East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light

on US-Asian Strategic Relations

David Lai & Gary W. Hamby

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• Abstract It is widely shared that Pacific Asia is emerging as the powerhouse of the 21st century. This region has the enduring Sinic culture that holds profound philosophical, political, and strategic thoughts that set the nations in this region apart from the rest of the world community, especially the US-led West. The United States seeks to establish a strategic edge and productive relations with the nations in this region. For this foreign policy to bear fruit, the United States must, among other things, follow Sun Zi’s advice to learn more about Asian society. In one particular aspect, the United States will be better served to supplement its traditional Western approach, one that is under the influence of poker- and chess-like logic, with a wei qi–based Asian strategy of international relations. A little knowledge of the ancient board game wei qi will take US national leaders a long way in achieving the US foreign policy objectives. The game of wei qi is a significant part of many Asian cultures and greatly influences their geopolitical thinking and behavior. It bears striking resemblance to international relations and warfare. The wei qi–based strategy to international affairs follows clearly an Asian way that emphasizes the interplay of yin and yang. It also exemplifies the Chinese military classics to a remarkable extent. The wei qi concept is not available in Western military strategic thought and literature. It is, after all, a different game.

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002

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An ancient yet challenging Asian strategy game is riding the tide of information revolution across the globe. This is the game of wei qi (pronounced as [wei ch’i]; it is called igo in Japanese, baduck in Korean, and go in the United States and other places). Created in China several thousand years ago, wei qi is the oldest and most enduring board game in the world. Thanks to the spread of the internet, players in all corners of the world can now log on to an internet go server (IGS) at popular web sites such as Yahoo to play this game with the state-of-the-art computer-designed features. While it is a national game of China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, wei qi’s popularity and the recognition of its usefulness in understanding Asian culture is spreading. In 1993, at the first Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting in Seattle, NBC news anchor Tom Brokow observed that the game was a useful tool for understanding Asian strategy, especially Asian business strategy. He also pointed out that many business schools in the United States offered wei qi as an elective course to students who wanted to specialize in international business, particularly in the Asia Pacific area. Indeed, the American Go Association has chapters in thirty-six of the fifty states. In 1999 when the US Go Congress held its annual convention in San Francisco, it offered a record number of tournaments and workshops, and a national school-based network that taught almost 5,000 American children to play wei qi. San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown proclaimed the week from July 29 to August 8 the “Go Congress Week in San Francisco.”1 Played between two people on a board of 19x19 intersecting lines, the rules and objectives are amazingly simple, yet the strategic interactions and complexities from this simple game are almost limitless. The basic objective is to secure more territory on the board than your opponent does. The board starts empty. The two players take turns to place black and white stones at the intersections on the game board. Once played, the stones cannot be removed unless captured by the opponent.

1 US Go Congress report available at http://www.usgo.org/congress/

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Each piece carries the same physical weight, yet each has varying immediate and potential power. The game is like a large-scale war with multiple campaigns and battlefronts or complicated international affairs with different levels of interactions. There are local as well as global connected and seemingly disconnected battles and engagements on the board. The play is over when both players pass, agreeing that there is no more advantage for either on continued play. The winner is the one who has secured more territory, even if by only one intersection. Unlike chess where computers can challenge masters, wei qi is far more complex than even the best computer’s ability. In a 1998 match-up at the American Association for Artificial Intelligence, a state-of-the-art wei qi-playing computer program called Handtalk was given a 25-stone handicap (an unheard of advantage) against a 27-year-old American wei qi master from New Mexico named Janice Kim. Amazingly, Ms. Kim defeated Handtalk, even with such a huge handicap. Losing a game despite a 25 stone handicap puts Handtalk in the same league as a beginner human player with a couple of month’s practice 2. In 1997, IBM’s supercomputer Deep Blue defeated Chess master Garry Kasparov, with no handicap at all. Yet the designers of Deep Blue also admitted that they could not write a program to beat a wei qi master—it is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Alternative moves are said to be way beyond a billion in a game. Programmers have yet to figure out the way to make the computer “think” like a human wei qi player. Western strategists often compare geopolitics and international relations to chess- or poker-like situations. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski provides a good example in his book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basicbooks, 1997). While certainly a game of intricate strategy, chess is a game of domination where the board starts full, with the pieces in their designated positions. Each piece on a chessboard carries different weight—an hierarchy of power and rank reflecting a political entity. The status of the game (i.e., who is winning or losing) can be determined by 2 David A. Mechner, “All Systems Go,” The Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1998), p. 1.

Page 4 comparing the number and strength of the pieces on the board. For the winner, victory is absolute, and so is defeat for the loser. While the pieces can coordinate their attacks, each piece’s ability and value stay the same. Chess undoubtedly has great political and military applications. Perhaps the most important ones are its influence on the strategy to focus on the central target on the chessboard, the king, and the quest for zero-sum victory—a complete destruction of the opponent. While this is the strength of chess, however, it is also its weakness. A decision-maker who follows strictly the chess-like strategy tends to be single-minded and always seeks absolute victory. Unfortunately, such absolute gain or victory in international relations is rare. More often than not, international interactions result in relative gain or loss. Engagement and confrontation are direct as well as indirect. A well-rounded national leader should learn to deal with both situations. Here the game of wei qi can offer some insight. Poker, arguably America’s favorite analogy for geopolitics, adds chance and the art of bluffing to the strategic interaction.3 Poker players have no control over what appears in their hands. Risk-taking and bluffing are the best strategies to make the most out of whatever hands are dealt. These strategies also find their frequent application in international affairs and conflict situations. However, we should bear in mind that these strategies have their limitations. In international interactions, it usually takes calculated and long-term-based strategies to achieve foreign policy objectives. Once again, wei qi offers this kind of strategic thinking. The game of wei qi is a perfect information game in the sense that all the moves, past and future, are known to the two players, although the number of alternative future moves is large and at the present even beyond the reach of supercomputer. Chance and gamble still have their place in the game due largely to the many possible future moves, but calculated and more importantly strategic moves are the rule. Wei qi has many other special features that are not readily available in chess or poker. Most of the strategic moves fit nicely into the thoughts of the Chinese military classics. Learning a little wei qi will certainly help in

3 See John McDonald’s classic Strategy in Poker, Business & War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1950).

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getting a better understanding of the subtle strategic concepts in Sun Zi’sArt of War and other ancient Chinese military classics. Although not everyone in the Asian cultures plays wei qi (neither is the case for chess or poker in the Western societies), it is becoming increasingly clear that wei qi-, chess-, and poker-based mindsets belong to different cultures and have different bearing on the thinking and behavior of different people. Decision makers usually think in terms of these different concepts. A little knowledge in the game of wei qi will take the US leaders a long way in understanding the Asian strategic thinking.

• Wei Qi: Its Origins and Evolution Wei qi originated in ancient China, but there is no solid record of when or how it was created. Wei qi scholars generally rely on three main sources of reference to speculate its origins and evolution. The first sources are the comments on wei qi and reference to the game by early Chinese philosophers such as Confucius and Mencius in their classics, and in the Zuo Zhuan, the first chronicle in world history on the change of government and warfare between the Chinese state of Lu and its neighbors during the Spring and Autumn epoch from 722 to 481 BC. If wei qi could catch the attention of these prominent thinkers, so goes the speculation, its existence and popularity are self-evident. Indeed, reference to wei qi also appeared in written matters. Since the game bears close resemblance to military affairs, early Chinese military strategists included wei qi in the Chinese military writings.4 By the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220 AD), there were even special books about wei qi such as Wei Qi Fu by Ma Rong and Wei Qi Ming by Li You. The second sources are the archeological discoveries from unearthed ancient burial sites in China. At one ancient burial site in Gansu province, scholars found some well-carved designs with intersecting lines on the pottery unearthed. These images contain ten or twelve intersecting lines. They are indicative of the early form of the wei qi gameboard.

4 Sui Shu: Jing Ji Zhi (Sui Dynasty, 581–618 AD) has mentioned wei qi in Chinese military works.

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At another burial site of the Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD) in Hunan province, archeologists unearthed a squared wei qi gameboard with fifteen intersecting lines. One finding at a Liao Dynasty (916–1125 AD) burial site in Inner Mongolia is rather interesting. Archeologists found a wei qi game table ten centimeters high and forty centimeters wide on each of the four sides. On the tabletop is a 30x30 cen-timeters square with 13x13 intersecting-lined wei qi gameboard. On the board is an unfinished game with 71 black stones and 73 white ones on the board as well as some extra stones by the side. It seems that the owner of this tome was a wei qi fan and he probably could not let go of this particular game so his family buried it with him by his side.5 Finally, there are the stories of the two legendary Chinese sage kings Yao and Shun creating the wei qi game and teaching it to their sons in an attempt to improve their intellect.6 This source remains legendary since the Chinese have not yet found any hard evidence about the existence of Yao and Shun and the other sage kings prior to the Xia Dynasty (a somewhat documented historical culture in north central China around 2200–1670 BC). While the creation of wei qi remains a puzzle to be resolved, evidence of its evolution throughout the Chinese history is readily available. Indeed, wei qi is one of the four main Chinese ancient and enduring arts—music, board game, calligraphy, and painting. From the Spring and Autumn and Warring States epochs (722–474 and 475–221 BC) on, wei qi had been a popular game in the Chinese culture. During the next two thousand years many Chinese emperors and senior political and military officials were wei qi masters. The list include Liu Bang, founder of the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC – 24 AD), Cao Cao, head of one of the Three Kingdoms (220–265 AD), Sun Che, Lu Fan, Zhuge Jin and Lu Shun, all high-ranking political and military officials of the Wu state of the Three Kingdoms,

5 Run Tu, History of Wei Qi, available at http://www.weiqi361.com/ygsm/do63/ d063-01.htm 6 Zhang Hua, Bo Wu Zhi (Encyclopedia), Jin Dynasty, 265–420 AD.

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Page 7 Jin Wu Di, founder of the Western Jin Dynasty (265–316 AD), Wang Dao, Premier of the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317–420 AD), just to name a few. 7 The popularity of wei qi game reached an all-time high level during the Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD). The Tang government established a high-ranking position for wei qi affairs at the same level with painting and calligraphy in the Imperial Academy. It was during this time that wei qi master Wang Jixin put forward one of the wei qi classics, the Ten Dictums of Wei Qi.8 Another milestone in the evolution of wei qi is the emergence of Qi Jing Shisan Bian (Thirteen Treaties on the Art of Wei Qi) in the Song Dynasty (960–1279). In this work, the author made a penetrating analysis of the strategic significance of wei qi, comparing it to the art of war. The author might have consulted Sun Zi’s Art of War because his work, like the Art of War, also has thirteen chapters. More importantly, the Thirteen Treaties on the Art of Wei Qi has incorporated rich Chinese philosophical, political, and military thought. The philosophy of yin and yang, the ideas of Daoist Yi Jing, and Sun Zi’s military thoughts are all well-blended into the art of wei qi.9 While wei qi continued to excel in China, it had also been introduced to other cultures. Wei qi made its way to India very early on. It is also played in Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal. Wei qi is believed to have reached Korea during the Chinese Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220 AD). By the seventh century, and during the Chinese Tang Dynasty time (618–907 AD), wei qi was widespread in Korea. It was also during the Tang Dynasty that wei qi entered Japan (around 754 AD), brought there by Japan’s envoys to China.

7 Run Tu’s History of Wei Qi is perhaps the most extensive study of wei qi game and its evolution. He has documented episodes of wei qi throughout the ages up to the Qing Dynasty at the turn of the twentieth century. This work is in Chinese. It is available at http://www.WeiQi361.com. Run Tu has listed well over one hundred ancient history references that carry stories of wei qi. Unfortunately, he has not provided detailed information about the publications and page numbers. Nevertheless, concerned wei qi scholars and players should consult this work. In fact, much of this section draws heavily from Run Tu’s work. 8 The text is available in Chinese both in bookstores and online in many of the weiqi web sites. I have not seen an English translation yet. 9 The Thirteen Treaties on the Art of Wei Qi is available online in many of the wei qi sites. I have not seen an English translation.

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Initially a game of the nobility, it quickly reached all ranks of the Japanese military by the thirteenth century. Wide social communities in Japan developed an interest in wei qi with skill at the game a sign of social finesse. So great was the reverence for the game that great players were frequently summoned to homes of nobles for demonstrations and exhibitions. The study of wei qi also became part of the Japanese government policy and led to the formation of the Go Academy. It flourished in Japan with the best players competing before the shogun year in and year out. Wei qi has also reached Southeast Asian nations such as Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia. In the sixteenth century, Portuguese sailors to Japan learned about wei qi and brought it back to Portugal. But wei qi did not become popular in Europe until after the nineteenth century.10

• Wei Qi: The Art of Strategy and Competition Wei qi is a game of strategy and competition. It is also a test of will and skill. Two players take turns to place black and white stones on the intersections (not the open squares) of a 19x19 line matrix on a playing board. By rule, the one who plays black stone goes first. Once played, the stones remain in place unless captured and removed by the opposing player. Diagram 1 contains the initial five moves of a recent game between two professional players, a Chinese 5-dan and a Korean 4-dan, in Chungqing, China (July 1, 2001), as they competed for the title of a major wei qi tournament between China and Korea. In this game, the Chinese player played black stone.11 The basic objective of the game is to secure more of the board (or territory). The players do so by encircling more territory (intersections). The competition for more territory thus leads to engagement, confrontation, and war fighting. As the game unfolds, it becomes a war with multiple campaigns and battlefronts. Or in the terms of international affairs, it is a competition between two nations over multiple interest areas.

10 For more on the history of wei qi, see Run Tu, History of Wei Qi, available at http://www.go361.com and Chen Huaxin, Ye Jiabin and Xu Xu, Story of Wei Qi (Shanghai: Cishu Chuban She, 1999). 11 The five diagrams are from www.flygo.net. The tournament started on July 1,2001. The winner was the one who won the best of five games.

Page 9 Wei qi starts with the board completely open. Because the two players must wait for their turns to place one stone at a time on the board, they must make the best out of each stone (each player has about 180 stones). In wei qi, the first fifty-some moves are called the initial-stage moves. At this stage, the players will develop their strategic plans, adjusting constantly to the new situation created by the opponent’s moves. Strategic moves, diplomatic posturing, and “testing each other’s waters” are the hallmarks of the initial stage of the game. Experienced wisdom suggests that the corners are easier to secure (you only need to build two walls to surround a corner, but three walls to secure a side, and a complete circle to secure a piece of territory in the middle). Thus out of strategic necessity, the two players will always start with attempts to occupy the corners. The first three moves in Diagram 1 are of this kind. However, the fourth piece is a special move. It is slightly off from the strategic position in the lower left-hand corner. This is a choice that could easily make a computer confused, but it is White’s strategic design. Black saw it an opportunity and immediately placed a black stone in the same corner. Let’s visualize the situation before white put the 6th stone on the board. By playing the 5th stone in the lower left-hand corner, Black has created a grand posture on the right-hand side of the board by loosely “claiming” the three corners and the area they bound. It is critical now that White try to frustrate this grand design. The 6th stone does exactly this. By placing the 6th stone inside Black’s posturing sphere of influence, White has changed the situation instantly. Of note is that stones 4 and 5, 3 and 6 are close to each other but not directly in touch—they keep an “arm’s length” from each other. This is a typical wei qi style of engagement and posturing.

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In Diagram 2 we see that the two players have exchanged a few more moves. The lower left-hand corner is now evenly divided between the two players. Both have also made their control more secure. This is a typical win-win situation in wei qi. Following the division of the corner, black stone 15 took a good “jump,” protecting the corner group on the one hand, and making an attempt to isolate white stone 6. By doing so, Black has resumed his strategic posturing for the right-hand side of the board. White answered Black’s move with stone 16. By doing so, White has also made a claim to the territory on the left-hand side of the board. Black stone 17 started an attack on the lone white stone 6. How White handles this situation has a great impact on the game. Diagram 3 shows that White has not only handled it well, but also successfully penetrated into Black’s posturing territory, reducing Black’s claim. Instantly, the situation looks more promising for White, for he has enlarged his posturing on the upper left-hand side. Please note that so far the moves are very “enlightened and civilized” here is no heavy engagement or fighting between the two players. But we can see that every move changed the outlook on the board instantly. Connection is a key concept in wei qi. The stones are placed on the intersections. They are connected through the lines. In Diagram 3, we see that black 7 is separated from the black groups at the bottom. Adjacent stones such as black 5 and 13, 17 and 19 are solidly connected. However, at the early stage of the game, this kind of connection is ineffective.

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Page 11 In order to make strategic claims to large areas, players need to make big jumps such as stones 15 and 16. When it comes to more direct engagement, they make smaller jumps such as the white stones 20, 24, and 22. These jumps are made with the expectation and confidence that the stones can be connected later, even if they are under attack. The ability to assess the situation of all stones on the board and then jump far enough to influence the maximum amount of territory while avoid overextending one’s reach hence creating a vulnerability is a critical element in the art of wei qi. Black 21 and 15 are close and potentially connected. White 24, however, poses a threat to cut off the line of connection between these two stones. Some stones are placed in greater distance from established home base. Some go deep into the opponent’s posturing territory. These moves are made with the expectation that they can be connected or rescued, or make life in enemy’s claimed territory. To remain alive, a stone must be adjacent or connected by their unit to an empty intersection, called a liberty. Stones can be captured if the opponent eliminates all their liberties or open intersections adjacent to them. As a rule, the player who threatens to capture the opposing player’s stone(s) gives a warning by calling “atari,” a Japanese term for such function. The opponent may or may not respond to the call, to rescue the threatened stone(s), depending on the situation. In chess one does not warn the opponent when poised to capture a piece, but when attacking the opposing king calls “check,” and the opponent must avoid the attack or lose. The atari of wei qi is a different call. Diagram 4 contains such a call. The unit composed of black 25 and 15 is surrounded by white stones and there is only one liberty left (the intersection of line L and 3). Since White only has to play one more stone (on the intersection below white stone 36) to capture this unit, White makes an atari call. If Black does not respond by playing on the intersection L-3 but chooses to play elsewhere, then White can play on this intersection and remove those

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Page 12 two black stones. This would result in White cutting a big hole in Black’s claimed territory, a result unacceptable to Black. But Black can respond to this call by putting a stone right below white stone 36, making an atari call on 36. If White tries to rescue 36 by extending it one more stone to the right, Black can then turn downward and call atari on 34. This way, Black’s 15 and 25 can be connected back. And this is the way the game unfolded with the two players getting into a battle even before the initial stage was completed (the upper part of the board was still open for grabs). This game, therefore, moved early into the midgame stage (usually between the 50th to the 150th moves) where the bloody battles are fought. Diagram 5 shows this midgame stage with separate groups and several separate battlegrounds in the making. The groups are the black group in the middle, the white group on the right, the black group at the bottom left-hand side, the black group at the lower right-hand side, and the white group on the left. Note that each color is separated into two groups at the disconnect where the four stones 25, 26, 27, and 36 are located. Since groups cannot be connected diagonally, black 25 and 27 are not connected and neither are white 26 and 36. This disconnect was the result of the battle fought at this place. Both Black and White face some uncertainty about their survival. The battle between these two groups would wage on. The black group in the middle has an “eye” in the middle of stones 27, 33, 39, and 41—a critical liberty for survival. By the wei qi rule, it takes at least two “eyes” for any group to survive. Black has secured one eye. Black 47 is leading the group toward the open middle ground. There will be plenty of space for black to make the other eye. Therefore, this group is in good shape. The white group on the right has the shape of one eye around 44, 48, and 6. White 40 and 58 are also leading the group toward the upper part of the board.

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The battle is between these two groups to see who can make life and gain more territory. Diagram 6 shows that Black left this battle unfinished and turned to make some moves on the left-hand side. This is again a typical wei qi way of war. Multiple engagements in various stages of completion are a common element in wei qi play. With a few moves, Black has brought the lone stone 7 back to life. In wei qi, there is a saying that a stone never dies or no stone is useless. Black 7 was quietly waiting for the right moment to make its impact. On the far left, three white stones surround black 63. White has obviously called Atari. Black 63 may or may not die. It all depends on what the two players do with it later. After about another thirty moves, Black has connected the left and middle groups through the stones 97, 77, and 79 (Diagram 7). Black has penetrated into White’s claimed sphere of influence or potential territory, greatly reducing White’s space. In addition, Black has also thrown three stones (91, 93, and 95) deep into White’s claimed territory and instantly put White’s three stones 84, 94, and 98 in danger. If Black can derail White’s attempts here, the entire upper part would be Black’s secured territory. That would be a slaughter, but it is difficult for two players of close rank to make that kind of landslide victory. Once again, we see how the situation of the game changes with a few critical moves. The upper right-hand part looks promising to Black. However, celebration for Black is too early. Black’s “troops deployment” in the upper right-hand corner is too thin. There is plenty of room for White to penetrate.

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Diagram 6

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Page 14 Diagram 8 shows the finished game board. We can see that White has cut quite a large piece from Black’s claimed upper right-hand side. All the groups have quite some open space inside their encirclements except for the white group on the bottom right-hand side. This group has exactly two eyes—the bare minimum for survival! The game is over. The Japanese count how many open intersections to determine the game. The Chinese way is to count all the intersections, occupied and open. The one who has more points (intersections) wins. In this particular game, White, the Korean player, won by one intersection point. Note that there are some “dead” stones on the board. Dead stones result when they cannot be rescued and any attempt would only waste turns. Both players usually recognize dead stones and shift their attention to more important areas of the board. For example, white 154, 274, and 306 near the middle right-hand edge around intersection R-13 are dead. The two black stones 61 and 63 at the middle of the left side at intersection C-12 and E-11 are also dead. During the game, there is no need to waste a valuable move to remove those captured stones. When counting the final results, those dead stones are counted as prisoners in the Japanese style and simply removed from the board in the Chinese way. The presentation in this section gives the reader a taste of wei qi. There are many books about wei qi in English at all levels nowadays. We would recommend interested readers check out the American Go Association web site. You can find the most basic books about wei qi and learn about the latest development in wei qi related activity.12 12 Check out the web site at http://www.usgo.org/.

Diagram 8

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• Wei Qi: The Art of Diplomacy and War

Life Magazine noted in 1942 that wei qi “is a favorite game of Japanese soldiers and a source of inspiration for Japanese military strategists” and that the way the Japanese “play go bears a striking resemblance to the way they fight their wars.”13 Indeed, Figure 2 shows Japanese soldiers playing wei qi against a background of ruins in China. The fact that soldiers brought wei qi game set to the battlefront emphasizes the impact the game has on their culture. When Japan recovered from its World War II destruction, wei qi also regained its prominence in Japan. As more and more Japanese play wei qi, especially high-ranking officials, it has become truly Japan’s national game. Today, Japanese employ wei qi concepts to promote their business. In his book Go: an Asian Paradigm for Business Strategy (Tokyo: The Ishi Press, 1995), Yasuyuki Mirura has made perhaps the best account of Japan’s wei qi culture in the business world. Moreover, because of his extensive overseas experience in the Middle East and the United States, Mirura has also offered some excellent comments on international affairs from the wei qi perspective. Back in wei qi’s home country, Mao Zedong was also a wei qi strategist. His theory about the protracted war against the Japanese was partly based on the wei qi concept. Scott A. Boorman’s book The Protracted Game: A Go Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy remains to this day the best account of Mao’s using the wei qi concept to lure Japanese troops deep into China’s inland and attack those overextended troops. Wei qi and Chinese military classics both prospered during the Spring and

13 “Wei Qi: Japs Play Their National Game the Way They Fight Their Wars,” Life Magazine, May 18, 1942, p. 92.

Figure 2

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Autumn and Warring States eras. The two share much insight in diplomacy, confrontation, and war preparation and fighting. The wei qi classic, The Thirteen Treaties on the Art of Wei Qi, has incorporated much Chinese classical military wisdom. Sun Zi’s Art of War is very much reflected in this wei qi classic. In 1996 Roy C. Schmidt published his translation of a Chinese wei qi master Xiaochun Ma’s book The Thirty-Six Stratagems Applied to Wei Qi (Santa Monica, CA: Yutopian Enterprises, 1996). This was the first book to apply Chinese military classics to explain the line of thought in various wei qi games. It was an excellent attempt and a great success. Wei qi had been a popular game in China for thousands of years. However, during the waning years of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), the prominence of wei qi also took a down turn. During the years from the first Opium War of 1840 to the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, wei qi culture has suffered many setbacks in China. In the last twenty years, however, wei qi has taken a new lease of life in China. The number of wei qi players has increased greatly. Under the leadership of Nie Weiping and several other wei qi masters, China is now narrowing its gap with Japan and Korea. Because of its close connection to Chinese military thought, wei qi is bound to become more influential in China’s military and foreign policies. For today’s international environment, wei qi has many features that are readily applicable to international relations and conflict situations. Perhaps the best way to discuss these features is to compare them with the characteristics of chess and poker, both of which have influence in international interactions. Wei qi concepts would be valuable additions to the art of diplomacy and war. Perhaps the first and foremost difference between wei qi and chess is the philosophy behind their strategic thought. The philosophy behind chess is to win decisively. Both players have the same clear, overriding objective—capture the opposing king—and accomplish this objective by decimating whatever opposing forces stand in the way. The “balance of power” is clear and players frequently concede when losses are too substantial. Chess grand master Garry Kasparov puts it best when he says, “the only goal in chess is to prove your superiority over the other guy. And the most superiority, the most total one, is superiority of the mind. I mean, your opponent must be destroyed, fully

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destroyed.”14 Wei qi is a much different game with a significantly different philosophy. At its heart, wei qi reflects Oriental philosophy of the dynamic interplay of opposites (yin and yang); the dynamic tension between those opposites provides balance. The basics of the game effectively prevent a player from totally removing their opponent from the board. Denied “total victory,” a wei qi player must settle for a relative victory. Therefore, wei qi strategy seeks to limit the opponent while building one’s own positions. Opponents need not be defeated or removed from the board, only contained and minimized. Without a “king” to capture and with near-infinite possible combinations of stones, the simply stated objective to control the majority of the board becomes a swirling tangle of engagements. Prolonged and complex, wei qi also focuses on building or creating versus chess’s emphasis on removal and destruction. If chess portrays tactical engagement, then wei qi is the “panorama of an entire campaign or complex theater of war” where “comprehensive strategy and only comprehensive strategy makes victory certain.”15 Due to its complexity, wei qi will “enable strategic maneuvers on a much larger scale than possible in chess, and it lends itself to positional conceptions of greater depth.”16 Another influence of these games on international thinking is from the different abilities and uses of the pieces. In chess, each type of piece on the board has different power and capability. The queen is the superpower; she can move in any manner. However, the pawn’s power is very limited. There is a clear hierarchy of capability among the pieces. Moreover, the pieces are like one’s weapon stockpile. Having more is clearly advantageous. Losing a piece in chess or unevenly trading pieces can be very significant, making it difficult to catch up with the opponent. In wei qi, however, each piece has the same tangible power, but their 14 Rudolph Chelminski and Jeff Seaver, "In the Game of Chess “Your opponent Must Be Destroyed”, Smithsonian , Vol. 28, No. 10 (January 1998), p. 47. 15 O. Korshet, The Theory and Practice of Go (Rutland, VE: Charles C. Tuttle Co. Publishers, 1965), pp. 6–7. 16 Edward Lasker, Modern Chess Strategy with an Appendix on Go (Washington Square, PA: David McKay Company, 1945), p. 374.

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intangible or potential power, based on the near-infinite combinations and uses, is situational and limitless. Each piece’s potential power depends on the grand strategic design. A wei qi player can use any piece to attack strongly fortified enemy territory. The player can put any piece in whatever ways he sees fit in the battle. This difference in pieces tends to reflect different cultural views on individuals and groups. In chess, as in Western culture, individual pieces are important as individuals with each having its own independent power and capability. Chess is a “knightly struggle where victory or defeat was decided more through the exceptional virtue of a single noble or group of nobles than through the mass action of the commoners as part of an overall strategy.”17 In wei qi, as in Asian culture, there is more emphasis on the group and overall situation where each piece’s power is relative. Taken in isolation, a stone is meaningless and has very little power. Viewed from the overall situation, every piece has an impact on the game. Sacrificing small groups in exchange for bigger gains is thus a key wei qi concept that flows from this cultural difference. The influence of these differences on international relations is rather significant. Under the influence of chess one tends to analyze conflict situations in terms of military balance. This in fact is rather typical in US military analysis with examples including General MacArthur’s miscalculations of the Communist Chinese during the Korean War or the current tensions between the US and China over Taiwan. General MacArthur, from a Western and chess point of view, simply did not believe China would intervene due to its poor economic conditions, limited military capabilities, and untrained military manpower. Chess-like thinking focusing on military balance may have cost the United States dearly in this example. The same line of thinking is still common in the current US view on the “hollow” Mainland Chinese threat to use force against Taiwan. Today when US strategists look at the China-Taiwan situation, they tend first to analyze the military balance across the Taiwan Strait and then add the weight of US intervention. Based on any military balance analysis, it would make no sense for the mainland Chinese to use force against Taiwan.

17 O. Korschelt, The Theory and Practice of Go (Rutland, VE: Charles C. Tuttle Co., Publishers, 1965), p. 6.

Page 19 This conclusion follows closely the chess concept of balance of power. Unfortunately, it may be off the mark if the Chinese are thinking in terms of the wei qi concepts. From a wei qi viewpoint, a military loss could easily support the political, cultural, or economic aspects of a larger, long-term gain. A third influence of these games on international relations is the difference in approaching the opponents. In chess, except for the knight, every piece moves in a straightforward fashion. The objective is to trap the opponent’s king. The approach is to capture more and more pieces and eventually the king. In wei qi, however, the stones are round shaped and flow like water. As described in the Thirteen Treaties on the Art of Wei Qi, the wei qi board is squared and secured; the stones are half-spherical therefore are good for maneuvering. They flow like water. Thus under the influence of wei qi concepts, one tends to be indirect, subtle, and always prepared to move in different directions. (Does this ring a bell on Sun Zi’s ideas on strategy?) Encirclement of an area takes many stones. The mirror part of this feature in international affairs is the many efforts one has to make to achieve a foreign policy objective. Table 1 is an attempt to highlight the key concepts in chess, poker, and wei qi and put them in perspective.

• Wei Qi: Game of the New Century between the US and China As Asia continues to grow and factor large in the US national interests, the United States is shifting more and more of its attention to this region. Among the nations in Asia, China is no doubt the most challenging one to the United States. In fact, the United States and China are already deeply engaged in and at odds with each other over a wide range of issues. These are the issues such as the China-Taiwan question, China’s human rights conduct, Chinese way of government, the Tibet issue, religious freedom, and China’s external conducts such as arms sales and nuclear proliferation, and the South China Sea disputes. In the wei qi perspective, China and the United States are already involved in multiple engagements. There has been heated debate in the last ten years about what the US strategy should be toward this rising China.

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Table 1. Comparison of Concepts Chess (West) Wei qi (East) Poker (West) Philosophical basis

Domination Yin and Yang (balance)

"Win the pot"

Intentions

Direct, bold Calculated subtlety Direct, bold

Approaches Straightforward Indirect, multifaceted

Straightforward, some subtlety with bluffing

Geopolitics Pure Realist "Balance of power"

Subtle Realist "Sphere of influence"

Realist with elements of chance and bluffing

Operation Single battle of annihilation

Multiple battles of coexistence

Multiple battles (hands) of annihilation through attrition

Outcome

Zero sum Non-zero sum Zero sum

Bluffing

Difficult Yes, as in Ko Nature of game

Risk

By miscalculation By miscalculation Nature of game

Relationship Seek destruction Co-existence Seek total absorption of opponent

Strategy Calculated narrow strategy

Calculated broad strategy

Calculated but opportunistic

Focus of game

Single focus Multiple focuses Single focus

Confrontation

Straightforward Less bearing Straightforward

Military basis

Jomini Sun Zi Clausewitz

Deception

Marginal Yes Yes

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President Clinton adopted an engagement policy after failed attempts to getting tough with China in the initial years of his first term. This approach has come under heavy attack from the conservatives in the last couple of years. The main criticism is that this approach is too nice to the Chinese and it offers no leverage for punishing China for its “wrongdoings.” Conservatives believe that the best way to make China change is through discipline. Containment therefore is their proposed policy choice to achieve this goal. A recent policy recommendation from the influential RAND Corporation contends that engagement and containment taken in isolation cannot achieve US objectives with China. It calls for a policy of “Congagement,” a combination of containment and engagement.18 This policy recommends a modified engagement with China, one that is less solicitous to China’s sensitivities on the issues mentioned above; strengthening US ties with China’s neighboring countries; and dealing with the Taiwan issue in a much more straightforward manner. Moreover, by incorporating “punishment” elements of containment policy, the proposed congagement approach will have both the carrots and sticks that the United States can deal with China more effectively from a position of strength. The RAND report bases its analysis on the assumption that “a China that approached or equaled the United States in power would presumably seek to vindicate its territorial claims and could strive to attain regional hegemony, increase its status in global terms, and alter the rules of the international system to its advantage.” Although some developments could lessen the prospects for such a negative outcome, such as China’s turning democratic along the way of its economic development or collapsing like the Soviet Union, such hopes are uncertain. The United States would be better served to pursue a policy that would guarantee its success even with the worst scenario. From the Chinese perspective, the US has been pursuing this congagement policy toward China for some time. From their wei qi perspective, congagement is tantamount to encirclement.

18 Zalmay M. Khalilzad et al., The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military implications (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999).

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Chinese leaders are rather convinced that the Bush Administration will continue this policy toward China. They charge that the United States has “built” a ring of encirclement around China. This ring begins in Japan, stretches south through Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea to include the Philippines and Australia, moves west through Thailand and Singapore to the US increasing involvement with India. It continues up through Pakistan and finally into Central Asia through the activities of US energy interests. Recent geopolitical developments would seem to support China’s perspective. The recently revealed “Bush doctrine” 19 on Asia along with the US’s moves to create stronger bonds between the US, Japan, South Korea, and Australia 20 have been labeled by the Chinese government as strategic maneuvering aimed at the containment of China. 21 Other actions that reinforce China’s feeling of being encircled include US-Japanese agreements on Theater Missile Defense; increased US arms sales to Taiwan and significantly fewer ambiguities in the US commitment to Taiwan’s defense; strengthened US military relations with the Southeast Asian nations such as Thailand and Indonesia;22 US agreements with Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand to allow US naval ships to enter these countries for repair and logistic support; mutual efforts to improve relations between the US and India, including possible lifting of US sanctions;23 and frequent US participation in military exercises with countries around China such as Japan, Korea, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia. Perhaps the boldest action was the recent (August 2001) and unprecedentedly large US Naval exercise (two aircraft carrier battlegroups instead of the usual one) in the South China Sea symbolically responding to a large-scale Chinese military drill off the southeast coast opposite Taiwan.

19 Greg Sheridan, “The Bush Doctrine Is Good for Asia,” Asian Wall Street Journal,August 20, 2001. 20 David Lague, “A U.S. Security Shake-Up in Asia,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 30, 2001. 21 Craig Skehan, “Australia Dancing to US Tune, Mocks China,” Sydney Morning Herald, August 2, 2001; Chinese People’s Daily “Bumpy Road for Sino-US Relations,” June 26, 2001. 22 Jane Perlez, “U.S. to Renew Relationship with Military in Indonesia,” New York Times, August 12, 2001. 23 Alan Sipress, “U.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India,” Washington Post, August 12, 2001.

Page 23 China appears to respond to these putative US encirclement actions with a wei qi countermeasure strategy. On the Korean peninsula, China’s wei qi strategy is to promote a neutralized united Korea (assuming the unification is going to take place). The logic of this approach is a wei qi “relative win” outcome where no one gains complete victory in this battle. This could be in the form of a compromise between the United States and China. The United States would withdraw its troops from Korea and China would not seek a pro-China Korea—an outcome acceptable to all four great powers in the region, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Taiwan is no doubt the thorniest problem between the United States and China. Using chess terminology, Taiwan’s president Chen Shui-bian insisted that he would not let Taiwan to become a pawn in the great power game between the United States and China. From a chess perspective, this would mean China will not allow Taiwan to become an instrument against China or to be sacrificed attacking China. However, from the wei qi perspective, Taiwan is a battleground—crucial territory to be struggled for and acquired rather than a pawn to be used. Instead of being an instrument of action, it becomes the object of the action. While the US may be trying to mold Taiwan into an effective instrument against China, China is trying to win Taiwan entirely. The mind-set difference here is clear. Pawns are small pieces of little value that can be sacrificed and lost with little impact—a short-term, “what’s in it for me” view. Something (such as territory) you want to acquire and make part of your nation is inherently valuable and worth careful thought and preservation—a much more cautious, reasoned, and long-term view. Pawns cannot “change color” while territory can be won over—a critical point that may rudely surprise the US. China’s actions toward Taiwan support this wei qi perspective. As in wei qi where you surround or isolate your opponent’s stones (troops) to eventually absorb or neutralize them, Mainland China has been slowly isolating Taiwan. For more than two decades since 1979, China has kept Taiwan isolated in the international diplomatic circle. China has frustrated Taiwan’s attempts to become a member of the United Nations and only allows Taiwan to participate in international organizations where statehood is not required (e.g., the International Olympic Organization, the World Trade Organization, etc.).

Page 24 In 1998, the Chinese leaders even got President Clinton to endorse this approach. 24 While isolating Taiwan from non-Chinese influences, China has been steadily increasing its own influence. In recent years, China has promoted economic integration with Taiwan at an escalating rate. At the same time, China has also courted the Taiwan opposition parties in an attempt to isolate President Chen Shui-bian. Many former high-ranking Taiwan government officials have visited the mainland. In July 2001 even a group of recently retired Taiwan military general officers came to the mainland for a goodwill visit. In its Olympic bid, China mobilized Taiwan popular support to co-host the games. Now that China has won the contest, in the next seven years, China would escalate its effort to implement this strategy. However, past US efforts to frustrate China’s attempts to host the Olympic games handed the Chinese leaders the material to portray the United States as a common cultural adversary of the Chinese. In China’s controlled media, which is widely available in Taiwan, US opposition to China’s hosting the Olympics became US prejudice against all Chinese (Taiwan and mainland)—a situation that not only helped unite Taiwan with China, but also helped distance Taiwan from the United States. Eventually China hopes to regain Taiwan without the use of force. This would be the biggest gain for China and perfectly fits a wei qi mindset. Gently pry the object of value away from your opponent so that you may gain it without damage or the loss of its value. In Southeast Asia, China is also pursuing a wei qi strategy. China clearly sees that Southeast Asian nations prefer a peaceful Southeast Asian region free of great power confrontation. China’s suggestion is to create a neutralized Southeast Asian region. This approach attempts to set a check on the US moves in the area. China’s relations with the Southeast Asian nations, however, are being hampered by its territorial disputes in the South China Sea with some of the Southeast Asian nations. China thus far has pursued a wei qi strategy to deal with each dispute separately rather than signing on to the code of conduct created by the ASEAN nations.

24 President Clinton made a “Three No’s” statement while in China. The three no’s are no support for Taiwan independence, no support for one China, one Taiwan, and no support for Taiwan’s membership in international bodies in which state hood is required

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Although no final solution of the disputes is anywhere in sight, China has made some progress with Vietnam and the Philippines. It also hopes that eventually this wei qi approach of incremental, individual “wins” will ultimately produce a wei qi “win”—settling the South China Sea disputes predominately in its favor. On the South Asia subcontinent, China is facing a much formidable challenge—the rise of India. During the 2000 US presidential election campaign, Condoleeza Rice made a public call at the Republican Party convention to play India to counterbalance China. The fact of the matter is that since Clinton’s second term, the United States has been quietly trying to improve its influence on India. President Clinton paid an unprecedented visit to India in March 2000 and India’s Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee visited Washington in September of the same year. More recently, General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made another unprecedented visit to India (July 2001). China took note of these developments. Its strategy is to respond with a wei qi “get there early” move (a wei qi terminology) and try to improve its relations with India. While the US–China diplomatic competition for India continues, China has found a new way to improve relations with India: the cross-border trade. Made-in-China products are now flooding Indian markets. With respect to Central Asia and Russia, China has scored big points by creating the Shanghai Five coalition. Originally called the Shanghai. Five and composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. They added a new member, Uzbekistan, on June 15, 2001 and changed its name to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This organization combines security, economic, political, and cultural affairs and is the only regional organization in the world that has no US involvement. Although China and the rest of the group claim that this organization is not against any outside powers, their hidden agenda is rather obvious—it is their attempt, especially China’s attempt—to get out of the shadow of US dominance in world affairs. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States factor into China’s approach in central Asia. The suicide terrorists who destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Center and heavily damaged the Pentagon were followers of the Islamic jihad leader Osama bin Laden.

Page 26 Bin Laden operates terrorist training camps and orchestrates worldwide terrorist attacks from bases in Afghanistan (central Asia). From a wei qi perspective, the US war on terrorism and specifically the full-scale military operations against bin Laden and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan on China’s northwestern borders present China with both an opportunity and a threat. The opportunity lies in using the American war as an excuse for China to “more firmly secure its area of the board” by tightening control on the Muslims in China’s Xinjiang province. The threat is that US operations may give the United States an opportunity to “place stones” in this region and establish a stronghold presence. Increased US activity in the area, combined with the reshuffled alliances between the US, Pakistan and India, could become a strategic nightmare for the Chinese. Elsewhere in Asia, China continues to follow wei qi strategies by moving into “empty” areas. To the south of India, China has quietly made some headway in one neglected place, Myanmar. In recent years, China has significantly increased cross-border trade with Myanmar. The Chinese are helping Myanmar to build a highway from the China-Myanmar border across to Myanmar’s Indian Ocean seashore. China clearly sees the strategic value of its moves in Myanmar. In fact China has already established its presence in the Indian Ocean by setting up a military monitoring facility off the coast of Myanmar. 25 But China is not limiting its maneuvers to its immediate neighborhood. China is “throwing stones” worldwide. Its efforts that impact US interest include Chinese companies installing fiber optics to improve Iraqi command-and-control capabilities against US planes in Operation Southern Watch; ongoing relations with and support to Cuba and Iran; increased relations with South American countries; and perhaps most alarmingly a strong commitment to information warfare. Uniquely suited to a wei qi perspective, information warfare is a field where China can subtly but directly influence US interests and significantly raise the cost of US involvement in areas of Chinese interest. It appears that the United

25 A. B. Mahapatra, “Commanding the ocean,” Indiareacts.com, May 16, 2001. Editorial, “Imagining a New Role for China,” The IRRAWADDY Publishing Group, Interactive Edition, Vol. 8. No. 6 (June 2000).

Page 27 States and China have already entered a wei qi like environment of multiple simultaneous interdependent engagements. Of note is that American may be dealing with China in chess-like confrontation style whereas the Chinese are responding with the wei qi–based strategies. Moreover, the US may be playing wei qi without the benefit of fully understanding the rules and the logic of this Asian game (See Figure 3). From a wei qi perspective, some of the US dealings with China are questionable. China’s most favored nation (MFN) status is a good example in point. In the years since the Tiananmen Square massacre, the United States, especially the Congress, has been trying to use MFN as a lever to improve China’s behavior in human rights conduct, proliferation of arms to “rogue states,” nuclear proliferation, and so on. From a wei qi perspective, the US appears to be poorly executing a condition called ko. In wei qi, the rule of ko occurs when stones are played in a critical area of the board such that the act of removing one of your opponent’s stones puts your own stone in atari. This results in your opponent’s being able to take your stone, but in turn having his own stone in atari. Rather than have a game stopping in an “infinite loop,” the rule of ko is invoked preventing your opponent from taking your stone on the turn immediately after you have taken his. In wei qi strategy, both players recognize the importance of this area of the board and desperately want to “win ko” and gain the area. Given wei qi’s complexity, however, winning the ko does not guarantee winning the game, so the cost of winning ko must be balanced against the threat to other areas. Each player must therefore threaten his opponent elsewhere so that he must respond instead of filling the intersection left open by your captured stone and winning the ko. To be effective, your ko threat to another group or place must be credible and specific. Your opponent must be able to weigh the cost and gain to decide whether he would concede to your threat. In this example, US-China trade is the area of the board, the two sides trying to win MFN is the ko. China wants to win ko by gaining MFN. The US wants to win ko by getting improved Chinese human rights in exchange for MFN. The US threat to terminate MFN (to “win ko”) with demands on China to improve its human rights conduct. However, the US call was not clear and specific enough to be effective. The US was unable to narrow the “improving human rights” into a measurable demand while threatening the hinese with an action that would harm both the US and China in trade.

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Figure 3

Although President Clinton finally delinked MFN with the other issues in 1993, the threat to MFN continues to arise but without much success. This failed approach can be seen clearly from the wei qi perspective. China won the trade area of the board without significant damage to its positions elsewhere.

Page 29 From a wei qi viewpoint, the US needs to learn the art of long-term strategy, indirect moves, and relative victory. Instead of seeing pawns that do not change sides and can be sacrificed at will, the US should see valuable territories that deserve, indeed demand, careful, calculated, and integrated strategies. Well-intentioned efforts such as opposition to China’s hosting of the Olympic games may play directly into Chinese leadership’ plans. As evidenced by the internal propaganda on the US naval EP-3 collision, Chinese leadership portrayed America as hostile and arrogant to China.

• Conclusion Wei qi concepts and strategies are well suited to today’s globalized and interconnected international environment. Multiple engagements in various stages of development across numerous fields characterize modern geopolitics. Nations’ power more and more rests on economic might and less on military strength. In a world where market share is king and the Pacific Rim is the next emerging powerhouse, US leaders would be well served to learn the combative co-existence skills taught by the protracted, complex, and uniquely Asian game of wei qi. Adding wei qi skills to chess and poker abilities would help American leadership shape what happens instead of leaving them wondering what happened. With respect to US-China relations, wei qi is even more relevant. With its huge size and 5,000 years of history China is too big and well entrenched to expect “total” victory. China is not the Soviet Union of yesterday and has the benefit of observing and learning from the Soviet experience. Moreover, China has been sufficiently alarmed by the putative US encirclement and is taking countermeasures. Given all of these, a chess- or poker-based approach alone is inadequate. Policies typically based on zero-sum and complete victory is ill conceived. The concepts of wei qi such as gradual encirclement, broad influence and mutual “wins” (including coexistence) must be added to our chess and poker-based toolbox. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force or any other US government agency.