ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION OF BANGLADESHIS INTO INDIA:

(National Security Challenges)

Paper

To be presented

in the CS 04 session of

23rd WORLD Congress of IPSA

[19th to 24th July 2014, Montreal, Canada]

Main Author: Co –Author:Dr. Rajeev Sharma Ankita BhushanAssociate Professor JournalistDepartment of ABST Headlines, TodayUniversity of Rajasthan, New Delhi, INDIAJaipur, INDIA

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION OF BANGLADESHIS INTO INDIA:

(National Security Challenges)

INTRODUCTION

1. Migration is a complex process driven by many factors. As a process, A migration has important effects on migrants, their area of origin and destination, and with the onset of globalization, the process of migration is likely to get accentuated. Migrants are motivated by the "push" and "pull" factors of possible origin/ destination areas and are attracted to go — other things being equal — to areas where previous streams have proceeded wherein network of their predecessors make the migration process easier [1].

Networks are particularly important for illegal or undocumented migrations. While developed regions are coveted destinations for migrants of a certain economic strata in the context of South Asia, a considerable human flow takes place within the region, based on variations in the levels of development. India's north-east is one such area that has traditionally been an attractive destination for migrants from Bangladesh.

3. Social, economic, political and geographical conditions obtaining in South Asia are such that they are bound to lead to large scale migration within the region and out of it. Heavy density of population, poverty, political turmoil, natural disasters, environmental degradation, similar ethnic and linguistic groups spread across political boundaries, porous and artificial borders, religious intolerance etc., have ensured that large scale flow of migrants continues across national boundaries in the region. Mere fact that India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Srilanka and Pakistan are separate countries has not been reason enough to stem this flow.

4. People in the South Asian region live in a world where large segments of national population subsist on incomes below poverty line. As opportunities with respect to employment and wages continue to decline, income gaps widen, violence rises and persecution of minorities increases, more and more people find themselves on the move. The reasons cited by migrants for moving are invariably the failure of government and development policies, health and environment disasters, evictions, armed conflict, structural adjustment programmes and debts, changes in crop patterns, poverty and deprivation of means, etc [2].

5. South Asia with India at its Centre, represents an amazing and complex phenomenon of human migration. Thus, South Bhutanese of Neaali_origin have fled to Nepal; Chakmas of Bangladesh have fled to India and Tamils of Indian origin have sought shelter in India from Sinhalese persecution in Srilanka. It is difficult to tell when the large scale, long term, seasonal, two-way migration of Nepalis and Indians in the Terai region will turn into another flashpoint. In any case, South Asia does not repeat the "melting pot" experience of the Unites States, it remains rather a boiling pot.

6. Even though the factors which cause major movements of people across national borders are complex and varied, a brief look at the 12 important flows of rejected people and unwanted

migrants in South Asia, particularly into India, will reveal that violence was the chief characteristic feature of the process. These twelve flows are:[3]

(i) India-Pakistan refugee flow, 1947-48 involving 15,000,000 Hindus and Muslims, (ii) exodus of Burmese Indians numbering about 1,000,000 during 1948-65, (iii) exodus of Srilankan Indians and Tamils to the tune of about 1,000,000 from 1954 which is still continuing, (iv) flight of almost 10,000,000 Bangladeshis to India in 1971, (v) "stranded" Pakistanis in Bangladesh numbering about 300000, (vi) flight of 200,000 Burmese Muslims to Bangladesh in 1978, (vii) flight of 100000 chakmas into India in 1981, (viii) some 3000000 Afghans moved to Pakistan during 1978-93 of which about 2000000 have since returned, (ix) flight of Tibetans to India from 1958 to 1963 numbering about 100000, (x) exodus of nearly 60000 Bhutanese of Nepalese origin to Nepal in 1990-91, (xi) unestimated and unaccounted immigration of Nepalis into India; and finally (xii) the massive, controversial and unwanted population flow from Bangladesh to Assam, West Bengal and Tripura in particular, and other parts of India in general.

7. "Since every country of South Asia shares atleast one important ethnic group with India, linguistic or religious, the proximity of a similar ethnic group across the border is a factor which encourages migration".[4]

WHY IS MIGRATION FROM BANGLADESH UNIQUE

8. Even though India has been at the receiving end of human migration from various quarters as mentioned above, we primarily propose to study the influx from Bangladesh into India in great depth in this study. The reason is that the phenomenon of migration of Bangladeshis into India is a unique one in more senses than one. It is true that economic and environmental causes are responsible for this migration "but to treat infiltration from Bangladesh to India as a part of the worldwide phenomenon of economic migration is to miss the vital point".5 No other migratory phenomenon has involved such huge numbers crossing national boundaries over several decades, thereby changing the demographic and electoral balance in parts of the host country. It will be difficult to find a parallel phenomenon where migrants have reduced the local people to minority in the border districts of a state (viz. Assam), and in another instance, have out-numbered the entire indigenous population of the whole Stat (viz. Tripura) Similarly, no other migration has evoked such divided opinion depending upon political convenience in the host country on the one hand, and total denial combined with brazen obfuscation of facts in the country of origin, on the other. In addition, this is also a phenomenon which is driven by elaborate networking system in the host country on the one hand and tacit approval, if not active encouragement, in the country of origin on the other. Migration of Bangladeshis into India is not as spontaneous as it may look at the first sight.

WHAT IS MIGRATION? WHO IS A REFUGEE?

9. According to one definition "migration is a permanent change in place of residence by crossing of specified administrative or political boundaries. The person who fulfils these two criteria is regarded as a migrant".6 On the other hand UN Convention on Refugees, 1951, defines refugee "as a person who owing to well founded fear is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country".

10. According to Myran Wiener[7] "migrant" are the unwanted people who are not liked by the host community. On the other hand "refugees" are the people who have been rejected by their own government or the people or who have fled due to oppression by brutal regimes. However, in the present study the term 'migrant' has been used in a manner as to include both senses.

11. Another point to be remembered is that migrants do not necessarily move long distances in one go. Their movement is often incremental —they initially move to areas close to themselves which are compatible geographically and culturally. However, over a period of time this gradual outflow can cross International Borders.[ 8]

INDO-BANGLADESH BORDER

12. The Indo-Bangladesh border is 4096 kms Ion which runs alone the States of West Bengal, Assam State-wise length of the border is as follows:

States Border length (Kms)

(a) West Bengal 2217

(b) Assam 262

(c) Meghalaya 443

(d) Tripura 856

(e) Mizoram 318

Total 4096

13. A significant portion of this borer, i.e. about 790 kms., is riverine. In addition, 180 kms of Indo-Bangladesh border is maritime. River borders pose a very complex problem because the shifting river routes, soil erosion and frequent floods make it difficult to demarcate borders, especially when they form "chars" and islands. To further complicate the matter, there are a number of enclaves along the Indo-Bangladesh border which are in 'adverse location'. While India has 111 enclaves in Bangladesh (17258 acres), the later has 51 enclaves (7083 acres) inside India. The enclaves along the Assam-Meghalaya-Bangladesh border covering an area of 755 acres of land remain unresolved. The border is basically artificial, with no natural boundaries, characterized by thick vegetation at places and human habitation till the zero ground at the other. The peculiar geographical features obtaining on this border render it extremely "porous" for illegal migration & smuggling.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MIGRATION FROM BANGLADESH

14. The influx of Bengalis inhabiting the region now called as "Bangladesh", largely Muslims, into North Eastern part of India is a phenomenon which goes back to 19th Century. The partition of Bengal (1905) administratively clubbed Assam with East Bengal, thus facilitating the process further. There is a well documented report of 1931 which spoke of how an entire population from East Bengal had transplanted itself into Assam "in the last 25 years". The then Census Commissioner had said "I can compare it only to the mass movement of a huge body of ants"[9].

15. Following addition of Bengali Muslim district of Sylhet and the Bengali Hindu district of Cachar to Assam Province, a minority Muslim league government led by Sir Mohammed Sadullah came to power in Assam in 1937. The Sadullah government followed a policy of encouraging Bengali Muslims from East Bengal to settle in Assam[10].

16. The settling of Bengali Muslims into Assam as part of a preconceived design prompted the then Governor General, Lord Wavell, to say that "The chief political problem is the desire of the Muslim ministers to increase this immigration into uncultivated government lands under the slogan 'Grow more food' but what they are really after is grow more Muslims"[11]. Sadullah was in fact laying the foundation for a demand by Jinnah for Assam's inclusion in a future Pakistan by emphasizing the size of Muslim population in Assam. However, these plans were thwarted by efforts of politicians like Gopinath Bordoloi.

17. The difference in growth rates between Assam and India during the pre-independence period shows that Assam's population grew at the rate of 103.51% while the rest of the country's growth rate was 33.67%. The difference can be accounted for only by migration[12].

Post-Independence Period:

18. Officially, all migrants to India from 1951 onwards are illegal but migration has continued. During 1951-71 phase it were the Bengali Hindus who dominated the migrating flocks. Besides, a large number of Muslims who had fled Assam in the wake of communal riots in Feb-March 1950 came back to Assam, but very few Hindus went back to East Pakistan. Following genocide by Pak Army in East Pakistan in 1971, hordes of refugees (nearly 10 million) came to India, mainly West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. It was expected that these refugees would go back to Bangladesh after the liberation, which most of them did. However, about 1 million refugees, mostly Hindus, stayed back in Assam and parts of West Bengal.

Post 1971 Period

19. While the Hindu migrant dominated the scene between 1951-71, after the independence of Bangladesh (1971) it was mostly Muslim migrants who came to North-East and West Bengal in search of land and employment. The influx had assumed such serious proportions that S.L.

Shakder, Chief Election Commission, observed in 1978 that "...disturbing reports are coming regarding large scale inclusion of foreign nationals in the electoral rolls. In one case the population in the 1971 Census recorded an increase as high as 34.98% over 1961 figures...". In 1991 Census it would be 100% over the 1961 Census... A stage would be reached when the state may have to reckon with foreign nationals who may constitute a sizeable percentage, if not the majority of the population in the State"[13].

20. While migration of Bangladeshis into West Bengal was relatively well tolerated on account of cultural and linguistic similarities, in Assam it became an explosive issue leading to 7 year long agitation against "foreign migrants" spearheaded by AASU. The elections of 1983 saw extreme acts of violence over the demand for detection and deportation of "foreigners". In one place viz., Nellie, about 1750 Muslim settlers were massacred by Tiwa tribals. The main issue was possession of land.

Assam Accord 1985

21. Following this agitation, an accord popularly called "The Assam Accord" was signed in 1985 which laid down that migrants who came to the State before 1st January 1966 were to be treated as citizens. Migrants coming after 25th March 1971 were to be treated as foreigner whose name would be deleted from electoral rolls and who would also be deported according to laid down procedure. Those migrants who came to the State between these two dates would be deleted from the electoral rolls for a period of 10 years, though registered under the Registration of Foreigners' Act. However, the Assam Accord has failed to check the illegal migrants into Assam, who mostly continue to be Muslims.

OVERALL ESTIMATES REGARDING THE NUMBER OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS FROM BANGLADESH

22. System of identification of citizens being more or less non-existent in India, it is a very difficult task to estimate the overall numbers of illegal migrants from Bangladesh. During the Bangladesh liberation war it is estimated that up to 10 million people fled from East Pakistan to India so as to escape the genocidal actions being carried out by the West Pakistan armed forces. As per 2001 census there are 3,084,826 people in India who came from Bangladesh No reliable numbers on illegal immigrants are currently available. Extrapolating the census data for the state of Assam alone gives a figure of 2 million. Figures as high as 20 million are also reported in the government and media.[ Samir Guha Roy of the Indian Statistical Institute called these estimates "motivatedly exaggerated". After examining the population growth and demographic statistics, Roy instead states that a significant numbers of internal migration is sometimes falsely thought to be immigrants. An analysis of the numbers by Roy revealed that on average around 91000 Bangladeshis nationals might have crossed over to India every year during the years 1981-1991 but how many of them where identified and pushed back is not known. It is possible that a large portion of these immigrants returned on their own to their place of origin. However, some of the estimates made by responsible quarters are listed below:

- Indrajit Gupta, the then Home Minister, stated in Parliament on May 6, 1997 that there were 10 million illegal migrants residing in India[14].

- Quoting Home Minister/ Intelligence Bureau sources the 10th August 1998 issue of "India Today" has given the breakup of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants as; West Bengal — 5.4 million, Assam — 4 million, Tripura — .8 million, Bihar - .5 million, Maharashtra - .5 million, Rajasthan - .5 million and Delhi - .3 million, making a total of 10.83 million[15]

- T.V. Rajeshwar, former Governor of West Bengal and former Director of IB, estimated the total at 15 million, including 7 million in West Bengal, 5 million in Assam and 2 million in Bihar[16].

- Baljit Rai in his book 'Demographic Aggression against India' (1993) puts the total at 10810000. The statewide distribution being West Bengal 40 lakhs, Assam 40 lakhs, Bihar 20 lakhs, Delhi 3 lakhs, MP 3 lakhs, Mumbai 1.5 lakhs, UP .5 Iakh, Rajasthan 10000.

- Home Minister's Working Group on Border Management estimated the total number of Bangladeshis to be about one crore ten years back.17

- The latest estimate has been provided by the Task Force on Border Management (established in the Wake of Kargil Conflict) headed by Madhav Godbole, former Union Home Secretary. This group went into painstaking details to examine this issue. In its report submitted to the government in August 2000, the Task Force places the overall figures at 1.5 crores with about 3 lakh Bangladeshis entering India illegally every year[18]

- L.K. Advani, the then Union Home Minister, addressing a Conference of Chief Secretaries and DGPs in Jan. 2003 put the figure of B.D. immigrants at 15 million.

"Missing" population in Bangladesh

23. Another way of establishing some kind of estimate about the number of illegal immigrants into India is to go about it in a 'reverse' way — that is studying the pattern of growth of population in Bangladesh. This study would throw light on a very curious phenomenon i.e. a "missing" population, estimates of which vary from 5 million to over 10 million.

- 1991 Census report of Bangladesh places the annual growth rate of population during 1981-91 at 2.1% whereas UN Population Fund estimated it at 2.7%. The 1991 Census report was clearly not compatible with the fertility rate of 4.5%. Therefore, the report talks of a unique phenomenon viz., a "missing" population which was estimated at 8 million[19].

- The Election Commission of Bangladesh deleted 2 million 'missing' voters during 1991-95. Assuming that 1 million of these absentees left Bangladesh without family, and another million left with four family members on an average, the annual number of infiltrators to India can be estimated at about 1 million annually[20]

- The Hindu population in Bangladesh has grown by a bare 2 million in 40 years, from 9.2 million in 1951 to 11.1 million in 1991. The Hindu rate of growth is 2.4% and, consequently, there are atleast 5 million missing Hindus in Bangladesh who could only have come to India. The population of Hindus has declined in Bangladesh to about 10% now as compared to over 20% four decades back[21]

- Population growth rate for Hindus has been abysmally low at 5.76%. In some of the districts of Bangladesh like Faridpur, Barisal, Jessore, Khulna, Kushtia and Pabna the growth has shown negative trend.The overall growth of Muslims during the same period was 24.39%. The growth rate of Muslims in border districts of Assam has been 33.20%. The difference in the growth rate can only be accounted for by the fact of massive migration into India[22].

Pattern of migration

24. Having formed some idea of the overall magnitude of the problem, it is extremely important to analyse its impact state wise, particularly in the adjoining States of Assam, West Bengal, Tripura and other North-Eastern States.

Assam:

25. The impact of illegal migrants has been most marked in Assam. Annexure 2 shows how Muslim population has increased in the border districts of Assam between 1971 to 1991. In addition, Hindus have also entered illegally in large numbers. But what is the estimate regarding illegal immigration pertaining to Assam alone?

26. On the basis of Indian & Bangladesh documents one estimate holds that not less than one third of Assam's 22.38 million population is that of immigrants and their descendants and that 10-14 million Bangladeshi migrants were settled in India (Hazarika, 1992). Another estimate by a former Governor of Arunachal Pradesh and West Bengal holds that about 5 million illegal migrants from Bangladesh are settled in Assam (Rajeshwar, 1996). Central Home Ministry/ Intelligence Bureau sources place Assam's alien population from Bangladesh at about 4 million. Another study estimates that "based on the 1951 growth rate, the state of Assam should have a population of about 15 million. It has more than 7 million extra, according to the latest (1991) census. The extra numbers can only be accounted for by either immigrants and/ or their descendants" (Hazarika, 1994). This would seem very plausible considering the estimates of 4 to 5 million made by Intelligence sources, being of reference only to the Bangladeshi immigrants and not to the descendants of such migrants.

27. A scholar from the Institute of Development Studies, Dhaka, points out that about 4.65 to 5 million migrated from Bangladesh between 1961-1974 (cited in Hazarika, 1994) and that there was no reason to believe that the phenomena of migration ceased after 1974. Though this estimate is very conservative compared to Indian estimates, this is a rare acceptance of emigration from Bangladesh. Generally, the stance of Bangladesh had been to simply deny that any immigration to India is taking place (Ghosh, 1985; Subrahnaryan, 1988), in stark contrast to what Indian Home Ministry sources estimate. Myron Weiner pointed out that had Assam's population increased at the same rate as the rest of India from 1901 to 1971, at a rate of 130%, the net population would be 7.6 million rather than 15 million in 1971 and, consequently, the share of migrants and their descendants amounted to 7.4 million (Weiner, 1988).

28. Going by such analysis, had Assam's population increased at the same rate as India from 1901 to 1991 at 407.64 %its population would be 24.9 million rather than 31.1 million in 1991, the share of migrants and their descendants amounting to 6.2 million.

29. Though such analysis is indicative of the migrant population in Assam, it is not useful in estimating the illegal immigration from Bangladesh. For this, the rate of growth of Muslim population in Assam proves more useful, though this would ignore many non-Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh. It is apparent that growth rates of Muslim population is Assam has been far higher than the all-India aggregates (Annexure 4). Such high growth rates can be attributed only to illegal immigration from Bangladesh (Misra, 1999).

30. Abnormal rise in the in number of voters within one year in assembly constituencies further strengthen the view of Bangladeshi illegal immigration in India. During 2004-2005 there has been a increase of 14.52 % in the number of voters whereas it was only 2.62 % during 2003-2004.

31. Using the figure mentioned above and estimated by other sources, the quantum of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in Assam must be in the range 5 to 6 million. It would mean that

between 18 to 22 percent of Assam's population comprises of illegal aliens. Few regions in the world have such a high proportion of its populace as illegal aliens.

WEST BENGAL

32. West Bengal has a border with Bangladesh of more than 2200 kilometers. In response to a writ petition filed by the All India Forum for Civil Liberties against the Government of India and others, the state first declared that not less than 1.02 million Bangladeshis (including 667,500 Hindus and 349,738 Muslims) had overstayed their official visas between 1972 and 1998[23].

33. Secondly, it said that a detection drive had expelled just over half a million Bangladeshis, of which over 4,00,000 were Muslim and 1,61,077 Hindus.

34. Even if we take a 3:1 ratio for those not apprehended against those who had been, this would still makes for over one million Bangladeshi Muslims in West Bengal and about half a million Hindus who would be illegally resident in the State. These figures show that both streams of migration are taking place at the same time: legal and illegal, with large numbers of those in the former category also preferring to jump ship, once they have docked safely, and found their bearings. It would not be inaccurate to note that the number of illegal Muslim detected was about three times that of the Hindus. Even by a conservative estimate, in West Bengal, one could have not less than 1.5 million illegals of both communities plus the 1.2 million who overstayed and vanished. This brings the figure close to 3 million just for that one state alone.

35. Thereafter, there is a continuous rise in the population of West Bengal. The growth rate of the population of India has been 21.51 per cent (1951-61), 24.80 per cent (1961-71), 24.66 per cent (1971-81) , 23.50 per cent (1981-91), 21.54 % (1991-2001) and ; while that of West Bengal has been comparatively higher at 32.80 per cent (1951-61), 26.87 per cent (1961-71), 23.17 per cent (1971-81) and 24.55 per cent (1981-91), 17.77 per cent (1991-2001) . However, during 2001-2011 the per cent increase for India ( 17.64) is more than per cent increase (13.93) in west Bengal[24].

36. In south Bengal border districts, growth rate has been even greater. For 24 Parganas district it was 40.29 per cent (1951-61), 33.44 per cent (1961-71), 25.42 percent (1971-81) 30.87 per cent (1981-91), and 30.96 percent (2001-2011) ; for Nadia it was 49.81 per cent in the identical periods; for Murshidabad it was 33.46 per cent, 28.57 per cent, 25.49 per cent 28.04 and 21.07 per cent for the five periods respectively; for Malda the figures were 30.33 per cent, 31.98 per cent, 26.00 per cent 29.63 per cent, and 21.5 per cent ; and for South Dinajpur the figures stood at 35.51 per cent, 40.50 per cent, 29.31 per cent, 30.25 per cent and 11.16 Per cent respectively.

37. Migrant have not only settled in the border district of West Bengal but have also spread to interior areas. West Bengal's percentage growth rate (PGR) in 1981-91 was 24.55% 1991-2001 (17.17), 2001-2011 (13.93) whereas PGR for Muslims stood at 36.89%. In the non-border district of Midnapur the PGR for Hindus was 19.74% while for Muslims it was 53.80%. In Bankura, the respective figures were 14.33% and 38.71% during 1981-91. Such disparities can only be explained by illegal infiltration.

38. In Tripura, the local tribal population has already been turned into a minority community over a period of time by the sheer numbers of cross border migrants from Bangladesh. In 1947, 56% of Tripura's population consisted of tribal (or indigenous) population. Today, this stands at a quarter of the total. Migrant Bengalis, mostly Hindus, accounted for 71 % by 1971, and by then political and administrative power had already passed from the indigenous tribal population to the migrant Bengalis. Transfer of land proved to be the critical factor in deteriorating social relations and in June 1980 riots hundreds lost their lives[25]

NORTH-EASTERN STATES OF MANIPUR, MEGHALAYA, MIZORAM, NAGALAND AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH

39. Arunachal Pradesh had a population of 8,64,558 in 1991 which had gone upto 13,82,611 by 2011.

40. Manipuri population was 1 million 837 thousand in 1991 and it has gone upto 2 million 721 thousand in 2011.

41. Meghalaya's population has gone up from 17,74,778 to 29,64,007 in 2011.

42. Mizoram's population registered an increase of 29.18% during this period.

43. Nagaland's increase is most shocking. From 12,09,546 it has gone up to 19,80,602[26].

44. The population increase is far beyond the national average and has to be partly explained by influx of illegal Bangladeshis. This conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that during the decade of 1981-1991, the Muslim population grew by as much as 135.01, 105.80, 74.84, 48.34 and 34.44 percentage points in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Manipur respectively.

45. Bangladesh is overpopulated, with a density of 755 persons per square kilometer as against 250 per sq. km. in India. According to 2001 census, the density of population in Bangladesh is 975 per sq. km. Fertility remains high at 35 per 1000. The number of people per hectare of arable land is 12 in Bangladesh and it would require a 250% increase in food grain production for whole population to be fed — a nearly impossible task. This eighth largest country in the world in terms of population occupies only 3/1000 part of the world land mass[27].

Economic

46. The per capita income of Bangladesh is less than 170 US $ per annum as against $ 350 in India. Literacy in Bangladesh was 35.3% in 1991. The same census reports that only 4.3% of the population had access to tap water and 8.2% of the rural homes to electricity. Human Development Report of 1999 places Bangladesh at 150th position and India at 132[28].

Natural calamities

47. More than a million people are displaced annually in Bangladesh on account of natural disasters like floods, cyclones, river bank erosion and drought. Situated on the deltaic region of Ganga, Brahmapura & Meghna,

atleast 20% of Bangladesh is inundated in a 'normal' flood. During severe flood, nearly 36% of the country and 60% of arable land is affected[29].

48. The 1996 Agricultural Census shows that functional landless households constitute 28.06% of all households.

Environmental

49. Climate change led problems compound Bangladesh's problems. These include salinization of soil, loss of fertility, pollution and deforestation. If these losses continue, the forests in Bangladesh would be entirely gone by 2011[30]

50. Population pressure has caused degradation of land. Shifting cultivation without adequate fallow period, absence of soil conservation measures, unbalanced fertilizer use have damaged land productivity in large areas[31].

51. In case there is a rise in sea level by 1 meter in the long run due to global warming 17% of land area in Bangladesh would get submerged affecting 71 million people!

Socio-Political

52. Bangladesh started in 1971 as a secular country but changes brought about in the Constitution by Gen. H.M. Ershad ensured that Bangladesh became an Islamic country in substance. BNP Government under Khaleda Zia carried the process further. Widespread violence perpetrated against Hindus in Bangladesh in the wake of demolition of Babri Mosque (1992) accelerated the process of exodus to India. Following installation of BNP government in 2001, Hindus are once again being targeted by BNP cadres in a systematic manner in the rural areas. Destruction of Hindu temples, forcible capture of land and property, while the administration looks the other way, is a common happening in Bangladesh.

Attitude of Bangladeshi Government

53. Even though there is no evidence of the government of Bangladesh actually encouraging Bangladeshi influx into India, there is no doubt that the government looks upon this phenomenon with a benign eye and makes no effort to prevent it. Successive heads of the government including Sheikh Hasina and Gen. Ershad have flatly denied the very existence of the problem. On the other hand, certain intellectuals of Bangladesh have been propagating the concept of "Lebensraum", a German word meaning "Living Space", for the exploding population of Bangladesh. According to Sadeq Khan, a former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, writing in "Holiday", (Oct. 18, 1991) "the natural trend of population overflow from Bangladesh is towards the sparsely populated lands of the South East and of the North-East in the Seven Sisters side of the India Sub-Continent.

Contributory Factors

54. Ethnic, linguistic and religious commonality between people on either side further facilitates the process of illegal migration and makes detection very difficult. Besides, certain political parties have been encouraging the phenomenon with a view to building vote banks.

Resultant availability of cheap labour at low remuneration also makes illegal migrants a desirable commodity from economic point of view.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Socio-Economic

55. The economy of the North-East is basically rooted in products like tea, petroleum and forest produce. Agriculture is the predominant means of livelihood for bulk of the population. Surplus, however, is nominal. Massive illegal migration from Bangladesh translates into a reduced share of an already limited cake. Land is also limited. Although migrants initially settle in the riverine tracts, over a period of time they come to acquire land from locals. This occasionally causes alienation of tribals from their ancestral land leading to ethnic conflicts. Although there is some law on paper to prevent alienation of tribal land, it remains largely ineffective in Assam. However, in other North Eastern States like Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh the existence of Inner Line Permit regime and enforcement of laws to prevent alienation of tribal land have kept the problem with the manageable limits. In West Bengal, on the other hand, Muslim migrants have already bought up lands on large scale in the bordering districts of North and South 24 Parganas, Nadia, Murshidabad, Malda and West Dinajpur, where Muslims now register a very fast growth. The same facts apply to bordering districts of Assam.

56. More significant is the perceived threat of being outnumbered and out maneuvered by the immigrants. Then, there is the fear of indigenous culture being submerged by that being brought by migrants. The perception is that in the near future a 'Tripurisation' of Assam is imminent (Saikia 1996) and other states of the north-east may also eventually end up meeting Tripura's fate.

Political

57. The political fall out of such a relentless influx is even more far reaching. Referring to the massive increase of Bangladeshi migrants into border districts of Assam and West Bengal, Gen. (Retd.) Shankar Roy Chowdhury, MP, told the Rajya Sabha (April 2000) that "on account of illegal migration, Bangladeshi's demographic border intruded upon India's political border over a 10-20 km. deep area".

58. There is a perception that unendin• II • ion from across the border will result in political power being taken away from the locals. It has already been pointed out that immigrant Bengalis now outnumber the locals in Tripura and, hence, Bengalis now wield the political power. This apprehension has been preying upon the minds of Assamese as well and was the cause of AASU led agitation (1978-85) for detection and deportation of "foreigners". According to an intelligence report, ethnic Assamese were in a minority in as many as 85 of a total of 126 assembly constituencies in the state of Assam. On the other hand, a report of a group of minister suggests that Bangladeshi migrants wereja position_to influence the result of elections in a large number of Constituencies in

North East States, including 32 in Assam (The Assam Tribune 24 May 2000)[32]

59. According to a study, out of the 292 Assembly Constituencies in West Bengal, Bangladeshi immigrants can 'determine' the outcome of ,polls in as many as 52 Constituencies. Besides, in another 100 Assembly Constituencies they can 'influence' the poll outcome[33].

60. Since the political clout enjoyed by the Bangladeshi migrant community is so significant in Assam, West Bengal, Tripura and Bihar, even the mainstream political parties do not have the courage to even acknowledge the problem, much less tackle it effectively. Most of the political parties play what is often termed as "Vote Bank" politics with an eye towards Bangladeshi Muslim vote. Examples are numerous; The AGP govt. of Prafulla Mohanta maintained before the Supreme Court that IMDT Act was ineffective in tackling the problem of illegal migrants — an absolutely correct stand — but this stand of the government was retracted when Congress Govt. of Tarun Gogoi came to power in 2001 which declared that IMDT Act was suitable for tackling the problem [34].

61. If so much clout is wielded by an alien population inhabiting the border states of India, it indeed has grave security implications.

Law and Order Implications

62. Influx of Bangladeshi migrants resulting in alienation of tribal lands, unemployment, 'vote bank' politics, fears of being reduced to a political minority in one's own state gradually plays upon the minds of the native population which in turn can lead to severe social strain and consequent law and order problems. Fear of inundation by an alien population led to a 7 year long agitation by AASU (1978-85) to press for identification and deportation of Bangladeshi aliens. The agitation burst into extreme violence in 1983 when tribals massacred over 1700 Bangladeshi Muslims at Nellie village where the former had been alienated in large numbers from their lands. Besides, this agitation against 'foreigners' was the prime motivating factors for the establishment of ULFA which has been carrying a violent secessionist campaign for last 20 years. Assam has witnessed a string of incidents of communal tension in last 20 years which had relatively been unknown before. A spate of communal riots in 1992 following the demolition of Babri Mosque is a grim reminder of the fact that the society has become thoroughly communalized in Assam.

63. Settling of Bangladeshi Muslims in the forest lands of Bodo dominated districts of Kakrajhar, Bangaigaon, Borpeta, Mangaldoi in Assam has resulted in bloody reprisals by Bodo tribals on a number of occasions in the last 15 years claiming the life of a number of Muslim settlers. Fear of losing their identity, culture and land was what led to a section of Bodos raising the demand for an independent Bodoland. The movement, originally led by All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU), was later dominated by extremist organizations like Bodo Security Force (BSF) and finally the National Democratic Front for Bodoland (NDFB). The latter organization has been responsible for a number of killings of civilians, abductions, ambush of security forces, explosions, etc., over the last 2 decades. The ongoing trouble with the Bodo militants is all the more serious because Bodos inhabit the districts of Assam which connect the North-East and the state of Assam with the rest of the country.

64. Similarly, in Tripura, the frustration experienced by the indigenous tribals at being reduced to a minority by the Bengali migrants led to the establishment of secessionist outfits like ATTF (All Tripura Tribal Force) and NLFT (National Liberation Front of Tripura). These outfits

have been undertaking a sustained campaign of violence against the security forces on the one hand and outsiders on the other.

65. Of late, even some districts of West Bengal viz., Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri and Siliguri areas, have been witness to anger and bitterness among the locals against outsiders, mainly Bengali settlers. An ominous result has been the establishment of Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) which has been responsible for a large incident of violence including explosions. This organization, which seeks to represent the interests of Koch Rajbangshis, also needs to be watched closely as it directly infests the 'chicken neck' area of Siliguri corridor.

66. In addition, a large number of Bangladeshi migrants have been found to be involved in criminal activities such as smuggling, cattle theft, dacoities, etc.

Environmental degradation

67. A growing population places increasing pressure on the land from which the requirements such as food, fuel wood and timber are met. As requirements of food increase, even marginal lands need to be put under the plough. Forest resources from which various minor products, including fuel wood, are derived are needed in incremental quantities. Assam's population boosted by illegal Bangladeshi immigrants — to the tune of 2.7 million between 1961-81 (Weiner, 1993) and above 1.5 million between 1981-91 — has put incremental pressure on land and forest resources.

68. Since the inception of Bangladeshi immigration, the impact on environment had been intricately linked with the magnitude of migration. Between 1930 and 1950 some 1,508,000 hectares were settled by immigrants, mostly in the Brahmaputra Valley (Weiner, 1988), and it led to the opening up of new areas, previously under dense jungles[35]

69. A study estimated that the annual fire wood requirement for a village population of 20 members was 3060 kg (Mishra and Ramakrishnan, 1982). Going by that estimate, the average annual consumption for a population of 19.58 million would work out to be about 153 x 1.958 crore kgs; a disastrous impact on the natural resources on this account alone (Ramakrishnan, 1985). North east India's illegal immigrant burden of 12 million and Assam's illegal component of above 5 million have substantial environmental impacts.

70. Beyond fuel wood consumption, although illegal migrants tend to inhabit the 'char' areas (riverine tracts that get inundated during the monsoon), some proportion of them spills over encroaching on nearby forest areas on account of growing population pressure. While it is true that illegal Bangladeshi migrants have damaged the geo-ecological conditions of the chars, beels (a beel is an inland freshwater body) and bathans (grazing lands) of buffaloes (Das, 2001). It is difficult to estimate the true extent of the damage in absence of reliable data.

Threat of import of radical Islam from Bangladesh

71. The question of illegal migration has to be seen in the context of increased apprehensions over radicalization of the Bangladeshi society. A recent report in Far Eastern Economic Review warned[36]:

"A revolution is taking place is Bangladesh that threatens trouble for the region and beyond if left unchallenged. Islamic fundamentalism, religious intolerance, militant Muslim groups with links to international terrorist groups, powerful military with ties to the militants, the mushrooming of Islamic schools churning out radical students, middle-class apathy, poverty and lawlessness — all are combining to transform the nation."

72. This radicalization also has its negative influences upon the illegal migrants with far reaching consequences for India. The cadres of Jamaat-e-Islami of Bangladesh have been active in Manipur and the increase in the numbers of Islamic groups and organizations in Assam is directly linked to the illegal migrants from Bangladesh. The mushroom growth of madrasas in West Bengal and some of the north-eastern states is partially attributable to major population changes brought about by illegal immigration from Bangladesh. In the year 2009, Assam had 2002 madrasas with 1,20,000 students while the small state of Tripura had 229 madrasas with 28,000 students. It is in this context that one should examine the recent warning by West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadev Bhattacharya that "some madrasas are indulging in unlawful activities". Even though inter-party compulsions and need for 'political correctness' forced him to backtrack, the issue is out in the open.

73. Reports of Pakistani support to radical groups in Bangladesh add a new dimension to the problem of insurgency. According to one Bangladeshi commentator, the Islamic fundamentalists in Bangladesh are "allegedly getting patronage from Pakistan's ISI and have even attacked the secular platforms including cultural functions and Bangla New Year's celebrations". There are suggestions that the Pakistani outfit Harkat-ul-Jihad al-lslami (HUJAI) has a branch in Bangladesh and these fundamentalists are believed to be active in support of various Islamic causes including Kashmir and in the attack on the American Cultural Center in Kolkata on January 22, 2002.

GROWTH OF MUSLIM OUTFITS IN ASSAM AND THE ROLE OF ISI

74. In the wake of incidents like Nellie massacre (1983), demolition of Babri Mosque (1992), an organization called the 'United Social Reform Army of Assam' (USRAA) was formed in 1992 to protect the interests of Muslims. Another organization called "Saddam Bahini" came into existence in 1994 at the instance of ISI elements in Bangladesh. This organization propagated anti-India feelings in its areas of influence viz., Barak Valley, Silchar, Karimganj, Dhubri and Cooch Behar which were also used as corridor by Muslim youth. There have also been reports of Muslim youths from Hojai, Nagaon, Goalpara, and Karimganj (all Assam) being lured away in the name of religion to join militant Islamic organization. The involvement of ISI of Pakistan in organizing Islamic militancy in Assam has been well established following arrest of many of its operatives and linkmen in Assam.

75. The increasing involvement of ISI in organizing disruptive activities in the North-East has been further facilitated by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Khaleda Zia coming to power in Bangladesh in 2001. Pro-Pak leanings of BNP, its close links with fundamentalist Islamic parties and presence of a massive number of Bangladeshi migrants in the North-East proved a boon for the Pak ISI[37]. The result has been that a number of active Islamic fundamentalist groups cropped up in the North-Eastern part of India, Bangladesh and Nepal who have been trained on the pattern of Lashkar-i-Toiba and the Taliban Militia. These groups include Muslim United Tigers of Assam (MULTA), Muslim United Liberation Front of

Assam, People's Liberation Front (PLF), Islamic Liberation Tigers' Force (ILTF), Muslim Liberation Militia of Assam (MLMA), Minority Volunteer Force, Mujahid Vahini and Jubo Command. Recent revelations made by arrested ISI operatives showed that plans have been hatched in Pakistan and Bangladesh that a separate state comprising Nagaon, Hojai, Hailakandi and Karimganj should be formed. There was also report regarding thousands of Bangladeshi youths being trained by ISI in Bangladesh with the help of Mujahid Vahini. There are also reports that ISI had been organizing camps in Galmari area of district Khulna and Baghchara and Salim Bila area of district Jessore for Bangladeshi youths with the help of DGFI (Military Intelligence of Bangladesh) and Jamait-e-Islami.

76. In the late 1990s, new, development took place in Bangladesh related to the growth of terrorism worldwide — the Harkatul-e-Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI), a faction of the Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, collaborated with the Rohingya Solidarity Front and set up a base near the Teknaaf river, the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar. A large number of Rohingya cadres were sent to Afghanistan for training. The videotapes recovered by CNN from Al-Qaeda camps post 9/11 developments include one marked "Burma" and showed cadres being trained. The camp had been located near Ukhia, a small town in the Cox's Bazaar region. Members of the Islamic Chatra Shibir, the youth front of the Bangladesh Jamaat Islami, were also trained there. HUJI had an estimated strength of 15,000 cadres in Bangladesh and was led by Sheikh Farid of Chittagong. This group is known locally as the Bangladesh Taliban, clearly asserting the link between it and Al-Qaeda[38].

INSURGENT MOVEMENTS OF NORTH-EAST; THEIR LINKS WITH PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH

77. Even though North-East insurgent groups like those of the Nagas and Mizos had always been known to be getting help from Pakistan/ East Pakistan, certain other development including rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh and Pakistan; close cooperation between Bangladesh and Pakistan; return of pro-Pak BNP govt. to power in Bangladesh and massive influx of illegal Bangladeshi migrants into North-East lend an entirely different colour to the whose problem.

78. All major groups of North-East including United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Issac & Muivah) (NSCN) (IM), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), Peoples' Libertion Army (PLA), Revolutionary Peoples' Front (RPF) of Manipur and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) etc., have been finding safe havens in Bangladesh. NSCN (IM) had, in the post, received delivery of huge quantities of arms on the beaches of Bandarban district of Bangladesh through international arms suppliers. Leaders of ULFA and NDFB like Arabinda Rajkhaba, Paresh Barua, Ranjan Doimary frequently visit and live in Bangladesh. Arrested ULFA leaders like Pradip Gogoi have confirmed how ISI operatives used to arrange air travel of ULFA cadres from Dhaka to Karachi for purposes of indoctrination and training. Anup Chetia of ULFA, who had been arrested in Dhaka in 1997 during Sheikh Hasina's regime had later applied for political asylum in view of favourable political climate following installation of Khaleda Zia led BNP government in 2001. ATTF and NLFT of Tripura are already known to be having camps in Sazek range of Chittagong hill tract area of Bangladesh. It is on record that one Sanjeev Deb Barman, a senior ATTF leader arrested in Bangladesh in 1998, was released on bail by BNP govt. in 2002. Similarly, PLA/ RPF of

Manipur is known to be having camps in Chittagong Hill Tracts and Maulvi Bazaar areas of Bangladesh. KLO has also developed strong links in Bangladesh on the one hand and with the ISI on the other.

79. During the meeting of DGs of BSF and Bangladesh Rifles in Nov.2002, the BSF handed over a list of 99 training camps being run for various North-east insurgent groups inside Bangladesh. The BSF also handed over a list of 77 ranking leaders of North-east insurgent groups known to be in Bangladesh at that time[39]

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

80. Strategic implications of this massive influx into the North Eastern region had been well summed by Lt. Gen. S.K. Sinha, the then Governor, Assam, in his report to the President in 1998. According to him, "demographic invasion of Assam may result in loss of geo-strategically vital districts of lower Assam. It will be only a matter of time when a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made... International Islamic fundamentalism may provide the driving force". Those who think this possibility far-fetched may recall the words of a 'pro-India' leader like Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in his book “Eastern Pakistan; Its population and Economics”. According to Shekh Mujibjur Rehman, “Because East Pakistan must have sufficient land for its expansion... it must include Assam to be financially and economically strong".

81. Gen. Sinha goes on to say that if this problem was not contained “the long cherished design of greater East Pakistanl Bangladesh making inroads into the strategic land link of Assam with the rest of the country, can lead to severing the entire land mass of the Nonh East, with all its rich I resources, from the rest of the country. The “chicken-neck" area is strategically very important from military and strategic point of view.

82. The rampant growth of alien Muslim population and the consequent growth of hundreds of madrasas along the border districts of Assam and West Bengal amount to demographic borders of Bangladesh intruding upon the political borders of India by 15 to 20 kilometers. This belt travels along the borders of West Bengal, covers most of the “chicken neck” area, connects itself with Nepal and travels along Assam, all the way upto Cachhar area. In case of an armed conflict with either Bangladesh or China, having such a population with suspect loyalties along the borders would be a major cause for concern.

83. In any case, even if the worst case scenario were not to occur, the mushroom growth of Muslim fundamentalist organizations in the North- East, support extended to them by ISI of Pakistan and linkages of North- East insurgent groups with Bangladesh and ISI could ensure that trouble orchestrated at an appropriate moment would tie up substantial levels of Indian troops in the North-East while they might be needed on western or northern borders.

GOVERNMENT OF lNDIA’S RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM REACTIVE AND KNEE-JERK POLICIES

84. No comprehensive policy was ever formulated and the Indian State's response to migrants after independence has mostly been knee- jerk. While Pakistan closed the door to immigrants in 1947, India continued to take in migrants from East Pakistan. The constitution of India prescribed July 19, 1948 as the cut-off date which was changed to 1950 under the Nehru-Liaqat Pact. The immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950 which drew a distinction

between Hindu refugees (victims of civil disturbance) and illicit Muslim migrants (driven by land hunger) was repealed in 1957. The Act was a virtual invitation to Hindu “refugees”. According to the Indira-Mujib Pact of 1972, Bangladesh would not be held responsible for persons who had migrated before the creation of Bangladesh on 25"‘ March 1971[40].

85. When large influx East Pakistani Bengalis into Assam became a matter of great concern, the government of India evolved the ‘Prevention of Infiltration from Pakistan (PIP) schemes’ in 1964 under which Patrol and Watch Posts and Passport check posts were set up. After 1965, the Border Security Force (BSF) was given the responsibility for guarding the border and they were also entrusted with the task of identification and deportation of illegal migrants. However, the Indian state has failed to stop the influx after 1971 and people still continue to cross over.

POLICING OF BORDERS

86. Pursuant to the Assam Accord a project for construction of roads and fence along the lndo-Bangladesh border in Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura and West Bengal has been taken up since 1987. Although this work was to be completed by December 2007;“ the situation on the ground is that till December 2008 only 2590 kms of border has been fenced out of a total of 4096 kms of lndo-Bangladesh border. The already fenced border includes 1187 kms in West Bengal (out of a total of 2216 kms), 200 kms in Assam (out of a total of 260 kms), 378 kms in Meghalaya (out of a total of 443 kms), 688 kms in Tripura (out of a total of 856 kms), 136 in Mizoram (out of a total of 318 kms).

CAUSES OF INEFFECTIVE POLICING OF BORDERS

87. Several factors are responsible for the ineffective border management. Some of them are:

(a) The erection of the fence along the lndo Bangladesh border is not complete and continuous and hence has not helped in checking infiltration and other negative activities on the border.

(b) The border does not have adequate border roads for patrolling. Terrain, in any case,’ makes it difficult to have continuous roads all along the border.

(c) There are habitations on the border which come in the way of effective policing. in addition, the existence of Enclaves, Indian Enclaves inside Bangladesh and Bangladeshi inside Indian territory, make it an extremely porous and complex border.

(d) The riverine stretches of the border is not adequately patrolled due to lack of mobility.

(e) Diversion’ of sanctioned BSF to other areas for internal security duties.

(f) The BOPs on the lndo-Bangladesh border are located at a great distance, and there are reports of rampant 1 corruption in policing of the border and this has adversely affected the checking of infiltrators.

ILLEGAL MIGRANTS (DETERMINATION BY TRIBUNALS) ACT, 1983 — IMDT ACT

88. The IMDT Act was enacted for Assam during the anti-foreigner movement. It provides for two individuals living within the same police station in which one of them can file complaint against the other as a suspected illegal migrant accompanied with a deposit of a sum of Rs.10/-. The Act provides for screening, for examination by District Tribunals, and for appeal to an Appellate Tribunal. It is an expensive and elaborate procedure which has made the job of identifying foreigners virtually impossible. The main infirmity with this act is that it puts the burden of proof on the state as against the 'Foreigners Act' which puts the burden of proof on the suspected illegal migrant/ foreigner. Besides, in practice, most of the tribunals stipulated under the IMDT act remained non-functional as a result of lack of resources and vacancies in the ranks of judges manning the tribunal. Predictably, the IMDT Act has been totally ineffective and the tribunals set up under it were able to detect only 1494 persons under it in a decade and a half[42]. Interestingly, IMDT Act applies only to Assam State since declared illegal by SC.

89. For detection and deportation of foreign nationals staying unauthorisedly in India power under the Foreigners Act, the Passport (Entry into India) Act, and the Registration of Foreigners Act, have been delegated to all the State Governments. In addition, the Ministry of Home Affairs have issued instructions to State/ UTs advising them to make concerted efforts to identify, detect and deport foreign nationals. Official sources indicates that from 1990 to 1999 the BSF detected 3,22,205 illegal Bangladeshi nationals and pushed back over 2 lakhs and handed over another 40,000 to the custom authorities. The problem faced by BSF is that the Bangladesh Rifles refuse to accept the illegal migrants handed over to them.

90. The Ministry of Home Affairs have issued instructions to the effect that while identifying and detecting Bangladeshi nationals illegally staying in any part of the country, the State Governments concerned would send details of residential address etc. as claimed by the suspected infiltrators to the State Government where the suspect claim to hail from, for verification and report within 30 days. During this period of 30 days the authorities will obtain permission of the Court, wherever necessary, to detain such persons to ensure physical availability. This time consuming verification procedure is necessary to ensure that Indian citizens are not harassed. The courts have emphasized that the principle of natural justice be followed and left the task of identification to the executive. The Supreme Court has held that government's right to expel is absolute. However, there is a need to de-politicize the issue of detection and deportation.

DIPLOMATIC ARRANGEMENTS

91. The following institutional arrangements for cooperation between the Indian Government and Bangladesh Government have been put in place:

(a) Home Secretaries of India and Bangladesh meet once a year.

(b) A Joint Working Group (JWG) comprising representatives of Home and Foreign Ministries of each country and BSF/BDR has been set up. JWG is required to meet twice a year and examine in depth all outstanding issues and to recommend practical measures for resolving them.

(c) DG level meeting between BSF and Bangladesh Rifles is held twice a year.

92. Through these meetings India has communicated her serious concerns to Bangladesh Government regarding the problems caused by the continuing illegal migration. The deportation of these illegal migrants has been taken up with the Bangladesh side.

93. There has been criticism that the Central Government's ad-hoc policies have failed to address the problems caused by economic migrants. It has been felt that in the context of 'pan-Indian politics' and the international politics of the sub-continent, Assam's illegal immigration problem has become embroiled in two sensitive issues: first, the treatment of India's Muslim minority population; and second, India's obligation to allow Hindu refugees from Pakistan to settle in India.43

RECOMMENDATIONS

94. Any strategy that is evolved to deal with this problem has to include two essential elements namely, prevention of any future illegal immigration and secondly, to deal with the adverse fall-out from the large scale infiltration that has already taken place. Needless to say that strategy has not only to be one that takes ground realities into account but one that should also be humane and generally acceptable to majority opinion in the country.

(a) Govt. must evolve a comprehensive policy to deal with the problem of illegal migration. This policy should be hammered out after nationwide consultations and consensus building involving all political parties, state governments, communities and NGOs. (b) It must be accepted that it is now practically not possible to deport about 1.5 crore illegal migrants already settled in India. Even if it was possible, the divided political and social opinion in India would not allow it. However, what must be done is that a massive exercise must be undertaken to identify the illegal migrants. In view of the enormity of the problem it may be attempted in three phases; first phase may take up border area upto 50 kilometers from the border; the second could include the bordering states adjoining Bangladesh and the third could take up rest of the country.

(c) The cut off date of 24th March, 1971 should not be changed under any circumstances. It is no doubt difficult to detect all the estimated 1.50 crores illegal migrants, however, it is necessary to conduct a survey to be followed by a thorough investigation into each individual case to ascertain the citizenship status. Intensive administrative supervision is required to ensure that Indian Muslim do not face harassment. There should be provision of only one appeal before the District Magistrate. Names of all those who are found to be illegal migrants, should be deleted from electoral rolls so that there is no fear in the minds of citizens about being dominated politically by illegal aliens.

(d) Introduction of "work-permit system" based on economic requirement will lead to regulation of the flow of economic migrants. Such migrants would not have political rights and the right to acquire property. The advantage of such a system, backed by law, would be to disenfranchise a large number of illegal immigrants and convert them into "productive workers" who would not be seen as a political threat or as a constituency by political parties.

(e) India has not been able to identify its citizens and has been unable to implement the planned scheme of National Photo Identity Cards. This issue has now assumed such paramount importance on account of prevailing security scenario in the Sub-Continent, that it must be regarded as part of over all national security strategy. The issue of photo ID cards will also go a

long way in tackling the problem of illegal infiltration. However, this should follow and not precede the survey and detection of aliens who have entered after the cut-off date. That is necessary because otherwise there would be danger of ID cards being issued to aliens. The photo-identity cards may be issued to citizens, foreigners who are living legally, as also to illegal aliens. These may be of different colours and may be issued in different phases as mentioned in para (b)

(f) India should prepare a legal regime concerning status of migrants, their detection and deportation. It is essential that uniform laws be made to cover the whole country and the IMDT Act 1983 applicable to Assam be scrapped. There should be no differentiation between the Hindu and Muslim illegal economic migrants.

(g) As regards Nepali citizens coming to India the existing system is that they do not require any visa to come to India. The same facility is available to Indian citizens going into Nepal. However, what happens on the ground is that system of checking identity, particularly at the land check-posts, is practically non-existent. Our land check-posts must be strengthened so that identity and nationality of the person coming from Nepal is thoroughly checked. There must be close cooperation with Nepal in view of Maoist insurgency and ISI activities taking place in that country so that a list of suspected persons is maintained on computer data base at each check post which should also be inter-linked. Besides, a careful and thorough record and details should be kept about Nepali citizens entering India, particularly through the land route. Besides, as the security situation in Nepal has been worsening over the years it is essential to take up border policing so that vulnerable gaps could be plugged. A beginning in this regard has already been made by deployment of S.S.B. on Indo-Nepal border.

(h) The 1950 national Register of citizens should be updated. Computerization will facilitate this progress. A separate register for illegal migrants (Stateless Citizens) should also be maintained.

(i) India must forthwith adopt the system of compulsory registration of births and deaths. Failure to do so on the part of any person should entail such dis-incentive as withholding or ration card, non-inclusion of name in electoral rolls, etc.

(i) Additional BSF battalions should be provided in the East with each battalion having a frontage of 30 kms. It is understood that one reason for thin development of BSF in the East is the fact that a large number of their Battalions are deployed on counter insurgency tasks. Such diversion of forces from border policing to other duties, when the battle against illegal migrants is on, cannot but have adverse effect. The shortage of BSF units must be made on priority through new raising. Additional BSF battalions should be provided in the East with each battalion having a frontage of 30 kms.

(k) The work of border fencing must be completed on Bangladesh frontier on war footing. In addition to fencing, there must be a provision for watch towers and lighting along the fence as has been done in Punjab and Rajasthan.

(I) A comprehensive scheme must be undertaken to develop road network along the border.

(m) The present arrangement of guarding the riverline border with some speed boats and out-board fitted country boats, is not adequate. There is need to have floating BOPs on medium watercraft with four to five speed boats attached to them.

(n) All country boats plying on the river near the border must be registered with their registration number marked on them and the registration papers available with the crew for verification when required.

(o) There is a need for greater co-operation and a need to abandon the 'isolationist mind-set', particularly in the backdrop of the partition of the subcontinent which has put both Indian and Pakistan/ Bangladesh into serious economic disadvantage, apart from the immense human cost that it has involved. The two countries as well as the units in the sub-region must give up their old attitudes and must get away from the habit of mutual suspicion, and treat questions of security or espionage as of lesser consequence compared to the prospect of economic co-operation between the two countries, and particularly in the region. Once the two countries as well as the units in the region decide on improvement of trade, utilization of common resources, arrangement of transit and mutual cooperation in investment, they will realize that political differences are of secondary importance.

Opportunities exist for co-operation with Bangladesh for creating a wider economic space for the people of North East, Eastern India and Bangladesh. Extending sphere of cooperation to development of border trade, transit and joint ventures will extend employment and attract further investment.

(p) Another alternative is the re-activation of riverine traffic between Calcutta and Assam through the Sundarbans and the Bangladesh river system. There was a considerable traffic on this route until 1965, when it was closed. On paper this route was revived after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. But it has remained on paper only because of lack of investment necessary for maintaining navigable channels.

(q) The measures suggested above are the minimum prescription required to tackle the problem on the one hand and yet be acceptable to the wide range of political opinion in India. In addition, these measures also take into account the human factor and practicability on the ground. If we don't wake up now and address the problem in the right earnest we may find out later that we have lost out far more on the eastern front than on the western which is far more prominent in the headlines.

References

1. Dr. Anup Saikia, Reader, Guwahati University, 'Global Processes and local Concerns: Bangladeshi Migrant in Assam' "Dialogue" Vol.3 No.3

2. Ranabir Samaddar, 'The Marginal Nation — Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal'. P26.

3. Myron Winer, Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia, Economic and Political Weekly, 21st August 1993.

4. Tapan K. Bose, 'The Changing Nature of Refugee Crisis in States, Citizens and Outsiders: The uprooted people of South Asia', South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu, 1997 P.48

5. Jayanta Kumar Ray, Formerly Professor of International Relations, Calcutta University, Migration from Bangladesh to India. 27 Nov. 2001.

6. K. Mahadevan and P Krishnan, "Some approaches to the study of Human migration". New Delhi, 1993, P.83.

7. Sanjay Hazarika, "Illegal Migration from Bangladesh: Problem and long term perspective", Dialogue Vol. — 3, No.3, P.25-26

8. Sanjay Hazarika, "Illegal Migration from Bangladesh: Problem and long term perspective", Dialogue Vol. — 3, No.3, P.25-26

9. Sanjay Hazarika; "Illegal Migration from Bangladesh: Problem and long term perspective". Dialogue Vol.3, P.23

10. BG Verghese and others, "Situation in Assam", Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1980.

11. Cited in the report of Assam Governor, S.K. Sinha, to the President (1998).

12. Jogesh Ch. Bhuiyan, "Illegal migration from Bangladesh and the Demographic changes in the N.E. region".

13. BG Verghese and others, "Situation in Assam", Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1980.

14. Cited in the report of Gen. S.K. Sinha, Governor of Assam, to the President 1998.

15. Cited in the report of Gen. S.K. Sinha, Governor of Assam, to the President 1998.

16. T.V. Rajeshwar, 'Migration or Invasion', The Hindustan Times Feb. 7, 1996.

17. Prakash Singh, ex-DG, BSF 'Bangladeshi Immigrant; Are we headed For Another Partition?' Dialogue Vol.3 No.3.

18. Prakash Singh, ex-DG, BSF 'Bangladeshi Immigrant; Are we headed For Another Partition?' Dialogue Vol.3 No.3.

19. Jayanta Kumar Ray 'Migration from Bangladesh to India' Dialogue Vol.3 No.3.

20. Jayanta Kumar Ray 'Migration from Bangladesh to India' Dialogue Vol.3 No.3.

21. Sanjay Hazarika, 'Illegal Migration from Bangladesh: Problem and long term perspective', 2001.

22. Jogesh Ch. Bhuiyan, Retd. Dy. Director, Census Assam, 'Illegal Migration From Bangladesh and the demographic change in the NE Region' - 2001.

23. Sanjay Hazarika, "Rites of Passage", 2000.

24. Ranbir Samaddar, "The Marginal Nation" 1999.

25. Anup Saikia, Reader, Department of Geography, Guwahati University, "Global processes and local concerns: Bangladeshi Migrants in Assam?" 2001.

26. Census Govt of India 2011

27. S.B. Samaddar, "The Marginal Nation" 1999.

28. Sanjay Hazarika, "Rites of passage".

29.Sarfraz Alam, IDSA 2003.

30.Alain Marcoux "Population change- natural resources. Environmental linkages in Central and South Asia" 1996.

31.Alain Marcoux "Population change- natural resources. Environmental linkages in Central and South Asia" 1996.

32.Quoted by Anup Saikia in 'Global Processes and Local Concerns; Bangladeshi M igrants in Assam'. 33.Prakash Singh, Ex-DG, BSF, in 'Management of India's North-Eastern Borders'

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Processes and Local Concerns — Bangladeshis migrants in Assam'.36.Sreeradha Datta, 'Indo-Bangladesh Relations: An overview of Limitations and

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