A NOTE ON THE CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY UNDER THE NIGERIAN LAND USE ACT

A. INTRODUCTION

The Governor of every state in Nigeria is empowered by Section 9(1) of the Land Use Act, 1 (‘the Act’) to

issue a Certificate of Occupancy under his hand in evidence of a right of occupancy in three instances

namely: -

(i) When granting a statutory right of occupancy to any person; 2

(ii) When any person is in occupation of land under a customary right of occupancy; 3

(iii) When any person is entitled to a statutory right of occupancy. 4

Apart from stating that the Certificate of Occupancy is to be issued in evidence of a right of occupancy, 5

the Act does not expressly define the nature of the Certificate. Regrettably, this lacunae has given rise to a

number of fundamental and crucial questions: What is the effect of the issuance of a Certificate of

Occupancy on an application for interlocutory injunction? Is it indefeasible or is it a mere “ Piece of paper

having no value”?

1 Act No. 6 of 1978

2 It is lawful for a Governor to grant a statutory right of occupancy to any person for any purpose whether or not the land is in an urban area: Section 5(1)(a)

of the Act.

3 A person may be in occupation of land under a customary right of occupancy by virtue of Section 36 of the Act, if the land was on the commencement of the

Act being used for agricultural purposes or in the case of a developed land, if the land was vested in that person immediately before the Act see also Section 6

of the Act.

4 A person is entitled to a statutory right of occupancy if the land was vested in that person immediately before the commencement of the Act so however that

the land must be in an urban area: Sections 34(1) and 34(5) of the Act.

5 Section 9(1) of the Act.

1

This paper is an attempt at elucidating the essence of a Certificate of Occupancy from a critical analysis

of the relevant provisions of the Act and some decided case particularly the recent decision of the

Supreme Court in JOSHUA OGUNLEYE V. BABATAYO ONI. 6

B. INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS

The questions highlighted above on the nature of a Certificate of Occupancy have long agitated the courts

in this country. In, 1980, for example, the effect of the issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy on a

preliminary application for an interim injunction was considered in the case of PRINCE ELIJAH OKE &

ANOTHER V.P ADALEMO & OTHERS. 7

There, the plaintiffs/applicants moved a motion on notice for an interim injunction to restrain the

defendants/respondents, their agents, privies and servants from alienating clearing, building and

trespassing in any manner with any part of the land in dispute pending the final determination of the

action. Delano, J. refused the application because the balance of convenience was in favour of the

defendants/respondents. The facts that the plaintiffs/applicants did not object to the issuance of a

Certificate of Occupancy in respect of the land in dispute to the defendants/respondents was considered

crucial to the just determination of the application. Accordingly, the learned judge held: “It is trite law that

he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. The plaintiffs/applicants have not come to court to

ask that my discretion be exercised in their favour with clean hands”. 8

Critics have argued that in so far as the learned judge in the OKE case “holds that a Certificate of

Occupancy is conclusive evidence of a right over land and that a person who omits to object to its

issuance is estopped from denying from denying its validity, he must have overlooked the express

6 (1990) 2 N.W.L.R (part 135), 745. This article is a follow up on an earlier case comment by the present writer entitled: The Certificate of Occupancy: its

Strength and Weaknesses”. – Forthcoming in the LASU Law Journal, 1990 Vol. 1 No. 2.

7 HCL/3/80 of 2/6/80 reported in cases on the Land Use Act, 1983 edited by J.A Omotola, at p. 123.

8 Supra at p. 123

2

provision of Section 39 of the Land Use Act which vests the High court with the exclusive jurisdiction to

determine title to a statutory right of occupancy”. 9 It is also been suggested that Delano, J’s “approach”

lacks legal basis although it is desirable. 10

But the truth would seem to be that these critics have deliberately misconstrued the ruling of Delano, J. in

the case by disregarding its context. The relevant passage in the ruling runs as follows:

“The plaintiffs/applicants could have got an arguable case if they had filed a caution instead of allowing

the defendants/respondents to be granted a Certificate of Occupancy….”11

The above statement needs to be understood in its context. The crucial issue for determination before the

court was not the nature or effect of the Certificate of Occupancy granted to the defendants/respondents;

but whether or not the circumstances of the case at that point in time, can justify an order of Interlocutory

injunction. An interlocutory injunction is an equitable remedy. 12 It is granted at the discretion of the

Court.13

This discretion is exercised judiciously, 14 with utmost caution and on recognized principles. 15 In

exercising the discretion one way or the other, the Court has a duty to consider all the circumstances of

9 Editorial comment on Prince Elijah Oke & Another v P. Adalemo & Others, HCL/3/80 of 2/6/80 (Cases on the Land Use Act), 1983 at p. 123.

10 A.A. Utuama: “Certificate of Occupancy and the Problem of Security of Title: Rt. Honourable Sir Adetokunboh Ademola V. John Amoo & Others”.

(1984) 1 & 2 J.P.P.L 97 ay 98; A.A. Utuama: Certficate of Occupancy: A Worthy Muniment of Title? Ozungwe V. Gbishe & Another, (1985)2 N.W.L.R. (Part

8), 528’ (1986)5 J.P.P.L 74 at 76; J.A. Omotola: Essays on the Land Use Act 1978. Lagos University Press, 1984 p.46; Yemi Osinbajo: “Problems of proof in

Declaration of Title to land”. (1987) 6 & 7 J.P.P.L. 47 at p.66.

11 Supra, at p. 123

12 Globe Fishing Industries Ltd & Others V Chief Folarin Coker, (1990) 7 N.W.L.R. (Part 162), 265 particularly per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. at pp. 285-286.

And see also Kufeji V Kogbe, (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 113: Egbe V Onogun, (1972)1 All N.L.R. 95; Ladunni V Kukoyi, (1972)3 S.C.33; Obeya Memorial

Hospital Ltd V A.G. Federation, (1987)3 N.W.L.R. (part 98), 465; Opara V Ihejirika, (1990)6 N.W.L.R (part 156), 291.

13 M.I. Jegede: Principles of Equity, Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1981 at p. 71 And vide supra n. 12.

14 M.I. Jegede, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

3

the case including the conduct of the parties and the effect the order would have on the rest. 16 Therefore,

it would appear that Delano, J acted rightly by considering the conduct of the parties and concluding that

is was inequitable to interfere with the status quo ante.

It is difficult to imagine how Delano, J’s ruling in the OKE Case could be interpreted as laying down a

rule on the nature of a Certificate of Occupancy. Since the application before the court was interlocutory,

it is submitted that the judge could not have held that the Certificate of Occupancy was conclusive

evidence of the right of the defendants/respondents over the land in dispute or that a person who omits to

object to its issuance is estopped from denying its validity. 17 As a matter of fact, the success or otherwise

of a preliminary application of the kind in the OKE Case has no effect on the substantive matter which

must still be adjudicated upon. 18 If critics had properly interpreted the ruling, they would have realized

that its strength lies in the principle that an applicant for an equitable remedy must conduct his affairs

conscienciously if he wishes to succeed. If he sleeps over his right like the plaintiffs/applicants in the

instant case, he should not hope that equity would avail him, for equity does not aid an indolent.

C. NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET

The nature and effect of a Certificate of Occupancy issued in respect of a piece of land to a person who

has no legal or equitable interest in the land was the issue for determination in the 1982 case of

15 In Globe Fishing Ind. Ltd. V Coker, (supra) the Supreme Court held that at the stage of an application for interlocutory injunction pending the

determination of the substantive suit, the pertinent consideration is whether a case is made out which requires to be tried, i.e. is there a substantial question to

be investigated? See also Kotoye V. C.B.N (supra).

16 Vide supra, 12. And see Akinlose V A.I.T. Ltd., (1961) W.N.L.R. 116;

17 With respect, the interpretation of the OKE Case by Yemi Osinbanjo, (Op. Cit, AT p.66) to the effect that the learned Judge refused to interfere with the

issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy to the plaintiff because the defendants did not object to its issuance at the appropriate time, cannot be correct.

18 The Supreme Court, per Akpata, J.S.C., held in Globe Fishing Ind. Ltd. V Coker that a court should refrain in its ruling on an application for an

interlocutory injunction from resolving matters which should be adjudicated upon at the trial. The essence of an interlocutory injunction is not to make the trial

a mere formality and a mockery of special procedure: (1990) 7 N.W.L.R (Part 162), 265

4

RT.HON.SIR ADETOKUNBOH ADEMOLA v. JOHN AMOO & OTHERS. 19In this case, the plaintiff,

Sir, Adetokunboh Ademola, instituted an action against the defendants claiming damages for trespass over

a developed piece of land in an urban area and which the plaintiff inherited from his late father. The

plaintiff’s root of title was traced to one Amoo who had sold it to one Subuola who in turn sold it to the

plaintiff’s father. On the other hand, the defendants relied on the fact that they purchased the land in

dispute from the descendants of the late Amoo and the fact that some of them sought and obtained

Certificate of Occupancy over the land in dispute from the Governor of Ogun State. It was also contended

on behalf of the defendants that since the plaintiff did not object to the issuance of the Certificates of

Occupancy when he was required to do so through an advertisement in the Nigerian Tribune, he can no

longer complain.

On the evidence before the Court, Odunlami, J. had no difficulty in pronouncing judgment in favour of

the plaintiff. It was obvious that the descendants of Amoo had no interest in the land in dispute, which

they can validly transfer to the defendants. On this premise, it was improper for the Governor to have

issued the Certificate of Occupancy to the defendants. Thus the Certificates of Occupancy were declared

invalid, null and void. A Certificate of Occupancy that is based on nothing cannot stand. It will collapse.20

Commentators have opined that the decision of Odunlami, J. in the ADEMOLA Case is tantamount to

proclaiming that a Certificate of Occupancy issued over a piece of land to a person by a Governor in

accordance with the provisions of Section 9 of the Act does not conclusively establish his right over the

land. 21 If this interpretation of the ADEMOLA Case is intended to serve as a precise and definite rule of

law on the nature of a Certificate of Occupancy, it is dangerously misleading. In any case involving rival

19 (1982) O.G.S.L.R. 273

20 Macfoy V U.A.C (1961) 3 A.E.R 1169 at 1172, per Lord Denning; Saidu Chiroma V M.W. Suwa, (1986) 1 N.W.L.R (Part 109), 751- And see Oladipo O.

Sholanke: “When a Revocation is not a Revocation under the Nigerian Land Use Act”. (1990) Jus Vol.1 No.8. 75-91

21 A.A Utuama: “ Certificate of Occupancy and the Problem of Security of Title: Rt. Honourable Sir Adetokunboh Ademola V. John Amoo & Others”.

(1984) 1 & 2 J.P.P.L. 97 at 98

5

claimants to a piece of land, it would be superfluous to lay down a rigid rule that a Certificate of

Occupancy is or is not conclusive of the right of the holder over the land in dispute for that may

unwittingly be ousting the jurisdiction of the Courts. 22 A better, and perhaps practical, approach is to

proceed on the premise that each case will depend on its peculiar circumstances, more so, that the act

appears silent on the issue.

Be that as it may, the decision of Odunlami, J. in the ADEMOLA Case granting the land in dispute to the

plaintiff inspite of the issuance of Certificate of Occupancy to the defendants by the Governor of Ogun

State cannot be faulted on the facts. Essentially, the decision was based on the time honoured maxim of

commercial and property law; nemo dat quod non Habet; rather than on the conclusiveness or otherwise

of the Certificates of Occupancy. If the descendants of late Amoo had had an interest in the land in dispute

or if the plaintiffs’ case had been shaky, the Certificates of Occupancy would have added some weight to

the case of the defendants. Apart from this possibility, Odunlami, J. made certain remarks, which are

pertinent.

“Incidentally, the Land Use Act does not make provisions for the way and manner in which the

prospective applicants for Certificates of Occupancy are to make their intention known to other claimants

and the Newspaper (Nigerian Tribune) is not a Government Gazette which the Court could take judicial

notice of things published in it, thus the plaintiff could not be bound by publication in the daily papers

especially when there is no evidence that he saw and read it”. 23 Taken to its logical end, the above remark

could mean that if the Government had advertised in the official Gazette rather than the Nigerian Tribune

and /or if the defendants had established by evidence that the plaintiff saw and read the advertisement in

22 On jurisdiction of High Courts and other Courts see Sections 39-42 of the Act. Note that the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine any

question as to the persons entitled to a piece of land under the Act. See also Section 236 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1979. And see

infra for further discussion.

23 (1982) O.G.S.L.R. 273 at 283-284 With respect, it is not totally correct to say that the Act does not make provisions for the way and manner in which

prospective applicants for Certificates of Occupancy are to make their intention known to other claimants. By Section 46 of the Act, the national Council of

States and the Governor are empowered to make regulations with regard to some matters including the grant of Certificate of Occupancy under Section 9 of

the Act.

6

the Nigerian Tribune inviting objections to the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy to the defendants

but did not object at the material time, the plaintiff would have been estopped from denying the rights of

the defendants over the land in dispute. If this interpretation is correct, it is submitted that the Certificates

of occupancy would have finally established the defendants’ right over the land in dispute at least as

against the plaintiff in this suit. It is arguable of course, that such a conclusion betrays an application of

equitable principles rather than law and that title to the land cannot be founded on estopped. Indeed, in

PETER CHIWENZE & ANOR V. VERONICA MASI & ANOR, 24 Oputa, J.S.C remarked, “title by

estopped is a negative title. It is a highly metamorphical and elliptical mode of indicating the use, which

may be made of an estoppel. An estoppel can never be a capital unit. It does not ipso facto confer title”.

Even then, the point will still be made that as between the parties in the instant case, a finding of estoppel

will certainly be fatal to the claims of the plaintiff for ownership and possession of the land in dispute. 25

Estoppel being a rule of evidence and an equitable principle 26 will in that wise, serve as a shield, rather

than as a sword, thereby preventing the plaintiff from denying the right of the defendants over the land in

dispute. And if the plaintiff is estopped from denying the right of the defendants over the land in dispute

consequent upon his conduct and the state of facts, the Court will have no power to declare that the

Certificate of Occupancy issued to the defendants were invalid and a fortiori, the interests of the

defendants in the land in dispute would have been established, albeit negatively.

D. A DOCUMENT OF TITLE?

24 (1989) 1 N.W.L.R. (Part 97), 254 at 269.

25 Dibie Ajuwa & Others V. Sebastian Benjamin Odili, (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. (Part 9), 710 at 730-731.

26 London Joint Stock Bank V. Macmillan (1918) A.C. 777 at 819 per Viscount Haldane; Peter Chiwenze and Anor V. Veronica Masi (Mrs) & Anor (supra)

at p. 268-269; of Ijale V. A.G. Leventis & Co. Ltd., (1965) 1 All N.L.R. 176.

7

In AHMED TIJANI V. YAKUBU & OTHERS, 27 a Certificate of Occupancy issued by the Governor of

Kwara State in evidence of a customary right of occupancy to a plaintiff was nullified because the

plaintiff had no legal or equitable interest in the land, the subject matter of the certificate , as required by

the Act. 28 Here again, the emphasis was on the root of title, not on the document of title.

However, commenting on the case, Momodu K. Momodu said:

“This case goes to reinforce the view that a certificate of occupancy does not amount to a grant of any

right. It is only evidence of a right that is already in existence. Where no right exists, the certificate cannot

serve as an efficacious means of establishing such non existent right”. 29 It is submitted that this is going

too far. It has been seen that the Governor of every state is authorized to issue Certificates of Occupancy

in three instances. 30 For ease of reference, these instances are reproduced again here:

“9(1) It shall be lawful for the Governor –

(a). When granting a statutory right of occupancy to any person; or

(b). When any person is in occupation of land under a customary right of occupancy and

applies in the prescribed manner; or

(c). When any person is entitled to a statutory right of occupancy, to issue a Certificate of

Occupancy under his hand in evidence of such right of occupancy”. 31

27 (Unreported) Suit No. KWS/104/80 of 16/4/84 Noted by Momodu Kassim-Momodu: (1984) 1 & 2 J.P.P.L.99.

28 i.e. Section 36 thereof.

29 Momodu Kassim-Momodu: “Nullity of Certificate of Occupancy – An Exanination of Alhaji Ahmed Tijani Ahmed V. Alhaji Yakubu & Others Siut No

KWS/104/80 of Monday, 16 April, 1984(Unreported) Honourable Justice J.F> Gbadeyan, High Court of Kwara State, Ilorin”. (1984)1 & 2 J.P.P.L. 99 at 101.

30 Section 9(1) of the Act.

31 Ibid.

8

It should be noted that Sections 9(1)(a), 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(c) reproduced above are to be read disjunctively.

32 The Governor could act under any of the subsection independently of the others. 33 Considering

instances (b) and (c) above first, it should be conceded that the Governor can only issue Certificates of

Occupancy in these instances in evidence of vested rights over land-prior to the commencement of the

Act. 34 Indeed the Governor has no power to refuse the issuance of the certificates to the applicants in

theses categories. 35 Once he is satisfied that the lands were vested in the applicants before the Act came

into operation, he has a duty to issue the certificates to them as a matter of course. 36 In these cases, it may

be argued that the Certificates of Occupancy do not amount to any granny of rights of occupancy. 37 This

is what happened in the AHMED case.

It is important to distinguish instances (b) and (c) above from a case arising from the grant of a statutory

right of occupancy under Section 5(1)(a) of the Act. i.e. instance (a) above. In this instance, the Certificate

of Occupancy is not issued in evidence of a right of occupancy in existence before the commencement of

the Act; it is issued in evidence of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor pursuant to

Section 5(1)(a) of the Act. A Certificate of Occupancy in this class can be likened to any other document

of title, which is meant to confer or transfer a right over land from a grantor to a grantee. It is submitted

32 Dennis A. Otti V. A.G. Plateau State & Others, (1985) H.C.N.L.R., 787.

33 Ibid.

34 In a case falling under Section 6 and Section 9(1)(b) of the Act, the Certificate of Occupancy may be issued in evidence of a right created pursuant to the

provisions of the Act rather than a right that was vested in a person before the Act. In this instance, the certificate will have the same feature as the one issued

pursuant to section 5(1)(a) and Section 9(1)(a) of the Act.

35 Ozungwe V. Gbishe, (1985) 2 N.W.L.R (Part 8), 528

36 Ibid.

37 But see infra.

9

that such a Certificate of Occupancy is a good and reliable document of title to land. 38 It is a document of

grant of a statutory right of occupancy. This is different from what happened in the AHMED case.

The Court of Appeal seems to have expressed the opinion that a Certificate of Occupancy is capable of

conferring or transferring an interest in land when it held in the case of SAIDU CHIROMA V. MARKUS

YEAM SUWA, 39 per Ogundere, J.C.A that “a Certificate of Occupancy creates a term of years absolute

or a lease for the number of years stated” 40 in favour of the holder of the certificate.

The facts of the CHIROMA case taken from the headnote are as follows: “The plaintiff/applicant sued the

defendant/respondent in the Kaduna Upper Court for trespass. At the trial, the plaintiff/appellant tendered

a Certificate of Occupancy issued to him in respect of the land in dispute but adduced no further evidence.

The Certificate of Occupancy was issued in 1981. The defendant/respondent on the other hand led

evidence to show that the plaintiff/appellant had sold the land in dispute to him for N1000.00 and that he

was put in possession thereof. Payment of the purchase price was, according to him, completed over

before the plaintiff/appellant got his Certificate of Occupancy in 1981.

The Upper Area Court gave judgment in favour of the defendant/respondent. The plaintiff/appellant

appealed to the High Court, which dismissed his appeal. Being dis-satisfied with the decisions, he

appealed to the Court of Appeal…” 41

Arising from these facts, the Court of Appeal was confronted with the issue of who, among the parties,

had a better title to the land in dispute? Was it the plaintiff/appellant who obtained a Certificate of

Occupancy in respect of the land in dispute in 1981 or the defendant/respondent who purchased the land

38 The same view was expressed by Omolaja Adeniji: “Land Use Act 1978- Mortgaging a Right of Occupancy” Report of a National Workshop on the Land

Use Act, Edited by J.A. Omotola, Lagos University Press, 1982, p. 86 at p. 90.

39 (1986) 1 N.W.L.R. (part 19), 751.

40 Ibid. , at 756

41 Ibid. , at 751-752

10

in dispute, paid for it and went into possession before 1981 without obtaining a deed of conveyance or

lease?

In answering the question, the Court of Appeal proceeded on the footing that both parties had interests in

the land in dispute: The interest of the plaintiff/appellant being a legal estate created by the Certificate of

Occupancy obtained in 1981 and the interest of the defendant/respondent being an equitable one arising

from the purchase and possession of the land in dispute from the plaintiff/appellant. Therefore, the issue

was: which of the two competing interests is superior? Put differently, can the Certificate of Occupancy

obtained subsequently by the plaintiff/appellant defeat the earlier equitable interest of the

defendant/respondent?

Following the cases of T.A ORANSAMI V. M.O. IDOWU, 42 KARIMU AYINLA V. SIFAWU

SIJUWOLA, 43 AMAO V. ADEBONA, 44 SOREMEKUN V. SHODIPO, 45 OSHODI V. BALOGUN &

OTHERS, 46 SULEIMAN & ANOTHER V. JOHNSON, 47 and WALSH V. LONSDALE 48 on priority of

competing interests in land, the Court of Appeal held that a defendant/respondent with an equitable

interest in land in an undisturbed long possession, be it a customary law title or under an agreement,

without a conveyance, cannot have his right defeated by a subsequent holder of a legal estate in the land.

The Court felt that the plaintiff/appellant should not be allowed to appropriate and reprobate. “He must

42 (1959) 4 F.S.C. 40

43 (1984) 5 S.C. 44 at 76-77

44 (1962) LLR 125

45 (1969) L.L.R. 30

46 4 W.A.C.A 1at 6

47 13 W.A.C.A. 213

48 (1882)2 Ch. D. 9 at 15-16

11

not be allowed to set up his real estate n fraud of his grantee of an equitable interest. The respondents

equity in the circumstances prevails over the legal estate of the appellant so far as the land in dispute is

concerned”. 49

In summary, the decision of the Court of Appeal in the CHIROMA case would appear to be authority for

the following propositions: -

(i) Where there are two competing interests in land the first in time prevails. 50

(ii) A subsequent legal interest in land cannot over-reach a prior equitable interest in the same land

if the equities are not equal. 51

(iii) The Land Tenure Law 52 (and the Land Use Act) recognize and approve the continued

applicability of equitable principles to land transactions. 53

(iv.) Equitable interest in land can and do subsist under the Land Tenure Law (and the Land Use

Act.).

(v.) A Certificate of Occupancy issued pursuant to the provisions of the Land Tenure Law 54 (and

the Land Use Act) 55 creates an interest in Land – it creates a term of years absolute or a lease for a

specified number of years.

49 (1986)1 N.W.L.R. (Part 19), 751 at 758

50 (1986)1 N.W.L.R. (Part 19), 751 at 752; Karimu Ayinla v. Sifawu Sijuwola, (1984)5 SC at 76 and Amao v. Adebona, (1962) L.L.R. 125 referred to.

51 Walsh v. Lonsdale, (1882)2 Ch.D.9.

52 Cap. 59 Laws of Northern Nigeria

53 (1986)1 N.W.L.R. (Part 19), 751 at 757-758 And see Section 10 Land Tenure Law and Section 48 Land Use Act.

54 Section 10 Land Tenure Law; Section 9 Land Use Act. Note that most of the provisions of the Land Tenure Law are in all fours with those of the land Use

Act.

55 Section 9 of the Act.

12

The fifth proposition above accords with the point being made in this paper that at least as regards cases

falling under Sections 5(1)(a) and 9(1)(a) of the Act, a Certificate of Occupancy is a document of title. It

is a document that confers a right of occupancy on the holder of the certificate and like any other

document of title, it is a registrable document. 56 In fact, in Lagos State, Certificate of Occupancy are

being registered as instruments of title. One is of the view that this practice has sufficient legal

foundation, 57

E. THE OGUNLEYE CASE

Of particular importance to the present exercise is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in JOSHUA

OGUNLEYE v. BABATAYO ONI. 58 The significance of the OGUNLEYE case is fourfold. First, it

reflects on the strength of a Certificate of Occupancy as a document of title and a documentary evidence

of a right of occupancy. Second, it confirms one of the leading themes of property and Commercial Law:

nemo dat quod non habet. Third, it signals the jealousness with the Courts quard their jurisdiction in this

sphere of the Law and Fourth, it defines the power of a Governor under the Act regarding the issuance of

Certificate of Occupany.

The short history of the OGUNLEYE case reveals that the plaintiff/appellant sued the

defendant/respondent for trespass allegedly committed over a developed piece of land and a perpetual

injuction restraining the defendant/respondent, his servants, agents and privies from further acts of

trespass to the land. The plaintiff/appellant’s case rested upon a document executed between him and the

Osu Community and a Certificate of occupancy issued to him by the Governor of Oyo State. The Osu

Community’s title to the land was said to be rooted in Native Law and Custom. In defence the

defendant/respondent pleaded and led evidence to show that he inherited the land from his late father

56 A registrable document is an instrument affecting land whereby one party(the grantor) confers, transfers, limits, charges or extinguishes in favour of

another party (the grantee) any right or title to, or interest in land. See Section 2 Land Instruments Registration Law of Lagos State for e.g.

57 Cf. J.A. Omotola: Essays on the Land Use Act. op.cit., at 42-43.

58 (1990)2 N.W.L.R. (Part 135), 745.

13

according to native law and custom. It was also established that the defendant/respondent’s father who

was in possession of the land at all times material to the action, bought the land from the oriinal owners –

the Ahere/Arikese people of Osu.

The Trial Court gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff/appellant holding that he had established a better

title to the land in dispute. 59 Dis-satisfied with the judgment, the defendant/respondent appealed to the

Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal un-animously allowed the appeal thus setting aside the decision of

the trial judge in respect of the claim for damages for trespass. 60 The plaintiff/appellant thereupon

appealed to Supreme Court.

The crucial issue formulated before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiff/appellant had a better

title to the land in dispute to sustain his action against the defendant/respondent for damages for trespass.

61

The five Justices of the Court un-animously affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal that the

plaintiff/appellant did not establish a better title. Summarized briefly, the main reasons for the conclusion

reached by each of the Justices would appear to be as follows:

BELGORE, J.S.C: (delivered the land judgment): The land in dispute was owned by

Ahere/Arikese descendants who granted it to the father of the defendant/respondent. The lengthy

and convincing averments in the defendant/respondent’s statement of defence regarding to the root

of his title to the land were never denied by the plaintiff/appellant. The plaintiff/appellant failed to

trace the root of title of Osu Community to the land in dispute. The weight of evidence is against

the plaintiff/appellant. 62

59 HIL/18/84 of 13th December 1984.

60 CA/1/34/86 of 3rd July 1987.

61 (1990)2 N.W.L.R. (Part 135), 745 at 768, 778 & 781. But see (1990)2 N.W.L.R. (Part 135), 745 at 774 per Obaseki, Ag. C.J.N.

62 Ibid., at 772 - 773

14

OBASEKI, Ag. C.J.N. (Concurred): The Certificate of Occupancy issued to the plaintiff/appellant

pursuant to Section 34 of the Act by the Governor of Oyo State did not confer any title in the land

in dispute on the plaintiff/appellant since he did not have any interest in the land prior to the Act.

63

AGBAJE, J.S.C. (Concurred): Since the issue in this case is whether the land in dispute was

originally owned by the Osu Community as alleged by the plaintiff/appellant or by the

Ahere/Arikese Community as alleged by the defendant/respondent, the burden is on the

plaintiff/appellant to prove that the land belonged to the Osu Community. The burden was not

discharged by the plaintiff/appellant having regard to the state of pleadings and the evidence

adduced by both parties. 64

NNAEMEKA-AGU. J.S.C. (Concurred): The production of a document of grant is not equivalent

to the proof of title when the origin of the title of the grantor was neither admitted nor established.

The burden of establishing the title of the grantor is on the plaintiff/appellant. The onus to prove a

better title will shift to the defendant/respondent, if, and only if, the plaintiff/appellant traces his

title to a person or persons whose title is admitted or established. 65

WALI, J.S.C. (Concurred): The Certificate of Occupancy issued to the plaintiff/appellant did not

confer any title on him in respect of the land in dispute since the Osu Community does not own

the land much less to pass any title to the plaintiff/appellant.66

63 Ibid. , at 774

64 Ibid. , at 778 - 779

65 Ibid. , at 782 - 783

66 Ibid. , at 785 - 786

15

It is thus clear that the decision of the Supreme Court In the OGUNLEYE case was, in the main, based on

the rule that no one can give a better title than he himself possesses. Obviously, the judges were persuaded

in their reasoning by the evidence that the Osu community had no interest in the land in dispute, which it

can transfer to the plaintiff/appellant. And the plaintiff/appellant not being the person in whom the land in

dispute was vested immediately before the commencement of the Act cannot be heard to say that the

Certificate of Occupancy issued to him by the Governor in evidence of a non-existing right of occupancy,

reinforces his claim. 67 the Supreme Court was therefore on the right path when it held that the Certificate

of Occupancy was a nullity. The decision could not have been different.

Indeed the decision of the Supreme Court in the OGUNLEYE case is 2/3 consistent with the views

expressed by the court of appeal and the same court in the earlier OZUNGWE v. GBISHE & ANOR. 68

which was briefly referred to by Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC in connection with another point of law in the

OGUNLEYE case. Although, in OZUNGWE v. OGBISHE & ANOR, the main issue addressed by the

Court of appeal and the Supreme Court was based on the doctrine of res judicata, the subsidiary issue

touching upon the nature of the land in dispute was disposed of by the Court of Appeal in this way:

“In my view, regardless of its apparent validity the Certificate of Occupancy… has become a

worthless document to the extent to which it relates to the parcel of land the subject of litigation in

exhibits ‘C’ and ‘D’. It no longer confers any title on the respondent sufficient to dislodge

Ornam… from the land”. 69

And the Supreme Court, per Aniagolu, JSC. , completed the coup de grace thus:

67 See further on this point: Oladipo O. Sholanke “When a Revocation is not a Revocation Under the Nigerian Land Use Act”. , op.cit.

68 (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. (Part 8), 528

69 Ibid. , at 534.

16

“Neither the Governor nor the Local Government would have a right to divert such land from the

person in whom it was properly vested by the issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy to another

person in whom the land was not vested”. 70

It should be stressed that these statements were made in the light of the fact that the Certificate of

Occupancy in question was obtained by the holder after his previous actions for possession of the land to

which the certificate relates, had been heard and dismissed on merit. 71 The Court of Appeal and the

Supreme Court did not hesitate to dismiss his new action based on the Certificate of Occupancy for the

simple reason that he cannot relitigate the same issue against the same parties.

For the present purposes, the dicta of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in OZUNGWE v.

GBISHE & ANOR. , are indications that the issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy in respect of a land

in dispute to one of the rival claimants would not cure any defects in the title of the recipient and if he

does not have an interest in the land, the Certificate of Occupancy would be no more than a worthless

document so far it relates to the piece o land in dispute. This is the essence of the maxim: neo dat quod

non habet.

F. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE OGUNLEYE CASE

The Supreme Court in the OGUNLEYE Case made three further points, which are of interest. First, while

recognizing that it would always be necessary to rest a decision on the determination of the onus of proof

and that the onus could shift in certain cases, Nnaemeka-Agu J.S.C. thought that the mere production of a

Certificate of Occupancy by a plaintiff/appellant, without more, does not shift burden of proof to his

opponent. 72 This point is crucial to the present enquiry because it touches upon the evidential status of a

70 Ibid. , at 540.

71 The plaintiff/appellant in Ozungwe v. Gbishe, (above) had earlier instituted two actions on the same piece of land prior to the issuance of the Certificate of

Occupancy to him. The first action was at Grade II Area Court while the second action was instituted at Grade I Area Court. Both actions were against the

same defendant. The Grade I Area Court gave judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff/appellants’ appeal to the High Court Makurdi was dismissed.

72 (1990) 2 N.W.L.R. (Part 135), 745 at 782 – 783.

17

Certificate of Occupancy. Second, the Supreme Court, per Belgore, J.S.C., perhaps not content with the

decision as it relates to the particular facts of the case, seized the opportunity to make a startling statement

on the value of a Certificate of Occupancy. According to the learned Justice: “The purported right of

occupancy issued by the Governor of Oyo State in 1983 is void and all the appellant has in his hand is a

piece of paper having no value.” 73 Third, Obaseki, Ag. C.J.N (as he was then) in his short concurring

judgement pointed out that a Certificate of Occupancy issued in respect of a piece of land cannot stop the

court from enquiring into the validity and existence of the title the holder claims to possess and on the

basis of which the certificate was issued. 74 It is proposed to examine these points in turn.

I. It is a principle of law that the onus is on the party who alleges a fact to prove that the fact exists;

75 and generally in civil cases, the burden of proof lies on the party who would fail if no evidence is

edduced on either side. 76 However, once that party produces satisfactory evidence to establish his claim,

the burden shifts on the party against whom judgement would be delivered if no more evidence were

edduced. 77 Thus it was held in the OGUNLEYE Case that the general onus was on the plaintiff/appellant

to prove that he had a better title to the land in dispute to support his claim against the

defendant/respondent for the trespass. But the question is: At what point, if at all, did the onus shift to the

defendant/respondent?

The Supreme Court was confronted with an argument that the Certificate of Occupancy being a prime-

facie evidence of title to the land in dispute dispenses with the need to establish the root of title of the Osu

73 Ibid. , at 773. Underlining supplied for emphasis.

74 Ibid. , at 774.

75 Section 134(1) Evidence Act, cap.62, 1958 Laws of the Federation. There are identical provisions in the evidence legislations of all the states in the

Federation; And see United Bank for Africa Ltd. & Anor. v. Ngozi Achoru, (1990) 6 N.W.L.R. (Part 156), 254 at 275.

76 Sections 135 and 136 Evidence Act; Ganiyu Tewogbade & Co. v. Arasi Akande & Co. , (1968) N.W.L.R. 440; Okechukwu & Sons v. Nda, (1967)

N.M.L.R. 368; Are v. Adisa, (1967) N.W.L.R. 304.

77 Section 136(2) Evidence Act; Anazodo Nwosu v. Chukwumanjo Udeaja, (1990) N.W.L.R. (Part 125), 188, Thomas v. Holder, 12 W.A.C.A. 78.

18

Community. Furthermore, it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant, that the production of a

Certificate of Occupancy by one party to a suit, shifts the burden of proving a better title to the land in

dispute to the other party.

Nnaemeka-Agu, J.S.C. conceded that the onus could shift to the defendant/respondent; but added that this

can happen if, and only if, the plaintiff/appellant has traced his title to a person or persons whose title is

admitted or established. 78 Although the learned Judge recognized that the production of a document or

documents regarding the land in dispute is one of the five ways of proving title to land, 79 he felt that it is

wrong to assume that all that the plaintiff/appellant needs to do is to produce the document or documents

and rest his case. 80 Indeed, while making a comparison between a Certificate of Occupancy and other

muniments or instruments of title, the learned Justice remarked:

“But all land title deeds are muniments or instruments of title. So they are at least prime-facie

evidence of title. On the other hand, a Certificate of Occupancy only gives the right to use and

occupy land. It neither confers nor is it necessarily an evidence of title”. 81

The impression thus created by Nnaemeka-Agu, J.S.C. is that a Certificate of Occupancy is inferior to

other “muniments or instruments of title” and that the evidential status of the certificate is as illusive as a

dream.

78 (1990) 2 N.W.L.R. (Part 135), 745 at 783.

79 Title can also be proved by (i) traditional evidence (ii) acts of possession and ownership extending over a sufficient length of time and are numerous and

positive enough to warrant the inference that the plaintiff is an exclusive owner; (iii) acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land (iv) possession of

connected or adjacent land in circumstances which make it probable that the owner of such adjacent or connected land is probably the owner of the land in

dispute. See cases of D.O Idundun & Ors. V. Daniel Okumagba & Ors. , (1976) 9-10 S.C. 227; Adedibu v. Adewoyin, 13 W.A.C.A 191; Johnson v. Lawanson,

(1971) 1 All N.L.R. 56; Ekpo v. Ita, 11 N.L.R. 68; Da Costa v. Ikomi, (1968) 1 All N.L.R. 394; Oke-chukwu v. Okafor, (1969) 1 All N.L.R. 685 and Anazodo

Nwosu v. Chukwumanjo Udeaja, (1990) 1 N.W.L.R. (Part 125), 188.

80 (1990) 2 N.W.L.R. (Part 135), 745 at 782. It should be noted that the Supreme Court held in the case of Anazodo Nwosu v. Chukwumanjo Udeaja, (1990)

1 N.W.L.R. (part 125), 188 that each of the five ways of proving title as laid down in Idundun v. Okumagba (1976) 9-10 S.C. 227 is independent of the others.

Thus, it was held, it amounts to mis-direction for a court to insist on additional pieces of evidence of ownership after a party has produced a document of title.

81 (1990) 2 N.W.L.R. (Part 135), 745 at 784 Underlining mine.

19

The first point regarding the inferior status of a Certificate of Occupancy has been addressed earlier in

this paper. One can only add at this stage that all muniments or documents of title or all documents

relating to the transfer of an interest in land, including a Certificate of Occupancy, have the same status so

long as their relative strength or weakness is based on the maxim nemo dat quod non-habet. 82 and so long

as the courts are vested with elusive jurisdiction to determine who owns a particular piece of land in any

given case. 83 As regards the second issue of the evidential status of a Certificate of Occupancy, it is

submitted that by law 84 and contrary to the opinion of Nnaemeka-Agu, J.S.C., a Certificate of Occupancy

is NECESSARILY a prime-facie evidence of a right of occupancy. It is a documentary evidence of a right

on a land in that it raises a presumption of title in favour of the holder which is sufficient to shift the onus

of establishing his interest in the land to his adversary or rival claimant.

In an inspiring article referred to by Agbaje, J.S.C. in his concurring judgment, 85 Yemi Osinbanjo

beautifully summarized the rule thus:

“… a general statement that may be made about the certificate of occupancy is that it raises a

presumption in favour of the holder albeit a rebuttable presumption that the holder has a right of

occupancy. The onus of disproving this right is on the person who asserts the contrary”. 86

Indeed implicit in the decision of the Supreme court, particularly the concurring judgment of Agbaje,

J.S.C., is the fact that a plaintiff/appellant who produces a Certificate of Occupancy as evidence of his

right of occupancy over a piece of land in dispute may succeed if the defendant/respondent does not

adduce evidence to rebut the presumption raised by the Certificate of Occupancy. If however, the

82 Abudu Lasisi v. Oladapo Tubi, (1974) 12 S.C. 71: Ogunleye v Oni, (1990) 2 N.W.L.R. (Part 135), 745 at 784.

83 Sections 38 – 42 of the Act and Section 236 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.

84 Section 9 of the Act.

85 (1990) 2 N.W.L.R. (Part 135), 745 at 779 – 780.

86 Yemi Osinbanjo: “Problems of proof in Declaration of Title to Land”, (supra) at 67. Emphasis mine.

20

defendant/respondent produces evidence to the contrary, the onus shifts again to the plaintiff/appellant

and he would than have to rest his case on other grounds. 87 In the OGUNLEYE Case, there was no doubt

that the presumption raised by the Certificate of Occupancy pleaded, tendered and relied upon by the

plaintiff/appellant was rebutted by the lengthy and cogent averments in the statement of defence and the

totality of evidence adduced by both parties which the learned judge failed to endorse, but ought to have

endorsed.

II. Next is the issue of whether a Certificate of Occupancy is a mere piece of paper having no value.

By now, it should be clear that it cannot be correct to postulate, much less, lay down a rule that a

Certificate of Occupancy is a piece of paper having no value. Thus the remark made by Belgore, J.S.C. in

the OGUNLEYE Case, in this regard must be received with utmost caution. While the statement may be

justified in view of the particular circumstances of the OGUNLEYE Case. 88 it is doubtful if it can be

supported as a general principle of law. By the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, a Certificate of

Occupancy is deemed to contain terms, which are crucial in understanding the nature of the right of

occupancy evidenced by it. For instance, the rent payable by the holder of a certificate to the state on the

land is by law annexed to the Certificate of Occupancy such that it automatically binds the holder of the

certificate and can form the basis of a cause of action. 89 Besides, by virtue of section 9(4) of the Act, the

terms and conditions of a Certificate of Occupancy issued in accordance with the provisions of the Act are

enforceable against the holder and his successors in title. Therefore, as between the holder of a Certificate

of Occupancy and the state, I would be somewhat anomalous to even suggest that the Certificate of

Occupancy is a mere “Piece of Paper having no value”.

87 Sections 134 – 136 Evidence Act.

88 In Ozungwe v. Gbishe, (above) where the Court of Appeal made a similar remark about the nature of Certificate of Occupancy, the facts indicated clearly

that the particular Certificate of Occupancy was based on nothing. Therefore, it was bound to collapse.

89 Section 10 of the Act.

21

III. So far the points have been made that the power of a Governor to issue a Certificate of Occupancy

is strictly regulated by the provisions of the Act and that the certificate itself is not an absolute instrument

of the title just as any other document of title is not infeasible. Indeed, the argument has been that the

correct enquiry is not whether a Certificate of Occupancy is a conclusive evidence of a right of

occupancy. The appropriate enquiry is: what is the nature of the Certificate of Occupancy tendered in the

instant proceedings? Of necessity, every decision must turn on the particular circumstances of each case.

This is the reason why it is often necessary to emphasize the jurisdiction of the courts in this sphere of the

law.

It is true that in some cases the Act authorizes a Governor to issue Certificates of Occupancy to applicants

if he is satisfied that the lands to which the applications relate were vested in the applicants before the Act

came into effect. 90 It is also true that the language of the empowering provisions indicates that in issuing

the certificates, a Governor, may act as he deems fit; 91 nevertheless, these should not be construed as

excluding or estopping the courts from adjudicating upon issues arising from or pertaining to such

certificates especially when there are rival claimants to the lands.

This must be so because the Governor may be satisfied and yet be wrong in his judgment. The courts are

better placed to determine whether a particular piece of land was or was not vested in a party before the

Act came into force. His was the view expressed by Obaseki, J.S.C. in the OGUNLEYE Case. It is correct

view.

In one case, 92 however, it may be argued that the jurisdiction of the courts is ousted by Section 47(1)(b)

of the Act which provides that no court shall enquire into any question concerning or pertaining to the

right of a Governor to grant a statutory right of occupancy in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In

90 Sections 34 (3) and 34(9) of the Act.

91 Dennis Otti v. AG. Plateau State, (1985) H.C.N.L.R. 787 at 792.

92 i.e. when a Certificate of Occupancy is issued pursuant to Section 5(1)(a) and 9(1)(a) of the Act.

22

the same vein, it may also be argued that the Courts are estopped from considering the validity of a

Certificate of Occupancy issued pursuant to Sections 5(1)(a) and 9(1)(a) of the Act. In this instance the

power of a Governor to issue a Certificate of Occupancy would seem to be absolute such that it cannot be

called into question. 93

However, it should be stressed that it is only when the grant of the right of occupancy is made and the

certificate is issued “in accordance with the provisions of the Act” that Section 47(1)(b) of the Act may

effectively oust the jurisdiction of the courts. That being the case, it is submitted that the courts have the

power, in fact the constitutional duty, to inquire whether the Governor granted the right of occupancy

and/or issued the Certificate of Occupancy in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This power

cannot be fettered in any way.

G. THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY

Before finally dispending the issue at hand, there is yet another interesting question on the power of a

Governor to issue Certificates of Occupancy under the Act which ought to be considered. It has been seen

that a Governor is authorized to issue Certificates of Occupancy in three instances but that it is only when

a Certificate of Occupancy is being issued to a person who is in occupation of land under a customary

right of occupancy that the Act expressly enjoins the prospective holder of the certificate to apply in a

prescribed manner. 94 This means that if a person in occupation of land under a customary right of

occupancy does not apply in the prescribed manner, it would be unlawful for the Governor to issue to him

a Certificate of Occupancy in evidence of his right.

In the case of an actual grant of a statutory right of occupancy under Section 5(1)(a) of the act, there

seems to be no doubt that the grant will be followed automatically by the issuance of a Certificate of

Occupancy. However, the problems of interpretation may arise when a person is entitled to a statutory

right of occupancy but has not applied for a Certificate of Occupancy in any manner. Can a Governor take

93 Dennis Otti v. AG. Plateau State, (above)

94 Section 9(1)(b) of the Act.

23

it upon himself to issue a Certificate of Occupancy to such a person if he is satisfied that the land was

vested in the person prior to the commencement of the Act? And if the person refuses or neglects, without

lawful 2/3 excuse, to accept and pay for the certificate, can the Governor invoke Section 9(3) of the Act and

thereby revoke the implied statutory right of occupancy?

Certainly, there is a conflict of interest here: The power of a Governor to issue a Certificate of Occupancy

under his hand in evidence of a right of occupancy in an automatic fashion on the one hand; and the

interest of a grantee of an implied statutory right of occupancy on the other hand. The Governor may

argue that since the Supreme Court held in SAVANNAH BANK OF NIGERIA LTD & ANOTHER v.

A.O. AJILO & ANOTHER, 95 that an implied grant of a statutory right of occupancy under the Act is to

be treated as an actual grant under the Act with all the attendant consequences; and since a grantee of an

actual statutory right of occupancy under the Act automatically gets a certificate of Occupancy from his

Governor, with all the terms annexed by law and the consequences thereof; there is no strong or

compelling reason why the grantee of an implied statutory right of occupancy under the Act should be

treated differently.

A quick answer to this may be that Section 34 of the Act which creates an implied grant of a statutory

right of occupancy does not make it mandatory for a grantee under the Section to apply for a Certificate

of Occupancy in evidence of his right. The provisions merely indicate that the grantee may at his

discretion apply for the certificate. 96 But, is the issue at hand one of liberty to apply for a Certificate of

Occupancy in evidence of an implied grant of a statutory right of occupancy or one of liberty to accept or

reject a Certificate of Occupancy thrust upon a grantee of an implied statutory right of occupancy?

Clearly, it is the latter.

Therefore, if the interpretation of the SAVANNAH BANK Case as unifying rights of occupancy under the

Act with all its attendant consequences is correct (one hopes it is not), it would seem that a grantee of an

95 (1989) 1 N.W.L.R. (Part 97), 305.

96 Sections 34(3) and 34(6) of the Act.

24

implied statutory right of occupancy under the Act may have to accept a Certificate of Occupancy issued

to him in evidence of his right with its terms and consequences. Otherwise, the Governor may exercise his

power under Section 9(3) of the Act and revoke the statutory right of occupancy or cancel the Certificate

of Occupancy and recover form the grantee any expenses incidental to its issuance. 97

The only possible solution to this imbrolio, it is suggested, is to distinguish the facts of the SAVANNAH

BANK Case from the present case and interprete the Savannah decision as unifying rights of occupancy

under the Act only to the extent that Governor’s consent must be sought and obtained for an alienation of

a right of occupancy, actual or implied. Of course, the point may also be made that the power of a

Governor to revoke a right of occupancy for a refusal or neglect to accept a Certificate of Occupancy

issued in evidence of the right is expressly limited to cases under Sections 5(1)(a) and 9(1)(a) of the Act.

Thus, it would be unlawful for a Governor to revoke am implied grant of statutory right of occupancy for

this reason.

H. COCLUSION

This paper has attempted a critical analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act and some cases decided

by the three superior courts in Nigeria since 1980 on the nature of a Certificate of Occupancy. The fact

that the status of a Certificate of Occupancy is not clearly stated in the Act need not lead to the

supposition that it is worthless document or to the assumption that the certificate does not confer title to

land under any circumstances. The conclusion reached is that the nature of a Certificate of Occupancy

97 Section 9(3) of the Act.

25

issued by a Governor pursuant to the provisions of the Act must always depend on the particular facts of

each case.

Thus a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a Governor when granting a statutory right of occupancy in

accordance with the provisions of Section 5(1)(a) of the Act is a valid and reliable document of grant.

Experience has shown that because its foundation is solid, such a certificate is usually indefeasible. A

Certificate of Occupancy is issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 9(1)(b) and 36 or Sections

9(1)(c) and 34 may also be reliable depending on the relative strength of the title of the holder prior to the

Act. In any case, the evidential status of the certificate is enormous. It raises a presumption of title in

favour of the holder, which is sufficient to shift the burden of proof from the holder to his adversary when

and if there is a dispute on the land.

And in view of the functions of a Certificate of Occupancy, it may be somewhat anomalous to classify it

as a piece of paper having no value. Since the inception of the Act, it has become imperative to take the

interest of the sate into consideration in virtually every transaction relating to land within the state. One of

the means by which state interests in land are defined is the Certificate of Occupancy. The certificate

usually contains terms specifying and defining the relationship between the holder and the state. It is

submitted that the Act would have created a vacuum had it not provided for the document known as

Certificate of Occupancy. The role of the certificate in the scheme o things under the Act seems

indispensible.

26