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© 2011 World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh

Fo r t y - F i r s t Annua l

World Affa irs Inst i tute

November 18, 2011 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Briefing Paper

The Arab Awakening: A Call for Change in the Middle East and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

CONTENTS

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...…..1 A Survey of American Interests in the Middle East Since 1945…………………………………………………………………….2 Underlying Causes of Revolt..……………..……….……………………………………………………….………………………….4 Revolts Across the Arab Region………….……..…………………………………………………………………….……………….6 Tunisia.…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………....6 Egypt..…………………………………………………………………………...……………………………………..…….....6 Yemen...…………………………………………………………………………..……………………………..……………...7 Saudi Arabia...…………………………………………………………..……………………………..……………………….8 Key Articles from The New York Times………………………………………………………..…………………………..10 Spotlights on the Impact of Social Media and Women Protestors on the Arab Awakening……..………………..…………...12 American Foreign Policy Consequences……………………………………………………………………………..…...………...14

Map from The Economist

May 10, 2011.

Introduction

The Middle East, locally dubbed “the mother of the world” for its contributions to global culture and history, today exhibits

conflict in virtually every state. In North Africa, autocrats have been deposed by youth-driven social movements in Tunisia

and Egypt, while in the Gulf countries monarchs have clung to power, making rapid changes to social programs to meet

citizen demands. Syria and Libya are experiencing widespread civil unrest. In the far reaches of the region, chaos plagues

Yemen as the state moves towards civil war, while Saudi Arabia weighs this conflict on its shared border and manages

domestic protests. In Bahrain, the government has assaulted and arrested citizens, as well as physicians who treated

protestors and government loyalists alike, all in an effort to keep the monarchy in power. These extremely diverse conflicts

in 2011 led to a significant spike in both regional violence and revolutionary fever, and taken together have been labeled

the Arab Awakening. These uprisings have also been referred to as the Arab Spring, the Arab Rebellions, and the Arab

Revolutions.

The Arab Awakening undoubtedly changes inter-Arab diplomacy, but also challenges long-standing actors such as the

United States to reconsider its role in the Arab world. For American interests, a difficult balancing act between supporting

liberalization and upholding traditional alliances means that any political or military action must be carefully recalculated.

Developing a widespread policy is almost impossible due to the diversity of countries in the region and rapidly changing

political and social situations. The U.S. will have to carefully consider its next moves in the Middle East. In the process, it

will have to reassess relationships that previously were crafted to maintain regional stability. It is very difficult today to

determine what states will look like in the near future, and even more challenging to anticipate where they will be in the

coming decades. This background paper will discuss American interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA),

diagnose the underlying causes of the Arab Awakening revolts, depict the events as they occurred, and assess American

policy moving forward. Sidebars will address a range of issues related to the Arab Awakening and related events.

A note to readers: This paper focuses on developments which are rapidly unfolding. The authors encourage readers to

utilize the resources in the back of this text and the Institute blog at www.WAIpittsburgh.wordpress.com for the most up-

to-date information about the region.

© 2011 WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF PITTSBURGH 1

Freedom of the

press is often tied to

other forms of

freedom and

democracy in a

country. Every year

the watchdog group

Freedom House

produces a report of

195 countries, and

ranks them on a

scale of zero to 100,

with zero as the

most free and 100 as

the least.

Arab countries find

themselves weighed

down by long-serving

regimes and high rates

of unemployment.

With the ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Egyptians were emboldened and

were able to force Hosni Mubarak from office. With many of these leaders

serving decades at a time, with growing young populations and tough

economic conditions, the entire region is experiencing political upheaval.

A Survey of American Interests in the Middle East Since 1945

Since 1945, American foreign policy in the Middle East has focused on three key areas: acquiring oil from the Persian Gulf states; securing the state of Israel; and limiting anti-Western forces and sentiments throughout the region, including post-September 11, 2001 pursuits to combat terrorism. The actors targeted by these policies have changed over time – from combating Soviet influences in the region to the present struggle against Al-Qaeda and Islamic militantism – yet, these three central issues continue to frame American strategy in the region. At the end of World War I, Western influences permeated the Middle East as the concept of the “nation-state” was abandoned in favor of French and British spheres of imperial influence, later known as the mandate period. This precedent shaped U.S. policy, particularly in the post-World War II period, as the United States joined European nations in injecting national interests into regional dialogues determining state independence and sovereignty. American foreign policy interests in the Middle East have been directly related to the region’s significant concentration of oil reserves, which account for between two-thirds and three-fourths of the world’s shares. The beginning of America’s so-called “oil addiction” dates to this period, during which the Allied powers focused on obtaining access to the region’s petroleum. At the close of World War II in 1945, President Franklin Roosevelt personally met with Saudi Arabian King Abdul Aziz to

discuss oil sales to the U.S., creating a standing place in American foreign policy for oil producing states. Henceforth, a special economic and political association came to exist between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, as well as with members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC.) While actively developing relationships in the Arab world, the U.S. also supported the 1948 creation of the state of Israel, thereby fundamentally positioning itself between Arab and Israeli interests. The Zionist founders of Israel sought a secure, self-determining, and sacred homeland based on religious writings in the Torah, the Jewish holy book, as well as based upon their collective experience as victims of genocide during the Holocaust. In the Arab world, resentment over American support for a Jewish nation-state abounded, particularly because the idea of an Islamic nation-state has been demonized in the West, and due to the great number of Palestinians who fled from Israel to the Arab states in 1948 and in the years after. The 1950s and 1960s marked a change colonial status, as European direct rule dwindled, to independent Arab states. During the Cold War period, the Soviet sphere of influence – particularly the relationship between the Soviet Union and Iran – prompted American concerns about competition for Middle East oil supplies. As the U.S.-Soviet rivalry played out in the developing world, American foreign policy interests focused dually on Soviet containment and balancing European regional interests. As Arab leaders realized that they could benefit from politically manipulating Western and Soviet actors against one another, inter-Arab tensions heated up as states received weapons from both parties. Soviet-supplied pan-

Arabist leader former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser established a bolder stance against Israel. This position agitated European, American, and Israeli interests, and eventually led to the 1956 Suez Crisis. One may think that the Suez Crisis, in addition to numerous wars fought between the Arabs and Israelis, would disrupt oil sales to the U.S. However, the largest disruption to the U.S. oil supply came later, serving as a political statement by members of the OAPEC. In 1973, as a reaction to American support for Israel’s position in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem, OAPEC oil producers cut production by five percent, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait later making more significant cuts. Soon after, nearly all members of the larger Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), including countries in Latin America, refused to sell oil to the U.S. until it ceased its support of Israel. However, the mutually beneficial nature of the OAPEC-American relationship was exemplified when American support for Israel continued, and as of January 1974, the OAPEC countries had returned to their original production amounts, later increasing production an additional 10% as relations normalized. 1979 was a significant milestone for American involvement in the region due to a series of political

2 © 2011 WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF PITTSBURGH

King Saudi Arabian King Abdul Aziz (left) and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt meet in 1945. Photo courtesy of the National Archives.

developments which took place that year. These developments set the stage for deeper U.S. military and strategic involvement in the region during the 1980s. First, American President Jimmy Carter facilitated the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty by then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Elsewhere in the region, Ayatollah Khomeini rose to power in Iran after a revolt ousted U.S. al ly Mohammed Reza Shah, and in Iraq, Saddam Hussein became president. Later in 1979, in post-revolution Iran, university students took 53 Americans hostage for 444 days, heightening tensions between the U.S. and the new Islamic republic. In Saudi Arabia, Islamic militants took over the Grand Mosque in the holy city of Mecca, foreshadowing tensions between such groups and the Saudi monarchy in the years to come.

Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan incited American covert operations to support Afghan militants with weapons and aid to be used against the rival superpower. These militants would later establish the Taliban government, which allowed the radical Islamic network al-Qaeda to base operations within the state. This tumultuous year greatly diversified American interests in the region, yet U.S. foreign policy priorities continued to include operations that secured oil, supported Israel, and curbed anti-American sentiments and actions. The myriad of challenges that stymied Washington’s ability to act effectively and successfully in the Middle East during the 1980s became even more complex in the 1990s and following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In 1990, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, along with the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, were drawn closer together following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In an effort to defend Kuwaiti oil fields, the U.S. stationed troops in Saudi Arabia, and fought the Persian Gulf War from this position. After nearly six months, Iraqi forces fled Kuwait and the war ended in February 1991 without deposing Saddam Hussein from power. The American military’s continued presence in Saudi Arabia particularly inflamed Saudi-born al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. In the late 1990s, al-Qaeda operatives staged attacks on American outlets abroad, including the bombing of the USS Cole and American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The group also launched a first attack on the World Trade Center in New York City. On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda enacted a series of simultaneous

airplane hijackings, resulting in airline crashes into the World Trade towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, as well as in a rural Pennsylvania field. This large-scale attack pushed American policy to focus heavily on combating terrorism within the Middle East, and in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. was challenged to respond to a fundamentally-changed geo-political environment. The Middle East remains a vexing challenge. Yet, this region is central to U.S. interests and to worldwide security and stability. The U.S. is simultaneously embroiled in conflict in the region and trying to serve as an “honest broker” in promoting peace. As noted by Robert Malley and Peter Harling in the September/October 2010 edition of Foreign Affairs, “the U.S. is currently juggling many competing and at times incompatible interests.” Currently, U.S. foreign policy seeks to curb Iran’s clout in the region while simultaneously creating stability in Iraq. The U.S. continues to align itself closely with Israel, focusing on state security, with Arab states forging partnerships to ensure a steady supply of oil, and finally with pro-American allies throughout the region who discourage extremism. Yet, just as the U.S. is trying to exert pressure in the region, it is perceived to be far less dominant than in the past.


Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (left), U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin make a three-way handshake at the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. (1979)

Photo from The Carter Center

Underlying Causes of Revolt

The recent revolts in the Arab world dominate the American foreign policy agenda, and understanding the causes of the uprisings makes it easier to foresee their long-term effects on the region and on American interests. Due to the complexity of the region and each of its individual conflicts, establishing the commonalities among the Arab countries proves vital to determining how these events fit together. Though on a state-by-state basis the uprisings look very different, there are a number of common challenges which are found in the region’s protests. First, and perhaps foremost, bulges in the youth population contribute to large numbers of educated, but often unemployed, young adults in the MENA region. The area has the highest concentration of young people in the world. As of 2005, nearly 95 million youths (15-24 years of age) lived in the Middle East. In Egypt alone, 60% of the population is under 30 years of age, while in Saudi Arabia, 38% of the country’s 25.7 million people are 14 years old or younger. According to the United Nations Development Programme’s Egypt Human Development Report 2010, “…the failure to control population growth has resulted in a serious loss in productivity and an accompanying decline in real wages and stagnation in the standard of living of those employed in the public and private sectors.” This statement certainly resonates throughout the region, where population growth has been significant and wages remain meager. As of 2008, total enrollment in primary schooling across the region reached nearly 100% among males, and 91% among females. 97% of this group completes primary school, and 95% of that group seeks some type of secondary schooling. However, much of this education is sub-standard, taught by ill-equipped teachers, focused on skills that are largely irrelevant in the job market, and mostly inaccessible for poor and rural segments of the population, particularly women and girls. Even with university degrees, students in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Bahrain are less likely to be employed than those with only primary and secondary education. Youth unemployment rates currently reach nearly 20% in many MENA states. While this largely frustrated population contributes to the organization of many of the Awakening’s most popular opposition movements, they remain susceptible to co-optation by extremist groups during

their search for employment. Unemployment creates personal problems as well: without an income, marriage proves impossible, stunting the social and familial prospects of young men and women. Marriage constitutes the opportunity for adult independence, and those who remain unwed live with their families in a period of “waithood,” or a lull before full transition into adult life. In addition to a large youth population, the disengagement of military and social elites from state leadership ripened conditions for revolt. Dictators, who typically have limited ideology and a thirst for wealth and power (such as Libyan Muammar el-Qaddafi, Syrian Bashar al-Assad, Tunisian Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptian Hosni Mubarak, and Yemeni Ali Abdullah Saleh) established a tradition of providing social elites with contracts, special positions, and monetary gifts to maintain favor and domestic legitimacy. This obvious corruption and abuse exploited foreign aid and economic growth, and caused unemployment and a shrinking of the middle class. Some scholars suggested that to maintain these perks, state militaries would shoot on their own citizens, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia. However, when elites no longer benefited from their relationship with state leadership, or the state’s actions became too radical and illegitimate, they ceased supporting them. Similarly, when military elites felt that a rogue political leader jeopardized their position or endangered national security, they were likely to distance themselves from the government to maintain power, as was the case with both the Tunisian and Egyptian military establishments. Another definitive condition for the Arab Awakening was the creation of citizen coalitions, which have appeared in all countries involved in the revolts. Though military and social elites may disengage from the state to spur revolt,


citizens from a variety of socio-economic, religious, and ethnic stripes engage with one another to express their discontent. Considering the great deal of sectarian strife present in MENA countries, forming diverse coalitions becomes all the more vital to o v e r h au l i n g t h e s t a t e apparatus. For example, Egyptian Christians were outraged by a 2011 New Year’s Day church bombing in Alexandria carried out by Islamic extremists, yet weeks later joined with members of the Mus l im Bro therhood to participate in the protests against Mubarak due to their common struggles against the state. Likewise, the momentum of youth coalitions conceived prior to the Arab revolts has played an active role in mobilizing networks to combat the state. The Egyptian Coalition of January 25 Youth, a combination of workers movements, human rights activists, and youth protestors, organized the demonstrations that ultimately ousted Mubarak from power. Their leadership allowed other groups to join in protest, and brought Egyptians from all backgrounds into the streets. Similar groups appeared throughout nearly all Arab states, many employing non-violence tactics adopted from foreign resistance groups, such as the Serbian group Otpor! As evidenced throughout the region, the willingness of citizens to leverage their collective capacity against the state marks a crucial condition for successful revolt. Furthermore, international support for revolts pressured autocratic state leadership to limit its armed forces from attacking citizens. The international community refused to support dictators militarily or diplomatically to encourage change. Throughout the protests, the U.S. and Western allies called for reform, and ultimately denounced many Arab leaders. Libya served as an example in which the international community had clearly denounced Qadaffi’s actions. Near the beginning of the crisis, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Libya due to concerns about war crimes against citizens, while the Arab League instituted a no-fly zone over the country. Later the United Nations pushed harder, authorizing North Atlantic Treaty Oragnization-led American and European air strikes to enforce the no-fly zone. Leaders from the African Union visited Qadaffi to talk about a peaceful transition, yet his refusal to step down and on-going violence against his own citizens finally prompted the International Criminal Court to issue a warrant for his arrest on charges of war crimes. The international community progressively pressured Qadaffi to resign,

and applied similar diplomatic force to leaders throughout the region. By extension, international media attention amplified protestors’ issues. In the Arab Awakening, Doha-based television networks al-Jazeera and al-Jazeera English provided live coverage of demonstrations and government reactions, particularly in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Tunisia. This service conveyed valuable information to protestors, allowing them to learn from each other’s experiences and to project their messages in the global arena. However, Arab critics of the news service suggest that the agency, due to its affiliation with the Qatari emir, have pushed a liberal agenda reflective of life inside Qatar, serving to condemn conservative Arab rulers. Throughout the Arab Awakening, al-Jazeera reporters have been beaten and jailed, and stations have been suspended or closed in many states. Commentators note that while the revolts did not occur because of al-Jazeera, they certainly would not have progressed so quickly without the network’s influence in the region. Finally, food shortages fueled resentment towards the state, representing the worst of citizen dissatisfaction, government corruption, and social inequality in years prior to the Arab Awakening. Regional food prices rose 32% in 2010, creating a dire situation for hungry MENA families. In Yemen, nearly nine million citizens have been struggling to meet basic food needs, meaning that one in three people are food insecure, and 50% of children suffer stunted growth from malnutrition. During the crisis in Libya, ongoing attacks in the city of Misrata have deprived citizens of basic food and water. Food scarcity has come to symbolize the stark contrast between those living in poverty and wealth, fueling revolutionary tensions among the poor and famished.


Revolts in the Arab Region

From a distance, the Arab revolts seem to have developed suddenly and without warning. In reality, the mounting pressures of daily life created the conditions for revolt. When coupled with a variety of key revolutionary acts, riots began throughout the region, dramatically altering the political landscape. This section will provide a timeline featuring case studies on how events in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia unfolded. In addition, key articles from The New York Times will highlight the conflict in Syria and Libya. This list of countries is not comprehensive, however, these states have shaped the narrative of the revolts, and their stories touch upon key areas of U.S. interest in the region. Additional information on developments throughout the region are explored further on the companion w e b s i t e a v a i l a b l e a t www.WAIpittsburgh.wordpress.com.

Tunisia

Before serving as the catalyst country that empowered a region to stand in revolt against its corrupt leaders, Tunisia had long endured the rule of President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali. His presidency began on November 7, 1987, in affiliation with the Constitutional Democratic Rally Party. The current Tunisian constitution does not stipulate term limits, and the sitting president appoints his prime minister, thus controlling most of the political process. Throughout the reign of Ben Ali, Tunisians faced many of the same struggles that challenged fellow Arab citizens across the region. The median population is 30 years of age, illustrating an obvious youth bulge in the population. Citizens were widely educated but very few were gainfully employed. Unlike many places in the Arab world, Tunisia had a middle class and a functioning private business sector. However, the draining effects of nepotism and corruption, particularly on the part of First Lady Leila Trabelsi and her extensive network of relatives in every sector of the economy and business, created hostility among citizens struggling to find work. For one Tunisian citizen, 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi, the pressure of governmental abuse was too much. Bouazizi, an educated fruit seller, worked as the sole supporter of his family in the town of Sidi Bouzid. Rampant police exploitation of citizens meant that officers routinely issued fines and confiscated proprietors’ wares on bogus charges. For example, Bouazizi had been fined nearly two months’ wages in the months before the incident that led to his death. On December 17, 2010, after a police woman and her male colleagues publicly humiliated him, physically assaulted him, and

ultimately took his wares, he lit himself on fire in front of the municipal offices that denied his request to take legal action against the officers. He was severely burned. Bouazizi’s act spurred Tunisians throughout the country to protest government corruption and to voice citizen dissatisfaction. Bouazizi’s death on January 4, 2011, further inflamed protestors against Ben Ali and the Tunisian government. As demonstrations became more violent, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia with his wife and family on January 14, 2011. He was tried in absentia and found guilty of embezzlement and misuse of public funds. Interim President Fouad M’Bazaa has led the state since January 17, 2011. Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi has scheduled elections for October 23, 2011, during which citizens will vote on a new body to re-write the constitution, and later, will oversee legislative and presidential elections.


Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia maps courtesy of geology.com

Egypt

After the Tunisian people drove Ben Ali from power, Egyptian revolutionaries were inspired to embark on revolts within their own state. However, pressure on the Egyptian government and President Hosni Mubarak had been building for some time. In the year before the revolts, three main events turned public opinion against the government: First, former International Atomic Energy Agency director general and Egyptian opposition leader Mohamed El Baradei returned to Egypt ahead of scheduled upcoming elections, spurring calls for reforms. Second, Alexandria resident Khaled Said was beaten to death by state police outside of an Internet café, causing public outrage. Third, a New Year’s Day church bombing killed 21 in Alexandria, prompting sectarian clashes and complaints from Coptic Christians that the government did not provide them with proper security. Citizen complaints akin to those waged against Ben Ali routinely surfaced during Mubarak’s 30-year reign. Egypt is another victim of the youth bulge; the median population age had declined to nearly 24 years of age. Recent years have been accompanied by small scale economic growth, yet 20% of Egyptians still live in poverty, while many others barely reach subsistence levels. Unemployment figures are grim, averaging 9.5%. Corruption, particularly the use of a wasta (“connection” in Arabic) infiltrates every aspect of

society and government. Social elites with ties to the Mubarak regime, particularly through business and political dealings, make up the small affluent upper class, while most Egyptians struggle for access to basic necessities. After the fall of Tunisia’s Ben Ali in early January 2011, Mubarak found himself at the nexus of long-standing domestic discontent, regional revolutionary fever, and internal, tech-savvy dissenters with access to youth networks, particularly through the social networking website Facebook. Pre-existing groups such as the April 6 Youth Movement used Facebook, text messages, and the video sharing website YouTube to organize a large scale protest in Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011. Calling themselves the Egyptian Coalition of January 25 Youth, a variety of revolutionary organizations joined together to call for Mubarak’s resignation. The protests grew, and on January 28, 2011, the powerful and well-organized Islamic opposition group the Muslim Brotherhood committed their efforts as well. Violent clashes erupted between state police and anti-Mubarak organizers into early-February 2011. The Egyptian military eventually joined the struggle on behalf of the protestors, and on February 11, 2011, Mubarak stepped down, handed power to national army commanders, and retreated to his

Sharm el-Sheikh villa on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast. The military quickly suspended the constitution and abolished both houses of parliament. Parliamentary elections were scheduled for September 2011, but have yet to be held. Presidential elections will follow. Mubarak, along with his two sons, went to trial on August 3, 2011, facing charges of corruption and intentionally killing unarmed protestors. There has not yet been a decision.

Yemen

Revolts in North Africa have not been lost on those living in the farthest reaches of the Middle East, such as Yemen. However, Yemen’s situation features a host of issues not present in Tunisia or Egypt, such as


complicated tribal conflicts and the influence of terrorist organizations. Due to its colonial history, Yemen was previously divided into two northern and southern states until the creation of the Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990. President Ali Abdullah Saleh had led Northern Yemen since 1978 and the Republic of Yemen since 1990. After the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, violence began in the Yemeni capital of Sana’a as a reaction to high unemployment, corruption, and a worsening economy. Protests began in January in the city of Taiz by young left-wing dissidents, who utilized sit-ins to protest the government. Saleh had been considered a U.S. ally because of his access to intelligence about al-Qaeda forces within the country, such as American born al-Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. For his information Saleh had received large amounts of U.S. aid. However, because he used al-Qaeda as a bargaining chip within Yemen, for example, often freeing jailed members, he became a risk to American and Saudi interests. Today, jihadists are said to be widely present in areas of south Yemen near Aden in the governorate of Abyan, and the government can do little to stop them. Saudi Arabia remains concerned about al-Qaeda’s growing influence and numbers in Yemen. Additionally, tribal lines are more defined than ever as citizens attempt to maintain order and security in the midst of chaos. Though the republic remains unified within Yemen, politics prove to be anything but cohesive. In addition to Saleh’s General People Congress Party, a number of opposition groups exist within Yemen. The Houthis (a group of Zayadi Shia Muslims from Saada in northern Yemen who are possibly backed by Iran), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Islah (the Islamic opposition group), the Joint Meeting Party (the largest opposition party in the opposition coalition), and the Southern Movement (a southern secessionist group), all oppose Saleh’s leadership. These groups have made it difficult for Saleh to maintain power, and a firefight between the al-Ahmar tribe and Saleh’s forces nearly led his death. On June 3, 2010, a bomb exploded in Saleh’s palace mosque, seriously burning and wounding the president. The following day, Saleh sought treatment in Saudi Arabia, where he has remained, though he has maintained power from afar with plans to return to Yemen. Now more than ever, the variety of opposition groups, general lawlessness outside of the capital Sana’a, extreme violence by the government against the people, and the outside influences of Saudi Arabia and Iran on tribal groups make the revolts more likely to disintegrate into a civil war.

Saudi Arabia

In 1932, the Arabian Peninsula was unified as the House of Saud under King Abdul al-Aziz. Today his son, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, rules the

mostly Sunni population and serves as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Life in Saudi Arabia is plagued by similar issues as its Arab counterparts. The population median age is 25. A 2010 unemployment estimate suggests unemployment to be at nearly 11%. King Abdullah has tried to create reforms within the kingdom, favoring democracy and improving the lives of citizens while balancing the wishes of Wahhabist Islamic fundamentalist desires to keep Western influences out of the Hejaz, or holy area surrounding Mecca and Medina.

Recent investments in higher education have benefited many young Saudis, in addition to aid packages such as the Ninth Five-Year Development Plan, which allocated $385 billion to projects including human resources, health and social services, economic resources, transportation, communication, and housing through 2014. The kingdom committed an additional nearly $36 billion towards citizen services at the start of the Arab Awakening. These funds consisted of housing loans, pay increases for employees, aid to the poor, and charitable donations, as well as the approval of new housing complexes, unemployment assistance, and bonuses for government employees. The kingdom and the U.S. enjoy a close allegiance. The basis of the relationship revolves around the sale of oil, a mutual interest in eliminating al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism from the Gulf, and curbing the Iranian political and nuclear ambitions. However, the monarchy does not emulate many American sentiments regarding democracy. For example, in late July 2011, the government proposed a law called Penal Law for Terrorism Crimes and Financing Terrorism, which declares that authorities could detain people "potentially indefinitely" without charge or trial, and could also imprison citizens for a minimum of 10 years for questioning the integrity of the King. While this law is proposed to combat terror in the country, it could also be manipulated against Saudi citizens seeking reform.


Conflict Rages in Libya as Gaddafi Attempts to Maintain

Power from Afar

Libya, an oil-rich nation in North Africa, spent more than 40 years under the erratic leadership of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi before a revolt pushed him from power in August 2011 after a six-month struggle.

In February 2011, the unrest sweeping t h r ough much o f the A r ab world erupted in several Libyan cities. Though it began with a relatively organized core of anti-government opponents in Benghazi, its spread to the capital of Tripoli was swift and spontaneous. Colonel Qaddafi lashed out with extreme violence. Soon, though, an inchoate opposition managed to cobble together the semb lance o f a t r an s i t i ona l government, field a makeshift rebel army and portray itself to the West and Libyans as an alternative to Colonel Qaddafi’s corrupt and repressive rule.

Momentum shifted quickly, however, and the rebels faced the possibility of being outgunned and outnumbered in what increasingly looked like a mismatched civil war. Then as Colonel Qaddafi’s troops advanced to within 100 miles of Benghazi, the rebel stronghold in the west, the United

Nations Security Council voted to authorize military action, a risky foreign intervention aimed at averting a bloody rout of the rebels by loyalist forces. On March 19, American and European forces began a broad campaign of strikes against Colonel Qaddafi and his government, unleashing warplanes and missiles in a military intervention on a scale not seen in the Arab world since the Iraq war.

Prior to the bombing campaign, the Obama administration intensely debated whether to open the mission with a new kind of warfare: a cyberoffensive to disrupt and even disable the Qaddafi government’s air-defense system, which threatened allied warplanes. But administration officials and some military officers balked, fearing that it might set a precedent for other nations, in particular Russia or China, to carry out such offensives of their own. They were also unable to resolve whether the president had the power to proceed with such an attack without informing Congress. In the end, American officials rejected cyberwarfare and used conventional aircraft, cruise missiles and drones.

By late May, the weeks of NATO bombing seemed to put the momentum back on the side of the rebels, who broke a bloody siege of the western city

of Misurata. By August, they were making territorial gains in the country’s east and west. Colonel Qaddafi rejected calls to leave power in spite of defections by subordinates, increased economic and political isolation and NATO air assaults. The rebels themselves suffered from internal dissension and lack of training.

Six months of inconclusive fighting gave way within a matter of days to an assault on Tripoli that unfolded at a breakneck pace. By the night of Aug. 21, rebels surged into the city, meeting only sporadic resistance and setting off r a u cou s s t r e e t c e l eb r a t i on s . Expectations grew that Colonel Qaddafi’s hold on power was crumbling as rebels overran his heavily fortified compound on Aug. 23 and finally established control after days of bloody urban street fighting. The rebels struggled in the days that followed to restore order and services to Tripoli, while Colonel Qaddafi’s whereabouts remained unknown.

The absence of the now fugitive Colonel Qaddafi and the growing influence of Islamists in Libya raises hard questions about the ultimate character of the government and society that will rise in place of Qaddafi’s autocracy. The Transitional National Council, which has promised to assemble a new cabinet, has thus far been unable to overcome regional disputes over the composition of the group or to persuade the militias that seized Tripoli to give up their arms.

(The New York Times, Libya - Revolution (2011), Accessed September 19, 2011. http://t o p i c s . n y t i m e s . c o m / t o p / n e w s /international/countriesandterritories/libya/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=libya&st=cse) From The New York Times, October 18, 2011 © The New York Times. All rights reserved. Used under license.


Updated Tuesday, October 18, 2011

As seen on nytimes.com

Photo reprinted from Istock.com


The Son of the “Lion of Damascus” Proves Difficult to Tame: Assad Responds

Forcefully to Citizen Uprisings in Syria

The wave of Arab unrest that started with the Tunisian revolution of January 2011 reached Syria in mid-March, when residents of a small southern city took to the streets to protest the torture of students who had put up anti-government graffiti.

President Bashar al-Assad, who inherited Syria’s harsh dictatorship from his father, Hafez al-Assad, at first wavered between force and hints of reform. But in April, just days after lifting the country’s decades-old state of emergency, he launched the first of what became a series of withering crackdowns, sending tanks into restive cities as security forces opened fire on demonstrators.

Neither the violence nor Mr. Assad’s offers of political reform — rejected as shams by protest leaders — brought an end to the unrest. Similarly, the protesters have not been able to withstand direct assault by the military’s armored forces.

The conflict is complicated by Syria’s ethnic divisions. The Assads and much of the nation’s elite, especially the military, belong to the Alawite sect, a small minority in a mostly Sunni country.

Sy r i a ’ s c ra ckdown has been condemned internationally, as has President Assad, a British-trained doctor who many had hoped would soften his father’s iron-handed regime. But no direct intervention has been proposed, and support for protesters has been balanced against fears of instability in a country at the heart of so many conflicts in the world’s most volatile region.

By October, estimates for the death toll ranged above 2,900, and human rights groups said that well over 10,000 people had been arrested.

In July, the Obama administration, in a shift that was weeks in the making, turned against Mr. Assad but stopped short of demanding that he step down. By early August, the American ambassador was talking of a “post-Assad” Syria.

As the assaults on restive cities continued, cracks emerged in a tight-knit leadership that has until now rallied its base of support and maintained a unified front. But by the fall, Syria’s economy was crumbling under the pressure of sanctions and the unrest, with its currency weakening, its recession expanding and its tourism industry wrecked — a serious blow to a regime whose legitimacy has relied on economic success.

In early October, in what seemed to be the most serious attempt to bring together a fragmented opposition, Syrian dissidents formally established the Syrian National Council. The group’s stated goal was to overthrow President Assad’s government. Members said the council included representatives from the Damascus Declaration group, a pro-democracy network ; the Syr ian Musl im Brotherhood, a banned Islamic political party; various Kurdish factions; the Local Coordination Committees, a group that helps organize and document protests; and other independent and tribal figures.

The same month, a semblance of civil war erupted in Homs, Syria’s third-largest city, where armed protesters w e r e c a l l i n g t h e m s e l v e s revolutionaries. Since the start of the uprising, Homs has been one of Syria’s most contested cities. In the targeted killings, the rival security checkpoints and the hardening of sectarian sentiments, Homs seemed to offer a dark vision that could foretell the future of Syria’s uprising as both the government and the opposition readied themselves for a protracted struggle over the endurance of the four-decade dictatorship.

Increasingly convinced that President al-Assad will not be able to remain in power, the Obama administration began to make plans for American policy in the region after he is gone. In coordination with Turkey, the United States has been exploring how to deal with the possibility of a civil war among Syria’s Alawite, Druse, Christian and Sunni sects, a conflict that could quickly ignite other tensions in an already volatile region. (The New York Times, Syria - Protests (2011), Accessed September 19, 2011. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/syria/i n d e x . h t m l ? s c p = 1 & s q = S y r i a %20Revolution&st=cse ) From The New York Times, October 18, 2011 © The New York Times. All rights reserved. Used under license.


Updated Wednesday, October 12, 2011

As seen on nytimes.com


1. Qatar 2. Bahrain 3. U.A.E. 4. Kuwait 5. Egypt


Tweets from the Arab Street How did the Arab world utilize

social media and the Internet to organize protests?

The Arab Awakening caused a collective shudder within the leadership of many nations, particularly those where the conditions were

also primed for revolt. Out of fear of seeing protests rise within their own countries, many governments sought to strengthen security

and tighten censorship in an effort to preserve power and order. Specifically, governments attempted to control social networks such

as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube as a means of stopping protestors from organizing meetings and demonstrations.

Throughout North Africa, social media played an enormous role in mobilizing protests. In Tunisia, the self-immolation of Mohammed

Bouazizi was eventually put onto YouTube by a family member seeking to promote revolt against President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

Likewise, the Egyptian April 6th Youth Movement broadcast its messages on YouTube and utilized its Facebook page to draw protes-

tors into the streets. The Egyptian government responded by making cellular telephone providers turn off service to stifle Tweets

(messages on Twitter) and text messages. The Internet was also restricted to diminish protestors, something that largely had an in-

verse effect as tempers flared over the state’s actions.

In Syria and Bahrain, two states still deeply embroiled in conflict, protesters have tried desperately to use social media to expose gov-

ernmental oppression. Videos of state police brutality have leaked from Syria onto the Internet, giving the world a citizen perspective

on the revolts, particularly since the foreign press is barred from reporting from Syria. In Bahrain, citizens actively used social media

to criticize the monarchy, and were successful because of the large number of educated, tech-savvy citizens. However, many are

now self-censoring in light of the government’s violent crack-

downs on protestors in the capital Manama’s Pear Roundabout

and in nearby hospitals where doctors insisted on treating protes-

tors and monarchy-loyalists alike.

Throughout Africa, many governments routinely practice Internet

censorship to disenfranchise citizens. In Ethiopia, one of the con-

tinent’s worst offending states, “the Ethiopian government blocks

a range of political opposition websites, as well as independent

news sites reporting on the country and the sites of a few human

rights organizations. Ethiopia's Internet infrastructure is state-

owned, leaving control of it entirely at the hands of the govern-

ment,” according to al-Jazeera.

In China, Internet censorship is not a new phenomenon, but after

the events of the Arab Awakening protests, the government has

cracked down more heavily. With the world’s largest number of

Internet users, censorship has become a serious issue within

Chinese society that has cut the population off from the rest of

the world. In early January 2011, the government made plans to

block Internet calling, and reinforced blocks on sites such as

Facebook and Twitter. In other parts of Asia, North Korea has

tightened its grip on citizens, ensuring that they are only able to

access the state Internet platform and that only authorized offi-

cials can utilize the real World Wide Web.

Facebook Fact Over 50 percent of surveyed Egyptians and Tunisians said that government blocking of Internet and Facebook made citizens more determined to revolt.

Facebook Fact During 2011, there was a 30 percent overall increase in Arab Facebook users, with 2 million Egyptian users joining the website between January 2011 and April 2011.

Most Popular Trending Hashtags on Twitter in the Arab World

#egypt 1.4 million

#jan25 1.2 million

#libya 990,000

#bahrain 640,000

#protest 620,000

Top 5 Tweeting Arab States

1. Qatar 2. Bahrain 3. U.A.E. 4. Kuwait 5. Egypt

Women and the Arab Awakening Female opposition protestors mobilized the Arab world…

but will their concerns heard at the highest levels?

In Egypt, women of all religions have been participating in contemporary protests since 1919, the year of the country’s independence for Britain. Prior to that, women and men joined in voicing their discontent for French and British oversight. Today, women continue to be highly influential protests. A spokeswoman for the April 6th Youth Movement, Asmaa’ Mahfouz, became one of the revolt’s most memorable faces as she passionately called for the initial protests via a YouTube video posted on the Internet. However, even though women are visible in daily life in Egypt, they are rarely elevated to high governmental offices or other positions of power. During the Mubarak regime, there was a quota for women’s representation in government. Moving forward, women’s groups have called for continued and increased representation. Their insistence for full participation may pave the way towards fully claiming their legal rights in the future.

Saudi Arabia is notorious for its poor record on women’s rights. Two of the most prominent slights include barring women from driving and voting. One example in the call for rights concerns the Women2Drive campaign, a movement which hopes to earn Saudi women the right to drive cars. The movement began when Manal Al Sharif, a 32-year-old Saudi woman, was detained for two weeks after driving and posting a video of herself defying the driving ban on the Internet. In the video, Al Sharif says women need to learn how to drive in order to protect themselves and their families. In Saudi Arabia, women are not banned from driving, but are unable to obtain a driver’s license. Recently, female drivers were sentenced to 10 lashings, but the sentence was revoked and the ban still goes unchanged. Recently however, shortly after the sentencing of the female driver, women were granted the right to vote in local elections. This step gives Saudi women more agency, and with some progressive members of the royal family supporting their bid to drive, it seems that Saudi women are making progressive steps towards equality.

Perhaps one of the most overt changes after the Arab Awakening are the number of women candidates who are running for office in local and national elections. In Egypt, Bothaina Kamel has begun to campaign as a contender for the presidency. In Tunisia, a legal ruling has mandated that an equal number of male and female candidates must be offered for elected offices. Perhaps pressured by regional challenges, Algeria has recently raised its quota for the number of female candidates in office. A number of women are running in the Federal National Council in the United Arab Emirates, though they have to campaign carefully to avoid harassment. In other parts of the region such, as Saudi Arabia, women are still barred for running for office until 2015 when new election laws take effect. Many experts suggest that the biggest challenge for women winning elections will be breaking the stereotype that they belong in their homes as wives and mothers. Trailblazing women such as 2011 Nobel Peace Prize Winner Tawakkol Karman of Yemen are helping to break such barriers.


Activist Asmaa’ Mahfouz. Photo from BikyaMasr Newspaper

Activist Manal Al Sharif. Photo from BikyaMasr Newspaper

Activist and Nobel Laureate Tawakkol Karman. Photo by Jonathan Saruk, The New Yorker

American Foreign Policy Consequences The United States will have to refine its foreign policy agenda in light of the Arab Awakening. Projecting the outcome in any specific state proves difficult, and thus this paper proposes addressing overarching issues for American consideration to be more useful. The success of democratic revolts throughout the Middle East lies within the interests of the U.S., yet it remains entirely possible that even with large amounts of Western support, the uprisings may still fail. Moving forward, there are a few things that the U.S. can begin considering immediately to help ensure the success of the Arab uprisings. These include: administering Western assistance to states throughout the Middle East and North Africa to tackle a number of post-revolt issues; using “smart power” foreign policy initiatives to manage changing American interests in the region; and emulating regional power players to identify possible partners moving forward in policy creation and implementation. By addressing this host of issues, mostly using Egypt, (the most populous Arab state, as a case study), the U.S. can begin hypothesizing about the region’s uncertain future. First, applying Western assistance to the Middle East proves essential in helping the region to recover; however, aid must be utilized in multiple ways. Financial assistance (such as the $150 million pledged by Secretary Clinton to stabilize Egypt) is of the utmost importance. Another way to begin tackling this task immediately includes “bringing the international donor community together [and] provid[ing] the blueprints for future donor commitments and priorities,” according to the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network. Additionally, constructing aid packages that are specific to the desires of the indigenous population and their governments serves the goal of foreign assistance, which should create “a strengthened compact between citizens and their governments,” said the same organization’s report. In each of these ways, Western financial contributions play a significant role in providing financial support to countries in the revolt and post-revolt period. Next, aid should assist in forming modern and democratic police and security forces. To ensure this, resources should be adequately divided between military interests and citizen institutions. According to the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, “U.S. assistance to militaries in transition should incentivize the separation of military and political decision making, while the technical expertise provided to nascent political parities should aim to institutionalize civilian control of the military.” Supporting the establishment of civil institutions, as well as ensuring that the political mechanisms of the country are dissimilar from the military apparatus, creates

a safeguard for public opinion, without which stability is unlikely. Furthermore, aid can help to reinvigorate floundering economies, such as that of Egypt. One way to encourage a financial jumpstart would be to create a climate that is positive for business as a way to interact with the private sector. Local entrepreneurs are vital to creating jobs and can serve as community leaders. The best economic policies will also seek an end to poverty, and provide rural populations with access to credit opportunities. Additionally, making aid organizations transparent in their reporting of funds spent ensures that contributors see

exactly where their donations go, and thus, are more likely to continue their support. Using aid to fund public safety initiatives and combat insecurity exemplifies a worthwhile avenue for assistance. Supporting institutions focused on judicial, financial, and health initiatives spur stability, human security, and economic success. Making long-term funding commitments to states that govern justly creates monetary incentives for countries to be safe and secure. In sum, applying Western aid provides a life-raft for states still entrenched in or emerging from the revolt period. Allocating resources carefully, and in ways reflecting the wishes of the indigenous population, will be of paramount importance to any efforts to stabilize the Middle East. Aid aside, American policy makers must consider how smart power — a strategic balance of hard and soft power — can be applied in the reordering of the Middle East. Geoffrey Aronson of the Foundation for Middle East Peace has outlined a number of observations about the changes in the region. He argues that the framework of smart power provides perspective on possible American foreign policy avenues moving forward. First, people in the region have clearly recognized that forced democracy does not serve as a good model, but rather as a cautionary tale about what outside forces should not do in the region. The U.S. has learned to balance hard and


soft power, particularly after the situation in Iraq, with an emphasis on what building democracy entails: encouraging full citizen participation, developing functioning institutions, and allotting for a great transitional period. The relationship between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the U.S. has reached an tense crossroad. Both Saudi Arabia and its neighbor Bahrain have Sunni monarchies who rule over Shia-majority populations. Saudi Arabia assisted Bahrain in forcefully putting down its Shia-led internal revolts, which Iran likely helped to back. Both the U.S. and Iran recognized that the Saudi monarchy will act to protect its royal Sunni brethren. The monarchy’s actions have increased the possibility of an Iranian-Saudi regional Cold War. This would present new challenges to the U.S. regarding the use of soft power on allies in the region. The U.S. has been called out in the international community for subjectively applying pressure for democracy and human rights in the region, and Saudi Arabia’s actions have exemplified this. The U.S. will carefully calculate how far they can allow an ally to go in protecting its sovereignty before compromising the American foreign policy agenda. President Barack Obama applied smart power very carefully to the Saudi situation, and avoided losing an important ally. It is also likely that the Obama administration has realized that military intervention in Iran could be costly. This also brings up an important observation regarding the notion of pan-Arabism, or the unity among Arabs due to their shared language, culture, and geography. It seems that any pre-existing sentiments of pan-Arabism have evaporated. After endorsing the presence of NATO troops in the region and suspending Libya from its ranks, it proves difficult to ascertain how the Arab League will react to other dissenting states, such as Syria. For the U.S., supporting the wishes of the Arab League is a good use of soft power, as it is the only regional body to speak for the Arab world. Similarly, participating in hard power exercises through NATO remains wise because it ensures that no unilateral action will be taken, which could further damage American’s image in the international community. Furthermore, the Arab revolts provide an opportunity for the U.S. to reflect on its policies on Palestine, and to consider if calls for democracy in the region are applicable to the Palestinian question. As a form of soft power, the U.S. could address the lack of a credible framework for negotiations, and truly hear the voices of citizens in Arab republics who are undoubtedly concerned about the Palestinian question and their Palestinian counterparts. According to the New York Times, “All across the region, popular uprisings have most insistently looked inward, at issues of democracy, social justice and dignity. But for many, dignity is a notion defined both individually and collectively. And even in the most idealistic moments of the Arab revolts, the weakness of their own governments was often a focus of protesters’ ire. In Tahrir Square in

Cairo, anger at the U.S. and Israel was less pronounced than resentment of the subservience of Egyptian leaders to their policies, namely the blockade of Gaza.” In listening to Arab voices, the U.S. might also watch the activities of regional power players, such as Turkey (a U.S. ally and a well-connected third party actor in the region). While Turkey’s position in the Middle East is in many ways dissimilar to the United States, its actions during the Arab revolts may provide some guideposts for U.S policymakers. As a member of NATO, Turkey is part of the Western bloc as well as a rising leader in the Islamic world with the election of the conservative Justice and Development Party, or the AKP. Turkey also has trade and economic interests in its Arab neighbors, similar to American strategic oil interests. It has employed soft power against neighbors such as Syria, but has been subject to criticism in the international community because of its treatment of the Kurdish population, which is in some ways similar to the disapproval that America has faced for its slow and wavering response to the Arab Awakening. To reiterate, Turkey and the U.S. both have complex and differing relationships within the region, but the U.S. should consider Turkey’s actions — and the way that they are perceived — as the protests continue to unfold. Finally, and perhaps most importantly in considering the United States’ role in the Arab revolts, Washington’s current policy in the Middle East mostly focuses on addressing its own interests in the region. For example, China has been critical of America’s policy during the Arab Spring as centering on “small” issues, such as Libya, which it considers a less mature conflict and lacking a strategic plan to measure success. Other foci, such as wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have been immensely costly to the United States. To assess how effective America’s Middle East policy is, there are a number of factors to consider. Weighing the financial costs for the current American policy may be a way to assess how strategic such efforts are. Another way could be to consider the “hearts and minds” cost of U.S. involvement. For example, how important is it for America to be well liked in the Middle East? Further yet, how does the United States’ role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process reflect on the U.S.? Should the U.S. embark on adaptations in policy and action to prepare leadership for future large-scale changes in the region, such as another series of events like the Arab Awakening? If you were a policy strategist, would you change U.S. policies in the Middle East? If so, how? How do you see U.S. policy affecting the outcome of the Arab Awakening? As you prepare for the World Affairs Institute, think creatively about the American approach to, and influence on, the regional conflicts that are the Arab Awakening. For updated information, visit www.WAIpittsburgh.wordpress.com .


WEBSITES


U.S. GOVERNMENT

Central Intelligence Council https://www.cia.gov/index.html

U.S. Agency for International Development www.usaid.gov

U.S. Department of Defense www.defense.gov

U.S. Department of State www.state.gov

U.S. Institute of Peace www.usip.gov

The White House www.whitehouse.gov National Intelligence Council www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_home.html

REGIONAL NEWS

Al-Jazeera (Pan-Arab, Qatar) http://english.aljazeera.net/ Al-Masry Al Youm (Egypt) www.almasryalyoum.com/en The National (U.A.E.) www.thenational.ae The Daily Star (Beirut) www.dailystar.com.lb Yemen Times (Yemen) www.yementimes.com The Saudi Gazette (Saudi Arabia) www.saudigazette.com.sa The Jordan Times (Jordan) www.jordantimes.com Gulf Daily News (Bahrain) www.gulf-daily-news.com Al Hayat (London) www.daralhayat.com/morenews/english Khaleej Times (U.A.E.) www.khaleejtimes.com/index00.asp Arab Times (Kuwait) www.arabtimesonline.com

INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES International Monetary Fund www.imf.org

United Nations www.un.org

World Bank Group www.worldbank.org

World Economic Forum www.weforum.org

World Trade Organization www.wto.org

WORLD NEWS

The Associated Press www.ap.org

BBC World Service www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice

The Guardian www.guardian.co.uk

International Herald Tribune www.iht.com

RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research www.aei.org

The Brookings Institution www.brookings.edu

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace http://carnegieendowmentorg

Center for Defense Information www.cdi.org

Center for Strategic and International Studies www.csis.org

Council on Foreign Relations www.cfr.org

GlobalSecurity.org www.globalsecurity.org

The Heritage Foundation www.heritage.org New America Foundation www.newamerica.net

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