john f. daum (sb #52313) framroze m. virjee (sb...
TRANSCRIPT
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JOHN F. DAUM (SB #52313) FRAMROZE M. VIRJEE (SB #120401) DAVID L. HERRON (SB #158881) DAVID B. NEWDORF (SB #172960) O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP Embarcadero Center West 275 Battery Street San Francisco, California 94111-3305 Telephone: 415.984.8700
Attorneys for Defendant State of California
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
ELIEZER WILLIAMS, et al., ) Case No. 312 236 1
Plaintiffs, ) Hearing Date: February 8, 2001
vs.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DELAINE EASTIN, State Superintendent Of Public Instruction, STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATE) BOARD OF EDUCATION,
1 Defendants. 1
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1
Cross-Complainant, ) 1
vs. 1 1
SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL ) DISTRICT, et al., 1
1 Cross-Defendants. )
\
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Department: 414
Judge: Hon. Peter J. Busch
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE CROSS-COMPLAINT
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I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE COURT MAY NOT STRIKE THE STATE'S CROSS- COMPLAINT SINCE IT MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF C.C.P. § 428.10..........................................2
.
A. The Cross-Complaint Arises From the Same Transaction or Occurrence as the Complaint.......... 2
B. A Cross-Complaint May Not Be Stricken Because Plaintiffs Say It Will Complicate the Issues........5
II. NO STATUTE PERMITS PLAINTIFFS' MOTION.................... 9
A. C.C.P. § 436(a) Does Not Authorize a Motion to Strike an Entire Pleading........................ 9
B. No Court Order Forbade Filing the Cross- Complaint..........................................lO
C. Plaintiffs May Not File a Motion Under C.C.P. 5 435 Since They Are Not Entitled to Respond to the Cross-Complaint.............................11
III. PLAINTIFFS MISREPRESENT THE APPLICABLE LAW.............. 12
CONCLUSION...................................................15
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578 (1978)....................... 5, 6, 8, 11
Butt v. State of California, 4 Cal. 4th 668 (1992)........................13, 14, 15
City & County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127 (1958)................................. 8
Currie Medical Specialties, Inc. v. Bowen, 136 Cal. App. 3d 774 (1982)........................... 4
El Monte School Dist. v. Wilkins, 177 Cal. App. 2d 47 (1960)............................7
Ellison v. Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1989).......................... 8
Great American Ins. Co. v. Evans, 269 F. Supp. 151 (N.D.Cal. 1967)...................... 8
Klein v. Leatherman, 270 Cal. App. 2d 792 (1969)........................... 8
Linday v. American President Lines, Ltd., 214 Cal. App. 2d 146 (1963)................. 5, 6, 8, 11
People v. Buellton Development Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 178 (1943)............................ 8
Ranchers Bank v. Pressman, 19 Cal. App. 3d 612 (1971)............................ 4
Roylance v. Doelger, 57 Cal. 2d 255 (1962)....................... 5; 7, 8, 11
Saunders v. New Capital for Small Businesses, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 324 (1964)........................... 4
Seeley v. Seymour, 190 Cal. App. 3d 844 (1987)........................... 8
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728 (1976)............................13, 14
Simon Hardware Co. v. Pacific Tire C Rubber Co., 199 Cal. App. 2d 616 (1962)........................... 5
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Taliaferro v. Davis, 211 Cal. App. 2d 229 ( 1962)..................
Time for Living, Inc. v. Guy Hatfield Homes, 230 Cal. App. 3d 30 (lggl)...................
United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Productions, 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1955)..................
Statutes
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Code of Civil Procedure § 1048 .................................
Code of Civil Procedure § 426.10 .............................. 4
Code of Civil Procedure § 428.10.........................passi m
Code of Civil Procedure § 431.10 .......................... 9, 10
Code of Civil Procedure 5 435............................11, 12
Code of Civil Procedure § 436(a) .......................... 9, 10
Code of Civil Procedure § 436(b) ............................. 10
Stats. 1971, Ch. 244.........................................12
Stats. 1982, Ch. 704..
Rule
Rule 13(a), F.R.Civ.P. .
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....................................... 4
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MFaMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE CROSS-COMPLAINT
The State's cross-complaint alleges that, if students
in any school district are receiving a constitutionally
inadequate education (as plaintiffs allege), the relevant
district should take steps to remedy the problem. The cross-
complaint expressly alleges that each school district possesses
the authority and ability to fix the problems alleged, but has
not done so. Cross-complaint ¶¶ 30, 41, etc.
Plaintiffs do not deny that the State is entitled to
the relief sought in the cross-complaint. Indeed plaintiffs
could hardly argue otherwise, given plaintiffs' position that the
State has "ultimate" responsibility to ensure every student in
California a constitutionally adequate education. Plaintiffs'
Motion to Strike Cross-Complaint ("Motion") 1:5-6. If that is
the State's responsibility, then self-evidently the State is
entitled to fulfill its responsibility by requiring school
districts to fix conditions that are within their power to fix.
That is what the State has done.
The only question on this motion, accordingly, is
whether the State may file its lawsuit as a cross-complaint
this action, or whether it is required to file it as an
independent action. Plaintiffs argue that the cross-compla
in
int
should be stricken because it is "irrelevant" to plaintiffs'
theories, because it will complicate this action, and because it
will add new issues. For nearly 40 years, the law of California
has been clear that such arguments do not allow striking a cross-
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complaint. Rather, if a cross-complaint complies with C.C.P. 5
428.10, it may be filed -- however much it complicates the
action, and however many new issues it adds. If problems arise,
the Court may deal with them by using its general case management
powers, but not by striking the pleadings.
I. THE COURT MAY NOT STRIKE THE STATE'S CROSS-COMPLAINT
SINCE IT MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF C.C.P. § 428.10.
A. The Cross-Complaint Arises From the Same
Transaction or Occurrence as the Complaint.
Section 428.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
A party against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint . . . may file a cross- complaint setting forth . . .:
(b) Any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him . . . .
The complaint alleges clearly that each plaintiff was
deprived of a constitutionally adequate education as a result of
conditions that supposedly prevail in their respective schools.
Thirty-seven pages, most of the complaint, describe those
conditions. Complaint 25-62. For each cause of action,
plaintiffs' charging allegations specify that the constitutional
violation is the failure, at the school level, to provide
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plaintiffs a constitutional .ly adequate educati0n.l Hence,
resolution of this case will require determining: (1) whether the
conditions alleged at plaintiffs' schools actually exist; and (2)
if they do, whether such conditions rise to the level of
depriving plaintiffs of a constitutionally adequate education.
If plaintiffs cannot prove both the facts they allege and that
those facts deprived them of a constitutionally adequate
education, plaintiffs will obtain no relief, and their complaint
will be dismissed.
The cross-complaint arises out of exactly the same
series of facts and events. It alleges that if plaintiffs have
failed to receive a constitutionally adequate education, the
districts have the power and ability to fix the problems, and the
districts should be ordered to do so. Plaintiffs' proof of their
own case will thus necessarily prove the factual matters that are
the basis of the State's cross-complaint. The complaint and the
cross-complaint thus "arise[] out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,N C.C.P. §
428.10, and the cross-complaint was properly filed. Time for
Living, Inc. v. Guy Hatfield Homes, 230 Cal. App: 3d 30, 38
(1991) (cross-complaint is transactionally related to complaint
where it alleges that the "precise problems" claimed by
th ' Thus plaintiffs allege that defendants have deprived
plaintiffs of equal protection "by failing to provide [them] wi basic educational opportunities equal to those that children in other schools receive," Complaint ¶ 300, that defendants have violated the common schools clause by denying them "the opportunity to obtain a basic education in [their] schools . . . in that the schools . . . lack one or a combination of the bare essentials of an education," Id. ¶ 302, that defendants have denied them due process by "deriving [ educational opportunities," Id. ¶ 310, - other causes of action.
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plaintiffs] of basic and similarly for the
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plaintiffs were at least partly a t
actions).
tributable to cross-defendant's
Cases that have interpreted the "same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrencesN language
support this conclusion.* They hold that by this phrase the
Legislature intended to adopt the "logical relation" test -- the
broad construction which the federal courts have given to the
similar language of Rule 13(a), F.R.Civ.P. Currie Medical
Specialties, Inc. v. Bowen, 136 Cal. App. 3d 774, 777 (1982)
Ranchers Bank v. Pressman, 19 Cal. App. 3d 612, 620 (1971);
Saunders v. New Capital for Small Businesses, Inc., 231 Cal. App.
2d 324, 336 (1964); see United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece
Productions, 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1955). "The California courts
have adopted the expansive logical relation test of United
Artists." Currie, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 777. "At the heart of the
approach is the question of duplication of time and effort; i.e.,
are any factual and legal issues relevant to both claims? . . .
[Such] overlap of issues satisfies the logical relation approach
to the transaction or occurrence test." Id. -
There can be no question that there is "overlap of
issues" here, so that the logical relation test is satisfied.
The factual and legal issues about what is happening at
plaintiffs' schools are common both to plaintiffs' complaint and
* These cases arise under C.C.P. 5 426.10, which relates to compulsory cross-complaints, but which contains the identical language as C.C.P. § 428.10. The two statutes were enacted at the same time, as part of the comprehensive 1971 revision, proposed by the Law Revision Commission, of the statutes governing cross-complaints. The inference is overwhelming that the Legislature intended identical language to have the same meaning in both statutes.
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to the State's cross-complaint. Indeed, those issues are
critically important to both pleadings. Allowing the cross-
complaint will thus promote judicial economy and efficiency,
while handling the State's allegations in a separate lawsuit
would result in duplicative litigation and a waste of time and
effort. It follows that the cross-complaint arises from the same
transaction or occurrence as the complaint, and under the plain
language of C.C.P. § 428.10 it may be filed.
B. A Cross-Complaint May Not Be Stricken Because
Plaintiffs Say It Will Complicate the Issues.
The foregoing discussion shows that the cross-complaint
will not in fact raise new issues: the cross-complaint will
involve no more factual and legal investigation than will be
required in any event to resolve plaintiffs' complaint. But even
if plaintiffs were right that the cross-complaint greatly
expanded the issues, a cross-complaint may not be stricken on the
ground that it will complicate the case or raise issues beyond
the ones which the plaintiff has chosen. American Motorcycle
,Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 605-06 (1978); Roylance
V. Doelger, 57 Cal. 2d 255, 261-62 (1962); Linday v. American
President Lines, Ltd., 214 Cal. App. 2d 146, 149 (1963); Simon
Hardware Co. v. Pacific Tire & Rubber Co., 199 Cal. App. 2d 616
(1962).
In Roylance, the trial court struck a cross-complaint
on the ground that the issues raised in the cross-complaint were
"much more complicated" than those on the original complaint. 57
Cal. 2d at 259. The Supreme Court reversed:
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[Clross-defendant's argument that the issues tendered by the cross-complaint are "much more complicated than those raised by the pleadings as between plaintiff and defendant . . . is, of course, met by the provisions of section 1048 of the Code of Civil Procedure. . . [W]e hold that the proper procedure is to permit and sustain filing of the cross- complaint under circumstances falling within the language of section 442 [now 428.101, but to allow the trial court to determine under the provisions of section 1048 whether the issues tendered by the complaint and the answer thereto shall be tried together with those raised by the cross-complaint, or shall be severed. 57 Cal. 2d at 261-62.
The next case was Linday, where a shipowner, sued by an
employee assaulted by a fellow-seaman, filed a cross-complaint
against the attacker. The trial court struck the cross-
complaint, and the Court of Appeal reversed:
[Rlecent California cases construing Code of Civil Procedure, section 442, have clearly established that the trial court has no absolute discretion to strike a cross-complaint which fulfills the requirements of that section. - In Roylance v. Doelger (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 255, . . . our Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that the trial court was entitled to strike a cross- complaint which raised much more complicated issues than those raised by the complaint and answer. The court concluded that the cross-complaint fulfilled all of the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 442, and accordingly ought not to have been stricken, pointing out that in the event the trial court determined that the issues raised by the cross- complaint should be tried separately from those raised - by the complaint and answer,-the to sever the action pursuant to Cal. App. 2d at 149.
proper procedure was C.C.P. § 10481. 214
The Supreme Court returned o this issue in American
Motorcycle, where the issue was whether the Court's then-new
doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity would result in
cross-complaints in every action for personal injury, greatly
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complicating all such actions beyond the plaintiff-defendant
issues presented in the original complaint. Relying on its
decision in Roylance, the Court held that cross-complaints were
permitted, regardless of their potential complication of the
proceedings:
Although real parties in interest claim that the effect of permitting a defendant to bring in parties whom the plaintiff has declined to join will have the undesirable effect of greatly complicating personal injury litigation and will deprive plaintiff of the asserted "right" to control the size and scope of the proceeding, as our court observed in Roylance (57 Cal. 2d at pp. 261-262), to the extent that such claims are legitimate the problem may be partially obviated by the trial court's judicious use of the authority afforded by Code of Civil Procedure section 1048. 20 Cal. 3d at 606.
These cases show plainly that plaintiffs' entire
argument is wrong. Contrary to what plaintiffs claim, a cross-
complaint may not be stricken because it introduces "irrelevant"
matter, or expands the issues, or contravenes plaintiffs' theory
of the case. Under California law, the proper response to new
pleadings that arguably or actually complicate a case is not to
strike the pleadings, but to use the Court's powers under C.C.P.
5 1048 to solve any problems that may arise. This case is no
different.
Plaintiffs cite only two cases, which are easily
distinguishable on their facts. El Monte School Dist. v.
Wilkins, 177 Cal. App. 2d 47 (1960); Taliaferro v. Davis, 211
Cal. App. 2d 229 (1962); Motion 8-9.3 Both pre-date the
3 El Monte was a condemnation case; the decision rests on the idea that the "transaction" clause of what is now C.C.P. § 428.10(b)(l) "is not applicable to a condemnation proceeding, for
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decisions in Roylance, Linday, and American Motorcycle, and, to
the extent inconsistent with those decisions, do not survive
them.
Nor is there anything to plaintiffs' arguments that the
cross-complaint should be stricken because it will not absolve
the State from liability, or because the State's duty is non-
delegable. Motion 2-3, 3:16-24, 10-13. Cross-complaints do not
generally absolve defendants from liability; instead their
purpose is to bring into the case those who may share
responsibility, if what plaintiff says is true. That is the case
here. And situations of non-delegable duties routinely result in
cross-complaints for indemnity.4 The cross-complaint here is
not, strictly speaking, one for indemnity, but an exercise of the
State's authority to require districts to provide
constitutionally adequate educations. Nevertheless the State's
cross-complaint is directly analogous to a cross-complaint
seeking indemnity, and the cases cited show the State's cross-
complaint is proper.
no transaction or other subject matter is involved in such a proceeding." 177 Cal. App. 2d 52; see People v. Buellton Development Co.! 58 Cal. App. 2d 178, 183 (1943). Obviously this rule is peculiar to condemnation cases and cannot help plaintiffs here.
Taliaferro held that a cross-complaint which (unlike this one) had no factual or legal issues in common with the complaint was properly stricken because it did not meet the "same transaction or occurrenceN test; it is not authority for striking a cross-complaint on grounds of "irrelevancy" where, as here, the cross-complaint satisfies 5 428.10(b).
4 Seeley v. Seymour, 190 Cal. App. 3d 844, 862-64 (1987); Klein v. Leatherman, 270 Cal. App. 2d 792, 796 (1969); City & County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 138 (1958); Ellison v. Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d 349, 353-54 (9th Cir. 1989) (California law); Great American Ins. Co. v. Evans, 269 F. Supp. 151, 157-58 (N-D-Cal. 1967) (same).
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II. NO STATUTE PERMITS PLAINTIFFS' MOTION.
A separate and independent ground for denying
plaintiffs' motion is that none of the statutes on which
plaintiffs rely authorizes the filing of the motion.
A. C.C.P. § 436(a) Does Not Authorize a Motion to
Strike an Entire Pleadina.
Plaintiffs' principal reliance is on C.C.P. S; 436(a).
But that statute does not say, as plaintiffs represent, that
irrelevant "pleadings" may be stricken, Motion 2:4, but rather
that the court may strike out "irrelevant, false, or improper
matter inserted in any pleading" (emphasis added). This language
is inconsistent on its face with plaintiffs' effort to use the
statute to strike an entire pleading. They cite no case that
suggests, let alone holds, that the statute may be used for such
a purpose.
On the contrary, C.C.P. § 431.10 shows that "irrelevant
mattern cannot mean an entire pleading, but instead refers to
material within a pleading which is irrelevant to the cause of
action alleged. § 431.10 states that "[a]n 'immaterial
allegation' means 'irrelevant matter'- as that term is used in
Section 436," and defines "immaterial allegation" as follows:
(b) An immaterial allegation is any of the following:
(1) An allegation that is not essential to the claim or defense.
(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense.
(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not
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the camp laint or cross- supported by the allegations of complaint.
One need only read this definition to see that what
plaintiffs are moving to strike -- an entire cross-complaint --
cannot possibly constitute "an immaterial allegation" under
§431.10. Therefore it cannot constitute "irrelevant matter" for
purposes of § 436(a) either.' Plaintiffs do not seek to strike
inessential allegations or impertinent matter; they seek to
strike the cross-complaint in its entirety. Section 436(a) may
not be used for such a purpose.
B. No Court Order Forbade Filing the Cross-Complaint.
Equally unavailing is plaintiffs' reliance on C.C.P. §
436(b). That section allows the Court to strike a pleading that
was filed in violation of a court order. Plaintiffs rely on the
Court's Order of November 14, 2000. That Order overruled the
State's demurrer based on exhaustion of administrative remedies,
on the ground that exhaustion would not eliminate the possibility
that, if plaintiffs proved their allegations, the State might owe
them some duty.
But neither by its terms nor by implication. did the
Order forbid the filing of a cross-complaint. The Order contains
not a word about cross-complaints; it contains not a word about
what pleadings may be filed; it contains not a word that
restricts the State's ability to defend itself, or to raise new
issues or add new parties, consistent with the requirements of
5 The two provisions were enacted at the same time in the same statute, Stats. 1982, Ch. 704, §§ 2, 3.5, and obviously must be read together.
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the law and the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, given
Roylance, Linday, and American Motorcycle, an order restricting
the State's right to file a cross-complaint would have been in
excess of the Court's authority; if a court may not strike a
cross-complaint, as those cases hold, it may not order in advance
that the same cross-complaint not be filed. But for present
purposes it is sufficient that the Court's order did not even
purport to bar a cross-complaint.
More fundamentally, the Court's Order of November 14,
2000, was made on demurrer, and as such the Court was required to
assume the truth of plaintiffs' allegations. The Order expressly
stated that the Court was making no determination of those
factual issues. The Court did not free plaintiffs from the
burden of proving their allegations, nor did it bar defendants
from rebutting those allegations. Contrary to plaintiffs'
arguments, the Order did not magically vaporize all factual and
legal issues about whether plaintiffs are, in fact, receiving a
constitutionally adequate education. And it did not prevent the
State from filing a cross-complaint that relates directly and
essentially to those very same issues.
C. Plaintiffs May Not File a Motion Under C.C.P. §
435 Since They Are Not Entitled to Respond to the
Cross-Complaint.
C.C.P. § 435 allows a party to file a motion to strike
only "within the time allowed to respond to a pleading." But
plaintiffs are not parties to the cross-complaint; they have no
right to respond to it at any time. Their motion thus was not
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filed within the time plaintiffs were "allowed" to respond to the
cross-complaint. It follows that § 435 does not authorize their
motion.
Any doubt on this point is answered by the legislative
history of 5 435. The statute was first made applicable to
cross-complaints as part of the general 1971 revision of the
procedures concerning cross-complaints. Stats. 1971, Ch. 244 §
33. The relevant language then read that a party could make a
motion to strike only "within the time he is allowed to answer a
[cross-complaint]." Id. (emphasis added) This language makes
unmistakable that a motion to strike a pleading may be made only
by a party entitled to respond to that pleading. The present
statutory language was adopted in 1982; presumably for the
purpose of eliminating sexist language, it dropped the words "he
is.II Stats. 1982, Ch. 704 § 3. But there is no evidence the
Legislature intended a substantive change. It follows that
plaintiffs may not rely on S; 435 as authorizing their motion to
strike.
III. PLAINTIFFS MISREPRESENT THE APPLICABLE LAW.
What has been said is sufficient to dispose of the
motion before the Court. But much of plaintiffs' argument, even
though addressed to matters not really pertinent to this motion,
rests on misconceptions about this case so fundamental that the
Court may find useful a brief summary of the State's views.
First. Plaintiffs rely on cases that say that the
State has "ultimate" responsibility for the public school system
(which is not disputed), but plaintiffs radically distort what
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those cases actually say. The only cases that matter are Serrano
V. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728 (1976), and Butt v. State of
California, 4 Cal. 4th 668 (1992). Serrano held that financing
school districts by means of property tax revenues created
unconstitutional disparities among school districts. Butt held
that when the Richmond school district ran out of money and had
to shut down six weeks early, that created an unconstitutional
disparity between the education provided in Richmond and that
provided elsewhere in California. Thus both cases involved
interdistrict disparities; and both involved situations where the
individual district had neither the authority nor the power to
fix the problem. No individual district could have changed the
property-tax system of school finance; the Richmond district had
no money to provide the extra six weeks of school, and could not
have done so even if so ordered. Accordingly neither case
supplies any authority for the proposition that State agencies
have a duty to intervene when local school districts have the
power and authority to cure problems. Plaintiffs say that
"instead of seeking to force the State to act only if and where
the districts fail, this lawsuit seeks to force the State to act,
period." Motion at 4:19-20. That may be.what plaintiffs seek. .-
But they cite no case holding that the State has any such duty,
and there is none. The only duty that Serrano and Butt impose on
the State is to remedy those unconstitutional educational
conditions that local districts have no power to fix.
Second. In Butt, the Supreme Court made clear that a
constitutional violation requires proof that public school
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students are receiving a constitutionally inadequate education.
As the Supreme Court said:
[Plrinciples of equal protection have never required the State to remedy all ills or eliminate all variances in service. . . . A finding of constitutional disparity depends on the individual facts. Unless the actual quality of the district's program, viewed as a whole, falls fundamentally below prevailing statewide standards, no constitutional violation occurs. 4 Cal. 4th at 686-87 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs' theories contradict this clear delineation
of the limited scope of the State's duty in at least three ways.
First, plaintiffs base their case not on interdistrict
disparities, which an individual district cannot cure, but on
interschool (or even interstudent) disparities, which an
individual district generally can cure. Second, plaintiffs say
the State has a constitutional duty to provide oversight and
monitoring even in the absence of proof that individual students
are receiving a constitutionally inadequate education, Motion
1:23 -- a proposition directly contrary to the language quoted
from Butt, and not supported by any authority. Third, plaintiffs
say a court must require intervention by State agencies even when
the Legislature has given--responsibility to local districts and
even when the local district has the power and the ability to
solve the problem, Motion at 3:15-19, 4:19-24, a proposition for
which there is no support in Butt, Serrano, or any other case.
Third. Because for constitutional purposes the
districts are the agent of the State, the actions of local
districts are the actions of the State for constitutional
purposes; and a local district which provides a constitutionally
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adequate education has fulfilled the State's constitutional duty.
That is the meaning of the proposition stated in Butt and other
cases that the State has ultimate responsibility for education,
but that the Legislature may properly delegate to the districts
responsibility for carrying out the State's duty; and it is the
only way to reconcile the constitutional theory that districts
are the State's agents with the practical reality that executive
officers of the State have only limited statutory powers to
compel districts to act. If plaintiffs ever showed that they
were entitled to some relief here, accordingly, for purposes of
the Constitution a remedial order directed to a local district
would constitute relief "against the State" just as much as an
order directed to a State agency. Given the constitutional
theory by which districts form part of the State for purposes of
the State's duty to provide an adequate education, it is
eminently reasonable that districts as well as State agencies
should be before the Court.
CONCLUSION.
For the reasons stated, plaintiffs' motion to strike
the cross-complaint should be denied.
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DATED: January 29, 2001
-16- 01
JOHN F. DAUM FRAMROZE M. VIRJEE DAVID L. HERRON
for Defendant alifornia