francis wilson - the anatomy of conservatives

8/3/2019 FRancis Wilson - The Anatomy of Conservatives

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The Anatomy of ConservativesAuthor(s): Francis G. WilsonReviewed work(s):Source: Ethics, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Jul., 1960), pp. 265-281Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379260 .

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ETHICS AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OFSOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHYVolumeLXX JULY 1960 Number

THE ANATOMY OF CONSERVATIVESFRANCIS G. WILSON

IT HE criticsof conservatives eemto center on the proposition thatthe "new conservatism" is notreally a properly intelligible position.There is a tendency, often implicit, tosay that conservatismhas no status as aprogram, ideology, or political philoso-phy. The gravamenof the charge is ei-ther that conservatives are irrational;that they have lost their senseof reality;or that they representa form of invertedorreversedutopianism,or doctrinairism,that cannot be taken seriously. How-ever, the denial of status as a politicalposition takes a variety of forms andsome of these must be noted before weenter into the positive argumentof thispaper.1. In the extreme, critics have in-sisted that conservatismis a kind of po-litical tropism. The conservative exhib-its a kind of inborninclination, or fixedpersonality drift, or trait, that is purelyand simply negative. The contemporaryemphasis on the study of personality,and the view that personality traits areextremelydifficultor impossibleto mod-ify, have lent support to the contentionthat conservatives by their tropism areexcluded from any connection with ra-tionality. On the assumption that the

conservativerepresentsa clinicalcase of"the authoritarian personality" it hasbeen said that we have only a "pseudo-conservatism" n the United States.'2. Again,the differencesbetweencon-servatives and others-especially theliberals-is one of moodand bias, ratherthan discerniblestands on public ques-tions. Exponents of this view deny thatconservatives have a position or thatthere can be any serious distinction be-tween liberals and conservatives. Still,Rossiter has insisted on the irresponsi-bility of the "ultra" conservatives,whoare presumably those who reject the"revolutions"of the last generation inboth domestic and foreign policy.Pushed to an extreme the "mood andbias" argument would deny also thehistorical foundations of conservativeargument, as well as national variantsin conservative thought and program.But it is quite clear that the legitimacyand quality of the conservative's posi-tion are minimizedto invisibility if theposition taken is shortof being "ultra."23. Another denial of the existentialquality of conservatismwould reduce itsimply to a reaction against change.That there is a "situational"element inconservatismcan hardly be denied, forthe prudential judgments of conserva-

265


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266 ETHICStives differ in different countries, indifferenttimes, and there are sharp dif-ferences in social philosophy.The con-servative, it is said, expresseshis naturein opposition, mostly futile, to change,whatever may be its social or politicalcharacter.Nor is it merely a matter ofdefinitionthat is involved here, for oneis concernedwith the existential qualityof the conservativemind.Moreover,thestruggleto prevent changecanbe eitherlimited and immediate,or it can be dis-covered in critical historical situationssuch as the attempts to turn back theReformation, to limit the impact of theFrench Revolution and its revolutionsby filiation, to retardthe marchof dem-ocratic parliamentaryinstitutions, andthe effort to check the technologicalrevolutions of modern society. Thus,conservatism s situationaland position-al. The critics have said that on thepositive side the "new conservative"isso vague in his immediate politicalstands and in his interpretationof tra-ditional personalities that conservatismhas little or no rationalrelevance to themodernworld.34. In a view of more savage criticism,it is said that conservatives then andnow, old or new, are simply reactionary,unprogressive, and feudalistic charac-ters attemptingto steal the social show.Such has been the condemnationvoicedby the left-wingrevolutionaryand morepositively by the long sequence of thedisciples of Karl Marx. Reaction hasbeen defined in the most elusive man-ner, and "unprogressive" s surely anepithet of the ideological wars. "Feu-dal"as used by Marxianshas, of course,no relation to any historicalor existen-tial meaning. For in Marxism it is anabstract idea, a definitional symbol,used to castigate the enemy. In morespecific terms, the conservativeas a re-

actionary has been described as theEuropean "economicliberal," defenderof the free-market economy, the de-fender of capitalism, and the opponentof democracy,popularsovereignty,andliberty. In other situations,the conserv-ative has been identified with the to-talitarian minds defending the totali-tarian regime, and, indeed, simply as afascist. Obviously, in such a war ofGiant Ideology, as Russell Kirk ex-presses it, the most extreme example isoften chosen as the most typical. In re-cent times, as well, the conservativehas been identifiedin communistpropa-ganda with the thrust of imperialism,particularly the alleged effort of theUnited States to dominate the world.Lenin's Imperialismis certainly one ofthe most important of the ideologicaltextbooks against conservatism in ourtime.45. At a higher level of dialectic theconservative is charged with being re-actionary in his commitmentto a phi-losophy, which is again a denial of ra-tionality and the right to claim honor-able status among political positions.The conservative is usually theisticrather than deistic or agnostic; he be-lieves in sin rather than atrophiedper-sonal moral responsibility; he assertsthe imperfectqualities in the compositeof human nature, and he denies thatcentral hypothesisof progressivism, heperfectibility of man. The conservativeis likely to be a traditional Christianor believer in a religious faith, whilethe enemy has emancipated himselffrom the superstitions and priestcraftof other and more primitive eras. Butthere have been impressive changes inboth the defense of theistic philosophyand of Christian-inspiredconservatism.Kuehnelt-Leddihnhas written, "Thereare close ties between the New Con-


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THE ANATOMY OF CONSERVATIVES 267servatism and the notions of Burke,von Stein, Gbrres, A. v. Muller, Cha-teaubriand, E. L. v. Gerlach, Lacor-daire, Montalembert, and even ofPeguy, but very few links with theideologyof De Maistre and almostnoneat all with that of De Bonald or Maur-ras." In other words, the new conserva-tism is profoundly hostile to national-ism, while it was not in a previoustime.5

II1. The attempt to explain the anato-my of conservatives begins here withthe proposition that conservatismmustbe accepted as a legitimatepolitical po-sition. As a "position"it must be stud-ied both in a general sense and in par-ticular situations. It is a dialecticalforce that arises when there are politi-cal oppositions, such as,betweenliberalsor revolutionaries and conservatives.Such conflict and contradiction are

found,naturally,where political and so-cial consensus has been in process ofbreakingdown, for where there is deepconsensusthere is hardly a consciouspo-sitionat all, andthere is no conservatismin a practical sense. When there is con-flict about ideals and solutions of hu-man uncertainties in the typically"human situation," there can be aclassification of conservatives for theconservativeis aware of his commitmentor engagementto a position in a chang-ing situation. In any given struggle apattern of argumentemerges,and ideasfrom the past are incorporatedin thepresent. But a point to be emphasizedis this: classification is most effectiveand meaningful to the student of con-servatives when value systems are thegroundwork of classification. Surelythe great ideas or the great conflicts inideas must matter most: the strugglebetweenreligious affirmationand indif-

ference or hostility; realism in a factu-al or naturalistic sense, and realism asthe attainment of truth and value, or abelief that in the end it is the truth thatwill work; the struggle between meth-ods of inquiry, between naturalism,even with a theistic interpretation, andintuition or the self-evident statement.No doubt, one of the deepest of all theconflicts is the materialistic insistenceon what life is against the spiritual in-terpretationof man's nature.To the conscious conservative hiscommitment is an adherence to orderand to the symbols of order that bothjustify and sustain it. A conservative ismore likely to view history as EricVoegelin has in his magnificent OrderandHistory, one of the most profoundlyconservative studies of history in ourtime. He has presented a central themeconcerning the attitude of those whowould create and conserve institutions:the historical process is to be under-stood as the movement of decisive civil-izations and societies either toward oraway from union with God. Every im-portant order has interpreted itself inrelation to its conception of an orderthat is both in nature and is ultramun-dane, and there is always a search forsymbols that can represent this orderin the life of a society. In Volume IVoegelin speaks of Israel, and for Israelorderwas discoveredprimarilyin reve-lation, as for the Hellenes it was pri-marily in philosophy. With Israel forthe first time mankind learned what itmeans to have a history and move intime toward the consummationof bothman's will and God's intention. Thismovement and this process of historyis symbolizedin scripture, n the liturgyof the religion of Yahweh, in sacredpoems and secularhistory, as well as indrama and philosophy.6If one proposes


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268 ETHICSto say that a conservative is a situation-al thinker,than one mustinquire deeplyinto "situations," for the transmundaneinterpretationof situation cannot in themore recent views of history be ex-cluded; "situation" cannot be limitedto a few details of pragmatic historywithout the infusionof meaningthroughvalue; formal history is not enough initself to sustain a thesis about the situ-ation in which the mindof the conserva-tive works.2. Let us consider the problematicof position and situation for the con-servative.a) First of all, there is a level ofdiscussion to be noted. While it is truethat the inarticulate man may live ei-ther with a common acceptance of tra-dition or with an uneasy sense of hos-tility toward those who oppose him, ata more formal level discussionis carriedon either by intellectuals, by the writeror teacher, or by the political leader.In-tellectuals have been said to sense theirremotenessfrom the masses; hence theirwillingness to become members of theMarxistmovement,which promises heman end to theiralienation.The conserva-tive intellectual is, no doubt, more suc-cessful than the revolutionary in inte-grating his personality with non-intellec-tual people. Still, it is especially part ofthe work of the politician to insist thathe has contact with commonmen and todiscuss the politics of issues that areunderstood at least to a limited extentby just anyone who may happen tohear.The eloquence of intellectual con-servativesmust in logic begin with somesort of philosophy of conservatism. Inturn, this philosophy rests remotely ona model of the universe and more im-mediately on history; it is a paradigmof causation,motivation, and sequence,

and it involves of necessity some posi-tion on ordinary or perennial philo-sophical issues. In contrast, the politicalleader is the purveyor of prudentialjudgments on policy and proposals forpolitical reform. There is surely a con-servative theory of reform, such as thatof the French Catholic intellectualswho criticized industrialism during thenineteenth century. Benjamin Disraeliand Richard Oastler in England maybe cited as conservatives who had atheory of reform having little in com-mon with the reforms urged either bythe triumphantliberals or by the emer-gent socialists. In the contemporarysituation the conservative is seeking todevelop new positions in the ideologicalvoid that covers much of Europe. Therestorationof symbols of order, includ-ing a Christian social policy and therestoration of the institution of mon-archy, has been foremost in the mindsof many European conservatives.b) In the second place, a statementof the common maxims and policies ofthe conservative should be offered. Wedeal here with the models, or designs,of a generalized conservative systemthat any of its adherents might advo-cate. The model or design is frequentlylike a Kantian conception which is de-fined formally to begin with while ad-mitting that no single instance of whatis definedmay be strictly in accordancewith the definition. The paradigm orthe stylization is a kind of historicalaverage; it is protographicand logicalrather than existential. However, sucha summary of maxim and policy is aconstruction of an idea resting on aconsiderable body of Western experi-ence. Any design of ideology must reston some primary idea of the cosmos.But since conservatism is a politicalposition (as viewed in this discussion),


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THE ANATOMYOF CONSERVATIVES 269the propositions that make up the"creed" are not usually primary ideasin speculative philosophy. Most writerson conservatives have attempted tostate a series of propositions that arecommonly associated with conservativepositions, and these statements consti-tute the model or the design of theideology. The model, then, constitutesa summary at the surface; it consistsof views held by intellectuals and thosewho in any case are articulate, but itmust be conceded that the statement ofthe ideological paradigm is not a prob-ing philosophicalexperience.First, conservatives have variant butsimilar attitudes toward the continuityof experience. Most conservativeswouldsay there are patterns in behavior to beobserved in history, and these patternsgive rise to clues of what is possible orprobable in politics. Obviously not allhistory by any means is a proper sub-ject of admiration, but "pattern," if itexists, is objective. Undoubtedly, theIrish look on their historical experiencesomewhat differentlyfrom the conserv-atives and Unionists in Great Britain.Second, where history has been kind,as Englishmen have generally seen it,the attitude of Edmund Burke is ap-propriate. His antagonism to "sophist-ers and calculators" becomes under-standable. History and statesmanship,as Burke urged, involve more than themetaphysics of an undergraduate an-dthe arithmeticof an excise man. Thereis faith in prescription, and the loveand enjoyment of tradition, as WalterBagehot noted. Social time has its mys-teries.8Third, T. S. Eliot once said theremust be an orthodoxy by which thetradition of practice, policy, and insti-tution may be judged. The orthodoxyby which traditionis judged is the con-

servative acceptance of a moral order,or perhaps one should say it is the tra-dition itself as a deposit of truth, some-thing that is handed on without basicchange. Russell Kirk has spoken of thebelief that a divine intent rules society.In Catholic terms this means naturallaw and rights, and in ordinaryProtes-tant expression it is moral law. In anyterms.,it means a new Aristotelianismrather than pragmatism.9Fourth, conservatives in their major-ity view have held that it is appropriateto have some distrust of human nature.The conservative "realist" may havethe psychological distortions of judg-ment in mind, but the Christian con-servative will probably consider theeffect of sin, and, indeed, the effect oforiginal sin. Such a view of practical,behavioral human nature suggests lim-its to humanitarianreform. In applica-tion reform and change are surely notthe same; change can, in some in-stances, make reform impossible. In1896, in a speech on Princeton Univer-sity during the American Revolution,Woodrow Wilson said he believed,"There is nothing so conservative oflife as growth. . . . But not all changeis progress, not all growth is the mani-festation of life. Let one part of thebody be in haste to outgrow the rest andyou have malignant disease, the threatof death." Or, as John Stuart Mill saidin Representative Government, thepeople must be able and willing to dothe things necessary to supporta higherform of governmentthan the one theymay have.Fifth, there is a further conservativeview related to the distrust of humannature which is the rejection of theprinciple of equality. In the extremeinEuropean society it has meant the dis-tinctions of orders and classes. How-


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270 ETHICSever, in commercial society it meansalmost simply the justification of theunequal distributionof wealth and thecorrelationof unequalfunctionwith un-equal rewardas a principle of distribu-tive or social justice. Equality, however,seemsto be the greatpassionof the twen-tieth century. Viscount Kilmuir said inJune, 1953,reflectinga Britishconserva-tive view, "Equality is intellectual andbiologicalnonsense.Even in the FrenchRevolution it took only five years forthe concept of equality to change intothat of equality of opportunity."'10Sixth, the conservative view holdsthat governmentmust be limited in itspower. Internal restrictions may beused, a careful arrangementof the pre-conditions of majority rule, and the at-tempt may be made to assure a plural-istic society. The revolutionistdemandsa high level of consensus,while the con-servative will settle for a low one. It isat this point that the conservative sus-picion of the planned society appears,and this suspicion is found both amongthosewho favoran effectivefree-marketeconomy and those who might acceptmuch of the modificationof individual-ism found in the old programof Disrae-li's Tory democracy.Seventh, conservatives are defendersof property, private property, beforethey are defenders of capitalism or aparticular system of the manufactureand distribution of goods. Capitalismis a late comer,while propertyin manyforms is an ancient institution.'1c) An additionalproblemof positionand situation for conservativesconcernsthe "prudential judgment" of politicsand programs.Here the political leaderbecomes primarilythe advocate of poli-cies which he believes will bring nearerthe realizationof the ideals in nationaltradition. Policy is always emergent in

the history and symbolism of a giventime. Since prudentialjudgmentis exer-cised in the atmosphereof national tra-dition-that is, the deposit of unchang-ing value-and within a given nation,it must vary fromsituation to situation.Policy naturally involves the contro-versies which whirl around the inter-pretation of tradition. Against the po-litical leader and his allies among theintellectuals there is often a struggleby segmentsof public opinionto securedifferent interpretationsof the meaningof national experience. Here one dealswith the existentialrather than with thepotential. The interpretation of tradi-tion is often an argument about whathas actually happened in national his-tory. One may say there is in conserva-tism a national character which is re-flected both in values and in establishedinstitutions. The application of tradi-tion signifiescommitment o policy, andpolicy may be generally regardedas anexplicit statement of prudential judg-ment. If the intellectual conservativemay be classified accoring to his theo-ries of the truth or validity of ideas, thepolitical leader who is a conservativemay be classified according to the na-tional character of the policies he urgesfor the common good.The American is fully aware of thecontroversy concerningthe meaning ofhis tradition. Among the intellectualsthere is usually a struggleover the rightto say what tradition means. One largeschool insists that the only Americantradition is the liberal attitude as therehas never been anything else either inthe colonies or in the United States.The contention is focused on this point:there has been no feudalismin Americato overthrow.But othershave said thereis here a practical and pragmatic atti-tude toward life; hence philosophical


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THE ANATOMYOF CONSERVATIVES 271views, often metaphysical in import,have had no meaning for Americans.The American tradition is the traditionof having no philosophy; it is a philos-ophy of no-philosophy. On the otherhand, mere practicality is not pragma-tism since pragmatism is an epistemol-ogy; it is a philosophy; and it mightas well be obvious that the principle ofnatural rights, so deeply embedded inour historic system (including the civillibertarianism of our mid-centurytimes), constitutes a philosophical sys-tem. While the liberal has been sayingthat the only tradition of America isliberalism, the conservative case hasbeen centered on the hypothesis thatconservative views have been creativelyimportant in American history. Thereis, therefore, a formative conservativeview in Americanexperience.Must notthe "political theology"of The Federal-ist be considered a conservative state-ment of first rank? Are not most politi-cal leaders and writings ambivalent toa degree in their positions? Jeffersonwas surely not all "liberal and demo-cratic," and John Adams should not beconsidered all conservative.Any political and intellectual lifemight be considered either liberal orconservative, with moments of the otherinterspersed within a general drift ofattitude. But the problem is to discoveras much as possible about the attitudes,motivations, and specific beliefs of anindividual as he looks out at the socialworld. It is the individual,not a group,who makes his commitment to societyand not to some form of social abstrac-tion. Each individual, as well as eachintellectual and political leader, mustagree within himself what he will eithersupport or reject and that he will feelharmoniouswith or alienated from thesocial world around him. The problem

is one of attitude and judgment in agiven situation. Conservativessay thatcertain ideas in America are valid andthat they constitute the core of the tra-dition. The constitution-interpreted ina given manner-is the central symbolof order and the representationof thepolitical cosmos. Private property, thefree market, the protection of agricul-ture, the maintenance of national de-fense and the system of government,the idea that the United States is aChristian nation, and the maintenanceof local autonomy and popular controlover schools-all form, to many, theessence of our tradition. Conservatives,likewise, have generally favored stablemoney, the payment of debts, and therecognition of the moral responsibilityof each individual.Curiously, too, whenthe modern existentialist stresses indi-vidual responsibility and the freedomof the will, he speaks like the tradition-al mind which stressed the moral codeand the freedomof the will.

IIIWe have now reached a point whereit should be asked: What is the centraltheme that creates some kind of tax-onomic satisfaction in the study of con-servatism? Gerhart Niemeyer has of-

fered a forceful conceptin these words:In essence,conservativeheorizinghas con-sisted in attempts to restate the understand-ings on which a given countryactually wasbased.... Conservatives,n thus formulatingpoliticaltruth,have not necessarilydesired oreturnto the past. Nor have they forswornchangeand a better future. Essentiallywhatthey have done is to point out the laws ofspontaneityn the orderof a community,estimpatientchange seek channelsof alienatingforce. Thesemenwerenot alwayscalledcon-servatives, ust as theiropponentswerenot al-waysnamed iberals.But the conservativeon-cern, always the same, has been consistentlywith the "planners,"he thinkersof abstract


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272 ETHICSschemes, the know-better innovators, the po-litically unresponsive intellectuals.12

The theory of the communityor thecountry involves the creation of an or-der to which the individual citizen cangive his commitment,or his allegiance,and one which he can regard as legiti-mate. Most articulate and intellectualconservatives are driven in the end toask also: What kind of a philosophy isnecessary as the underpinningof such acommunity?And they will say, I think,with Niemeyer that behind the thoughtof men like Coke, Burke, Donoso Cor-tes, Richard Hooker, or the Frenchcritics of the Great Revolution, likeMaistre or Bonald, is some kind ofAristotelian-Christian heory of the so-cial nature of man and the society inwhichhe may live. These conservatives,like WoodrowWilson in the foundationof his thought, would say that just asfolly may be observed in history, sowisdom can be gained. The revolution-ary mind, and the liberal mind, I think,are more likely to be Kantian thanAristotelian; such minds are surely ma-terialistic if one considers the wholeimpact of skepticism and dialecticalmaterialismon modernman. The revo-lutionist may be existential in the athe-istic sense, or pragmatic,and an adher-ent of radical empiricism; but the neo-Aristotelian believes that we can knowreal things and essential structures;thatthere is a free spiritual principle inman; that God exists and is providen-tial; and that there is a universalmorallaw. It is the function of the conserva-tive to state such a position, and it isthe function of the conservative leaderto formulateprudential judgmentsthatwill assist in the realizationof the prop-er symbols of order. It is thus that onemay seek to meet a crisis in the exist-ence of the community.

Such a theory of the community isdifferentin a profoundsense fromwhathas been called a modern "liberal"the-ory of society. The communityhas beenemphasized at times to such a degreethat there is support for an absolutemajority rule, which in itself would bethe definition of the truth of the com-munity. There would be no recognitionof a weightier or wiser part in makingpolitical decisions, for all decisionswouldflow fromthe easy spiritof demo-cratic groupings. Freedom is to be at-tained through "belongingness" and"togetherness,"and throughthe devel-opment of the personality under theguidance of psychologists rather thanmoral teachers; the objective of educa-tion and of life in the communitywouldbe "life normality and group conform-ity" and the process of learning mightbe regarded as a phase of group dy-namics. It is a little like the zusammen-gehorigkeitsgefuhll f the Hitler Jugend.Indeed, some philosophershave sensedin the pragmatic or instrumentalistgroup life an approach to the idealisttheory of the community,which wouldbe always morally superior to the in-dividual.The conservative'sview of the com-munity seeks to reject extremes.He re-jects the utopia of the individual wholives in isolation like a god, as Aristotlenoted, and also the utopia in which allmembers have a full expression of theego. In the utopia of the isolated indi-vidual, the person must renounce thecommunityand mean it; this very re-nunciationmust be his condition of hu-man happiness. A probing issue israised: What are the ideal types ofmen? Even the most dedicated in themore strict of monastic orders of lifefind the process of self-realization inunionwith God a slow andpainfulproc-


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THE ANATOMYOF CONSERVATIVES 273ess. The saint, the wise man, the hero,the farmer,the artist, the servant of thecity or the church, the person withbeauty and talent, and those who prac-tice the arts-have all been praised asideal types, and all of them experiencethe necessity of "withdrawal"to soli-tude for a time. But nearly all of whomwe have any recordhave returned fromthe transformingexperienceof self-com-munion to the activity of life in thecommunity. The utopia of solitude isthe preparation for life in society.13Likewise, the conservative is unim-pressed with the utopia of the sub-merged ego, the life in the group inwhich the personality realizes its ownperfect importance, its unmeasuredprestige, and the complete absence ofany problem of security. In such agroup there would be no need for anycatharsis by violence against others,and frustration or pressure would bejust words in other people's tracts forthe times. In such a society the indi-vidual wouldneverwithdraw since with-drawal would be unsocial and danger-ous to the individual who draws awayfrom contented life with his fellowship.Conservativesseek the balancedcom-munity, however difficult in practice itmay be to attain it. Balance itself wouldbe difficult both to define and to attainin policy under whatever system of so-ciety it might be sought. If the conserv-ative attains his end he secures to thecreative individual the proper condi-tions of life in the community so thatthere would be no alienation of thosewho might search for the utopia of thesublime life. Neither the intellectualnor the worker must be devalued andalienated from his social world. Theburning ego of those who exploit mustbe restrained in so far as the politicsof the possible says it can be done.

IVLet us shift the discussion now to amore difficult level. It has been seenthat to the conservative the primaryobject of inquiryis the community.Theconservative life is a search for an au-thentic communitywhich the individualfeels to be legitimate and in which heshares in a commonly recognized con-sensus. It is a consensus, indeed,whichis shared by the intellectual and thecommonman, or by any and all classes.The conservative community is always

one in which there is some alleviationof class struggleand in which, it is said,stasis may be avoided altogether.But this means that conservative in-quiry into the community is far morethan an inquiry conducted by observingpolitical behavior. It is an inquiry thatgives valid propositions; that is, the in-quiry into community must result intruth. Now, the critics of conservativesin the past century believed they couldreach truth, but in more recent daysthey have contented themselves withhistorical relativism, pragmatic worka-bility, behavioral or operative consen-sus, and scientific analogy in socialstatement. If all conservatives have en-gaged in the quest for the truth of acommunity, and if this has meant someform of philosophy, one may surelyclassify the conservativesin accordancewith their modes of discovering mean-ing in symbolsof order. What conserva-tives would recognize, it seems, is thatthere must be a basis for truth that ismore than pragmatic history; historyhas its uses, but the conservativewouldsay, I think, that the philosophical in-quiry is valid, for the philosopher canstate the paradigmatic meaning thatmay be woven into the pragmaticevent.Even the reason of the political leader


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274 ETHICSconcerned with prudential judgmentand the enactment of policy can probeinto the issue of meaning.1. On the one hand, meaning issought in the sense of the transcendent,and in the openingtoward God. To livein history is to live with God and thedestiny He will allow or provide forthose, who like the children of Israel,formulated the principle for the firsttime.14 At the other extreme, one mightcite Latin naturalism, including theviews of Ortega y Gasset, Santayana,and Unamuno. At times philosophyerupts into the discussion of generalpolicy, and policy is chosen because itseems to stand in agreement with pri-mary philosophical views. Behind anysuch conception of policy, which is heldto be the expressionof truth, there is amodel or a design of the universe; andthe state, the government,and the sys-tem of politics are regardedas harmoni-ous with a larger conception of the ex-istential. The larger events of the revo-lutionof heavenlybodies,aresaid tohavesuggested by analogy the whole notionof "revolution." Thomas Hobbes wassurely one of the first to use "revolu-tion" in the modernsense of the word.15In modern times secular philosophershave looked at the world as a machine,as a kind of organism,and as historicalprocess, while the religious thinker hasincludedthe providentialwithin his de-sign or law of the universe.16The the-istic view may, of course,be found withmanyshadings.Isaac Newton, who pro-vided modern man with a mechanicalsystem, was deeply theistic and provi-dential in his thought. Or even law inhistory may be seen in the state aspower or force, realismin the empiricalsense. So the German historian Hein-rich von Treitschke idolized Machia-velli, and Treitschkeexerciseda greater

spiritual influence on succeedinggener-ations of academic youth in Germanythan any other conservative beforehim.17Still, Treitschke was an earnestChristian; the laws of Godand the lawsof realistic or factual politics did notconflict though moral attainment wassurely the higherand ultimateobjectiveof political life. The state as powerwasthe creation of the will of God himself.The formulation of a theory of lawor design in the world is a search for abasis of valid conclusions. Conserva-tives seek ideas to justify a social order,indeed, but the justification occurs be-cause the ideas are true, and being truethey are embodied in institutions thatmust be defended.18 The conservativeideology rests on a view of truth, andpublic policy as prudentialjudgmentisconsidered to be an expression of deep-er strataof thinking aboutjustice, right,and law in the universe. For the con-servative as an intellectual, the modelof proof of value rests upon a twofoldfoundation: "history" as a method ofinquiry, and "philosophy"as a methodof inquiry. Fact andvalue in eithercaseare united, and empiricismis a "meth-od" by which the facts of history andphilosophy are joined into the satisfac-tory demonstrationof judgment.a) In the demonstrationof the valid-ity of ideas history had been, in truth,one of the great weapons of the con-servative. From history one may derivea behavioral criticism of both revolu-tion and reform. In some views historyand evolution have blendedtogether in-to a single tool of social inquiry. As atool for the attainment of truth, historyis used in three significantways: as thecriticism of institutions, as the buttressof empiricalrealism,and as the embodi-ment of an ideal, a paradigm, or anorthodoxy that may stand in judgment


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THE ANATOMYOF CONSERVATIVES 275on a social and political tradition. Theuses of history separate conservativetraditions with a great width, for hu-man experience with history is diverse,and ultimately history is a tool that isjudged for its utility in each situation.History as a criticism of institutionsis most lucid in the statement and de-fense of tradition. One startswith whatis considered excellent, and those tra-ditional and habitual forms of lifewhich are in accordance are approvedand proved throughhistorical study. Asa criticism of institutions history seemsto say "the truth will work" eventhough some stretch of pragmatic his-tory may have shown the failure of thesymbols of orderthat are being defend-ed. Institutions are criticized for theirdeviation fromthe standardof truth, orthe word, or the law. But history as acriticism of situations and institutionsis an agency for use in the applicationof an idea. It is a means to judge a situ-ation by the standard which stands in-tellectually and traditionallyoutside ofthe whole of the historical moment.Judgment arises less from history andmore from the energy of judgmentthatis injected into the historical.In contrast, the historical realist at-tempts to see the facts separated fromvalue; he asks whether somethingworks, and in the spirit of pragmatismhe says that it is true if it works. Thejudgment found in tradition is subjec-tive, conventional, limited in time; andbecause values beyondthe empiricalaresubjective, the fact judges the value.Now most conservatives would, I be-lieve, be found in the camp which saysthat fact andvalue are organicand maynot be separated effectively in Humeanfashion. But this organicity works intwo ways; for just as facts speak tovalues, values speak to facts, and the

judgment is one of conscience and in-tellect on the part of the person who isdoing the judging. Still, there is a classof conservatives who are in effect radi-cal in their empiricismand who assumethat a knowledgeof facts will generatea proper judgment of values. Scientificrealists in international relations areamongthe most commonproponentsofthis view. Such realists, who persuadeinterests and facts to speak for them-selves, find in history the confirmationof their judgment of contemporaryaf-fairs.19History as value or as ideal seeks,in a sort of Kantian manner,to use his-tory to create the ideal. The conserva-tive's history looks toward the futurethoughit is a future that is generally inno hurry to arrive. History as value be-comes a standardby which tradition isjudged.20b) Against the conservative whoseconcernis some use of history as a toolfor gaining social truth we must ob-serve the conservative whose deepesteffort is to attain an engagement orcommitment on philosophical issues.Conservativeshave commonlybeen at-tached to certain of the great philo-sophical positions, primarily the Aris-totelian, the Christian, the Thomist,and the Hegelian. The conservative in-tellectual is, of course, a philosopher-of necessity so-and he is drivento askan ontological question, or the existen-tial question, What is man? Throughphilosophy one acquires a basis forjudging experience and an insight intothe justice of a social system. Whenonespeaks of the unity of the "GreatTra-dition" of the West there is behind it asense of community in philosophicalmethod which has its ultimate roots inthe Greek,Roman, and Jewishheritage.From the Greeks one might learn the


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276 ETHICSface of reason, from the Romans thesymbols of order in a legal system, andfrom the Jewish-Christian raditiontherealization that history is lived orjudgedunder God. There is a paradigmor order that transcends, he pragmaticevents of the "kingdom" or of the"war."From the groundwork n philos-ophy one can discern agreement in so-cial purposein the creationof a society,and a sense that there is communicationabout order throughout the civilizedWest. To the conservative, the greatsymbols grounded on ontological in-quiry have been order, law, the socialinequality of man, the ownership ofproperty, and the family. With all ofthe variationin the system there is someunity; but there is also imperfect reali-zation, and there is evolutionor change.Some have said this is the traditionof every intellectual grounded in theWest, not only Aristotle, Adam Smithand Burke, and not only the Tory andthe Whig, but the liberals.Actually, thewhole idea of a self-consciousconserva-tism did not originate until there hadbeen an attack on tradition throughanattack on religionand the theistic orderof life. The conservative was born inthe eighteenthcentury in the defense ofreligion, of the Church, and of the so-cial order that had lived in symbiosiswith the Churchfrom time immemorial.While the critic might like to make theconservative reaction a tropism, theconscious conservative will assert he isessentially in the Aristoteliantradition,and he will not permit the denial of theimportanceof the truth of the commu-nity. But the conservative must oftenassert, against the liberal, that he is anintellectual.2. It has been suggested that theconservative may be dissected in ac-cordance with his method of searching

for the meaning and the nature of thecommunity.In a more specific sense hemay be called either one who uses his-tory as a tool for his course of discov-ery or one who uses philosophy moredirectly. But conservativesmay be clas-sified in accordancewith their programsof the prudentialjudgment.We face animmense variety of programs, for thenational tradition will dictate the pos-sibilities of practicalpolicy andpolitics.Yet, there are issues that transcend anational situation, such as internationalcommunism, the energy of capitalism,or pressuresat the point of contact be-tween the great religious systems. The-ology, like philosophy, is in conserva-tism, a basis for a program; it demandsby its logic to be translatedinto action.It is in this area that most of thecriticism of the conservative occurs. Itis said that he has no program,that heis an exponentof do-nothingpolitics, orthat what he does is reactionary, un-progressive, or dangerous. Here theconservativeis chargedwith sponsoringoutmoded political doctrine, of beinga standpatter,and, indeed,simply as anopponentto change. On the other hand,he may be charged with a subversiveattachmentto change, resulting in a re-jection of legal process and the espousalof revolution.2' Still, the main chargein the anti-conservativebarrageis thatof doing little or nothing save resistingsalutary change. F. M. Cornfordin hiswhimsical classic on academic politicshas defined conservative liberals andliberal conservatives as follows:A Conservative Liberal is a broad-mindedman,who thinks that something ought to be done,only not anything that anyone now desires, butsomething which was not done in 1881-82. ALiberal Conservative is a broad-minded man,who thinks that something ought to be done,only not anything that anyone now desires;


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THE ANATOMY OF CONSERVATIVES 277and that most things which were done in 1881-82 ought to be undone.22

The range of conservativeprudentialjudgments about policy have variedenormously from country to country,from time to time, and from one cul-ture to another.Often, at this point, theconservative is chargedwith an unper-ceptive traditionalism,such as a Burk-ean unwillingness to reform Parlia-ment, or a Metternichianunwillingnessto accept the liberalism of the FrenchRevolution and its daughterrevolutionsin Europe. But to the conservatives,aside from those who attempt to be"realistic"or scientific Machiavellians,their assumptions reach back into theethical groundworkof their society andtheir history. The issue is expressed inthe immediateand the human, but it isgroundedin the national past. In a de-mocracy such as ours one may praiseboth rights and majority rule, but inSpain a conservative like Calvo Serermay become the leading advocate ofreforms that will bring about a Chris-tian society and the restorationof mon-archy.23 n France, Raymond Aron hasidentified three kinds of conservatism:opposition to the Third Republic; theright wing in Parliament,including op-position to the Latin Liberal conceptionof the separation of church and state,the defense of laissez-faire and the freemarket economy; and the Boulangist-Gaullist position, which has beencharged with showing vaguely fascisttendencies.24For the American, one of the mostdifficultof all the problems of conserv-ative symbolismhas beenthe divergencebetween historic Toryism and the lib-eral, laissez-faire theory in Europe. InAmericathe European Tory system didnot take root, and the liberalismof theEuropeansbecame the conservatismof

Americans. The Tories in Englandlaunchedone of the most effective earlyattacks on free trade in factory society,and the liberals in England (until afterthe middleof the century) opposed fac-tory legislation. Adam Smith, as an ex-ponent of capitalism, was in general abeliever in free trade though there weremany limitationswhichin his mind werecompatible with free competition. Wefind Burke, the founder of conserva-tism, a liberal in this instance, since hesupported the ideas of Adam Smith.Might not one say that the idea of freecompetition has been ambivalent, ap-pealing to all liberals and to some con-servatives? Might we not also say, inconsequence, that the acceptance offree tradeby the conservatives n Amer-ica was a slow business? Did not thedemocratic tide of Jacksonianism de-fend free trade while conservatives re-mainedHamiltonians?After the middleof the century the liberals in both Eng-land and America began to be moresympathetic toward collectivism, andthe conservatives slowly but certainlymovedtowarda moreforcefulpresenta-tion of free competition as an aspectof capitalism.What the contemporary, collectivistopponent of American conservativescan hardly realize is that there has beena conservative theory of reform in Eu-rope, exemplified in Disraeli and thecontinental aristocraticcritics of indus-trialism. Though a particular reformmay be accepted by both English Con-servatives and Laborites, for example,the principle and the tradition behindthe reform can readily be different.In-dustrial reform is the largest of theareas of political change involved inmodern society, but it is not the onlyone by any means.Much of the prudentialjudgment of


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278 ETHICSconservatives has been an effort tomaintainsome of the traditionalordersof society against the impact of revo-lutions. The French Revolution, therevolution of 1848, World War I andWorld War II, the Russian revolution,the Fascist revolutions, the incrediblespread of communist ideology through-out Asia, and the threat of furtherrevo-lutions under communist inspiration inthe Near East and in Africa, not tomention the Americas-have destroyedmuch of the relevance of many institu-tions and ideas that only a short timeago seemed lasting. Can the UnitedStates or any Western power succeedinconvincing the Asian and the Africanthat the Western states are not imperi-alistic? Can it be shown that they areonly trying to serve well the interna-tional communityof which we are all apart? Clearly the Romantic and anti-revolutionarythinking of Adam Mullercannot be restoredto favor nor can thedetails of the institutionalargumentsofEdmund Burke. However, both Mullerand Burke must be numbered amongthe heroes of the conservative move-ment.The conservative prudential judg-ment has sought to restrainthe commu-nist revolution; and, by so doing, it hashoped to maintain the spirit and struc-ture of nineteenth-century economic,religious, cultural, and political institu-tions. In the end the conservativehopesfor a victory over both fascists andcommunists and a resolution of thevarious "colonial" issues. But the vic-tory over fascism in World War IIstrengthenedthe communists, while atthe same time only a limited vitalitywas restoredto parliaments,to capital-ists, and to the influence of religiousleaders.

VNot all conservatives have been alikein this large enterprise. Many systemsof policy may obviously be listed underconservatism. But it is clarifying tomake some statement of the differencesbetween conservatism in Europe andAmerica. Both similarity and differencemay be observed, and one of the mostsimilar aspects of ideological thinkingin both places has been "schools" ofthought in Western politics. In his studyof the history of political ideas Gaetano

Mosca noted, first, that from the end ofthe eighteenth and through the nine-teenth century there have been thosewho, following Montesquieu, haveformed he liberalcurrent;second, alongwith these there have been those whowere democrats,aiming primarily at po-litical equality through universal suf-frage; third, one may observe the so-cialists who would complete politicalequality with an economic revolution;and, fourth, those who have formulatedthe principle of national union and in-dependence,and sought to attain it inGermany, Italy, Poland, and in othercountries.25The "schools" of politicalthought have spread throughout theWest, and much of Montesquieu hasbeen used by conservative thinkers.Thenationalistic theory of the last centurywas upheld both by those who soughta revolution for the new and by thosewhowanted to restorethroughnational-ism the ancientuse andwont of politicallife.Since movementsof ideas and ideol-ogies are now more widespreadthan inthe past, one can well expect similaritiesbetween Europe and America that aregreater than in the days when ThomasPaine and Joel Barlow were Americanmissionaries of the "republicancreed"


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THE ANATOMYOF CONSERVATIVES 279to European society. The conservativewhereverhe is in the West is an enemyof the march of militant communism.One may say, indeed, that one of thedeeper causes of the crisis in Europesince August, 1914, has been extremenationalism and the philosophies andideologiesthat have gone with it in eachcountry where the infection becameacute. While there has been no effec-tive, extremenationalismin the UnitedStates, the conservativesof Europehavebeen increasinglyhostile to the ravagesof nationalisticpassion.Onethingseemsto be clear: many conservatives inEuropehave been weaned away from aliberalistic, free-marketcapitalism, andthey have turned much of their loyaltyto a functional or corporativeorganiza-tion of the economic process. In otherwords, social gains shouldbe preserved,and there should be an effective func-tional organizationof workers and man-agement or owners. Thus, the youngconservative imagines a world beyondboth socialism and communismon theone hand, and beyond liberal and capi-talistic society on the other. Con-servatism can, thus, become a third vi-sion of how man may earn his dailybread.In Catholic Europe the conservativeturnsto the defense of the church,whileconservatives in America are bound tobe defenders of a pluralistic societywhich includes Protestants, Catholics,and Jews. In LutheranEuropethe con-servative can defend a state-supportedchurch and the confessional schoolwhich receives money from the state,while the Lutheran in Americamay bethe defender of a different public-lawsetting for his religiouslife. In Englandthe Anglican and monarchist traditionyet stands as the symbol of stabilityto the continental conservative where

therehas been a resurgenceof monarch-ism. But in America our conservatismmustbe republicanandthus must rejectan Anglicanismthat is tied to the mon-archy though our modern republicancreed can hardly be influenced by theutopianismof the vision of progress ofthe years immediatelyafter the Ameri-can Revolution.In our time, of course, the secularmindturnsto the ingredientsof "liberal-ism" in the Americanpolitical psyche.Ludwig Freund has said "there is noplace in this country for a conservativemovement in the European sense" be-cause, first, liberal ideas of the Enlight-enment deeply influenced the forma-tion of the American tradition, and itwas in oppositionto manyof these ideasthat Europeanconservatismwas formu-lated. American conservatism must,thus, be steeped in aspectsof the liberaltradition. The main differencebetweenpolitical parties within the Americanconsensusis oneof degreeand emphasis."Do they believemorein the humanistictraditionof liberalismas symbolizedbyLocke, Montesquieu,andThomasPaineor in the economic aspects of liberalismas embodied in the teachings of theManchester school of thought?"26Buttimes change, and the position of theliberalelementis not the sameas it oncewas. Liberalism in America has growncollectivistic, and the conservativemaynow affirm the principle of the free-market against the liberal. But, as Ger-hartNiemeyerhasargued,conservativesfear that the "innocent ideologists" inthe fight against communismare insuffi-ciently firm.Hence it is no accident that over the issue ofcommunism conservatives have attacked notonly liberal actions and policies, but the verypattern of modern liberal thought. The sight


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280 ETHICSof totalitarian actuality has sharpenedthe con-servatives' sense of dangerous potentialities in-herent in liberal ideology.27

There has beenmorethana faint sug-gestion that American and Europeanconservativesin the new age are sensingthat they have muchin commonbecauseof the weakness of Europeanliberalismand the successes of communism. ButEuropeanliberals in the same situationmay sense they have somethingin com-

mon with conservatives. As Kuehnelt-Leddihnhas said:A hundred years ago the Liberals worshippedAdam Smith, Spencer,J. S. Mill, and Bentham,while the nineteenth-century Conservatives de-voured De Maistre, Bonald, Carlyle, Cortes,and C. L. von Haller. Today the New Liberalsas well as the New Conservatives are livingon a common diet of Alexis de Tocqueville,Acton, Burckhardt,Vinet, R6pke, Hayek, Daw-son, Jouvenal, Martini, and Somary.28UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

NOTES1. Consult Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," American Scholar, XXIV(Winter, 1954-55), 9 ff.; Herbert L. McCloskey,"Conservatism and Personality," American PoliticalScience Review, LII (March, 1958), 27-45. For ex-cellent criticisms of this method see David L. Spitz,"Power and Personality: The Appeal to the 'RightMan' in Democratic States," ibid., pp. 84-107;Willmoore Kendall, "Comment on McCloskey'sConservatism and Personality," ibid., pp. 506-10.2. Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America(1955). See the significant review of this work byGerhart Niemeyer, Journal of Public Law (Emory

University), IV (Fall, 1955), 441 ff.3. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism asan Ideology," American Political Science Review,LI (June, 1957), 454-73, for a development ofsuch a point of view.4. Bernard L. Kronick has said: "Natural con-servatism is both the result of habit and the prod-uct of fear. Thus it is the psychological basis of allother conservatism. Many kinds of fear are presentin conservatism" (see "Conservatism: A Defini-tion," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,XXVIII [September, 1947], 171-79, 173).5. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, "The New Con-servatism in Europe," Southwest Review, Winter,1955, p. 2. M. M. Auerbach, The Conservative Il-lusion (1959), may be consulted on the philosophi-cal issue in the criticism of conservatism.6. See Edward Gargan, "The Ultimate Serviceof History," Critic, XVI (June-July, 1958), 7-8.7. See Modern Age, Vol. II (Summer, 1958), fora discussion of the social theory of Otto von Haps-burg who illustrates some of the current theories ofthe reform of the social order.8. From the Greek criticisms of democracy to thepresent, some conservatives have had distrust ofthe extreme forms of populistic politics: democraticmass movements can easily become despotic. SeeAmaury de Riencourt, The Coming Caesars (1957);R. H. Luthin, American Demagogues (1954); Don-ald R. Richberg, Labor Union Monopoly: A Clear

and Present Danger (1957).9. On tradition see Josef Pieper, "The Conceptof Tradition," Review of Politics, XX (October,1958), 465-91. On p. 490 he notes tradition is bothresistance and incentive at the same time.10. R. A. Butler (ed.), The New Conservatism:An Anthology of Post-war Thought (1955), p. 85.11. A great range of literature might be cited butthe following may suffice: Russell Kirk, The Con-servative Mind (1953); A Program for Conserva-tives (1954); Beyond the Dreams of Avarice(1956); Peter Viereck, Conservatism Revisited(1949); Conservatism from John Adams toChurchill (1956); F. G. Wilson, The Case for Con-servatism (1951); "A Theory of Conservatism,"American Political Science Review, XXXV (1941),29 ff.; Daniel Bell (ed.), The New American Right(1955); Walter Lippmann, Essays in the PublicPhilosophy (1955); Daniel Boorstin, The Geniusof American Politics (1953) ; Ludwig Freund, "TheNew American Conservatism and European Con-servatism," Ethics, LXVI (October, 1955), 10ff.;W. M. McGovern and D. S. Collier, Radicals andConservatives (1957); W. M. Chamberlin, TheEvolution of a Conservative (1959).12. See Niemeyer's review of Rossiter, Conserva-tism in America, in Journal of Public Law (EmoryUniversity Law School), IV (Fall, 1955), 443.13. Consult Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of His-tory (Abridgment, 1947), pp. 217 ff., for his dis-cussion of the "withdrawal and return" of the cre-ative personality. Cf. E. V. Walter, "The PoliticalSense of Ford Maddox Ford," New Republic,March 26, 1956, pp. 17-19: "In the aristocraticimagination, there are four royal roads to the sub-lime life: the saintly, the wise, the heroic and thebucolic."

14. See Eric Voegelin, Israel and Revelation(1956), passim. The theistic conservatism of JohnH. Hallowell, Main Currents in Modern PoliticalThought (1950) and The Moral Foundations ofDemocracy (1954) is a significant contribution toAmerican conservative thinking.


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THE ANATOMY OF CONSERVATIVES 28115. This analogy is present at the end of the"Review and Conclusion" of the Leviathan.16. Karl W. Deutsch, "On CommunicationModels in the Social Sciences," Public OpinionQuarterly, XVI (Fall, 1952), 356 ff.17. Freund, op. cit., p. 15.18. Huntington, op. cit., p. 454.19. Voegelin has said: "In Protagoras appears,for the first time, the type of thinker who is a skep-tic, or agnostic, with regard to transcendent realityand, at the same time, a conservative with regardto historical order." For further illustrations hementions Pyrrho toward the end of the fourth cen-tury and Montaigne, Bayle, and Hume in post-Ref-ormation times. Voegelin regards the position un-stable, to be maintained only if "the theoreticalquestion of validity and its source will not beraised" (Eric Voegelin, Order and History, Vol.

II: The World of the Polis [1957], p. 308).20. See T. S. Eliot, After Strange Gods: APrimer of Modern Heresy (1934).21. See Robert J. Harris, Journal of Politics, XX(February, 1958), 232, in a review of Jackson Kil-patrick, The Sovereign States (1957).22. Microcosmographia Academica, Being aGuide for the Young Academic Politician (5th ed.,1953), p. 4.23. See Rafael Calvo Serer, Politica de integra-cio'n (1955); Theoria de la restauraciodn(2d ed.,1955).24. (1) Raymond Aron, "Espoir et peur dusiecle," Western World, No. 7 (November, 1957);Rene Remond, La Droite en France de 1815 d nosours (1954). Remond shows that the right itself

is a microcosm in which diverse traditions and di-verse ideologies cross and enter into combat. Thom-as Molnar, "French Conservative Thought Today,"Modern Age, III (Summer, 1959), 283-98, has madean excellent statement of the positions to be foundamong French conservatives.25. See Ferruccio Pergolessi, "Notas sobre la'ciencia politica' de Gaetano Mosca," Revista deestudios politicos, LXXXIX September-October,1956), 83-84, summarizing Mosca's Storia delledoctrine politische (1st ed., 1933). Pergolessi's longarticle is a remarkably complete study of Mosca,both in idea and in bibliography.26. Freund, op. cit., p. 16. Since World War IIthe Christian Democrats in France have believedin the neo-Thomist theory of man and society.They have had a "long-range desire to reconcile thechurch and the Enlightenment" and to cure the

division that has prevailed since 1789. In additionthe "reconciliation" would be based on a peacefulreplacement of the capitalist economy "with a sys-tem based on the private ownership and the publicmanagement of property." Also some form of plu-ralism should be attained in which there would bea decentralized social order and a recognition ofgroup rights. Each person should be free to asso-ciate himself with groups having a philosophy ac-ceptable to his view of life. See Willard Ross Yates,"Power, Principle, and the Doctrine of the Mouve-ment Republicain Populaire," The American Po-litical Science Review, LII (June, 1958), 421.27. Niemeyer, op. cit., p. 444.

28. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, op. cit., p. 9.

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