. asked money from the complainants;

and stated that he did not see the complainants handing the money

to the judge. He admitted that he was the one who had requested

the judge to personally collect his unpaid attorneys fees from the

complainants with respect to their previous and terminated case; and

that the judge did not ask money from the complainants in exchange

for a favorable decision in their case.

On January 28, 1998, the respondent returned to the

complainants residence, but was surprised to find complainant Lolita

crying aloud. She informed him that the judge was again asking an

additional P30,000.00 although they had given himP30,000.00 only

the week before. She divulged that the judge had told her that their

case would surely lose because: (a) they had engaged a counsel

who was mahinang klase; (b) the judge hearing Civil Case No. 5645

in Iloilo and the woman who had testified in Civil Case No. 6029 had

not been presented; and (c) they would have to spend at

least P10,000.00 for said judges accommodations in General

Santos City.[12]

On January 31, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. went to the house of

the respondent, but the latter was not home. The judge left a note

addressed to the complainants, and instructed the respondents

secretary to deliver the note to the complainants along with a gift

(imported table clock).[13]

According to the respondent, the

complainants consistently refused to accept the gift several times; it

was later stolen from his house in Cebu City.

On February 1, 1998, the respondent delivered the note and

gift to the complainants, but the latter refused to receive it, telling him

that they were no longer interested to continue with the case. At the

same time, the complainants assured him that they bore no personal

grudge against him, because they had a problem only with

Judge Dizon, Jr.

On February 24, 1998, the respondent went to the National

Bureau of Investigation Regional Office, Region XI, and the

Philippine National Police Regional Office, Region XI, both

in Davao City, to request the investigation of the matter.[14]

On March 2, 1998, the respondent paid Judge Dizon, Jr. a

visit upon the latters request. In that meeting, the respondent told

the judge about the refusal of the complainants to accept the judges

gift and about their decision not to continue with the case.[15]

On the next day, Judge Dizon, Jr. sent a note to the

respondent to inform him that the judge had raised the amount that

he had borrowed from the complainants.[16]

The judge requested the

respondent to tell the complainants that he (Judge Dizon, Jr.) was

going to return whatever he had borrowed from them. However, the

complainants informed the respondent that he should tell the judge

that they were no longer interested in getting back the money.

The respondent made a follow-up at the NBI and PNP

Regional Offices in Davao City of his request for assistance after

Manuel mentioned to him that he (Manuel) knew of many armed men

ready at any time to help him in his problem with the judge

Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated May 15,

2008,[17]

the OBC opined that the administrative case against the

respondent could not be dismissed on the ground of failure to

prosecute due to the complainants failure to appear in the scheduled

hearing despite due notice.

Based on the facts already established and identified, as

rendered in the decision dated January 21,

2006 in ManuelRafols and Lolita B. Rafols v.

Judge Teodoro A. Dizon,[18]

the OBC rejected the respondents

denial of any knowledge of the transaction between his clients and

the judge.

The OBC recommended:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing

premises, it is respectfully recommended that

respondent ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS, Jr. be

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)

years with a stern warning that a repetition of similar

act in the future will be dealt more severely.

Ruling of the Court

We approve and adopt the report and recommendations of

the OBC, which we find to be fully and competently supported by the

evidence adduced by the complainants and their witnesses, but we

impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, which we believe is the

proper penalty.

I

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which governs

the disbarment and suspension of attorneys, provides:

Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of

attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds therefor.

A member of the bar may be disbarred or

suspended from his office as attorney by the

Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other

gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral

conduct, or by reason of his conviction for a crime

involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the

oath which he is required to take before admission

to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful

order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully

appearing as an attorney for a party to a case

without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting

cases at law for the purpose of gain, either

personally or through paid agents or brokers

constitute malpractice.

The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension

proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The

Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant

establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that

warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty.[19]

As a rule, an attorney

enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made

against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further

presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in

accordance with his oath.[20]

Here, the complainants successfully overcame the

respondents presumed innocence and the presumed regularity in

the performance of his duties as an attorney of the complainants.

The evidence against him was substantial, and was not contradicted.

To begin with, the respondents denial of knowledge of the

transaction between the complainants and Judge Dizon, Jr. was not

only implausible, but also unsubstantiated. It was the respondent

himself who had introduced the complainants to the judge. His act of

introducing the complainants to the judge strongly implied that the

respondent was aware of the illegal purpose of the judge in wanting

to talk with the respondents clients. Thus, we unqualifiedly accept

the aptness of the following evaluation made in the OBCs Report

and Recommendation, viz:

xxx Being the Officer of the Court, he must have

known that meeting litigants outside the court is

something beyond the bounds of the rule and that it

can never be justified by any reason. He must have

known the purpose of Judge Dizon in requesting him

to meet the complainants-litigants outside the

chamber of Judge Dizon. By his overt act in

arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon and

complainants- litigants in the Coffee Shop of the

East Royal Hotel, it is crystal clear that he must have

allowed himself and consented to

Judge Dizons desire to ask money from the

complainants-litigants for a favorable decision of

their case which was pending before the salaof

Judge Dizon.[21]

Secondly, the respondents insistence that he did not see the

complainants act of handing the money to the judge is unbelievable.

In his comment, the respondent even admitted having himself

received the P80,000.00 from the complainants, and having

kept P30,000.00 of that amount pursuant to the instruction of the

judge as a token of the friendship between him and the judge.[22]

The

admission proved that the respondent had known all along of the

illegal transaction between the judge and the complainants, and

belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the money to

the judge.

Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the complainants had

given the money to the judge as a loan, far from softening our strong

impression of the respondents liability, confirmed his awareness of

the gross impropriety of the transaction. Being the complainants

attorney in the civil case being heard before the judge, the

respondent could not but know that for the judge to borrow money

from his clients was highly irregular and outrightly unethical. If he

was innocent of wrongdoing, as he claimed, he should have desisted

from having any part in the transaction. Yet, he did not, which

rendered his explanation unbelievable. Compounding the

unworthiness of his explanation was his admission of having

retained P30,000.00 of the borrowed money upon the judges

instruction.

And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that the respondents

act of requesting the NBI Regional Office in Davao City to investigate

was an afterthought on his part. We agree with the OBC, for the

respondent obviously acted in order to anticipate the complainants

moves against him and the judge. To be sure, the respondent

sensed that the complainants would not simply forgive and forget the

mulcting they had suffered at the hands of the judge and their own

attorney from the time that the complainants assured him that they

were no longer interested to get back their money despite their being

very angry at the judges greed.

Overall, the respondent denials were worthless and

unavailing in the face of the uncontradicted evidence showing that he

had not only personally arranged the meeting between Manuel and

Judge Dizon, Jr., but had also communicated to the complainants

the judges illegal reason for the meeting. It is axiomatic that any

denial, to be accepted as a viable defense in any proceeding, must

be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. This need

derives from the nature of a denial as evidence of a negative and

self-serving character, weightless in law and insufficient to overcome

the testimony of credible witnesses on affirmative matters.[23]

II

The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with

conditions.[24]

The attorney is a vanguard of our legal system, and,

as such, is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a

very high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in

order that the peoples faith and confidence in the legal system are

ensured.[25