judi-partiii & conscoms part i

8/3/2019 Judi-partiii & Conscoms Part i

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/judi-partiii-conscoms-part-i 1/49

PARTIII ARTICLE VIII.

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

SECTION 5 The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal orcertiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final

judgments and orders of lower courts in:(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of anytreaty, international or executive agreement, law,presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relationthereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is inissue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed isreclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law isinvolved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as publicinterest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed sixmonths without the consent of the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, theadmission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legalassistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplifiedand inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall beuniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of specialcourts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unlessdisapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordancewith the Civil Service Law.

Capital PunishmentPeople v.Mateo

Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with tencounts of rape by his step-daughter ImeldaMateo.

During the trial, Imelda’s testimoniesregarding the rape incident wereinconsistent. She said in one occasion thatincident of rape happened inside herbedroom, but other times, she told the court

Whether or not thecase should directlybe forwarded to theSupreme Court byvirtue of theexpress provision inthe constitution onautomatic appealwhere the penalty

The case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records areordered to be forwarded to the Court of Appeals forappropriate action and disposition.

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed thedirect appellate review over all criminal cases in whichthe penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment (or lower but involving offensescommitted on the same occasion or arising out of the

1 | P a g e



that it happened in their sala. She also toldthe court that the appellant would cover hermouth but when asked again, she said thathe did not.

Despite the irreconcilable testimony of the

victim, the trial court found the accusedguilty (beyond reasonable doubt) of thecrime of rape and sentenced him the penaltyof reclusion perpetua.

The Solicitor General, however, assails thefactual findings of the trial court andrecommends an acquittal of the appellant..

imposed is reclusionperpetua, lifeimprisonment ordeath.

same occurrence that gave rise to the more seriousoffense for which the penalty of death, reclusionperpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practicefinds justification in the 1987 Constitution –

Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the

following powers:“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appealor certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court mayprovide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed isreclusion perpetua or higher.”

In passing, during the deliberations among themembers of the Court, there has been a markedabsence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt orinnocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced thatthe evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict;some would accept the recommendation of acquittal

from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequateproof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, theoccasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e.,the determination and appreciation of primarily factualmatters, which the Supreme Court has had to face within automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appealsthat has aptly been given the direct mandate to reviewfactual issues.

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatoryreview by the Supreme Court of cases where thepenalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, lifeimprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it

proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensureutmost circumspection before the penalty of death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, theCourt now deems it wise and compelling to provide inthese cases a review by the Court of Appeals before thecase is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life andliberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determinehis guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused,and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever beoverdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appealson, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize thepossibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of

2 | P a g e



Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusionperpetua, or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as thecircumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case tothe Supreme Court for its final disposition.

Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-yearperiod since the re-imposition of the death penalty lawin 1993 until June 2004, the cases where the judgmentof death has either been modified or vacated consist of an astounding 71.77% of the total of death penaltycases directly elevated before the Court on automaticreview that translates to a total of six hundred fifty-one(651) out of nine hundred seven (907) appellants savedfrom lethal injection.

Under the Constitution Article VIII, Section 5, the powerto amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in

the Supreme Court.

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall moresquarely within the rule-making prerogative of theSupreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announce additionally allowing anintermediate review by the Court of Appeals, asubordinate appellate court, before the case is elevatedto the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such aprocedural matter.

Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on CriminalProcedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of

Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124, Section 3 of rule 125,and any other rule insofar as they provide for directappeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the SupremeCourt in cases where the penalty imposes is death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, as well as theresolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19September 1995, in “Internal Rules of the SupremeCourt” in cases similarly involving the death penalty,are to be deemed modified accordingly.

Garcia vsPeople

The Provincial Fiscal of Guimaras filed withthe RTC an information charging petitioners

Whether or not theSC must

It is only in cases where the penalty actuallyimposed is death that the trial court must

3 | P a g e



with murder for the killing of one JoseEstrella. After due trial, the trial courtpromulgated its decision convictingpetitioners of the crime charged andsentencing each of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Petitioners filed a motion

for reconsideration of the decision. The trialcourt denied the motion. Petitioners did notinterpose an appeal from the decision by thefiling of a notice of appeal. Thus, thedecision became final.

automaticallyreview a trialcourt’s decisionconvicting anaccused of a capitaloffense and

sentencing him toreclusion perpetua

forward the records of the case to the SC forautomatic review of the conviction.

As the petitioners did not file a notice of appealor otherwise indicate their desire to appeal fromthe decision convicting them of murder and

sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua,the decision became final and unappealable.

Integrated BarIn Re:Integrationof the Bar

of the Phil.

On December 1, 1972, the Commission onBar Integration 1 submitted its Report datedNovember 30, 1972, with the "earnest

recommendation" — on the basis of the saidReport and the proceedings had inAdministrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court,and "consistently with the views and counselreceived from its [the Commission's] Boardof Consultants, as well as the overwhelmingnationwide sentiment of the Philippine Benchand Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordainthe integration of the Philippine Bar as soonas possible through the adoption andpromulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally

prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, givingrecognition as far as possible and practicableto existing provincial and other local Barassociations. On August 16, 1962,arguments in favor of as well as inopposition to the petition were orallyexpounded before the Court. Writtenoppositions were admitted, 3 and all partieswere thereafter granted leave to file writtenmemoranda. 4

(1)WON the Courthas the power tointegrate the

Philippine Bar?

(2) Would theintegration of theBar beconstitutional?

1. YES. The Court is of the view that it mayintegrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of itspower, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the

Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerningpleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,and the admission to the practice of law."Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherentpart of the Court's constitutional authority overthe Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Courtmay adopt rules of court to effect theintegration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act6397 neither confers a new power nor restrictsthe Court's inherent power, but is a merelegislative declaration that the integration of theBar will promote public interest or, morespecifically, will "raise the standards of the legal

profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge itspublic responsibility more effectively."

2. YES.

The judicial pronouncements support thisreasoning:

- Courts have inherent power to supervise andregulate the practice of law.

4 | P a g e



Since then, the Court has closely observedand followed significant developmentsrelative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys

that there had grown a strong nationwidesentiment in favor of Bar integration, theCourt created the Commission on BarIntegration for the purpose of ascertainingthe advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed HouseBill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing forthe Integration of the Philippine Bar, andAppropriating Funds Therefor." The measurewas signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcoson September 17, 1971 and took effect onthe same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law

provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from theapproval of this Act, the Supreme Court mayadopt rules of court to effect the integrationof the Philippine Bar under such conditionsas it shall see fit in order to raise thestandards of the legal profession, improvethe administration of justice, and enable theBar to discharge its public responsibilitymore effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand

pesos is hereby appropriated, out of anyfunds in the National Treasury not otherwiseappropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may benecessary for the same purpose shall beincluded in the annual appropriations for theSupreme Court.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon itsapproval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with

— The practice of law is not a vested right but aprivilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed withpublic interest, because a lawyer owes dutiesnot only to his client, but also to his brethren inthe profession, to the courts, and to the nation;

and takes part in one of the most importantfunctions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

— Because the practice of law is privilegeclothed with public interest, it is far and justthat the exercise of that privilege be regulatedto assure compliance with the lawyer's publicresponsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best bedischarged through collective action; but therecan be no collective action without an organized

body; no organized body can operate effectivelywithout incurring expenses; therefore, it is fairand just that all attorneys be required tocontribute to the support of such organizedbody; and, given existing Bar conditions, themost efficient means of doing so is byintegrating the Bar through a rule of court thatrequires all lawyers to pay annual dues to theIntegrated Bar.

A. Freedom of Association.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer

to associate with anyone. He is free toattend or not attend the meetings of hisIntegrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse tovote in its elections as he chooses. The bodycompulsion to which he is subjected is thepayment of annual dues.

B. Regulatory Fee

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar isan exaction for regulation, while thepurpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has

5 | P a g e



argument on the constitutionality of Barintegration and contains all necessaryfactual data bearing on the advisability(practicability and necessity) of Barintegration. Also embodied therein are theviews, opinions, sentiments, comments and

observations of the rank and file of thePhilippine lawyer population relative to Barintegration, as well as a proposed integrationCourt Rule drafted by the Commission andpresented to them by that body in a nationalBar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basisas well as ample material upon which theCourt may decide whether or not tointegrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

inherent power to regulate the Bar, itfollows that as an incident to regulation, itmay impose a membership fee for thatpurpose. It would not be possible to pushthrough an Integrated Bar program withoutmeans to defray the concomitant expenses.

The doctrine of implied powers necessarilyincludes the power to impose such anexaction.

C. Freedom of Speech.

For the Integrated Bar to use amember's due to promote measures to which saidmember is opposed, would not nullify or adverselyaffect his freedom of speech.

In Re: Atty.MarcialEdilon

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a dulylicensed practicing attorney in thePhilippines. The IBP Board of Governors

recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay hismembership dues” to the IBP since thelatter’s constitution notwithstanding duenotice.

Edilion contends that the provision providingfor the IBP dues constitute an invasion of hisconstitutional rights in the sense that he isbeing compelled, as a pre-condition tomaintaining his status as a lawyer in goodstanding, to be a member of the IBP and to

pay the corresponding dues, and that as aconsequence of this compelled financialsupport of the said organization to which heis admittedly personally antagonistic, he isbeing deprived of the rights to liberty andproperty guaranteed to him by theConstitution. Hence, the respondentconcludes, the above provisions of the CourtRule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

WON the paymentof IBP dues suffersconstitutional

infirmity.

All legislation directing the integration of the Bar hasbeen uniformly and universally sustained as a validexercise of the police power over an important

profession.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege,a privilege moreover clothed with public interestbecause a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to hisclient, but also to his brethren in the profession, to thecourts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of themost important functions of the State — theadministration of justice — as an officer of the court.

1. The practice of law is a privilege that is subject

to reasonable regulation by the State.

2. Bar Integration is mandated by the Constitution

{Art VIII Sec5(5)}

3. The lawyer is not being compelled to join the

association. Passing the bar examination

already made him a member of the bar. All that

Integration does is to provide a national

organization for a well-defined but unorganized

6 | P a g e



and incohesive group of lawyers. (NOTE: This

does not violate the Constitutional right to

associate). He is free to attend or not attend the

meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote

or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses

The only compulsion to which he is subjected isthe payment of annual dues, and this is justifiedby the need for elevating the quality of the legalprofession.

4. The Constitution vests in the SC plenary powers

regarding admission to the bar. {Art VIII

Sec5(5)}.

Andres vsCabrera

In SC’s Resolution promulgated December14, 1979 in the first case, respondentStanley Cabrera, a successful Bar examineein 1977 against whom petition had been filedfor denial of his proclivity to filing baseless,malicious and unfounded cases, was foundguilty of contempt of this Court for “ hisimproper conduct in the use of highlydisrespectful, insolent language, respondenthas tended to degrade the administration of justice, he has disparaged the dignity andbrought to disrepute the integrity andauthority of the Court and was sentenced to

pay within ten days from notice a fineP500.00 or imprisonment of 50 days.

Respondent filed Urgent Motion forAdmission to the Bar but denied since theinvestigation against him was still pendingbefore the Legal Investigator of the Court.

Respondent then wrote a letter to the Chief Justice, reiterating his sincere apologies tothe Court for all his actions, and prayed forhelp to enable him to uplift the living

Whether or not theauthority over theadmission,suspension,disbarment andreinstatement of attorneys is a judicial function.

Yes. The authority and responsibility over theadmission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatementof attorneys is vested in the Supreme Court by theConstitution Art VIII Sec 5 (5). This power is indisputablya judicial function and responsibility. It is judicial in thesense that discretion is used in its exercise.

The function requires:1. Previously established rules and

principles2. Concrete facts, whether past or present,

affecting determinate individuals3. Decision as to whether the facts a re

governed by the rules and principles.

This power to admit attorneys to the Bar is not.However, an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercisedat the pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudiceor personal hostility but it is the duty of the court toexercise and regulate it by a sound and judicialdiscretion.

In the case at bar, the SC is convinced by the actions of the respondent, having paid the fine and havingapologized in repeated motions filed before this Court.

7 | P a g e



conditions of his seven children.

Her wife also wrote a second letter , oncemore reiterating his sincere apologies to theCourt.

The Court then resolved to requirerespondent to submit within 5 days, a letterof apology to the Court Atty. Victor Sevilla, tocomplainant Emilia Andres and to FiscalLeonardo Arguelles for the contumaciousand vile language contained in his pleadings,and (2) obtain certifications of good behaviorand exemplary conduct from the Parishpriest and form the Brgy captain.

Respondent was able to comply to the saidrequirements.

To prolong the agony of his misconduct which he hassuffered for seven long years since 1977 when hepassed the Bar exams but also would appear to bedespotic and arbitrary. The SC held that respondent hasexpiated enough for his misdeed and may now beallowed to take the lawyer’s oath and thus become a

more useful member of society and of the lawprofession.

SECTION 6

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and thepersonnel thereof.

Maceda v.Vasquez

Petitioner seeks the review of the orders of the Ombudsman denying the ex-partemotion to refer to the SC filed by petitionerand the latter’s motion for reconsideration

and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.

Respondent alleged that petitioner hadfalsified his Certificates of Service.

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsmanhas no jurisdiction over the case since theoffense charged arose from the judge’s/petitioner’s performance of hisofficial duties and that the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an

Whether or not theinvestigation madeby the Ombudsmanconstitutes an

encroachment intothe SC’sconstitutional duty of supervision over allinferior courts

A judge who falsifies his certificate of service isadministratively liable to the SC for serious misconductand under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of

Court, and criminally liable to the State under theRevised Penal Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action takenagainst him by the Court with regard to his certificatesof service, the investigation being conducted by theOmbudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and itspersonnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

8 | P a g e



encroachment into the SC’s constitutionalduty of supervision over all inferior courts. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in

the SC administrative supervision over all courts andcourt personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CAdown to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtueof this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws,and take the proper administrative action against themif they commit any violation thereof. No other branchof government may intrude into this power, withoutrunning afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or othercourt employee arises from their administrative duties,the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaintand refer the same to the SC for determinationwhether said judge or court employee had acted withinthe scope of their administrative duties.

SECTION 10

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, andof judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, theirsalary shall not be decreased.

Nitafan v.CIR

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC, NCR, Manila. They sought

to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin therespondent Commissioner of InternalRevenue and Finance Office of the SC frommaking any deductions of withholding taxesfrom their salaries. They submit that a taxwithheld from their compensation as judicialofficers constitutes a decreased ordiminution of their salaries contrary to theprovision of Sec. 10 of Art 8 of theConstitution mandating that during theircontinuance in office, their salary shall notbe decreased.

Whether or not thesalary of justices and

judges subject toincome tax.

In the Affirmative: Isthe deduction in thesaid salaries inviolation of Sec 10 of Art. VIII.

YES. Although the 1987 Constitution no longer containsthe explicit provision in ART XV, Section 6, of the 1973

Constitution:

“No salary or any form of emolument of any publicofficer or employee, including constitutional officers,shall be exempt from payment of income tax.”

It was the clear intention of the ConstitutionalCommission that the rule would be the same under thenew Constitution, contrary to the ruling in Perfecto vsMeer.

Although this is not clear from the text of the 1987

9 | P a g e



Constitution, the clear intent of the ConstitutionalCommission was to subject the salary of judges and justices to income tax.

Commissioner Rigos: “It is to give substance toequality among the three branches of the

government.”

The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justicesand Judges are properly subject to a general incometax law applicable to all income earners and that thepayment of such income tax by Justices and Judgesdoes not fall within the constitutional protectionagainst decrease of their salaries during theircontinuance in office.

It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress topass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher that

that which they are receiving at the time of enactment,or if lower, it would be applicable only to thoseappointed after its approval. It would be a strainedconstruction to read into the provision an exemptionfrom taxation in the light of the discussion in theConstitutional Commission

SECTION 11

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until theyreach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The SupremeCourt en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of amajority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

De la Llanav. Alba

Petitioners assailed the unconstitutionality of Batas PambansaBlg 129 entitled “An ActReorganizing the Judiciary, AppropriatingFunds therefore and for other Purposes” thesame being contrary to the security of tenure provision of the Constitution as itseparates from the judiciary Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to Municipal Circuit Courts, exceptthe occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the

Whether or not BatasPambansa 129 isunconstitutional.

No. The SC dismissed the petition, theunconstitutionality of Batas PambansaBlg. 129 nothaving been shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in answer to a pressing and urgent need for amajor reorganization of the judiciary. The attendantabolition of the inferior courts, which shall cause theirincumbents to cease from holding office, do not impairthe independence of the judiciary and the security of tenure as incumbent justices and judges with goodperformance and clean records can be named anew in

10 | P a g e



Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed tothe inferior courts established by such Act. They likewise impute lack of good faith in itsenactment and characterize as unduedelegation of legislative power to thePresident his authority to fix the

compensation and allowances of the Justicesand judges thereafter appointed and thedetermination of the date when thereorganization shall be deemed completed.

The Solicitor General maintains that there isno valid justification for the attack of theconstitutionality of the statute, it being alegitimate exercise of the power vested inthe Batas Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of goodfaith as well as the attack on theindependence of the judiciary being

unwarranted and devoid of any support inlaw.

legal contemplation without interruption in thecontinuity of their service. The provision granting thePresident authority to fix the compensation andallowances of the Justices and judges survives the testof undue delegation of legislative power, a standardhaving been clearly adopted therefore. The

reorganization provided by the challenged Act will becarried out in accordance with the President’sconstitutional duty to take care that the laws befaithfully executed, and the judiciary’s commitment toguard constitutional rights.

People v. JudgeGacott

For failure to check the citations of theprosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing acriminal case was annulled by the SC. Therespondent judge was also sanctioned with areprimand and a fine of P10, 000.00 forgross ignorance of the law. The judgmentwas made by the Second Division of the SC.

Respondent filed a motion forreconsideration and a supplemental motionfor reconsideration. Respondent judgequestions the competence of the SecondDivision of this Court to administrativelydiscipline him. Respondent bases hisargument on second sentence of Section 11,Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution whichreads:He argues that it is only the full Court, not adivision thereof, that can administrativelypunish him.

W/N administrativediscipline of judgesmust be heard onlyby the SupremeCourt sitting enbanc? [AlternativeIssue: W/N theSecond Division of the Supreme had no

jurisdiction inreprimanding JudgeGaccot, since itSection 11, ArticleVIII says “SupremeCourt en banc shallhave the power todiscipline judges of lower courts”?]

A decision of the Supreme Court en banc isneeded only when the penalty to be imposed is(1) dismissal of a judge, (2) disbarment of alawyer, (3) suspension of either for more thanone (1) year, or (4) a fine exceeding 10,000pesos.

“Very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIIIclearly shows that there are actually two situations

envisaged therein.

"The Supreme Court en banc shallhave the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissalby a vote of a majority of the Memberswho actually took part in thedeliberations on the issues in the caseand voted thereon."1

11 | P a g e



1. First Clause – declaration of grant of disciplinary power anddetermination of procedure. Thefirst clause which states that "theSupreme Court en banc shall havethe power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of thegrant of that disciplinary power to, andthe determination of the procedure inthe exercise thereof by, the Court enbanc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary casesshould be heard and decided by thewhole Court since it would result in anabsurdity…

2. Second Clause -- The second

clause, which refers to the secondsituation contemplated therein and isintentionally separated from the firstby a comma, declares on the otherhand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in thecase and voted therein." Evidently, inthis instance, the administrativecase must be deliberated upon anddecided by the full Court itself.

RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA:

“The power to discipline isconcerned; the qualification wasnot intended to make a difference,as a reference to the Court by

1 This provision is an expansion of and was taken from the second sentence of Section 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution which provided:

"The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal."

12 | P a g e



itself necessarily means theCourt en banc. It was only decidedto state "en banc" becauseinternal procedural andadministrative matters, as well asceremonial functions, are alwaysdecided by or conducted in theCourt en banc.”

Justice Regalado (who wrote the resolution), as amember of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986Constitutional Commission, had the opportunity to takeup that precise matter with the committee chairman,retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, by pointingout the equivalent provision in the 1973 Constitution,hereinbefore quoted, which merely referred to the"Court," without qualification.

It was accordingly explained and agreed that insofar asthe power to discipline is concerned, the qualificationwas not intended to make a difference, as a referenceto the Court by itself necessarily means the Court enbanc.

It was only decided to state "en banc" there becauseall internal procedural and administrative matters, aswell as ceremonial functions, are always decided by or conducted in the Court en banc.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY

To require the entire Court to deliberate upon andparticipate in all administrative matters or casesregardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed,would result in a congested docket and undue delay inthe adjudication of cases in the Court, especially inadministrative matters, since even cases involving thepenalty of reprimand would require action by theCourt en banc.

This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the

13 | P a g e



Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite thedecision or resolution of cases or matters pending inthe Supreme Court or the lower courts, and the verypurpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or indivisions of three, five, or seven members.

Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only casesinvolving dismissal of judges of lower courts arespecifically required to be decided by theCourt en banc, in cognizance of the need for athorough and judicious evaluation of serious chargesagainst members of the judiciary, it is only when thepenalty imposed does not exceed suspension of morethan one year or a fine of P10, 000.00, or both, that theadministrative matter may be decided in division.

It must not also be overlooked that as early as

February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No.2-89 which clarifies that:

xxxxxxxxx

2. A decision or resolution of a Divisionof the Court, when concurred in by amajority of its members whoactually took part in thedeliberations on the issues in acase and voted thereon, and in nocase without the concurrence of atleast three of such Members, is a

decision or resolution of theSupreme Court (Section 4[3], ArticleVIII, 1987 Constitution).

That guideline or rule in the referral tothe Court en banc of cases assigned toa division thereof rests on the samerationale and applies with equal forceto confute the antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it would indeed be

14 | P a g e



desirable for said respondent tohereafter deal with situations like theone subject of this resolution with moreperspicacity and circumspection.WHEREFORE, the basic and

supplemental motions forreconsideration of the judgment in thecase at bar are hereby DENIED. Thisresolution is immediately final andexecutor.

SECTION 12

The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated toany agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

In Re:Manzano

The Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon.Rodolfo C. Farinas designated JudgeManzano as a member of the Ilocos NorteProvincial Committee on Justice createdpursuant to Presidential Executive Order No.856 of 12 December 1986, as amended byExecutive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988.

Manzano wrote a letter addressed to theChief Justice, asking the latter forauthorization to (1) accept the appointmentand to assume and discharge the powersand duties attached to the said position; (2)considering his membership in theCommittee as neither violative of theIndependence of the Judiciary nor a violationof Section 12, Article VIII, or of the secondparagraph of Section .7, Article IX (B) of theConstitution; and (3) consider his

Whether or not therequest of JudgeManzano should beapproved?

Under the Constitution, the members of theSupreme Court and other courts established bylaw shall not be designated to any agencyperforming quasi- judicial or administrativefunctions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the

Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, whichdischarges an administrative function, will be inviolation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained todeny his request.

15 | P a g e



membership in the said Committee as partof the primary functions of an Executive Judge.

An examination of Executive Order No. 856,as amended, reveals that Provincial/City

Committees on Justice are created to insurethe speedy disposition of cases of detainees.It is evident that such Provincial/CityCommittees on Justice performadministrative functions.

Administrative functions are those whichinvolve the regulation and control over theconduct and affairs of individuals for theirown welfare and the promulgation of rulesand regulations to better carry out the policyof the legislature or such as are devolvedupon the administrative agency by theorganic law of its existence Under EO No.326 amending EO. 856, it is provided thatProvincial/City Committees on Justice shallbe under the supervision of the Secretary of Justice.

SECTION 14

No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the factsand the law on which it is based.

NicosIndustrialCorp v. CA

NICOS obtained a loan of P2M from privaterespondent UCPB and to secure paymentthereof executed a real estate mortgage on

two parcels of land. The mortgage wasforeclosed due to non-payment of the loan,and the sheriff's sale was held without re-publication of the required notices. UCPBwas the highest and lone bidder and themortgaged lands were sold to it.

Thereafter, UCPB sold all its rights to theproperties to private respondent Manuel Co,who transferred them to Golden StarIndustrial Corporation, another private

Whether or not theorder complies withthe Constitutional

requirement underSection 14 of Article8

No. The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates Article 8, Section 14, of theConstitution. It is a requirement of due process that the

parties be informed of how it was decided, with anexplanation of the factual and legal reasons that led tothe conclusions of the court. The losing party is entitledto know why he lost, so he may appeal to a highercourt, if permitted, should he believe that the decisionshould be reversed. A decision that does not clearlyand distinctly state the facts and the law on which it isbased leaves the parties in the dark as to how it wasreached, prejudicial to the losing party, who is unableto pinpoint the possible errors of the court for reviewby a higher tribunal.

16 | P a g e



respondent.

NICOS and the other petitioners filedtheir action for "annulment of sheriff's sale,recovery of possession, and damages, withprayer for the issuance of a preliminary

prohibitory and mandatory injunction."Golden Star and Victorino P. Evangelista, asex officio sheriff of Bulacan, moved todismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,prescription, estoppel, and regularity of thesheriff's sale.

RTC Judge dismissed the petition and issuedan order stating that “the Sheriff's AuctionSale…was in complete accord with therequirements of Section 3, Act 3135 underwhich the auction sale was appropriatelyheld and conducted.”

Petitioners contend in the case at bar thatthe order violates Article 8 Sec 14 of theConstitution claiming that it is not areasoned decision.

All the trial court did was summarily conclude "fromthe very evidence adduced by the plaintiff" that thesheriff's sale "was in complete accord with therequirements of Section 3, Act 3135." It did not botherto discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it

believed that the legal requirements had beenobserved. Its conclusion was remarkably threadbare.Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it shouldnot and cannot be substituted for substance.

**The constitutional provision does not apply tointerlocutory orders (motion for postponement,quashing a subpoena, etc) because it "refers only todecisions on the merits and not to orders of the trialcourt resolving incidental matters.

The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisionsall the time. It has ample discretion to formulate

decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legalbasis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

Mendoza v.CFI The SC resolution of January 26, 1973

dismissing the petitions for habeascorpus, certiorari and mandamus forlack of merit is sought to bereconsidered by petioner Mendoza. Itwas ruled that petitioner failed tosustain the burden of showing that his

confinement was marked by illegality orthat the order cancelling the bailpreviously issued was tainted with graveabuse of discretion.

Although Mendoza’s petition for habeascorpus was dismissed, he obtainedprovisional liberty as he was allowed tobail by the Municipal Court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail was

Whether or not theissuance of a brief dismissal orderoffends theconstitutionalrequirement thatno decision “shall

be rendered byany court of recordwithout[expressingtherein clearly anddistinctly the factsand the law] onwhich it is based.

No, an extended decision was not necessary. Itwas held that a minute resolution dismissing apetition for habeas corpus, certiorari,and mandamus was not covered by the provisionof Art.8, Sec.11 of the 1935 Constitution.

Therefore, minute resolution disposing of case at

bar is not violative of the Constitution.

-If the situation is subjected, to searchinganalysis, it cannot be denied that what is reallyinvolved is just a mere incident in theprosecution of petitioner. Had he prevailed, hewould have been entitled to provisionary liberty.Under the circumstances, as the facts of theclearly demonstrate, with the plea for habeascorpus be unavailing, we felt that a minute

17 | P a g e



revoked by the Court of First Instance inthe order now challenged. Suchactuation he would now condemn as agrave abuse of discretion.

The petitioner raised a motion forreconsideration objecting to the SC’sdismissal of the petition through aminute resolution. It is his contentionthat there should be an extendeddecision. As noted at the outset,reliance is had on the constitutionalprovision requiring a decision by a courtof record to contain "clearly anddistinctly the facts and the law on whichit is based."

resolution which certainly would require less timethan a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate.

-Precisely, the leniency shown the partiesdwell at length on their respective contentions

should disprove any suspicion that the decisionarrived at was reached without according theparties the fundamental fairness to which theyare entitled under the Constitution.

-Since, at the most, the relief sought bypetitioner will not, in any way, foreclose theultimate outcome of the cases against him oneway or the other, we deemed that theconstitutional provision invoked did not strictlycall for application. In that sense, a minimumresolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in

any wise failing to abide by a constitutionalcommand.

According to Jose v. Santos, what is expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makesclear why either party prevailed under theapplicable law.” There is no rigid formula insatisfying the requirement of clarity anddistinctness. The discretion of the judge in thisrespect is necessarily broad. There is nosacramental form of words which he must use."What must be stressed is that the decision

spoken of is the judgment rendered after theprevious presentation of the proof in an ordinarycivil or criminal case upon which its disposition isto be based. (Soncuya v. National InvestmentBoard)

Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and theConstitutional provision have been held to referonly to decisions of the merit and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such

18 | P a g e



as the one at bar.

The case involves a mere incident in theprosecution of petitioner. Had he prevailed, hewould have been entitled to provisionary liberty.

Under the circumstances, a minute resolution,which would require less time than a full-blowndecision, was not inappropriate.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration isdenied

Borromeov.CA

.Petitioner charges Attys. Julieta Y. Carreonand Alfredo P. Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court,respectively, of the 3rd Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of the Judicial RecordsOffice of this Court, with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly “maliciouslyand deviously issuing biased, fake, baselessand unconstitutional ‘Resolution’ and ‘Entryof Judgment’ in G.R. No. 82273.

In several letter-complaints filed with thecourts and the Ombudsman, the petitionerhad repeatedly alleged that he “sufferedinjustices,” because of the disposition of the4 cases he separately appealed to this Courtwhich were resolved by minute resolutions,allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution.

His invariable complaint is that theresolutions which disposed of his cases donot bear the signatures of the Justices whoparticipated in the deliberations andresolutions and do not show that they votedtherein.

He likewise complained that the resolutionsbear no certification of the Chief Justice and

W/N (1) thecertification of theChief Justice isimperative in minuteresolutions? (2) theresolution inquestion lackednecessary facts andlaw on which thedecisions are based?

(1) No. Minute resolutions need not be signed by themembers of the Court who took part in thedeliberations of a case nor do they require thecertification of the Chief Justice. For to requiremembers of the Court to sign all resolutions issuedwould not only unduly delay the issuance of itsresolutions but a great amount of their time would bespent on functions more properly performed by theClerk of Court and which time could be more profitablyused in the analysis of cases and the formulation of discussions and orders of important nature andcharacter.

The Court needs the full time and attention of its Clerksof Court and other key officials in discharging itsconstitutional duties. Its officers do not have the timeto answer frivolous complaints filed by disgruntledlitigants questioning decisions and resolutions of theCourt and involving cases deliberated upon and

resolved by the Court itself. As earlier stated, allresolutions and decisions are actions of the Court, notits subordinate personnel. The Court assumes fullresponsibility for all its acts. Its personnel cannotanswer and should not be made to answer for acts of the Court.

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, andlitigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases byminute resolutions and decrees them as final andexecutory, as where a case is patently without merit,

19 | P a g e



that they did not state the facts and the lawon which they were based and were signedonly by the Clerks of Court and therefore“unconstitutional, null and void.”

The Supreme Court’s resolution through its

3rd

Division which disposed of petitioner’spetition is a four-page resolution which morethan adequately complies with theconstitutional requirements governingresolutions refusing to give due course topetitions for review. The petition and itsincidents were discussed and deliberatedupon by the Justices of the 3rd Division.

where the issues raised are factual in nature, wherethe decision appealed from is supported by substantialevidence and is in accord with the facts of the caseand the applicable laws, where it is clear from therecords that the petition is filed merely to forestall theearly execution of judgment and for non-compliance

with the rules.

2. No. In Macario Tayamura, et al. vs IntermediateAppellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), thecourt clarified the constitutional requirementthat a decision must express clearly anddistinctly the facts and law on which it is basedas referring only to decisions. Resolutionsdisposing of petitions fall under theconstitutional provision which states that, “Nopetition for review…shall be refused duecourse…without stating the legal basistherefor” (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution).

When the Court, after deliberating on a petitionand any subsequent pleadings, manifestations,comments, or motions decides to deny duecourse to the petition and states that thequestions raised are factual and reversible errorin the respondent court’s decision is shown orfor some other legal basis stated in theresolution, there is sufficient compliance withthe constitutional requirement.

KomatsuIndustries(Phils), Inc.vs CA

NIDC granted KIPI a direct loan of P8M and aP2M guarantee to secure PNB. As security, aDeed of Real Estate Mortgage was executedby Petitioner KIPI in favor of NIDC, covering aparcel of land in the Province of Rizal (nowMakati, Metro Manila). In order to secure theobligation of Petitioner KIPI underRespondent PNBs deferred letter of credit infavor of Toyota Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan,Petitioner KIPI executed an Amendment of Mortgage Deed covering the same parcel of land in favor of Respondent PNB and NIDC.Upon full payment of Petitioner KIPIs accountwith NIDC and the P2.0 M Credit Line with

Whether or not theCourt violated Art 8Sec 14 of theConstitution inrendering minuteresolutions.

No. These resolutions are not decisions within the

above constitutional requirements; and the petition toreview the decision of the CA is not a matter of rightbut of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no needto fully explain the Courts denial since the facts andthe law are already mentioned in the Court of Appealsdecision. (Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al)

← The constitutional mandate is applicable onlyin cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due courseand after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/orother pleadings, but not where the petition is refused

20 | P a g e



Respondent PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage.

In this Deed, it is provided that the creditaccommodations had been fully paid by theBorrower to the PNB and NIDC. By virtue of

this full payment and the execution of theDeed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, NIDC returned the owner’s copy of the TCT of the petitioner and the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage wasregistered with the Registry of Deed.

PNB requested for the return of the owner’scopy of the TCT and filed a Petition forCorrection of Entry and Adverse Claim withthe office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati.PNB also filed with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Makati a Petition of Sale Under ACT 1508 to

extra-judicially foreclose various propertiesbelonging to Petitioner by virtue of a ChattelMortgage with Power of Attorney.

Petitioner KIPI received an undated Notice of Sheriffs Sale to the effect that the landcovered by the TCT would be foreclosedextra-judicially.CA reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court and declared legal the FirstNotice of Sheriffs Sale, the Second Notice of Sheriffs Sale, the Extrajudicial ForeclosureProceedings, the Certificate of Sale, the FinalDeed of Sale, its registration and the Transfer Certificate of Title, the Deed of Salein favor of and the Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the intervenor Santiago LandDevelopment Corporation. The CA deniedpetitioner’s subsequent motion forreconsideration.

The SC ruled that:

(1) NIDC was in no position to state thatKomatsu’s direct obligation to PNB has been

due course, with the resolution stating the legal basisthereof. When the Court, after deliberating on apetition and subsequent pleadings, decides to denydue course to the petition and states that thequestions raised are factual or there is no reversible

error in the respondent courts decision, there issufficient compliance with the constitutionalrequirement. (Que vs. People, et al., Munal vs.Commission on Audit, et al.)

The Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minuteresolutions and decrees them as final and executory,as (1) where a case is patently without merit, (2) wherethe issues raised are factual in nature, (3) where thedecision appealed from is supported by substantialevidence and is in accord with the facts of the caseand the applicable laws, (4) where it is clear from therecords that the petition is filed merely to forestall the

early execution of judgment and for non-compliancewith the rules. The resolution denying due course ordismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.(Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) The Court is notduty bound to render signed Decisions all the time. Ithas discretion to formulate Decisions and/or MinuteResolutions, provided a legal basis is given.

The SC is not compelled to adopt a definite andstringent rule on how its judgment shall be framed. Ithas discretion to decide whether a minute resolutionshould be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in anyparticular case and that a minute Resolution of

dismissal of a Petition for Reviewon Certiorari constitutes an adjudication on the meritsof the controversy or subject matter of the Petition. Aminute Resolution denying a Petition for Review of aDecision of the Court of Appeals can only mean thatthe Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findingsand conclusions of the Court of Appeals, in other wordsthat the decision sought to be reviewed and set asideis correct.

21 | P a g e



fully paid.(2) The extrajudicial foreclosure of themortgage on the whole Pasong Tamoproperty is valid.(3) As to the validity of the foreclosureproceedings and the non-binding effect of

the Deed of Release, Komatsu is not entitledto any award of damages.

Petitioner filed a Second Motion forReconsideration, attributing supposed errorsand irregularities in the disposition of thiscase to the CA and the SC. Petitioner assailsviolation of Section 14, Article 8 of the 1987Constitution. It insinuates that the procedureadopted by the SC is a culpableconstitutional violation and can be subject of impeachment proceedings.

PrudentialBank v.Castro

An administrative complaint was filedagainst respondent Atty. Grecia, and aDecision to disbar him was subsequentlyrendered. He moved to reconsider but wasdenied in a Minute Resolution “for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having beenpreviously duly considered and passedupon.” Respondent Grecia now prays thatthe Decision and the Resolution of the denialof the motion for reconsideration be setaside. He challenges the Decision asviolative of Sec, 13, Art VIII of the 1987Constitution due to lack of certification bythe Chief Justice that the conclusions of theCourt were reached in consultation beforethe case was assigned to a member forwriting of the opinion of the Court. He alsoavers that the Minute Resolution disregardedthe constitutional mandate in Sec.14, ArtVIII.

1. Whether or notthe certificationrequirement in Sec.23, Art VIII of theConstitutionapplicable to thecase at bar, anadministrative case.

2. Whether or notthe denial of themotion forreconsideration byMinute Resolutionviolate Sec. 14, ArtVIII of theConstitution.

1. Administrative cases. From the verybeginning, the resolutions/decisions of the Court inadministrative cases have not been accompanied byany formal certification. In fact, such a certificationwould be a superfluity in administrative cases, whichby their very nature, have to be deliberated uponconsidering the collegiate composition of this Court.

• But even if such a certification were required,it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court inits decision were arrived at after consultation anddeliberation. The signatures of the members whoactually took part in the deliberations and voted

attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision,or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is noponente although any member of the Court may beassigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formalcertification is obviously not required.

2. No. The Constitutional mandate under par.2

Sec.14, Art VIII that “No petition for review ormotion for reconsideration of a decision of thecourt shall be refused due course or deniedwithout stating the legal basis therefor” is

22 | P a g e



inapplicable in administrative cases. And evenif it were applicable, said Resolution stated thelegal basis for the denial, and thereforeadhered faithfully to the Constitutionalrequirement. “Lack of merit” which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis.

Oil andNatural GasCommission

Petitioner is a foreign corporation owned andcontrolled by the Government of India whilethe private respondent is a privatecorporation duly organized and existingunder the laws of the Philippines. Privaterespondent undertook to supply thepetitioner 4,300 metric tons of oil wellcement. Petitioner paid $477,300.00 in favorof private respondent. The oil well cementwas loaded on board the ship MV SURUTANANAVA for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta,India. However, due to a dispute betweenthe ship owner and the private respondent,

the cargo was held up in Bangkok and didnot reach its destination. Private respondentfailed to deliver the oil well cement,notwithstanding its receipt of payment fromthe petitioner. Both parties agreed that theprivate respondent will replace the entire4,300 metric tons of oil well cement withClass "G" cement cost free at the petitioner'sdesignated port. However, the Class "G"cement did not conform to the petitioner'sspecifications. The petitioner then informedthe private respondent that it was referringits claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause16 of their contract. Arbitrator ruled in favorof petitioner and ordered the reimbursementof expenses incurred by petitioner. Thepetitioner filed a petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India prayingthat the decision of the arbitrator be made"the Rule of Court" in India. The foreign courtissued notices to the private respondent forfiling objections to the petition to which theprivate respondent complied. However, theforeign court issued an order requiringprivate respondent to pay corresponding

Whether or not the judgment of theforeign court isenforceable in this jurisdiction in view of private respondent’sclaim that thedecision is bereft of statement of factsand law upon whichthe award wasbased.

The pertinent portion of the judgment of the foreigncourt reads:

Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1is made Rule of the Court. On the basisof conditions of award decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall bea part of the decree. The plaintiff shallalso be entitled to get from defendantUS$ 899,603.77 along with 9% interestper annum till the last date of realization.

As specified in the order of the Civil Judge, "AwardPaper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree". This is acategorical declaration that the foreign court adoptedthe findings of facts and law of the arbitrator ascontained in the latter's Award Paper. Award Papercontains an exhaustive discussion of the respectiveclaims and defenses of the parties, and the arbitrator'sevaluation of the same. The appellate court was inerror when it described the latter to be a "simplisticdecision containing literally, only the dispositiveportion". 25

The constitutional mandate that no decision shall berendered by any court without expressing thereindearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based (Article 8 Section 14, 1987 Constitution)does not preclude the validity of "memorandumdecisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisionsof inferior tribunals.

For judicial convenience and expediency, therefore,We hereby adopt by way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the court a quo spread in its

23 | P a g e



docket fees. Instead of paying, privaterespondent sent a written communicationasking for the exact amount to be paid. Thereafter, foreign court disregarded privaterespondent’s objections on the ground of failure to pay docket fees and considered the

rule of the Arbitrator as a Rule of Court.

Due to private respondent’s failure tocomply with the order of the foreign court,petitioner filed before the RTC a complaintfor the enforcement of the judgment. TheRTC dismissed the complaint stating thatpetitioner’s lack legal capacity to sue, causeof action and the claim has been waived. TheCA upheld the RTC’s decision. Hence thispetition for certiorari before the SC.

decision, as integral part of this Our decision. (Romerov. CA)

Incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of thelower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the

higher court.30

This is particularly true when thedecision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusionsarrived at. (Francisco v. Permskul)

Francisco v.Permskul

On May 21, 1984, the F leased his apartmentin Makati to Permskul for a period of 1 yearfor the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 amonth. Pursuant to the lease contract, theprivate respondent deposited with thepetitioner the amount of P9,000.00 toanswer for unpaid rentals or any damage tothe leased premises except when caused byreasonable wear and tear.

On May 31, 1985, the private respondentvacated the property. He thereafter

requested the refund of his deposit minusthe sum of P1,000.00, representing therental for the additional ten days of hisoccupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He saidthe lessee still owed him for other charges,including the electricity and water bills andthe sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of theleased premises to restore them to theiroriginal condition.

Whether or not thememorandumdecision of the RTCis unconstitutional,as it didn’t statedclearly anddistinctively the factsand the law on w/c itis based.

No.

The Court has deliberated extensively on the challengeposed against the memorandum decision as nowauthorized by law. Taking into account the salutarypurpose for which it is allowed, and bearing in mindthe above-discussed restraint we must observe when alaw is challenged before us, we have come to theconclusion that Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as weshall interpret it here, is not unconstitutional.

Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines

Memorandum decisions. — The judgment or finalresolution of a court in appealed cases may adopt byreference the findings of fact and conclusions of lawcontained in the decision or final order appealed from.

Respondent justifies the memorandum decision asauthorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals,( Laid down

24 | P a g e



Permskul sued in the Metropolitan Trial Courtof Makati. MTC sustained Permskul, holdingthat the repainting was not chargeable tohim. Francisco was ordered to pay theplaintiff the amount of P7,750.00,representing the balance of the deposit after

deducting the water and electricity charges.

Thedecision was appealed to the RTC of Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. dela Rama on January 14, 1987. This was donein a memorandum decision reading in full asfollows:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

After a careful and thorough perusal,evaluation and study of the records of thiscase, this Court hereby adopts by referencethe findings of fact and conclusions of lawcontained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch63 and finds that there is no cogent reasonto disturb the same.

WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from ishereby affirmed in toto.

When Francisco went to the Court of

Appeals, his petition for review was deniedon September 29, 1987, as so too was hismotion for reconsideration, on December 1,1987. 4 He is now before us to fault therespondent court, principally for sustainingthe memorandum decision of the regionaltrial court. His contention is that it violatesArticle VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.

Francisco asked that the case be remandedto the regional trial court for a full blown

Doctrine of permitting the use of the memorandumdecision). Which sustained the said law.

Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:

Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. — Everydecision or final resolution of a court in appealed casesshall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact andthe conclusions of law on which it is based which maybe contained in the decision or final resolution itself, oradopted by reference from those set forth in thedecision, order or resolution appealed from.

Judge dela Rama availed himself of the convenienceoffered by Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, he was onlyacting in accordance with the ruling announced inRomero permitting the use of the memorandum

decision. It must also be observed that even if therespondent court appeared to be partial to thereservation rather than the rule in the said case, itnevertheless had the duty — which it discharged — toabide by the doctrine announced therein by thehighest tribunal of the land.

In reviewing the decision of the metropolitan trialcourt, the Court of Appeals was actually reviewing thedecision of the regional trial court, which hadincorporated by reference the earlier decision renderedby Judge Balita.

The reason for allowing the incorporation by referenceis evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, inthe decision of the higher court. The Idea is to avoidhaving to repeat in the body of the latter decision thefindings or conclusions of the lower court since theyare being approved or adopted anyway.

Although only incorporated by reference in thememorandum decision of the regional trial court, JudgeBalita's decision was nevertheless available to the

25 | P a g e



hearing on the merits, to be followed by adecision stating therein clearly and distinctlythe facts and the law on which it is based.

For his part, Permskul demurs. He justifiesthe memorandum decision as authorized byB.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the ruling of thisCourt in Romero v. Court of Appeals, Which sustained the said law.

Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads asfollows:

Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases.- Every decision or final resolution of a courtin appealed cases shall clearly and distinctlystate the findings of fact and the conclusions

of law on which it is based which may becontained in the decision or final resolutionitself, or adopted by reference from thoseset forth in the decision, order or resolutionappealed from.

Court of Appeals. It is this circumstance, or evenhappenstance, if you will, that has validated thememorandum decision challenged in this case andspared it from constitutional infirmity.

Rules for a Valid Memorandum Decision:

1. It cannot incorporate the findings of fact andthe conclusions of law of the lower court onlyby remote reference.

2. It must provide for direct access to the factsand the law being adopted, which must becontained in a statement attached to the saiddecision.

In other words, the memorandum decision authorizedunder Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actuallyembody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made anindispensable part of the decision.

The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that thememorandum decision should be sparingly used lest itbecome an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is anadditional condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where thefacts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily

determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinalcomplications involved that will require an extendeddiscussion of the laws involved. The memorandumdecision may be employed in simple l itigations only,such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal isobviously groundless and deserves no more than thetime needed to dismiss it.

Note: SC ruled that the interpretations will not applyretroactively to the memorandum decision rendered bythe regional trial court in the case at bar, or to the

26 | P a g e



decision of the respondent court such decision on thestrength of Romero v. Court of Appeals. As earlierobserved, there was substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct availability and actualreview of the decision of Judge Balita incorporated by

reference in the memorandum decision of Judge de laRama. The memorandum decision as then understoodunder the Romero decision was a valid act at the timeit was rendered by Judge de la Rama and producedbinding legal effect.

No violation of Section 14 of Article VIII of theConstitution.

SECTION 15 (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four monthsfrom date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower

collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, ormemorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may havebeen incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, withoutfurther delay.

Re: Problemof Delays inCasesBefore theSandiganbayan

Submitted to the Court for consideration is aresolution of the Board of Governors,Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter,the IBP) recommending an inquiry into thecauses of delays in the resolution of incidents and motions and in the decision of cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.

On July 31, 2000, the IBP, through itsNational President, Arthur D. Lim,transmitted to the Court a Resolutionaddressing the problem of delays in cases

W/N theSandiganbayanhas 12 months or3 months toresolve/decidecases submittedfor its resolution.

Period To Decide/Resolve Cases: There are 2 views:

1. From the time a case is submitted for decisionor resolution, the Sandiganbayan has 12months to decide or resolve it.

2. As a court with trial function, the

Sandiganbayan has three 3 months to decidethe case from the date of submission fordecision.

27 | P a g e



pending before the Sandiganbayan.

On August 8, 2000, the Court requiredSandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis E.Garchitorena to comment on the letter of theIBP and to submit a list of all Sandiganbayan

cases pending decision, or with motion forreconsideration pending resolution,indicating the dates they were deemedsubmitted for decision or resolution.

Thus, the Sandiganbayan has a total of fourhundred fifteen (415) cases for decisionremaining undecided long beyond thereglementary period to decide, with onecase submitted as early as May 24, 1990,7

and motion for reconsideration which hasremained unresolved over thirty days fromsubmission.

On November 21, 2000, the Court resolvedto direct then Court Administrator Alfredo L.Benipayo (hereafter, the OCA) "to conduct a judicial audit of the Sandiganbayan,especially on the cases subject of thisadministrative matter, and to submit areport thereon not later than 31 December2000."

On January 26, 2001, the Court Administratorsubmitted amemorandum to the Courtstating that the causes of delay in:

(1) Failure of the Office of the SpecialProsecutor to submit reinvestigation reportdespite the lapse of several years;

(2) Filing of numerous incidents such asMotion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash,Demurrer to Evidence, etc. that remainunresolved for years;

(3) Suspension of proceedings because of a

Art. 8, Sec. 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitutiondoes not apply to the Sandiganbayan for it’s not aregular court but a special one: Special courts are judicicial tribunals exercising limited jurisdiction overparticular or specialized categories of actions—(They

are the Court of Tax Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, andthe Shari'a Courts).

- The above provision does not apply to theSandiganbayan. The provision refers to regular courtsof lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchyapplies only to the Court of Appeals.

- The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the samelevel as the Court of Appeals and possessing all theinherent powers of a court of justice, with functions of a trial court.

- The Sandiganbayan was originally empowered topromulgate its own rules of procedure. However, onMarch 30, 1995, Congress repealed theSandiganbayan's power to promulgate its own rules of procedure and instead prescribed that the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply toall cases and proceedings filed with theSandiganbayan.

The 3 month period, NOT the 12 month period, todecide cases applies to the Sandiganbayan.

- Given the clarity of the rule that does notdistinguish, we hold that the three (3) month period,not the twelve (12) month period, to decide casesapplies to the Sandiganbayan.

The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 isclear on this issue.It provides:

"Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases –As far as practicable, the trial of cases before the

28 | P a g e



pending petition for certiorari and prohibitionwith the Supreme Court;

(4) Cases remain unacted upon or have nofurther settings despite the lapse of considerable le

(5) Unloading of cases already submitted fordecision even if the ponente is still inservice.

The SC consider ex mero motu theResolution of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) as an administrativecomplaint against Presiding Justice Francis E.Garchitorena for "serious delays in thedecision of cases and in the resolution of

motions and other pending incidents beforethe different divisions of theSandiganbayan," amounting toincompetence, inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and misconduct in office.

Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuousuntil terminated and the judgment shall be renderedwithin three (3) months from the date the case wassubmitted for decision."

On September 18, 1984, the Sandiganbayanpromulgated its own rules,36 thus:37

"Sec. 3 Maximum Period to Decide Cases – The judgment or final order of a division of theSandiganbayan shall be rendered within three (3)months from the date the case was submitted for decision.”

CourtAdministrator v.Quinanola

From October 28 to 31, 1996, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial and physical inventory of casespending before the Municipal Trial Court(MTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, in view of thethen impending compulsory retirement of its

presiding judge, Leonardo F. Quiñanola, onNovember 6, 1996.

Seventeen (17) cases had been submittedfor decision, twelve (12) of which werepending beyond the 90-day reglementaryperiod. They also found forty-seven (47)cases with interlocutory matters awaitingresolution, 41 of which had been pendingbeyond the reglementary period.

In its Memorandum, the OCA, through

Whether or not aheavy case load anda poor health maypartially excuse Judge Quinanola innot meeting the 90

reglementary period.

No, Judge Leonardo F. Quiñanola is found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and gross misconduct and is herebyordered to PAY a fine of forty thousand pesos(P40,000) to be taken from his retirement benefits. Ten thousand pesos (P10,000), the balance of the

amount withheld earlier from such benefits wasordered to be IMMEDIATELY RELEASED to him, absentany other administrative case pending against him.

The failure of a judge to decide cases promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency , w/cconsequently warrants administrative sanctions.

Also, the fact that a judge is burdened with a heavy case load and has a poor health serves only to

29 | P a g e



Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N.Elepaño, recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P40,000 andrespondent clerk of court be reprimanded.

Secured copies of Judge Quiñanola’s

Certificates of Service for the months of July,August, and September 1996 and discoveredthat he continued to certify that ‘ x x x allproceedings, applications, petitions, motionsand all civil and criminal cases which havebeen under submission or determination fora period of ninety (90) days or more havebeen determined and decided,’ despite thefact that cases submitted for decision formore than (3) years remained undecidedand several cases also remained unactedupon for a considerable length of time.

mitigate the penalty, NOT to exonerate him—to becompletely faultless, he should write to the SC toexplain his predicament and ask for extensions of time.

Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision withinthe period fixed by law constitutes a serious violationof the constitutional right of the parties to a speedydisposition of their cases. This transgression [was]compounded when respondent continued to collect hissalaries upon certification that he had but one casesubmitted for decision.

PART IARTICLE IX

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

SECTION 6 Each Comission en banc may promulgate its own rulesconcerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of itsoffices. Such rule however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Aruelo v. CA Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-Mayoralty candidates in Balagtas,Bulacan. Gatchalian was declared thewinner. Thereupon, Aaruelo filed with the

W/N prohibitions onfiling Motions toDismiss and Motionfor Bill of Particular

The rules of the COMELEC should prevail if theproceeding is before it. But if the proceeding isbefore a court, the Rules of Court prevail.Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot

30 | P a g e



RTC a civil case protest in the sameelections.

Aruelo claims that in the electoralcontests, the COMELEC RULES give therespondent only 5 days from summons

to file his answer and that this 5-dayperiod has lapsed. According to him, thefiling of Motions to Dismiss and Motionfor Bill of Particulars is prohibited under§1 RULE 13 of COMELEC Rules of Procedures, hence, filing by Gatchalianof said pleadings did not suspend therunning of the 5-day period.

under COMELECRULES should befollowed by thecourts?[W/NCOMELEC RULESshould prevail over

Rules of Court?]

W/N respondentGatchalian’s filing of said pleadings fellwithin thereglamentaryperiod?

adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certainpleadings in the regular courts. The power topromulgate rules concerning pleadings, practiceand procedure in all courts is vested on theSupreme Court.

APPLICATION:

RULES OF COURT PREVAIL. Nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided thatmotions to dismiss and bill of particulars are notallowed in election protests or quo warranto casespending before the regular courts.

Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answerafter receipt of the order denying his motion for a billof particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had untilAugust 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The

Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed byhim on August 11, 1992 was filed timely.

[NOTE: Reglamentary period should be viewed in thecontext of the RULESOFCOURT and not COMELECRULES, because it was filed before the court and notCOMELEC]

31 | P a g e



Estrella v.COMELEC

Romeo M. Estrella (petitioner) and Rolando F. Salvador (respondent) were mayoralty candidates in Baliuag, Bulacan duringthe May 14, 2001 Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent as winner. Petitioner thereafterfiled before the docketed as, which was raffled to Branch 10 thereof. By Decision of April 10, 2002, the

SUMMARY OF FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDPetitioner Respondent RTC COMELEC SC

(1)Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Bulacan an electionprotest [EPC No.10-M-2001]

(2)RTC annulledrespondent’s

proclamation anddeclared petitioneras the duly electedmayor of Baliuag.

(4)

filed before the RTCa motion forexecution of thedecision pendingappeal

(3)

Appealed the RTCdecision to the

COMELEC

(5)

RTC, grantedpetitioner’s motion

for executionpending appealand accordinglyissued a writ of

execution.

[APRIL 16, 2002Order]

(7)

Petitioner latermoved for theinhibition of

Commissioner RalphC. Lantion, a member

of the COMELEC[2nd DIVISION, which heard

the case]

(6)

Assailed the April16, 2002 Order

petition forcertiorari filed

before theCOMELEC

(8)

the motion forinhibition of

CommissionerLantion was denied

by the COMELEC

[Order of July 9,2002]

(9)

Filed before SC apetition forcertiorariquestioning theCOMELEC SecondDivision May 20,2002 Status QuoAnte Order

[July 11, 2002]

(10)

No temporaryrestraining order was

issued by SC.

Status Quo Ante Order of the

COMELEC wasimplemented on orabout July 17, 2003,

resulting in the ouster of petitioner from the

32 | P a g e



mayoral post.(11) July 23, 2002 hearing of SPR No. 21-2002, COMELEC Commissioner Lantion inhibited himself.

(12)

During thependency of casefiled before SC,

COMELEC, byOrder of January

16, 2003, nullifiedin SPR No. 21-2002 the writ of execution issued

by the RTC(13)

Respondent filed aMotion for

Reconsideration of the said Order

which motion wasduly certified to

the COMELEC EnBanc.

(14)

On September 16, 2003,SC dismissed SC case on

the grounds that:

1) the case had become

moot and academicbecause of the COMELECSecond Division’s

resolution on the meritsof SPR No. 21-2002, and

2) this Court has no jurisdiction over Division

orders or rulings of theCOMELEC.

(15)

Petitioner, in themeantime, filed onOctober 22, 2003 a

motion for

immediateexecution of theCOMELEC SecondDivision October

20, 2003Resolution, which

was set for hearingon October 28,

2003 but reset toNovember 4, 2003.

(16)

On even date,respondent moved toreconsider the saidOctober 20, 2003

Order.

(17)

On October 20,2003, the

COMELEC SecondDivision issued

in EAC No. A-10-2002 a Resolution

affirming withmodifications theRTC decision and

declaring petitioneras the duly elected

mayor.

(18) (19)

33 | P a g e



On October 29,2003, respondentfiled before the

COMELEC SecondDivision a "very

urgent motion toconsider the

instant casecertified to theCommission en

banc.Respondent laterfiled on November

3, 2003 a "veryurgent

manifestation andmotion to suspend

proceedings."

November 5, 2003,the COMELEC

Second Divisionissued an

Order denyingrespondent’s

plea for

suspension of proceedings and

grantingpetitioner’smotion forexecution

pending appealand accordingly

directing theissuance of a writ

of execution.

On even date, theCOMELEC En

Banc issued the

questionedNovember 5,

2003Status Quo Ante Order.

The Five (5) members including Commissioner Lantion participated in thisNovember 5, 2003 Order wherein Commissioner Lantion stated that "his previousvoluntary inhibition is only in the SPR cases and not in the EAC and as furtheragreed in the Second Division, [he] will not participate in the Divisiondeliberations but will vote when the case is elevated [to the] en banc.

ISSUESW/N Commissioner Lantion’s votes should bedisregarded?

W/N assailed order is void because it wasnot supported by the required majorityvote?

YES.Commissioner Lantion’s voluntarypiecemeal inhibition cannot becountenanced. Nowhere in the COMELECRules does it allow a Commissioner tovoluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allowhim to participate in the En Banc proceedingswhen he previously inhibited himself in theDivision is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but

Since Commissioner Lantion could notparticipate and vote in the issuance of thequestioned order, thus leaving three (3)members concurring therewith, thenecessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was notattained. The order thus failed to complywith the number of votes necessary for thepronouncement of a decision or order, as

34|

P a g e



legally improper and absurd. required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure whichprovides:

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. – (a)When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorumfor the purpose of transactingbusiness. The concurrence of amajority of the Members of theCommission shall be necessary forthe pronouncement of a decision,resolution, order or ruling.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003issued by the COMELEC En Banc is hereby NULLIFIED. This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY .

Acena v. CSC Petitioner Acena was appointed as anAdministrative Officer of Rizal

Technological Colleges (RTC), a statecollege. He was approved as permanentby the CSC.

Dr. Profets later extended to Acena apromotional appointment as AssociateProfessor and at the same timedesignated the latter as ActingAdministrative Officer, despitepromotional appointment.

Dr. Estolas replaced Dr. Profets as RTCOTC. In a memorandum of Dr. Estolas

revoked the designation of Acena asActing Administrative Officer.

Subsequently, petitioner filed suit withthe Merit Systems Protection Board(MSPB) against Dr. Estolas for illegaltermination. MPSB initially dismissed thecomplaint, but subsequently reverseditself after having been informed of theopinion of the CSC Chairman Gotdalerato the effect that Acena is still AO od the

W/N CSC actedwithout or in excess

of jurisdiction or withgrave abuse of discretion when it setaside the order of MSPB?

Under PD 1409, the CSC has the jurisdiction to reviewthe decision of MSPB. However, said authority to

review can only be exercised if the party adverselyaffected by the decision of the MSPB had files anappeal with the Commission within the 15-dayreglementary period.

Here it is admitted by the CSC and not disputed byprivate respondent Estolas that the petition for reviewwas filed outside the reglementary period.This beingso, the public respondents exceeded their jurisdictionwhen it entertained this petition that was erroneouslyfiled with the Office of the President. Having exceededtheir jurisdiction, CSC committed a reversible errorwhen it set aside the order of the MSPB which had long

become final and executor. Final decision or order canno longer be subject to review.Moreover, Estolas has not even bothered to offer anexplanation why she incurred delay and why she filed apetition whith the Office of the President. Such beingthe case, the public respondent CSC cannot legallyinvoke and justify the assumption of jurisdiction ongrounds of equality and substantial justice.

35|

P a g e



RTC because his appointment wasAssociate Professor had been withdrawn.

Dr. Estolas and Salvador (the oone whoreplaced Acena) filed a petitioner filed apetition for review with the Office of the

President, which referred said petition tothe CSC. The CSC ruled in favor of Dr.Estolas and Salvador. Hence, thispetition.

Vital Gozon vs CA In 1987, by virtue of E.O. 119 issuedby then Pres. Cory Aquino, areorganization of the Ministry of Healthwas effected. At the time of suchreorganization, Dr. Alejandro DelaFuente was the Chief of Clinics of theNational Children’s Hospital. In February1988, Dr. Dela Fuente received a noticefrom the Deparment of Health that hewould be re-appointed as MedicalSpecialist II. Such a position wasconsidered as two ranks lower than hisprevious position of Chief of Clinics.

This prompted Dr. Dela Fuente to filea protest with the DOH ReorganizationBoard. The protest was ignored. DelaFuente then filed a case before the CSC.In the meantime, the position of Chief of Clinics (then changed to Chief of MedicalProfessional Staff) were turned over andthereafter exercised by a Dr. Merencilla.

CSC ruled in favor of Dr. Dela Fuente.It ruled that Dr. Dela Fuente is deemedhaving retained his previous position.Neither an MR nor an appeal was filedassailing such a decision therebyrendering the decision as final andexecutory. Months have elapsed but stillthere was no action on the part of Vital-Gozon et. al. to execute the decision of the CSC.

Whether or not theCourt of Appeals has jurisdiction to takecognizance of thematter of damagesin aspecial civil action of mandamus.

Whether or not CSChas no coercivepowers to enforcetheir own decision.

1. Yes. CA has jurisdiction to award damages in

mandamus petitions. Sec. 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorized therendition of judgment in a mandamus action"commanding the defendant, immediately or atsome other specified time, to do the actrequired to be done to protect the rights of thepetitioner, and to pay the damages sustainedby the petitioner by reason of the wrongful

acts of the defendant."The provision makesplain that the damages are an incident, orthe result of , the defendant's wrongful act infailing and refusing to do the act required to bedone. It is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940had an identical counterpart provision. TheSolicitor General's theory that the rule inquestion is a mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and anotherfor damages, is untenable, for it implies that aclaim for damages arising from the omission orfailure to do an act subject of a mandamus suitmay be litigated separately from the latter, thematter of damages not being inextricablylinked to the cause of action for mandamus,which is certainly not the case.

Note: The Batasang Pambansa clearly intended thatsaid Court should exercise all the powersthen possessed by it under the Rules of Court inrelation to said action of mandamus and auxiliarywrits, including the adjudication of damages to thepetitioner in the action in appropriate cases.

36 | P a g e



CSC also told him that they believedthey have no coercive powers to enforcetheir own decision. This prompted DelaFuente to file a petition before the CA tocompel Vital-Gozon et. al. to restore him

to the position of Chief of Clinics and payhim his backwages plus damages forVital-Gozon’s refusal to comply with theCSC resolution. CA granted the decisioninsofar as his restoration to his formerposition but denied insofar as the grantof damages ruling that the petition is notthe correct vehicle to claim suchdamages not the CA is the correct forumfor such relief. CA also took note torepresentation by the SolGen of Dr. Vital-Gozon saying that pursuant to the rulingin Urbano and Co cases, the SolGen is

not authorized to represent her.

MR was filed by Dela Fuente arguingthat CA has the power to grant damagesin a mandamus action by virtue of BP129 which gave the SC, CA and RTCsconcurrent jurisdiction over suchpetitions and that CA was given thepower to conduct hearings and receiveevidence to resolve factual issues. Torequire him to separately litigate thematter of damages he continued, wouldlead to that multiplicity of suits which is

abhorred by the law. CA eventuallygranted the MR and ordered setting adate for reception of evidence on thedela Fuente's claim for damages. Itbased its judgment on the last phrase of Sec. 3 Rule 65 ROC which expresslyallows the award of damages in amandamus petition.

2. Yes.The proposition, communicated to de la

Fuente, of the Commission's supposed lack of coercive power to enforce its f inal judgments,is incorrect. It is inconsistent with previous actsof the Commission of actually directingexecution of its decisions and resolutions,

which this Court has sanctioned in severalcases; 36 and it is not in truth a correctassessment of its powers under theConstitution and the relevant laws.

In an En Banc Decision promulgated on October 15,1991 in G.R. No. 96938 entitled "GovernmentService Insurance System (GSIS) versus CivilService Commission, et al.,"

. . . it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil ServiceCommission the power or authority to enforce or order

execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which,it should be stressed, it has been exercising throughthe years. It would seem quite obvious that theauthority to decide cases in inutile unlessaccompanied by the authority to see that what hasbeen decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to atribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or theauthority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thusrenders, unless the law otherwise provides.

In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power

of execution has been sanctioned by this Court inseveral cases.

Those issues appear to the Court to be importantenough to deserve serious treatment and resolution,instead of simply being given short shrift by a terseruling that the proceedings in the Court ServiceCommission actually had the power to execute its finaland executory Resolution.

37 | P a g e



Filipnas.. v.Ferrer

In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondentCommissioners of the Commission onElections (COMELEC) issued an INVITATION TOBID CALL No. 127 on September 16, 1969calling for the submission of sealed proposalsfor the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000

units of voting booths.

On October 7, 1969, the respondent COMELECBidding Committee Chairman and Memberssubmitted their Memorandum on theproceedings taken pursuant to the saidInvitation to Bid which stated that Acme's bidhad to be rejected because the sample itsubmitted was "made of black iron sheets,painted, and therefore not rust proof or rustresistant," and that, "it is also heavy — 51kilos in weight. 4 The Committee insteadrecommended that Filipinas be awarded thecontract to manufacture and supply thevoting booths, but that an "ocular inspection

be made by all members of the Commissionof all the samples before the final award bemade." after an ocular inspection of all thesamples submitted was conducted by theCOMELEC Commissioners, and after theCommissioners noted that Acme submittedthe lowest bid, the COMELEC issued aResolution awarding the contract (for votingbooths) to Acme, subject to the condition,among others, that "(Acme) improves thesample submitted in such manner as it wouldbe rust proof or rust resistant.

Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the thenCourt of First Instance of Manila against

herein public respondents COMELECCommissioners, chairman and members of the Comelec Bidding Committee, and privaterespondent Acme.

The public respondents filed a motion toDismiss on the grounds that the lower courthas no jurisdiction over the nature of suit, andthat the complaint states no cause of action.

The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to theconduct of elections and shall exercise all other functionswhich may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, savethose involving the right to vote, all administrative questionsaffecting elections, including the determination of the numberof location of Polling places, and the appointment of election

inspectors and of other election officials. ... The decisions,orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject toreview by the Supreme Court. (Section 2, Article X, 1935

Philippine Constitution, which was then in force)

Section 5 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180,approved June 21, 1947, the election law then enforced)provided that, "(a) any controversy submitted to theCommission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided byit within fifteen days counted from the time the correspondingpetition giving rise to said controversy is filed," and that, "anyviolation of any final and executory decision, order, or rulingof the Commission shall" constitute contempt of courtLikewise, the same section provided that, "any decision, order

or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed bythe Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with theRules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated bythe Supreme Court.

Hence it has been consistently held that it is the SupremeCourt, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive

jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders orrulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of electionsand enforcement of election laws.

The SC however, far from convince that an order of theCOMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to

its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order"which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court oncertiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders,rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable bycertiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are thoserendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC andtaken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of itsadjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by theConstitution and the law on the Commission on Elections mayeither be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or

38 | P a g e



quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherentlyadministrative and sometimes ministerial in character.

The petition was dismissed because of being moot andacademic and without merit.

Mateo v. CA Petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation onprivate respondent Edgar Sta. Maria,then General Manager. When placedunder preventive suspension, MaximoSan Diego was designated in his place asacting General Manager. He was laterdismissed from service.

Private respondent then filed a SpecialCivil Action before the Regional Trial

Court of Rizal, Branch 78, challenging hisdismissal by petitioners.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the case ontwo grounds:

1. The court had no jurisdictionover the case; and

2. Quo warranto was not theproper remedy.

Respondent judge denied the motion todismiss and the motion for

reconsideration as well.

W/N the regional trialcourt has jurisdictionover the special civilcase involvingdismissal of anemployee of quasi-public corporation?

The Supreme Court held that RTC has no jurisdiction. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporationcreated pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 198, asamended, and as such its officers and employees arecovered by the Civil Service Law. Indeed theestablished rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlledcorporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Laws and Rules andRegulations.

Civil Service Laws categorically provide that the partyaggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of anagency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen(15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could goon certiorari to Supreme Court under Rule 65 of theRules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission.

.Under the present rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91 asamended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the

Court of Appeals. In any event, whether under the oldrule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involvingdismissal of officers and employees covered bythe Civil Service Law.

Orocio v. COA Auditing powers of COA vs. NPC’sGrant Gen. Counsel Power to Handle

ISSUE: RULINGDoes the legal NO. In determining whether an expenditure of

39 | P a g e



All Legal Matters

On 25 May 1982, an accident occurred atthe Malaya Thermal Plant of the NationalPower Corporation (NPC). Due to tubeleaks in its facility releasing steam and

hot water, two employees incurredsevere burns and were brought to theHospital for treatment.

Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC employee,suffered 1st and 2nd degree burns onthe lower part of his body while DomingoAbodizo, a casual employee of O.P.Landrito's General Services (OPLGS), a janitorial contractor of the NPC, assignedto the Maintenance Section, suffered 1stand 2nd degree burns on nearly 70% of his body.

NPC initially advanced payments forhospitalization dues of said employeesby setting it up as an account receivablefrom OPLGS deducted on a staggeredbasis from the latter's billings againstNPC until the same was fully satisfied.

NPC initially advanced this amount bysetting it up as an account receivablefrom OPLGS deducted on a staggeredbasis from the latter's billings againstNPC until the same was fully satisfied.

OPLGS requested for a refund of thetotal amount deducted from their billingsrepresenting payment of the advancesmade by the NPC.

In his Memorandum to the VP-HRGS, theAssistant Chief Legal Counsel of the NPC,recommended favorable action on therequest of the contractor. This was

opinion of petitioner, whichwas relied uponfor thedisbursement inquestion,

preclude or barthe COA fromdisallowing inpost-audit suchdisbursement?

a Government agency or instrumentality suchas the NPC is irregular, unnecessary,excessive, extravagant or unconscionable, theCOA should not be bound by the opinion of thelegal counsel of said agency or instrumentalitywhich may have been the basis for the

questioned disbursement; otherwise, it wouldindeed become a toothless tiger and itsauditing function would be a meaningless andfutile exercise. Its beacon lights then should benothing more than the pertinent laws and itsrules and regulations.

While it may be true that the charter of the NPCprovides that all legal matters shall be handled bythe General Counsel of the Corporation, it by nomeans follows that all legal opinions of the GeneralCounsel are ex-cathedra and binding upon all.

The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, isunder the COA's audit power. Under the 1973Constitution, which was the Constitution in force atthe time the disallowance in question was made, theCOA had the power to,inter alia, examine, audit, andsettle, in accordance with law and regulations, allaccounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of,and expenditures or uses of funds and property,owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, theGovernment, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, orinstrumentalities, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations; and promulgate accountingand auditing rules and regulations including those for

the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds orproperty.

Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions conferredupon the COA a more active role and invested it withbroader and more extensive powers. These were notmeant to make it a toothless tiger, but a dynamic,effective, efficient and independent watchdog of theGovernment.

Has the General Section 7, Article IX-A of the present Constitution also

40 | P a g e



forwarded to the Acting Manager, MetroManila Regional Center (MMRC) of theNPC. In turn, this opinion was referred tothe General Counsel of the NPC forcomment. In a memorandum,

petitioner, as officer-in-charge,recommended favorable action onOPLGS' request.

Thereupon, the amount for thehospitalization expenses was refundedto the contractor OPLGS. In Certificate of Settlement and Balances (CSB) preparedby respondent Jose M. Agustin, UnitAuditor of the Commission on Audit(COA) assigned to the NPC-MRRC therefund of the hospitalization expensesfor Domingo Abodizo was disallowed

for "[u]nder the NPC-O.P. Landritocontract, there is no employer-employee relationship between theCorporation and the latter'semployees." Hence, the NPC is notanswerable for such expenses.

General Counsel Marcelino C. Ilao of theNPC, in his Memorandum, asked for areconsideration of the aforesaiddisallowance.

In his memorandum, respondent Agustininformed General Counsel Ilao of theNPC that he is adopting his standcontained in his memorandum tothe COA Regional Director as theanswer to the request forreconsideration.

The COA Regional Director confirmedthe disallowance and held that thepersons determined to be liable should

Counsel of theCOA the authorityto decide amotion toreconsider thedisallowance in

question?

provides:

Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by amajority vote of all its members any caseor matter brought before it within sixtydays from the date of its submission for

decision or resolution. A case or matter isdeemed submitted for decision orresolution upon the filing of the lastpleading, brief, or memorandum requiredby the rules of the Commission or by theCommission itself. Unless otherwiseprovided by this Constitution or by law,any decision, order, or ruling of eachCommission may be brought to theSupreme Court on certiorari by theaggrieved party within thirty days fromreceipt of a copy thereof.

The COA, both under the 1973 and 1987Constitution, is a collegial body. It must resolvecases presented to it as such. Its GeneralCounsel cannot act for the Commission for he isnot even a Commissioner thereof. He can onlyoffer legal advice or render an opinion in orderto aid the COA in the resolution of a case or alegal question.

Thus, 5th indorsement cannot, by any stretchof the imagination, be considered as a"decision" of the COA. If the same were to be soconsidered, it would be void ab initio for having been

rendered by one who is not possessed with anypower or authority

What Mr. Nepomuceno should have done was torender the opinion precisely sought for in thepreceding 4th indorsement of respondent Ursal dated30 May 1985, 43 and submit the same to theCommission for the latter's guidance in resolving themotion for reconsideration.

41 | P a g e



be directed to immediately refund theamount disallowed and/or the properofficial be directed to retain any moneydue them in satisfaction thereof.

General Counsel Ilao submitted a secondrequest for reconsideration. This request justifies the legal opinion tendered basedthe NPC charter which provides that". . . all legal matters shall behandled by the General Counsel of the Corporation . . ."

1. First indorsement, respondentAgustin submitted the request tothe Chairman of respondent COAwith the claim that his findingson the said disallowance have

already been confirmed by theRegional Director, NCR.

2. Second indorsement, Managerof the Corporate Audit Office(MCAO) of respondent COA,referred for comment and/orrecommendation to the Auditor,NPC, the request forreconsideration.

3. Third indorsement, CorporateAuditor of COA, returned thesecond indorsement torespondent MCAO informing thelatter that he concurs with thecomment/opinion of respondentAgustin contained in the 1stindorsement.

4. 4th indorsement, respondentMCAO, expressing hisconcurrence with thedisallowance, referred to theCOA's General Counsel for anopinion the request forreconsideration.

Respondent Agustin, therefore, acted prematurelyand with undue haste in implementing thedisallowance against the parties allegedly liabletherefor on the basis of the favorable opinion of Mr.Nepomuceno who, incidentally, merely concurred

with his (Agustin's) 22 March 1985 indorsement.Is the petitionerpersonally liablefor thedisallowance onthe theory thatthe disbursementwas made on thebasis thereof?

If he rendered the opinion in the justperformance of his official duties and withinthe scope of his assigned tasks, he would notbe personally liable for any injury that mayresult therefrom.

A public official may be liable in his personalcapacity for whatever damage he may havecaused by his act done with malice and in badfaith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that in no case maythe petitioner be liable for his legal opinion. As the thenofficer-in-charge of the Office of the General Counselof NPC, he exercised quasi judicial functions. He wasempowered with discretion and authority to render anopinion as to whether the claim for reimbursement by theOPLGS was proper and ultimately, to determine if the NPCor any of its employees was responsible for the accidentand, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by Abodizounder the law on quasi-delict .

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged 5th indorsementof the General Counsel of the respondent Commission on Audit, dated 21 May1986, Memorandum of respondent Agustin of 30 June 1986, insofar, as it holdspetitioner personally liable for the disallowed disbursement and the DebitMemo, dated 22 July 1986, of the Manager of the Accounting Department of the National Power Corporation, are hereby set aside for being null and void.

42 | P a g e



5. 5th indorsement, GeneralCounsel of the COA, acting"FOR THE COMMISSION",made a return to the UnitAuditor, herein respondentAgustin; expressed hisconcurrence with the viewsof said unit Auditorcontained in the latter's 1stindorsement.

Thereupon, respondent, now in hiscapacity as Regional Auditor,transmitted to the General Counsel of the NPC a copy of the aforesaid 5thindorsement of COA's General Counsel.,which the former considers as theCommission's decision wherein heordered that the subject

disallowance "be booked" in thepetitioner's name, ''upon whose legalopinion the payment of the aforesaidrefund was made possible, jointly andseverally with Approving official on thevoucher, Examiner, and Chief Accountant," thereby amending previousfindings as to the persons liable.Petitioner, filed the instant petitionseeking to annul and get aside the (1)above-mentioned memoranda; 1stindorsement of respondent Agustinto the Chairman, COA; 3rdindorsement of respondent; 4thindorsement of respondent to theGeneral Counsel of the COA,conforming to the position of JoseM. Agustin; and 5th indorsement of the COA General CounselNepomuceno, Jr. and (2) praying fora writ of preliminary injunction toenjoin respondents from enforcingthe same. In support thereof, petitioneralleges that he prepared the questionedlegal opinion in the performance of his

43 | P a g e



official functions as mandated bylaw. At the time he rendered it, he wasthe officer-in-charge of the NPC's Officeof the General Counsel.

Since this function is quasi-judicial innature, the discretion exercised in thedischarge thereof is not subject to re-examination or controversion by therespondents; when the latter did whatwas proscribed, they in effect usurpedthe statutory function of the GeneralCounsel of the NPC. There is no lawwhich expressly authorizes therespondents to re-examine or controvertthe General Counsel's opinion. Petitioneradditionally stresses that he is notpersonally liable for the amount

disallowed as he was merelyperforming his official functions.Besides, his questioned opinion is notalleged to have been rendered withmalice and bad faith.

Respondents, through the Office of theSolicitor General, maintain that thequestioned disbursement on thebasis of the legal opinion of thepetitioner is within the scope of theauditing power of the COA. TheConstitution grants the COA the power,

authority and duty to examine, audit andsettle all accounts pertaining to theexpenditures or uses of funds andproperty pertaining to the Governmentor any of its subdivisions, agencies orinstrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Thematter of allowing in audit adisbursement account is not a ministerialfunction, but one which necessitates theexercise of discretion. Finally,

44 | P a g e



respondents assert that it waspetitioner's legal opinion whichmade possible the questioneddisbursement.

Ambil Jr.v.

COMELEC

Commissioner Guiani, before his

retirement from the COMLEC, signed adraft ponencia in a case. He vacated hisoffice. He vacated his office without finaldecision or resolution having beenpromulgated.

W/N the draft

ponencia is binding?

No.Before the resolution or decision is so signed and

promulgated, there is no valid resolution or decision tospeak of. A final decision or resolution becomesbinding only after it is promulgated and not before.Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of theCommission at the time the final decision or resolutionis promulgated cannot validly take part in thatresolution or decision. Much less could he be theponente of the resolution of the resolution or decision.

Dumayas v.COMELEC

This special civil action, petitionerRodolfo Dumayas, Jr., seeks to nullifythe Resolution promulgated March 2,2000 by the Commission onElections (COMELEC) en banc,

reversing that of the Second Divisiondated August 4, 1998, whichannulled the petitioner’sproclamation as Municipal Mayor of Carles, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. andrespondent Bernal, Jr. were rivalcandidates for the position of mayorin Carles, Iloilo last 11 May 1998synchronized elections.

During the canvassing on 13 May1998, election returns for precinctnos. 61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan was protested forinclusion in the canvass before theMunicipal Board of Canvassers (MBCfor brevity) by petitioner-appellantDumayas Jr. The grounds relied uponfor their exclusion are all the same-

Whether or not theresolution of COMELEC en bancwas null and void,for being violative

of Article IX-A,Section 7 of the1987 Constitution

No, the resolution by the COMELEC en banc wasvalid and constitutional.

In Jamil vs. COMELEC we held that a decisionbecomes binding only after its promulgation. If at

the time it is promulgated.

--The SC ruled that if at the time the resolutionwas promulgated, a judge or member of thecollegiate court who had earlier signed orregistered his vote has vacated his office, hisvote on the decision must automatically bewithdrawn or cancelled.

-- Accordingly, the votes of CommissionersGorospe and Guiani should merely be consideredas withdrawn for the reason that their retirement

preceded the resolution’s promulgation. Theeffect of the withdrawal of their votes would beas if they had not signed the resolution at all andonly the votes of the remaining commissionerswould be properly considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy.

-- However, unless the withdrawal of the voteswould materially affect the result insofar as

45 | P a g e



that is, "violation of Secs. 234, 235,236 of the Omnibus Election Codeand other election laws; acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion,and similar acts prohibited by law."Appellant Dumayas, Jr. submitted his

evidence to the Board of Canvasserson 14 May 1998 which consist of (a)the joint affidavits executed byLAMMP watchers for precinct 61A: Teresita Oblido, Reyland de la Rosa,and Armando Flores [signed byOblido and Flores only]; (b) affidavitof petitioner’s supporter VirgilisaCapao; (c) joint affidavit of precinct63A – watcher Nona Dichosa andprecinct 62A – watcher DanielCarmona; (d) blotter report dated 12

May 1998 of Carles PNP, Iloilo; and(d) corroborating affidavit of LAMMPsupporter Honorato Gallardo.

On the other hand, respondentBernal, Jr. in vehemently denying theallegations of petitioner, submitted joint affidavits of the members of thedifferent Boards of ElectionInspectors for precinct nos. 61A, 62Aand 63A/64A.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appealbefore the MBC on May 15, 1998. The appeal was given due course bythe COMELEC 2nd Division whichrendered a resolution, declaring thequestioned returns tainted w/irregularities. Thus proclaimingDumayas as the winning mayoraltycandidate.

votes for or against a party is concerned, we findno reason for declaring the decision a nullity. Inthe present case, with the cancellation of thevotes of retired Commissioners Gorospe andGuiani, the remaining votes among the fourincumbent commissioners at the time of the

resolution’s promulgation would still be 3 to 1 infavor of respondent. Noteworthy, these remainingCommissioners still constituted a quorum.

--In our view, the defect cited by petitionerdoes not affect the substance or validity of respondent Commission’s disposition of thecontroversy. The nullification of the challengedresolution, in our view, would merely prolong theproceedings unnecessarily.

Wherefore, petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.

46 | P a g e



On August 10, 1998, privaterespondent Felipe Bernal, Jr., filed amotion for reconsideration of the

above-cited resolution with theCOMELEC en banc.

On August 12, 1998, an ordercertifying that the motion forreconsideration and records of thecase were elevated to theCOMELEC en banc was signed byCommissioner Julio F. Desamito andissued by the Clerk of theCommission.

Pending resolution of the motion forreconsideration and pursuant to theresolution of the COMELEC SecondDivision, COMELEC set thereconvening of the MBC on August13, 1998, for the continuation of canvass proceedings andproclamation of winning candidatesfor Vice-Mayor and MunicipalCouncilors of Carles, Iloilo. No winnerfor the position of Mayor wasproclaimed since private respondent

was able to present a copy of hismotion for reconsideration beforethe MBC. The MBC then reset thedate for reconvening of the board onAugust 17, 1998, after confirming byphone with COMELEC-Manila that amotion for reconsideration wasindeed filed by private respondent. Thereafter, the MBC ruled thatproclamation of the winning

47 | P a g e



candidate for Mayor would proceedon August 17, 1998 unless privaterespondent could present acertification from the COMELEC thatthe motion for reconsideration waselevated to the COMELEC en banc.

On August 17, 1998, despitepresentation of the August 12, 1998order, petitioner Dumayas wasproclaimed winner of the electionafter excluding from the canvass theelection returns from the threecontested precincts in accordancewith the COMELEC Second DivisionResolution. The MBC, with its Vice-

Chairman dissenting, justified its actby reasoning that it did not receivean official copy of the order directingthe elevation of the case to the banc

The following day, privaterespondent immediately filed anurgent motion to declare void abinitio the proclamation of petitioneron the ground that the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division wasnot yet final and executory. For his

part, petitioner opposed both themotion for reconsideration andmotion to declare void ab initio hisproclamation as Mayor of Carles,asserting that private respondentfailed to show palpable errors towarrant reconsideration of saidresolution and maintaining, at thesame time, that his proclamationwas legal since respondent failed to

48 | P a g e



produce the certification required bythe MBC.

In a resolution by the COMELEC enbanc, the Resolution of the SecondDivision was REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and the proclamation of Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. wasANNULLED. Also a new MunicipalBoard of Canvassers of Carles, Iloilowas constituted.

On March 13, 2000, respondentBernal, Jr. was proclaimed by thenewly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality of Carles, thereby unseating petitioner

Dumayas.

Petitioner alleged that THERESOLUTION PROMULGATED ONMARCH 2, 2000 IS ILLEGAL AS ITWAS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE IX (A)SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTIONCONSIDERING THAT ONLY FOURCOMMISSIONERS VOTED TOREVERSE THE RESOLUTION DATEDAUGUST 4, 1998 OF THE SECONDDIVISION COMMISSION ON ELECTION

AND THAT, TWO COMMISSIONER(S)HAVE ALREADY RETIRED, AT THE TIME OF THE PROMULGATION

49 | P a g e

judi-partiii & conscoms part i

Documents