is botswana the miracle of africa: democracy, the rule of...
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Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa? Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Human Rights Versus Economic
Development
Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin**
I. BOTSWANA TODAY ..................................................................... 458
II. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT .......................................................... 460
III. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT ......................................................... 461
IV. WHY BOTSWANA HAS PROSPERED ............................................ 463
V. BOTSWANA‘S LUCKY BREAK ...................................................... 466
VI. IS BOTSWANA A MIRACLE IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT? .............. 471
A. Laws and Practice ............................................................ 474
B. Politics .............................................................................. 475
C. Criticism ........................................................................... 476
D. Civil Society and the Media ............................................. 477
E. Economic Issues ................................................................ 479
F. Minority Groups ............................................................... 480
G. Human Rights in General................................................ 481
H. HIV/AIDS ........................................................................ 485
I. Diversifying the Economy ................................................ 486
J. Unemployment .................................................................. 487
K. ―Negative Peace‖ ............................................................... 488
VII. CONCLUSION.............................................................................. 488
In November 2008, former President of Botswana, Festus Gontebanye
Mogae, received the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership.1
The Mo Ibrahim Foundation awards this prize to a democratically-elected
Editor of Publications for the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts
University.
** Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School 2008–2009.
1 Daniel Howden, Former Botswana President Wins Award, INDEP. (U.K.), Oct. 21, 2008,
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/former-botswana-president-wins-
award-967692.html.
454 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
former African head of state who has served within the limits set by the
domestic constitution and has left office in the prior three years.2 The
Foundation assesses Sub-Saharan leaders on their exercise of leadership and
their country‘s performance during their term in office.3 It is the largest
annually-awarded prize in the world and consists of $5 million over ten years
and $200,000 annually thereafter for life.4 The Foundation also considers
granting an additional $200,000 per year for ten years to leaders who take on
public interest activities and espouse good causes.5 The citation notes that
former President Mogae won the award because, among other things:
[Botswana‘s] democracy was strong, stable and rooted in the
rule of law. Botswana was widely regarded as one of the more
effective countries in the world in combating corruption. . . .
President Mogae‘s outstanding leadership has ensured
Botswana‘s continued stability and prosperity in the face of
an HIV/AIDS pandemic which threatened the future of his
country and people. . . . The Prize Committee believes that
good governance requires an environment conducive to peace,
security and development, based on the rule of law and
respect for human rights. Botswana has had to address the
challenge of advancing each in a balanced way. This has been
helped by the independence and integrity of its institutions
which bodes well for further progress towards spreading
wealth and opportunity across all sectors of Botswana
society.6
The awarding of this prize to President Mogae offers a context in which to
evaluate whether Botswana deserves the oft-used moniker, ―the African
Miracle.‖7 The international community has long considered Botswana a
2 Mo Ibrahim Found., Terms of Reference for the Ibrahim Prize, http://www.moibrahimfounda
tion.org/en/termsofreference/the-ibrahim-prize/terms-of-reference.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
3 Press Release, Mo Ibrahim Found., President Mogae Receives 2008 Ibrahim Prize for
Achievement in African Leadership (Nov. 15, 2008), available at http://www.moibrahim
foundation.org/en/pressrelease/media-centre/press-releases/president-mogae-gets-2008-ibrahim-
prize.html.
4 Howden, supra note 1.
5 Press Release, Mo Ibrahim Found., Festus Mogae Wins the Largest Prize in the World (Oct. 20,
2008), available at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/pressrelease/media-centre/press-rel
eases/festus-mogae-wins-the-largest-prize-in-the-world.html (click on ―Download Press Release‖
to access a PDF copy). The Prize Committee was comprised of Kofi Annan (Chairperson), Martti
Ahtisaari, Aïcha Bah Diallo, Mohamed ElBaradei, Mary Robinson, and Salim Ahmed Salim. Id.
6 Press Release, Mo Ibrahim Found., Citation of the Prize Committee of the Mo Ibrahim
Foundation (Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/2009
1002_2008-citation-english.pdf.
7 ABDI SAMATAR, AN AFRICAN MIRACLE: STATE AND CLASS LEADERSHIP AND COLONIAL LEGACY IN
BOTSWANA DEVELOPMENT passim (1999).
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 455
success story on the African continent.8 Since achieving independence in
1966, it has maintained high economic growth, sound fiscal policies, and
regular elections, which have fed this image.9 However, this label of success
has led to inadequate questioning of what occurs beneath the façade in
Botswana. Inequality, discrimination, the dominance of a single political
party, the government‘s aversion to criticism, and an array of human rights
abuses are among the many problems afflicting Botswana.10 The country has
made especially slow progress toward improving many social and cultural
rights.11
Achievements such as Botswana‘s noteworthy economic growth, political
stability, and regular elections often eclipse issues like human rights, which
remain on the periphery of most analyses of Botswana. However, human
rights issues present a significant threat to Botswana‘s positive reputation.
One of these issues concerns the long and complicated relationship between a
minority ethnic group, the San,12 and the ruling elite, who mostly come from
the Tswana ethnic group.13 The ethnic division has led to the San‘s
vulnerable position in Batswana14 society today.15 No example better
demonstrates the limits of democracy in Botswana16 than the eviction by the
Government of Botswana (―GOB‖) of San bushmen from their homeland in
the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, presumably to further the exploration of
potential diamond mines.17 This controversy over land rights between the
San and the GOB has led to the longest and most expensive court case in the
8 See Anne Dissez, Botswana’s Good Reputation, 13 AFR. GEOPOLITICS 213, 213 (2004).
9 See KUSUM DATTA, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS IN BOTSWANA: WITH SOME REFERENCE TO
GENERAL LITERATURE ON DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS IN AFRICA: BIBLIOGRAPHY (1991).
10 See KENNETH GOOD, BUSHMEN AND DIAMONDS: (UN)CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOTSWANA 6–8, 23 (2003)
(reviewing the limitations of Botswana‘s liberal democracy, violations against the rights of the
San, and issues of inequality and an undiversified economy).
11 U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: BOTSWANA (2007),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78720.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
12 The San are also known as the ―Bushmen‖ or the Basarwa. See SIDSEL SAUGESTAD, THE
INCONVENIENT INDIGENOUS: REMOTE AREA DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA, DONOR ASSISTANCE,
AND THE FIRST PEOPLE OF THE KALAHARI 28 (2001).
13 See infra notes 32, 36–37.
14 ―Batswana,‖ as opposed to ―Botswana,‖ refers to the people of Botswana.
15 GOOD, supra note 10, at 20–24.
16 See also David Sebudubudu & Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie, Pitfalls of Parliamentary Democracy in
Botswana, 41 AFRIKA SPECTRUM 35, 35–53 (2006).
17 Ian Taylor & Gladys Mokhawa, Not Forever: Botswana, Conflict Diamonds and the Bushmen,
102 AFR. AFF. 261, 261–83 (2003), available at http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/102/407/
261.
456 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
history of the country, known simply as the Central Kalahari Game Reserve
(―CKGR‖) case.18
The CKGR case serves as a reflection of the GOB‘s general failure to
uphold many of the basic tenets of human rights, especially in regard to
indigenous and otherwise marginalized groups. The case has finally begun to
draw international attention, however meager, to Botswana issues other than
its growth rate and the regularity of its elections.19 Potentially, it could pave
the way for more rigorous assessments of what it means to be a success story
in Africa. Although the San won the case,20 the government has not
cooperated in implementing the ruling,21 raising many questions about the
democratic process in Botswana. Furthermore, the ―win‖ has led to very few
changes to the San‘s position in society.22 This Article is less concerned,
however, with the CKGR case than with the question of Botswana‘s majority
group and its promotion and protection of democratic and human rights,
especially among minorities.
On the African continent, many argue that the need for economic growth
and political stability outweigh, at least in the short term, the need to ensure
proper compliance with international human rights law. This is supposedly
so because economic and political improvements are often predecessors to
advancements in human rights.23 In many ways, this stance is difficult to
refute. Creating a stable and thriving democracy is critically important to the
advancement of human rights.24 Economic growth is also important because
it can lead to improved education,25 which in turn can lead to improved
18 Sidsel Saugestad, Notes on the Outcome of the Ruling in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve
Case, Botswana, BEFORE FARMING, Mar. 2007, available at http://www.waspress.co.uk/journals/
beforefarming/journal_20064/news/2006_4_10.pdf.
19 Julie J. Taylor, Celebrating the San Victory Too Soon?, 23 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 3, 4 (2007),
available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/indigenous/documents/Botswana/Cases/Celebrating%20too%
20soon%20CKGR%20Case.pdf.
20 Botswana Bushmen Win Land Ruling, BBC NEWS, Dec. 13, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/6174709.stm.
21 Lucia Van der Post, Bushwhacked, TIMES ONLINE (London), Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.times
online.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article2482706.ece.
22 Bushmen of the Kalahari, AM. CHRON., Feb. 28, 2009, http://www.americanchronicle.com/
articles/view/92720.
23 See Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority over Civil
and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467, 467–90 (1983); Neil
J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights
Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476, 476–98 (1988).
24 See Gizachew Tiruneh, Democratic Development in Botswana and Tunisia: A Comparative
Analysis, 22 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 13, 13–28 (2004).
25 See Imogen Mogosti, Technologies and Poverty Education: Pre-Conditions for Effectiveness, 17
PULA: BOTS. J. AFR. STUD. 35, 35–40 (2003).
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 457
livelihoods.26 When considering the state of affairs in many African countries,
such basic improvements in quality of life are invaluable. Yet the question
remains, when will it be time to confront longstanding violations of human
rights in countries that have already experienced economic growth, political
stability, and the establishment of a functioning democracy?
This Article investigates the claim that Botswana is the ―Miracle of
Africa‖ in the context of its political, economic, and human rights record. It
contextualizes the arguments and findings that scholars make today about
Botswana‘s success in achieving economic prosperity, political stability, and
sustained growth. This Article then compares these accounts to Botswana‘s
record in a number of other areas, including its treatment of marginalized
groups, especially the Batswana indigenous population. This Article inspects
the historical development of Botswana, the political and economic context of
the country, and Botswana‘s marked prosperity.
Part I introduces the general question under review: should modern-day
Botswana be regarded as the ―African Miracle?‖ Part II provides a brief
overview of the political situation in Botswana, and introduces the idea that
some of the country‘s achievements have come at the expense of fundamental
human rights. Part III reviews the economic context of the country. Part IV
examines why Botswana has been able to prosper to the extent that it has.
Part V, on the other hand, argues that some of Botswana‘s accomplishments
stem from elements of good fortune, including its unique colonial experience,
the discovery of diamonds shortly after independence, and the political
dominance of a single ethnic group.
Part VI investigates the ―Miracle‖ adage in more depth, noting
Botswana‘s successes while also exposing several problematic practices
related to governance and the marginalization of minority groups. It analyzes
the role of civil society and the media, as well as the extent to which they can
operate freely. Certain economic issues, including economic inequality, are
explored to lift the veil on the Botswana ―Miracle.‖ This Part reviews
Botswana‘s compliance with its international human rights obligations and
the extent to which it has enacted into domestic law the rights enshrined in
ratified international treaties. The findings of international human rights
treaty bodies on Botswana are also explored in this section. Additionally, the
section examines Botswana‘s stance on the death penalty, the situation in its
prisons, its HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the role of its national human rights
institutions. While certain elites benefit from Botswana‘s accomplishments,
many citizens have been excluded from and marginalized by them. This Part
assesses the cost of success at the expense of some Batswana citizens‘ human
rights. This Article concludes that other African countries can learn many
lessons from Botswana. However, Botswana must also diversify its economy,
deal with high rates of unemployment, especially among marginalized
26 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
458 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
groups, and take steps to address a number of human rights concerns in
order to function as an example for the rest of the continent.
I. BOTSWANA TODAY
The goal of this Article is not to diminish Botswana‘s successes, many of
which are highly commendable, but to explore those features of its democracy
that threaten Botswana‘s image and its ability to serve as an example for
other African nations. While the international community hails Botswana as
a beacon of democracy,27 several issues—especially those concerning human
rights28—threaten this adage. Since independence, the GOB has pursued a
policy of non-racialism with regard to Botswana‘s indigenous groups.29 This
policy has allowed it to violate the rights of many of the country‘s indigenous
and otherwise marginalized groups, placing them far outside the walls of
Botswana‘s ―Miracle‖ democracy.30 Not only do these groups have little means
of actively participating in the decision-making processes of government, but
many of their basic social, cultural, political, and economic rights are violated
consistently in pursuit of a non-racial, nationalist policy.31 In reality, this
policy simply supports the political, economic, and cultural status quo as
established by the dominant32 ethnic group, the Tswana.33 Although there are
many other ethnic groups living in Botswana, the Tswana have long-
dominated the political realm.34 As a result, not all of Botswana‘s people
benefit from the fruits of the country‘s successes; democracy and human
rights are protected for only so many in Botswana.35
27 GLORIA SOMOLEKAE, DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF
BOTSWANA 19 (1998), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFR
AD/UNPAN 009287.pdf.
28 See Kenneth Good & Ian Taylor, Mounting Repression in Botswana, 96 ROUND TABLE 275,
275–78 (2007).
29 ―Non-racialism‖ refers to the GOB‘s policy of portraying Botswana as a non-racial, culturally
homogenous state, based—as it argues—on the dominance of a single ethnic group, the Tswana.
This has led to a lack of recognition for other, unique ethnic groups, like the San. SAUGESTAD,
supra note 12, at 28, 77.
30 Id. at 54.
31 Cf. Jacqueline Solway, Navigating the ―Neutral‖ State: ―Minority‖ Rights in Botswana, 28 J. S.
AFR. STUD. 711, 720 (2002) (stating that the groups‘ rights are continually marginalized, but
official acts fall short of rights violations).
32 Some researchers have concluded that the Tswana are not numerically dominant in Botswana,
but are politically dominant and succeeded in building the post-independence political system
around their culture and language. For more discussion, see Minority Rights Group Int‘l,
Minority Tribes in Botswana: The Politics of Recognition (2008) (prepared by Lydia Nyati-
Ramahobo), http:// www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=622.
33 Solway, supra note 31, at 714.
34 AFRICANA: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AFRICAN AND AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1891
(Kwame Anthony Appiah & Henry Louis Gates, Jr. eds., 1999) [hereinafter AFRICANA].
35 Sebudubudu & Osei-Hwedie, supra note 16, at 35–53.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 459
Common wisdom on the Botswana ―Miracle‖ suggests that the country
provides a model for others to follow.36 Others certainly can learn valuable
lessons from Botswana in many regards. The country‘s economic policies are
exemplary. The GOB has taken preventative measures to avoid ―Dutch
Disease;‖37 built a cushion of financial reserves to counter fluctuations in
international prices for primary exports and to strengthen its currency; taken
steps to anticipate future troubles, and relied on experts to plan responses to
possible disasters; historically focused on education; and avoided extreme
foreign debt.38 The regularity of Botswana‘s elections39 since gaining
independence in 1966 is commendable.40 Efforts to foster a sense of national
unity, especially by Botswana‘s first president, Sir Seretse Khama, proved
successful in many regards during the post-independence process of nation-
building and peace-keeping.41 Furthermore, Botswana has been fairly
successful in developing initiatives that protect the environment, especially
through the use of Community-Based Natural Resource Management, which
often focuses on combining eco-tourism, conservation, and the livelihoods of
indigenous groups.42 However, it would be a shame if other nations followed
the same path as Botswana, marked by sacrifices of basic human rights
tenets. Botswana‘s successes are, to a degree, the result of the hard work of
the country‘s leadership.43 They are also due, in significant measure, to good
36 Diamond Country, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 1998, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-
20486940.html.
37 See generally W.M. Corden, Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and
Consolidation, 36 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 359 (1994) (consolidating and reviewing the existing
body of literature on Dutch Disease and booming resources sectors, beginning with a core model
and extending to historical application). ―Dutch Disease,‖ also known as ―the resource curse,‖
refers to the phenomena of a boom in natural resources drawing enough foreign capital that the
value of the local currency is driven up and domestic goods are rendered less competitive. See
The Devil’s Excrement, ECONOMIST, May 22, 2003.
38 Stephen L. Lewis, Explaining Botswana’s Successes, in DEVELOPING CULTURES: CASE STUDIES
3, at 8, 16–17, 20–21 (Lawrence Harrison & Peter Berger eds., 2006).
39 Patrick P. Molutsi & John D. Holm, Developing Democracy When Civil Society Is Weak: The
Case of Botswana, 89 AFR. AFF. 323, 324 (1990).
40 But see Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie & David Sebudubudu, Botswana’s 2004 Elections: Free and
Fair?, 4 J. AFR. ELECTIONS 27 (2005) (disputing the fairness of Botswana‘s elections).
41 Lewis, supra note 38, at 17.
42 Michael Taylor, CBNRM and Pastoral Development in Botswana: Implications for San Land
Rights 9, 11–12 (Dec. 1, 2006) (unpublished workshop submission, Oxford Univ. African Studies
Ctr.), available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/indigenous/documents/Botswana/Report/CBNRM%20
San%20Land%20Rights.pdf.
43 Lewis, supra note 38, at 12.
460 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
fortune, including the country‘s unique Protectorate experience,44 perceived
homogeneity,45 and diamond resources.46
It is problematic that labels such as ―Africa‘s success story‖ or ―Africa‘s
miracle,‖47 based simply on national economic performance and political
stability, are so flippantly used to describe Botswana. Such labels give the
impression that as long as a country experiences economic growth and
regular elections, the protection of other basic human rights is not important.
A country that denies many basic human rights should not be regarded as
Africa‘s ―Miracle‖—such a definition of ―Miracle‖ sets the standard too low.
The African situation is not so wretched that the protection of human rights
is of no consequence. Africa‘s ―Miracle‖ should be a country working toward
addressing pitfalls, not shying away from them. Botswana is in a
comparatively advantageous position, having a 2008 per capita GDP of
$13,900, the fourth highest GDP per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa,48 and a
stable political environment in which to work. These advantages provide the
means to address many human rights issues.49 Thus, it cannot—should not—
be praised for settling for anything less.
II. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
From 1885 to Botswana‘s independence in 1966, the country was the
British Protectorate of Bechuanaland.50 The British established the
Protectorate at the behest of two paramount chiefs—Khama and Setshele—
who were seeking protection from the Boers‘ imminent plans to expand
northwards from South Africa.51 As a Protectorate, Botswana suffered less
colonial intrusion than many of its neighboring countries, which European
nations ruled more bureaucratically as colonies.52
Since its independence from Great Britain, Botswana has maintained
functioning democratic institutions, good relations with its neighbors, and a
44 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 97.
45 Balefi Tsie, The Role, Functions and Performance of Botswana’s Independent Electoral
Commission, 2 J. AFR. ELECTIONS 145, 151 (2003) [hereinafter Tsie, Botswana’s Independent
Electoral Commission].
46 Diamond Country, supra note 36.
47 SAMATAR, supra note 7, at iii.
48 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: BOTSWANA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact
book/geos/bc.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) [hereinafter CIA WORLD FACTBOOK].
49 J. CLARK LEITH, WHY BOTSWANA PROSPERED 4 (2005).
50 AFRICANA, supra note 34, at 290.
51 Id.
52 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 69–70.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 461
flourishing economy.53 It is a parliamentary republic with a sound
institutional structure based on Roman-Dutch law and local customary law.54
Botswana has enjoyed free and fair elections every five years since 1966,
although a single political party, the Botswana Democratic Party (―BDP‖),
has dominated politics throughout this period.55 Opposition parties, including
the Botswana National Front and the Botswana People‘s Party (which
recently joined forces), as well as the Botswana Congress Party, have not
been able to present significant competition.56
The BDP‘s dominance has historical roots in Tswana elite‘s gradual
establishment within the country.57 The Tswana power base grew as the
group began to seize land and political control in the 1800s.58 Other ethnic
groups have never been powerful enough to unseat the Tswana, which
accounts, in part, for the historical lack of ethnic strife in Botswana that has
plagued so many African countries.59 Since independence, the Tswana have
marginalized and disempowered minorities, effectively preventing them from
mounting any possible resistance to the current Tswana-based power
structure.60
III. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Economically, Botswana has performed very well since 1966, maintaining
one of the highest economic growth rates in the world.61 The Economist notes
that Botswana had the fastest growing income per person over the thirty-five
year period prior to 2002.62 Despite this high growth rate, 23.8 percent of the
population was unemployed in 2004.63 As a result, more than 47 percent of
53 See generally Lewis, supra note 38 (reviewing Botswana‘s achievements as well as the policies
that the author proposes helped Botswana secure these achievements).
54 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48.
55 GOOD, supra note 10, at 9.
56 Int‘l Found. for Electoral Sys., Election Guide, Election Profile for Botswana, http://
www.electionguide.org/election.php?ID=266 (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
57 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 70, 73.
58 GOOD, supra note 10, at 14.
59 James A. Robinson & Q. Neil Parsons, State Formation and Governance in Botswana, 15 J.
AFR. ECONOMIES 100, 134–35 (2006).
60 Press Release, Ditshwanelo: Bots. Ctr. for Human Rights, Statement Following a Workshop on
the Rights of Minority Groups (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.ditshwanelo.org.bw/
feb15press.html.
61 Diamond Country, supra note 36.
62 The African Exception, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 2002, available at http://www.economist.com/
businessfinance/economicsfocus/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TDVSPDP.
63 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48.
462 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
the population lived below the poverty line.64 Income disparities are among
the worst in the world.65
Diamonds have played a major role in the story of the ―African Miracle‖
over the course of the last forty years.66 In 1967, geologists from the mining
company De Beers discovered a kimberlite pipe67 slightly northeast of the
Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Orapa, near the Makgadikgadi Pans.68 De
Beers‘ discovery of these diamond resources provided Botswana, one of the
world‘s poorest countries at that time, an immense windfall.69 Since this
discovery, the diamond industry has been the cornerstone of the Botswana
economy.70 The government has maintained control of this resource by
creating Debswana, the national diamond company, which it owns in equal
partnership with global diamond giant De Beers.71 Without the discovery of
diamonds, it is unlikely that Botswana would have been able to prosper to
such an extent.72 After all, despite Botswana‘s good fortune in some areas,
the country is unlucky in many other areas: only 0.65 percent of its land is
arable;73 it is landlocked and thus has high transportation costs;74 it suffers
64 United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], Botswana, Anti-Poverty Projects,
http://www.unbotswana.org.bw/undp/ poverty.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2009). For a further
discussion of poverty eradication in Botswana, see also Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, Poverty Eradication
in Botswana: Towards the Realisation of Vision 2016, 18 PULA: BOTS. J. AFR. STUD. 1, 7–18
(2004).
65 Zibane Maundeni, The Politics of Poverty in Botswana, 35 BOTS. NOTES & REC. 99, 99–109
(2003); see also Happy K. Siphambe, Dimesions and Measures to Reduce Poverty in Botswana, 17
PULA: BOTS. J. AFR. STUD. 19, 19–25 (2003); UNDP, Human Development Report 2009: Gini
Index (2009), http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/161.html [hereinafter Gini Index]. The Gini
Index is a measure of national income inequalities. Id. Botswana is ranked fourth worst for
income inequality in the world. Id.
66 Robinson & Parsons, supra note 59, at 134.
67 A kimberlitic pipe is a primary diamond deposit found in volcanic rock. See Ralph Hazelton,
Diamonds: Forever or For Good?, in THE DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT 2 (2002),
available at http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/diamonds_KP/3_diamonds_Forever_Eng_March
2002.pdf.
68 Debswana: History and Profile, http://www.debswana.com/Debswana.Web/About+Debswana/
History+and+Profile/ (under ―1955–1969,‖ follow the ―MORE...‖ link) (last visited Oct. 10, 2009)
[hereinafter Debswana].
69 Taylor & Mokhawa, supra note 17, at 262.
70 Diamond Country, supra note 36.
71 GOOD, supra note 10, at 17.
72 Ellen Hillbom, Diamonds or Development? A Structural Assessment of Botswana’s Forty Years
of Success, 46 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 191, 201 (2008).
73 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48.
74 Hillbom, supra note 72, at 201.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 463
from regular droughts;75 and it has limited potential substitutes for the role
diamonds play in its economy.76
IV. WHY BOTSWANA HAS PROSPERED
There are many reasons for Botswana‘s post-Protectorate success. Some
reasons stem from Botswana‘s unique history and context, a few are
coincidental, and several are the byproduct of efforts by the country‘s leaders.
Academics have debated these achievements, resulting in many assessments
applauding Botswana and a handful that note Botswana‘s success story is not
without significant flaws.77
Botswana‘s trajectory seems to have gone nowhere but is up since its
precarious and poverty-stricken position in 1966.78 In 1999, Abdi Ismail
Samatar wrote An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial
Legacy in Botswana Development, one of the first explorations of the story of
the ―African Miracle.‖79 In the last decade, the debate over Botswana‘s
achievements has flourished.80 Those who applaud Botswana as ―the African
Miracle‖—including scholars such as Abdi Samatar, Daron Acemoglu, Simon
Johnson, James A. Robinson, J. Clark Leith, and Stephen Lewis,81 as well as
former president of Botswana, Quett Masire, who recently published his
memoirs—point to its political stability, regular elections, consistent
economic growth, and sound investment policies.82 Botswana succeeded in
these regards, as a brief summary of these achievements will demonstrate.
Following the discovery of significant diamond reserves, the GOB
pursued sound fiscal policies ensured that the country‘s diamond wealth was
75 Glenn-Marie Lange, Sustainable Development in Mineral Economies: The Example of
Botswana, 9 ENV‘T & DEV. ECON. 485, 491 (2004).
76 Hillbom, supra note 72, at 201.
77 See, e.g., QUETT KETUMILE MASIRE, VERY BRAVE OR VERY FOOLISH: MEMOIRS OF AN AFRICAN
DEMOCRACY ix–x (Stephen R. Lewis, Jr. ed., 2006); Daron Acemoglu et al., An African Success
Story: Botswana 2, 3 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No.3219, 2001), available
at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/284; LEITH, supra note 49, at 3; Lewis, supra note 38, at 3;
SAMATAR, supra note 7.
78 See Balefi Tsie, The Political Context of Botswana’s Development Performance, 22 J. S. AFR.
STUD. 599, 599–600 (1996).
79 SAMATAR, supra note 7, passim.
80 Dozens of articles have been published which review the achievements and failures of
Botswana with regard to several topics: the economy, the political context, indigenous and
minority rights issues, the environment, the mineral sector, and so on. Many of these articles are
cited herein.
81 See SAMATAR, supra note 7; Acemoglu et al., supra note 77, at 2; Lewis, supra note 38; LEITH,
supra note 49.
82 See generally MASIRE, supra note 77.
464 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
not squandered.83 The government has increased investment through
―responsibly handled dealings with foreign corporations and management of
state enterprises.‖84 Botswana‘s leadership has ensured that it has utilized
the wealth afforded by its natural resources wisely and accomplished great
economic feats.85 In turn, since its independence, Botswana has maintained
one of the highest GDP growth rates—not only in Africa, but also in the
world.86 From 1970 to 1999, Botswana‘s GDP growth rate has averaged 8.3
percent.87
Although the country‘s economic prosperity is based primarily on wealth
from diamond mining, it also arises from the beef exports and a growing
tourism industry88 that revolves around Botswana‘s many game reserves,
open landscape, and the biodiversity of its crown jewel, the Okavango Delta.89
The resulting financial base has provided the government with resources to
construct and maintain a solid infrastructure, including roads,
telecommunication systems, hospitals, hotels, and schools.90 The presence of
a well-maintained infrastructure, complemented by consistent political
stability, has incentivized foreign investment, furthering economic progress.91
Unfailing political stability has also proved central to Botswana‘s success.
Since its independence in 1966, Botswana has held free and fair elections
every five years, and maintained well-developed democratic institutions in
comparison to its African neighbors.92 Traditional Batswana society is noted
for its open discourse on public issues, which takes place in the communities
83 See Lewis, supra note 38, at 16.
84 Nicholas Olmstead, Indigenous Rights in Botswana: Development, Democracy and
Dispossession, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 799, 801 (2004).
85 Joakim Hilldén & Johan Mesterton, Diamonds and Sustainable Growth: The Success Story of
Botswana (Fall 2005) (Bachelor‘s thesis, Uppsala University), available at http://urn.kb.se/
resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-6353 (follow the ―fulltext »‖ link).
86 The African Exception, supra note 62.
87 UNICEF, Botswana, Statistics, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/botswana_statistics.html
(last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
88 Naomi Moswete & Felix Mavondo, Problems Facing the Tourism Industry of Botswana, 35
BOTS. NOTES & REC. 69, 69–77 (2003).
89 See generally Republic of Botswana, Democracy, Development, Self-Reliance and Unity,
http://www.gov.bw (the GOB‘s official website) (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
90 LEITH, supra note 49, at 11–12.
91 Anupam Basu & Krishna Srinivasan, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Some Case Studies
22 (Int‘l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/02/61, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0261.pdf.
92 Lewis, supra note 38, at 6, 11. However, Botswana‘s electoral system and its electoral
commission are criticized as being in need of reform. See generally Mpho G. Molomo, The Need
for Electoral Reform in Botswana, 4 AFR. J. CONFLICT RESOL. 55 (2004) (addressing Botswana‘s
―First-Past-The-Post‖ electoral system, its stability, and its shortfalls in support of ―internal
democracy‖).
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 465
through the kgotla, an institution of the chieftaincy system in which the chief
and community leaders discuss issues of concern in a neutral setting.93
Francis Nyamnjoh thoroughly documents Botswana‘s incorporation of the
chieftaincy system into its modern government in her article, Chieftaincy and
the Negotiation of Might and Right in Botswana Democracy.94
There has been so little internal or external conflict in Botswana in
recent history that some authors have referred to the political situation as
―dull.‖95 In its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency
International ranked Botswana the best-performing country in Africa, with a
global ranking of thirty-six, which it shared with Malta and Puerto Rico.96
The country has been lucky to have some of the more commendable
African leaders. Noteworthy among them are the three chiefs, Bathoen,
Khama (the Great), Sebele, who traveled to England in 1895 to petition the
Queen not to hand over Botswana‘s lands to Cecil Rhodes, and the Republic‘s
first President, Sir Seretse Khama.97 Khama‘s focus on accountability and
political consultation, his push to de-racialize the political system, his
responsible fiscal policy, and his contingency planning are all achievements
emblematic of his successful and popular leadership.98
The combination of these positive economic and political factors has led to
endless references to Botswana as Africa‘s ―Miracle,‖ not just by a handful of
academics, but by the media and many others.99 While these same
commentators deplore the tragedies of failing African economies and corrupt
governments, they reference Botswana as a remarkable exception to the
overall condition of the continent.100 Clearly, Botswana has succeeded by
many standards in pulling itself out of devastating poverty101 and building
93 MASIRE, supra note 77, at 62–63.
94 See Francis B. Nyamnjoh, Chieftancy and the Negotiation of Might and Right in Botswana
Democracy, 12 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 233 (2003).
95 GOOD, supra note 10, at 8.
96 TRANSPARENCY INT‘L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (2008), available at http://www.trans
parency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008. In comparison, South Africa was ranked
54, Mozambique 126, Angola 158, Zambia 115, and Namibia 61, while the United States was
ranked 18. Id.
97 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 68–69.
98 See Lewis, supra note 38, at 10, 17 (recounting Khama‘s leadership in difficult, racially-tense
times, and speaking generally to the GOB‘s foresight).
99 See SAMATAR, supra note 7; see also Acemoglu et al., supra note 77; Gadibolae Gadibolae II,
Commentary Bemoans Signs of ―End of Democracy‖ in Botswana, BOTS. GAZETTE, Nov. 19, 2008;
Ian Taylor, The HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Botswana: Implications for the ―African Miracle,‖ in
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AIDS IN AFRICA 151 (Nana Poku & Alan Whiteside eds., 2004).
100 See SAMATAR, supra note 7, passim; Acemoglu et al., supra note 77, at 2–3.
101 Stephen M. Kapunda, Diversification and Poverty Eradication in Botswana, 17 PULA BOTS. J.
AFR. STUD. 51, 54 (2003).
466 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
the foundation for a functioning democracy.102 However, as Francis
Nyamnjoh notes, ―Real democracy means much more than the right to vote or
to be voted for, especially as these rights do not always deliver the
recognition, representation and entitlements that individuals and groups
seek in any given context.‖103 One must ask, is Botswana truly a progressive
and democratic state simply because it holds elections and maintains a high
GDP?
V. BOTSWANA‘S LUCKY BREAK
If Botswana is to serve as an example for other African countries, it is
important to note that many of Botswana‘s successes are the result of
happenstance rather than intent, and therefore cannot be replicated. Among
the non-replicable factors that have played significant roles in Botswana‘s
success are its distinctive colonial context, which helped facilitate the
political dominance of a single ethnic group, and the existence of some of the
most significant diamond deposits in the world.104
While most European colonies in Africa were governed by direct rule, the
British governed Botswana indirectly in the form of the Bechuanaland
Protectorate.105 At the time, the British saw the region as an empty
scrubland, worth little more than a buffer zone between their enemies and a
road heading north.106 Though this region aroused little interest regarding
the natural resources or crop production found in other colonies, was sparsely
populated, and was more or less politically irrelevant at the time, the British
decided it was worth protecting in order to avoid expansion of other colonial
powers.107 At the invitation of two paramount chiefs, who feared invasion
from the Boers in the south, the British cemented their control of the region
by establishing the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885.108
Because Britain‘s financial resources were already strained by its other
colonies around the world, it wanted to avoid the cost of micro-managing yet
another African nation.109 As a consequence, the choice of the protectorate
model of governance had significant impacts on Botswana‘s political
102 See 40 YEARS OF DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA: 1965–2005 (Zibani Maundeni ed., 2005).
103 Nyamnjoh, supra note 94, at 233.
104 Acemoglu et al., supra note 77, at 3, 11, 12, 29.
105 J.H. Proctor, The House of Chiefs and the Political Development of Botswana, 6 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 59, 59 (1968).
106 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 70.
107 Olmstead, supra note 84, at 817.
108 NEIL PARSONS, KING KHAMA, EMPEROR JOE AND THE GREAT WHITE QUEEN: VICTORIAN
BRITAIN THROUGH AFRICAN EYES 40–41 (1998).
109 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 70.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 467
leadership.110 The protectorate model meant limited colonial interference in
the pre-existing forms of governance.111 In fact, the Crown specifically
instructed its first Assistant Commissioner to the Protectorate ―not to
interfere with the Native Administration; the Chiefs are understood not to be
desirous of parting with their rights of sovereignty, nor are Her Majesty‘s
Government by any means anxious to assume the responsibilities of it.‖112 In
1891, the British government specifically ordered the High Commissioner to
―respect any native laws or customs by which the civil relations of any native
chiefs, tribes, or populations under [British] protection are now regulated.‖113
The British left the Batswana more or less to rule themselves and therefore
only minimally interrupted functioning political systems in the country.114
The relevance of past indirect rule in Botswana is highly significant
today. Limited interference in all aspects of life meant the British colonial
footprint was much less pronounced than in other African nations.115 Local
leadership and a partially homegrown political framework already existed at
independence, whereas other liberated countries had to recreate such
frameworks nearly from scratch.116 Indirect rule also meant that the
transition to independence was less brutal.117 Botswana was a peaceful
Protectorate, and its people did not have to rise up against its colonizers in a
violent manner to become the country it is today.118 The British relinquished
their protectorate fairly easily, due in part to its perceived lack of value.
However, the absence of struggle in Botswana at independence may also have
affected levels of political consciousness adversely during the post-colonial
period.119
While there is much debate over how imbedded the colonial footprint is in
former colonies today, this Article argues that its footprint is intrinsic in
110 Christian John Makgala, Taxation in the Tribal Areas of the Bechuanaland Protectorate,
1899–1957, 45 J. AFR. HIST. 279, 279 (2004) (arguing ―[S]ince Bechuanaland became a British
territory through negotiations the Tswana rulers were able to protect their interests aggressively
but with little risk of being deposed.‖); see generally Michael Crowder, Tshekedi Khama and
Opposition to the British Administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1926–1936, 26 J. AFR.
HIST. 193 (1985) (arguing that the leaders of the Protectorate never pandered to British
domination).
111 Molutsi & Holm, supra note 39, at 324.
112 Olmstead, supra note 84, at 820.
113 Id. at 821 (insertion in original).
114 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 70.
115 Molutsi & Holm, supra note 39, at 324.
116 See Proctor, supra note 105.
117 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 70.
118 Id.
119 Ian Taylor, As Good As It Gets? Botswana’s ―Democratic Development,‖ 21 J. CONTEMP. AFR.
215, 221 (2003).
468 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
modern African statehood. Colonialism changed the entire mapping of the
African continent,120 instilled foreign institutions, and destroyed much of
Africa‘s historic institutional framework.121 Colonizers generally removed the
traditional institutions for leadership training and forced the African
populations into obedience.122 The protectorate model minimized this
destructive colonial legacy, which may account for Botswana‘s
straightforward transition to independence, successful democratic
institutions, and commendable leadership. A combination of British
cooperation with the Batswana in governing the country during the
Protectorate era, and the fact that power was in the hands of a few local elite,
made the transition to independence even easier.123 As Kenneth Good notes,
―a major reason for this smoothness was that the transfer took place
collaboratively between an indigenous elite and a colonial elite, with little or
no engagement by the people.‖124
Botswana also benefited from what others have termed its ethnic
homogeneity, which is more accurately described as the dominance of a single
ethnic group.125 According to some sources, the Tswana people, who are
comprised of several subgroups, constitute a significant majority at 79
percent of the population.126 The Tswana are descendents of the Sotho
peoples of Southern Africa who arrived in Botswana in the 1800s.127 There
are roughly 5 million Tswana across Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa
today.128 Tswana descendents speak Setswana, creating a near-universal
native language spoken by 78 percent of the national population.129 In the
late 1800s, the group began to take land and to dominate the political process
through the chieftainship system.130
120 J. Barron Boyd, Jr., African Boundary Conflict: An Empirical Study, 22 AFR. STUD. REV. 1, 1
(1979).
121 See generally Pierre Englebert, Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic
Development in Tropical Africa, 53 POL. RES. Q. 7 (2000) (arguing that the extent to which pre-
existing forms of governance clash with post-colonial systems impacts a state‘s economic growth).
122 See generally Maake Masango, Leadership in the African Context, 55 ECUMENICAL REV. 313
(2003) (treating the extent of the colonial imprint on Africa today, and the challenges of
developing new models of leadership).
123 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 70–71.
124 GOOD, supra note 10, at 8; see also Dennis L. Cohen, The Botswana Political Elite: Evidence
from the 1974 General Election, 4 J. S. AFR. AFF. 347 (1979).
125 LEITH, supra note 49, at 28–29.
126 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48.
127 AFRICANA, supra note 34, at 1891.
128 Id.
129 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48.
130 Olmstead, supra note 84, at 813.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 469
In 1933, British authorities officially recognized the eight principal
Tswana-descended ethnic groups131 in the Chieftainship Act. At
independence, the law carried over this distinction into the Botswana
Constitution,132 which stipulates in §§ 77–79 that a representative of each
Tswana tribe will serve in the House of Chiefs, a governmental advisory
committee.133 The four representatives from minority ethnic groups serving
in the House of Chiefs are referred to as ―sub-Chiefs.‖134 Complaints by
minority groups eventually led to a Presidential Commission, appointed in
2000, which examined the question of whether §§ 77–79 of the constitution
are discriminatory and found that they were.135 The government published a
White Paper in 2002, in which it accepted the Commission‘s findings and
agreed that the language in this section should be changed.136 However,
scholars have argued that the constitutional amendments made in 2005 did
not eliminate its discriminatory nature, as specific references calling for
chiefs from the eight dominant Tswana tribes were simply replaced by
references calling for chiefs from districts controlled by these same tribes.137
The Tribal Territories Act of 1933, which divided Botswana into districts and
named each district according to the seven dominant Tswana tribes,138 was
also carried over into the constitution at independence.139
While there is great diversity among small ethnic groups within
Botswana, the political dominance of one group more or less eliminated the
threat of ethnic battles for power,140 such as the conflict between the Hutu
131 Nyati-Ramahobo, supra note 32, at 1. The eight groups are: the Barolong, Bakwena,
Bangwaketse, Balete, Bakgatla, Batlokwa, Bangwato, and Batawana. Id.
132 Id. at 3; see generally A. Aguda, Discriminatory Statutory Provisions and the Fundamental
Rights Provision of the Constitutions of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, 89 S. AFR. L.J. 299
(1972) (discussing judicial interpretation of laws implying state-sponsored discrimination across
different African countries with identically-worded constitutional fundamental rights
provisions).
133 BOTS. CONST. ch.5, §§ 77–79, available at http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files/constitution_
of_botswana.pdf.
134 Nyati-Ramahobo, supra note 32, at 2.
135 Charles Mange Fombad, The Constitutional Protection Against Discrimination in Botswana,
53 INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 155, 156 (2004) [hereinafter Fombad, Constitutional Protection Against
Discrimination in Botswana].
136 Id.
137 See Nyati-Ramahobo, supra note 32 (exploring the marginalization of non-Tswana tribes in
Botswana).
138 Tribal Territories Act of 1933 ch. 32, § 3, reprinted in THE LAWS OF BOTSWANA: REVISED
EDITION OF 2002 (Republic of Botswana Vol. IV 2002).
139 Fombad, Constitutional Protection Against Discrimination in Botswana, supra note 135, at
156.
140 ONALENNA DOO SELOLWANE, U.N. RESEARCH INST. FOR SOC. DEV., ETHNIC STRUCTURE,
INEQUALITY AND GOVERNANCE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN BOTSWANA 1–2 (2004), available at
470 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
and Tutsi in Rwanda,141 or between Arab northerners and black southerners
in the Sudan.142 However, the absence of ethnic conflict does not necessarily
indicate that the Batswana are less prone than other peoples to ethnic
violence. The Tswana have simply marginalized existing minorities to the
point that minorities have little chance of impacting the Tswana‘s dominance
in the political sphere.143 These minority groups, which include thirty-eight
other ethnic groups, struggle to gain official recognition from the
government—a battle they have not yet won—let alone meaningfully
participate in the political process.144 Beyond the discrimination espoused in
the constitution, which does not officially recognize the non-Tswana tribes,145
the Tswana‘s dominance is also reflected in Botswana‘s official languages.146
The GOB permits only the use of Setswana and English in schools and in
government, which affects linguistic minorities‘ access to social services.147
These two languages also dominate the media.148
Botswana‘s third good luck charm was the fortuitous discovery of
diamonds just after independence, when Botswana was one of the poorest
nations in the world.149 De Beers geologists found diamonds in Orapa in
1967.150 Had knowledge of the diamonds surfaced even a year earlier, it could
have changed the course of Botswana‘s modern history. While the wealth
afforded by the diamonds would exist regardless of the date of their
discovery, the British may not have relinquished control of the Protectorate
quite so easily or quickly had they known of Botswana‘s diamond deposits. At
the very least, they likely would have pushed for mineral concessions as a
contingency for independence. Instead, the newly independent government
was able to maintain control of its diamond resources by creating Debswana,
the national diamond company it owns in an equal partnership with the
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetITFrame?ReadForm&parentunid=C9BAF69
26799077AC1256E9E00447A6F&parentdoctype=paper&netitpath=http://www.unrisd.org/unpub
lished_/dghr_/selolwan/content.htm.
141 BILL BERKELEY, THE GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL 248 (Basic Books 2001).
142 Id. at 196.
143 David Reed Cohen, Tracing Rootlets of Modern Political Discourse in Botswana: The Role of
Archaeology in the Creation of Identities 6 (Feb. 19–20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://traumwerk.stanford.edu:3455/CulturesofContact/admin/download.html?attach
id=65980.
144 Nyati-Ramahobo, supra note 32, at 1.
145 Id. at 3.
146 Id. at 4.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Taylor & Mokhawa, supra note 17, at 262.
150 Debswana, supra note 68.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 471
global diamond conglomerate De Beers.151 The fortuitous discovery of
diamonds jump-started the nation‘s fledgling economy.152 Without diamonds,
Botswana may have remained among the poorest nations in Africa.
Because Botswana is so often treated as a model of success in Africa, it is
highly relevant that three factors—diamond wealth, limited colonial
intrusion, and the dominance of a single ethnic group—cannot easily be
replicated by other countries. What the country‘s leadership was able to do
with these elements of fortune is important and often admirable. However, a
closer examination of Botswana‘s political and economic context shows,
despite some good decision-making, Botswana can do much more to ensure
that all of its citizens benefit from this fortune. It can also better protect the
human rights of all Batswana and should work to ensure a more even
application of these rights among its citizenry.
VI. IS BOTSWANA A MIRACLE IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT?
On October 6, 2008, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (―Foundation‖)
recognized Botswana when it released its 2008 Ibrahim Index of African
Governance.153 First published in September 2007, the Ibrahim Index of
African Governance is ―a comprehensive ranking of African countries
according to governance quality.‖154 It assesses national governance against
fifty-seven criteria intended to capture the quality of services that
governments provide to their citizens.155 It is meant to focus on the
experiences of the people of a country, using criteria that are divided into five
categories.156 It is interesting to note that, according to the Index, almost two-
thirds of sub-Saharan African countries—thirty-one out of forty-eight—
recorded an improvement in government performance between 2000 and
2006.157 The Foundation notes further that the largest improvement occurred
in the category ―Participation and Human Rights,‖ in which twenty-nine
151 GOOD, supra note 10, at 17.
152 Taylor & Mokhawa, supra note 17, at 262.
153 MO IBRAHIM FOUND., IBRAHIM INDEX OF GOVERNANCE: II. THE 2008 RESULTS 1 (2008),
available at http://site.moibrahimfoundation.org/The full 2008 Ibrahim Index.pdf (figures based
on data from 2006) [hereinafter IBRAHIM INDEX OF GOVERNANCE].
154 Mo Ibrahim Found., Ibrahim Index, http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibra
him-index (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
155 IBRAHIM INDEX OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 153, at THE MEANING OF GOVERNANCE 2.
156 The five categories are: safety and security; rule of law, transparency, and corruption;
participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development.
IBRAHIM INDEX OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 153, at THE MEANING OF GOVERNANCE 1.
157 Press Release, Mo Ibrahim Found., New Data Shows That Two Thirds of Sub-Saharan African
Countries Have Improved Governance Performance (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://
www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/20091002_061008-index-global-press-release.pdf
[hereinafter Press Release, New Data Shows].
472 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
countries demonstrated progress.158 On releasing the index, Mo Ibrahim
himself noted that:
Obscured by many of the headlines of the past few months,
the real story coming out of Africa is that governance
performance across a large majority of African countries is
improving. According to this comprehensive analysis,
progress is being made across the continent against a range of
key governance indicators.159
However, other findings contradict this analysis.160 While the last few
years have shown signs of hope for human rights on the African continent,
recurring instances of flagrant human rights abuse, and the debilitating
violence that often accompanies the abuse, continue to afflict large swaths of
the continent.161 In its 2008 World Report, Freedom House noted that:
The year 2007 was marked by a notable setback for global
freedom. The decline, which was reflected in reversals in one-
fifth of the world‘s countries, was most pronounced in South
Asia, but also reached significant levels in the former Soviet
Union, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan
Africa.162
The decline is, therefore, not specifically an African problem, but a global
one. However, the Report also noted that:
While in the last several years the sub-Saharan region has
made incremental if uneven progress, the year 2007 saw the
deterioration of freedom on the continent. Fifteen countries in
sub-Saharan Africa registered reversals of sufficient
magnitude to be noted in the survey, while six countries
registered improvements.163
The fifteen countries experiencing declines were Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, the
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), and Somalia; while those demonstrating
improvements were Cote d‘Ivoire, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 ARCH PUDDINGTON, FREEDOM HOUSE, FINDINGS OF FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2008—FREEDOM
IN RETREAT: IS THE TIDE TURNING? (2008), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=
130&year=2008.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 473
Leone, and Togo.164 The imbalance between the number of African countries
showing improvements and those showing declines indicates there are still
many countries on the African continent that will continue to violate human
rights with relative impunity. The Freedom House research suggests that the
number of countries that are experiencing positive developments in the area
of human rights is in decline.
According to the Mo Ibrahim Index, Botswana marginally improved in
three out of five categories: Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable
Economic Opportunity; and Human Development.165 Botswana‘s score
remained the same in the Safety and Security category; however, this is the
country‘s weakest category and the only one in which it ranked outside the
top ten.166 Botswana fell slightly in the Rule of Law, Transparency and
Corruption category.167 The Index shows that, between 2005 and 2006,
Botswana improved its overall score to seventy-four out of one hundred, but
remained in fourth place out of sub-Saharan Africa‘s forty-eight countries.168
Although scholars and analysts accurately have recognized Botswana‘s
success in achieving political stability and economic growth,169 it is important
not to end the analysis there. Several scholars have devoted their work to
dissecting the myth of the Botswana ―Miracle‖ and exposing the limitations of
democracy and human rights suffered by many Batswana.170 Among the
problems they cite are the dominance of the ruling party, unchecked
presidential power, limited freedom of expression, economic disparities that
are among the worst in the world, preferential treatment for certain ethnic
groups, and levels of HIV/AIDS171 that threaten the very existence of a future
work force.172 Some scholars, such as Jacqueline Solway, Richard Werbner,
Keitseope Nthomang, and Sidsel Saugestad, have focused on the inadequate
protection of minority and indigenous rights in Botswana.173 Clement
164 Id.
165 Press Release, New Data Shows, supra note 157.
166 Id.
167 See generally R. Nengwekhulu, Human Rights, Development and the Rule of the Law in Post-
Colonial Botswana, in BOTSWANA: POLITICS AND SOCIETY 351 (W.A. Edge & M.H. Lekorwe eds.,
1998) (evaluating early Botswana‘s compliance with the rule of law).
168 Press Release, New Data Shows, supra note 157.
169 SAMATAR, supra note 7, passim.
170 See examples of such work, infra notes 176–83.
171 See, e.g., T. Maundeni, The Boy Child and HIV in Botswana: A Neglected Issue in Research
and Practice, 18 PULA BOTS. J. AFR. STUD. 43 (2004) (dealing with HIV/AIDS issues in Botswana
and the GOB‘s response to the disease).
172 GOOD, supra note 10, at 9.
173 See Solway, supra note 31, at 711–29; SAUGESTAD, supra note 12; Richard Werbner,
Introduction: Challenging Minorities, Difference and Tribal Citizenship in Botswana, 28 J. S.
474 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
Ng‘ong‘ola and Robert Hitchcock have written extensively on land rights and
indigenous groups.174 The works of Ian Taylor and Francis Nyamnjoh uncover
the historical roots of—and limitations to—democracy in Botswana.175
Finally, Bugalo Maripe, Scott Pegg, and Kenneth Good have exposed
restrictions on freedom of expression due to government control of the media,
academia, and access to information.176 Good, who is among the most notable
critics of the GOB, has explored rarely-exposed violations of human rights,
the severity of economic inequality, and constraints on the democratic
process.177 Digging beneath the surface exposes significant limitations to the
story of the Botswana ―Miracle‖ and reveals a far less commendable
democracy beneath.178
A. Laws and Practice
Although Botswana is considered one of Africa‘s most successful multi-
party democracies, the system contains political practices and laws that are
decidedly undemocratic. For example, the constitution provides the President
with unrestrained powers, authorizing him to make many decisions without
input.179 He has direct control over the police, the information and
broadcasting sector, the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime, and
the public service.180 The President appoints the Vice President and all
cabinet members, and is permitted to appoint four Specially Elected Members
of Parliament.181 A 1998 constitutional amendment allowed the Vice
President to automatically succeed the President upon his retirement,
AFR. STUD. 671 (2002); Keitseope Nthomang, Relentless Colonialism: The Case of the Remote Area
Development in Botswana, Donor Assistance, and the First People of the Kalahari, 42 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 415 (2004).
174 See Clement Ng‘ong‘ola, Land Rights for Marginalized Ethnic Groups in Botswana, with
Special Reference to the Basarwa, 41 J. AFR. L. 1 (1997); Robert K. Hitchcock, We Are the First
People: Land, Natural Resources and Identity in the Central Kalahari, Botswana, 28 J. S. AFR.
STUD. 755 (2002).
175 See Taylor, supra note 119; Nyamnjoh, supra note 94.
176 See Bugalo Maripe, Freezing the Press: Freedom of Expression and Statutory Limitations in
Botswana, 3 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 52 (2003); Scott Pegg, Presidential Succession and Academic
Freedom: Botswana Deports Leading Political Scientist Kenneth Good, 38 POL. SCI. & POL. 829
(2005); Kenneth Good, The State and Extreme Poverty in Botswana: The San and Destitutes, 37 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 285 (1999).
177 See, e.g., GOOD, supra note 10.
178 See Monageng Mogalakwe, Botswana: Exploding the Myth of Exceptionality, 38 AFR. INSIGHT
105, 105–17 (2008).
179 BOTS. CONST. ch.4, § 47(2). Section 47(2) provides, ―In the exercise of any function conferred
upon him by this Constitution or any other law the President shall, unless it is otherwise
provided, act in his own deliberate judgment and shall not be obliged to follow the advice
tendered by any other person or authority.‖ Id.
180 GOOD, supra note 10, at 9.
181 Id.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 475
permitting recent Presidents Ketumile Masire and Festus Mogae, who ―had
no popular constituencies whatsoever,‖ to come to power.182
B. Politics
Political campaigning is another major issue. The Botswana Democratic
Party (―BDP‖) has been in power so long that other political parties have
rarely stood a chance against it. The Botswana National Front is the BDP‘s
main adversary, but its apparent inability to mount any threat to the BDP
has rendered it and other parties, including the Botswana Congress Party,
largely helpless, as potential constituents are not likely to contribute to a lost
cause.183 The U.S. State Department‘s 2007 Country Report on Human Rights
Practices in Botswana expresses concern about BDP candidates‘ ―preferential
access to state-owned television during much of the campaign.‖184
Furthermore, the BDP‘s impartiality is constrained by the fact that, ―in a
country where the ruling party has been so dominant for so long, the
distinction between party and government interests is clearly blurred.‖185
Regular elections are not enough to indicate a functioning democracy. As Sir
Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana, noted:
A fixation on natural electoral practices, without
considerations of broader democratic practices in the economy
and social sphere, creates skepticism. There is much in the
African experience that suggests that a broader view of
democracy building that encompasses social dynamics is not
only necessary, but essential for any of the policy perspectives
that we are seeking to establish.186
The election process in Botswana was historically tainted by the fact that
the public did not perceive the Supervisor of Elections as independent.187 The
Independent Electoral Commission, which replaced the Supervisor for the
election of 1999 and subsequent elections, is also suspect. This is due to two
factors: the President appoints the CEO, and the staff are under the control
of the public service.188
182 Pegg, supra note 176, at 830.
183 Taylor, supra note 119, at 218.
184 U.S. Dep‘t of State, 2007 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Botswana (2008),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100467.htm [hereinafter U.S. Dep‘t of State
2007].
185 Taylor, supra note 119, at 218.
186 INT‘L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPMENT:
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE EU‘S ROLE IN DEMOCRACY BUILDING 23 (2009).
187 Tsie, Botswana’s Independent Electoral Commission, supra note 45, at 145.
188 See id. at 146, 149.
476 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
Purveyors of the rosy Batswana myth often praise the country‘s strong
leadership. Botswana has had commendable leaders, such as the country‘s
first President, Sir Seretse Khama. However, Botswana‘s ―strong‖ leadership
could, in fact, be indicative of an authoritarian or elite culture.189 Botswana is
noted for ―historically high levels of social control possessed by its ruling
elites.‖190 While Batswana society has certainly remained stable, Good argues
that stability is actually based on critically low levels of popular
participation, ―a handmaid to elitism.‖191 Even the kgotla, Botswana‘s
traditional democratic platform for political representation, as Larry Swatuk
claims, ―allows for the illusion of inclusion and open (though limited)
expression of opinion by the citizenry, but . . . the agenda is set and key
decisions are taken by the ruling class.‖192 Essentially, as Good and Taylor
argue, ―Botswana‘s democracy is highly elitist, power is excessively
centralized in the presidency, secrecy and non-accountability in government
are pervasive, and there is growing autocracy.‖193
C. Criticism
Another issue of concern is the GOB‘s aversion to criticism and its efforts
to eliminate disparagement of the government from public discourse. A
telling case of the limits of democracy in Botswana was the 2005 deportation
of Kenneth Good, vocal critic of the government.194 The government expelled
Professor Good, a 72-year-old Australian academic, after he had spent fifteen
years teaching at the University of Botswana.195 President Festus Mogae
declared Good a ―Prohibited Immigrant‖ and gave him two days to leave the
country, exercising his executive right to forgo any explanation for the
eviction because he deemed it an ―issue of national security.‖196 It is widely
assumed that the GOB deported Good because of his criticism of the
government.197 As Scott Pegg notes, Good‘s deportation ―painfully confirms
the validity of many of his arguments about the nature of democracy in
189 GOOD, supra note 10, at 7.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 8.
192 Larry A. Swatuk, From ―Project‖ to ―Context‖: Community Based Natural Resource
Management in Botswana, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 95, 109 (2005), available at http://www.mit
pressjournals.org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/doi/abs/10.1162/1526380054794925.
193 Pegg, supra note 176, at 830.
194 Botswana Deports Professor Critic, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/4597053.stm.
195 Pegg, supra note 176, at 829.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 830.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 477
Botswana.‖198 Since that time, the government has made it more difficult for
foreign journalists and academics to obtain visas.199 The Minister of Labour
and Home Affairs, Charles Tibone, recently invoked a clause from the
Immigration Act regarding visa requirements in order to target seventeen
individuals from abroad who he perceived as inclined to criticize the
government.200 The list includes Good‘s colleague Ian Taylor, an academic
who often criticizes government actions against the San.201 The targeted
individuals, unlike other visitors, must now obtain a visa before traveling to
Botswana.202
D. Civil Society and the Media
Botswana also suffers from a weak and apolitical civil society,203 evinced
in part by low voter turnout in the 1990s. National elections in 1999 showed
a 42 percent turnout, very low in comparison to the turnout in much of the
rest of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, which often pushed 80 percent.204
There are low levels of political consciousness and a weak civil society in
Botswana, due in part to the ―lack of any meaningful ‗struggle‘ for
independence and the concomitant absence of a tradition of questioning.‖205
This legacy also may result from historical domination by the chiefs and
other elites.206 Batswana often tend to go with the flow when it comes to
politics.207 As Swatuk claims, ―public opposition to the ruling party is frowned
upon, as is aggressive, confrontational styles of political activism.‖208 Perhaps
because of this, Botswana‘s NGOs are hesitant to address controversial
issues such as human rights, gender equity, capital punishment, political
education, the San, or democracy.209 One of the biggest concerns in any weak
civil society is that there is little chance of consolidating an opposition group
198 Id.
199 Thom Mclachlan, Botswana’s Special Entry Visas for Critics, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), Apr. 7, 2007,
at 1.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See Terrance Carroll & Barbara W. Carroll, The Rapid Emergence of Civil Society in
Botswana, 42 COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 333 (2005); Maurizo Carbone, Weak Civil Society in
a Hard State, 1 J. CIV. SOC‘Y 167 (2005).
204 GOOD, supra note 10, at 5.
205 Taylor, supra note 119, at 221 (citing Holm et al., The Development of Civil Society in a
Democratic State: The Botswana Model, 39 AFR. STUD. REV. 2 (2003)).
206 Swatuk, supra note 192, at 109.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 GOOD, supra note 10, at 6.
478 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
that is strong enough to force the government to address democratic
deficiencies, specifically in the form of human rights abuses.
Government influence and certain laws also severely limit the freedom of
the media in Botswana.210 While there is independent media, the government
dominates most of the media through state television, two radio stations, and
its newspaper, the Daily News.211 State media rarely criticizes the
government and often favors the BDP.212 The Office of the President has
direct control over the Daily News, and public officials are forbidden to talk to
the press.213 Furthermore, the 1986 National Security Act forbids publication
of information relating to national security and generally restricts access to
information.214 There is no freedom of information legislation and the public
does not have access to government documents.215 Until the end of 2009, the
government website had a link to the laws of Botswana labeled ―restricted
access;‖ the page said ―access forbidden‖ and noted that Botswana‘s laws
were not yet available on the internet for public use.216 Additionally, the
government has been known to intervene and censor the media when it
covers sensitive topics,217 including the cancellation of live radio panel
discussions on state-owned broadcasting.218 According to the U.S. State
Department‘s 2007 Report on human rights in Botswana, government
journalists often censored themselves.219 In 2005, the government deported at
least two foreign journalists, in addition to Good, whose reporting was critical
of the government, without justification other than national security
concerns.220 The government also has attempted to enact a piece of legislation
entitled the Mass Media Communications Bill, which would place further
checks on free media,221 such as bestowing power upon the government to
210 See Maripe, supra note 176.
211 U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE 2007, supra note 184.
212 Id.
213 GOOD, supra note 10, at 9.
214 AFR. MEDIA DEV. INITIATIVE, BOTSWANA COUNTRY REPORT: CONTEXT 9 (2006), available at
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/AMDI/botswana/amdi_botswana3_media_healt
h.pdf.
215 U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE 2007, supra note 184.
216 Government of Botswana, Access Forbidden, http://www.laws.gov.bw/ (last visited Oct. 10,
2009).
217 GOOD, supra note 10, at 12.
218 AFR. MEDIA DEV. INITIATIVE, supra note 214, at 11.
219 U.S. Dep‘t of State 2005, Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Botswana (2006),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61555.htm [hereinafter U.S. Dep‘t of State
2005].
220 Id.
221 Taylor, supra note 119, at 220.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 479
register and deregister newspapers at will.222 Some argue that this bill
directly contradicts constitutionally-protected freedom of expression rights.223
Since 2008, the GOB has been trying to impose a statutory press council on
the country, further attempting to control the media and make it as
compliant as possible with the wishes of the state.224 The task of the press
council will be to adjudicate complaints against the media.
E. Economic Issues
In addition to political issues, several economic concerns highlight that
the description of Botswana as Africa‘s ―Miracle‖ fails to convey meaning for
all Batswana. While Botswana has experienced noteworthy economic growth
over the last forty years, its ―national success conceals hugely different
outcomes among the local population,‖ who suffer significant disparities in
wealth.225 According to the U.N. Development Programme Human
Development Indicators, Botswana ranks third highest in the world in its
Gini coefficient, a measure of the inequality of income distribution, behind
Comoros and Namibia.226 It has a Human Development Index rating of 125
out of 182 countries.227 As Good notes, ―high growth has not ameliorated the
socioeconomic inequalities long existing in the country.‖228 From 2000 to
2007, 31.2 percent of the population lived on less than $1.25 per day, while
49.4 percent of the people lived on less than $2 per day.229 The richest 10
percent of the population have access to a 51.2 percent share of income or
expenditures.230 Therefore, as Ian Taylor argues, ―the creation of a more
equitable society and fairer distribution of resources remains Botswana‘s
greatest development challenge and one which will define the success or
otherwise of the post-independence project.‖231 As of yet, Botswana has not
been successful in translating its mineral wealth into overall poverty
reduction, and many Batswana continue to suffer at the bottom of the
222 AFR. MEDIA DEV. INITIATIVE, supra note 214, at 11.
223 Id. at 10.
224 Khanyi Mndaweni, The Press Council of SA’s Annual General Meeting in Johannesburg, THE
PRESS COUNCIL OF S. AFR., Aug. 15, 2008, http://www.presscouncil.org.za/pages/posts/the-press-
council-of-sarsquos-annual-general-meeting-in-johannesburg-on-august-14-and-15-200815.php.
225 Michael B.K. Darkoh & Joseph E. Mbaiwa, Globalization and the Livestock Industry in
Botswana, 23 SING. J. TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY 149, 150 (2002).
226 Gini Index, supra note 65.
227 UNDP, Human Development Report 2009—HDI Rankings (2009),
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.
228 GOOD, supra note 10, at 23.
229 UNDP, Human Development Report 2009: Botswana (2009), available at
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_BWA.html.
230 Id.
231 Taylor, supra note 119, at 227.
480 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
economic food-chain. Thus, while Botswana is doing well economically, its
riches are not trickling down to those who most need assistance. Advances in
socioeconomic rights are not occurring even though Botswana has some
capacity to make improvements to the lives of its poorest inhabitants.
F. Minority Groups
This economic differentiation is most exemplified by the San, a group of
traditional hunters and gatherers that live in the Kalahari region and are
one of Botswana‘s most marginalized minorities. ―Belonging to a
marginalized, often stigmatized, indigenous minority,‖ Sidsel Saugestad
notes, ―almost invariably includes a state of abject poverty,‖ and the San are
no exception.232 Olmstead writes, ―the San have largely been denied the fruits
of Botswana‘s rapid economic growth and social development,‖ as they endure
chronic poverty and unemployment and are forced to depend on handouts
from the government to survive.233 In general, the Tswana have historically
treated the San as second-class citizens, often taking them as servants or
slaves.234 More recently, tremendous tensions between the government and
the San led to the prominent land rights conflict in the Central Kalahari
Game Reserve and the ensuing court case.235 The San residents of the
Central Kalahari Game Reserve suffered the following at the hands of the
government: forced removal, termination of basic and essential services,
―dismantling of existing infrastructures, the confiscation of livestock,‖
restriction of movement, harassment, and ill-treatment.236
The marginalization of ethnic minorities is a major issue in Botswana.
While Botswana premised its nation-building on over-emphasized ethnic
homogeneity, in fact, the ruling Tswana elite simply ignored the
heterogeneity that existed.237 In Botswana, as in many African countries,
borders were drawn in such a way that disparate ethnic groups were brought
together under the umbrella of a single nation. This delineation of borders
effectively split ethnic groups across national boundaries, including the
Ju/‘hoansi people in the northwest of Botswana, whose population stretches
across the Namibian border, and the many Setswana speakers who live
232 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 31.
233 Olmstead, supra note 84, at 799.
234 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 31, 40, 93.
235 See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.
236 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding Observations:
Botswana, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/BWA/CO/16 (Apr. 4, 2006) [hereinafter CERD, Consideration
of Reports Under Article 9].
237 SAUGESTAD, supra note 12, at 68–69.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 481
within the borders of South Africa.238 Despite frequent government claims to
the contrary,239 there is significant ethnic diversity in Botswana.240 The
Tswana simply comprise a critical mass and often control perceptions of this
diversity.
Botswana has enjoyed some measure of improvement in the
representation of minority groups. In fact, members of ethnic groups not
officially recognized by law, such as members of the Kalanga and Bakalagadi
ethnic groups, often participate in the government.241 In 2006, twenty-three
minority members held seats in the sixty-one-seat parliament, ten held seats
in the twenty-seat cabinet, and five were represented in the High Court.242
However, these groups often are forced to toe the line of the Tswana political
leaders and Chiefs in order to maintain their posts.243 For this reason, the
presence of representatives from minority groups in government positions
has not led to better representation of the interests of those minorities.244 The
GOB has failed in many regards to protect the rights of Botswana‘s
indigenous groups, and there is often little recourse for these groups to seek
justice within their own national borders.
G. Human Rights in General
On the human rights front, in general, Botswana suffers a number of
shortcomings. While Botswana is a party to many international treaties and
conventions, it often shows only limited support for the human rights
agreements that it has signed and ratified.245 For example, it never submitted
a state report to the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights as
required by Article 62 of the African Charter on Human and People‘s
Rights.246 The Commission condemned this failure in a 2005 visit to the
country.247 In addition, the country failed to submit a report to the Committee
238 Id. at 199.
239 Id. at 68–69.
240 Id.
241 U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE 2007, supra note 184.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 See LONE LINDHOLT, QUESTIONING THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE AFRICAN
CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES‘ RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA, MALAWI AND MOZAMBIQUE 247 (1997).
246 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); see AFR. COMM. ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE‘S RIGHTS,
MISSION REPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA (2005), available at http://www.achpr.org/
english/Mission_reports/mission%20report_Botswana.pdf (noting Botswana did not submit a
report).
247 AFR. COMM. ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE‘S RIGHTS, supra note 246, at 10.
482 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
Against Torture.248 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (―CERD‖) lamented the fact that Botswana‘s constitution and
domestic law ―do not seem to respond fully to the requirements of the
Convention.‖249 It noted, for example, that Article 15 of the constitution
permits derogations from international obligations prohibiting racial
discrimination.250 CERD also noted that Botswana has various laws,
including the Chieftainship Act and the Tribal Territories Act, which
recognize only the Tswana people, and not other groups in the country.251
Therefore, CERD indicated that these laws and others violated the
Convention.252 It specifically found that the political system discriminated
against San people.253 Interestingly, in Attorney General v. Unity Dow, the
Court of Appeal of Botswana determined that citizenship laws allowing only
male citizens to pass citizenship status onto their children254 amounted to
sexual255 discrimination.256 The court poignantly noted, ―Botswana seeks to
avoid violating international law where possible.‖257 The court went to great
lengths to expound upon Botswana‘s image as a liberal democracy and its
248 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
249 Office of the U.N. Comm‘r for Human Rights [UNCHR], Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Botswana, ¶ 298, U.N. Doc. A/57/18,
paras. 292–314 (Aug. 23, 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/A.57.18,
paras.292-314.En?Opendocument.
250 Id. ¶ 300.
251 Id. ¶ 301.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See generally Bugalo Maripe, The Recognition and Enforcement of Children’s Rights in
Domestic Law: An Assessment of the Child Protection Laws in Botswana in Light of Prevailing
International Trends, 9 INT‘L J. CHILD. RTS. 339, 355 (2001) (discussing children‘s rights in
Botswana in contrast to the emerging body of international children‘s rights laws).
255 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SECOND CLASS CITIZENS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
UNDER BOTSWANA‘S CITIZENSHIP ACT (1994), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/
1994/09/01/second-class-citizens (discussing the GOB‘s discrimination against women in light of
a past court order declaring such discrimination unconstitutional and violative of international
law); Kabelo K. Leboste, Bail and Punishment in Rape Cases: The Situation in Botswana, 6 E.
AFR. J. PEACE HUM. RTS. 115 (2000); Godisang Mookodi, Male Violence Against Women in
Botswana: A Discussion of Gendered Uncertainties in a Rapidly Changing Environment, 8 AFR.
SOC. REV. 118 (2004); Godisang Mookodi, The Dynamics of Domestic Violence Against Women in
Botswana, 18 PULA: BOTS. J. AFR. STUD. 55 (2004).
256 See generally Simon Coldham, Human Rights in Botswana: Unity Dow v. Attorney General, 36
J. AFR. L. 91, 91 (1992) (discussing citizenship and discrimination under the Botswana
constitution, citizenship law, and a recent case interpreting the interaction of these legal
regimes); Reem Bahdi, Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of
International Law in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT‘L L. REV. 555 (2002) (exploring the
reasons that national court judges use international human rights law in their decisions).
257 Bahdi, supra note 256, at 555.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 483
loyalty to the human rights agreements it has signed.258 In practice, the GOB
has not always lived up to this image.
The treatment of women and women‘s rights, which was the key issue in
the Unity Dow decision,259 is a tremendous problem in Botswana. Domestic
violence is pervasive, and few women hold political positions. In 2008, there
were only seven women in the sixty-one seat parliament, five female cabinet
ministers out of twenty, three female judges out of thirteen on the High
Court, and two women among the fifteen members of the House of Chiefs.260
The GOB has yet to enact many of the treaties it has signed into domestic
law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(―ICCPR‖), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention
Against Torture. In this regard, the U.N. Human Rights Committee (―HRC‖)
noted that the ICCPR is ―not directly applicable‖ in domestic law, and that
the laws of the country do not contain several of the rights contained in the
Convention.261 It also noted the numerous reservations Botswana entered
with respect to the ICCPR.262 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has
recommended that Botswana withdraw its reservation to Article 1 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child263 and make the Convention applicable
in Botswana.264 In 2008, the HRC also expressed its concern that the
exceptions to the Botswana constitutional right to be free from discrimination
did not comply with Articles 2, 3, and 26 of the ICCPR.265 CERD noted that
the country was reluctant to recognize the existence of indigenous peoples on
its territory and urged Botswana to respect and protect the existence and
258 Id. at 593.
259 Attorney-General v. Unity Dow, 1992 BLR 119 (Bots.).
260 Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Summary Prepared
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in Accordance with Paragraph 15(c) of
the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/3/BWA/3,
(Sept. 15, 2008).
261 Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40
of the Covenant, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/BWA/CO/1 (Apr. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Human Rights
Comm., Consideration of Reports].
262 Id. ¶ 14.
263 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1456, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. Article 1 of the Convention provides that
―[f]or the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of
eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.‖ Id. art.
1.
264 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 44 of the Convention, Concluding Observations: Botswana, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.242 (Nov. 3, 2004).
265 Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports, supra note 261, ¶ 9.
484 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
cultural identities of all ethnic groups, as well as to review its policy on
indigenous peoples.266
Botswana‘s stance on the death penalty also continues to be problematic,
especially in light of its mandatory imposition for certain crimes and the
country‘s low rate of commutations.267 The HRC criticized the fact that
Batswana laws do not define torture, and suggested that the GOB make
torture a grave criminal offense and provide reparations to victims of
torture.268 Such measures are especially important due to reports of torture
and the impunity of security services.269
Botswana‘s prisons also received criticism from the HRC, specifically in
regard to overcrowding, the large percentage of persons awaiting trial, and
the length of detention before trial.270 The HRC suggested that the state
increase its efforts to ensure that prisoners are kept in humane and dignified
conditions by ensuring healthy conditions and adequate access to healthcare
and food.271 The HRC also condemned Botswana‘s laws on corporal
punishment.272
The Office of the Ombudsman in Botswana,273 which is a public, extra-
ministerial institution, was established by the Ombudsman Act of 1995.274 It
is charged with investigating ―maladministration‖ and making
recommendations to the government.275 However, the effectiveness of the
office is questionable.276 In his meeting with the African Commission,
Ombudsman Lethebe Maine claimed to have received very few complaints
thus far, save a few protestations of human rights abuses by prisoners.277 The
266 CERD, Consideration of Reports Under Article 9, supra note 236, ¶ 9.
267 Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports, supra note 261, ¶13.
268 Id. ¶ 15.
269 See Isaiah Morewagae, Botswana: Police Chief Unaware of DIS Torture Report,
ALLAFRICA.COM, Feb. 6, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200902080020.html; see also Torture of
Bushmen—Shocking Details, SURVIVAL INT‘L (London), Oct. 31, 2007, http://www.survival
international.org/news/2572.
270 Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports, supra note 261, ¶ 15.
271 Id. ¶ 17.
272 Id. ¶ 18.
273 Botswana Office of the Ombudsman, http://www.ombudsman.org.bw/ (last visited Feb. 1,
2010).
274 Charles Fombad, The Enhancement of Good Governance in Botswana: A Critical Assessment of
the Ombudsman Act, 1995, 27 J. S. AFR. STUD. 57, 57 (2001) [hereinafter Fombad, Enhancement
of Good Governance in Botswana].
275 AFR. COMM. ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE‘S RIGHTS, supra note 246, at 17.
276 See id.
277 Id.; see also Tirelo Modie-Moroka, Vulnerability Across a Life Course: An Empirical Study:
Women and Criminality in Botswana Prisons, 18 J. SOC. DEV. AFR. 145 (2003) (studying the
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 485
office has a limited mandate. As a result, it faces criticisms of being weak,
ineffective, and without the resources to function effectively.278 Furthermore,
the President appoints the Ombudsman in consultation with the leader of the
opposition party, and the government funds the position.279 Especially where
governments are guilty of human rights violations, a presidential appointee
is unlikely to be impartial. While acknowledging the Office of the
Ombudsman, the HRC found that there was no national human rights
institution, and therefore called on Botswana to establish such an institution
in accordance with the Paris Principles.280
H. HIV/AIDS
Extremely high levels of HIV/AIDS are an issue of major concern in
Botswana.281 The country has one of the highest percentages of HIV-infected
persons in the world.282 At its peak in 2003, the level may have reached
nearly 38 percent of the population.283 Although the birth rate is now 2.289
percent,284 past negative population growth (estimated at negative 0.4
percent in 2006)285 suggests that the population was shrinking as a result of
HIV/AIDS. In 2006 Botswana‘s life expectancy was one of the lowest in the
world—ranked 223 overall—due to the impact of HIV/AIDS.286 It has now
risen to 61.85 years (61.72 years for men and 61.99 years for women), which
gives it a ranking of 178 out of 223 nations globally.287 Botswana also suffers
relationship between women‘s ―life events‖ and their subsequent criminal behavior, linking
poverty and prisoner status). Overcrowding in prisons and extensive pre-trial waiting periods
adversely affect the rights of detainees. See JEREMY SARKIN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICAN PRISONS
(2008).
278 BBC Focus on Africa Magazine, BBC NEWS, Apr. 1, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/7297374.stm.
279 Fombad, Enhancement of Good Governance in Botswana, supra note 274, at 57.
280 Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports, supra note 261, ¶ 8. The Paris Principles
emerged on Oct. 7–9, 1991, from a workshop regarding the role, status, and function of the
National Human Rights Institutions, and were adopted by a U.N. Human Rights Commission
Resolution in 1992 and the U.N. General Assembly in 1993. Id.
281 Tim Allen & Suzette Heald, HIV/AIDS Policy in Africa: What Has Worked in Uganda and
What Has Failed in Botswana?, 16 J. INT‘L DEV. 1141, 1143 (2004).
282 Id.; see also Peggy G. Ntseane & Julia Preece, Why HIV/AIDS Prevention Strategies Fail in
Botswana: Considering Discourses on Sexuality, 22 DEV. S. AFR. 347 (2005).
283 THE NAT‘L AIDS COORDINATING AGENCY, BOTSWANA 2003: SECOND GENERATION HIV/AIDS
SURVEILLANCE 1 (2003), available at http://www.achap.org/downloads/Sentinel.pdf.
284 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48.
285 KAREN A. STANECKI, THE AIDS PANDEMIC IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2000), available at http://www.masosha.org/?q=system/files/
censusfinal.doc; Index Mundi, Botswana Life Expectancy at Birth, http://www.indexmundi.com/
botswana/life_expectancy_at_birth.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
286 Index Mundi, supra note 285.
287 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48.
486 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
from a culture of stigmatization of infected persons, a prejudice that only
makes the problem more difficult to address.288 Local myths, detailing how
one can ―cure‖ oneself of the disease, actually spread it further.289 In addition
to the humanitarian crisis it causes, the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Botswana
merits great economic alarm as the current rate of infection, and the number
of deaths it portends, could leave too few people to run the growing economy
in future years.
I. Diversifying the Economy
The need to diversify the economy looms large in Botswana.290 Diamonds
and beef are the country‘s only significant exports, yet both face threats to
their long-term existence.291 Miners will eventually cease to find new
diamond sources. Further, the international media can easily affect the
diamond market—which depends heavily on public perception—as human
rights messaging, such as the ―conflict diamonds‖ campaign, have
exhibited.292 Severe overgrazing and a lack of water sources in most parts of
the country threaten the cattle industry, as does the risk of disease and its
effects on market preferences.293 Furthermore, beef exports make up a mere
3.1 percent of export earnings, and the diamond industry subsidizes the
cattle industry.294
In May 2006, DeBeers and the GOB signed a deal that created the
Botswana Diamond Trading Company (―BTDC‖) in the hope that Botswana‘s
diamond income would remain secure for decades.295 The deal included the
creation of four cutting factories in Botswana, aiming to increase the tiny
portion of the labor force (1.5 percent) that the diamond industry employed at
that time.296 These factories will allow a Batswana work force to cut and
polish diamonds. Yet, despite the industry‘s profitability and the additional
labor the BTDC employs, the reality is that the diamond industry is capital-
288 See Gobopamang Letamo, HIV/AIDS-Related Stigma and Discrimination Among Adolescents
in Botswana, 19 AFR. POPULATION STUD. 191 (2004) (determining the factors that lead to
stigmatization and discrimination against young people with HIV/AIDS in Botswana).
289 Mike Earl-Taylor, HIV/AIDS, The Stats, the Virgin Cure and Infant Rape, SCI. AFR., Apr.
2002, http://www.scienceinafrica.co.za/2002/april/virgin.htm.
290 See Thad Dunning, Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability, 49 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 451, 464 (2005); see also GOOD, supra note 10, at 30–31.
291 Botswiri O. Tsheko, A Thinly-Based Economy: The Discussion of Impacts of Diamonds and
Beef Industries on the Botswana Economy, 6 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. AFR. 1, 19 (2004).
292 Taylor & Mokhawa, supra note 17, at 264.
293 Darkoh & Mbaiwa, supra note 225, at 160–61.
294 Id. at 151.
295 New Diamond Deal to Be Signed in Botswana, BUS. REP. (Johannesburg), May 22, 2006,
available at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=603&fArticleId=3256946.
296 Id.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 487
intensive and requires limited labor.297 The government will need to do much
more with future diamond revenues and focus on economic diversification to
address issues of poverty, unemployment, and income inequality.298
Botswana must establish alternative industries to replace the role that
cattle and diamond exports play in the economy. The primary alternative
thus far has been a policy of high-cost, environmentally low-impact tourism299
that seeks to preserve Botswana‘s environment for the long term. This policy
has served the country well,300 but it is not enough. In addition, the
government has begun to encourage a growing manufacturing sector;
however, manufacturing is nowhere near the size necessary to replace
diamond revenues.301
J. Unemployment
High levels of unemployment also threaten the ―African Miracle.‖ At 23.8
percent in 2004, Botswana was certainly not at the top of the list among
African countries,302 but unemployment was high enough to be of great
concern.303 Aside from indicating wealth inequities, high unemployment can
eventually lead to civil unrest.304
A severe lack of workers‘ rights makes this situation worse. According to
Ian Taylor, the ability of workers to strike is extremely limited, the
registration of new unions is nearly impossible, and a general strike is
entirely infeasible in Botswana.305 He concludes that ―profound restrictions—
enshrined in law—limit the potential of workers to organise effectively and
exercise their democratic right to withhold their labour.‖306 Interestingly,
Taylor points out that the working class is a likely sector of society from
297 Taylor & Mokhawa, supra note 17, at 263.
298 See generally Kenneth Good, Resource Dependency and Its Consequences: The Costs of
Botswana’s Shining Gems, 23 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 27 (2005) (dealing with Botswana‘s
dependency on diamonds and the costs thereof).
299 Joseph E. Mbaiwa, Enclave Tourism and Its Socio-Economic Impacts in the Okavango Delta,
26 BOTS. TOURISM MGMT. 157, 157 (2005).
300 Erdener Kaynak, Tourism Market Potential Analysis in Botswana: A Delphi Study, 45 J.
TRAVEL RES. 227, 227 (2006).
301 Tsheko, supra note 291, at 19.
302 Index Mundi, Botswana Unemployment Rate, http://www.indexmundi.com/botswana/unempl
oyment_rate.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
303 But see id. (indicating that the current unemployment rate is 7.5 percent, based on 2007
figures).
304 Mica Panic, Reconstruction, Development and Sustainable Peace, 4 RUSS. IN GLOBAL AFF. 176,
178–79 (2006), available at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/region-economics/numbers/14/1009.html.
305 Taylor, supra note 119, at 227.
306 Id.
488 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 19:453
which political opposition to the BDP could materialize.307 Making it difficult
for the working class to mobilize through unions helps to suppress that
threat. Therefore, GOB control of the labor movement reflects a possible
political strategy. The employment situation in Botswana is a potential issue
for political discourse, the benefit of which could be its ability to create a
more active civil society.
K. ―Negative Peace‖
As Kenneth Good has said, modern Botswana represents a ―negative
peace.‖308 Simply put, the issues outlined above negate Botswana‘s touted
image of stability and growth. Admittedly, Botswana has been successful in
the post-colonial nation-building period in many ways, but it is certainly not
the beacon of democracy that it is often portrayed to be. ―Botswana has
combined high growth rates and visible ‗development,‘‖ Taylor writes, ―with a
structural autocracy that belies its benign image internationally.‖309 African
nations, when looking to Botswana as a progressive example, should
acknowledge these facts that tarnish the myth of the ―African Miracle.‖
VII. CONCLUSION
Since independence in 1966, Botswana has enjoyed much success,
especially in comparison to many post-colonial African nations. It has evolved
from one of the poorest countries in the world to a symbol of political
stability, economic growth, international investment, and development in
Africa.310 Thus, the international community has spent several decades
praising the country of Botswana for these achievements.
While these achievements deserve acknowledgement and respect,
Botswana has fallen short of its image as the ―African Miracle‖ in many
ways. The GOB has failed to address many issues of great concern to a
country that could be emblematic of what is possible in Africa. These include
severe inequality, government aversion to criticism, limitations on civil
society and the media, the dominance of a single political party, extensive
executive authority, unemployment, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the
marginalization of minority groups, among others. With regard to indigenous
issues, the government has used its policy of non-racialism to prove that it is
highly sensitive to racial issues and that it strives to provide equal rights to
all Batswana. However, the condition of various groups of its people exposes
that this image is a distortion. From the minority groups‘ vantage points, it
seems as though non-racial policies allow the GOB to marginalize the
307 Id.
308 GOOD, supra note 10, at 24.
309 Taylor, supra note 119, at 216.
310 Taylor & Mokhawa, supra note 17, at 262.
Spring 2010] IS BOTSWANA THE MIRACLE OF AFRICA? 489
concerns of minorities in a Tswana-dominated society. To various degrees,
many of Botswana‘s minorities are suffering.
On a number of other fronts, Botswana‘s human rights record is wanting.
The GOB has not incorporated into domestic law several of the human rights
treaties that Botswana has ratified. The government has failed to submit
many of the reports required by these agreements. There is no national
human rights institution, thus recourse for citizens is not what it ought to be.
The Office of the Ombudsman is not playing such a role. Due to this void, an
institution is needed that can promote and protect the rights of all the
citizens of the country.
Botswana cannot serve as an example for Africa unless it confronts these
fundamental failures. The country‘s stability and available capital give it the
capability to address some of these tough problems. Botswana has the
resources required to truly promote a democracy based on the rule of law and
human rights. Until the country takes action to address these essential
shortcomings, the international community should refrain from referring to
Botswana as the ―Miracle of Africa.‖ For Africa to truly succeed, both African
nations and the rest of the world must set the bar higher.