CCFFSSPP FFoorruumm Volume 2, Issue 2 March 2004

Note from the Editor Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

With this issue, CFSP Forum returns to the topicof European defence policy (see also vol. 1, no.2). By the end of the IntergovernmentalConference (IGC) in December 2003, EuropeanUnion member states had reached severalimportant agreements on the European Securityand Defence Policy (ESDP) – notably onenhanced cooperation and a headquarters – butthe failure of the IGC to adopt the draftconstitutional treaty left the agreements in legallimbo. The articles here analyse the stepsagreed, and consider their implications for EUdefence policy in general, for member states leftout of initial discussions of avant-garde groups,and for relations with the United States.

Contents Flexibility in ESDP 1 CFSP and the Constitutional Hangover 6 Italy, ESDP and the Avant-Garde 10 US Reactions to ESDP 12 New books and articles 14

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Flexibility in ESDP: From the Convention to the IGC and Beyond Udo Diedrichs, Senior Researcher at the Jean Monnet Chair for European Politics, University of Cologne, Germany

and

Mathias Jopp, Director of the Institute for European Politics, Berlin, Germany Flexibility in the European Security andDefence Policy (ESDP) has been one of the keyissues during the Convention on the Future ofEurope and the subsequent IntergovernmentalConference.1 After the disappointing experienceof the 2000 IGC, a fresh effort was needed tomake ESDP more efficient and operational. Aslong as unanimity prevails in ESDP decision-making, flexible modes of governance providethe best way of overcoming obstacles to takingaction or proceeding with deepening in the fieldof European defence.

Flexibility in ESDP: the Convention results as an important, but not a final step

While at the December 2000 Nice summit, itproved impossible to modify the rigid forms ofdecision-making in the EU Treaty on all mattershaving military or defence implications, theConvention made a surprising and impressivemove towards introducing flexibility in defencepolicy:2 • Member states that establish multinational

forces may make them available to thecommon security and defence policy (Art. I-40 (3)).

• The Council may entrust the execution oftasks to a group of countries (Art. 40 (5)

2, no. 2, p. 1

•

•

•

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and Art. III-211). This refers in particular tocrisis management operations (Art. I-40(1)); the member states concerned shallagree between themselves on themanagement of the task (Art. III-211 (1)). Member states fulfilling higher criteria formilitary capabilities and having made morebinding commitments with a view to moredemanding tasks shall establish structuredcooperation within the Union (Art. I-40 (6)and Art. III-213). Those member states willbe listed in a Protocol annexed to theconstitutional treaty, which shall also containthe military capability criteria andcommitments which they have defined (Art.III-213 (1)). The EU Council may ask thecountries under structured cooperation tocarry out crisis management tasks (Art. III-213 (4)). A European Armaments, Research andMilitary Capabilities Agency should be setup, open to all member states wishing toparticipate; within the Agency, specificgroups of countries engaged in joint projectscan be established (Art. I-40 (5) and Art.III-211). Until the European Council decidesunanimously on a common defence, closercooperation shall be established as regardsmutual assistance (Art. I-40 (7) and Art. III-214). If a member state participating incloser cooperation is ‘victim of an armedaggression on its territory, the otherparticipating states shall give aid andassistance by all means in their power,military or other, in accordance with Art. 51of the UN Charter.’

is menu represented an ambitiousgramme for the future political andtitutional development of ESDP, whoselitical viability was discussed by the membertes at the IGC starting in autumn 2003. It

on became evident that not all EU countriesoleheartedly supported the text elaborated the Convention. There were two camps oftics: the ‘Atlanticists’, those EU membertes that emphasise NATO’s role as themary organisation responsible for Europeancurity (not only with regard to collectivefence), and the non-aligned countries, whichre trying to block any tendency to bring the closer to becoming a military alliance.

pute among the EU member states hadeady been caused by the quadripartitetiative launched by France, Germany, Belgiumd Luxembourg in April 2003. The four headsstate and government adopted a declaration

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expressing their intention to initiate a number ofmultinational projects on EU defence policy; themost sensitive item concerned the plan to createa nucleus capacity for planning and conductingautonomous EU operations without recourse toNATO.3 This idea, which became notorious underthe label ‘Tervuren’ (standing for the creation ofan autonomous multinational EU headquarters inthis quarter of Brussels), provoked severecriticism. Atlanticists and the new member statesregarded the establishment of an EUheadquarters as an unnecessary duplication ofstructures that were available either at NATO(SHAPE) or at national level (OperationalHeadquarters), and countries like Austria,Finland and Sweden disliked the idea of turningthe EU into a militarily operational organisationsimilar to an alliance.

At the Naples conclave of the EU foreignministers in November 2003, a breakthrough wasreached on the major issues under discussion,which was modified and refined in the followingweek. This success resulted to a large extentfrom the emergence of a Franco-British-German‘deal’ that had been prepared in trilateral talksduring the preceding weeks. Although theprocedure was little attractive to the Presidencyand many smaller EU countries, it reflected thegrowing role of the ‘Big Three’ in EU foreign and

During the IGC, the member states tried to settlethe controversies about these issues and arriveat an amended constitutional treaty. Manycountries viewed the structured cooperationclause as drafted by the Convention withmistrust because of their fear of possibly beingexcluded from it. This was true in particular forthe candidate countries which disliked the idea ofbecoming relegated to second-class membershipif they were not able to fulfil the required criteria.Additionally, Britain wanted to prevent structuredcooperation from being used to create avant-gardes or pioneer groups, much favoured byFrench President Jacques Chirac. The mutual assistance clause also met withconsiderable resistance. Here again, the UK, asthe most prominent torchbearer of Atlanticism,rejected any clause that would undermineNATO’s function as the guarantor of collectivedefence in Europe. The US put considerablepressure on its allies not to harm transatlanticrelations, while the non-aligned countries wantedto prevent the EU from turning into a militaryalliance, which would call into question theirtraditional foreign and security policy.

Flexibility at the IGC: taking a new turn

l. 2, no. 2, p. 2

security policy in solving contentious issues andthus pushing the EU ahead. The compromise included three keycomponents: a new wording for the provisionson structured cooperation, a reformulation ofthe mutual assistance clause, and a solution tothe ‘Tervuren’ issue concerning the creation ofan autonomous EU headquarters.4 Structured cooperation, now renamed‘permanent structured cooperation’, was wordedin a manner sufficiently open to include all EUmember states. The revised Article 40 (6) of thedraft constitutional treaty defines the procedurefor setting up structured cooperation. Here it isimportant to note that authorisation will begranted by the Council acting by qualifiedmajority. Any country willing to join at a laterstage will need a decision by the Council actingby qualified majority where only theparticipating member states will be allowed tovote. Another important element lies in thepossibility of suspending participation instructured cooperation by qualified majority if amember state no longer fulfils the criteria (onlythe participating countries shall take part in thevote, excluding the country concerned). Anycountry wishing to withdraw from structuredcooperation may do so without restrictions.

Decisions in the framework of structuredcooperation will be taken by the participatingmember states, while deliberations will be opento all EU member states – this also in contrastto the Convention’s draft which had kept theother EU countries out of the deliberations. Thusthe creation of a special Council for structuredcooperation was avoided.

Concerning the criteria for participation, noobstacles were set up that would ex anteexclude a country. Two conditions wereformulated in the protocol on permanentstructured cooperation agreed at the IGC. First,the member states should be ready to developmore intensively their defence capabilitiesthrough national contributions or multinationalforms of cooperation and within the EU Agency.Second, they should commit themselves tosupply by the year 2007 – either by nationalcontributions or within multinational forcegroups – targeted combat units for carrying outcrisis management missions, which arestructured at a tactical level as combatformations and supported by sufficient transportand logistical capabilities. These combat unitswould have to be deployable within 5 to 30days, and be sustainable for an initial period of

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30 days, extendable up to at least 120 days.5

A second set of commitments to be accepted bythe member states includes a broad list ofactivities, like cooperation for achievingimprovements in the level of investment indefence equipment; harmonising theidentification of military needs; pooling andpossibly specialising defence means andcapabilities; improving the availability,interoperability, flexibility and deployability ofmilitary forces; filling the major capability gapsidentified in the ‘Capability DevelopmentMechanism’; and participation where appropriatein major joint or European equipmentprogrammes in the context of the EU Agency.

This quite comprehensive list of fields ofcooperation for improving military capabilitiesunderlines the will of the member states toregard structured cooperation as the key elementof flexibility within ESDP under the constitutionaltreaty. There is virtually no important sector notcovered by the protocol. At the same time, notall participating countries will be engaged in allareas to the same degree. So, even if all EUmember states enter structured cooperation assuch, most probably a differentiation process willemerge among them.

The second disputed element of the Convention’sdraft constitutional treaty to be solved by theIGC concerned closer cooperation on mutualdefence. The new text drops the idea of adeclaration annexed to the Treaty in which themember states wishing to enter closercooperation are listed, but instead formulates ageneral obligation for all EU countries to provideaid and assistance by all means in their power ifan EU member state is victim of armedaggression on its territory. It also states that thecommitments in this area shall not ‘prejudice thespecific character of the security and defencepolicy of certain member states’ (that is, thenon-aligned countries) and shall also beconsistent with NATO which remains thefoundation for the collective defence of itsmember states.6 Furthermore, the IGCcompletely deleted Article III-214 as drafted bythe Convention, which included a specificprocedure for implementing the mutualassistance clause.

Thus, closer cooperation will no longer fall underthe ‘flexibility’ provisions (giving a number ofcountries the opportunity of going ahead withoutwaiting for the rest), but will be applied to allmember states; it will also become an obligationof a less binding nature than envisaged in theConvention’s draft. In the end this compromise

l. 2, no. 2, p. 3

was acceptable to the non-aligned countries(although they would have preferred a softerversion), while the Atlanticists were satisfiedwith explicit mention of NATO’s role.

Finally, the controversial headquarters issuewas settled through a compromise, thus ‘killing’the Tervuren proposal launched by the ‘Gang ofFour’ in Brussels in April 2003. Instead ofcreating a fully-fledged headquarters, the IGCagreed to enhance the EU military staff (EUMS)through a cell with civil and militarycomponents. This cell would be responsible forplanning and running an autonomous EUoperation, but should not serve as a permanentheadquarters.7 In addition, the implementationof military operations by the cell was defined asa rather low ranking option. By this formula itwas possible to reconcile Europeanist andAtlanticist concerns, as it calmed British fearsover an autonomous EU acting on its own, whilesatisfying French desires for more permanentstructures within the EU. In parallel, an EU cellshould be established at SHAPE for improvingthe preparation of EU operations havingrecourse to NATO assets and capabilities. The creation of an EU Agency proved to bemuch less contentious. Initially, it had beenreceived with caution as some countries dislikedexpensive European procurement programmesmanaged by a central authority. It was underBritish pressure that the name and the tasks ofthe Agency were reformulated, puttingemphasis on capability improvement rather thanprocurement. Furthermore, Germany waspleading for an organisational model which wasbased upon a network rather than abureaucratic apparatus, so that existing bodieslike Organisation Conjointe de Coopération enmatière d’Armement (OCCAR), WesternEuropean Armaments Group-Western EuropeanArmaments Organisation (WEAG-WEAO) andthe Letter of Intent (LoI) Framework Agreement(see p. 9) would be linked together and notabsorbed by a European superstructure. Based upon these considerations, it waspossible – with support from all EU countries –to take concrete steps; at the Thessalonikisummit in June 2003, the European Councildecided to set up the Agency for CapabilityImprovement, Research, Procurement andArmament as an intergovernmental body. InNovember 2003 the Council decided to set upan Agency Establishment Team (AET), whileaccepting a report by COREPER in which keyfeatures of the Agency were defined.8 It will be

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under the political responsibility of the Councilcomposed of the defence ministers, who will besupported by COREPER and the Political andSecurity Committee; the national armamentsdirectors will also be included in decisionpreparation in a way still to be defined. The maintasks of the Agency will lie in the development ofdefence capabilities with a view to crisismanagement missions, promoting armamentscooperation, strengthening the defence industrialbase and promoting defence-related research. Itis also stated that the Agency shall be open toparticipation by all EU member states. Conclusions and options for the future: withor without the constitutional treaty The provisional results of the IGC so far seem tohighlight a number of basic trends. The first oneunderlines the role of the EU, alongside NATO, asthe preferred institutional framework for flexiblesolutions in defence policy, instead of ad hocarrangements outside the EU. The memberstates seemed willing to include as many issuesas possible under the constitutional treaty toprovide a collective framework for takinginitiatives inside the Union. This became evidentin the broad range of the areas falling underpermanent structured cooperation, but also bysolving the headquarters issue.

A second trend hints at a preference by the IGCfor softer and more inclusive versions offlexibility compared to the Convention’s draft.Flexibility should include as many countries aspossible and avoid creating second or third rankmembership within the EU; again, this becameapparent with structured cooperation heldsufficiently open as to include as many countriesas possible at the start, but also by the newwording of closer cooperation on mutual defence(which no longer falls under flexible forms ofcooperation) and by emphasising that the newAgency shall be open to all EU member states. Third, a balance between Atlanticist, Europeanistand non-aligned positions was struck among themember states at the IGC. Flexibility should notserve as an instrument for Europeanists to moveahead and thus create problems for the Allianceor for those member states rejecting bindingobligations in mutual defence. Fourth, the major solutions as agreed at Napleshad been prepared by a de facto informaldirectoire including France, Germany and the UK.It can be expected that these three countries willcontinue to play a major role when fundamental

l. 2, no. 2, p. 4

decisions on ESDP are at stake, although harshcriticism by the other EU countries has beenvoiced. However, there will be no alternative toan informal directoire among the big three asthese countries have the sufficient political,economic and military weight to provide ESDPwith the necessary credibility.

The failure of the Brussels summit in December2003 to reach an agreement on theconstitutional treaty also affects the solutionsfound so far for ESDP. Apart from the Agencyand the creation of a civil/military cell attachedto the EUMS – which will come true irrespectiveof agreement on the constitution – it is inparticular structured cooperation and the mutualdefence clause that might fall victim to thedispute over the weighting of votes in theCouncil.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a clear will bythe member states to save the results of the IGCon ESDP even without a constitution. One ideawould be to include the programme of structuredcooperation into the new definition of theHeadline Goals, so that the member states couldfollow the different activities defined in the draftprotocol within project groups where interestedcountries would be engaged in specific areas forimproving their capabilities. As a last resort,even a Schengen-like solution of establishingstructured cooperation outside the EU would bepossible - compatible with the Union and alwaysready to be incorporated in the Treatyframework. But it implies the risk of creatingdurable structures and alienating insiders andoutsiders.

Even more difficult to handle is the issue ofmutual defence. Here, it is hardly thinkable thatsome countries would establish amongthemselves such a clause outside the Union,detached from any institutional and politicalframework. The future of the mutual defenceclause is therefore closely linked to the fate ofthe constitutional treaty.

At the moment, it remains unclear whichdirection will be followed. France hints at thepossibility that an avant-garde outside the EUcould be the outcome if the constitutional treatyfails to be adopted. Germany on the other handhas changed its position: Foreign Minister Fischerdeclared in a recent newspaper interview that heno longer regards the establishment of coregroups outside the EU as a viable option;instead, any effort should be undertaken tostrengthen the common institutional framework,whereby enhanced cooperation or structuredcooperation could help to advance the integration

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process.9

From this perspective, the search for intra-EUsolutions should be taken as a priority even if theconstitutional treaty will not soon become areality. If the agenda of structured cooperation isto be inserted into the new headline goals, itmust be assured that it will not be submergedwithin an inefficient, cumbersome andbureaucratic process, but will be organised in anidentifiable, effective and transparent manner.The initiative of the ‘Big Three’ is crucial forensuring that the respective commitments aretaken seriously. If they agree on a commonapproach, progress in ESDP will be possible evenwithout the adoption of the constitutionaltreaty.◊

1 See Udo Diedrichs and Mathias Jopp, ‘Flexible Modes ofGovernance. Making CFSP and ESDP Work’, The InternationalSpectator, Issue 3, 2003, pp. 15-30. 2 See the draft constitutional treaty, adopted on 13 June and10 July 2003, Brussels, 18 July 2003 (CONV 850/03). 3 See Meeting of the Heads of State and Government ofGermany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium on EuropeanDefence, Brussels, 29 April 2003. 4 See the Note by the Presidency, 9 December 2003, CIG60/03 ADD 1, pp. 31-35. 5 Article 1 of the Protocol on permanent structuredcooperation, see ibid. 6 See the wording of Article I-40(7), ibid. 7 See the Council document, ‘European Defence: NATO/EUConsultation, Planning and Operations’, Press release,Brussels, 15 December 2003. 8 See 2541st Council meeting, External Relations, Brussels,17 November 2003, 14500/03 (Presse 321). 9 See Berliner Zeitung, 28 February 2004; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 March 2004.

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CFSP and the Constitutional Hangover Simon Duke, Associate Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, The Netherlands

The failure of the 2003 IntergovernmentalConference (IGC) to reach agreement on theconstitution, at least for now, may not havebeen all negative. A pause may, for instance,allow for measured reflection and hopefullywider public engagement in the variousdebates surrounding the constitution. ForCFSP, however, this pause comes at a ratherawkward juncture since there are a number ofreal world challenges, recently set out in theEuropean Security Strategy, which need to beaddressed regardless of the lack of an agreedconstitution. Indeed, the chair of the EUMilitary Committee, Gustav Hägglund, publiclyruminated on why ‘other issues having nothingto do with defence’ should slow downprogress.1 The events of 2003 have alsoreinforced the notion that if Europe wishes tobe a ‘puissance politique’ as well as economic,then defence is an indispensable part.2 Whatare the implications of this impasse for thedevelopment of the CFSP and its integralsubset, the European Security and DefencePolicy (ESDP)?

Forward, march (anyway)

First, the good news: some notable CFSPreforms do not depend upon approval of theconstitution to go ahead. For instance,preparations have started to create an agencyin the field of defence capabilities,development, research, acquisition andarmaments.3 The aim is to have the agency,which the head of the European Aeronautic andSpace Company, Philip Camus, sees as‘crucial’, operational by the end of 2004.4

Although there are a number of challengesahead, such as establishing appropriatearrangements with other similar organisations(such as the Organisation Conjointe deCoopération en matière d’Armement [OCCAR],Western European Armaments Group-WesternEuropean Armaments Organisation [WEAG-WEAO] and the Letter of Intent [LoI] countries– some of which include non-EU members orare open to non-EU countries; see Table 1, p.9), the need for such an agency has long beenevident. Much will depend upon the willingnessof the EU member states to work with the

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agency whilst, somewhat awkwardly, ignoringthe stipulations of Article 296 of the treatyestablishing the European Community.5

On a practical level, associated with structuredand other forms of cooperation, a dispute aroseabout the need for a dedicated EU Planning Cellwhich was seen as an ‘absolute necessity’ byBelgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt.8 Key tothe ongoing debate was the United Kingdom,which, at least in the early days of the debates,appeared to have been irreversibly tarred with apro-Bush administration brush over Iraq.However, there was also recognition, mostnotably by French Foreign Minister Dominiquede Villepin, that any structured cooperationwould depend upon British participation for

Deliberations on ‘structured cooperation’ havebeen ongoing since June 2003, following aninitiative by Belgium, France, Germany andLuxembourg (whom Richard Boucher, US StateDepartment spokesman, derogatively termedthe ‘chocolate makers’). Initial oppositionstemmed both from familiar Atlanticistarguments, as well as more general concernsabout the desirability of an avant-garde ofmember states. However structured cooperationwas evaluated more positively following the Iraqimbroglio, which threatened to leave CFSP intatters. In addition, there is a wider realisationthat there are circumstances where it may beappropriate, or even desirable, for the EU to actalone even though, for a variety of reasons, notall EU member states will wish to be involved –a point underscored by imminent EUenlargement.

The often confusing language in the draftconstitutional treaty on structured cooperation(for instance, references to military capabilitiesfulfilling ‘higher criteria’ or to ‘the mostdemanding missions’, in Article I-40(6)) wasusefully clarified by the Italian Presidency toinclude more comprehensible procedures,criteria and indication of required militarycapacities.6 Under the draft constitutionaltreaty, the Council could entrust ‘theimplementation of a task to a group of MemberStates having the necessary capability anddesire to undertake the task’ (Articles I-40(5)and III-211). There is little reason why suchcooperation cannot be developed in the absenceof a constitution. Arguably, the latter alreadyhappens in the form of coalitions of the willing,while critical foundations for the former arebeing laid with the establishment of a closersecurity dialogue between France, Germany andthe UK.7

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military credibility. British participation was alsoneeded to sell it to Washington as somethingthat would not compete with NATO. Under anagreement reached on 11 December 2003between France, Germany and the UK, the EUwill have its own civil-military planning cell.However, provision was also made for lead-nation operations, based primarily aroundnational (or even multi-national) arrangements,as well as close liaison with NATO’sheadquarters, SHAPE, for Berlin Plus operations(in which NATO assets could be used by the EU).

In many ways the varying forms of cooperationfound in the draft constitutional treaty, with theexception of the stipulations on mutual defence,merely codify what is already happening de factoas has been seen in recent operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia and the Democratic Republic ofCongo. It is, though, important that the linkagebetween various forms of cooperation and theaims of the armaments agency (i.e. resourceissues for the short and long term) should bemade explicit - something the draft constitutionaltreaty did not do particularly well.

About turn?

The second main consideration applies to thoseways in which CFSP may have been weakened inthe absence of an agreed constitution. Thediscussions in the Convention, and even prior tothe Convention, identified the need for a UnionMinister for Foreign Affairs. The logic is that theUnion Minister could enhance consistency in EUexternal affairs as a whole – accompanied by theassumption of legal identity for the EU. Thetheme of consistency was underlined in theEuropean Security Strategy, adopted by theEuropean Council on 12 December 2003, whichnoted that ‘the challenge now is to bring togetherthe different instruments and capabilities:European assistance programmes and theEuropean Development Fund, military andcivilian capabilities from Member States andother instruments’ (p. 13).

It is of course possible to continue with thecurrent system, with all of its imperfections.However, this only prolongs the institutionaltensions between the Commission and Council,especially in areas where there are significantjoint responsibilities, such as conflict prevention,early warning, defence industrial issues, externalrepresentation and strategic guidance. The issueis not only confined to the highest levels since ithas implications for the EU’s external relations asa whole. For instance, the absence of a legalidentity for the EU continues the awkward fictionwhereby the Commission’s External Service

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represents the Community’s interests throughthe delegations, while the Presidency and HighRepresentative carry out many of the morepolitical and strategic aspects of externalrelations. In reality these roles have becomeincreasingly difficult to separate, especially withthe pressure on the External Service to addressan increasing number of political issues.

The lack of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairsand, as mentioned, a European External ActionService, will stymie the development of agenuine European corps diplomatique, whichwould not only represent the Union’s interests,but include member state diplomats as well.Until there is an agreed constitution, it isdifficult to see the Commission and Councilmoving towards anticipatory inter-institutionalarrangements, especially when they involvesuch sensitive ‘turf’ issues. Representation tothird parties will therefore continue to befragmented and confusing.

Under the draft constitutional treaty, the UnionMinister for Foreign Affairs would chair a ForeignAffairs Council which would have been, for themost part, outside a revamped rotatingPresidency. In its absence, the current six-month rotating Presidency system continues, asdo its inefficiencies, including the temptation ofthe Presidency to stamp its imprimatur on EUexternal relations, sometimes with fractiousresults (for instance, the Greek Presidency’swell-intentioned efforts to reach agreement onIraq, which only highlighted intra-EUdifferences, or Italian Prime Minister SilvioBerlusconi’s recent support for Russia overChechnya – a position not shared by other EUmember states).

The absence of suitable funding for operations,beyond the currently inadequate budget, mayfurther hamper CFSP, especially at a time whena follow-on operation to SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and possibly some form ofmonitoring in Moldova are under consideration.To avoid the financial scrabbling of the type thatwent on before the launch of the EU PoliceMission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (over relativelysmall amounts), the draft constitutional treatysuggested the need for a ‘start-up’ fund (ArticleIII-215) while the Convention discussed theneed for an emergency fund to be used by theUnion Minister for Foreign Affairs. Futurefunding provisions for CFSP will, in all likelihood,not fall neatly into categories of those‘operations having military and defenceoperations’ and those that do not (Article 28TEU). Most operations are likely to involvesubstantial military/police and civilian

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components. Even if the funding arrangementshave worked thus far, they are unlikely to do soin the event of a major operation, such as apossible EU follow-on to SFOR.

Close ranks

The third main reflection stems from the fact thatthe Convention was held ostensibly with EUenlargement in mind: what effect willenlargement have on CFSP in the absence of anagreed constitution? The indefinite prolongationof the current system, which has difficultiesworking at fifteen, may have two main effects.

First, it may encourage more ad hoc coalitionbuilding outside CFSP, especially by the larger EUmember states. Although the need for flexibleforms of cooperation is reflected in the draftconstitutional treaty, it is not clear how thebewildering array of forms of cooperation -ranging from structured cooperation (discussedabove) and enhanced cooperation (Article III-322-329), to entrusting tasks to a ‘group ofMember States’ (Article I-40.5), ‘closercooperation in mutual defence’ (Article I-40.7)and a solidarity clause in the event of a terroristattack or a man-made disaster (Article I-42.1) -will work. While these formulations recognisethat flexible arrangements (groups) areincreasingly necessary, they also have to bebalanced against the needs for coherence andsolidarity, and to develop the EU as an actor onthe international stage. The tensions betweenthe two aims was illustrated by the October 2003mission to Tehran by France, Germany and theUK: successes may be credited to individualmember states or groups, while failures reflecton CFSP, as was the case with Iraq.

Second, although the so-called ‘constructiveabstention’ device (Article 23 TEU/Article III-201) remains untested, it is perhaps more likelyto be called upon in decisions involving twenty-five member states. In this case if there is astated national reason for adoption of a decision,the onus would be on the European Council todecide matters by unanimity which wouldpresumably be rather difficult. On thosedecisions taken by QMV, the Nice system ofweighted votes may also introduce new politicaldynamics (‘not so old’ and ‘not so new’ Europes?)and exacerbate existing tendencies (such aslarge versus small state divisions) that areespecially evident in CFSP.

The problems of operating at twenty-five, absenta constitution, will call for innovation. The specialrole of the ‘Big Three’ in CFSP/ESDP issues is anunpleasant fact of life for many smaller member

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states. Yet, the positive aspects of such adirectoire need to be acknowledged. Thedifficulties of finding consensus at twenty-five ormore and the emergence of the directoire pointto the need for some form of an EU ‘SecurityCouncil’ which would reflect the role of some asprimus inter pares, whilst allowing participationby others on a rotating basis at less than twenty-five. This could represent significant headway inaddressing the twin challenges of leadership andconsistency that CFSP currently faces. This mightusefully be reflected in the ongoing discussionson the constitution.

Fall out

The context in which the debates on CFSP wereconducted in the Convention and IGC is of coursecrucial. The ramifications of ‘9-11’ continued toshape Washington’s security outlook, while thedebates prior to the US-UK military interventionin Iraq exposed not only transatlantic rifts, butconsiderable differences within Europe. However,it is also worth noting that in the midst of itsinternal disagreement the EU launched a policemission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, a militaryoperation in the Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia and a military operation in theDemocratic Republic of the Congo. It is of littlesurprise that these events led to polarconclusions: for some it symbolised CFSP’sdemise (no common, no security, no policy, butall foreign) while, for others, the divisions overIraq buttressed determination to make the EU aneffective and credible actor on the internationalstage.

The macro questions regarding what type ofrelations the EU and individual member stateswish to have with the US and others, the extentto which the EU will be proactive, the willingnessof the member states to spend more (and morewisely) on defence, and the strengthening ofpartnerships with other regional and internationalbodies, are questions that fell beyond the scopeof the IGC. These are admittedly complex issues,yet they must be addressed as an integral part ofany further moves towards a constitution. Mostfundamental of all is the question that theEuropean publics appear to have answeredaffirmatively, judging by the consistently highpublic support for CFSP and ESDP, but thepolitical elites less clearly: are the memberstates serious about creating an effective CFSPas an integral part of the EU’s external relations?

Critics of CFSP have long queried where the ‘P’part can be found. The European SecurityStrategy is an admirable contribution to acoherent external policy for the Union, while the

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creation of a new armaments agency mayreinforce the ‘S’ aspects. The ‘F’ aspects cancertainly be strengthened, which will involve thepotentially difficult task of balancing the need formore flexibility with greater consistency in EUexternal relations. However, the future of CFSPcontinues to rest upon the extent to which theMember States wish to be ‘C’. That is somethingthat does not depend upon the existence of aconstitution.◊ 1 Hufvudstadsbladet, quoted in http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=13914&sid=13 17 December 2003. 2 See Allocution du Ministre de la Défense, Michèle Alliot-Marie,sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2004 devant laCommission de la défense nationale et des forces armées,Paris - Assemblée nationale, le 30 septembre 2003,http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/communiques/2004/d030204/030204.htm 3 Council Decision creating a team to prepare for theestablishment of the agency in the field of defence capabilities

Table 1: EARMCA’s potential relations w

WEAG/WEAO

OCCAR

Letter of Intent

Austria

Belgium

Czech Republic

Denmark

FinlandGreece

Hungary

LuxembourgNetherlands

Poland

Portugal

Norway Turkey

Spain

Sweden

France

GermanyItaly

United Kingdom

* The Agency is open to all EU Member Sta

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development, research, acquisition and armaments,2003/834/EC, 17 November 2003. 4 Quote appears at http://www.euactiv/com/cgi-bin/cgint.exe, 15 November 2003. 5 The article does not oblige a member state to supplyinformation ‘the disclose of which it considers contrary tothe essential interests of its security’, and it permitsmember states to take such measures as they considernecessary ‘for the protection of the essential interests of itssecurity which are connected with the production of ortrade in arms, munitions and war material …’. The samearticle reappears as Article III-342 in the draftconstitutional treaty. 6 See Conference of the Representatives of theGovernments of the Member States, CIG 57/1/03, REV I,Annex II, Protocol on permanent structured cooperationestablished by Articles I-40(6) and III-213 of theConstitution, Brussels, 5 December 2003. 7 See James Blitz and Christopher Adams, ‘UK bolsters tieswith Germany and France’, Financial Times, 21 January2004. 8 Belgium stands firm over EU military HQ plans, 2September 2003, http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/030902115525.21u6krb2.

ith other Defence Capabilities Agencies

European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency*

Estonia

Ireland

Latvia

Lithuania

MaltaCyprus

Slovakia

Slovenia

tes wishing to be part of it

2, no. 2, p. 9

ITALY, ESDP AND THE AVANT-GARDE Giovanni Gasparini, Security and Defence Analyst, Aerospace and Defence Industry Analyst and Co-director, Transatlantic Programme on ESDP, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, Italy and Michele Comelli, Research Fellow on European Issues, IAI, Rome, Italy

On 13 December 2003, the IntergovernmentalConference (IGC), chaired by the ItalianPresidency, failed to adopt the draftconstitutional treaty, which has led to astalemate in the European integration process.The Italian Presidency had been activelypursuing changes to the draft constitutionaltreaty required to achieve a consensus from allgovernments and claimed to have reached anagreement on defence issues. Unfortunately, theoutcome of this diplomatic effort is far frombeing positive, since what has been agreed uponcannot be considered legally binding and somegovernments (including Ireland) already questionsome aspects of the defence agreement. TheItalian government, as well as a number ofprominent political personalities, includingPresident Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, is now activelystimulating and supporting the Irish Presidencyin its effort to create the political conditions forreopening successfully the IGC, probably duringthe second semester of 2004. In the meantime,the absence of a new institutional framework fordefence leaves the EU member states with onlythe rules established by the Treaty of Nice, whichexclude the use of enhanced cooperation in thedefence sector. This institutional vacuum has already had animpact on the strategy that each member stateis pursuing vis-à-vis the evolution of Europeandefence policy and capabilities. The most visibleconsequence is probably the setting up of ad hocinitiatives of a group of countries, a methodbacked particularly by France (the so-calledavant-garde). In any case, the establishment ofan advanced party is normal in defence matters,given the present intergovernmental character ofthe initiatives in this sector. Since the Franco-British meeting at Saint Malo in 1998, there hasbeen a long history of bilateral andintergovernmental meetings and initiatives tofacilitate the advancement of ESDP, in whichItaly has not often been included. Normally,

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these initiatives represent an opportunity for theprocess of European integration, as well as a riskfor the countries remaining outside of the hardcore, therefore the first reaction from theoutsider is usually negative. However, the settingup of groups of countries can also createdangerous divisions between the EU memberstates, which are particularly difficult tovercome once they are in place.

strong.

1)

o The Italian reaction to the so-called ‘mini defencesummit’ (between France, Gemany, Belgium andLuxembourg) on 29 April 2003 was quiteThere were three main reasons for this:

The Italian government is rather Atlanticistand wants European defence to be linked to

2)

who were most vocal in their opposition

3)

NATO.

The summit was called at a time when the EUmember states were deeply divided over theUS war in Iraq, and the countriesparticipating in the summit happened to bethose to it.

The format and the timing of the summitwere considered divisive.

Yet the Italian reaction to the developments inthe CFSP and ESDP domains brought about byagreements between the UK, France andGermany during the Italian Presidency was fairlypositive. Commenting on the visit by the ForeignMinisters of the ‘Big Three’ to Teheran on 21October, which led the Iranian government toagree to put its nuclear reprocessing activities onhold and to declare that it will sign up to moreintrusive inspections, Italian Minister of ForeignAffairs Franco Frattini asserted his support forthe initiative but said that Italy was ‘unable tojoin them in view of its position as EU President.’With regard to the agreements between the UK,France and Germany on the EU command andplanning cells, which led to general EUagreement prior to the Brussels EuropeanCouncil in December 2003, Frattini concludedthat the deal on defence demonstrated thatunilateral initiatives can easily be extended to allEU member states. Basically, Italy seemed to besatisfied with this agreement which was, afterall, struck during its Presidency. Italy’s absence,it was thought, had to do with the fact that Italywas in the sensitive position of holding the UnionPresidency.

However, Italy continued to be excluded fromthe ‘Big Three’ meetings. On 18 February 2004,German Chancellor Schroeder hosted a meetingin Berlin with his colleagues French President

. 2, no. 2, p. 10

Chirac and UK Prime Minister Blair. The issuesthat were discussed mainly concerned theeconomy and the Lisbon strategy and thedocument issued was rather narrow in scope.Nevertheless, the exclusion prompted strongreactions in Italy. Italian Prime Minister SilvioBerlusconi went so far as to label the meeting a‘mess’. The fear of being excluded from ‘coreEurope’ is deeply rooted in a country that hasbased its post-war foreign policy on theEuropean and Atlantic pillars. Even though thecurrent Italian government seems moreinterested in relations with the US than withFrance and Germany, exclusion from the coregroup is still looked upon with fear, whichaccounts for Berlusconi’s strong reaction.

With regard to the issue of structuredcooperation in the defence field outside theTreaties – this being the only viable option forenhanced cooperation on defence issues giventhe current stalemate in the adoption of the draftconstitutional treaty by the IntergovernmentalConference – Italy is not in principle opposed.Speaking before the Defence Committee of theItalian Senate on 18 February 2004, DefenceMinister Antonio Martino said that bi- and multi-lateral initiatives in the defence field, such as theAnglo-French-German reaction force, will not bedivisive provided they are open to theparticipation of all willing and able EU memberstates. This implies that Italy may want to takepart in this or similar initiatives. The ministeralso referred to a new initiative that Italy isabout to launch: the European Police Force(Forza di Gendarmeria Europea, FGE). Thisinitiative involves the creation of a Europeancapacity to integrate police and military policeforces, such as the French Gendarmerie, theItalian Carabinieri, the Spanish Guardia Civil, theDutch Marechaussee Royale Neerlandaise, forstabilisation and conflict prevention missions thatwould be available not only to the EU, but alsoto other multinational organisations such as theUN, NATO and the OSCE. Italy also offered tohost the multinational headquarters of the FGE.This kind of initiative is extremely important andshould be welcomed. Nevertheless, it is notenough. Such intergovernmental initiatives wouldhave a better impact if they were backed by anadequate legal framework, as proposed in thedraft constitutional treaty.

To understand the reasons why Italy is notalways part of the hard core, it is helpful toexamine the criteria for establishing who is in theavant-garde: political willingness and operationalability. In term of military capability, Italy lackssome key elements (such as force projectability,sustainability, numbers) compared to the two

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leading EU military powers, the British and theFrench, while Italian forces are relatively betteroff compared to German ones, particularly interms of usability and experience in missionsabroad. Therefore, Italy can give an importantcontribution to most defence initiatives, but it isot considered indispensable. n

The second criteria is less objective and moresubject to a different political evaluation: thecontinuous willingness to engage in furthercooperation and provide a positive contribution.In this area Italy probably suffers from acredibility gap, while Germany is understood tohave a clear advantage over Italy. There is awidespread perception that in internationalpolitical terms the added value of Italianparticipation is low. This (mis)perception couldbe changed only through a more active policytowards European defence, backed by a crediblecommitment of military capability to the EUroject. p

Italy must become proactive at the politicallevel. For example, during the Convention onthe Future of Europe, Italy tended to supportother countries’ initiatives in the defence field,without tabling independent contributions. Thesame happened during its Presidency of theUnion. In this case, the Italian governmentchose to adopt a low profile on many issues, soas not to be perceived as partial. Now that thePresidency has ended, Italy should be moreactive at the highest political level in the fieldsof CFSP and ESDP and, more generally, in theoverall process of European integration. Forexample, Italy should rely more on some of itspolitical assets within the EU. One of these is nodoubt the fact that it is a founding member ofthe European integration process. With politicalcommitment, Italy will be perceived as acredible and reliable partner and can play animportant role in European foreign, security anddefence policy. After its Presidency, Italy mustend its self-inflicted role as honest mediator andassume a far more assertive and positive role asa locomotive of European defence integration,st

imulating the participation of other countries.◊

. 2, no. 2, p. 11

More Heat Than Light: US Reactions to ESDP Wyn Rees, Reader in International Relations,

University of Nottingham, UK This article argues that the United States needsto adopt a more tolerant and less alarmistattitude towards European Union efforts toconstruct a meaningful defence capability. Thetendency to adopt a hard rhetorical line stemsfrom a lack of certainty on the part of the USabout what it wants from the European Securityand Defence Policy (ESDP). Does it want anascent strategic partner with whom it can shareburdens in the international system? Amongst allits allies, Europe offers the best prospects forthis but it will take some time to develop thenecessary strategic culture and militarycapabilities in the EU. Or does the US prefermilitarily weak and dependent allies? If so, itspolicy must be to constrain the development ofESDP. The argument advanced here is that thelatter strategy would be a mistake, but the USmay procure this result by default if it continuesto treat ESDP as a threat rather than anopportunity. Both self-interest and self-awareness wouldcounsel the US to be more accommodating toESDP initiatives. Self-interest in the sense thatthe US has exhibited an historical tendency toover-react on the subject of European defence.The compromises that evolve in the EU positiontend to draw back from the early maximalistproposals and, with the aid of hindsight, theinitial US reaction frequently appears overdone.For example, the notorious ‘Bartholomew Letter’of February 1991, in response to Franco-Germanproposals to subordinate the Western EuropeanUnion to the European Council, illustratedAmerica’s exaggeration of the risks to NATO.1

The vitriol of the US condemnation only serves toconfirm the arguments of European detractorsthat America wants to dominate the continent’ssecurity politics. In terms of self-awareness, the US should heedthe words of the parable and extract the plankfrom its own eye before attempting to removethe splinter from the eyes of the EU. The crisis inUS-European relations resulting from the warwith Iraq was acknowledged on both sides of theAtlantic as a potentially catastrophic experience.The disagreement represented a ‘perfect storm’in transatlantic relations as it was theculmination of long-standing differences between

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a group of European countries and the US overhow to deal with Iraq. No fair-mindedcommentator could exonerate Europeancountries of all blame in the affair, particularlyover France and Germany’s veto of support toTurkey. But the principal fault lay with the US,in its determination to oust the regime inBaghdad and the relentless speed with which itpursued that goal. In addition, the manner inwhich the current US Administration has raiseddoubts about NATO’s future role has played amajor role in unsettling the Alliance. In itsdesire to re-configure the Alliance to addressglobal security concerns, such as terrorism andthe proliferation of weapons of massdestruction, the US has called into question theutility of the organisation.

It is worth acknowledging that Americanconcerns about independent European defenceefforts have a long heritage and are notrestricted to the present administration. USSecretary of State Madeline Albright, in anarticle in the Financial Times on 7 December1998, responded to the creation of ESDP with awarning against ‘discrimination, duplication andde-coupling’. In Washington there is currently adiversity of perspectives on ESDP, but echoes ofearlier concerns persist. In 2003, theseconcerns were exacerbated by twodevelopments. One was the summit betweenFrance, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg inApril 2003. This signalled the ambitions of thesecountries to make strides in defence cooperationthat appeared incompatible with NATO. WhereasEU defence efforts were supposed to besubordinated to NATO primacy through the‘Berlin Plus’ agreements (where Alliance assetswould be made available for European-ledoperations), the summit talked of creatingcapabilities that would facilitate greaterautonomy. The sensitivity of these proposalswas heightened by transatlantic tensions overIraq.

Second, and linked to the April summit, the EUconstitutional debate in 2003 led to substantiveproposals on European defence that the US waspowerless to influence. The contentious issue ofa separate EU planning capacity was raised,which risked both duplicating NATO’s ownfunctions and exacerbating the problem ofcoordinating future operations between the twoorganisations. The US Ambassador to NATO,Nicholas Burns, reacted angrily and warned of athreat to the very survival of the Alliance.2

However, the resulting compromise went a longway to reassure the US about EU intentions.Only a token planning ‘cell’ has been authorised

. 2, no. 2, p. 12

for the EU to enable civil-military expertise fromwithin the Union to be grafted on to anoperation. The cell will stand aside in favour ofnational planning frameworks – the most likelyscenario if NATO did not want to lead in anoperation. The cell will only be strengthenedand transformed into a full-scale planningcentre if all the alternatives have been rejectedand even then it would only exist on an ad hocbasis until that task had been completed.Counter-balancing the establishment of theplanning cell, an important EU-NATO liaison hasbeen authorised which will see military stafffrom each organisation embedded in the other.3

It is intended that, over time, this will enable anew modus operandi to develop between NATOand the EU. A second proposal which was raised in thedebate over the EU constitution was to allow‘structured cooperation’: namely, groups of EUmembers would be able to proceed on defenceissues at a faster pace. This was a significanttopic that had been raised previously in the EU,such as at the Nice European Council, but neveragreed upon. The April summiteers increasedthe saliency of the matter by warning that theywere willing to pursue cooperation outside theEU if they found their progress blocked. The USfeared that the emergence of directoires indefence could undermine, rather than bolster,European strength. Yet the real danger is that ofEuropean paralysis and lack of effort indefence,4 rather than countries acting as anavant-garde. Britain, despite its traditionalsensitivity on these issues, came to embracestructured cooperation because it realised thatthere was a place for specialist contributions inthe building of ESDP. The British governmentrecognised that ESDP had to be built from thebottom up through the accumulation of avariety of contributions from EU members. TheUK proviso was that certain reassurances werewritten into the package, such as the ability ofall states to join forms of structured cooperationat any stage. The sort of pragmatism exhibited by the UK isconsistent with the US objective for ESDP – thatit should be focused upon capabilities and notdistracted with endless institutional posturing.The yardstick the US should employ towardsESDP is whether European initiatives serve toenhance the Union’s capacity to act in differenttypes of military operations. Steinbergemphasises the ‘crucial necessity for Europe todevelop at least some “high–end” militarycapabilities to allow European forces to operate

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effectively with the United States’.5 The US hasbeen right to impress upon its allies the need forimprovements both in overall defenceexpenditure and on priority areas within defencebudgets. Washington was a prime motivatorbehind the Defence Capabilities Initiative in 1999and the Prague Capabilities Commitment in2002, which sought to address weaknesses inEuropean armed forces.6 EU agreement such asthe creation of an armaments agency should bewelcomed by the US as it is a step towardsrationalising the Union’s defence research andprocurement processes. The scaremongers in Washington need toappreciate that ESDP will offer the EU, for theforeseeable future, only a modest militarycapability. To conduct high intensity militaryoperations at any distance from their hometerritories, the Europeans will need militaryassets from the United States and will want thereassurance of acting alongside a superpower.Past examples, such as NATO’s use of force inBosnia and Kosovo, bear this out. Recentexperiences are also consistent with this view.The EU ‘Concordia’ mission in Macedonia involvedthe takeover of a military mission from theAlliance and the borrowing of operational assets.If Concordia were to degenerate into conflict,then the EU would look rapidly to NATO forassistance. Similarly, the proposed follow-on EUpeacekeeping force in Bosnia, after the cessationof SFOR, will demand the closest possible liaisonbetween the two organisations. In short, USleadership in major military operations will notbe put at risk by ESDP. This is not to argue that the US is paranoid inrelation to ESDP. Washington is only too awareof different ambitions towards ESDP amongst EUmembers. Countries such as France antagoniseAmerica by talking about the need for a multi-polar world to counterbalance the solesuperpower. They are also eager to fosterdevelopments that would create separateEuropean military options. France has argued forsome time that Europe should possess militarycapabilities that would enable it to actindependently of the Alliance. In suchcircumstances, it would be harder to justify aNATO right of first refusal to stage a militaryoperation and it would undercut the leadershiprole of the United States. Viewed from thisperspective, the de-coupling of the US fromEuropean defence could be engineered by acorrosive process rather than a single policydecision.

l. 2, no. 2, p. 13

But it is contended here that the Washingtonshould take a robust and balanced attitudetowards EU proposals. The US can takecomfort in the knowledge that there is neitherthe strength in Europe to challenge Americanor the prospect of it being developed throughincreases in European defence spending. Thereis also a lack of political will amongst all theleading European states to realise such anambition. Washington can trust the Britishgovernment to veto any initiatives that wouldundermine NATO. The British are vitalparticipants in any meaningful ESDP and theyact as a brake on developments that would riskalienating the US from European security.◊

Recently-published and foarticles on European foreig Please send details of new publications to for Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson, eds. EUto Symbol. Manchester University Press, Christopher Hill, ‘Renationalising or ReSeptember 2001’, Journal of Common2004. Britta Joerissen and Bernhard Stahl, edsIdentität :Verglechende Diskurs- und VeDeutschland, Frankreich, Griechenland, I

uenster, 2003.

M

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1 See W. Rees, The Western European Union at theCrossroads: Between Trans-atlantic Solidarity and EuropeanIntegration, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1998, p.80 2 A. Browne and M. Evans, ‘Rumsfeld Attacks EU Defence Planas Threat to NATO’, The Times, 1 December 2003, p.13. 3 Agence Presse, ‘Agreement on Permanent Units for PlanningEU’s Military and Civil Operations’, No. 8605, 13 December2003, p.5. 4 This point is made by I. Daalder and J. Goldgeier, ‘PuttingEurope First’, Survival, vol. 43, no. 1, Spring 2001, p.80. 5 J. Steinberg, ‘An Elective Partnership: Salvaging TransatlanticRelations’, Survival, vol. 45, no. 2, Summer 2003, p.129. 6 Heads of State and Government participating in the NorthAtlantic Council, Washington Summit Communique,Washington DC, 24 April 1999, and Declaration by the Headsof State and Government participating in the North AtlanticCouncil, Prague, 21-22 November 2002.

rthcoming books and n policy

net@fornet.info.

Development Cooperation: From Model 2004.

grouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 1, March

nd national. Europäeische Aussenpolitik u rhaltensstudie zu Dänemark, talien un den Niederlanden. Lit Verlag

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