field level cfsp

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Field-level CFSP: EU Diplomatic Cooperation in Third Countries

Tim Bale

Victoria University of Wellington

PO Box 600, Wellington, NZ

Research into the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has traditionally

been restricted to procedural studies of cooperation taking place at an

intergovernmental level within Europe and/or to case studies involving intervention

(or the lack of it!) in well-known global flashpoints. As a result, there remains a gap

in our knowledge about the more mundane, but arguably just as significant,

cooperation between EU states at the diplomatic level in third countries - cooperation

which arguably contributes to the kinds of shared identification and spillovers

promoted by transactionalist and neo-functionalist approaches to integration. This

paper describes and presents findings from a project which studies diplomatic

cooperation in several countries of varying size. It attempts - using fieldwork

conducted in Washington DC, Kuala Lumpur, Canberra and Wellington - to portray

and develop explanations of current progress. It explores, for example, whether

enthusiasm for and the extent of cooperation varies a) according to member-state size

and/or the holder of the presidency, b) with regard to particular issues, and c)

according to the nature and preferences of the host country; it also looks at the role of

the European Commission delegation. It concludes by looking at the obstacles to

greater integration in the senses conceived of by both transactionalists and neo-

functionalists in this neglected but not necessarily insignificant dimension of the

CFSP.


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INTRODUCTION

In June 1998, the Indonesian occupied territory of East Timor was the subject of a

fact-finding mission by the EU. The mission comprised the British, Austrian and

Dutch ambassadors, constituting the then Troika (the Netherlands substituting for

Luxembourg), the European Commissions Head of Delegation in Indonesia and a

representative of the European Council Secretariat. In the same month, in Belarus in

the former Soviet Union, ambassadors from several states found themselves all but

locked out of their residences on the orders of that countrys increasingly autocratic

and erratic President. The diplomatic objections of individual EU member states were

conveyed on behalf of the EU as a whole by the UK representative in Minsk, who,

living outside the compound, was not herself directly affected by the shenanigans.

Just over a year before, following another diplomatic incident that provoked a recall

of personnel, this time in Iran, the Council of EU foreign ministers announced that

Member states [would] instruct their Ambassadors, after their return to Teheran, to

contribute in a coordinated way to the continual appraisal by the Council of the

relationship between the EU and the government there.

Examples like these hint at increased diplomatic coordination and cooperation in third

countries between member states and between member states and Community

institutions. This paper explores the issue in more depth. It begins by providing a

rationale for such an exploration and then moves on to discuss the work of those few

scholars who have examined the topic previously. It goes on to lay out some of the

findings from fieldwork in Washington DC, Kuala Lumpur, Canberra and Wellington

in the light of hypotheses derived from that work.1

It concludes, in looking to the


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future, by stressing that while it may be true that developments in operational practice

within Europe are helping to move the conduct of national foreign policy away from

the old nation-state national sovereignty model towards a collective endeavour, a form

of high-level networking with transformationalist effects and even more potential

(Hill and Wallace, 1996, p. 6), the same cannot really be said at present of operational

practice outside the continent itself.

RATIONALE

Those scholars working on the theory of integration have recently been invited to

revisit the work of the transactionalist or communications school associated most

closely with Karl Deutsch (see Sandholtz and Stone-Sweet, 1998; see also Deutsch,

1966). In a manner reminiscent of neo-functionalisms emphasis on spillover from

one area of activity to another, transactionalism suggested some kind of snowball

effect - in its case, however, the momentum had to do with the gradual melding of

identity through the sharing of symbols and support for similar norms and values.

While Deutsch and his colleagues looked for the existence and effect of such

mutually-reinforcing transactions at the level of peoples, it now seems more

profitable to restrict the search to particular players and the fields in which they play.

One such might be the foreign policy, and the foreign policy community, of the

member states.

Admittedly, studies of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and Common Foreign

and Security Policy (CFSP) tend to concentrate on procedural studies of cooperation

taking place at an intergovernmental level within Europe and/or to case studies

involving intervention (or the lack of it!) in well-known global flashpoints (eg.


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Regelsberger et al., 1997). However, they often hint that a great deal goes on

underneath the process at the highest level that offsets - subtly and incrementally - its

all-too-obvious shortcomings. Even if foreign ministers cannot always agree, it is

suggested, their officials are gradually building up habits of cooperation whose

eventual integrative affect will be significant. Such engrenage is, more often than

not, portrayed as taking place in Brussels and the other EU capitals. Nevertheless,

now and again, there is mention of it occurring in and as a result of activities in third

countries. Hill and Wallace, for example, note that this process of engrenage on

which habits of working together [may] have gradually upgraded perceptions of

common interest has as its root the taking as given the exchange of confidential

information not only about third countries but about their own governments

intentions and domestic constraints, the sharing of tasks (and sometimes of facilities)

in third countries, the acceptance of officials on secondments to their home ministry

as no longer foreign but as colleagues (Hill and Wallace, 1996, p.1, p.12).

That the engrenage effect would occur in an overseas as well as a European setting

has clearly been the hope of many who have drafted Community declarations and

legislation covering the foreign policy process, especially in the early years of

political cooperation. It must be said, though, that anyone hoping to find mention of

third country cooperation in the rather less supranational statements and Treaty

revisions of recent years might be hard-pressed to come up with even a nod in that

direction. In the Summary of Positions of the Member States included in the White

Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-

home/eu-doc/parlment/peen2.htm), for instance, mention of the matter is confined to

Spain (which referred to increased cooperation in third countries as a goal), to


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Portugal (which suggested that the CFSP should be dynamized via such actions as

the opening of joint embassies in third countries) and more predictably, Belgium

(which pointed out that the diplomatic networks, expertise, personnel and resources

available in each of the member states should be fully utilised in a joint approach,

with the commission acting as a catalyst and co-ordinator). This lack of interest (or at

least lack of interest in mentioning the possibility of advance) in the field was also

reflected in the Group of Reflections Westendorp Report of December 1995 and,

unsurprisingly, in the Amsterdam Treaty itself. This is in marked contrast, however,

to pre-Maastricht times when the risk of any state actually feeling bound by

commitments made on the common foreign policy front was so much smaller.

True the first priority for the fledgling EPC in the early seventies was to encourage

links between member states foreign ministries within European capitals.

Consequently these links were only gradually extended to the embassies of the

member states in third countries and it was more or less left to the ambassadors

themselves to convene a meeting or, alternatively, to ignore this new dimension in

diplomacy (Regelsberger, 1988, p. 11). However, as EPC developed this new

dimension was slowly institutionalised. The London Report of 1981 (see Pijpers et al,

1988, pp. 321-327) provided for crisis procedures which, among other things, allowed

for ambassadorial meetings within 48 hours at request of three member states.

Acknowledging the role of ambassadors in actually delivering joint messages of

support or disapproval in respect of third countries, the Report also promised (see Part

II, 1) that when declarations are issued by Ministerial meetings and the European

Council they should as a rule be accompanied by a list of posts in appropriate counties

where the local representative of the Ten will draw the declaration to the attention of


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the host government. It went on to state (Part II, 8 Procedure for Political Co-

operation in Third Countries) that

in view of the increasing activities of the Ten in third countries it is important

that the Heads of Mission of the Ten maintain the practice of meeting

regularly order to exchange information and co-ordinate views. In considering

their response to significant developments in the country to which they are

accredited their first instinct should be to co-ordinate with their colleagues of

the Ten.

The Political Committee welcomes joint reports from Heads of Mission of the

ten. These may be prepared on response to a request form the Political

Committee, or, exceptionally on the Heads of Missions own initiative, when

the situation requires it. Recommendations for joint action are particularly

valuable, Where reports are made on the Heads of Missions own initiative, it

is for them to decide whether to draft a joint report, or to report separately on

the basis of their joint discussions. An equally acceptable alternative is for the

Presidency to draft an oral report on its own authority reflecting the views

expressed.

A couple of years later the so-called Stuttgart Declaration of 19 June 1983 (see Pijpers

et al, 1988, p. 327-333, and especially 3.2 Foreign Policy) also called for closer co-

operation in diplomatic and administrative matters between the missions of the Ten in

third countries. Next the Single European act of 1986 (and specifically title III

article 30 which put EPC on a treaty basis, though without making it part of the wider


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EC process), codified such calls, stressing the importance of the presidency in

initiating, co-ordinating and representing a collective presence for member states

abroad, and even going so far as to declare (see point 9) that The High Contracting

Parties and the Commission, through mutual assistance and information, shall

intensify co-operation between their representations accredited to third countries and

to international organisations. This vague and therefore potentially alarming

declaration was, however, very quickly specified - and thereby limited - by the

following decision adopted by member state foreign ministers on 28 February (see

Pijpers et al, 1988, pp. 338-342):

II Co-operation of Member States Missions and Commission Delegations in

third countries and international organisations.

1. Member States missions and Commission delegations shall intensify their

co-operation in third countries and international organisations in the following

areas:

a) exchange of political and economic information;

b) pooling of information on administrative and practical problems

c) mutual assistance in the material and practical sphere;

d) communications;

e) exchange of information and drawing up of joint plans in case of local

crises;

f) security measures;

g) consular matters;


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h) health, particularly in the field of health and medical facilities;

i) educational matters (schooling);

j) information;

k) cultural affairs;

l) development aid.

The Maastricht Treaty had little to add to this, simply stating in Title V, J6 that

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the

Commission

Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their

representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring

that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are

complied with and implemented. They shall step up cooperation by

exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the

implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty

establishing the European Community.

These sorts of official statements - combined with the almost total neglect by

academics of the question of their actuality - have given rise to what Martin Holland

(who is one of the few scholars who have looked at it ) calls a general assumption,

though an untested one, that political co-operation between embassies has become a

systematised, institutional reflex, leading to new behavioural norms based on co-

operation rather than competition (Holland, 1991, p. 244).


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The existence of a general but untested assumption in a rapidly expanding field of EU

study such as foreign policy is perhaps justification enough for more empirical

enquiry (see Holland, 1991, p.240). But there is also another reason why the question

of diplomatic cooperation should merit the attention of those interested in European

institutions, namely the putative increase in Commission competence in the area. As

yet this has been as much a subject of speculation in the Brussels-based inside-

dopester media as the occasion for serious academic study. However, it is hard not to

see the latter following hard on the heels of the former, particularly when it reports,

for instance, that the Heads of the 128 Commission Delegations located throughout

the world are meeting in Brussels to discuss their future role at a time when, despite

the antipathy among member states towards such an idea, so-called Euro-federalists

are suggesting that the obvious why aheadwould be for the Commissions foreign

service gradually to assume primacy in foreign relations, while national embassies

restrict themselves to promoting national companies and offering their citizens a

friendly face (EU foreign service a step nearer European Voice, 3 September

1998)!

However far-fetched such a suggestion may seem, it is tapping into some fundamental

questions that those who seek either to enhance or to delay CFSP need to ask and

answer. As Allen (1996, p. 303) notes, the lack of progress towards a Commission-

based, encompassing foreign diplomacy is a crucial barrier to the CFSPs making

p.303 a fundamental integrative leap forwards. In truth, it is hard to imagine a

genuine common foreign policy without a common diplomatic service and a means of

identifying and operationalizing a notion of the European interest. Since such a

service is just as likely to come about by incremental default as by deliberate design,


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the involvement of EC Delegations in diplomatic co-operation in third countries gives

us another good reason to take a closer look at the process on the ground - a process

which has at least the potential to change the character of CFSP from, as it were,

below. Delegation Heads, for example, attend meetings on an equal footing with their

member state counterparts and are by implication associated with their reports and

actions, and this inevitably blurs what in Europe is still a reasonably clear distinction

between the intergovernmental and the supranational: consequently, as Simon Nuttall

points out (1992, p. 68), [t]he move towards interaction in third countriesraises

some delicate questions which need to be handled carefully.

GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND MUNDANE REALITIES

Much of the work already done on diplomatic cooperation in non-European capitals

has involved case studies. The first appears to gave been that conducted in the late

seventies in Washington by Philip Taylor, who used structured, open ended

interviews with embassy officials of the then nine member states (Taylor, 1980).

Without having been directed from Europe to do so, Taylor found (p. 35), member

state missions had initiated a range of regular, routinely scheduled meetings. These

were not just at ambassadorial level but also between those responsible in each

embassy for matters such as commercial and economic affairs, and press and

information. This was in marked contrast, he suggested, to other capitals where

meetingsrange from two to six per year at most. This relatively high level of

activity among the nine occurred despite the fact that, according to interviewees (p.

38), Washington was such an open city for informationthat the openness somewhat

negates the necessity for political co-operation and makes it relatively less important


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than elsewhere. However, it tended to vary with the enthusiasm of the member state

holding the presidency and was limited in scope: Most of theparticipants, Taylor

noted, characterised their efforts in Washington as an exchange of information, rather

than as co-ordination of action per se (Taylor, 1980, p. 37,35). He also found that

enthusiasm for such an exchange - and indeed for co-operation as a whole - varied

according to the size of the state: larger states felt that the smaller states gained the

most because they could obtain access to information that the larger states have by

virtue of larger staffs or closer ties to the [host] Government; larger states seemed to

believe political co-operation in Washington has evolved as far as it ought to, and

they would not welcome a push to increase the process(Taylor, 1980, p. 38, p. 39).2

Taylors tightly-focused case study was followed by a more synoptic piece by Bot

(1984), who was as concerned to point out the potential advantages of, and obstacles

to, diplomatic co-operation as he was to address actual practice. Indeed with regard to

the latter, Bots views had much in common with Taylors: the organisational talents

and interest of the ambassador holding the presidency was crucial; smaller partners

profited most from co-operation, much of which amounted to occasional EPC get-

togethers; discussion during these meetings (portions of which were often taken up by

invited speakers from host countries) varied from the highly political to the more

peripheral and even to outright mundane issues such as the sharing of translators,

carpools and diplomatic bags; meetings rarely resulted in drafted conclusions, let

alone joint reports to the Political Committee in Brussels, whose understandable

reluctance to be bombarded with relatively insignificant information from all round

the globe was matched by the reluctance of those who might have filed such

information to file it with anyone other than their respective foreign ministry, which


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for its part world gave been alarmed by anything else (Bot, 1984, p. 154-156)! This

concentration on the practical matters of diplomatic lifestyle, staff services,

communications, security and consular issues, as well as joint information services

and cultural events such as film weeks, concerts and exhibitions in which embassies

could (though not necessarily did) involve themselves was not, for Bot anyway,

unimportant - true to the spirit of engrenage, it could be the glue that holds [member

states] together and contribute in the long run, to the goal of a greater

harmonisation of policies. He did, however, however, insert a caveat: concentrating

on such mundane questions as the diplomatic bag or joint health services, he warned,

may very well become a sign of weakness or a substitute [rather than a symptom]

of political co-operation (Bot, 1984, p. 158).

Bots other main point was that the location of the host country could be an important

determinant of the extent of diplomatic co-operation among member states. For him

this was mainly because he saw third country co-operation at any substantive level as

both driven and limited by the enthusiasm of member states and the geographical

focus of Community institutions back in Europe (Bot, 1984, p. 151, 155). For the

next person to address diplomatic co-operation in print, former British Diplomat

Roger Tomkys, it was the nature as much as the location of the state that mattered:

working in the relatively hostile environment of Syria tended to pull representatives of

EC member states together and encourage a certain solidarity and sense of purpose -

so much so in his case that he emphasises the contrast between the close bonds of

European Political Co-operation as felt by those engaged at a working level and the

doubts about its usefulness on terms of highpolicy (Tomkys, 1987, p. 435, 425).

Despite this, and despite noting (p. 434) that circulation between foreign, domestic


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and European postings often means diplomats in third countries already exhibit a co-

ordination reflex and exploit friendships formed previously, he warned that

The limits on this community of interest should not, however, be ignored. The

governments of the EC remain competitors for commercial sales and

sometimes for political influence. Some governments and administrations,

and the French are a case in point, may be more reserved about sharing

information than others.

It was clearly the limits to diplomatic cooperation in a third country that most

forcefully struck Martin Holland when he conducted in apartheid South Africa what

remains the fullest case study of the phenomenon to date (Holland, 1991). True he

observed that, as a result of regular meetings at the ambassadorial and attach level, a

new diplomatic norm of consultation [had] become prevalent and that diplomats

attitudes, if not concrete procedures, had changed (p. 251). But he concluded (p.244)

that political co-operation as practised in South Africa [between June 1986 and

December 1987] remained rudimentary and variable. Interestingly, though,

Hollands explanations for such variation differed from previous writers on the

subject in a number of ways.

For a start, he found (p. 248) that the hostile character of the relationship between the

member states and South Africa impeded rather than (as Tomkys argued) encouraged

diplomatic cooperation between Community Heads of Mission. And, unlike Bot, he

argued, not just that there seems to be no be no necessary link between intensified


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political co-operation and the relative importance of a third country (p. 250), but

also (p. 251) that

it may well be that political co-operation at the third country level operates

most cohesively where the political stakes are low[and where Member

States are not] too internally divided behind the faade of common dmarches

for a sharing of information and collegiate action at a practical level to

prosper. In third countries where EC concerns are more commonly focused,

where diplomatic resources are more equal and where they have economic

rather than political objectives, diplomatic co-operation ought to be more

easily facilitated.

Cooperation, then, depends partly on just what is being dealt with: since the content

of diplomatic activity runs parallel to, rather than in unison with, political co-

operation, the specific issue involved will dictate whether a state adopts a bilateral

or EPC posture (Holland, 1991, p. 251). Behaviour and general attitudes towards co-

operation are also dictated not just by the relative size of the member state and its

representation but also by its traditional links with the country in question (the UK

obviously being particularly important in former colonial possessions, for example) -

and both clearly override the importance of presidency in determining the extent of

co-operative activity (p. 244, 249). Equally important, Holland stresses (p. 249), is

the diplomatic attitude of the host country and its foreign ministry: if, like South

Africas, the strategy of the latter is one of divide and rule, then bilateralism is likely

to be the order of the day whether missions like it or it - and, presumably, vice versa.


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The latest work which discusses diplomatic cooperation on the ground in any detail is

a more journalistic piece by Buchan (1993), which concentrates on the supposedly

ambivalent relationship between national diplomats and those of the European

Commission - particularly in Washington, Tokyo and Moscow. Some of his findings

echo familiar themes. He is told, for instance (p. 63), that unlike Washington, where

apparently amongst the EU ambassadors you tend to findonly princes and little

kings, who are not easily disposed to co-ordinate their activities, in Tokyo, the

feeling of fighting an uphill battle against an unfair competitormakes for

considerable cohesion. According to Buchan, however (p.62), it is Moscow which

at present provides a model of close co-operation between the ambassadors of [the

member states] and the Commission not least because at their weekly meetings the

former have much to learn from the EC Head of Mission whose role in co-ordinating

food and technical aid gives him possibly unrivalled access and contact with the

Russian bureaucracy.3 This is a big contrast with Washington, Buchan points out,

where there is clear separation between trade matters and what EC Head of

Delegation there, who pursues a self-denying ordinance on such matters, calls the

classic confines of foreign policy.

This tension between the separation and blurring of the economic and the political,

symbolised by the seemingly ambivalent role of the Commission and its delegations

in the EUs external relations, is of course the subject of many academic contributions

on EPC and CFSP more generally. Consequently, it is not only a feature of diplomatic

co-operation in third countries, but yet another feature that renders it worthy of

academic attention. Simon, who has written as much as anyone on EC and EU

foreign policy, mentions it explicitly when he argues (Nuttall, 1992, p. 69) for the


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importance of the Commission attending ambassadorial meetings. According to him,

anyway,

The agenda for [such] meetings covers both EPC and Community topics

without any separation between the two: indeed the distinction is barely

perceived. Practical cooperation is possible in a more relaxed way than in the

formal EPC and Community bodies, particularly in the smaller countries in

which not all the member states are represented.

Whether this is in fact the case is something this paper will go on to explore. Its

immediate aim is to update our knowledge of what actually goes on and test that

reality against assumptions of an incremental increase in cooperation and engrenage.

It does this by asking similar questions to those asked in previous work, largely

through the use of semi-structured interviews with diplomats serving member states in

third countries, normally at the level of ambassador. Its wider aim is to supply one

small part of an overall picture that tests the claim, most closely associated with

transactionalism and neo-functionalism, that of such small parts is closer integration

made.

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS

Diplomatic cooperation among member state embassies in all four capitals has as its

main formal expression a monthly meeting of Heads of Mission - a meeting organised

and hosted by the holder of the six-month presidency.4 The meeting normally takes

the form of a roundtable discussion, lasting an hour and a half or more, on a


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customary agenda consisting of the domestic political situation, the domestic

economic situation, and the relationship between the host country and the EU.

Discussion on the latter will be led by the Head of the Commission Delegation or in

his or her absence (the norm in Kuala Lumpur, where there is no Delegation, and

around half the time in Wellington, whose Delegation is based in Canberra) by the

holder of the presidency. Discussion on the economy tends to be limited to the

macro-outlook for the host country. It avoids issues like foreign direct investment and

trade promotion, which are still national concerns (although, as one Head of Mission

in Malaysia pointed out, even this is beginning to change as trans-European mergers

gather pace.)

Discussion on political matters - by general (although not complete) agreement - can

touch on foreign policy. In Canberra, for instance, there is a great deal of interest in

the affairs of the wider region and matters such as East Timor and Polynesia).

Defence matters are rarely discussed, especially not in detail: they are at the moment

really beyond the brief of CFSP cooperation and neither those countries which have

large defence interests (some of which may meet in Washington on a WEU or Contact

Group basis) nor those that are neutral have any desire to explore such questions

collectively. Outside the latter, there are few issues considered taboo - although it

would seem that Heads of Mission (quite understandably) try to avoid topics that

provoke predictable responses (be they positive or negative) from one or more of their

colleagues. Discussion is often followed by lunch, to which, after consultation, an

outside speaker is invited. Typical invitees include top public servants, cabinet

ministers and central bankers. The frequency of such invitations varies: in Wellington

they are the norm for each meeting; in Washington they occur once per presidency,


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but commonly involve the US Secretary of State. Although they may do some

homework on the EU position on relevant issues, and collective discussion concerning

appropriate questions to the speaker is not unknown, there is little in the run-up to

such occasions that could truly be called preconcertation.

Monthly meetings vary in formality according to the size and importance of the host

country. In New Zealand, for example, unless the Head of Mission holding the

presidency makes it his practice to do otherwise, the meetings go unminuted. Rarely

in either country are they the subject of formal feedback to Europe (say, to the capital

of the presidency) - indeed this, in the opinion of some, would be both pointless and

inhibiting to the free flow of discussion. In the other countries, though tabled papers

are rare, minutes are always taken, even if, on the one hand, not all conclusions are so

recorded and, on the other, those that are tend to be records of views and impressions

rather than instructions for action. Despite this, however, diplomats, particularly in

Washington and Malaysia, were keen to stress that their meetings were real

meetings - in Kuala Lumpur, for example, the meeting was used to work on the

monitoring of the trial of the deposed deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim (on

charges of corruption and immorality) and on a common report on that country that

the Heads of Mission provided for the Political Committee (POCO) back in Europe.

That said the stress in most meetings in all the capitals is very much on what one

Head of Mission called an exchange of views, a comparing of notes and another a

sharing of feelings and perceptions - an exercise, many pointed out, whose

usefulness, although particularly marked when they were new in their posts,

continued well beyond that point.


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In Washington, Canberra and Wellington, the value of such an exercise does not lie so

much in the gleaning of new intelligence - in informal and media-saturated political

and bureaucratic cultures like the US, Australia and New Zealand there is little that

even comparatively small embassies (traditionally the main beneficiaries of and

therefore enthusiasts for such sharing), cannot get on the open market, so to speak.5

Instead it lies in grasp rather than reach, in the chance to get different takes or

reality checks on familiar material - wider perspectives which, as Bot (1984, p. 149,

150,152) hoped, do indeed feed into individual ambassadors assessments prepared for

their respective reports home.6

The same is true for diplomats reporting home from Kuala Lumpur, only in their case

there was a stronger emphasis on the possibilities of learning something genuinely

new, Malaysia having a much less open society and government. However, the

gleaning of new information was by no means the main added value; indeed the two

things, information and views, were interwoven - something reflected in the

ambiguity of one Head of Missions observation that meetings were about

confirming certain things that you otherwise wouldnt know. By the same token, as

a number of Heads of Mission (particularly from states that had recently joined the

EU) noted, it would be a mistake completely to discount the informational content of

the meetings in the more open countries. This is true when it comes to matters and

issues picked up on during ambassadors trips outside the political villages that are

their respective capitals: one Head of Mission in Wellington, for instance, mentioned

in this respect a visit, occasioned by an invitation to share in the celebrations of a

public holiday, to aMarae, where Maori perspectives on a range of issues did provide

something fresh, firstly to the ambassador himself and then to his EU colleagues. It is


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also true when it comes to discussions of economic matters because different

embassies often have contacts with different companies and sectors.

In the case of Australia, both a continent and a country, additional information and

perspectives are also provided by those larger missions that have outposts in federal

states - information which when shared with EU colleagues helps them in their efforts

to, as one ambassador put it, build up the mosaic or put the great Australian jigsaw

together. These efforts were also assisted, a number of Canberra Heads of Missions

noted, by the contributions of ambassadors from member-states which, although small

in size (and representation), were able to tap into their ethnic links within the

Australian population (at both the grassroots and the governmental levels), the Irish

being the most obvious example. As one might expect, the same is of course true -

perhaps even more so - in Washington.

The other function of such meetings is clearly their role in contributing to the sense -

shared even by those countries that, due to their global power or historical

relationships, would appear in several circles of any diplomatic Venn diagram - of

being a definite club or caucus within the wider diplomatic corps in the host country.7

It should also be said that, in a world where contacts are everything, it is not the

interests of any Mission to be seen to operate as part of some kind of exclusive group

within a group; in any case, diplomacy - especially in small countries - depends so

much on personal relationships that the chances of such friendships being confined to

one regional grouping or another are pretty small. In some cases as well, member

states may also be part of another caucus that includes non EU countries - the

Commonwealth and Nordic countries, for instance, interact quite closely on occasion.


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In addition, there are now regular meetings in Canberra between the EU Heads of

Mission and their counterparts from, firstly, the candidate countries and, secondly, the

ASEAN caucus. And generally, notwithstanding EU cooperation, there are clearly

many opportunities for bilateral contacts between member states missions.

Diplomacy is rarely a zero-sum game in any of its aspects: combinations and

permutations are pursued according to contingent and particular circumstances - a

further example is provided by the very close cooperation between the EU states,

acting collectively but also with other states, with regard to the full-time observation

of the trial of Anwar Ibrahim.

Adding to this, of course, is the chance the meeting gives ambassadors to consult on

other, practical and protocol issues. Often the latter involves ensuring that everybody

is singing from the same hymn-sheet: would it, for instance, be appropriate to accept

an invitation to a particular event hosted by an embassy whose relations with Europe

have at times been less than cordial?

Cooperation beyond the monthly meeting of Heads of Mission - at least at the

diplomatic as opposed to the consular level - is the responsibility of the holder of the

rotating presidency. Common tasks - which can be logistically fairly onerous for a

small embassy - include the following: the organisation of various cultural and

educational events that seek to boost the presence of the EU - and not entirely

coincidentally - that of member states;8: the distribution of relevant COREU

telegrams in order to keep missions informed of political cooperation back home;

and the organisation of meetings below the level of ambassador. In fact, such

meetings, it has to be said, are not really a significant feature of cooperation outside


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Washington. There (with the interesting exception of political counsellors whose

discussions might risk cutting across those of their superiors perhaps) regular

meetings take place at a variety of levels (see appendix). On the other hand, more

than one diplomat interviewed was of the opinion that anyone taking the extensive

timetable of meetings at all levels at purely face value could gain an inflated idea of

the breadth depth of meaningful cooperation in DC. He or she would also fail to

appreciate the significance of gatherings which are not on the official menu, so to

speak, the best example being the so-called Lunch Club involving the Deputy Heads

of Mission from France, Britain, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands.9

The presidency is also involved at a more formal political level in leading so-called

Troikadmarches, cooperation on which can often be a useful way - for large and

small countries alike - of spreading (and thereby minimising) the discomfort felt by

diplomats at having to bring to the attention of their hosts the sometimes unwelcome

positions or requests of their governments back home (see Bot, 1984: 156).10 These,

of course, are rather rare in both Australia and New Zealand because of the friendly

relations that (with the occasional tiff over agricultural matters) normally exist

between it and the EU: the most recent example of a dmarche in New Zealand, and

one made only at Counsellor level, was a request that it sign and ratify a UN narcotics

convention. Similarly, there are few occasions where such a formal approach would

be deemed appropriate in the US, though there are issues like trade policy (where the

stakes are very high and relationships have at times been very strained) and the

Americans failure to meet their financial contribution to the United Nations which

have given rise to more formal action.


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Recent events in Malaysia involving human rights abuses and the former deputy

prime minister have, unsurprisingly, provoked strong statements of disapproval from

the EU, drafted and delivered by Missions in Kuala Lumpur.11 On the other hand it

is important to note that even in Malaysia such robust initiatives are a departure from

the norm. But even if the sorts of occasion to which such initiatives are a response

were more common, it is clear in all the countries under discussion that they would

not be pursued on all matters. A decision by member state missions to act bilaterally

or multilaterally (and for that matter publicly or privately) depends not so much on the

type of issue as on its substance. Effort, in other words, is directed at that point in the

host countrys government or media that seems to offer to that state, on the particular

issue at hand, the most leverage or the most cover.12

Another arena of cooperation beyond the monthly meeting concerns the visits of

member state ministers and European Commissioners to Australia and New

Zealand.13 In 1998, for example, the Commissioner for External Relations (and

Commission Vice President) Sir Leon Brittan visited the countries to publicly

announce the signing of a potentially ground-breaking type of mutual recognition

agreement covering a limited number of medical, electrical, telecoms and

pharmaceutical products.14 In Wellington, to take just one of the capitals, Brittan met

with member state Heads of Mission to brief them on his meetings with New Zealand

ministers and a note was prepared by the Delegation for their next regular meeting

which outlined Brittans trip and reported on the talks he had with Prime Minister

Jenny Shipley the day after he met them.


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Visits by Commissioners naturally raise the question of the role that Commission

Delegations (which organise such visits) play in diplomatic cooperation. As regards

New Zealand, the answer, it would seem, is, as yet at least, not especially significant.

This is partly because the delegation is located in Canberra, but also because member

state heads of mission see the Delegation as standing on one side of a still clearly

demarcated division of labour. Relations between ambassadors and the Delegation

Head are good - not least because the latter is held in high personal esteem by the

former. There is also little sense of his being in any way a competitor - indeed

member state heads of mission in Wellington, it seems, would actually welcome a

more substantive (as opposed to part-time and peripatetic) Commission presence in

New Zealand. Instead he is a partner with responsibility for one side of the business,

namely EU trade matters (and possibly, as in the case of spreadable butter, disputes) -

things in which he, rather than member state ambassadors, is clearly the significant

interlocutor.15 Michael Bruter, in his recent stimulating article on Commission

delegations (Bruter, 1999: 193) divides their activities into two main areas: their

autonomous actions, and their actions as part of the European diplomatic team in

the host country. In Wellington, certainly, the latter depend on the former: the

Delegation is part of the team because it plays in a particular position.

In Canberra, the division of labour and competency is similarly clear and only

occasionally blurred: the Commission Delegation, according to one Head of Mission

(speaking figuratively), fights the EU battles (most often on agriculture) and, though

it had a hand in the production of the wide-ranging Joint Declaration on Relations of

June 1997, is overwhelmingly involved in the negotiation of bilateral trading

agreements between the EU and Australia and New Zealand.16

It also, however,


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contains a useful range of expertise, particularly on the economy, trade regulations

and science and technology (see Bruter, 1999: 193). The Commission Delegations

expertise in these areas is generally recognised as a resource by member state

missions: economic counsellors are happy to receive its monthly report on the

Australian economy and trade and Heads of Mission seem comfortable with the Head

of Delegation leading discussion on such matters during their monthly meetings. It

seems clear also that during those meetings the Head of Delegation, who has high

level experience in Europe and elsewhere and is charged with sending regular

political reports back to DG1A, is accepted and involved as a full participant in

political discussions, not least because it is widely recognised that the divide between

high and low politics is increasingly blurred.17

Outside of the meeting, however, the Delegation tries hard to avoid the misconception

- common in many parts of the world (see Bruter, 1999:186) held by some in the host

country that it speaks for the EU on matters beyond its brief as strictly defined. This

is not always easy, of course, because a large part of its role is informational and

promotional, not least in order to improve the sometimes negative image of the EU

(and indeed Europe) as a whole that arises from it supposed support for subsidies

and protection.18 Still, there is little evidence Australia or New Zealand, of the kind

of proliferation of areas of tension, competition and redundancy among

representatives suggested by Bruter (ibid). This is almost certainly because, where it

is proactive, the Commission Delegation concentrates (like others discussed by

Bruter) on areas which complement rather than conflict with member state missions

activities.


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In Malaysia, as in Australia and New Zealand, this complementarity - symbolised by

the Delegations contributions at those meetings it does attend, its written reports and

its educational material - is recognised as a resource by member state missions.

Indeed the absence of a Delegation in Kuala Lumpur (the responsible one is located in

Bangkok and also covers Laos and Cambodia) is felt to be a hindrance to the full

development of a trade agenda with Malaysia.

In other areas - though not because, as Bruter seems to imply (1999: 195), of any lack

of CFSP cooperation between embassies - the Delegation is more reactive, at least

with regard to Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia. Bruters suggestion that

(beyond participating in meetings, sharing information and, say, sponsoring cultural

events) there is much delegations can actually do to reinforce, energize and develop

political cooperation between European embassies (ibid.) may not be far-fetched

when it comes to places like the Lom countries and the CIS, where it plays an

important and often leading role in coordinating aid and restructuring activities. But

it has little resonance in the countries studied here. True, the Commissions

delegations are keen to, and do, play an active part in the increasingly common six-

monthly political dialogues held between the EU and third countries (see Monar,

1997).19 But this is arguably more symbolic of the development of an autonomous

actorness by the Commission than a contribution to cooperation that is necessarily

appreciated by member states. Likewise, the idea that to gain more weight in the

European context, [the] delegation [could] take upon itself the task of representing the

interestsof smaller member countries with no local embassy (Bruter, 1999: 196)

seems highly unlikely to find favour with member-states.20


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The extent of Commission Delegation involvement is more problematic in

Washington than it is in the other capitals. Although it would be untrue to call the

relationship between the Commission and the member state missions conflictual,

neither could it be characterised as one of seamless complementarity. While the

missions are grateful for the work done on trade and economic issues and information,

there would appear to be some suspicion that the Delegation is, attempting to build up

competency in areas like foreign affairs and US politics that - it could be argued -

takes it beyond its remit and into the realms of a sixteenth member state. 21 At the

moment, though, it is fair to say that such developments lack much of a public face -

not least because the Commission Delegation is careful (perhaps off its own bat,

perhaps because it is aware that to do so would quickly provoke criticism from

member state missions) not to comment in the media, for example, on issues which

are more political than economic or trade related.

No research into such matters is of course complete without consideration of the role

that the host countrys government plays in enhancing or inhibiting diplomatic

cooperation among the EU member states. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and Trade (MFAT)s European effort in Wellington is divided within one

division into trade policy (the bulk of which concerns the EU) and political issues,

where the predominant task is to ensure that the international environment in which

New Zealand trades is as benign as possible.22 Within the NZ/EU context, it clearly

considers bilateral relationships are of at least equal standing with multilateral

diplomacy and feels that some of those bilateral relationships are more important than

others.23 The quality of such relationships varies with events, and of course trade

flows, but more often than not is based on long-lasting (and not necessarily always


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28

obvious) historic links. In terms of what those links actually mean in practice in

Wellington itself, it has to be said that, from MFATs perspective, the most significant

contact it has in Wellington with member state ambassadors concerns overseas visits

by their heads of state/government or cabinet ministers (of which there are one or two

per year and five or six per year respectively) on fact-finding and commercially-

linked visits. Some lobbying by ambassadors does take place but a fair amount of this

will be done (some tines after consultation with MFAT) with the Ministry most

concerned. It is also - almost without exception - done bilaterally. The exception is

of course provided by official Troika dmarches, but there is little to indicate that

such things are taken any more seriously than bilateral statements, requests and

protests: generally it is the intrinsic significance to New Zealand of the issue - rather

than the way in which MFATs attention is drawn to it - that determines its

importance.

It is during the visits of foreign politicians to Wellington (or New Zealand politicians

to European capitals) that MFAT will press the case (not always directly) for its

commercial interests and trade and agricultural liberalisation. If the case is to be

made via standard diplomatic channels it is (at least at a formal level) normally made

- as was the case with spreadable butter and chilled lamb - via New Zealands own

mission in Brussels and other EU capitals rather than in Wellington, or as part of the

Dialogue between the EU and New Zealand (see Monar, 1997) in which, it would

appear, ambassadors are not involved. There is an evolving relationship with the EC

Delegation in Canberra; however, the opening of an EC Delegation in Wellington -

now on the agenda - would accelerate that evolution. On the other hand, and despite

the fact that the Head of Delegation is regarded as equal in rank to his Ambassadorial


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colleagues (and a visiting Commissioner such as Leon Brittan regarded as a cabinet

minister), that distance means that there is little likelihood of the Delegation - even if

wanted to - being able to take on political as well as more narrowly-defined economic

diplomacy.

Hill and Wallace (1996, p. 13) talk of third countries being left to puzzle overthe

duplication of national embassies by Community representations which see

themselves as playing an increasingly political role (see also Bruter, 1999: 186).

New Zealand does not, however, have a problem distinguishing competence in this

area and neither does it envisage (any more perhaps than does the Delegation itself)

an expanding political role for the EC Delegation in the near future. Nor - despite

seeing obvious advantages in terms of time saved - does it see much likelihood of an

umbrella EU embassy. Indeed it sees little substantial evidence of a trend toward EU

Heads of Mission in Wellington behaving as a bloc - not least because trade

promotion and investment links, now such an important part of diplomacy, are still

pursued on a national rather than an EU wide basis. In any case, New Zealand would

currently see no advantage in substituting its own predominantly bilateral diplomacy

with EU states and/or the Commission in Brussels for some kind of multilateral

approach. This is primarily because it sees that almost all the issues that most concern

it (agriculture and foreign policy more generally, to name but two) are still decided on

an intergovernmental rather than a supranational level. While the perception remains

that the EU whole is as yet little more than the (not altogether cohesive sum) of its

component parts, then relationships with those component parts - both at home and

abroad - still make most sense. In short, it is clear to MFAT, first, that there are

significant differences on a range of issues between Member States and, second, that


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the defences ofFortress Europe - if such a thing exists - are better breached by using

existing bilateral relationships to tease out those differences and then take advantage

of them.

Australias Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in Canberra comprises

three sections. One deals exclusively with the EU, concentrating mainly on economic

issues, but including political consultations with the Presidency and the Commission).

The second deals with the major west European bilateral relationships and the third

with Russia, and the other parts of Europe. Like MFAT in New Zealand, DFAT

regards its own efforts as Europe as the most important means of pursuing Australias

interests on that continent. European diplomatic missions in Canberra, however, are

seen as a useful second communication channel to European governments, not least

because they are involved in visits to Australia by ministers and senior public servants

for the sort of high-level intergovernmental consultations which are a significant

means of pursuing policy. The Commission Delegation clearly plays a similar role if

visits are by Commission staff, but when it comes to DFATs effort to keep abreast of

EU affairs, its own mission in Brussels is seen as very much the key player. Finally,

Canberra, like Wellington, has no problem in distinguishing the relative

responsibilities of the Commission Delegation and member state missions. And,

while it would guess that the level of cooperation between those missions (including

the delegation) has increased over time - measured, for instance by requests for joint

briefings24 - it affirms that independent bilateral action is still far and away the most

common modus operandi.


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The same appears to be true of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry. While recent

difficulties - and the EUs collective response to them - have raised the profile of the

Union in Kuala Lumpur, the government continues to open in a predominantly

bilateral manner. There is some feeling, indeed, that the Malaysians have not perhaps

fully recognised the increasing importance of the Union as a foreign policy actor (or

indeed as an actor more generally) in its own right. Interestingly, though, their

reluctance to talk too openly about the Anwar case (and human rights abuses) more

generally has arguably put an unusual premium on those often collective briefings for

member state missions that have been given.

In Washington, too, there seems to be little or no evidence that the State Department

has any illusions about either the role of the Commission Delegation or the continued

bias among member state mission for bilateralism. Indeed the latter is a bias it largely

shares: while the one-stop-shop, logistical, argument for collective briefings, for

instance, is of course appreciated and the regular Transatlantic Dialogue is assuming

more and more importance, the Americans are aware that - until Javier Solana as M.

PESC/Mr CFSP proves otherwise - anyone wanting to press Europes buttons is still

best off dealing individually with its biggest players. This bilateral bias is reinforced,

as in other countries, by an organisational structure that continues to involve country

desks - and by an awareness that multilateral fora do rather increase the chances of

being ganged up on by otherwise more malleable interlocutors! It should also be

noted that there is no pressure on the administration to treat Europe as more of a piece

from the legislature: most congressmen and senators continue to see the continent

refracted through the prism of their own ethnic origins and therefore see little sense in

thinking about it - let alone dealing with it - on any other basis than bilateral.


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CONCLUSION

There seems to be little evidence from this study to support the idea - la Deutsch -

that, at least in any general sense, increased transactions between the players in this

particular field lead to a significantly more mutual identity. Indeed, it could be argued

that it is precisely those symbols and norms that are expected to both generate and

reflect such mutuality which help to arrest its development. Other obstacles exist in

two of the areas most associated with the classical arguments of neo-functionalism:

both economic and political interests are weighed against what potential there is for

technical/functional spillover. There is also a range of contingent and/or exogenous

factors which have to be taken into account.

The first of these is the fact that the more open and friendly the host country, the less

need there is for EU Heads of Mission to pull together in the way that some diplomats

in friendly countries had clearly experienced in postings in rather more hostile

environments. In addition, in friendly countries - and especially where the

Commission delegation is non-resident - there is little impetus for it to become

involved in political matters; instead, it will stick to a narrower trade and aid brief.

Cooperation on - and even discussion of - foreign policy and security matters among

ambassadors, in any case, varies with the extent to which the third country is in these

areas a matter of concern for Brussels. With regard to friendly third countries, policy

is characterised by its absence, as it were, so there is little emanating from Brussels

for ambassadors to talk about; hence they will share views but feel no need to develop

a common view.


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Cooperation in friendly countries is, then, limited because there is no need - or

externally imposed obligation - for it to be anything other than limited. It is true,

though, that, because cooperation need only be what its participants want it to be, the

more enthusiasm shown by the presidency holder, the greater the scope (though not

necessarily the intensity) of cooperation in private and public diplomacy. However,

as Heads of Mission themselves continually stressed, that enthusiasm does not

necessarily vary with size or with the relationship that exists between a member state

and the host country, or with that member states general attitude to CFSP. More

important, according to participants, than any of these was the personal enthusiasm of

individual ambassadors. Possibly such enthusiasm is correlated with youth and, more

significantly, with experience of working either in Brussels (for example in

COREPER) or in missions located in European member states. Significantly, of

course, such experience is increasingly common as younger cohorts reach

ambassadorial status. But there were plenty of individual examples volunteered of

Heads of Mission who were older and/or had little EU experience, yet who were

nonetheless very pro-cooperation.

Concern that one plays, and is seen to play by ones fellow diplomats, the presidential

role seriously and effectively also seems to be important - so much so that it is

capable of overriding the reluctance of even the least enthusiastic of Heads of

Mission: as one diplomat in Washington put it You just have to be keen! Just as in

Europe itself, performing well may is clearly a matter of pride and principle to all

member states, big or small. Similarly, there is no doubt that a good performance can

considerably enhance the esteem in which a mission and its head is held by the others


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- the performance of the Austrian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur during the tense period

engendered by the Anwar trial is a case in point. A high profile presidency may in

any case serve many purposes. In Australia and New Zealand, for instance, the UK

High Commissions took their private and public roles seriously, seeing in them the

opportunity - particularly given the thrust of the British Labour governments Foreign

Office Mission Statement - to emphasise at all levels of opinion that it was very much

a European nation rather than the semi-detached awkward partner it is sometimes

portrayed as in the media.

Of course, the temporary prominence in PR terms afforded by holding the presidency

is by no means detrimental to boosting the profile of the individual country concerned

either; but that illustrates once again that the choice between multilateral and bilateral

action is not a zero-sum game. The two approaches are more likely to be mutually

reinforcing and pursued simultaneously than they are to be black and white

alternatives; the choice of one or the other, or both, depends largely on the issue at

hand, but is also dictated by the host countrys preferences

When thinking of integration in the field of diplomacy in third countries, it may be

useful to think of four, not necessarily evolutionary, stages, as follows: bilateral-

independentwhere member state missions may go through the motions of meeting

etc. but think and act very much according to their own lights, sensible-collective,

where the co-ordination reflex is present in at least some areas and a communaut

somewhere between information and vues, if not action, exists as members realise that

cooperation can be a positive-sum game; multilateral, best summed up by Ruggies

more general definition of an institutional form which coordinates relationson the


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basis of generalized principles of conduct25, and, finally,full-blown merger. In al

the capitals studied here it is clear that things are at the second stage. There is little

need at present to advance beyond it. The capability to do more is probably there; the

low expectations of member states back in Europe, however, means that it is not.

There is little evidence, then, at least from this study, that would lead us at the

moment to challenge Bots conclusion - made some fifteen years ago (Bot, 1984, p.

151-152) - that foreign policy co-ordination in Europe remains at the level of a

pragmatic form of collective diplomacy which in turn encourages amongst missions

in third countries a mainly pragmatic form of cooperation with a clear accent on

regular exchanges of information rather than on joint action or a common approach to

the problems facing them. What of the future, however?

As Bot pointed out, [i] f one draws the concept of diplomatic cooperation to its

logical conclusion, individual embassies are bound to disappear (Bot, 1984, p. 168).

Clearly, however, as Bot (ibid.) also stressed, theory does not necessarily translate

into practice. States have resisted and are predicted to continue to resist such a move,

even if that resistance ironically leads to the increased sharing - organised

intergovernmentally - of facilities and co-location with other member states (see

Allen, 1996, p. 295).26 Some commentators see this - not unjustifiably - as one facet

of a wider refusal to relinquish command of foreign policy on the grounds that it

represents the last bastion of sovereignty (see Whitman, 1998, p. 204) - an argument

which some Heads of Mission, not always without regret, point to as significant. But

concentrating on continued attachment to the symbols of sovereignty as an


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explanation can lead us to ignore the rather more practical arguments against joint

representation and in support of the logic of diversity.

One such argument is noted - though very much in passing - by Whitman himself,

namely that it may be constitutionally illegal in some member states, France being the

best known example after its constitutional court ruled that the French president could

only be represented by a French citizen. Another - and one echoed by all those

interviewed - was the ever-increasing fusion of public diplomacy and trade

promotion. The job of the diplomat, particularly in liberal capitalist, friendly host

countries, is increasingly one of maintaining and projecting, through holding and

attending functions, monitoring and feeding the local press, etc., a national cultural

presence - a role that, while going much further than salesmanship, is ultimately

perhaps not divorceable from it. Collective representation might make sense in terms,

say, of cost, narrowly defined. But these costs are ultimately far outweighed by the

benefits that accrue from having personnel on the ground or in-country who -

metaphorically at least - fly their own nations flag. Substantive differences between

individual products - goods or services - are now so small that purchase decisions are

made on largely symbolic grounds, on a companys brand image. Each brand

continues to be associated (and to associate itself) with a particular country and its

image (be it tradition, romance, sophistication, efficiency etc.), making it all the more

important for each brand owner that the brands country of origin (even if the product

in question is in fact manufactured elsewhere) is represented abroad.27

All this means that the limits on supranational development are as bottom-line as they

are blimpish. And that bottom line is not simply commercial; it is to do with high as


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well as low politics. Member states are fully aware that their unique historical and

ethnic ties with certain third countries are a precious resource that needs to be

husbanded as well as exploited for political as well as economic gain. The prospect of

some kind of unified representation that would loosen these ties is consequently less

than attractive. Concrete losses would be myriad, but to take just one example, an

Irish-Australian or American politician, would find it even harder than his brethren

back home to think of himself as European and therefore be less enthusiastic about

interacting with a European rather than an Irish diplomat.

It is also true to say that member state missions, though they may be happy on

occasions to use their EU status as cover (see above), often feel the need to, if not

disown it, then downplay it, when talk turns to topics on which the Union has a

particularly poor image - which, in New Zealand and, particularly, Australia, can

often seem to begin with agricultural protection and then radiate rapidly outward.

Clearly this would be impossible if individual missions were to be subsumed by a

unified foreign service. And to all this one is obliged to point out that diplomats - as

the tenacious rearguard action fought by the British FCO against Treasury attempts to

scale down its scope - are no different from any other group in the public or private

sector in wanting to maintain their current position: what vested interests they do have

do not lie, it seems safe to assume, in working to squeeze the quart of individual

member state representation into the pint-pot of a putative European diplomatic

service. Even if this were not the case, one would still be faced with the fact that, as a

number of respondents pointed out, diplomats are conditioned and constrained by

their representative function not to push anything further than their national

governments require.


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This points to the fact that the hard-headed logic of diversity is ultimately rooted in

the fact that progress abroad is to a large extent a dependent variable of progress in

Europe itself. Bot, for instance, suggests that

cooperation between diplomatic missions (and the Commission) can only be a

reflection of the degree of harmonisation reached between the [member states]

at home, andit can never develop into a sui generis form of cooperation.

Ambassadors, being representatives of sovereign states, have only so much

political leeway as their respective ministries are willing to grant them. Their

opinions and evaluations will therefore, perforce, first and foremost reflect

national policies and intentions.

In none of the capitals under discussion was there anything that could accurately be

described as a coordination reflex. The automaticity implied by such a term is

impossible when those who might demonstrate - the diplomats themselves - rely in

important matters on instructions from home first before acting in concert. For

instance, fieldwork for this research in Kuala Lumpur was carried out as retailers in

Malaysia and elsewhere were busy removing European food products from their

shelves in the wake of the Belgian dioxin scare: Heads of Mission made it clear,

however, that there would be no effort to forge a collective response to such a panic

unless and until they had received advice from their individual capitals.28 There can,

then, be no European foreign policy until there is an identifiable European interest.

And without the latter - for all the expectations generated around the appointment of

Javier Solana as M. /Mr CFSP - there can be no unified Foreign Service.


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But just as problematic as the continued commitment among member states to

intergovernmentalism in the field of foreign policy is their perceived continuation of

intergovernmental decision-making in fields (like agriculture for example) which

have a more indirect bearing on such policy. In short, while third countries continue

to believe that it is the case that the issues they care most about are still ultimately

decided - albeit by way of some collective process - by individual governments, then

those third countries will continue to focus their own diplomatic efforts on the

bilateral plane. Rummel (1988, p. 126) has noted that for member states it makes

sense to pursue as many avenues and use as many channels as possible when

negotiating with third parties since [t] he high degree of redundancy in the

multiplicity of duplicated relationships seems more an asset than and impediment.

But what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander. Hence, even if there is

some movement towards integration in CFSP it will be insufficient to shift the

preferences of the EUs interlocutors for bilateralism unless there is at the same time a

similar and simultaneous leap forward in other key areas. Given that multi-level

governance, like foreign policy cooperation, can be comfortably accommodated as a

terminal condition rather than seen as the embryo of a supranational state, the

chances of movement are surely slight.

On the other hand, and rather ironically, there are developments outside CFSP that

may do much more than it can do to encourage cooperation in third countries. Some

of these are rather contingent: for example, missions in Kuala Lumpur found

themselves working together quite closely on The most significant of these is the

move - given extra impetus by the Schengen Agreements incorporation into the


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Amsterdam Treaty - toward the creation of a common visa policy for the EU. In the

capitals studied here at least, consultation on the processing of visa applications -

which now involves regular meetings between consular attachs - is evidently a

growth area when it comes to cooperation between the various member state

missions. It could be, then, that such cooperation - at least in the near future - will

tend towards the consularrather than the diplomatic. Whether this will, in spite of all

the obstacles analysed above, lead to the sort of technical/functional spillover still

much beloved by neo-functionalists remains of course a moot point. If it does, we

will at least be able to observe wryly that it would not be the first or the last time that

an issue supposedly dealt with under one pillar of the European Union ends up

strengthening - or, if one takes a sceptical line, undermining - the other two.


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References

Allen, D. (1996) Conclusions: the European Rescue of National Foreign Policy in

Hill, 1996.

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1 These missions were chosen for a variety of reasons. Wellington constituted the

pilot for the study and also represents a small country where formal links with the EU

are limited and where by no means all countries choose to be represented. Canberra

was chosen to provide an initial contrast with Wellington, Australia having stronger

formal links with the EU and virtually the full range of countries represented; it also


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allowed a study of the way in which a Commission Delegation operated in its home

base and in the another country for which it was responsible but non-resident. Kuala

Lumpur was chosen because links with certain European countries are sometimes

problematic, making it possible to study cooperation in a more hostile environment;

it too had no resident delegation and was also a member of the British Commonwealth

making it possible to compare and contrast with New Zealand and Australia on a

number of levels. Washington was chosen to represent a city where diplomatic

resources were far greater by comparison, and where clearly the strategic interests of

countries were much higher; it also had the merit of having been studied beforehand,

allowing an element of comparison over time. Some thought was given to including a

site in Latin America and/or Africa, and perhaps a former communist country.

Resources were, however, limited and it quickly became apparent that many of the

diplomats interviewed in the chosen sites had served in those locations and were able

to provide comparisons which were useful in any case.

2 The idea that smaller states have most to gain from diplomatic cooperation in third

countries is of course a theme in studies of the wider EC/EU foreign policy process:

Weiler and Wessels, for instance, noted a decade ago (1988, p. 252) that [t]he smaller

member states have an obvious stake in EPC as a platform and a forum which in

normal circumstances would necessitate a huge diplomatic effort and would not

guarantee the same level of success, though they also suggested - both tentatively and

tantalisingly - that common foreign policy may be able to mitigate [in the case of

France and the UK] or accelerate [Germany and Italy] the changing lot of certain

European powers.

3 This is confirmed elsewhere. Christopher Piening, in a passing comment on the

November 1993 joint action sending observers to the parliamentary elections in


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Russia (1997: 41-2), calls it a good example of the genuinely Union dimension of a

foreign policy activity: the Commission Delegation played a central role in

coordinating not just the EC but also the member states contributions, working with

various member states embassies to ensure that national teams were integrated into

the overall Union effort; and the embassy of Belgium (the presidency holder)

cooperated with its troika partners in arranging political briefings for all the incoming

teams of observers.

4 Since not all member states are physically represented in Wellington, this meeting

therefore includes only the ambassadors of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the

Netherlands and the UK, the Consul-General of Greece, and any other EU

ambassadors resident in Canberra who happen to be visiting New Zealand (including

the Head of the EC Delegation to Australia and New Zealand who is resident in the

capital of the former rather than the latter). Clearly, if the presidency holder is not

resident in New Zealand then the nation that substitutes for it in Wellington will take

on all such functions. Note, though, that there are standard procedures in place to

avoid one nation having to form on its own the entire Troika in Wellington! For

example, in the eighteen month period in 1998-1999, Germany, as substitute for

Austria and Finland and also - in the middle - the holder of the office in its own right,

was theoretically in this position, but in practice was accompanied by the UK and

Belgium. Interestingly, Germanys substitution for Austria was coordinated not

between the German ambassador in Wellington and his Austrian counterpart in

Canberra but via Bonn.

5 Though, as one diplomat from one of the smaller nations represented in Washington,

the accessibility of information is not always matched by the capacity of small

embassies to process it.


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6 Bot suggested that, owing to cooperation providing them with both access to new

information and the equally important process of cross-fertilisation, embassies could

supply the raw materials for [EPCs] final product, the coordinated line of conduct,

by informing their own authoritiesabout significant developments at their

respective posts and suggested that since these frequent, almost institutionalized

exchanges of information were increasingly influencing the nature and contents of

the reporting to the respective capitals, they should not be belittled.

7 Other countries Heads of Mission, it should be said, do caucus - the Latin

Americans and the ASEAN countries are examples - but these are (or are at least

perceived to be) looser arrangements based as much on social and cultural than on

substantive ties. Other countries Heads of Mission, it should be said, do caucus - the

Latin Americans and the ASEAN countries are examples - but these are (or are at

least perceived to be) looser arrangements based as much on social and cultural than

on substantive ties. It should also be said that, in a world where contacts are

everything, it is not the interests of any Mission to be seen to operate as part of some

kind of exclusive group within a group; in any case, diplomacy - especially in small

countries - depends so much on personal relationships that the chances of such

friendships being confined to one regional grouping or another are pretty small. In

some cases as well, member states may also be part of another caucus that includes

non EU countries - the Commonwealth and Nordic countries, for instance, interact

quite closely on occasion. In addition, there are now regular meetings in Canberra

between the EU Heads of Mission and their counterparts from, firstly, the candidate

countries and, secondly, the ASEAN caucus. In addition, notwithstanding EU

cooperation, there are clearly many opportunities for bilateral contacts between

member states missions.


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8 In New Zealand, for example, the UK High Commission organised a European film

week in Wellington.

9

In Malaysia Deputies meet some ten days before Heads of Mission partly in order to

prepare the upcoming meeting of their superiors.

10 Clearly, if the presidency holder is not resident in New Zealand then the nation that

substitutes for it in Wellington will take on all such functions.

11 The EU issued statements on the Anwar case on 2 October and 27 November 1998,

and on 14 April 1999.

12 In an interview with a Wellington based national newspaper given soon after he

assumed his post, Britains new High Commissioner in New Zealand, after insisting

judiciously that the relationship between Britain and New Zealand has not been

downgradedin response to the governments wish to improve Britains stand

field level cfsp

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