idiosyncratic deals: testing propositions on timing, content, and the employment relationship

Journal of Vocational Behavior 74 (2009) 338–348

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Journal of Vocational Behavior

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Idiosyncratic deals: Testing propositions on timing, content,and the employment relationship

Denise M. Rousseau a,*, Severin Hornung b, Tai Gyu Kim c

a Tepper School of Business, Heinz School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USAb Institute and Outpatient Clinic for Occupational, Social and Environmental Medicine, Ludwigs-Maximilians-University Munich,Ziemssenstr. 1, 80336 Munich, Germanyc College of Business Administration, Korea University, Anam-dong Seongbuk-Gu, Seoul 136-701, Korea

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history:Received 24 November 2008Available online 28 February 2009

Keywords:Idiosyncratic dealsIndividual negotiationEmployment relationshipsSocial exchangeEconomic exchange

0001-8791/$ - see front matter � 2009 Elsevier Incdoi:10.1016/j.jvb.2009.02.004

* Corresponding author. Fax: +1 412 268 5338.E-mail address: [email protected] (D.M. Rousseau

This study tests propositions regarding idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) in a sample of N = 265hospital employees using structural equation modeling. Timing and content of idiosyn-cratic employment arrangements are postulated to have differential consequences forthe nature of the employment relationship. Results confirm that i-deals made after hirehave greater impact on the employment relationship than those made ex ante. Develop-mental i-deals are positively related to perceiving employment as a social exchange ratherthan an economic exchange, whereas work hour i-deals show the opposite pattern. Impli-cations for research and practice are discussed.

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1. Introduction

Individually negotiated features in employment arrangements are an emerging topic in contemporary organizational re-search (Rousseau, 2001; Rousseau, 2005). Challenging long-standing notions of standardization in personnel management,employees increasingly play an active role in customizing and crafting their own personalized ‘‘employment solutions” tomeet individual needs and preferences (Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Freeman & Rogers, 1999; Thornthwaite, 2004; Wrzesniew-ski & Dutton, 2001). Concomitantly, in competitive labor markets, employers today are willing to grant special conditions toattract, motivate, and retain valued employees (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Lee, MacDermid, & Buck, 2000; Perlow, 1997).The construct of idiosyncratic deals (i-deals), customized employment conditions bargained for by an individual worker, ad-dresses this shift in employment arrangements (Rousseau, 2001; Rousseau, 2005).

Research on i-deals is in its infancy. Data on i-deals are largely anecdotal (e.g., Lawler & Finegold, 2001; Perlow, 1997;Rousseau, 2005). One recent study showed that proactive individuals negotiate i-deals even in unlikely settings, such asthe German public administration (Hornung, Rousseau, & Glaser, 2008). Its results also suggest that i-deals differ in theireffects on work–life balance, commitment, and performance, depending on their content, that is, whether they providethe recipient with work time flexibility or developmental opportunities (Hornung et al., 2008). Nonetheless, theory on therelationships between i-deal timing and content is largely untested (see Rousseau, Ho, & Greenberg, 2006). The present studyseeks to close the gap between i-deal theory and empirical evidence. It tests propositions developed by Rousseau et al.(2006) on the connection between the timing and content of i-deals and their effects on the employment relationship. Indoing so, it is the first study to examine i-deals made during recruitment as well as after hire.

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2. Idiosyncratic deals and the employment relationship

Idiosyncratic deals are personalized agreements of a non-standard nature individual employees seek out and negotiatewith their employer (Rousseau, 2005). I-deals are intended to benefit both employee and employer. In that respect, they dif-fer from dysfunctional personalized employment arrangements such as cronyism or favoritism. A form of differential treat-ment, authorizing i-deals requires special attention to the concerns of coworkers (Lai, Rousseau, & Chang, 2009). Whereascronyism or favoritism eventually will undermine workplace relationships, fair individual treatment through i-deals canreinforce a climate of organizational justice and trust (Greenberg, Roberge, Ho, & Rousseau, 2004). I-deals can take myriadforms, differentiated according to the timing of their formation and their specific terms or content.

The timing and content of i-deals can influence how an employee construes his or her relationship with an employer. Thepsychological employment relationship is characterized by the degree to which it is experienced in terms of social and eco-nomic exchange (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Rousseau, 1995; Shore & Barksdale, 1998). Employee beliefs in asocial exchange construe a supportive relationship based on broad mutual contributions, trust, and voluntary reciprocity(Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002). Economic exchange reflects beliefs in employment as an impersonal market-based transac-tion, which is limited in time and scope to a specified exchange of material resources for job performance. Social and eco-nomic exchange are not mutually exclusive, that is, any given employment arrangement can contain elements of each invarying degrees (Rousseau, 1995; Shore & Barksdale, 1998; Tetrick, 2004). High quality employment relationships are char-acterized by high degrees of social and lower levels of economic exchange, enhancing employee commitment, satisfaction,and contributions to employer (Coyle-Shapiro, Shore, Taylor, & Tetrick, 2004; Li, Rousseau, & Silla, 2009). Employment pre-dominantly based on a more narrow economic exchange rationale is viewed as less valuable by both employer and worker(Lazear, 1981). The potential of i-deals to impact how workers construe their employment exchange depends in part onwhether they emerge during recruitment or on-the-job, the matter to which we next turn.

2.1. The timing of I-deals

I-deals may be negotiated either at the time of hire or later—i.e., during the recruitment process (ex ante) or in an ongoingemployment relationship (ex post). Workers who bargain ex ante may be inclined to bargain once as the job as well. How-ever, others may be more reluctant to bargain, lacking the confidence, skill or leverage to do so effectively (Rahim, 1983). Inthe context of an on-going employment arrangement, otherwise reluctant bargainers can find it easier to address their needsand interests by negotiating with their manager or other agent of the employer (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). The timing of i-deal negotiation is associated with differences in the balance of power between the parties, the information they possessabout each other, and the frame of references each uses to interpret the negotiation. Ex post negotiation allows both employ-ees and employer to draw upon insider knowledge, prior contributions the parties have exchanged and their relationshiphistory in crafting i-deals.

Employers are inclined to grant i-deals to those employees who have proven their trustworthiness and value (Rousseau,2005). In contrast, before hire, employers are likely to agree to i-deals only for recruits with unique skills or in highly com-petitive labor markets. Moreover, in time, worker needs and preferences can change in ways that a firm’s standard practicesmay not easily fulfill (e.g. work/family conflict, career aspirations). An on-going relationship with an employer can make iteasier to negotiate preferred arrangements. Indeed with repeated cycles of employee–employer exchange, opportunities fori-deal negotiation are likely to present themselves. Based on the prediction that workers are more likely to negotiate ex posti-deals than ex ante i-deals (Rousseau et al., 2006), we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1. The extent of ex post negotiation will be greater than the extent of ex ante negotiation.

Although an employee may have negotiated both ex ante and ex post i-deals, these deals affect the employment relation-ship differently. Ex ante negotiation occurs prior to the formation of a relationship between the parties. In this context, work-ers will tend to attribute i-deals predominantly to their labor market value (Rousseau, 2005). Ex post negotiation, however, isembedded in an ongoing employment relationship. The employee who successfully negotiates an ex post i-deal is inclined tointerpret it as an indicator of the employer’s values and recognition of his or her own contributions and needs. Both ex anteand ex post negotiation imply job individualization and employer responsiveness to employee requests. Therefore bothshould create a basis of reciprocity that affects the employment relationship in a positive way. Due to their more relationalnature, however, ex post deals are likely to be perceived as stronger signals regarding the quality of the employment rela-tionship than ex ante deals (Rousseau et al., 2006). Conceptualizing the nature of the employment relationship in terms ofsocial- and economic exchange, we therefore hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2. Ex post negotiation will relate more positively to beliefs regarding social exchange (H2a) and more negativelyto beliefs regarding economic exchange (H2b) than ex ante negotiation.

2.2. The content of I-deals

The content of an i-deal is the resources it involves. Resources differ in the extent they are concrete with broadly sharedmeaning and value or intangible with meanings particular to a given individual (Blau, 1964; Foa & Foa, 1975; Haas & Des-

340 D.M. Rousseau et al. / Journal of Vocational Behavior 74 (2009) 338–348

eran, 1981). The former typically are quantifiable and can be exchanged regardless of the relationship between employeeand employer (e.g., money, material goods). Intangible and particular resources derive their value from the depth of relation-ship between giver and receiver (e.g., affection, support). I-deal timing and content are interdependent. Ex ante deals madeduring recruitment are more likely to be based on concrete resources with general meaning, as in the case of market-relatedfeatures (e.g., payment, work hours, job duration). Ex post-deals are more likely to involve intangible resources with mean-ings depending on the presence of a relationship between the parties (e.g., mentoring, especially challenging developmentalassignments; Rousseau et al., 2006).

The present study focuses on two common resources i-deals comprise: work hours and developmental opportunities(Hornung et al., 2008). I-deals regarding work hours customize the amount and/or schedule of working times (e.g., workingfewer hours to increase time for family or more hours to increase income; Klein, Berman, & Dickson, 2000; Lee et al., 2000;Thornthwaite, 2004). Development i-deals involve opportunities to exploit or expand personal competencies and pursue ca-reer goals (Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Maurer, Pierce, & Shore, 2002). Work hours are an objectively verifiable, concreteemployment feature. As part of the basic extrinsic conditions of work, individualized working times are typically are nego-tiated at the time of hire. In contrast, the nature and meaning of development depends on the employee’s interests and on-the-job experiences. Negotiating development i-deals necessitates organization-specific knowledge of intrinsic job featuresand related skill- and career building opportunities, more readily available in an ongoing employment relationship. Drawingon Rousseau and colleagues (Rousseau et al., 2006), we thus hypothesize that the two studied forms of i-deal content willdiffer in their likelihood of ex ante or ex post negotiation.

Hypothesis 3. Ex ante negotiation will relate more positively to i-deals regarding work hours than to i-deals regardingdevelopment opportunities.

Hypothesis 4. Ex post negotiation will relate more positively to i-deals on development opportunities than to i-deals onwork hours.

The content of i-deals gives rise to differential effects on the employment relationship (Hornung et al., 2008). Material andmonetary resources are concrete and universal, consistent with the character of economic exchange. Symbolic and socio-emotional resources are particularistic and abstract in nature, characteristic of social exchange (Foa & Foa, 1975; Haas & Des-eran, 1981). Both work hour i-deals and development i-deals imply employer responsiveness to specific worker needs. How-ever, the resources exchanged in both forms differ. Work hour i-deals reflect economic conditions of employment (i.e.,concrete, universal, and tied to monetary consequences; e.g., Golden (1996)). In contrast, development i-deals are more rela-tional in nature (i.e., particularistic, abstract, and corresponding to socio-emotional needs for social recognition and personalgrowth). Accordingly, developmental i-deals are expected to have a more positive effect on the employment relationshipcompared to work hour-related arrangements.

Hypothesis 5. Development i-deals will relate more positively to beliefs regarding social exchange (H5a) and morenegatively to beliefs regarding economic exchange (H5b) than work hour I-deals.

3. Methods

3.1. Organizational setting

The field site was a 154-bed general hospital, located in a highly competitive region for health care providers in the north-eastern United States. In the ten years prior to our study, the hospital had faced financial difficulties, limiting its capitalinvestments, human resource programs, and pay raises. It was chosen in part because of the likelihood that idiosyncraticarrangements were used to attract and retain qualified employees during difficult times. Interviews with hospital managersand employees confirmed this use of i-deals and provided a basis for developing appropriate measures for their timing andcontent.

3.2. Participants

The data originate from two waves of an employee survey conducted during a period of two years. At the time of the firstsurvey, the staff consisted of 350 employees, 166 (47.42%) of which participated. Two years later, staffing had risen to 400employees as the hospital expanded its services. During this time, annual turnover was about 20%. At time 2, 207 (51.7%)employees completed a questionnaire identical to the first. All respondents signed an IRB-approved consent form. They wereadvised that participation was voluntary and the study’s purpose was for research and publication. The majority of partic-ipants complied with a request to provide a four digit personal code derived from their social security numbers. This codenumber was used to identify repeated responders. Due to the low number of repeat responders (n = 65) and missing datarelevant to this study, the longitudinal sample lacked sufficient power to permit meaningful tests of our hypotheses. Instead,this study focuses on the two larger cross-sectional data sets, kept independent by removing repeat responders from the sec-ond measurement point. After list-wise deletion of missing data regarding i-deals, the employment relationship, or personalcode number (i.e., missing data were allowed only for demographics), the two samples yielded N’s of 145 and 120.

Table 1Sample description.

Sample 1 (obtained at T1) Sample 2 (obtained at T2) Combined sample

Complete data sets N = 145 N = 120 N = 265Female 1 127 (87.6%) 101 (84.2%) 228 (88.0%)Age (median category)2 46–50 years 41–45 years 41–45 yearsTenure (median category)3 6–10 years 4–5 years 4–5 yearsPart-time4 31 (21.4%) 22 (18.3%) 53 (20.0%)

Education5

High school 36 (24.8%) 33 (27.5%) 69 (27.0%)Registered nurse 22 (15.2%) 15 (12.5%) 37 (14.5%)Associate degree 43 (29.7%) 43 (35.8%) 86 (33.6%)Bachelor degree 34 (23.4%) 15 (12.5%) 49 (19.1%)Masters degree 7 (4.8%) 8 (6.7%) 15 (5.9%)Missing 3 (2.1%) 6 (5.0%) 9 (3.4%)

Notes: Results of Chi-square Test for comparing distributions between Sample 1 and Sample 2: 1v2(1) = 1.22 ns; 2v2(9) = 4.61 ns; 3v2(8) = 22.30, p < .01;4v2(1) = 0.06 ns; 5v2(5) = 9.56 ns.


Participants included clinical (e.g., nurses, therapists), clerical (e.g., hospital administration), technical (e.g., radiologic tech-nicians, engineering), and support (e.g., dietary, security) staff.

Distributions of gender, age, tenure, part-time status, and education for the two groups are provided in Table 1. Chi-square tests compared these categorical variables between the groups. As the T2 cross-sectional sample excluded repeatresponders, its average tenure is lower. Other than this logical difference, the samples have comparable demographicsand means on all variables.

3.3. Measures

Unless indicated, measures used a five-point Likert scale with following anchors: ‘‘not at all” (1), ‘‘slightly” (2) ‘‘some-what” (3) ‘‘to a great extent” (4) ‘‘to a very great extent” (5).

3.3.1. I-deal timingThe timing of i-deals was measured with two items each for ex ante and ex post negotiation. Ex Ante Negotiation was mea-

sured by ‘‘At the time I was hired, I negotiated for work arrangements that differ from the typical employee here” and ”WhenI was hired, I negotiated for particular employment conditions that suited me personally.” The internal consistency was .74and .77 in the two samples. Ex Post Negotiation was measured by ‘‘After I started working here, I have been able to negotiatespecial arrangements that suit me personally” and ‘‘I have been able to negotiate with my supervisor to create an employ-ment arrangement that suits me personally.” Internal consistency was .77 and .85 in the two samples.

3.3.2. I-deal contentBased on types of i-deals identified during interviews with managers and staff, study participants reported on the extent

to which they had ‘‘asked for and successfully negotiated” specific aspects of individual employment arrangements. Threeitems captured Work Hour I-deals: ‘‘Schedule different from coworkers”, ‘‘Reduced work hours”, and ‘‘Greater work hours”.Internal consistency was .69 and .70. Development I-deals were captured with another three items: ‘‘Skill development”, ‘‘Per-formance goals”, and ‘‘Career development.” Reliability was .84 and .85.

3.3.3. Employment relationshipThe nature of the employment relationship was measured using five items for Social Exchange and five items for Economic

Exchange (Shore, Tetrick, Lynch, & Barksdale, 2006). Sample items for Social Exchange are ‘‘My relationship with ____ is basedon mutual trust”, ‘‘There is a lot of give and take in my relationship with ____”, and ‘‘The things I do on the job today will ben-efits my standing at ____ in the long run.” Reliability was .87 and .78. Sample items for Economic Exchange are ‘‘My relationshipwith ____ is strictly an economic one—I work and they pay me”, ‘‘I do what ____ requires, simply because they pay me”, and ‘‘Iwatch very carefully what I get from ____, relative to what I contribute”. Reliability was .75 and .71.

3.3.4. Demographic variablesDichotomous items assessed gender (0 = female, 1 = male) and part-time employment (0 = full-time, 1 = part-time). Age

and organizational tenure were measured with eleven and ten categories from ‘‘below 21” to ‘‘over 65” and from ‘‘a year orless” to ‘‘more than 30 years‘‘. Five categories assessed education from high school diploma to master’s degree.

3.4. Scale analyses

In a first step, we tested measurement models including all items on the timing and content of i-deals and the nature ofthe employment relationship in two-group analyses (N = 145/120). To evaluate models, we used an established set of good-

Table 2Measurement models and invariance.

v2 df v2/df IFI TLI CFI RMSEA [CI] Ddf Dv2 p

Two-group analysis (N = 145/120)I-deals: 1 factor 468.42** 70 6.69 .58 .45 .57 .147 [.135; .160]**

I-deals: 2 factors (1 � timing, 1 � content) 312.86** 68 4.60 .74 .65 .74 .117 [.104; .130]**

I-deals: 2 factors (2 � timing-content) 356.17** 68 5.24 .70 .59 .69 .127 [.114; .140]**

I-deals: 2 factors (2 � timing-content) 346.23** 68 5.09 .71 .60 .70 .125 [.112; .138]**



I-deals: 4 factors (2 � timing, 2 � content) 87.98** 58 1.52 .97 .95 .97 .044 [.024; .062] BaselineI-deals: 4 factors (equal factor weights) 98.40** 64 1.54 .96 .95 .96 .045 [.026; .062] 6 10.42 .108I-deals: 4 factors (equal covariances) 104.74* 74 1.42 .97 .96 .97 .040 [.020; .056] 16 16.76 .401I-deals: 4 factors (equal measurement errors) 131.47** 84 1.57 .95 .95 .95 .046 [.030; .061] 26 43.49* .017

Relation: 1 factor 268.40** 70 3.83 .77 .70 .76 .104 [.091; .117]**

Relation: 2 factors (social, economic) 122.84** 68 1.81 .94 .91 .94 .055 [.039; .071] BaselineRelation: 2 factors (equal factor weights) 133.72** 76 1.76 .93 .92 .93 .054 [.038; .069] 8 10.88 .208Relation: 2 factors (equal covariances) 139.58** 79 1.77 .93 .92 .93 .054 [.039; .068] 11 16.74 .116Relation: 2 factors (equal measurement errors) 158.50** 89 1.78 .92 .92 .92 .054 [.040; .068] 21 35.66* .024

All: 1 factor 1350.13** 340 3.97 .46 .38 .44 .106 [.100; .112]**

All: 6 factors 411.66** 310 1.33 .95 .93 .94 .035 [.025; .044] BaselineAll: 6 factors (equal factor weights) 429.38** 324 1.33 .94 .93 .94 .035 [.026; .044] 14 17.72 .220All: 6 factors (equal covariances) 447.48** 345 1.30 .95 .94 .94 .034 [.024; .042] 35 35.82 .430All: 6 factors (equal measurement errors) 491.60** 365 1.35 .93 .93 .93 .036 [.028; .044] 55 79.94* .016

Combined sample (N = 265)All: 6 Factors 228.81** 155 1.48 .96 .95 .96 .042 [.030; .054] BaselineAll: 7 factors (common methods factor) 199.22** 135 1.48 .97 .95 .97 .042 [.029; .054] 20 29.59 .077

Notes: v2 = chi-square discrepancy; df = degrees of freedom; v2/df = relative chi-square discrepancy; IFI = Incremental Fit Index; TLI = Tucker Lewis Index;CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CI = 90% Confidence Interval.* p < .05.

** p < .01.


ness-of-fit indices and their conventional cut-off values (Bollen & Long, 1993; Byrne, 2001): Relative chi-square (v2/df),should not exceed values of 2.0; Incremental Fit Index (IFI), Tucker Lewis Index (TLI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) shouldbe above .90; special attention is given to the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), where values below .05indicate good fit and values up to .08 still acceptable fit. For RMSEA, a 90% confidence interval (CI) is reported. Its lowerbound should be close to .00 while its upper bound should not exceed .08 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; MacCallum, Browne,& Sugawara, 1996). An additional test for close fit indicates the probability that the RMSEA is below .05 in the population.Here, a statistically significant result indicates that this is likely not to be the case.

I-deal scales were developed for this study. Thus, we took special precaution to establish discriminant validity among thefour types of i-deals based on timing and content. We consecutively tested a one-factor model, a two-factor model distin-guishing between timing and content generally, another pair of two-factor models, combining each timing and content as-pect to form a common factor, and finally two three-factor models discriminating only timing or only content. None of thesesix models shows acceptable fit (Table 2). A four-factor model, corresponding to the theorized scale structure of Ex AnteNegotiation, Ex Post Negotiation, Work Hour I-deals, and Development I-deals did yield good fit with a relative chi-squareof 1.52, all three comparative fit indices well above .90 and a low RMSEA of .044 (Table 2).

Next, this four-factor model was tested for measurement invariance. Restricting model parameters to be equal for bothsamples, we tested the significance of the change in the overall model discrepancy, indicated by the chi-square statistic(Kline, 1998). No significant decrease in model fit resulted from constraining factor weights (Ddf = 6, Dv2 = 10.42, ns)or factor weights and factor covariances (Ddf = 16, Dv2 = 16.76, ns). Extending the equality constraints to include measure-ment errors does affect model fit negatively (Ddf = 26, Dv2 = 43.49, p < .05). Equality of measurement errors, however, isnot considered a requirement for measurement invariance (Byrne, 2001; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Lievens & Anseel,2004).

We conducted similar analyses for Social and Economic Exchange. As expected, a two-factor solution fit the data consid-erably better than one-factor. Again, measurement invariance between the two groups could be established for factorweights and factor covariances. Finally, the complete six-factor model also showed good overall fit, clearly outperformeda one-factor model, and was invariant between the two groups, except for measurement errors (Table 2). Measurementinvariance justifies combining the samples into one of N = 265 (Byrne, 2001; Kline, 1998). In this aggregate sample, the com-plete six-factor measurement model again is supported (Table 2). Finally, we added an unmeasured latent method factor(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Although this addition decreases the chi-square discrepancy somewhat,the improved fit was not significant (Ddf = 20, Dv2 = 29.59, ns), indicating no common methods threat to validity.


3.5. Hypothesis testing

Descriptive statistics and correlations of scales and demographic variables for the aggregate cross-sectional sample aredisplayed in Table 3. To test Hypothesis 1 that the Ex Post Negotiation will be more prevalent than Ex Ante Negotiation,we used a paired t-test. With a mean value of M = 2.25 (SD = 1.25) Ex Post Negotiation exceeds Ex Ante Negotiation(M = 1.54, SD = 0.99). The resulting difference (DM = 0.71; SD = 1.32; t(264) = 8.71, p < .01), supports Hypothesis 1. Cohen’sd effect size is d = .63, a medium size effect (Cohen, 1988). Subsequently, we tested whether this effect was influenced byjob structure, including organizational tenure, job type, and full/part-time status. First, we spilt the file into four groupsbased on Tenure (a year or less, N = 45; 2–5 years, N = 94, 6–15 years, N = 60, 16 to more than 30 years, N = 65). In all fourgroups, Ex Post negotiation (M = 2.71/2.24/2.33/1.86; SD = 1.43/1.25/1.22/1.01) had a higher mean than Ex Ante Negotiation(M = 1.53/1.65/1.50/1.44; SD = 1.02/1.12/.84/.90). Differences in means (DM = 1.17/.59/.83/.42; SD = 1.42/1.36/1.27/1.15)were statistically significant (t(45) = 5.61, t(93) = 4.22, t(59) = 5.07, t(64) = 2.98, all p < .01) and the largest effect was ob-tained for the group with the shortest tenure (d = .95/.50/.80/.44). Second, we compared participants by Education. All fivegroups reported higher Ex Post Negotiation (M = 2.23/2.28/2.08/2.53/2.60; SD = 1.25/1.47/1.14/1.21/1.33) than Ex AnteNegotiation (M = 1.53/1.72/1.45/1.65/1.33; SD = 1.00/1.24/.81/1.15/.84); differences (DM = .70/.57/.63/.88/1.27; SD = 1.31/1.35/1.27/1.42/1.29) were significant (t(68) = 4.47, t(36) = 2.56, t(85) = 4.86, t(48) = 4.32, t(15) = 3.79; second group p < .05all others p < .01) and most pronounced for participants in the highest category, holding a masters degree (d = .62/.42/.64/.75/1.14). Finally, both full-time and part-time employees showed a similar result pattern (Ex Post Negotiation: M = 2.08/2.88; SD = 1.16/1.34; Ex Ante Negotiation: M = 1.47/1.83; SD = .90/1.15; DM = .61/1.05; SD = 1.23/1.54; t(208) = 7.14,t(51) = 4.89, both p < .01; d = .59/.84).

To test Hypotheses 2–5, we specified a structural model in which the ex ante and ex post negotiation affects developmen-tal and working hours i-deals as well as the nature of the employment relationship, also predicted by these i-deals. Fit indi-ces fully support its adequacy (v2(157) = 285.62, p < .01, v2/df = 1.82, IFI = .93, TLI = .91; CFI = .93, RMSEA = .056), and 9 of the12 paths in the model attain statistical significance (see Fig. 1 and Table 4).

In a second step, we included all available demographic information, controlling for Gender, Age, Education, Tenure, andPart-time on all four variables connected to i-deal timing and content. Including controls impacts model fit significantly neg-atively (v2(238) = 445.53, p < .01, v2/df = 1.87; IFI = .90, TLI = .85,CFI = .89; RMSEA = .057 [.049; .066]; Dv2(81) = 159.91,p < .01). Part-time employment status related positively to Ex Ante Negotiation (b = .14, p < .05), Ex Post Negotiation(b = .27, p < .01), and Work Hour I-deals (b = .20, p < .01). Age related negatively to Ex Post Negotiation (b = �.16, p < .05)and Work Hour I-deals (b = �.16, p < .01), and Tenure negatively to Ex Post Negotiation (b = �.16, p < .05) and positivelyto Work Hour I-deals (b = .14, p < .05). Finally, Work Hour I-deals were also negatively related to by Education (b = �.13,p < .05), suggesting that negotiated variability in work schedule was less relevant for higher qualified workers (e.g., hourlypayment vs. salary). Overall, these results correspond with previously found structural and demographic influences on work-ing time related i-deals (Hornung et al., 2008).

However, none of the nine interpretable structural paths in the model were substantially affected in size or significancelevel by the inclusion of control variables. As our method of hypothesis testing relies on a well-fitting baseline model, sub-sequent analyses are based on the structural model without controls.

Hypotheses 2–5 specify differences in the effects of the two forms of timing and content of i-deals studied here. We testedthese hypotheses by (a) comparing the respective path coefficients to assess whether they differ in proposed directions, and(b) subsequently constraining them to be equal in size and re-estimating the model. If model chi-square increases signifi-cantly by imposing the equality constraint, a meaningful difference between the effects is established (Byrne, 2001; Kline,1998).

Table 3Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations in the combined sample.

a M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

1. Gender — —2. Age — — �.063. Education — — �.13* �.054. Tenure — — �.05 .46** �.055. Part-time — — �.10 �.12 .05 �.106. Ex Ante Negotiation .75 1.54 0.99 �.08 �.04 �.02 �.08 .14*

7. Ex Post Negotiation .81 2.25 1.25 �.04 �.26** .07 �.21** .26** .32**

8. Work Hour I-deals .70 1.91 1.02 �.05 �.22** �.12 �.11 .33** .26** .37**

9. Development I-deals .85 2.21 1.10 .00 �.10 .04 �.03 .03 .15* .34** .38**

10. Social Exchange .84 3.02 0.91 �.01 .05 �.03 �.20** .03 .10 .33** .07 .31**

11. Economic Exchange .74 2.08 0.80 .13* �.16** �.08 �.01 �.00 .00 �.10 .07 �.14* �.40**

Notes: N = 265; a = scale reliability (Cronbach’s alpha); M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation.* p < .05.

** p < .01.

X3

X4

Y1 Y2 Y6

Y5Y4Y3

Y7

Y8

Y9

Y10

Y11

.41** [.36; .07]

.23* [.25; .10]

.31** [.27; .07]

-.21* [-.22; .09]

-.35** [-.33; .10]

Social Exchange

Y12

Y13

Y14

Y15

Y16

-.05 [-.06; .09]

X1

X2

Economic Exchange

.46** [.43; .08]

.02 [.02; .08]

.47** [.46; .11].46** [.34; .08]

.05 [.04; .07]

-.40** [-.31; .08]

Ex Ante Negotiation

Ex Post Negotiation

.38** [.39; .08]

Notes: N=265;**p < .01, *p < .05; Fit indices displayed in Table 4; values in brackets refer to the unstandardized estimates and standard errors of measurement [B; SE].

Work Hour I-deals

DevelopmentI-deals

Fig. 1. Structural model.

Table 4Hypothesis testing through imposing equality constraints in the structural model.

Structural model and equality constraints v2 df v2/df IFI TLI CFI RMSEA [CI] Ddf Dv2 p

Unconstrained model (baseline for comparisons) 285.62** 157 1.82 .93 .91 .93 .056 [.045; .066] BaselineH2a: Ex Post Negotiation ? Social Exchange =

Ex Ante Negotiation ? Social Exchange292.51** 158 1.85 .93 .91 .93 .057 [.047; .067] 1 6.89** .009

H2b: Ex Post Negotiation ? Economic Exchange =Ex Ante Negotiation ? Economic Exchange

288.66** 158 1.83 .93 .91 .93 .056 [.046; .066] 1 3.04 .081

H3: Ex Ante Negotiation ? Work Hour I-deals =Ex Ante Negotiation ? Development I-deals

289.47** 158 1.83 .93 .91 .93 .056 [.046; .066] 1 3.85* .049

H4: Ex Post Negotiation ? Work Hour I-deals =Ex Post Negotiation ? Development I-deals

286.19** 158 1.81 .93 .91 .93 .055 [.045; .066] 1 0.57 .450

H5a: Development I-deals ? Docial exchange =Work Hour I-Deals ? Social Exchange

310.05** 158 1.96 .92 .90 .92 .060 [.050; .070] 1 24.43** .000

H5b: Development I-deals ? Economic Exchange =Work Hour I-deals ? Economic Exchange

303.08** 158 1.92 .92 .90 .92 .059 [.049; .069] 1 17.47** .000

Notes: N = 265; v2 = model chi-square discrepancy; df = degrees of freedom; v2/df = relative chi-square; IFI = Incremental Fit Index; TLI = Tucker LewisIndex; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CI = 90% Confidence Interval; Ddf = change in degrees of freedomthrough imposing one equality constraint; Dv2 = change in chi-square compared to unconstrained model.* p < .05.** p < .01


H2 states that Ex Post Negotiation will relate more positively to Social Exchange (H2a) and more negatively to EconomicExchange (H2b) than Ex Ante Negotiation. As expected, Ex Post Negotiation had a positive effect on Social Exchange (b = .46,p < .01) and a negative effect on Economic Exchange (b = �.35, p < .01), whereas Ex Ante negotiation did not relate to eitherSocial Exchange (b = .05, ns) or Economic Exchange (b = �.05, ns). Constraining the path from Ex Ante Negotiation to SocialExchange to be equal to the path from Ex Post Negotiation to Social Exchange decreased model fit (Ddf = 1, Dv2 = 6.89,p < .01), fully supporting H2a. Imposing an equality constraint on the paths from Ex Ante and Ex Post Negotiation on Eco-nomic Exchange, however, did not decrease model fit (Ddf = 1, Dv2 = 3.04, ns). Consequently, only H2a was supported.

According to H3, Ex ante Negotiation should be more positively related to i-deals on work hours than to developmentalones. A positive effect on Work Hour I-deals (b = .23, p < .05), with none on Development I-deals (b = .02, ns) backed thisassumption. Forcing these two path estimates to be identical decreased model fit (Ddf = 1, Dv2 = 3.85, p < .05), supportingHypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 4 states that Ex Post Negotiation will be more closely related to Development I-deals than to Work Hour I-deals. Ex Post Negotiation had a positive effect on both Development (b = .41, p < .01) and Work Hour I-deals (b = .46,p < .01). H4 was rejected, as no difference existed between the path coefficients (Ddf = 1, Dv2 = 0.57, ns).

Table 5Testing for alternative models and structural invariance.

v2 df v2/df IFI TLI CFI RMSEA [CI] Ddf Dv2 p

Combined sample (N = 265)Postulated model 285.62** 157 1.82 .93 .91 .93 .056 [.045; .066] BaselineAlternative model I1 304.16** 157 1.94 .92 .90 .92 .060 [.050; .070] 0 18.54 —Alternative model II2 301.19** 157 1.92 .92 .90 .92 .059 [.049; .069] 0 15.57 —Alternative model III3 311.60** 157 1.99 .92 .90 .91 .061 [.051; .071] 0 25.98 —

Two-group analysis (N = 145/120)Unconstrained model 475.14** 314 1.51 .91 .89 .91 .044 [.036; .052] BaselineEqual factor weights 491.26** 328 1.49 .91 .90 .91 .044 [.035; .051] 14 16.12 .306Equal structural weights 499.23** 340 1.47 .91 .90 .91 .042 [.034; .050] 26 24.09 .571Equal covariances 503.31** 343 1.47 .91 .90 .91 .042 [.034; .050] 29 28.17 .509Equal structural residuals 505.29** 347 1.46 .91 .91 .91 .042 [.033; .049] 33 30.15 .610Equal measurement errors 545.52** 367 1.49 .90 .90 .90 .043 [.035; .050] 53 70.38 .055

Notes: N = 265; v2 = model chi-square discrepancy; df = degrees of freedom; v2/df = relative chi-square; IFI = Incremental Fit Index; TLI = Tucker LewisIndex; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CI = 90% Confidence Interval; Ddf = change in degrees of freedomcompared to baseline models; Dv2 = change in chi-square compared to baseline models. Order of variables in alternative models: 1negotiation timing—employment relationship—i-deal content; 2ex ante negotiation—i-deal content—ex post-negotiation—employment relationship; 3ex ante negotiation—employment relationship—ex post-negotiation—i-deal content.** p < .01.


The most distinctive results were associated with Hypothesis 5. Not only did Development I-deals relate more positivelyto Social Exchange (b = .31, p < .01), than did Work Hour I-deals, but the latter even had a pronounced negative effect on So-cial Exchange (b = �.40, p < .01). Moreover, Development I-deals had a negative effect (b = �.21, p < .05) and Work Hour I-deals a positive effect (b = .47, p < .01) on Economic Exchange. Changes in chi-square confirmed the differential implicationsof i-deal content for Social Exchange (Ddf = 1, Dv2 = 24.43, p < .01) and Economic Exchange (Ddf = 1, Dv2 = 17.47, p < .01), aspostulated in H5a and H5b.

As further evidence for our model’s validity, we tested three alternative models with similar degrees of freedom (Table 5):A model in which the order of i-deal content and nature of the employment relationship were reversed (Alternative Model I),and two models, where ex ante negotiation preceded Ex Post Negotiation, which mediated between content and the employ-ment relationship (Alternative Model II) or between the employment relationship and the content (Alternative Model III). Allthree alternatives demonstrated a higher chi-square and thus lower fit than the postulated model. Additional analyses dem-onstrated the complete structural invariance of our model for the two combined samples (see Table 5).

As an alternative test of the differential effects postulated in Hypotheses 2–5, we also used regular Student’s t-tests tocompare the unstandardized regression coefficients obtained in our model. This alternative approach is more straightfor-ward than imposing an equality constraint on the respective paths and evaluating changes in model fit (Byrne, 2001). Meth-odologically, however, it is inferior, as it does not take into account the overall data structure. One advantage it does offer isestimation of the discrepancy’s magnitude. Cohen’s d effect size statistic is obtained by dividing the mean difference by thepooled standard deviations (Cohen, 1988; Cohen, 1992). Accordingly, the strongest differences were visible in the effects thatDevelopment I-deals and Work Hour I-deals had on Social Exchange (H5a; d = .47, t(528) = 5.46, p < .01) as well as onEconomic Exchange (H5b; d = .41, t(528) = 4.79, p < .01). These were followed by the differential associations of Ex PostNegotiation and Ex Ante Negotiation with Social Exchange (H2a; d = .25, t(528) = 2.90, p < .01). An effect size below .20 indi-cated a small difference in the path estimates of Ex Post Negotiation and Ex Ante Negotiation on Economic Exchange (Cohen,1992). Deviating from results obtained in the structural equation modeling approach, however, it was significant below thefive percent level (H2b; d = .17, t(528) = 1.99, p < .05, pexact = .047). Equally low in size, the differential effects of Ex AnteNegotiation on Work Hour and Development I-deals did not attain statistical significance by conventional standards (H3;d = .15, t(528) = 1.82, p > .05, pexact = .069). Again, no meaningful difference could be detected in the relationship Ex PostNegotiation had with Work Hour I-deals and Development I-deals (H4; d = .06, t(528) = 0.70, p > .05).

Overall, results support the majority of this study’s hypotheses. Per H1, Ex Post Negotiation had a consistently higherprevalence than Ex Ante Negotiation. Differential associations of the timing and content of i-deals with the employment rela-tionship were tested by two alternative methods, which yielded slightly dissimilar results. Full support across all analyseswas obtained for H2a, H5a, and H5b: Ex Post Negotiation related more positively to Social Exchange than Ex Ante Negotiationand Development I-deals related more positively to Social Exchange and more negatively to Economic Exchange than WorkHour I-deals. Partial support (i.e., with one of the two methods yielding significant results) was obtained for H2b and H3: ExPost Negotiation related more negatively to Economic Exchange than Ex Ante Negotiation, which related more positively toWork Hour I-deals than to Development I-deals. No support, whatsoever, was found for Hypothesis 4, suggesting that Ex PostNegotiation would relate more positively to Development I-deals than to Work Hour I-deals.

4. Discussion

Results are largely in accordance with i-deal theory regarding the effect of their timing and content on the nature of theemployment relationship (Rousseau et al., 2006). Scale analyses confirmed the validity of distinguishing between ex ante


and ex post i-deal negotiations as well as their developmental and work-time related content. Negotiating special terms atthe time of hire (ex ante) was less common than in later phases of employment (ex post). Additionally, relationship-based expost negotiation was associated positively with social exchange and negatively with economic exchange, whereas market-based ex ante negotiation was not related to the nature of the employment relationship. Utilizing more rigorous methodo-logical approaches for comparing the strength of the empirical associations, differential effects of the timing of i-deals on theassessment of the employment relationship were more pronounced for social exchange than for economic exchange.

As hypothesized, ex ante negotiation related positively and more strongly to the concrete and universal content of workhour i-deals than to the particularistic and abstract developmental i-deals. Ex post i-deals, however, did not show the inversepattern, relating equally positively to both development and work hour i-deals. We infer that ex post negotiation is not onlymore widespread than ex ante negotiation, but it also involves a greater variety of resources. The differential effects of devel-opment i-deals and work hour i-deals were more pronounced than expected. Not only did development i-deals relate morepositively to social exchange and more negatively to economic exchange than work hour i-deals, but the latter even had aconsistent negative effect on social exchange, relating to beliefs in economic exchange instead.

As work hour i-deals represent special arrangements regarding the expansion, reduction, or scheduling of work time, theyare tied to monetary consequences (e.g., shift- and overtime wages), and appear to reinforce the nature of employment as aneconomic transaction rather than a social relationship. This result suggests that firms may treat employees with non-con-forming work hours as deviants, perhaps reducing their subsequent performance ratings and the quality of their treatment(e.g., Hochschild, 1997; Rousseau, 2005). It also illustrates how consequences of i-deals are sensitive to the resources ex-changed. It thus points to a need for closer examination of the context-specific and individually-attributed meaning of i-deals.

In past research, developmental opportunities have differed in whether they signify a relational or transactional psycho-logical contract, depending on whether they reflect long-term professional advancement in one firm or a fast track careeracross firms (Rousseau, 1990; Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994). Similarly, individualized work time arrangements aresubject to differential interpretations, depending on whether they are more closely tied to economic conditions of employ-ment or work–life balance (Hornung et al., 2008). To investigate the wide array of idiosyncratic terms and their implicationsfor the employment relationship, more differentiated measures for i-deals may be needed to capture their diverse forms andconsequences for the employment relationship (e.g., differentiating between work hour i-deals with and without monetaryimplications).

4.1. Limitations

The scope of this study is limited to a subset of propositions specified by Rousseau et al. (2006). These propositions dealtwith the timing and content of i-deals and their implications for the employment relationship. Others regarding firm-levelantecedents and consequences, repeated bargaining, and effects of i-deals on co-workers remain untested.

Some measurement concerns should be noted. Both ex ante and ex post negotiation were reported in retrospect, raisingconcerns about recall bias (Lippman & Mackenzie, 1985). Even in the aftermath of critical life events, which are typically as-sumed to affect both attribution and memory, the empirical evidence for recall bias is weak and inconsistent (Middel et al.,2006; Teschke, Smith, & Olshan, 2000). We note that the discrepancy between ex ante and ex post negotiation was mostpronounced for the subgroup with the shortest tenure (i.e., one year or less) and recall period. Nonetheless, all tenure groupsdemonstrated the same tendency toward more ex post i-deal negotiations than ex ante. Thus, if recall effects do play a role inour results, any bias seems to increase the probability of type II rather than type I error. Longitudinal studies on organiza-tional newcomers would be the design of choice for a more rigorous comparison of ex ante and ex post negotiation.

To test the propositions of Rousseau et al. (2006) we have contrasted the timing and impact of two important types of i-deals relating to work times and professional development. Qualitative interviews were used to insure we had captured themost applicable forms in the present context. However, by limiting this study to two forms of i-deals, we may have neglectedother relevant individual arrangements, a matter we address in research implications below.

Our method of pooling data obtained at different points in time might raise questions about the inclusion of repeatedresponders. However, by comparing survey identifier codes as well as departmental and demographic information, we tookall precautions to avoid this problem. In all respects the two survey administrations and their data were comparable.

Lastly, cross-sectional data are a major limitation, despite statistical remedies for common method variance and alterna-tive model tests. Empirical support for two of our hypotheses is weak and to some extent contingent on the method of dataanalysis, therefore necessitating replication. Our reliance on two samples in a single organization raises questions about gen-eralizability to other organizational settings. More research also is needed to compare relationships with i-deals in differentoccupations, organizations, and societies.

4.2. Implications for research

This study has looked inside the black box of the employment relationship, identifying the importance of the type andtiming of resources exchanged. It also demonstrates one way in which workers with the same employer can come to con-strue their employment differently, through the existence of i-deals.


Future research would be useful into the role of i-deals in the context of the employer’s broader practices for attracting,motivating and retaining workers. Our finding that work time-related i-deals are negatively associated with social exchangeand positively with economic exchange may in part be attributable to the difficulties employers face in managing relation-ships with workers whose i-deals place them out of sync with a firm’s standard ways of assessing and rewarding employees.In ethnographies addressing how firms and employees cope with work/family balance issues, Hochschild (1997) and Perlow(1997) each identified the negative consequences workers experience from putting in fewer or different hours than theirpeers. Such consequences include reduced performance ratings over time, often leading erstwhile star performers to be ratedsubsequently as marginal or substandard. Opportunities for development, promotion, or other forms of enhanced participa-tion in the organization can also be diminished for those with reduced or non-standard hours. If such i-deals are made withthe intention of motivating or retaining workers, these dysfunctional consequences warrant further investigation to under-stand what workplace practices might offset their downside.

Future research also would benefit from a broader assessment of the diverse and heterogeneous forms i-deals take perour limited focus here are two kinds of content. In developing broader measures, one promising avenue would be to establisha framework regarding resources exchanged though i-deals to reflect the full range and combination of economic and socio-emotional resources i-deals can involve. Their impact on the employment relationship may depend on both the nature aswell as the combination of personalized conditions a worker has bargained for.

4.3. Implications for practice

Employers using i-deals as a means of achieving workforce flexibility should pay particular attention to managing i-dealsover time. Reduced work hours and other non-conforming arrangements can have adverse side effects. Such undesirableconsequences are likely if the contributions of workers with such arrangements are not well monitored and measured—increasing the likelihood that workers with reduced schedules will be viewed as poor contributors (Rousseau, 2005). I-dealswarrant special efforts not only in their formation but also in their aftermath to insure that intended goals are being met.Effective supervision of i-dealers with reduced or non-compliant hours requires attention to whether performance remainsacceptable or above standard and, when appropriate, is recognized in ways comparable to workers with standard arrange-ments. Without workplace practices to insure that non-compliance is not dysfunctional, i-deals may prove more costly thanis acceptable to both worker and employer. The value and benefit of such i-deals may ultimately depend on how effectivelythe firm’s more standardized performance management practices support them.

In contrast, developmental i-deals may actually strengthen the employment relationship. They engender greater workercontributions in the form of increased performance, more overtime, and higher commitment (Hornung et al., 2008). How-ever, employers who rely on assertive employees to speak up in seeking development opportunities at the expense of moreprogrammatic training and career development activities are not necessarily serving their own interests or their workers’.I-deals for development made in the context of a well-thought out career system, however, are likely to augment and am-plify the benefits that such a system provides. In contrast, where i-deals are the only way to attain advancement or growthopportunities in a firm, overreliance upon them may lead to unsystematic developmental practices and backlash from thoseworkers who failed to bargain for development or did so unsuccessfully. I-deals are effective supplements for standardizedhuman resource practices, but not substitutes (Rousseau, 2005).

5. Conclusion

Results affirm that i-deals impact the employment relationship. Generally speaking, their timing and content are inter-related yet differ in their effects on the ways employees interpret their employment relationship. Positive consequencesare tied to both ex post negotiation and developmental content, each resulting in the experience of one’s employment asa social rather than an economic exchange. In contrast, the impact of ex ante negotiation on the employment relationshipis negligible, suggesting that the more powerful signals to employees regarding the supportiveness of the employer occurafter recruitment.

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idiosyncratic deals: testing propositions on timing, content, and the employment relationship

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