GENERAL ASSEMBLY

GENERAL ASSEMBLYOFFICIAL RECORDS: THIRTY-FIFTH SESSIONSUPPLEMENT No.24 (A/35/24)UNITED NATIONSNew York, 1981

NOTESymbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combinedwith figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nationsdocument.The present volume contains part five of the report of the United Nations Councilfor Namibia covering the period from 1 November 1979 to 31 July 1980 andincludes documents which were initially issued in provisional form under thesymbols A/AC. 131/ 82 and Add. 1-9 and corrigenda. Volume I contains parts oneto three of the report of the Council and volume II contains part four.

/Original: Englishj /24 November 1980/CONTNTSVOLUME I1*PART FIVE: REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON THE HEARINGS ONNAKIIBIAN URANIUMI. INTRODUCTION ......... ........................II. ORGANIZATION OF THE HEARINGS ON NAMIBIAN URANII4 ....... III.LEGAL PREMISES IN RELATION TO NAMIBIA AND ITS RESOURCESA. Termination of the Mandate ..... ...............B. Action by the Security Council ..... ............C. Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice D. Further action by theSecurity Council ... .........E. Establishment of the Council and enactment ofDecree No. 1 ........ ...................F. Other related action by the General Assembly . .G. Request by the General Assembly to hold hearingsNamibian uranium ....... .................IV. ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF NAMIBIAT URANIU4 ........A. Extraction ........ ....................B. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C. Processing ........ ....................D. Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .E. Health hazards ....... ..................V. ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC VALUE OF NAMIBIAN URANIM4 . .on

A. R~ssing and its international connexions ......... B. Role of Namibian uraniumin South Africa's domestic and foreign policies ...... .............. ..C. Strategic value of Namibian uranium ........* For the complete table of contents, see vol. I.Paragraphs1 - 89 - 23 24 - 49 24 - 25 26 - 2829 - 33 34 - 3637 - 42 43 - 484950 - 139 51 - 75 76 - 91 92 - 103 104 - 124 125 - 139 140 - 171 140 - 162163 - 167 168 - 171-iii-Page12555610 10 1113 13 13 1720 2225 28

CONTENTS (continued)ParagraphsVI. MILITARY CO-OPERATION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANADMINISTRATION BY CORPORATIONS INVOLVED IN URAIIUM4EXTRACTION .......... .......................A. Direct co-operation ................B. General military and nuclear co-operation .....VII. DEVELOPMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA OF A NUCLEAR CAPABILITYANDTHE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ....... VIII.CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINANCIALIMPLICATIONSA. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B. Recommendations ..................C. Activities involving financial implications ....172 - 183 173 -177 178 - 183 184 - 220 221 - 237 221 - 233 234 - 236237ANNEXESI.II. III. IV.

List of experts and organizations invited to testify at the hearings List ofparticipants in the hearings ....... ................List of written material presented at the hearings ... ..........Supplementary legal information ..................-iv-Page

PART FIVEREPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON THE HEARINGS ON NAMIBIANURANIUH*I. INTRODUCTION1. The United Nations Council for Yamibia, created by the General Assembly inaccordance with its resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, has been empoweredby the Assembly to administer Namibia until independence and to promulgatesuch laws, decrees and administrative regulations as necessary for theadministration of the Territory. In the implementation of its mandate andconscious of its responsibilityto protect the interests of the Namibian people, the Council has endeavoured totake all measures to ensure that the interests of the Namibian people are protected.2. In its capacity as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia, the Councilrepresents Tamibia in major organizations and conferences within the UnitedNations system 1/ with the status of full member, and also represents Namibia inother intergovernmental organizations. 2/ Also in the same capacity, the Councilhas held consultations on the question of Namibia with the Governments of 51ember States. 3/ The protection of the natural resources of Namibia wasdiscussed, inter alia, during all of those consultations.3. Since 1967, when, at its twenty-second session, it first took up0 the question ofthe activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding theimplementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to ColonialCountries and Peoples, the General Assembly has condemned the role that foreigneconomic and financial interests play in the exploitation of natural and humanresources in colonial Territories. In respect of Namibia, the Council has studied,and the General Assembly has noted, the particularly significant role whichforeign economic interests, making use of "concessions" granted by the illegalSouth African* The Council approved the present report at its 242nd meeting, on 21 November1980.1/ International Labour Organisation (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) andThird United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.2/ Conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries,the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and others.3/ Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, France, Gabon,

Germany, Federal Republic of, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan,Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Netherlands,New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland,Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey,Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America,Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia.-1-

administration in Namibia, play in the exploitation of the mineral resources of thecountry. The Council has paid particular attention to the exploitation of Namibianuranium.4. By its resolution 31/148 of 20 December 1976, the General Assemblyauthorized the Council to hold hearings on Nlamibian uranium and to continue toseek information regarding the exploitation and purchase of Namibian uranium.5. Pursuant to the above resolution, the Council considered the organization ofthe hc:arings on Namibian uranium and, at its 263rd meeting on 7 September1977, approved the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Uranium Hearings. 4/6. By its resolution 32/9 G of 4 November 1977, the General Assembly tooknote of the Council's progress report on the hearings regarding the exploitationand purchase of Nlamibian uranium 5/ and authorized the necessary budgetallocations for its full implementation.7. During 1978 and 1979, the Council kept the question of the exploitation ofNamibian uranium under review.8. By its resolution 34/92 B of 12 December 1979, the General Assemblyrequested the Council to continue to examine the exploitation of and trade inNamibian uranium by foreign economic interests and to report on its findings tothe Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.II. ORGANIZATIOP OF THE HEARfINGS ON NAMIBIAM. URANIUM9. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 34/92 B, the Council in 1980 gavepriority consideration to the organization of hearings on Namibian uranium.10. At its 318th meeting on 28 March 1980, the Council approved the report of itsStanding Committee II containing guidelines for hearings on Namibian uranium(A/AC.131/76 and Corr.1). The guidelines established the general objectives andpurposes of the hearings. The general objectives were: (a) to endeavour tomobilize the international community to take action in support of theimplementation of United Nations resolutions on the question of Namibia and onthe activities of foreign economic and other interests which were impeding theimplementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to ColonialCountries and Peoples, as well as of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of theNatural Resources of Namibia, enacted by the Council on 27 September 1974; 6/and (b) to expose and denounce those foreign economic interests which, byengaging in the illegal exploitation of Namibian resources, were contributing tothe maintenance and strengthening of South Africa's illegal occupation of theTerritory.

11. The purposes of the hearings were, inter alia, to develop informationconcerning the exploitation and purchase of Iamibian uranium; to identify thefirms4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, SupplementNo. 2V (A/32/24), vol. II, annex XII.5/ Ibid., vol. I, paras. 128-133.6/ For the full text of the Decree, see vol. I, annex II, of the present report.

and countries involved in the exploitation and purchase of Namibian uranium; toassess the financial and economic deprivation suffered by Namibians as a result ofthe illegal exploitation and depletion of Namibian uranium resources, bearingin mind that the future Government of an independent Namibia would be justifiedin seeking compensation from companies and individuals which had illegallyexploited Namibia's natural resources since 1966, to identify the foreignprocessing plantsto which the illegally exported Namibian uranium was sent and the ultimatedestination of the processed uranium and the routes by which it was sent; toexpose and denounce South Africa's illegal exploitation of Namibia's uranium tothe detriment of th: Namibian people and their environment; and to expose anddenounce the use by South Africa of Namibian uranium in its drvelopment of anuclear weaponscapability.12. At its 322nd meeting on 20 May 1980, the Council adopted rules of procedurefor the hearings (A/AC.131/79). The rules of procedure established (a) that thehearings would be conducted in open meetings by a panel composed of Councilmembers, a representative of the South West Africa People's Organization(SWAPO) and theUnited Nations Commissioner for wTamibia or his representative; (b) that theparticipation of witnesses in the hearings would be restricted to persons to whoma formal invitation had been addressed by or on behalf of the President of theCouncil; and (c) that any procedural question regarding the conduct of business ofthe hearings not covered by the rules of procedure would be decided by theChairman in consultation with the Panel in the light of the rules of procedure ofthe Council.13. Commencing on 2 June 1980, the President of the Council addressed letters ofinvitation to persons who might be able to provide information on the question ofNamibian uranium (see annex I to the present volume). Most of those invitedaccepted the invitations and participated in the hearings (see annex II to thepresent report).14. On 27 June, the President of the Council appointed the members of the Panel.After the election of officers, conducted at the 1st (closed) meeting of thePanel, held on 2 July 1980, the composition of the Panel was as follows:Chairman: Mr. Noel G. Sinclair (Guyana)Vice-Chairman: Mr. T. P. Sreenivasan (India)RaDporteur: Mr. Tyrone R. Ferguson (Guyana)Members: Mr. Abdelharid Semichi (Algeria)

Mr. Chin Yung-tsien (China)Mr. Jorge Eduardo Chen Charpenter (Mexico) Mr. Bariyu A.. Adeyemi (Nigeria)Hrs. Solmaz Unaydin (Turkey)Mr. Valentin N. Berezovsky (Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics)Hr. Feodor Star~evi6 (Yugoslavia)Mr. rkhondo D. Lungu (Zambia)Mr. Fahnwulu Caine (representative of the United NationsCommissioner for Namibia)Mr. Theo--Ben Gurirab (SWAPO)

Secretary: Jir. John F. Robson (United Nations Secretariat)Le-1 adviscr. ;r. Ralph Zacklin (United Nations Secretariat)Scientific adviser: fir. Richnrd Wilson (Harvard University)15. At its 330th meeting on 7 July 1980, the Council held a solemn openingmceting for the hearings. Stat ments wor( made by the President of the SecurityCouncil, the representative of the Socretary-General of the United Nations, theChairman of the Special Committee on the Situntion with regard to theImplementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Tndepen0]-nce to ColonialCountries and Peoples, the Acting Cha'irman of the 'pccial Committee againstApartheid, the Acting President of the Council and the Permanent Observer ofST-TAPO to the United Nations.16. At its 2nd (closed) meeting, on 7 July 1980, the Panel decided that verbatimtranscripts of the hearings would be distributed qs documents of the Panel.17. The hearings were conducted at the 3rd to 12th meetings of the Panel,between 7 and 11 July 1980 (see A/AC.131/82/Add.lO). The meetings were opento the public and were publicized widely. At its 7th meeting, on 9 July 1980, thePanel decided to accept a written statement from the Reverend G. flichael Scott,who had been invited to participate in the hearings, but was unable to attend (seeA/AC.131/82/Add.IO, sect. I).18. The Panel continued its 12th meeting in closed session in order to discuss itsdraft report to the Council. At its 13th (closed) meeting, held on 14 July 1980, thePanel approved the outline of its draft rerort.19. The Panel further considered its draft report at its 14th to 26th meetings, heldbetween 27 October and 18 !Tovember 1980. At its 26th meeting, the Panelapproved its report to the Council. The Panel also decided to express its thanks toall the participants in the hearings, to the secretariat of the Council, to theDepartment of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization as a whole and tothe Department of Conference Services.Dissemination of information on the hearings20. Before the hearings, English and French versions of a -oster with the heading'Plunder of Namibian Uranium' were produced and distributed. A backgroundpress release was issued on 23 June 1980. Paid advertisements announcing thehearings were placed in The New York Times The Times (London) and LeMhonde.21. During the hearings, the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat

issued daily press releases and provided television coverage of all the onenmeetings. A photograph exhibit was set up outside the Trusteeship CouncilChamber and a kit on Namibia was distributed.22. On 10 July, a Dress conference was held, in which participants in the hearingsanswered questions. On 11 July, the Chairman of the Panel gave a pressconference to sum up the work of the Panel.23. The Panel recommends that the present report, as well as the verbatimtranscripts of the hearings (A/AC.131/82/Add.lO), should be disseminated widely.-4-

I!I. LEGAL PREMISES IN RELATION TO NAIIBIA AND ITS RESOURCESA. Termination of the MJandate24. By its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, the General Assemblyterminated the League of Nations M1andate previously exercised by South Africaover South West Africa. By the same resolution, the Assembly declared thatSouth Africahad failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the MandatedTerritory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and securityof the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa and had, in fact, disavowedthe Mandate; and decided that the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic 1ajestyto be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa wastherefore terminated, that Fouth Africa had no other right to administer theTerritory and that henceforth South West Africa came under the directresponsibility of the United Nations.25. The following year, the General Assembly established the United TTationsCouncil for amibia with a mandate to administer the Territory until independence(see para. 37 below).B. Action by the Security Council26. Subsequently, the Security Council also declared South Africa's presence inNamibia to be illegal. By its resolution 276 (1970) of 30 January 1970, theSecurity Council declared that the continued presence of the South Africanauthoritits in Iamibia was illegal and that all acts taken by the Government ofSouth Africa concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate wereillegal and invalid. The Security Council called upon all States, particularly thosewhich had ccoronic and other interests in Namibia, to refrain from any dealingswith the Government of South Africa which were inconsistent with the SecurityCouncil's position that the continued presence of South African authorities inNamibia was illegal.27. By its resolution 283 (1970) of 29 July 1970, the Security Council called uponall States to ensure that companies and other commercial and industrialenterprises owned by, or under direct control of, the State cease all dealings withrespect to commercial or industrial enterprises or concessions in Namibia. It alsocalled uron all States to withhold from their nationals or companies of theirnationality not under direct governmental control, government loans, creditguarantees and other forms of financial support that would be used to facilitatetrade or commerce with Namibia.

28. By the same resolution, the Security Council further called upon all States toensure that companies and other commercial enterprises owmed by, or underdirect control of, the State cease all further investment activities, includingconcessions, in Namibia. It also called upon all States to discourage theirnationals or comnanics of their nationality not under direct governmental controlfrom investing or obtaining concessions in Namibia, and to that end to withholdprotection of such investment against claims of a future lawful Government ofNamibi a.

C. Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice29. By its resolution 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, the Security Council sought anadvisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.30. On 21 June 1971, in renly to the question"What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presenceof South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution276 (1970)?;the Court stated that it was of the opinion:"by 13 votes to 2,"(1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal,South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration fromTamibia irmediately and thus put an end to its occupation of theTerritory"by 11 votes to 4,"(2) that States Hembers of the United Nations are under obligation torecognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in iamibia and theinvalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and torofrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Governmentof South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lendingsupport or assistance to, such presence and administration;(3) that it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the UnitedTations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in theaction which has been taken by the United Nations with regard toNamibia. 7/31. In reaching its opinion, the Court first reiterated the conclusions it reached in1950, 1955 and 1956:/Authority of the United Nations to supervise theadministration of Namibia/... the-General Assembly of the United Nations is legally qualified toexercise the supervisory functions previously exercised by the League of Nationswith regard to the administration of the Territory, and that theUnion of South Africa is under an obligation to submit to supervision andcontrol of the Gcneral Assembly and to render annual reports to it'(I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 137).197/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa inamibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276(1970),

*Idvisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.-6-

"'Thus, the authority of the General Assembly to exercise supervision overthe administration of South-West Africa as a mandated Territory is based on theprovisions of the Charter.' (I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 76).II"Accordingly, the obligations of the Mandatory continue unimpaired with thisdifference, that the supervisory functions exercised by the Council of the Leagueof Nations are now to be exercised by the United Nations.' (I.C.J. Reports 1956, p.27)." 7/The Court also stated, in reaching its opinion:/Continued existence of the Mandate/'74. That the Mandate had not lapsed was also admitted by the Government ofSouth Africa on several occasions during the early pcriod of transition, when theUnitod Nations was being formed and the League dissolved ...17'78. In the light of the foregoing review, there can be no doubt that, as consistentlyrecognized by this Court, the Mandate survived the demise of the League, andthat South Africa admitted as much for a number of years/Validity of action by the General Assembly/"87. The Government of France in its written statement and theGovernment of South Africa throughout the present proceedings have raised theobjection that the General Assembly, in adopting resolution 2145 (XXI), actedultra vires."91. One of the fundamental principles governing the internationalrelationship thus established /by the Mandate/ is that a party which disowns ordoes not fulfil its own obligations cannot be recognized as retaining the rightswhich it claims to derive from the relationship.-94. In examining this action of the General Assembly /resolution2145 (XXI)7 it is appropriate to have regard to the general principles ofinternational law regulating termination of a treaty relationship on account ofbreach ... only a material breach of a treaty justifies termination, such breachbeing defined as:"(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the presentConvention; or-7-

'i(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishmpnt ofthe object or purpose of the treaty (Art. 60, para. 3)."95. General Assembly resolution 215 (XXI) determines that both forms ofmaterial breach had occurred in this case ..."96. It has been contended that the Covenant of the League of Nations did notconfer on the Council of the League power to terminate a mandate for misconductof the mandatory and that no such power could therefore be exercised by theUnited Nations, since it could not derive from the League greater powers than the

latter itself had. For this objection to prevail it would be necessary to show thatthe mandates system, as established under the League, excluded the application ofthe general principle of law that a right of termination on account of breach mustbe presumed to exist in respect of all treaties, except as regards provisions relatingto the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitariancharacter (as indicated in Art. 60, para. 5, of the Vienna Convention). The silenceof a treaty as to the existence of such a right cannot be interpreted as implying theexclusion of a right which has its source outside of the treaty, in generalinternational law, and is dependent on the occurrence of circumstances which arenot normally envisaged when a treaty is concluded.4 i05. ...R elying on these decisions of the Court, the General Assembly declaredthat the Mandate having been terminated 'South Africa has no other right toadminister the Territory'. This is not a finding on facts, but the formulation of alegal situation. For it would not be correct to assume that, because the GeneralAssembly is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it is debarred fromadopting, in specific cases within the frameworkof its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operativedesign./Binding nature of Security Council decisions underArticle 25 of the Charter of the United Nations/"113. It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only toenforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. It is not possibleto find in the Charter any support for this view. Article 25 is not confined todecisions in regard to enforcement action but applies to 'the decisions of theSecurity Council' adopted in accordance with the Charter. Moreover., that Articleis placed, not in Chapter VII, but immediately after Article 211 in that part of theCharter which deals with the functions and powers of the Security Council. IfArticle 25 had reference solely to decisions of the Security Council concerningenforcement action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, that is to say, if itwere only such decisions which had binding effuct, then Article 25 would besuperfluous, since this effect is secured by Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter."114. It has also been contended that the relevant Security Councilresolutions are couched in exhortatory rather than mandatory language and

that, therefore, they do not purport to impose any legal duty on any State nor toaffect legally any right of any State. The language of a resolution of the SecurityCouncil should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to itsbinding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question -hether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, havingregard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it,the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assistin determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council."115. Applying these tests, the Court recalls that in the preamble ofresolution 269 (1969), the Security Council was 'Mindful of its responsibility totake necessary action to secure strict compliance with the obligations entered intoby States Members of the United Nations under the provisions of Article 25 of the

Charter of the United Nations'. The Court has therefore reached the conclusionthat the decisions made by the Security Council in paragraphs 2 and 5 ofresolution 276 (1970), as related to paragraph 3 of resolution 264 (1969) andparagraph 5 of resolution 269 (1969), were adopted in conformity with thepurposes and principles of the Charter and in accordance with its Articles 24 and25. The decisions are consequently binding on all States Members of the UnitedYations, which are thus under obligation to accept and carry them out.1 16. ... Thus when the Security Council adoots a decision underArticle 25 in accordance with the Charter, it is for Hember States to comply withthat decision, including those members of the Security Council whichvoted against it and those Members of the United !Tations who are not membersof the Council. To hold otherwise would be to deprive this principal organ of itsessential functions and powe2s under the Charter./obligation of Iember States/1119. The Member States of the United Nations are, for the reasons given inparagraph 115 above, under obligation to recognize the illegality and invalidity ofSouth Africa's continued presence in Namibia. They are also under obligation torefrain from lending any support or any form of assistance to South Africa withreference to its occupation of Namibia ..."124. The restraints which are implicit in the non-recognition of South Africa'spresence in Namibia and the explicit provisions of paragraph 5 of resolution 276(1970) impose upon Member States the obligation to abstain from entering intoeconomic and other forms of relationship or dealings with South Africa on behalfof or concerning Namibia which may entrench its authority over the Territory. 8/8/ Ibid.

33. It should also be noted that, as was pointed out in the written statementsubmitted to the International Court of Justice on behalf of the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations in 1970, "although a State may be unable to control someprivate acts carried out by its citizens within Namibia under the protection of theillcgal South African regime, the results of such private acts may nevertheless callfor the participation cr sanction of the State in order to acquire legal recognitionoutside Namibia ".D. Further action by the Security Council34. By its resolution 301 (1971), of 20 October 1971, the Security Councilendorsed the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.35. By the same resolution, the Security Council declared that all mattersaffecting the rights of the people of Namibia were of immediate concern to allMembers of the United Nations; and called upon all States, in the discharge oftheir responsibilities towards the people of Namibia, to abstain from entering intoeconomic and other forms of relationship or dealings with South Africa on behalfof or concerning Namibia which might entrench its authority over the Territory.36. The Security Council further declared that franchises, rights, titles or contractsrelating to Namibia granted to individuals or companies by South Africa after theadoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) were not subject to

protection or espousal by their States against claims of a future lawful Government of Namibia.E. Establishment of the Council and enactment of Decree No. 137. On 19 May 1967, by its resolution 2248 (S-V), the General Assemblyestablished the United Nations Council for Namibia and entrusted to it, inter alia,the following powers and functions, to be discharged in the Territory:(a) To administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximumpossible participation of the people of the Territory;(b) To promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as werenecessary for the administration of the Territory until a legislative assembly wasestablished following elections conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage.38. Acting by virtue of the powers entrusted to it by the General Assembly in itsresolution 2248 (S-V), the Council, on 27 September 1974, enacted Decree No. 1for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia.39. Decree Po. 1 establishes that:"1. No person or entity, whether a body corporate or unincorporated, maysearch for, prospect for, explore for, take, extract, mine, process, refine,use, sell, export, or distribute any natural resource, whether animal ormineral, situated or found to be situated within the territorial limits ofNamibia without the consent and permission of the United Nations Council for

Namibia or any person authorized to act on its behalf for the purpose ofgiving such permission or such consent;"2. Any permission, concession or license for all or any of the Durposesspecified in paragraph 1 above whensoever granted by any person or entity,including any body purporting to act under the authority of the Governmentof the Republic of South Africa or the 'Administration of South West Africa'or their predecessors, is null, void and of no force or effect,'4. Any animal, mineral or other natural resource produced in oi emanatingfrom the Territory of Namibia which shall be taken from the said Territorywithout the consent and written authority of the United Nations Council forNamibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Council may beseized and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the said Council and heldin trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia."' 9/40. Subsequently, by its resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974, theGeneral Assembly requested all Member States to take all appropriate measuresto ensure the full application of, and compliance with, the provisions of Decree ro.1.41. Decree No. 1, the first major legislative act of the Council, is a domestic lawof Namibia. However, the fact that the Council, the authority which legallyadministers Namibia and which promulgated the Decree, discharges aninternational responsibility for that Territory under a mandate from the UnitedNations, must imply an awareness and acceptance on the part of States Membersof the United Nations that the act of that authority carries internationalconsequences. Therefore, Decree No. 1, while being a domestic law of ITamibia,

is also an instrument carrying international consequences for States Members ofthe United Nations.42. Removal of uranium from Namibia in contravention of Decree No. 1, inaddition to being a violation of the domestic law of Namibia, has the additionaleffect that persons or entities which remove uranium in this way have no legaltitle to any Namibian uranium which may be in their possession. By the sametoken, the Council has the right, when the movement of the uranium has beentraced, to bring a case in any appropriate jurisdiction.F. Other related action by the General Assembly43. At its twenty-second session, the General Assembly first took up the questionof foreign economic interests in colonial Territories. By its resolution 2288(XXII) of 7 December 1967, the Assembly strongly condemned the exploitationof the colonial Territories and peoples by foreign economic interests and deploredthe policies of the colonial Powers which permitted the exploitation of the naturalresources of the Territories.44. In subsequent years, the General Assembly, acting on the question of foreign9/ For the full text of the Decree, see vol. I, annex II, of the present report.-11-

economic interests in colonial territories, continued to adopt resolutions of a si-ilar character.45. At its twenty-fifth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 2678 (XXV)of 9 !X-cr-iber 1970, included tle question of the activities of fcrei -n econoricinterests in its resolution on Tlamibia. At its thirty-second session, the Sse 'bly,Yv its resolution 72/9 G a,-ain requested all Member States to take all aTpropri:tt,mtsures to ensure the full aplication of Decree 7o. 1; authorizer the -0tucil tonotify tl_ Governments of Statc-s whose corrorations, whether public or nrivate, -er-ted in Jamibia of the illc-ality of such operations :.n4 of the r:o-ition of theCouncil in that rr.l; anc! authorized the Council to contact adininisterin( and 'r -mn- bodies of forein corporations creratin in ,rribia to warn them of the illeiralbasis on which they w,::re oreratin - in amibia and of the losition of the Council inthat re <[rd.46. At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly, by resolution 33/1-82 A of21 December 1978, declared that South Africa was liable to Day reparations toZamibia for the damage caused by its illegal occupation of Namibia and its acts ofaggression against the Famibian people since the termination of its Mandate overNamibia.47. At its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly, by its resolution 34/92 B,urged those States which had not yet done so to break off economic relationswrith South Africa that concerned Namibia; declared that the exploitation of thenatural resources of Namibia by foreign economic interests, in violation of theCharter of the United Nations, of the pertinent resolutions of the GeneralAssembly and the Security Council and of Decree No. 1 was illegal; stronglycondemned the activities of all foreign corporations operating in Namibia underthe illegal South African administration which were exploiting the human andnatural resources of the Territory, and demanded that such exploitation cease

forthwith; and appealed to Governments to discourage private investors frcm theircountries from participating in business ventures in Namibia which benefited theSouth African r6gime by making available additional resources to meet themilitary costs of its repressive policies in Namibia.48. At the same session. the General Assembly, by resolution 34/41 of 21ilovember 1979 on the question of foreign economic interests in colonialTerritories, reiterated that any administering or occurying Power which deprivedthe colonial peoples of the exercise of their legitimate rights over their naturalresources or subordinated the rights and interests of those peoples to foreigneconomic and financial interests violated the solemn obligations it had assumedunder the Charter of the United Nations, reaffirmed that, by their deDletiveexploitation of natural resources, the continued accumulation and repatriation ofhuge profits and the use of those profits for the enrichment of foreign settlers andthe entrenchment of colonial domination over the Territories, the activities offoreign economic) financial and other interests operating currently in the colonialTerritories of southern Africa constituted a major obstacle to politicalindependence and to the enjoyment of the natural resources of those Territories bythe indigenous inhabitants; strongly condemned the collusion of France, theFederal Republic of Germany, Israel and the United States with South Africa inthe nuclear field, and called upon all other Governments to continue to refrainfrom supplying the racist minority regime of South Africa, directly or indirectly,with installations that might enable it to produce uranium, plutonium and othernuclear materials, reactors or military equipment- called once again upon allGovernments which had not yet done so to take legislative, administrative orother-12-

measures in respect of their nationals and the bodies corporate under theirjurisdiction that owned and operated enterprises in colonial Territories,particularly in Africa, which were detrimental to the interests of the inhabitants ofthose Territories, in order to put an end to such enterprises and to prevent newinvestments which ran counter to the interests of the inhabitants of thoseTerritories; and called once again upon all States to discontinue all economic,financial or trade relations with South Africa concerning Pamibia and to refrainfrom entering into economic, financial or other relations with South Africa, actingon behalf of or concerning Namibia, which might lend support to its continuedillegal ,ccupation of that Territory.G. Request by the General Assembly to hold hearings on Namibian uranium49. After a number of resolutions authorizing the Council to hold hearings onNamibian uranium, the General Assembly) by its resolution 34/92 B, specificallyrequested the Council to report on its findings to the Assembly at its thirty-fifthsession. Accordingly, the Council held hearings from 7 to 11 July 1980.Paragraphs 50 to 220 of the present report analyse the testimony presented at thehearings: and paragraphs 221 to 237 contain the Panel's conclusions andrecommendations arising out of the hearings.IV. ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF IIALIBIAIJ URANIUM

50. In the course of the public hearings held from 7 to 11 July 1980, the Panelheard testimony from 24 participants (see annex II to the present volume). Thepresent section of the report summarizes and analyses their testimony and,occasionally, supplements it with published material from other sources. Theinformation presented in this section relates to (a) the extraction of uranium-.(b) the transport of uranium; (c) the processing of uranium- (d) sales of uranium:and (e) the health hazards associated with these activities.A. Extraction51. According to what is known of the world's uranium reserves, Ilamibiaoccupies sixth place among market-economy countries. Authoritative estimatesplace the reserves at R6ssing, the world's largest open-cast uranium mine, atapproximately 180,000 metric tons of uranium oxide which, in the opinion ofsome observers, would be enough for 40 years' production at current rates.However, others estimate Rssing's uranium reserves to be only 100,000 metrictons, and at the current rate of extraction, that would give the mine a life span ofless than 25 years. It is also estimated that production could rise in future years atR6ssing. According to some participants, Namibia as a whole has a potentialoutput of some 15,000 metric tons per annum, which could be reached in 1990. Itwas reported that annual production at the Rssing mine could amount to about5,000 metric tons until about 1992 and then drop to around 4,600 metric tons by1993. The later rate could be maintained until about 2000.Involvement of transnational corporations52. Uranium is extracted by R6ssing Uranium, Ltd., which was reportedlyincorporated in South Africa in 1970 at a time when there was no mandatory-13-

provision for the incorporation of local companies in Namibia. However, becausea change of "law" in 1978, and the establishment of a mandatory provision that allcompanies operating in !'amibia be incorporated as internald' or "external"companies, Rssing Uranium was incorporated in 1979 as an "internal company"in Namibia. The initial development costs of the mine were £120 million plus alater expenditure of £45 million so that the total cost of development at Rassingup to 1978 was £165 million.53. Although the owners of R6ssing Uranium have kept a veil of secrecy over theownership of the company, available information indicates that Rassing Uraniumwas financed by a combination of approximately one third equity and two thirdsloans. The two major equity holders are the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, Ltd.(RTZ) of the United Kingdom, with 46.5 per cent, and the Industrial DevelopmentCorporation of South Africa, Ltd. (IDC), with 13.2 per cent. IDC, which is whollyowned by the South African Government, is described by RTZ as having a"significant shareholding" in the mine, and provided the main financing for itsexpensive processing plant. The list of equity participants also includes RioAlgom, Ltd. of Canada (a subsidiary of RTZ), with 10 per cent ownership Total-Compagnie miniere et nucleaire of France, which is wholly owned by theCompagnie frangaise des p~troles (CFP), with 10 per cent ownership; and theGeneral Hining and Finance Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (GMFC) (62.5 per

cent of which is owned by Federale Mynbou (Bpk.), also of South Africa), with6.8 per cent ownership.54. RTZ, incorporated in 1962 in the United Kingdom, is one of the largesturanium producing companies in the world, handling approximately one quarterof the trade of the market-economy countries in this mineral. It has the largestinvestment of any foreign interest in Namibia, holding a 46.5 per cent interest inR6ssing Uranium, which owns and operates the only active uranium mine in theTerritory. It is also the parent company of Rio Algom, Ltd. of Canada, whichitself has a 10 per cent equity holding in the E6ssing mine. In addition, RTZ isinvolved in other ventures in Namibia. It has an interest in G.P. Louw (Pty.) Ltd.through a holding in G.P. Louw by Rio Algom. In addition, Rio Tinto Financeand Exploration Ltd., a wholly-owned United Kingdom subsidiary of RTZ, owns100 per cent of Skeleton Coast Diamond (Pty.) Ltd. of Namibia.55. It may be noted that, despite heavy United Kingdom involvement in RbssingUranium, control over the voting rights of all shares in the company is said to bein the hands of IDC and GMFC which, respectively, have 13.2 per cent and6.8 per cent equity in the company. Even though RTZ and its subsidiary, RioAlgom, together own the largest block of shares in R6ssing (56.5 per cent), RTZcontrol of the voting rights was reduced from 36.8 per cent in 1972 to only 26.5per cent in 1978. (There are two types of ownership shares in Rssing: "A" sharesand "B'" shares. Only the "A' shareholders are allowed to vote in mattersregarding policy and over-all control of the company. IEC and the FederaleMynbou-GMFC group, both of which are South African, control the majority of"A" shares.) IDC has stated that it views R6ssing as an integral part of SouthAfrica's plans to expand its uranium production and become involved in thecommercial enrichment of uranium in the 1980s.56. CFP, the owner of Total, is a French conglomerate engaged in all phases ofthe oil industry as well as in the exploitation of uranium. The French Governmentcontrols 35 per cent of the share capital and 40 per cent of the voting rights ofCFP and possesses a right of veto over decisions by the company's management.Total owns its 10 per cent share in Rssing Ursninm thrQligh a subsidiary,-11 -

Hinatome, S.A., in which it has a 50 per cent interest (see also para. 71 below).The remaining 50 per cent of Minatome is owned by Pechiney-Ugine Kuhlmann.57. Although companies based in the Federal Republic of Germany are notdirectly involved at present in the exploitation of Namibian uranium,Urangesellschaft mbH continues to have a stake in the Territory's uranium output.Available information indicates that control of Urangesellschaft is vested in asyndicate comprising Metallgesellschaft (33 per cent), Steinkohlen-ElektrizitdtsAG (STEAG) (33 per cent) and Veba AG (33 per cent). The Government of theFederal Republic of Germany holds 40 per cent of the shares of Veba. Some 25per cent of the shares of STEAG are owned by the Gesellschaft fur Energie,majority ownership of which is vested in the Government.58. Urangesellschaft was set up at the end of the 1960s with much support fromthe Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the purpose of exploring

for, and exploiting, uranium deposits all over the world in joint ventures withoverseas companies. Until 1972, Urangesellschaft did preparatory research withRTZ on R6ssing. About 75 per cent of the research costs of Urangesellschaft (DM6 million out of a total of DM 8 million) was borne by the Government of theFederal Republic of Germany. This support, however, stopped in 1972. Theofficial reason given at the time was that the Federal Republic of Germany hadbecome less dependent on R6ssing due to the finding of new sources of supply inAustralia and Canada. As a reward for its efforts up to 1972, Urangesellschaftreceived an option to acquire 10 per cent of the annual production at R6ssing.Urangesellschaft has denied having taken up the option. According to aparticipant in the hearings, this option has indeed been exercised. Subsequently,Veba, one of the companies which controls Urangesellschaft, admitted that itssubsidiary company Preussenelektra had obtained uranium from Namibia throughthe intermediary of Urangesellschaft, and that another of its subsidiaries,Hordwestdeutsche Kraftwerke, had also obtained uranium from Namibia.59. It was also reported that the Federal Republic of Germany had supplied avariable interest loan of "PUS 25 million to RTZ for the period 1979-1985.Furthermore, in addition to the $US 72 million advanced for the Rgssing projectby IDC, the European-American Banking Corporation in 1975 had played aleading role in arranging $US 48 million in supplementary financing to SouthAfrican state corporations, some of which were involved in building theinfrastructure for R6ssing. Also, Rio Algom's holding in R6ssing was reported tobe valued at SCan 8.1 million.60. Iran, which under the previous Government had agreed to purchase a certainamount of uranium from Rassing each year, has terminated its contract since theestablishment of the Islamic Republic. It reportedly still owns 15 per cent of the"B" shares of Rssing Uranium.61. A number of other corporations have engaged in auxilliary activities. A jointventure including the Western Knapp Engineering Division of Arthur G. McGee,a United States company, and Power Gas, Ltd. of the United Kingdom secured themanagement contract for the design, engineering, procurement and constructionof the R6ssing mine. Interspace, Inc. supplied pipes for the R6ssing water system.62. With regard to its activities in other developing countries, RTZ has 9subsidiaries or affiliates in independent African countries, 15 in the Caribbean and20 in South America, all of which are relatively insignificant in financial termscompared to its operation in Namibia.-15-

63. Pre-tax profits from the RTZ group's uranium operations amounted to £30.4million in 1978, or 10.7 per cent of the group's total for the year. Of this amount,£4.5 million, or 1.6 per cent of total profit, was represented by R~ssing Uranium.In 1979, of the total Pre-tax profits earned by RTZ, £48 million, or 11 Der cent ofits pre-tax profits, came from RPssing Uranium. It should be noted, however, thatcurrently Rbssing is paying no taxes at all in Namibia. Under the terms of theSouth African Income Tax Act of 1963, companies can write off all theircapitalized pre-production expenditures against their taxation liability.

64. According to evidence submitted to the Panel, the transnational corporationswhich owned Rssing Uranium were attracted to Namibia because they couldutilize Namibian labour at a lower cost than the price of labour elsewhere in theworld. By using migrant labour in Namibia, they could mine uranium at a cheaperprice than they would have to pay otherwise. They were also attracted to Namibiabecause they did not have to concern themselves with either the rights of thepeople or the protection of the environment; nor did they have to concernthemselves with thehealth and safety of Namibian workers or the long-term effects on the health ofthe local population as a whole.65. In that connexion, the Panel was informed that Namibian workers at R~ssingwere employed under a grossly discriminatory system of wages, workingconditions and living standards. According to information placed before thePanel, black vorkers lived in single quarters in unsanitary conditions while thewhite workers received good housing at only nominal rent. As one observerstated: "Hundreds of thousands of Africans are forced into the deep-level mines inSouth Africa or the open-pit mines of Namibia under the migrant labour system.They work for 11 months out of every 12 for nothing less than slave wages, tornaway from their families most of their working lives because of the Draconianmigrant labour laws".66. It was also stated that the workers did not receive regular health checks,which, although not required for radio--activity monitoring, were required in therest of the world as part of good general health care.67. In 1977, according to information released by 1RTZ, the employees at Rssingwere divided into two groups. "Day-rate workers" consisted of 19678 "non-whites" distributed among 7 grades of pay ranging from 136 to 557 rand permonth with the majority of "day-rate workers" occupying the lowest 4 grades.The "salaried staff" consisted of 674 whites and 6 "non-whites" distributed among12 grades of payranging from R 300 to "over R 1,050" per month, with the majority of "salariedstaff" occupying the middle grades in the scale. The salary difference between themajority of non-white workers and the majority of white workers was over R 400per month. By 1979, the two separate pay scales had been consolidated into asinglescale comprising 17 grades. The situation, however, remained similar; out of atotal of 2,747 workers, the majority of white workers were in the top grades,while the majority of black workers were in the bottom 6 grades.68. In addition to the extraction of Namibian uranium described above,corporations are engaged in extensive prospecting in an attempt to locate newdeposits of uranium.69. The Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. is one of the leadersin the search for new uranium deposits in Namibia. It has been reported that theuranium prospecting activities of Anglo-American are being carried out jointlywith-16-

the Union Corporation, Ltd. of South Africa and Societ6 Nationale Elf Aquitaine(SNEA), CFP, Pechiney-Ugine Kuhlmann of France and Total.70. SNEA, which is 70 per cent owned by Enterprise de Recherches et d'ActivitesPetroli~res (ERAP), a French state company, is conducting its activities throughits wholly-owned subsidiary, Omitaramines, S.A., formerly known as AquitaineSWA.71. Pechiney-Ugine Kuhlmann, in addition to its 10 Der cent ownership of theR6ssing mine, conducts prospecting through its subsidiary, Minatome, S.A., 50per cent of which is owned by CFP/Total.72. GMFC is the second largest South African company involved in the search foruranium in Namibia. It is 62.5 per cent controlled by Federale Mynbou of SouthAfrica, maintains close ties with the South African regime and shares directorswith many state-owned corporations, including the Iron and Steel Corporation ofSouth Africa (ISCOR), the South African Oil, Gas and Chemicals Corporation(SASOL) and IDC.73. In addition to Rio Algom, another Canadian company currently involved inexploration for Namibian uranium is Falconbridge Nickel Mines, Ltd., which iscontrolled by the Superior Oil Company of Texas (United States).74. Despite the withdrawal in the mid-1970s of certain United States transnationalcorporations which had been searching for oil, other United States firms havebecome active in the exploration for new uranium deposits, employing the mostadvanced mining technology. They include the Union Carbide Corporation andthe Newmont Mining Company, both of which have engaged in extensiveprospecting for uranium in Namibia.75. In addition, a number of United States uranium and nuclear corporations haverecently registered as "external" companies in Namibia. These include DelawareNuclear, Inc., the Midwest Uranium Corporation, the Southern UraniumCorporation and Tristate Nuclear, Inc. It is believed that these corporations areinterested in prospecting for uranium.B. Transport76. Namibian uranium is concentrated into uranium oxide, known as"yellowcake", at the R~ssing mine site and then shipped to buyers by air or sea.77. The principal customers currently receiving Namibian uranium are basedwithin France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.78. In the case of the air routes used until late 1979, about which extensiveinformation was provided to the Panel, uranium in the form of yellowcake wastransported during the period February 1978 to mid-December 1979 fromWindhoek by Boeing 707 cargo aircraft operated by South African Airways(SAA) and DC-8s of the French airline Union des transports a~riens (UTA).79. The aircraft flew over different countries in Africa, reportedly without takingthe necessary precautions to safeguard the territories over which they flew, andreportedly without giving notice to the Governments of the countries concerned.-17-

Those Governments were thus not even aware that aircraft of differentnationalities flying over their territories were carrying a dangerous substance.

80. Throughout 1978 and 1979, the flight path used by SAA in deliveringNamibian uranium went from Windhoek over the Atlantic Ocean to a refuelingstop in Cape Verde then on to its destinations in 1,1arseille and Paris (OrlyAirport).81. The flight path used by UTA went over Angola, Zaire and Gabon to itsdestinations at Marseille and Paris (Charles de Gaulle Airport). In the case of boththe SAA and UTA flights, the Governments of the countries concerned were notaware of the nature of the cargo.82. Movement by air began at the beginning of 1978, shortly after consistentproduction levels had been reached at the Rdssing mine. The figure confirmed byRTZ for 1977 was 2,759 metric tons. On 15 February 1978, the first flight bySAA, carrying some 100 barrels of Namibian uranium, went from Windhoek toOrly Airport. The 100 barrels weighed approximately 350 kilograms each andwere marked correctly with the stamp "radio-active material". The cargo wasdestined for use in the United Kingdom and the aircraft was met by two lorriesregistered in the United Kingdom. While several other flights by SAA Boeing707s and UTA DC-8s took place between February and May 1978, those weresuspended for some weeks early in June of that year, following a serious fire atthe mine on 27 May. The fire destroyed one of the mine's two solvent extractionplants and caused production to be cut back by 20 per cent for 1978. However, bymid-July, regular flights were being made on a twice-weekly basis by SAA andUTA. Each aircraft is known to have carried between 90 and 94 barrels ofNamibian uranium, each weighing 350 kilograms.83. From February 1978 until mid-December 1979, most of the uranium flownout of Namibia was destined for United Kingdom and French nuclear processingplants in northern England and southern France. Flights took place in the greatestpossible secrecy. Regular deliveries were made first at the Marseille-MarignaneAirport, with final destinations at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport for UTAaircraft and at Orly Airport for SAA. Numerous precautions were taken to concealthe entry of Namibian uranium into France, including the use of UTA planes so asto render their identification difficult. There were no public indications of the useof special flight plans or of the fact that the flights (coded UT 280) had stopped atWindhoek; the arrivals of planes transporting Namibian uranium to Frenchairports were particularly discreet.84. Furthermore, the nature of the goods themselves was likewise concealed. Incustoms declarations, the uranium was designated as "other non-ferrous andconcentrated metal ores" unless, as customs officials at Marseille-Marignanemaintained, it was listed as a "special transaction", an expression used for thetransportation of armaments.85. In transporting Namibian uranium, the French State railway company, theSociet6 Nationale des Chemins de Fer (SNCF), used wagons indistinguishablefrom other freight wagons except for their small radio-activity stickers, Thesewagons transported Namibian uranium from Canet, near Marseille, to a plantoperated by the Societe pour la conversion de l'uranium en metal et enhexafluorure (COMURHEX), where the uranium oxide was transformed intouranium hexafluoride (see also para. 98 below).

-18-

86. From the COITRHEX plant, the Namibian uranium was taken as hexafluorideto the Socifte pour la construction et exploitation d'une usine d'enrichissement pardiffusion gazeuse (EURODIF) enrichment plant at Pierrelatte prior to distributionto various European nuclear plants.87. Among the nuclear plants were those belonging to Electricit6 de France(EDF), which has not admitted that it purchased uranium from Namibia.However, the French Government has recognized that 2 per cent of that supplydid come from Namibia. The uranium was unloaded at French airports under theprotection of the French police.88. During the last five months of 1979, the majority of the uranium cargoestransported by air were delivered by road through France and the United Kingdomto the enrichment and nuclear fuel fabrication plant operated by British NuclearFuels, Ltd. at Springfield, near Preston in the north of England. The cargoes werecarried by Edmondson's Transport Company, a privately-owned United Kingdomcompany based in Morecambe, some 48 kilometres from the Springfield nuclearplant. The Panel was informed that 12 different lorries, belonging to or hired byEdmondson's, transported uranium from Charles de Gaulle and Orly Airports tothe Springfield plant between February and December 1979. The route used wasthrough the crosschannel ports of the United Kingdom and France. It was alsoreported that the airfreight contract was a very lucrative one for UTA. The freightcharges involved were quite high and were regarded by UTA as a form ofpremium business which the company was anxious to retain.89. The twice-weekly flights by UTA and SAA ended in mid-December 1979.The reason given by the UTA management was that both aircraft companies'uranium transport contracts were due to expire at the end of that year. However,the Panel was informed of another reason, namely, that workers at one of theFrench airports had intended to launch a carefully planned action in support ofDecree No. 1 early in December of that year to coincide with the delivery ofNamibian uranium by one of the airline companies involved. While that actionhad been discreetly planned, two articles released in the French and UnitedKingdom press respectively, one of which disclosed the transport method usedand the nature of the action intended one week prior to it, served to awaken theattention of the authorities concerned, and from mid-December 1979 flights of thekind described were known to have ceased.90. As a result, alternative transport methods have been used, including oceanshipping. In January 1980, the Federal Republic of Germany vessel Urundiarrived in Zeebrugge, Belgium. There it unloaded two containers of drumscontaining Namibian uranium, an amount large enough to fill two lorries. The twocontainers were collected by Edmondson's Transport Company and taken by sea(cross-channel ferries) and road to the Springfield plant in the United Kingdom.At least two shipments of uranium have been made to Zeebrugge since that time,one in early February and the other in March or early April. The sister ships of theUrundi, namely, the Usumbura and the Ulanga, were used, sailing via Lagos andtravelling around Africa to the northern European ports of Zeebrugge, Rotterdam,

Hamburg and others. Again, the Governments of the countries concerned werenot aware of the nature of the cargo.91. The total quantity of Namibian uranium being transported each year out ofR6ssing to the European destinations was estimated at 5,000 metric tons. ThePanel-19-

was informed that some Namibian uranium had been shipped to the United Statesfor enrichment and re-export to Japan. No information on the transport route wasmade available.C. Processing92. From testimony presented during the hearings, it emerged that manycompanies were known to be involved in the conversion of Namibian uraniuminto hexafluoride, its enrichment, its fabrication into fuel rods and its sale as thefinal product, nuclear fuel. However, as a result of secrecy, the identities of all thecompanies involved was not necessarily known.93. The initial process of mechanically crushing the uranium-bearing ore, as wellas its purification and concentration into uranium oxide or "yellowcake", wasdoneat the R6ssing mine. It was exported at that point in the cycle for isotopeenrichment in Europe.94. The two primary isotopes of uranium which are derived from the ore are thecommon U-238 and the rare U-235. Only the isotope U-235 is fissionable byslow neutrons and U-235 is the element used both for making fuel for nuclearreactors and for making nuclear weapons. As with almost all natural uraniumores, the REssing uranium contains 99.3 per cent U-238 and 0.7 per cent U-235.However, the ore at R~ssing, it should be noted, is among the lowest grade oresthat are commercially exploited in the world. It is necessary to enrich the ore inthe rare isotope U-235 in an isotope enrichment plant. Since isotope enrichmentplants work with gases, it is necessary to make a gaseous chemical compound outof the uranium: uranium hexafluoride. The uranium hexafluoride molecule UF6contains only one atom of uranium and six atoms of fluorine. The best knownmethod of enrichment is a process known as gaseous diffusion, in which the UF6,which is a highly corrosive gas, is passed through porous metallic membranes.The lighter isotope passes through the membranes more quickly and the process isrepeated until the desired enrichment of the lighter isotope is achieved. There isalso a newer process known as separation by ultra-centrifuge which is being usedprincipally by Urenco (see para. 103 below). A third process, known as jet-nozzleor Beckernozzle enrichment, is believed to be in use in South Africa.95. For civilian nuclear power plants, the U-235 content is increased or enrichedto roughly 3.3 to 4 per cent. If the same process were continued to the point wherethe U-235 content reached a concentration of 40 per cent or more, the uraniumwould then be of "'bomb grade". It requires roughly 75 kilograms of 40 per centU-235 to produce a nuclear explosive. As the percentage of fissile isotopesincreases, the mass needed decreases. At 60 per cent enrichment, roughly 37kilograms of U-235 are needed; at 70 per cent enrichment, the required mass

drops to 28 kilograms; at 80 per cent enrichment, the amount drops to 21kilograms; at 90 per cent enrichment, to 17 kilograms; and at 100 per centenrichment, only 15 kilograms are needed to produce a nuclear explosive.96. Uranium 235, however, is not the only element that can be used to produce anuclear weapon. Plutonium 239, which occurs naturally only in minute quantities,may be used to produce a nuclear explosive in even lesser quantities than U-235.The figures for plutonium 239 are: at 40 per cent enrichment, 11 kilograms; at 60per cent enrichment, 8 kilograms; at 70 per cent enrichment, 7 kilograms; at 80per cent enrichment, 6 kilograms; at 90 per cent enrichment, 5 kilograms; and at100 per cent enrichment, 4.4 kilograms.-20-

97. According to infcrmation given to the Panel, the following countries andorganizations were involved in the processing of NIamibian uranium.France98. The principal company involved in processing Namibian uranium wasCOMRHEX, whose role was to convert the Namibian uranium oxide intohexafluoride at its plants at Plalvezi, near Narbonne, and at Pierrelatte, nearAvignon. Its major owners were Pechiney-Ugine Kuhlmann and Compagniegenerale des mati res nucl~aires (COGEHA). The latter had a 39 per cent interestin COMURHEX and depended entirely for its financing on a governmentdepartment, the omrnnissariat a l'enerlie atomique (CEA), which was controlledby the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. COGEMA was also affiliated withthe EURODIF enrichment plant at Pierrela. e (see para. 86 above).Federal Republic of Germany99. The companies concerned included Urangesellschaft and Veba, which werepredominantly state corporations, and Uranisotopenttrennungsgesellschaft(URANIT), which appeared to be a private company. Urangesellschaft importeduranium oxide from Namibia. URAIT had ties with Urangesellschaft and Veba; italso had a joint function together with British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd. and Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN) in the enrichment of Namibian uranium, which itdid at a price, without owning the material it processed (see para. 103 below).Reaktor Brennelement GmbH fabricated fuel rods using enriched uraniumoriginally obtained from Namibia.United Kingdom100. United Kingdom companies appeared to have a strong relationship with theUnited Kingdom Government. British Nuclear Fuels was a commercial subsidiaryof the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and was established in 1971. Itpurchased uranium oxide from Namibia and apparently converted it intohexafluoride before sending some of it to Urenco in the Netherlands forenrichment. The company also had its own enrichment plant at Capenhurst in theUnited Kingdom. Much of the uranium which it purchased and processed wassold to the electric power producers grouped together in the Central ElectricityGenerating Board.United States and Japan

101. The Panel was informed that Japan had been engaged in the illegalimportation of Namibian uranium and had been using United States facilities forits enrichment. According to l's. Yoko Kitazawa, a participant in the hearings, theKansai Electric Power Company, a private firm, purchased large quantities ofiamibian uranium through the agency of another company, Mitsubishi, whichbought it from a Swiss subsidiary of RTZ. According to testimony, the UnitedStates Government had stated that "small quantities" of Namibian uranium mighthave been imported for re-export to Japan.European Atomic Energy Community (EURTATOM)102. EURATOM was the atomic energy agency of the European EconomicCommunity (EEC). It acted in connexion with the delivery of Namibian uraniumto the various Western European electricity producers. It approved all contractsfor the purchasing and processing of uranium within member States of EEC. Intheory it owned all the uranium which enters EEC countries.-21-

Urenco103. A large volume of Namibian uranium was sent to Urenco for enrichment,according to testimony. Urenco was a joint operation for uranium enrichment runby URANIT, a company in the Federal Republic of Germany, UCI (in which theNetherlands Government owned some 98 per cent of the shares) and the UnitedKingdom Statecontrolled British Nuclear Fuels. It was established in accordancewith the Treaty of Almelo, to which the Governments of the three above-mentioned countries were signatories. The three partners each contrclled anenrichment plant: British Nuclear Fuels had a plant at Capenhurst in the UnitedKingdom and URANIT and UCN operated a plant - which used the ultra-centrifuge process - at Almelo in the Netherlands. A third plant was underconstruction at Gronau in the Federal Republic of Germany. A so-called jointcommittee, in which each partner had a representative, was responsible for policy-making decisions, and was therefore responsible for the enrichment contractsaccepted by Urenco. In 1980, the operational plants together had a potentialcapacity to separate 460 metric tons of enriched uranium per year. It was expectedthat by 1981 their capacity would be 600 metric tons and by 1985, 2,000 metrictons. In a Netherlands television programme which was shown to the Panel, Mr.W. A. Rooke, the manager of Urenco at Almelo stated: "It must be possible thatboth at Capenhurst and Almelo we are processing uranium which has beensupplied from Namibia".D. Sales104. The Panel was informed that long-term purchase contracts for Namibianuranium, all of it from the R6ssing mine, were known to have been concludedwith nuclear fuel suppliers and electric power companies in the United Kingdom,France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. The Netherlands was alsoinvolved, supplying enrichment services for customers in the Federal Republic ofGermany and the United Kingdom. The basis for all those purchases wascontracts offered by RTZ, its subsidiary, R6ssing Uranium, and other subsidiaries- contracts which were in fact illegal and invalid under international law.

105. With regard to sales of Namibian uranium in the form of uranium oxide oryellowcake, the report of RTZ on total sales in 1979 indicated that they reached alevel of R 128.1 million. During 1978, the sale of 3,500 metric tons of uraniumoxide was reported to be worth $US 150 million at the 1978 exchange rate, whichaccounted for about half the increase in total group sales by RTZ for that year.106. RTZ did not publicly release the contracted prices for its uranium sales.However, it was known that contract prices varied from customer to customer andalso according to the date on which the contract was negotiated. Some buyers,primarily British Nuclear Fuels, were believed to be paying well below $US 45per kilogram (at the 1978 exchange rate). Most of Rassing Uranium's othercontracts probably fell in the $US 48-$US 55 per kilogram range, a figure thatwas far less than the current world market price of $US 77-$US 82 per kilogram.107. In 1979, total RTZ sales were £2.7 billion. Of that amount, uranium from allsources accounted for £255 million or just over 9 per cent of the total. Of the totalpre-tax profits earned by RTZ of £482 million, £48 million (10 per cent) camefrom uranium. It was revealed that 50 per cent of the contribution made byuranium to total RTZ profits currently came from the R~ssing mine. It was alsoreported that sales of Namibian uranium exceeded the sales from the RTZ coppermine at Palabora in South Africa.-22-

108. In order, inter alia, to raise the profits of R6ssing Uranium, representativesconnected with uranium sales from Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic ofGermany, France, the United Kingdom and, reportedly, South Africa founded theUranium Marketing Research Organization in Johannesburg in January 1972. Theformation of the cartel resulted in the increase in the price of uranium oxide from$US 13 per kilogram in 1973 to $US 95 in 1977. A new organization, theUranium Institute in London was currently acting as a clearing house forinformation about uranium supply and demand on behalf of representativesconnected with uranium sales from the above-mentioned countries. According tothe figures given by Rssing Uranium, the deliveries from R6ssing between 1977and 1980 could be estimated to be around 13,150 metric tons of uranium oxide ifall known production had been exported.109. Virtually all the customers for Namibian uranium were either governmentauthorities or State-controlled corporations; the exception appeared to be Japanwhere the customers were private corporations. The Japanese Government,however, had to approve uranium imports. RTZ claimed that it had sold all of theR6ssing mine's output for the next several years in advance to various nationalatomic energy authorities and public utilities in Europe and Japan.110. The most important contract for Namibia's uranium and the one which madethe initial investment by RTZ in Namibia possible was the one held by the UnitedKingdom Atomic Energy Authority with one or more RTZ subsidiaries. Under theterms of the contract, 7,500 metric tons of yellowcake would be delivered over asix-year period between 1976 and 1982 (about 42 per cent of the UnitedKingdom's planned civilian requirements over that period), at a price of E150million.

1il. Although the contract was originally signed by RTZ and the United KingdomAtomic Energy Authority in 1970, as a result of opposition in the UnitedKingdom Parliament and elsewhere to dealing with the South African authoritiesin Namibia, the contract was transferred to British Nuclear Fuels in 1975.112. The Panel was informed that a number of United Kingdom electricityproducers, grouped together in the Central Electricity Generating Board, weresupplied with uranium by British Nuclear Fuels. However, despite lengthycampaigns against both South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and thecontinued presence of RTZ in the Territory, the Government of the UnitedKingdom decided in August 1980 not to review the Board's contract to buyuranium from the Rtssing mine in Namibia, even though the supply of uraniumfrom Namibia was no longer essential to fulfil the requirements of the Board, andhad even been considered to be surplus.113. Links between RTZ and officials of the United Kingdom Governmentindicated that there was close co-operation in the placing of the contract. ThePanel was informed that Lord Carrington, a leading figure in the ConservativeParty, had served as a non-executive Director of RTZ since 1974 and continued tohold that position until his appointment in 1979 as Secretary of State for Foreignand Commonwealth Affairs in the United Kingdom Government.114. The Panel was informed that direct contracts with Japanese companies hadbeen negotiated but were understood to be inactive currently. A group of Japaneseelectric power companies signed a contract for the supply of 8,200 metric tons ofNamibian uranium during the period 1976-1985. According to the contract, thosecompanies were to import 500 metric tons annually in 1977 and 1978.;-23-

600 metric tons in 1979 and 1980; and 1,000 metric tons annually from 1981 to1986. That was part of an arrangement by which Japan would have imported 40per cent of its total uranium needs from RTZ subsidiaries in Australia, Canada,Namibia and South Africa.115. A participant informed the Panel that the main sales agency for RTZ uraniumin Japan was the Mitsubishi Corporation, together with the Marubeni TradingCompany, which played a lesser role. As exploitation of Namibia's uraniumresources was a violation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the NaturalResources of Namibia, and of other international obligations, the contract drewattention both in Japan and abroad. In 1974, the issue of 'amibian uranium wasbrought up in the Japanese Diet. Following the debate, the contract was said tohave been cancelled, but although the Japanese Government announced that thecompanies concerned had decided not to proceed with any imports under theirexisting contracts, it was revealed that in about 1971 RTZ had set up a Swisscorporation to act as a sales subsidiary, through which Japanese electric powercompanies, such as the Kansai Electric Power Company, were purchasingNamibian uranium.116. According to the testimony, RTZ was taking advantage of the fact thatSwitzerland was not a member of the United Nations in order to arrange salesthrough its Swiss subsidiary, RTZ Mineral Services, Ltd., a company which

existed only on paper. In that way, the Namibian uranium could be mixed withuranium from Australia and Canada (Japan also imported from those twocountries), making it difficult to pinpoint the origin of uranium shipments. It wasalso revealed that a portion of the uranium reaching Japan was processed in theUnited States, where it was also mixed with uranium from other sources beforereaching Japan.117. The conversion of uranium, first from uranium oxide to uraniumhexafluoride and then from uranium hexafluoride to enriched uranium was donein France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Additional enrichment wasalso done by Urenco in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (see para.103 above).118. The Panel was informed that Urenco did not itself buy uranium for resale inenriched form; Urenco was paid to enrich uranium that remained the property ofthe client.119. Major clients of Urenco were electricity producers in the Federal Republic ofGermany and the United Kingdom. It was brought to the attention of the Panelthat not only was British Nuclear Fuels using Namibian uranium, but that half ofthe Federal Republic of Germany's uranium requirements between 1977 and 1980had come from South Africa, including Namibia.120. One of the most important clients of Urenco, Veba, of the Federal Republicof Germany, had also admitted that its electricity-producing subsidiarycompanies, Preussenelektra and Nordwestdeutsche Kraftwerke, used uraniumfrom Namibia in their nuclear power stations. Furthermore, a Urenco official hadadmitted that uranium purchased by RTZ was enriched by Urenco (see para. 103above).121. Veba, which owned some hO per cent of the shares of URANIT, which is apartner in Urenco, also revealed, according to the same sources, thatUrangesellschaft, of the Federal Republic of Germany, held an option on 10 percent of the annual R6ssing production. That company, owned byMetallgesellschaft, Veba and STEAG had originally been a partner in thedevelopment of the Rssing project but later withdrew.-24-

122. Information provided to the Panel by participants indicated that EURATOMwas the contracting agency for the uranium supplied from Namibia to WesternEuropean electricity producers. EURATOM gave its approval to each uraniumcontract and co-signed it. EURATOM was responsible for buying all the uraniumwhich entered the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). InFrance, Namibian uranium had been received by the COMURHEX hexafluorideplant, the EURODIF enrichment plant and the nuclear power stations ofElectricit6 de France. Enriched uranium had also apparently been distributed byEURODIF to nuclear plants in other European countries (see para. 86 above). Inthe Federal Republic of Germany, companies with State involvement such asUrangesellschaft and Preussiche Elektrizitatswerke, as well as Kraftwerke Union,Hamburgische Elektrizitqtswerke, bnd Bayernwerke and NordwestdeutscheKraftwerke had received uranium from Namibia. Althcugh in the opinion of some

observers sales of uranium to B Igium appeared to be taking place, there was noinformation as to whether Belgium itself was in fact importing uranium fromNamibia or only trans-shipping it to the United Kingdom.123. It was also stated to the Panel that the policy of EURATOM was the politicalresponsibility of the highest body of EEC, the Council of Ministers, MemberStates of EEC have never protested within the Council against the approval ofEURATOM of the R~ssing contracts.124. There was also a contract for an undisclosed amount of uranium betweenRtssing Uranium and the French energy company COHURHEX. That amount hadonly been described as a "substantial amount" in terms of France's over-alluranium imports.E. Health hazards125. The testimony of several speakers during the hearings showed that themining, processing and utilization of uranium could be hazardous to humanhealth.126. According to some testimony, the danger to health was not merely limited tothe uranium mine workers but also extended to members of wider ccmmunitiesdue to the ease with which direct contaminants may be spread by water, wind anderosion.127. The actual dangers most commonly mentioned by the speakers could becategorized as follows: (a) lung and skin cancer; (b) increased mortality due tothese and other diseases caused by radiation; and (c) genetic damage.128. The general trend of the testimony of several speakers in regard to the healthof the people of Namibia was that the damage had already been done, though itseffects would take time to show. In the words of one participant, there was"concern of the Namibian people, the families, the husbands, the wives and thechildren of the miners at RPssing who are suffering, a population that will sufferill health because of the exploitation that is going on in Namibia".129. According to a number of speakers, the potential for radio-activecontamination among the people of Namibia and the workers at R6ssing inparticular was high.-25-

130. The Panel was informed by a representative of the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) that since South Africa was not a party to the Treaty onthe Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, contained in the annex to GeneralAssembly resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, it did not consider itselfobliged to submit information on its uranium activities in Namibia. 10/ IAEA hadno access to Namibia.131. The owners of R6ssin, Uranium, Ltd. also practised discrimination in healthchecks. It must be remembered that all mining operations, whether radio-activitywas involved or not, involved health hazards. It was stated that while whiteworkers received regular health checks, no such effort, or at least only theminimum effort, was made to monitor the health of black workers.132. One participant stated that Namibian uranium workers at R6ssing wereconstantly exposed to the danger of radio-active contamination. He said that there

were few medical facilities at Rssing, and that the workers did not receive regularhealth checks which although not required for radio-activity monitoring, wererequired in the rest of the world as part of good general health care. The onemedical facility in existence was a first-aid centre operated on a racial basis 11/and the only form of health facility in the African residential area of Arandis wasa clinic, manned by only one nursing sister. The only adequate medical facility forAfricans (the hospital at Swakopmund) was not within easy reach of the Africanworkers. Medical facilities for uranium workers were organized in accordancewith the apartheid system.133. The Panel was also informed that the housing for Namibian miners waslocated in the township of Arandis, near to and downwind from the tailings dump,while the white workers were housed at Swakopmund some 50 kilometres away.The absence of concern by RTZ for the health of the uranium workers at theR6ssing mine was in sharp contrast to that which had been shown, for example, inthe United States. Concern over the health of its uranium miners in the UnitedStates had given rise to the establishment of standards which the uranium miningcompanies were required to observe in order to protect the health of their workers.In 1950, a service was established to evaluate the environmental conditions in themines. Between 1952 and 1957, controls were imposed which called for theimmediate shut-down of those mines which did not conform to the required healthsafety measures. In time, more health controls were imposed and in 1971 theUnited States Department of the Interior promulgated a set of standards for thecontrol of the workers' exposure to the radio-active decay products of radon,known as the "'radon daughters".134. In 1978, the United States Congress passed the Uranium Mill TailingsRadiation Control Act for the protection of the public from the waste tailingsfound at inactive uranium ore processing sites, as well as from mill tailings atactive processing sites.10/ According to the representative of IAEA, South Africa still retained itsmembership in the organization although it no longer participated in the work ofthe IAEA Board of Governors.ll/ European workers had the right to become members of the R6ssing medicalschemes without any restrictions; Africans, however, were only allowed to joinsuch schemes after one year of employment.-26-

Health dangers in the mining process135. The mining process used at Rassing was of the open-pit variety, whichinvolved large-scale rock and earth movement. Once the earth had been extractedfrom the open-pit mine, the next stage was to take it by truck to a crushing mill.There, the uranium oxide was extracted from the rock.136. In that process the workers might be exposed to the long-lived radio-activedecay products of uranium (U 234, Thorium-230, Radon-226 and others) whichwere released. Those products could lead to internal radiation through inhalationby the workers and their families, since the Arandis residential area for theAfrican workers at R~ssing was downwind from the R~ssing plant; they could

also adversely affect the workers, their families and the Namibian population ingeneral through external radiation.137. In uranium mining, in general, the mill residue remaining after the uraniumoxide had been extracted was deposited in a waste-products pond called thetailings pond, or piled into a heap.138. In some cases, attempts were made to cover up the tailings ponds but withoutnecessarily protecting the environment. Often, water-streams under the groundbecame contaminated. In the case of Namibia, there was no evidence indicatingany attempt to protect the environment. Thus there was a danger to health fromairborne radio-active dust particles from unstabilized and uncovered mill tailings,according to evidence placed before the Panel. There was no indication that thecompany had made arrangements for permanently coping with the tailings, whichwould in fact remain radio-active for 100,000 years.139. The Panel was also informed that health hazards might arise from the factthat Namibian uranium was transported clandestinely by air, rail, road and sea.-27-

V. ECONOMIC AWll STRATEGIC VALUE OF NArIBIA,, URANIUMA. 7,Sssing and its international connexions14(h. In 1970, aTZ, using investment resources provided by other corporationsbased in Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa, aswell as its own resources, established a subsidiary in Namibia known as RssingUranium, Ltd. To do this, RTZ obtained authorization from the South Africanauthorities in iamibia for the new company's activities. Rssing Uranium, Ltd. wasthus incorporated fcur years after the adoption of General Assembly resolution2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, by which the Assembly terminated theM1andate; one year after Security Council resolution 264 (1969) of 20 March1969, by which the SecurityCouncil recognized that the Arsembly had terminated the Iandate and i2adassumed direct responsibility for the Territory until its independence and statedthat the South African presence in Famibia iTas illegal; and also one year after theSecurity Council, by its resolution 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, had called uponall States to refrain from all dealings with the Government of South Africa,purporting to act on behalf of namibia, and had recognized the legitimacy of thestruggle of the Namibian people.141. The key to the investment by RTZ was a contract signed by the UnitedKingdom Atomic Energy Authority. According to a statement by RTZ, theoriginal contract signed by the luthority was Tith RFssing Uranium, and was notswitched to RSssing Uranium from another subsidiary of RTZ, as had sometimesbeen stated. The Panelwas informed that the supply department of EUMATOT, an agency of EEC, hadgiven its approval to the contract. EURATOM became a co-signatory to thecontract between the Authority and R'ssing Uranium.142. At about the same time that the United Kingdom signed a contract withSouth Africa in 1970 to manufacture and reprocess fuel elements for Safari I,South Africa's research reactor, Sir John Hill, Chairman of the United Kingdom

Atomic Energy Authority, stated: "We have in the past obtained a very substantialpartof our uranium requirements from South Africa, and I see no reason at all whythis should not continue". That, according to testimony, was the thinking behindthe long-term commitment of the Authority to obtaining uranium from theR~ssing mine.143. Before the signing of the uranium contract, the position of the UnitedKingdomGovernment with regard to the question of Namibia, the Panel was informed, hadbeen more favourable towards the role of the United Nations in determining thefuture of Namibia. In 1966, through its Permanent Representative to the UnitedNations, theUnited Kingdom recognized that South Africa's right to administer Namibia hadbeen forfeited and that independence for IlTamibia should be sought "not bywords alone but by considered and deliberate action within our clear capacity". Insuch action the United Kingdom was prepared "to play a full and constructivepart". 12/144. After the signing of the contract, the United Kingdom Government was abletoaccept only part of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21June 1971. It was also stated that resolutions of the Security Council on thequestion of Namibia did not impose any binding obligations on the UnitedKingdom12/ For the full text of the statement, see Official Records of the GeneralAssembly, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 1448th meeting, paras. 17-59.-28-

Government and indicated South Africa to be the "de facto administeringauthority"of ITamibia. The Panel was informed that in taking that course the UnitedKingdom Government considered that there was "no obligation to take activemeasures of pressure to limit or stop commercial or industrial relations of ournationals with the South African administration in PNamibia". 13/145. The stated position of RTZ itself was that its presence in lamibia wasconsistent with the policy of the United Kingdom Government.146. With regard to France, a major French corporation, Total, was involved inthe initial investment and other corporations became involved later. Although theofficially stated position of the French Government 14/ appeared intended todiscourage French corporations from dealings involving Naimibia, the Vice-Director of UTA, which was then carrying Namibian uranium from Namibia toFrance, stated on 19 July 1979: "The United Nations Council for Namibia is notrecognized by France. As far as the company (UTA) is concerned, there is aformal agreement by the French authorities for this transport".147. Among the foreign corporations involved with Namibian uranium were anumber of companies which were controlled by the State. They included, in thecase of France, the State-controlled Total petroleum company; and in the case of

the Federal Republic of Germany, a private corporation in which the State hadinvested. In the United Kingdom, the government connexion included a contractfor the purchase of Namibian uranium entered into by a State-owned body,namely, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority; links between the Boardof Directors of RTZ and the United Kingdom Government; and a reported holdingof the Crown in RTZ shares. Indeed, the Panel was informed that, generallyspeaking, transnational corporations, both those which were involved in theextraction of Namibian uranium and those which were involved in the supply ofnuclear technology to South Africa, possessed the power to influence governmentagencies and even to obtain government support in order to enable those activitiesto take place.148. The Panel noted that the contracts involving the supply of Namibian uraniumhad not been made public and, given the underhanded nature of uraniumextraction at RSssing, it was not surprising that some 20 per cent of theshareholders of R6ssing Uranium did not want their names publicized.149. Following the signature of the purchase contracts, R8ssing Uranium was ableto commence operations on a firm basis and to develop its activities. In 1979, itproduced 5,000 metric tons of uranium oxide which represented 16 per cent of theuranium production of all market-economy countries.150. Three of the current recipients of Namibian uranium were energy consortiabased within France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.Those countries were all members of the five-member Western Group which hadbeen negotiating with South Africa regarding Namibia and which was the authorof the Security Council plan for the independence of Namibia prepared within theframework of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976 and435 (1978) of13/ Further information on the position of the United Kingdom Government inthis regard is contained in annex IV to the present report.14/ Ibid.-29-

29 September 1978. The continuation of those supplies of uranium, withoutchange in the conditions under which it is supplied, would appear to require thecontinuation of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. It should also benoted that RTZ, through its holdings in Australia, Canada, Namibia and SouthAfrica, currently accounted for about 25 per cent of the annual production ofuranium in the world's market-economy countries and controlled roughly 24 percent of the reasonably assured uranium reserves of those countries. That,according to a participant in the hearings, put RTZ in the position of acting inmany respects as a uranium producing and exporting nation.151. In addition to exploitation, prospecting for uranium was continuing inNamibia. The mining corporations involved in prospecting in Namibia wereamong the world's largest and came predominantly from Canada, France, SouthAfrica, the United Kingdom and the United States.152. The Panel was informed that if only one or two of the uranium prospects inNamibia were to be put into production, iHamibia could become an even more

important producer of uranium than it already was and its significance to theindustrialized countries of the West would be further intensified. Output couldtreble to 15,000metric tons per year by 1990. That would mean that Tamibia would become thefourth largest producer of uranium among the market-economy countries, afterthe United States, Canada and Australia.153. The Panel received information on the views of the companies themselves. Itwas informed that, currently, the companies involved in Namibia appeared tohave evaluated the political prospects and were seeking to obtain the maximumbenefit out of an investment under a regime that favoured the retention of most ofthe profits earned, before the establishment of an independent Government whichwould be able to negotiate equitable arrangements on behalf of the Namibianpeople.154. The Panel heard a considerable amount of testimony relating to the apparentdesire of State-controlled and private corporations to obtain uranium specificallyfrom Namibia despite the fact that uranium could be obtained from othercountriesand that at the time of the initial investment in the Rssing mine uranium was notand still was not in short supply.155. In the early stages of the Rbssing project, almost half of the UnitedKingdom's planned requirements for uranium for civil nuclear power were to beobtained from R5ssing. (Specific information on the importance of R5ssing toother countries at that stage was not made available.) However, the Panel wasinformed that that did not mean that the United Kingdom was "dependent" onNamibian uranium in the sense that supplies could not be obtained from any othersource.156. In fact, according to testimony before the Panel, at the time the decision wasmade to invest in theR~ssing project, South Africa had to renegotiate a number ofcontracts for uranium supplies to Western countries. At that time, there was asurplus of uranium, and those countries that had contracted with South Africa tobuy its uranium had asked South Africa to stretch out those agreements so that theuranium would be supplied on a longer-term basis.157. On the basis of the information provided by the participants, the decisions ofthe Governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the UnitedKingdom to support the Rassing project could have been based on one or more ofthe following considerations:-30-

(a) The uranium obtained from R~ssing would be cheaper than that obtained fromother sources, as a result of the discriminatory wage system prevailing inNamibia, the low taxation rate in Namibia (35 per cent, lower even than the 40per cent prevailing in South Africa, and with a feature that allowed R6ssingUranium to write off all its capitalized pre-production expenditure of more than£150 million against its taxation liability), the freedom from environmentalobligations and indeed the freedom from any restraints as a result of the fact thatNamibia was in a situation of illegal occupation;

(b) The three Governments wished to gain control of a major source of uraniumfor use in the future and for stockpiling;(c) The R5ssing project wor- part of a wider scheme in the late 1960s and 1970sby South Africa and certain Western Powers to create a major economic operationin southern Africa involving the penetration of territories around South Africa.RPssing was thus an essential component of a plan which involved a heavyinvestment in the Cunene River scheme covering Namibia and Angola and theCabora Bassa scheme in Mozambique. At that time, the South African regime wasworking extremely hard to attract international capital and migrants from Europeand North America into southern Africa and was endeavouring, through thosevast economic projects, to involve powerful transnational corporations andWestern Governments in South Africa's strategy of expanding its economiccontrol of southern Africa.158. The excess of supply over demand on world uranium markets wascontinuing. According to projections by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United States Geological Survey(USGS), the excess would continue until 1985.159. The Panel was informed that France and the Federal Republic of Germanyhad recently announced that they were "revitalizing" their strategic stockpiles ofminerals, including uranium. The stockpile of the Federal Republic of Germanywas reported to have reached the level of 2,000 metric tons of low enricheduranium, equivalent to 12,000 metric tons of unenriched uranium. Other countrieswere also maintaining vast stockpiles.160. The power companies in the Federal Republic of Germany, which weremainly State-onred, were nevertheless continuing to buy Namibian uraniumalthough they were reportedly not in great need of it. In the United Kingdom, theCentral Electricity Generating Board was reportedly reluctant to accept theNamibian uranium which was beyond its requirements. In any event, supplies ofNamibian uranium were contiuuing to flow into both those countries. Participantsin the hearings informed the Panel that that was a result of some kind ofcommitment of the two Governments to South Africa.161. According to the forecasts of OECD and USGS, by 1990 there would be atleast a 25 per cent short-fall on world markets, given the number of existinguranium producers and the level of planned production. It thus appeared that thecentral question with regard to Namibia's uranium was the actual as well as theperceived dependence of the major nuclear Powers which lacked their ownindigenous sources of supply and were dependent upon foreign sources ofuranium. Those States included, most notably, member countries of EEC andJapan. The States concerned had a desire for an assured access to existing suppliercountries and a desire to develop new uranium resources in what they considered"politically stable" countries that would also enable them to circumventunilaterally imposed supplier restrictions on uranium exports.-31-

162. In recent years, seven countries, namely, Canada, France, Gabon, Namibia,Higer, South Africa and the United States had been responsible for approximately

97 per cent of the output of uranium in the market-economy countries. Amongthose seven producers, the United States and France had already reached the stageof becoming net importers. Excluding those two countries, the countries whichaccounted for 95 per cent of the production of market-economy countriesavailable for export were Canada, Gabon, Namibia, Niger and South Africa.Australia had the potential to become a significant exporter. If Australia andCanada were excluded, which imosed certain restrictions, the group of exporterswas reduced to four countries and it was estimated that Namibia and South Africacould soon account for as much as 50 per cent of the total of uranium in market-economy countries that could be available for export. That could also explain theinterest in Namibia of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the UnitedKingdom and certain other EEC States, and Japan.B. Role of Namibian uranium in South Africa's domestic and foreign policies163. According to evidence placed before the Panel, Namibia contained a largeproportion of the uranium reserves of the market-economy countries; from illegalexports of Namibian uranium, South Africa earned 'PUS 500 million per annum atcurrent prices, a large part of which added to South Africa's foreign exchangerevenue.16h. Namibia's current uranium output of 5,000 metric tons per year was nearlydouble that of South Africa. Furthermore, Namibia's reserves, if added to those ofSouth Africa, would increase the latter's reserves by 50 per cent. Significantly, forSouth Africa, Namibia's uranium could be extracted independently of any othermineral, unlike the case in South Africa, where the production of uranium wastied to that of gold. As an independent producer, Namibia would have thepotential, as mentioned above, to become perhaps the fourth largest producer ofuranium in the market-economy countries after Australia, Canada and the UnitedStates.165. The Panel also received testimony regarding South Africa's strategies.Through its illegal occupation of Namibia, it was stated, South Africa was able tocontrol a sizable proportion of the world's uranium reserves and productionavailable for export. That appeared to give Pretoria a degree of political andeconomic leverage not only with regard to the supply and price of uranium butalso with respect to the formulation by the countries involved in Namibianuranium of foreign policy towards South Africa's current illegal occupation ofNamibia and indeed towards the Pretoria regime itself.166. That policy should be seen in the light of a wider strategy, by which SouthAfrica was seeking to make itself irreplaceable as a supplier of mineral resourcesto Western countries. By exporting enormous quantities of coal and uranium tothose countries, the South African regime was attempting to strengthen its abilityto influence their formulation of policies towards South Africa.167. According to evidence presented to the Panel, the South AfricanGovernment, together with its Nuclear Fuels Corporation (NUFCOR), which wassaid to be the largest uranium supply corporation in the world, participated in aninternational uranium cartel. The cartel, the Panel was informed, had been able toraise world uranium prices to the point where the Rssing mine had becomeprofitable. More

-32-

recently, the cartel, with the participation of the Governments of Australia andCanada and the Gulf Oil Corporation of the United States, had been able to driveuranium prices up to an artificially high level.C. Strategic value of Namibian uranium168. The participants at the hearings were of the unanimous opinion that Famibiahad considerable strategic significance because of its wealth of uranium reserves.R6ssing possessed uranium reserves of 100,000 to 200,000 metric tons and somereports suggested that Namibia as a whole might contain as much as 20 per centof the uranium reserves of the market-economy countries. It was noted that,together with Canada, Gabon, Niger and South Africa, Namibia accounted for 95per cent of the world's production available for export.169. South Africa wished to hold on to Namibia for economic, military andpolitical reasons. The uranium in Namibia was being used by South Africa, whichhad neither oil nor adequate uranium supplies within its territory, to develop itsnuclear programme. In addition, uranium and other minerals obtained fromPamibia provided substantial benefits to South Africa, both in the form of thetaxes paid by the mining companies and in the form of the foreign exchangederived from exports.170. By being a major supplier of uranium to the West, South Africa hadmanaged to influence the policies of the West towards apartheid and itsoccupation of Namibia. In exchange for economic benefits, certain Westernnations had adopted policies which amounted to acquiescing in South Africanpolicies.171. It was also clear that South Africa used Namibia to build military supremacyin the area, to launch acts of aggression against neighbouring countries and toserve as a military buffer between South Africa and the front-line States and apolitical buffer against the spreading into South Africa of ideas which couldundermine the apartheid system.VI. MILITARY CO-OPERATION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANADMINISTRATION BYCORPORATIONS INVOLVED IN URANIUM EXTRACTION172. According to testimony given to the Panel, corporations involved in uraniumextraction were engaged in direct co-operation with the illegal South Africanadministration in Namibia in its efforts to combat the liberation movement, aswell as in activities to strengthen the illegal regime in the military and nuclearfields.A. Direct co-operation173. The Panel was informed that the corporations which owned R5ssingUranium, Ltd. participated in a "security scheme" at the Rssing mine. The schemeset up a state of preparedness for civil or labour unrest or so-called "terroristattack" against the mine. A document describing the scheme, obtained from theR~ssing mine, showed that the scheme provides for detailed military proceduresto be effected by a paramilitary unit stationed at R~ssing. The document stated

that the 69-man unit had at its disposal automatic weapons, including 24automatic rifles and4 submachine guns, and ample rounds of ammunition.-33-

174. The Panel noted that RPssing Uranium was actively preparing to co-operatemilitarily with the illegal South African administration, including the SouthAfrican army.175. The Panel was informed that the South African Government had developed acomprehensive and wide-ranging plan, in accordance with which it had insistedthat every leading transnational corporation engaged in what the Governmentconsidered strategic industries should be characterized as a national keypointindustry which would share its White personnel in what were called commandounits in a kind of a paramilitary arrangement to protect the industry in case ofcivil disturbance.176. It was believed that the keypoint industries scheme, or something similar,extended to Namibia.177. Testimony heard by the Panel indicated that the South African Governmenthad imposed strict laws requiring secrecy relating to all strategic military matters;in particular, the Secrecy Act of 1967, as applied to Namibia, would imposeheavy fines and prison sentences for disclosure without permission of informationrelating to uranium production or use. The secrecy law was cited by RTZ when itrefused to give information relating to its activities at the RBssing mine. Inaddition, the Uranium Enrichment Act of 1974 provided for intervention by theSouth African Government in the production and marketing of uranium.B. General military and nuclear co-operation178. The Panel was informed that Western Governments had always dependedheavily on transnational corporations in their countries to develop nucleartechnology and raw materials for nuclear development. Those Governments hadcreated the conditions permitting private firms, which were eager to sell theiroutput, to negotiate arrangements for profitable sales of nuclear technology andmaterials to South Africa. They had done so within the framework of governmentprogrammes so in no case could it be said that the Governments of countrieswhose firms were engaged in developing the South African nuclear technologywere ignorant of what those companies were doing. A participant informed thePanel, for exampJe, that the United States had, from the beginning, emphasizednational corporate involvement in nuclear development. It gave transnationalcorporations access to the results of government-financed research anddevelopment efforts relating to nuclear technology and it encouraged them toparticipate in the "Atoms for Peace" programme. When Allis Chalmers had soldthe "Safari I" reactor to South Africa, the United States Government had certainlyknown about it; in fact, Allis Chalmers had drawn on the resources of theGovernment and of universities in the United States to develop that reactor.General Electric, which was engaged in building up the over-all electrical industryof South Africa and was the leading electrical firm there, had frequently haddirect participation, through members of its Board of Directors, in various

government agencies. For example, in the 1970s, a former director (1966-1972) ofGeneral Electric had been the Secretary of Commerce in the United StatesGovernment. General Electric had also competed with the Societ6 franco-am~ricaine pour les constructions atomiques (FRAMATOME) of France for thedevelopment of the Koeberg nuclear power production station. It had been beatenin that competition by FRAMATOME, in which the Westinghouse Corporationowned 15 per cent.-34-

179. In the case of the United Kingdom, its Atomic Energy Authority hadcontracted with private firms such as RTZ to supply uranium from Namibia. Inorder to do so, it had to have had some kind of governmental approval. RTZ alsohad informal ties with the Government through its Board of Directors.180. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government was linked, throughState corporations, with private firms dealing with nuclear energy and actuallyhad shareholdings in such firms. An example was the Government 's ownership ofthe majority shares of Gesellschaft fUr Energie which, in turn, owned 25 per centof STEAG, which had sold South Africa the equipment for its enrichmentprocess.181. A participant in the hearings stated that, in general, firms that were eager tosell their products profitably and to obtain uranium had, through their subsidiariesin South Africa, secretly negotiated their own arrangements with the SouthAfrican Government, as well as with South African parastatal companies andmining finance houses. Such arrangements had helped South Africa to build up itsmilitaryindustrial complex, which had given it the capacity to produce nuclearpower and nuclear weapons.182. The Panel heard testimony that the transnational corporations had viewed themilitary market of South Africa, with the rapid growth of its defence budget, as animportant market and had decided to collaborate with the South AfricanGovernment and its parastatal organizations in many ways which contributed tothe development of its military and nuclear capacity.183. The Panel was informed that the following companies, which were or hadbeen involved in the exploration for, extraction, processing or sale of, Namibianuranium, were also collaborating in a wide sense with the South AfricanGovernment in the military and nuclear fields:(a) South African companies:Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd., a transnational corporationwith affiliates in many parts of the world which had ties with Barclays Bank(United Kingdom), Charter Consolidated (United Kingdom) and EngelhardMinerals and Chemicals (United States);General Mining and Finance Corporation, Ltd. of South Africa (GIIFC)/FederaleMynbou (Bpk.), a subsidiary of Federale Volksbeleggings (Edms. (Bpk.));Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (IDC), a state-ownedparastatal organization closely linked to the policy of apartheid;Nuclear Fuels Corporation (NUFCOR), a state-o.ned corporation;

Electrical Supply Commission (ESCOM), a state-owned organization whichsupplied electricity to R5ssing Uranium;Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR), a state-owned organization;(b) United Kingdom companies:Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, Ltd. (RTZ);-35-

(c) United States companies:Union Carbide Corporation;Neiwmont Mining Corporation;(d) Federal Republic of Germany companies:Urangesellschaft, owned by letallgesellschaft, STEAG and Veba, of which theGovernment owned 40 per cent (see also para. 57 above);Steinkohlen-Elektrizitgts AG (STEAG), which helped build up South Africanenrichment technology for processing uranium, reportedly including Namibianuranium.Twenty-five per cent of STEAG was owned by the Gesellschaft fir Energie, inwhich the Government had a majority shareholding;Hoechst AG, which helped produce sophisticated chemicals and electricalequipment for the production of nuclear power using uranium, reportedlyincluding Namibian uranium;Siemens AG, which helped build up the South African electrical industry asbase for the nuclear industry to use uranium, reportedly including Namibianuranium;Deutsche Bank, founded by G. von Siemens, which helped mobilize Europeanloans for the R~ssing mine through IDC and RTZ;(e) French companies:Compagnie frangaise des p'troles (CFP), a government-owned company which,through its subsidiary Total-Compagnie miniere et nucl aire, owned a 10 per centinterest in the REssing mine until 1975, when that interest was taken over by,linatome, S.A., owned jointly by Total Pechiney-Ugine Kuhlmann (see below);Pechiney-Ugine Kuhlmann, whose subsidiary Minatome, S.A., jointly owned byTotal, took over 10 per cent of R6ssing in 1975;Soci~t6 franco-am'ricaine pour les constructions atomiques (FRAIATOME), aconsortium of companies which contracted to construct for ESCOM the Koebergnuclear power station, which reportedly utilizes Namibian uranium;Cr~dit Lyonnais, which provided credit for the construction of the Koebergnuclear plant in South Africa.-36-

VII. DEVELOPMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA OF A NUCLEAR CAPABILITYAND THE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 15/184. Several participants presented testimony on the develorment by South15, The Council notes that the possession by South Africa of the capability ofmaking nuclear bombs has been declared by the United Nations to be a threat tointernational peace and security.

In addition, a further threat to international peace and security is posed by the factthat uranium is being exported illegally and without any restrictions by SouthAfrica to regimes situated in areas of tension and to countries which have notacceded to the Treaty on the Non-Prcliferation of Nuclear Weapons.The United Nations has become increasingly concerned with South Africa'spolicies of aggression and apartheid, its nuclear activities, the proliferation ofnuclear weapons and the serious threat to international peace and security whichthe latter poses. In this respect, the United Nations has adopted numerousresolutions urging world disarmament and the cessation of nuclear tests.In particular, the General Assembly has adopted several resolutions on theconsideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone and on the implementation of theDeclaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Headsof State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) andendorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 Decembuer19k5. The General Assembly has, moreover, referred to South Africa'sdevelopment of a nuclear weapons capability in resolutions on the question ofNamibia and on the policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa. TheGeneral Assembly has in each instance condemned the racist regime of SouthAfrica for its efforts to develop a nuclear capability for military and aggressivepurposes.On 4 November 1977, the Security Council adopted resolution 418 (1977),following reports that South Africa was on the threshold of producing nuclearweapons. By that resolution, the Security Council decided that all States shouldrefrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture anddevelopment of nuclear weapons.By its resolution 32/9 D of 4 November 1977 on the question of Namibia, theGeneral Assembly condemned those Western States which had assisted SouthAfrica in developing a nuclear weapons capability.By its resolution 32/81 of 12 December 1977, on the implementation of theDeclaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the General Assembly condemnedany attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent ofAfrica and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting anynuclear explosion on the continent of Africa or elsewhere.Subsequently, on 11 December 1979, the General Assembly adopted resolution34/76 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa,by which it noted with concern that South Africa had persistently refused toconclude adequate and comprehensive safeguard agreements with IAEA with aview to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to themanufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.The General Assembly, expressing alarm at the report that South Africa mighthave detonated a nuclear explosive device, vigorously condemned the reported-37-

Africa of a nuclear capability, including the capability of making nuclearweapons. 16;

185. Despite the fact that all information pertaining to military matters in SouthAfrica was kept in the utmost secrecy, the majority of participants informed thePanel that there was no doubt that the South African Government had pursued aconsistent policy of nuclearization of its military strength. They submitted that,currently, the South African r~gime could produce all the bomb-grade material itwished and was equipped with weapons and delivery systems to strike at any partof Africa. Furthermore, the participants informed the Panel that that was the resultof South Africa's conscious decision to achieve military supremacy throughnuclear dominance.186. In that context, Professor Seidman indicated that the South AfricanGovernment had imposed very strict laws requiring secrecy relating to allstrategic military matters and, in particular, that in accordance with the provisionsof the Terrorism Act of 1967 as applied to Namibia, heavy fines and prisonsentences would be imposed for disclosure of information relating to uraniumproduction or use, without government permission. She was aware that that lawhad been invoked by RTZ when it had refused to give information relating to itsactivities in the R6ssing mine. The 1974 Uranium Enrichment Act provided forthe South African Government to intervene in the production and marketing ofuranium and that too was shrouded in secrecy so that it was very difficult topresent the full truth. The fact was that even Governments which were engaged inbuying uranium or making nuclear technology available had concealed datarelating to their activities, knowing as they did that they were sometimes violatingand frequently skirting the edge of violations of international law. Mr. Manningemphasized strongly that nuclear secrets were by far the most highly guarded ofState secrets in South Africa and that there was therefore a necessary element ofspeculation in all those matters due to the extreme level of secrecy.187. There was a widespread feeling among the participants that the SouthAfrican Government had been capable of making nuclear bombs for some time.Moreoever, South Africa's position regarding its use of nuclear potential formilitary purposes(continued)detonation of a nuclear device by South Africa and reaffirmed that the nuclearprogramme of the racist r6gime of South Africa constituted a very grave danger tointernational peace and security. The Assembly demanded that South Africasubmit all its nuclear installations to inspection by IAEA.16/ Regarding South Africa's development of a nuclear capability, the Panel heardtestimony from Mr. Donald Morton, of the South African Military Refugee Fund;Mr. Robert Manning, journalist and researcher of foreign affairs; Mr. Abdul S.Minty of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and the World Campaign againstMilitary and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa; Ms. Barbara Rogers, of theCampaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contract (CANUC); and Mr. WolffGeisler of the Anti-Apartheid Movement of the Federal Republic of Germany.Other participants also made reference to South Africa's development of a nuclearcapability; among them were Mr. Sean MacBride, international jurist, andProfessor Ann Seidman. The Panel also received information provided by theCentre on Disarmament and by IAEA.

-38-

was clearly stated by the South African Finance Minister, who had said: "If SouthAfrica wishes to use its nuclear potential for other than peaceful purposes, it willjolly well do it according to our decisions and our judgement."188. Mr. Minty stated that there was no doubt whatsoever that South Africa hadnuclear-weapon capability, and "indeed the Western Powers did not doubt that,and it was as a result of that lack of doubt that in 1977 President Carter and otherWestern leaders appealed to /Prime Minister7 Vorster not to proceed to test anexplosive device in the Kalahari desert".189. It was stressed that South Africa's contention and that of its allies that it usednuclear energy for peaceful purposes was, at best, misleading. South Africa, itwas explained, had no real need for nuclear power in generating electricity since ithad the cheapest electricity available from its coal and hydroelectric schemes.Therefore, they pointed out, it would seem that South Africa's nuclear technologymust have been developed for other purposes. Those other purposes werecommercial and military, as part of South Africa's total nuclear self-sufficiencystrategy plan.190. The Panel was informed that one of the purposes of IAEA was to detect ingood time any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear materialfor the manufacture of any nuclear weapons, or for any other military purpose, orfor the manufacture of any other explosive nuclear device.191. However, the Panel was informed by a representative of IAEA that thesafeguards agreements under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons concluded between IAEA and States parties to the Treaty did notinclude provisions by which collaboration with South Africa or any other countrywas prohibited or restricted.192. The Panel noted that the relevant articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 17/ dealing with possible collaboration amongcountries are as follows:"Article I"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not totransfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclearexplosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devicesdirectly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, orinduce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquirenuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over suchweapons or explosive devices."Article III"1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes toaccept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated andconcluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with17/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.-39-

the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's

safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of thefulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view topreventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclearweapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguardsrequired by this article shall be followed with respect to source orspecial fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in anyprincipal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility.The safeguards requird by this article shall be applied on all source orspecial fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities withinthe territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out underits control anywhere."2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide:(a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especiallydesigned or prepared for the processing, use or production ofspecial fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peacefulpurposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall besubject to the safeguards required by this article."4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall concludeagreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet therequirements of this article either individually or together with otherStates in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic EnergyAgency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 daysfrom the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositingtheir instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiationof such agreements shall commence not later than the date ofsuch deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later thaneighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations."193. The Panel was not informed of any subsequent agreements that mightmodify the above-mentioned dispositions.194. The Panel heard evidence of South Africals nuclear development which hadbeen obtained from soldiers who had served in the South African defence forces.Mr. Morton, a former soldier in the South African army who had deserted, toldthe Panel that some soldiers were privy to information on South Africa's nucleardevelopment. Such information had been confirmed by experts in the field ofnuclear development who, having studied the information available, hadconcluded that South Africa had acquired nuclear warfare capability.195. Some participants referred to the report on South Africa's plan and capabilityin the nuclear field which the General Assembly had requested in its resolution34/76 B of 11 December 1979 (A/35/402 and Corr.l).196. They also referred to evidence contained in a study entitled "South Africa'sNuclear Capability" published by the World Campaign against Military andNuclear Collaboration in February 1980.197. Furthermore, participants referred to the report of the United NationsSeminar on uclear Collaboration with South Africa held in London on-4o-

24 and 25 February 1979, published by the United Nations Centre againstApartheid.198. Participants also referred to the draft report on ways and means of makingthe mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective, submitted bythe Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerningthe question of South Africa. 18/199. Participants informed the Panel that currently South Africa had two nuclearresearch reactors: Safari I and Safari II, both situated at Velindaba, near Pretoria.Participants emphasized that, whereas Safari I had been covered by an IAEAsafeguards agreement since 1967 in accordance with a safeguards transferagreement between IAEA, the United States and South Africa and therefore wasinspected by IAEA every year, South Africa had not acceded to the non-proliferation treaty and therefore its key installations including its enrichmentfacility were beyond monitoring by the international agency. The power station atKoeberg had been covered by a trilateral safeguards agreement between IAEA,France and South Africa since 1977.200. Participants emphasized the decisive role of South Africa's Western allies inenabling South Africa to develop its nuclear technology.201. Participants stressed that in the last 10 years, most of the major WesternPowers had assisted South Africa in building its current nuclear capability. Inparticular, Mr. Sean MacBride stated that evidence accumulated over the lastthree or four years indicated that South Africa, with the help of some Westerncountries, had been acquiring the capacity to make nuclear weapons. That, hesaid, was in flagrant violation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and therefore endangered world peace withinthe meaning of the Charter of the United Nations.202. Information placed before the Panel indicated that certain Western countrieshad been assisting South Africa in becoming a nuclear Power.203. South Africa's development of nuclear capability started in 1945 whenUnited Kingdom and United States authorities set up a joint research programmewith South Africa. In 1948, the South Africa Atomic Energy Act was passed. TheAct placed the sole right to prospect, to mine, to produce, to process and todispose of uranium in the hands of the South African regime and extended thatlegislation to Namibia.204. In 1950, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States enteredinto a long-term agreement providing money for the exploration, exportation andpurchase of South Africa's uranium. Furthermore, those countries contributed toperfecting techniques of extraction and processing and financed the entire costs ofthe whole programme. By 1969, agreements for the sale of highly enricheduranium involved France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Switzerland,the United Kingdom and the United States.18/ Subsequently issued under the symbol S/14179. For the printed text, seeOfficial Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for July,August and September 1980.-41-

205. In May 1976, a French consortium was awarded the contract for buildingSouth Africa's first nuclear power station at Koeberg, 30 kilometres north of CapeTown. The Koeberg nuclear reactor could in theory produce 400 kilograms ofplutonium per year. It was also a major market for the purchase of Namibianuranium. Professor Seidman stated that there was evidence, in fact, that withoutNamibian uranium the Koeberg station would not have adequate supplies unlessSouth Africa cancelled its export contracts.206. The Federal Republic of Germany's involvement in South Africa's nucleardevelopment went back 20 years. The licence for a uranium refining pilot plantwas transferred to South Africa in 1959. STEAG, a company in which theGovernment of the Federal Republic of Germany had an interest, had suppliedSouth Africa with technical hardware to perfect its jet-nozzle technique of fuelenrichment. The Federal Republic of Germany's co-operation with South Africain nuclear weapons development was said by Mr. Sean MacBride to be inviolation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons and also an evasion of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty 19/whereby the Federal Republic of Germany itself was precluded from acquiring anuclear capability.207. He also stated that, in his view, it could well be that part of the militaryestablishment in the Federal Republic of Germany thought that that would be aconvenient way of circumventing the provisions whereby the Federal Republic ofGermany was not allowed to develop nuclear weapons.208. In 1970, the United Kingdom signed a contract with South Africa tomanufacture and reprocess fuel elements for Safari I, South Africa's researchreactor.209. Participants emphasized that one of South Africa's most important allies inthe nuclear field was the United States. Some of the major contributions of theUnited States to South Africa's nuclear development had included Safari I andcomputers manufactured by International Business Machines (IBM). One hundredand fifty five nuclear experts were sent to assist South Africa and 90 SouthAfricans were trained at United States facilities.210. The United Statcs had collaborated with South Africa for more than 20 yearsin the developing of the nuclear potential of South Africa. In 1953, the UnitedStates began to purchase urnaium from South Africa. The United Statesdeveloped a uranium mining and nuclear processing industry in South Africa,giving Preotria the opportunity to begin nuclear research.211. In 1957, the United States signed a nuclear co-operation agreement withSouth Africa which guaranteed South Africa access to a broad range of UnitedStates technical aid, enriched uranium and classified nuclear information. Thatagreement was renewed in 1974 and would remain in effect until 2007. In 1958,according to a participant, Mr. Manning, the United States, in co-operation withSouth Africa, carried out a series of nuclear tests off the South African coast.South Africans helped to monitor the fallout of nuclear tests and so becamefamiliar with fallout dispersal patterns in the region. That region was the samegeneral area

19/ The Treaty, dated 17 March 1948, was originally signed by Belgium, France,,Luxemb-ourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic ofGermany signed the Treaty on 23 October 1954 and ratified it on 27 February1955.-42-

where a suspected nuclear blast took place on 22 September 1979. Mr. Manningstated that the aforementioned event had been confirmed by an official of theDepartment of Energy of the United States who told Mr. Manning and hiscolleague, Mr. Steve Talbot, that weapons effect tests, involving small bombs of 1to2 kilotons, had taken place on 27 and 30 August and 6 September 1958. Mr.Manning also said that a United States company, Allis-Chalmers had built SouthAfrica's first nuclear research reactor, Safari I. The United States had suppliedSafari I with 105 kilograms of enriched uranium, which was enough, in theory, tomake about 10 bombs of the kind exploded at Hiroshima.212. In 1976, it was reported that Dr. A. J. A. Roux, the head of the South AfricanAtomic Energy Board, had told a group of visiting Americans: "We ascribe ourdegree of advancement today, in large measure, to the training and assistance sowillingly provided by the United States of America during the early years of ournuclear programme, when several of the Western world's nuclear nations co-operated in initiating our scientists and engineers into nuclear science".213. In November 1979, a number of black American employees at the UnitcdStates Department of Energy's nuclear laboratory at Argonne, near Chicago,discovered that two white South Africans had been enrolled there for a six-weekcourse on nuclear technology. They sent urgent telegrams of protest toWashington but, none the less, the South African were allowed to complete theirtraining.214. As an instance of continuing collaboration, Mr. Manning indicated thatLukas Bernard, now the Head of the Department of National Security of SouthAfrica, had recently come to the United States to study nuclear strategy. That, theparticipant said, had been confirmed by the United States State Department.215. Nuclear technology alone as planned by South Africa for its developmentwas estimated to cost some $US 4 billion spread over an unknown period. Therewas speculation that the SASOL II project, whose announced purpose was toproduce synthetic petroleum products from coal, might itself include nucleartechnology for the enrichment of uranium and development of nuclear capacity,both for peaceful and military purposes.216. Mr. Manning drew the attention of the Panel to the military and nuclearcollaboration between Israel and South Africa. Though the full extent ofIsraeliSouth African technical co-operation was not known, there had beencontacts at a high level and agreements had been concluded between bothGovernments, notably in 1976 when Mr. John B. Vorster, the Prime Minister ofSouth Africa, had visited Israel. It had been said that there were Israelis at theVelindaba nuclear plant in South Africa and there were reports of an agreement to

exchange Israeli technology for South African uranium which possibly came fromNamibia. All agreements entered into by both countries were veiled in secrecy.217. Another participant, Mr. Minty, stated that South Africa was a signatory tothe Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space andunder Water, concluded in 1963, 20/ and that if South Africa had exploded anuclear device it would have violated that treaty.20/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.-43-

nula intlain une interniona cotos Frnc and th Feea Republic219 Som patcpns suc as Mr. Manig Mr. G and. Mr Mitrfresesr of a Unte Stte VEA saelie whs pups wa to m-oitor nuceaexlsin. h -aellite - re isee sintr of. ai nula bls wh0ihwek lae an by accdn whe th str wa lekdt a reore fo h Ameica BracatnCopn teeiso network.5 0 = = I 220 Th exlso a reore to hav tae plac in thSot AtlanticOceannea th Prnc Edar Isns in an are cale th Sout Afia anomal.21 Theda foloing th dicosr of th exloio by th pressthe St e e ten exlsin Hoevrit di no exli .0y th Unite Stae Goenmn ha not22 Setme sina ha no reule froa nula exlsinNaios thrug th Un ~ ite Nain Coni for Namibia. - *0222 As the lea AdiitrnAuhrt fo th Tertr uni indpedece the Coni refim tha th naua reore of Naii arth birh-rghSeurt Concl Th Counc i- als refirm- th prvsin of it Dere No I for th Prtctoof th Naua Reore of Namibia.223. Th aetmn prsne to. th Pae by th pariciant establishesthinesv and exesv inovmn of5 som States patcual Wetr Erpa Stte an thicoprtos in th exrcin prcsig trnsor an sale 0 0 -u

of Namibia's uranium. For these countries and firms, Namibia, in addition tobeing an abundant source of uranium, is also a cheap source, on account of thelow wages paid to uranium workers and the low production costs of Namibia'suranium, made possible by the grossly inadequate protection given to Namibianworkers against the dangers of contarination by radioactive material and thecomplete lack of protective measures in respect of the environment.224. The absence of proper protection creates a high risk of radiation-relatedillness among uranium miners, while at the same time threatening a generation ofNamibians as yet unborn with genetic damage.225. From testimony presented to the Panel, it is clear that Governments andcorporations engaged in the extraction and purchase of TJamibia's uranium areintent on doing so at the fastest possible rate, even in excess of their actual needs,as a hedge against the time when Namibia will accede to independence.226. While the Territory is vastly rich in mineral resources, the continueddepletion of its uranium resources must seriously affect the growth and economicdevelopment of a future independent Namibia, and this is a concern to which allmembers of the international community must be sensitive.

227. The participation of foreign Governments and corporations in the extraction,processing and sale of Namibia's uranium contributes directly to the maintenanceof South Africa's illegal presence in the Territory and thereby to the continuingoppression by the Pretoria r6gime of the people of Namibia. Such participationalso fortifies South Africa in its defiance of the decisions of the United Nationsand of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.228. In view of the simultaneous involvement of certain Western States, directlyand through their corporations, in the extraction, processing or sale of Namibia'suranium on the one hand, and in international efforts to secure South Africa'swithdrawal from the Territory on the other, the Panel has serious doubts as to theability of those States to faithfully pursue and defend the interests of the people ofNamibia in any dialogue with South Africa. The liberation of Namibia hastherefore been subjected to delays on account of this duplicity.229. The participation of foreign Governments and corporations in the extractionand processing of Namibia's uranium and the collaboration existing betweenSouth Africa and certain Western States in the nuclear field contribute directly tothe development of South Africa's nuclear capability and thereby to theintensification of a threat to international peace and security, since South Africa'sactions and attitudes towards the international community so far give noindication of a concern for the established norms of international behaviour or forthe purposes and principles of the Charter.230. South Africa's collaborators, in particular the Western permanent membersof the Security Council, are themselves displaying extreme cynicism towards thedecisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council in relation toNamibia and towards their responsibilities in respect of the maintenance ofinternational peace and security.-45-

231. By its resolutions 276 (1970), 282 (1970) and 301 (1971), the SecurityCouncil has unequivocally declared that the continued presence of the SouthAfrican authorities in Namibia is illegal, and that all acts undertaken by theGovernment of South Africa after the termination of the Mandate are illegal andinvalid. The Council has called upon States to refrain from any dealings ,?ithSouth Africa which are inconsistent with the Council's position and has elaboratedsteps which the States concerned could take to comply with its decisions.232. Under Article 25 of the Charter, Member States agree to accept and carry outthe decisions of the Security Council. A good-faith performance of the obligationsunder this article would, in the Panel's view, consist of the faithful implemenationof the decisions of the Security Council with regard to Namibia.233. In view of the termination by the General Assembly of the Mandatepreviously exercised by South Africa over Namibia, the relevant decisions of theSecurity Council and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, of21 June 1971, South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal and all its acts onbehalf of or concerning Namibia are illegal and invalid. The activities ofcorporations engaged in any aspect of the extraction, processing, transport or saleof Namibia's uranium are illegal and must cease.

B. 'Recommendations23h. At its 242nd meeting, on 21 November 1980, the Council approved thefollowing recommendations of the Panel, some of which require action by theGeneral Assembly and others action by the Council itself, acting within the termsof its existing mandate.235. The Panel recommended that the Council should prepare for considerationby the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, under the agenda item entitled"Question of Namibia", a draft resolution dealing with the illegal exploitation ofNamibian uranium, ?2_/ by which the Assembly would:(a) Reaffirm that the illegality of the South African presence in Namibia has beenrecognized by all Members of the United Nations without exception;(b) Condemn the increased threat to international peace and security causedby:(i) The development by South Africa of a nuclear capability using Namibianuranium;(ii) The dangers of nuclear proliferation arising from the sale, withoutsafeguards, by South Africa of Namibian uranium;(c) Ccndemn the attempt by certain countries and their transnational corporationsto maintain control over Namibia's uranium reserves;(d) Draw to the attention of the Security Council the fact that the hearings22/ For the text of the draft resolution, see vol. II of the present report, para. 1,draft resolution J.

have shown serious violations of Security Council resolutions 276 (1970), 283(1970) and 301 (1971), and request the Security Council to take appropriateaction;(e) Request the Security Council to take action to ensure that South Africa doesnot continue to acquire nuclear technology from other countries;(f) Condemn the activities regarding uranium currently being carried out inNamibia by State-owned or State-controlled corporations, activities whichconstitute clear violations by the Governments concerned of binding resolutionsof the Security Council and are thus violations of Article 25 of the Charter;(g) Declare that any State which deprives the Namibian people of the exercise oftheir legitimate rights over their natural resources or subordinates the rights andinterests of that people to foreign economic and financial interests violates thesolemn obligations it has assumed under the Charter;(h) Declare that, by their depletive exploitation of natural resources and thecontinued accumulation and repatriation of huge profits, the activities of foreigneconomic, financial and other interests operating at present in Namibia constitutea major obstacle to its political independence;(i) Strongly condemn the collusion of France, the Federal Republic of Germany,Israel and the United States of America with South Africa in the nuclear field, andcall upon all States to refrain from supplying the South African regime directly orindirectly, with installations that might enable it to produce uranium, plutoniumand other nuclear materials, reactors or military equipment;

(J) Call once again upon all Governments which have not yet done so to takelegislative, administrative or other measures in respect of their nationals andbodies corporate under their jurisdiction that own and operate enterprises inNamibia to put an end to such enterprises and to prevent new investments orprospecting;(k) Reaffirm that the natural resources of Namibia are the inviolable heritage ofthe Namibian people and that the rapid depletion of the natural resources of theTerritory as a result of the systematic plunder by foreign economic interests incollusion with the illegal South African administration is a grave threat to theintegrity and prosperity of an independent Namibia;(1) Invite the attention of the Security Council to the present critical situation inNamibia and request it to convene urgently to impose comprehensive andmandatory sanctions on South Africa as provided for under Chapter VII of theCharter of the United Nations;(m) Declare that uranium extracted in and exported from Namibia is stolenmaterial and that the acquisition of this uranium by corporations or Governmentsis an act of theft;(n) Decide to take promptly all necessary measures to enable the Council to takelegal action to seize cargoes of Namibian uranium in accordance with paragraph 4of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, and totake legal action to prevent purchase of Namibian uranium by States;-47-

(o) Request the International Atomic Energy Agency to grant full membership toNamibia represented by the United NTations Council for Namibia;(p) Request the European Atomic Energy Community to prohibit importation ofNamibian uranium by all its members;(q) Request the Governments of States whose corporations are involved inNamibian uranium, in particular the Governments of Canada, France, the FederalRepublic of Germany, Japan, STitzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britainand Northern Ireland and the United States of America, to take measures toprohibit their State-owned corporations and other corporations under theirjurisdiction from all dealings in Namibian uranium and all prospecting activitiesin Namibia;(r) Request the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, theNetherlands and the United Kingdom, which operate the Urenco uraniumenrichment plant, to have Iamibian uranium specifically excluded from the Treatyof Almelo, which is expected to be renewed in the near future and which regulatesthe activities of Urenco;(s) Note that the exploitation of Namibian uranium by Western Countries, thenature of South Africa's policies regarding Namibian uranium, the collaborationby certain Western countries with South Africa, the transfer of nuclear technologyand South Africa's large-scale participation in the export of natural and enricheduranium pose grave dangers to the early independence of Namibia;(t) Request all States to cease granting tax relief to corporations of theirnationality for taxes paid to the illegal South African administration in Namibia,

as well as the practice of allowing corporations of their nationality to deduct as abusiness expense taxes paid to the illegal South African administration inNamibia;(u) Request the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations tocompile information which would assist the Council in preparing a claim fordamages or reparations with regard to uranium illegally extracted from Namibia,including medical and land reclamation costs;(v) Request all States making use of article 35 B of the Chicago Convention onInternational Civil Aviation of 1944 to prohibit the carriage above their territoryof Namibian uranium or other products emanating from Namibia.236. The Council approved the recommendation of the Panel that the Councilshould:(a) Compile a register of companies operating in Namibia, including the names ofdirectors, leading executives, shareholders and associated companies;(b) Encourage non-governmental organizations, support groups and otherorganizations to continue tracing the transport routes of Namibian uranium;(c) Discuss with the International Atomic Energy Agency the question of tracingthe movement of Namibian uranium, particularly in the case of countries whichare parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear WTeapons; 23/23/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.-48-

(d) Request the European Atomic Energy Community to provide to the Councilinformation on the importation into Europe of Namibian uranium and thedestinations of that uranium;(e) Seek from Governments concerned information on the importation andexportation of both unrefined and enriched Namibian uranium;(f) Establish further contacts with corporations involved in Namibian uraniumwith a view to warning them of the implications of their activities related toNamibia;(g) Strengthen the campaign to mobilize public opinion in favour of the cause ofNamibia by working with non-governmental organizations, support groups andother organizations, including trade unions;(h) Engage consultants to carry out research in respect of Nanibian uranium;(i) Invite organizations and support groups in countries involved in theillegal extraction, processing, transport and sale of Namibian uranium to consultthe Council regarding legal action in the courts of their countries;(j) Continue to gather information regarding Namibian uranium;(k) Hold seminars for jurists, trade unions and support groups regarding theimplementation of Decree No. 1, Darticularly with reference to ramibian uranium.C. Activities involving financial implications237. The recommendations for action by the Council itself referred to abovewould have the following administrative and financial implications for the year1981:(a) Implementation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources ofNamibia, including:

(i) Legal action in the courts of various countries;(ii) Compilation of a register of companies, for which the Council wouldengage a consultant;(iii) Encouragement of non-governmental organizations, support groups andother organizations to trace the transport routes of Namibian uranium;the Council would engage consultants in countries which are activelyinvolved in importing Namibian uranium;(b) Action in international organizations:(i) Discussions with IAEA; the Council would send a mission to IAEA,comprising three Council members, one representative of SWAPO and staffmembers of the Secretariat;

(ii) Contact EURATOM; the Council would send a Mission to EURATOM,comprisingthree members, one representative of SWAPO and staff members of theSecretariat;(c) Seeking information from Goverrments. The Council would send a mission toeach Government involved in major exploitation of Namibian uranium,comprising three Council members, one representative of SWAPO and staffmembers of the Secretariat;(d) Establishment of contacts with corporations the Council would send missionsto hold consultations with corporations, comprising two Council members, onerepresentative of SWAPO and staff members of the Secretariat when required;(e) Source of funds. The Panel recommends that all travel in connexion with theabove activities should be combined with the regular programme of work of theCouncil, and that engagement of consultants and expenditures on legal and othermatters should be financed by the United Nations Fund for Namibia.

ANNEX IList of experts and organizations invited to testify at the hearings1. Experts from United Nations bodies, the specialized agencies and otherorganizations within the United Nations system, as well as regional organizations,including:(a) Centre for Disarmament;(b) United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations;(c) United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP);(d) International Labour Organisation (ILO);(e) World Health Organization (WHO);(f) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);(g) Organization of African Unity (OAU).2. Representatives of companies engaged in the exploitation, exportation,transportation or use of Namibian uranium, including:(a) Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, Ltd. (RTZ) (United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland);(b) Rio Algom, Ltd. (Canadian subsidiary of RTZ);(c) Rio Tinto Mineral Services, Ltd. (Switzerland).

3. Representatives of companies engaged in uranium prospecting in Namibia,including:(a) Falcairidge Nickel Mines, Ltd. (Canada);(b) Compagnie franqaise des p~troles (France);(c) Soci~t6 nationale Elf Aquitaine (France).4. Representatives of other organizations and companies concerned withNamibia and/or uranium or atomic energy, including:(a) Uranium Institute;(b) The International Institute for Strategic Studies;-51-

(c) Granada Television (United Kingdom) (producer of an investigative report onNamibian uranium);(d) Religious denominations(e) Non-governmental organizations;(f) Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contract (CANUC) (London);(g) Westinghouse Electric Corporation (United States of America).5. Individual experts, including:(a) An expert or experts on uranium mining, marketing and processing and onnuclear weapons,(b) Abdul S. Hinty (Director, World Campaign against Military and NuclearCollaboration with South Africa);(c) Martin Walker (United Kingdom journalist who investigated South Africanatomic weapons testing in the 1960s);(d) Barbara Rogers (author of The Nuclear Axis (with Zdenek Cervenka),Namibia's Uranium: Implications for the South African Occupation Rggime andForeign Investment in Namibia, member of CADMC);(e) Joan Lestor (United Kingdom Labour Party expert on southern Africa)(f) Arepresentative of the Navaho Indians of the United States (who have mineduranium in the United States under conditions apparently similar to those at theR6ssing uranium mine in Namibia);(g) Ann Seidman (Professor at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusettshasserved as a consultant to the United Nations Centre on TransnationalCorporations)(h) Roger Mlurray (journalist specializing in southern Africa, authorof The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia; has served as a consultant to the UnitedNations Centre on Transnational Corporations and to the United NationsCommissioner for Namibia);(i) A representative of the National Union of Seamen of the United Kingdom;(j) Ruurd Huisman (researcher on Namibian uranium, and member of WerkgroupKairos, Utrecht)Ck) David de Beer (former treasurer of the Anglican diocese ofDamaraland, expelled from Namibia with Bishop Colin O'Brien Winter; helpedtrace uranium shipments to the Netherlands);(1) Wolff Geisler (of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the Federal Republic ofGermany and West Berlin; has testified before the Special Committee AgainstApartheid on the "German connexion" in the development of South Africa'snuclear capability);-52-

(m) F. ,Tertmiller (Swiss researcher on the "Swiss connexion' between Namibianuranium and the Japanese atomic energy industry);(n) Sean MacBride (former United Nations Commissioner for Namibia),(o) Ineke Lambers-Hacquebard (in the Netherlands parliamentarian and memberof "Democrats '66", with information on the "Dutch connexion" in thetransportation of Namibian uranium);(p) Helen Caldicott (expert on the effects of radiation on human beings; residentphysician at the Children's Hospital, Boston, f'assuchusetts ivrb~ r of Physiciansfor Social Responsibility, Boston);(q) The Editor, AVRO Televizier Magazine, Hilversum, the Netherlands(interviewed Mr. 11. A. Rooke, Manager of Urenco, concerning Namibianuranium);(r) Hoss Evans (Transport and General Workers' Union, London);(s) Secretary-General of the International Transport Tlorkers' Federation,London);(t) Randall Ment (consultant, GREEDPEACE New England, Boston,Massachusetts)*(u) Arthur R. Tamplin (nuclear biophysicist, Natural Resources Defense Council,New York);(v) Joseph W-agoner (research epidemiologist, expert on the effects of radiationon health; formerly with the Environmental Defense Fund, Washington, D.C.);(w) Peter Wilkinson (GREENPEACE Ltd., London)(x) Bernard Taillefer (Secretary-General, Mouvement Anti-Apartheid, Paris);(y) Yoko Kitazawa (researcher on Japan's role in purchasing Namibian uranium;Pacific Asia Resources Center, Tokyo);(z) Helen Vozenilek (Citizen's Hearings for Radiation Victims, Washington,D.C.);(aa) Stephen Ritterbush (consultant on international resources issues, Cambridge,Massachusetts);(bb) Remi Parmentier (GREENPEACE, Paris);(cc) Alun Roberts (author of The R~ssing File; researcher for the NamibiaSupport Committee, London, and member of CANUC, London);(dd) Art Van Remundt (GREENPEACE Netherlands, Amsterdam);(ee) Roger Moody (Colonialism and Indigenous Minorities Research Action,London);-53-

(ff) Norman Soloman (Radiation Victims Conference, Environmental PolicyInstitute, Washington, D.C.);(gg) Robert Vanning (United States corresaonefent for Nc-w African and TheMiddle East (London); contributing editor to World Press Review (Oakland,California));(hh) Donald Morton (staff co-ordinator, South African Military Refugee Aid Fund(SAMRAF), based in the United States);

(ii) Barbara Masekela (representative of the African National Congress of SouthAfrica (ANC), New York);(jJ) Ian McBride ("World in Action", Granada Television, Manchester, UnitedKingdom; researcher of Follow the Yellowcake Road);(kk) Jacques Marchand (Mouvement Anti-Apartheid, Paris);(11) Louis Trussell (Consultant, GREENPFACE Ltd., London).-54-

ANNEX IIList of participants in the hearings(in order of appearance)Sean MacBrideGuy Ferri F. T. RoseAnn Seidman Roger Murray Ian McBride Barbara RogersAlun Roberts Jacques Marchand Ruurd Huisman Ineke LambersHacquebardDavid de BeerFormer United Nations Commissioner for NamibiaInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)United Nations Centre on Transnational CorporationsProfessor at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts; has served as aconsultant to the United Nations Centre on Transnational CorporationsJournalist specializing in southern Africa; author of The Role of Foreign Firms inNamibia; has served as a consultant to the United Nations Centre onTransnational Corporations and to the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia"World in Action", Granada Television, Manchester, United Kingdom, researcherof "Follow the Yellowcake Road"Author of The Nuclear Axis (with Zdenek Cervenka), Namibia's Uranium:Implications for the South African Occupation REgime and Foreign Investment inNamibia; member of the Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contract(CANUC), LondonAuthor of The R6ssing File; researcher for the Namibia Support Committee,London; and member of CANUC, LondonMouvement Anti-Apartheid, ParisResearcher on Namibian uranium; and member of Werkgroup Kairos, UtrechtParliamentarian in the Netherlands and member of "Democrats '66", withinformation on the "Dutch connexion" in the transportation of Namibian uraniumFormer treasurer of the Anglican Diocese of Damaraland, expelled from Namibiawith Bishop Colin O'Brien Winter; helped trace uranium shipments to theNetherlands-55-

Wolff GeislerYoko Kitazawa Stephen Ritterbush Joseph Wagoner Louis Trussell Randall MentDonald Morton Robert Manning Fehmi Alem Helen CaldicottAbdul S. 11,inty Barbara Masekela

Anti-Apartheid Movement in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin;has testified before the Special Committee Against Apartheid on the 'Germanconnexion:' in the development of South Africa's nuclear capabilityResearcher on Japan's role in purchasing Uamibian uranium; Pacific AsiaResources Centre, TokyoConsultant on international resources issues, Cambridge, MassachusettsResearch epidemiologist- expert on the effects of radiation on health; formerlywith the Environmental Defense Fund, Washington, D.C.Consultant, GREENPEACE Ltd., LondonConsultant. GREENPEACE New England, Boston, MassachusettsStaff co-ordinator, South African rtilitary Refugee Aid Fund (SAMRAF), based inthe United StatesUnited States correspondent for New African and The IMiddle East (London);contributing editor to World Press Review, Oakland, CaliforniaCentre for DisarmamentExpert on the effects of radiation on human beings; resident physician at theChildren's Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts; member of Physicians for SocialResponsibility, BostonDirector, World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration withSouth AfricaRepresentative of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) in NewYork-56-

ARNEX IIIList of written material presented at the hearingsAuthor, title and/ordescription of material1. Guidelines for hearings on NamibianuraniumA. Material mentioned in oral statements Symbol,* source, publisher, place ordate of publication Meeting No.*A/AC.131/76 and Corr.l2. Hearings on Namibian uranium: rules A/AC.131/79of procedure3. Membership of the Panel4. List of participants5. Index to the verbatim transcripts(List of speakers)6. Information on Namibian uranium:background paper based on information provided by aconsultant7. Barbara Rogers andZdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis8. Report of the United NationsSeminar on Nuclear Collaboration

with South Africa9. Fact vs. FictionSee para. 14 of the present reportSee annex II to the present reportA/AC.131/82/Add.11Conference Room Paper No. 265London Julian Friedman Books, Ltd., and New York Times Books, 1978United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, 7 March 1979Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Press and Information Office,5 October 1978CommentsApproved by the Council at its 318th meeting, on 28 March 1980Approved by the Council at its 322nd meeting, on 20 May 1980Appointed by the President of the Council on 27 Jude 1980Approved by Standing Committee II at its 51st meeting, on 19 March 1980Approved by the Chairman of the PanelPrepared by Standing Committee II and distributed to all Council membersIntroduced as evidence by Mr. Sean MacBrideMentioned by Mr. Sean MacBride10. The Reply Anti-Apartheid Movement of theFederal Republic of Germany11. Material submitted byMr. Sean MacBride dealing withimplementation of the Council'sDecree No. 1 for the Protection ofthe Natural Resources ofNamibia***12. Implementation of the Declarationon the Denuclearization of Africa:report of the Secretary-General13. The dRasing File:Article on housing and medicalconditions at Rassing14. The Rssing File:Article by Ingolf Diener on housingand medical conditions at Rbssing,originally published inThe Guardian (Manchester)15. The Rssing File:Statement by Sir Mark Turner,Chairman of the Rio Tinto ZincCorporation (RTZ) on the high levelof uranium dust at R6ssing (p. hi,para. 3)Conference Room Paper No. 226A/35/402 and Cort.l

London Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contract (CANUC), 1980London, CANUC, 1980Introduced as evidence by Mr. Sean MacBride Mentioned by Mr. Guy FerriMentioned by Mr. Sean MacBrideLondon, CANUC, 1980.1 11

Author, title and/ordescription of material16. Activities of transnationalcorporations in southern Africa andthe extent of their collaborationwith the illegal r~gimes in thearea17. Activities of transnationalcorporations in southern Africa:impact on financial and socialstructures18. Activities of tranmnationalcorporations in southern Africa andtheir collaboration with racistminority r6gimes in that area19. The activities of transnationalcorporations in the industrial, mining and military sections ofsouthern Africa20. Study of the role of thetransnational corporations in theNamibian economy21. Review of trends in mininglegislation agreements22. Questions from members of the Paneland participants to the representative of IAEA23. Ann Seidman, "Partial list oftransnational corporations involved in extraction, processing and salesof Namibian uranium"24. Jennifer Davis, "General Motors inSouth Africa: secret contingencyplans in the event of civil unrest"25. Ann W. Seidman and Neva Mekgetla,Activities of transnationalcorporations in South Africa26. Ann Seidman and Neva Makgetla,Transnational Corporations and the South African Military-Industrial27. Ann Seidman and Neva Makgetla,Outposts of Monopoly Capitalism: Southern Africa in the ChangingGlobal Economy

28. Transcript of film "Follow theYellowcake Road" (GranadaTelevision, Manchester, UnitedKingdom)29. Alun Roberts, The Rdssing File30. Summary of a memorandum from RTZ to the European EconomicCommunity (EEC) in 197631. Statement to the Soci6t6 Nationale des Pilotes de Ligne (SNPL) byNamibian workersSymbol, source, publisher, place or date of publication Meeting No.E/C.10/26 and Corr.lComments3 Mentioned by Mr. F. T. RoseE/C.10/39 E/C.lO/66ST/CTC/12United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, to be published in 1981To be prepared by the United Nations Centre on Transnational CorporationsConference Room Paper. No. 2213 113 Request of Chairman that questionsasked of IAEA be submitted inwritingIs Introduced as evidence byProfessor SeidmanNew York, The Africa Fund, 1978, and Conference Room Paper No. 223Centre Against Apartheid, September 1978Centre Against Apartheid, September 1979 Westport, Conn., Lawrence Hill,1980, and London, Zed Press, 1980Conference Room Paper No. 253London, CANUC, 1980 Contained in The Rssing File (see above)January 1980Mentioned by Professor SeidmanFilm was shown and the transcriptintroduced as evidence byMr. Ian McBride6 Introduced as evidence byMr. Alun Roberts

Author, title and/ordescription of material32. Addenda to statement made byMr. Ruurd Huisman to the Panel atits 7th meeting containing furtherinformation on activities ofUrenco

Symbol, source, publisher, place or date of publicationConference Room Paper No. 219Meeting No.33. Letter from the Minister for ForeignAffairs of the Netherlands to theCommittee on Southern Africa of theNetherlands, expressinggovernmental recognition of DecreeNo. I and of the CouncilCommentsIntroduced as evidence by Mr. HuismanQuoted by Mr. Huisman34. Declaration of Foreign Ministers ofStates members of EEC on mineralsfrom southern Africa35. Written statement byRev. 0. Michael Scott36. Transcript of "Namibia", item inNetherlands "Television Magazine"broadcast of 31 March 1980(expanded Netherlands Televisionversion of the film "Follow theYellovcake Road", see No. 28above)37. Wolff Geisler, The Uranium of theRssing Mine in I'amibia, tableshowing known deliveries ofuranium from Faetibia38. Wolff Geisler, The Uranium of theR5ssing Mine in Namibia, tableshowing countries involved inprocessing 'Tamibian uranium39. Table showing contracts made byJapanese corporations forimportation of uranium40. Minutes of the Budget Committeemeeting of 19 December 19744I. Stephen Ritterbush, The Economicsand Politics of Natural Resources in Southern Africa: A Case Studyof Namiiia and South Africah2. Joseph K. Wagoner, "Evaluation ofthe hazards of uranium mining,milling and waste disposal"43. Joseph K. Wagoner, Uranium: TheUnited States Experience: A Lesson in History (extracts)44. Article on transportation of

Namibian uranium, andimportation by Belgium ofNamibian uranium45. Western Massachusetts Associationof Concerned African Scholars,U.S. Military Involvement inSouthern Africa46. UAEA answers to questionsappearing in Conference RoomPaper No. 221EEC, February 1976 or 1977 A/AC.131/L.82/Add.IO, sect. K Conference RoomPaper No. 26hAnti-Apartheid Movement of the Federal Republic of OermanyThe Economist (Tokyo edition), 25 November 1977 House of Representatives ofJapan, 74th SessionMay 1980Washington, D.C., Environmental Defense Fund Agence France Presse, 15February 1978Boston, South End Press, 1978Conference Room Paper No. 221/Add.l (see No. 22 above)Mentioned by Mr. Wolff ceislerAt its 7th meeting, the Panel decided to accept a written statement from ReverendScottIntroduced as evidence by Mr. David de Beer, Mrs. I. Lambers-Hacquebard andMr. HuismanIntroduced as evidence by Mr. GelslerIntroduced as evidence by Ms. Yoko KitazawaMentioned by .r. RitterbushIntroduced as evidence byMr. WagonerMentioned by Mr. Ruisman Introduced as evidence by Professor Seidman Writtenanswers by Mr. Ferri

Author, title and/ordescription of material47. Regulations for the Safe Transportof Radioactive MaterialsSymbol, source, publisher, Dlace or date of publicationIAEA Safety Standards: Safety Series No. 6, 1973, revised editionMeeting No.CommentsQuoted by Mr. FerriLA. Statute of IAEA (as amended up to 1AEA1 June 1Q73)4g. Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons

50. Structure and content of agreementsbetween the Agency and the Statesrequired in connexion with theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear WeaponsGeneral Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex IAEA, June 1972,INFCIRC/153Mentioned by Mr. Ferri Quoted by Mr. Ferri51. Manual on Radiological Safety in IAEA and IL0, Safety SeriesIraniun. and Thorium Mines and Mills No. 43, 197652. The Code of Practice in RadiationProtection in Mining and Millingof Radioactive Ores53. Kaighn Smith, "The PoliticalEconomy of Uranium Mining in Namibia and the FrancophoneCountries of Africa"54. John Hershey, Hiroshima55. South Africa's Nuclear CapabilityIAEA, Safety Series No. 26Africa Resource Centre, 21 April 1980World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa,in co-operation with the Centre Against Apartheid, February 198056. Eli Teicher and Ami Doron: None 10will survive us: The Story of theIsraeli A-Bomb57. Evidence submitted by SWAPO:document on 'Security scheme" atR6ssing58. Plan of R6ssing mine installations 59. Site plan of R6ssing mineConference Room Paper No. 220Quoted by Mr. Randall MentQuoted by Dr. Helen Caldicott Introduced as evidence by Mr. Abdul S. MintyQuoted by Mr. Manning Introduced as evidence by Mr. Gurirab (SWAPO)B. Other material submitted by participantsAuthor, title and/ordescription of material60. Copies of airway bill and cargo manifest forNamibian uranium carried by Union des transportsadriens (UTA)61. Richard Wilson, Nuclear Power: Its Promisesand Problems, chapter on health effects ofradiation62. The Nuclear Disaster, chapters on "The nuclearestablishment", "True to type" (profits) and"The uranium fix" (prices)63. Annual report and accounts, 1978

64. Annual report and accounts, 197965. Rssing Uranium, 1979Symbol, source, publisher, place or date of publicationUniversity of New Hampshire, 1980 London, Counter Information ServicesLondon, RTZ, 1978 London, RTZ, 1979 London, RTZ, 1979

Author, title and/or Symbol, source, publisher,description of material place or date of publication66. "Some Aspects of Rbssing Uranium, Ltd." London, RTZ,197667. "Some Aspects of R6ssing Uranium, Ltd." London, RTZ,197768. "Some Aspects of Rssing Uranium, Ltd." London, RTZ,197869. Statement by Sir Mark Turner, Chairman of London, RTZ,1976RTZ, at the annual general meeting of19 May 197670. Statement by Sir Mark Turner, Chairman of London, STZ,1980RTZ, at the annual general meetinp of28 May 198071. Edward J. Hanrahan, Richard H. Williamson Geneva, 1976and Robert W. Brown, "World requirementsand supply of uranium"72. Article on price renegotiation for Nucleonics Week, 9September 1976uranium for Rassing73. Policies of apartheid of the Government A/35/358of South Africa: inquiry into thereports concerning a nuclear explosionby South Africa: report by theSecretary-General74. General and complete disarmament: A/35/392comprehensive study on nuclearweapons: report by the SecretaryGeneral* Miscellaneous papers and conference room papers of the Council have beenissued to members of the Council in English only.** See A/AC.131/82/Add.lO for the verbatim transcripts of the meetings.*** For the text of Decree No. 1, see vol. T, annex II, of the present report.

AINNEX IVSupplementary legal information1. The present annex attempts to indicate, as far as is known, the legal positionof certain Governments on whose territory Namibian uranium is processed or

used, or where corporations which have directly or indirectly invested in theexploitation of Namibian uranium are incorporated.A. Canada2. Canada recognizes the authority of the United Nations over Namibia but doesnot recognize Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources ofNamibia a/ of the Council. On 28 July 1971, the Canadian Government sent anote to South Africa informing it that the double-taxation agreement concluded in1956 between Canada and South Africa specifically did not apply to Namibia.However, the Canadian Government does allow Canadian corporations operatingin Namibia to deduct as a business expense taxes paid to the South Africanadministration. b/B. France3. The French Government considers the South African presence in Namibia tobe illegal, but it does not accept the advisory opinion of the International Court ofJustice of 21 June 1971 c/ and has "legal doubts" about the status of the Council.4. The French Government states that it does not feel legally bound by SecurityCouncil resolutions 283 (1970) of 29 July 1970 and 301 (1971) of 20 October1971 as it had abstained in the voting on them. Nevertheless, the FrenchGovernment is acting in the spirit of those resolutions and, with two exceptions,has successfully discouraged French corporations from operating in Namibia.With regard to shipments of Namibian uranium to France, the French Governmentstates that the French airline Union des transports a6riens (UTA) ceased theseshipments as of 31 December 1979. So far as it knows, no shipments of uraniumare now entering France from Namibia. d/5. In response to questions in the Chamber of Deputies on 20 December 1979,the French Minister of Foreign Affairs stated:a/ For the full text of the Decree, see vol. I, annex II, of the present report.b/ See A/35/337-S/14065, annex, paras. 59-60. For the printed text, seeOfficial Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Su plement for July,Auaustand September 1980.c/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa inNamibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276(1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.d/ See A/35/300-S/14014, annex, paras. 37, 39 and 52. For the printed text, seeOfficial Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for APril,May and June 1260.-62-

(a) For reasons associated with its loyalty to the Charter of the UnitedNations, and particularly to the observance of the division of powers between theGeneral Assembly and the Security Council laid down by the Charter, theGovernment of France, like those of many other countries, accorded no legalstanding to Decree No. 1, the application of which was recommended by theAssembly in resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974. The Governmentheld that it was not in the interests of States Members of the United Nations, andcertainly not of France, a permanent member of the Security Council, to allow the

Assembly to disregard the limitations imposed by the Charter on its action. Torecognize the legitimacy of that decree would lead to endowing the Assembly andits subsidiary organs with a competence in the matter of sanctions that belongedto the Security Council alone. In the absence of a decision by the Security Councilon the subject, the activities of French companies in Namibia could not bedeemed to contravene international law. Nevertheless, whenever the Governmentreceived inquiries from companies concerning their activities in Namibia, itconsistently reminded them of the special status which that Territory had in theeyes of the international community. It was, indeed, on account of that status, andin order not to appear to be sanctioning South Africa's presence in Namibia thatthe Compagnie frangaise d'assurance pour le commerce exterieur (COFACE) andthe Investment Committee did not guarantee commercial transactions involvingthat Territory. That policy would be maintained until Namibia acceded tointernationally recognized independence, in conformity with the settlement plandrawn up by five Western countries, including France, and approved by theSecurity Council.(b) Flight UTA 280, which had landed at Marignane on 16 November 1979, hadbeen carrying about 25 metric tons of uranium concentrates from the R6ssingmine. The concentrates were the property of a foreign company which hadconcluded a contract with a French company specializing in the processing ofsuch ore. It was not customary for companies to impose requirements concerningthe origin of uranium on their customers. The required customs documents fortemporary import had been sent, after customs clearance, to the competentauthorities. It should be noted in that connexion that UTA had reported that thecontract it had concluded with the company that operated the R6ssing mine hadexpired in December 1978 and that it would, therefore, no longer be transportingore from that mine.(c) It was true that in 1973 the Compagnie frangaise des ptroles (CFP)had acquired an interest in the R6ssing mine. The matter had been ccnridered bythe Board of Directors of CFP on 6 June 1973, i.e., before a vote was taken onGeneral Assembly resolution 3295 (XXIX), a resolution which, as stated earlier,did not in itself create any legal obligation for a private company. TheGovernment's representatives could not, therefore, raise any objection to such atransaction.(d) France was represented in the European Atomic Energy Community(EUiRATOM) by an ambassador, the permanent representative of France to theEuropean Economic Community (EEC), and not by a representative of theCommissariat a l'energie atomique (CEA). Experts from CEA who had attendedEURATOM meetings had no responsibilities within any cartel.-63-

C. Federal Republic of Germany6. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany states that it supportsthe Council as the United Nations authority for Namibia and that its policies are inconformity with Security Council resolutions 283 (1970) and 301 (1971). In 1971,

governmental support for uranium activities was discontinued and since that timepurchases of uranium from Namibia have declined considerably.7. The Government states that, in addition, there is no governmental support forprivate corporations operating in Namibia, such as export credits or investmentguarantees which would normally be provided in other countries. However, theGovernment does not possess the legal means to restrain private corporationsfrom doing business in Namibia. The agreement on double taxation between theFederal Republic of Germany and South Africa wras prepared in such a way thatit is not applicable in Iamibia. e/D. Japan8. The Japanese Government states that Decree No. 1 was published some yearsago in the Japanese Government Gazette and that the Government believes that itis being observed by Japanese companies. Furthermore, as a result ofV"administrative guidance" from the Japanese Government, a contract involvingthe importation of uranium ore from Namibia into Japan has been suspended. Nofurther importation of uranium will take place until Namibia becomesindependent. f/E. Netherlands9. The Netherlands Government states that no uranium has been imported intothe Netherlands from Namibia for use in nuclear plants in the Netherlands, norwill it be allowed in the future. Concerning the enrichment of processed uraniumat Almelo, the Netherlands, by Urenco (the enrichment plant owned jointly by theNetherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom),however, it is virtually impossible to determine the country of origin of uraniumalready processed. Under the Treaty of the European Atomic Energy Community(EURATOM), theNetherlands lack the legal power to prevent the entry into the Netherlands ofuranium already imported by another member of EURATOM since the Treatyestablishing EURATOM provides for the free circulation of uranium amongst,inter alia, the States parties to the Treaty. E/10. According to information provided to the Panel by participants from theNetherlands, the Netherlands Government recognizes Decree No. I as part of thedomestic or municipal law of Namibia.e/ Ibid., paras. 22 and 23. For the printed text, see Official Records of the SecurityCouncil, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1980.f/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, SupplementNo. 2V (AI34/24), vol. III, paras. 104 and 108.L/ Ibid., annex IV, para. 62.-64-

F. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland11. The United Kingdom position is contained in a "further statement" made inthe House of Commons on 4 December 1974 by Mr. James Callaghan, UnitedKingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, as follows:"It will be recalled that the Security Council of the United Nations

sought the advice of the International Court on the question '"That are the legalconsequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa inNamibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?'. Theprincipal conclusions reached by the Court in its advisory opinion of21 June 1971 were:"(1) By 13 votes to 2, that the continued presence of South Africain Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw itsadministration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupationof the Territory;"(2) By 11 votes to 4, that States Members of the United Nations areunder obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibiaand the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia,and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with theGovernment of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, orlending support or assistance to, such presence and administration."In October 1971, the Government of the day informed Parliament and theSecurity Council that it did not accept those conclusions."In its opinion, the Court examined the legality of resolution 2145(xxi) of 1966 by which the General Assembly purported to terminate theMandate.One of the underlying questions, to which the Court gave an affirmativeanswer, was whether the General Assembly had the competence to make suchan executive decision. The Charter confers upon the General Assemblypowers which, with certain exceptions of very limited scope, are recommendatoryonly, and in our opinion the arguments in support of the legal effectiveness of theresolution are not convincing. Accordingly, we are unable to accept the Court'sreasoning on resolution 2145 (XXI) and its conclusion that thatresolution operated of itself to terminate the Mandate."However, South Africa has itself repudiated the Mandate and theobligations which it accepted by virtue of the Mandate. The United Nations byresolutions commanding very wide support both in the Assembly and in theSecurity Council has adopted the position that owing to fundamental breaches ofits obligations on the part of the Mandatory, the Mandate is no longer inforce. In view of South Africa's conduct by which it has divested itselfof any entitlement urnder the Mandate, and of the recognition thereof andresponse thereto by the United Nations and the international community, theMandate cannot be regarded as still alive and operative; and with thetermination of the Mandate South Africa's rights to administer the Territory-65-

have lapsed. Nevertheless, the international status of the Territory still continues,since no lawful basis exists or has ever existed upon which SouthAfrica can or could have unilaterally altered that status."The General Assembly havinp called the attention of the Security Councilto resolution 2145 (XXI), the Council adopted resolutions in 1969 and 1970 of

which the essential one was 276 (1970) of 1970. This resolution reaffirmedresolution 2145 (XXI), declared the presence of South African authorities inNamibia and all acts taken by the Government of South Africa on behalf of orconcerning the Territory after termination of the mandate to be illegaland called upon all States to refrain from any dealings with the Government ofSouth Africa inconsistent with that declaration. There was no prior findingunder Article 39 of the Charter to found a mandatory resolution WithinChapter VII; indeed proposals for such a finding were not accepted.Nevertheless, the opinion of the Court was that resolution 276 (1970) imposedobligations upon lember States. The Government believes that the course ofevents in the Security Council and the consultations amongst its membersdo not support the conclusions of fact asserted in the Court's opinion. Andas a matter of law, they remain of the view that the Security Councilcannot take decisions generally binding on Member States unless there has beena determination under Article 39 of the existence of a threat to the peace,a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Consequently, they are unableto accept this part of the advisory opinion.'However, for the reasons explained above, the Government takes theview that South Africa is in occupation without title of a territory whichhas international status. This occupation is unlawful and South Africashould withdraw. Meanwhile, South Africa remains the de facto AdministeringAuthority. However, in the circumstances, there is an obligation on Statesnot to recognize any right of South Africa to continue to administer theTerritory. But there is no obligation, in the absence of appropriatedecisions under Chapter VII of the Charter to take measures which are innature of sanctions. It follows that we do not accept an obligation to takeactive measures of pressure to limit or stop commercial or industrialrelations of our nationals with the South African administration ofNamibia." h/G. United States of America12. The United States Government states that it accepts the advisory opinion ofthe International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 and recognizes the authority ofthe United Nations over Namibia and the legitimate interest of the United NationsCouncil for Namibia in the question of Namibia.h/ United Kingdom: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard): House of CommonsOfficial ReporT, fifth series, vol. 882, cols. 156h-1566 (London, H.M. StationeryOffice, 1975).-66-

13. With regard to Security Council resolutions 283 (1970) and 301 (1971), theUnited States Government considers certain dispositions of those resolutions to benot binding as a result of the use of the word "'requests". In considering thebinding quality of Security Council resolutions, it is necessary to consider thelanguage used in each particular case. i/i/ See A/35/337-S/14065, annex, paras. 18-22. For the printed text, see

Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for July,August and September 1980.-67-