ASSESSING PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY BY

EXECUTIVE AGENCIES TO THE PUBLIC IN TANZANIA

By

Hanif Tuwa

M.A. (Political Science and Public Administration) Dissertation

University of Dar es Salaam

June, 2009

i

i

ASSESSING PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY BY

EXECUTIVE AGENCIES TO THE PUBLIC IN TANZANIA

By

Hanif Tuwa

A Dissertation Submitted in (Partial) Fulfilment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Arts (Political Science and Public Administration) of the

University of Dar es Salaam

University of Dar es Salaam

June, 2009

DEDICATION

For My Children, Thuraiya and Saleem

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms

List of Tables and Figures

Acknowledgements

Abstract

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TANZANIAN PUBLIC

SERVICE …………………………………………………………………...……….1

1.1 Context and Background of the Problem …………………………...………..1

1.2 Research Problem ……..…………………………………………………..... 5

1.3 Objectives of the Study ………………………………………………………6

1.4 Research Questions …………………………………………………………..6

1.5 Justification of the Study ………………………………………………..……7

1.6 Organization of the Study ……………………………………………………7

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON “AGENCIFICATION”, ITS EFFECTS

ON AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY.......................................9

2.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………….……9

2.2. The Executive Agency Model ……………………………………………...10

2.3 Perspectives on ‗Agencification‘, its Effects on and Implications for

Accountability in the Public Sector …………………………...………….. 13

2.4 Conceptual Framework ………………………………………………….. 20

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..……………………….27

3.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………………27

3.2 Qualitative Research Design ……………………………………………….27

3.3 Scope of the Study ………………………………………………………….29

3.4 Target Population and Characteristics of Respondents ……………………..29

3.5 Data Collection: Sources of Data and Methods of Collection ……………..31

3.6 Data Handling and Analysis ……………………………………………….32

3.7 Limitations and Challenges Encountered …………………………………..33

CHAPTER FOUR: FORMATION, ORGANIZATION AND AUTONOMY

OF EXECUTIVE AGENCIES UNDER

INVESTIGATION ………………………………………...34

4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………....34

4.2. Institutional Characteristics of Executive Agencies under Investigation…..34

4.2.1 Case I: The National Housing and Building Research Agency (NHBRA)…34

4.2.2 Case II: The Tanzania Foods and Drugs Authority (TFDA)……….…….....36

4.2.3. Some Comparative Notes on the Two Agencies …………………………...38

4.3. Relative Autonomy of the Two Agencies …………………….…………….38

4.3.1. Financial Independence of the Two Agencies ……………………………...39

4.3.2. Operational Discretion of the Two Agencies ……………………………….42

4.3.3. Authority and Control over the Employees ………………………………...46

CHAPTER FIVE: STATUS OF VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY …….…50

5.1. Introduction ……...……………………………………………………........50

5.2. Monitoring Performance of the Two Agencies ……………………………51

5.3. Performance Reporting by the Two Agencies …………………………….56

CHAPTER SIX: THE “AGENCY-PUBLIC” INTERFACE AND THE

STATUS OF HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY …...61

6.1. Introduction …………………………………………………………………61

6.2. Interface of the Two Agencies and the Public ……………………………...62

6.3. Extent of Agencies‘ Responsiveness to the Public ………………………....75

6.4. Potential of the Public to make the Two Agencies Accountable ………..….80

6.5. Propensity of the Public to make the Two Agencies Accountable …………83

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Introduction …………………………………………………………….…...85

7.2. The Impact of ‗Agencification‘ on Performance Accountability ………..…85

7.3. Factors Affecting Levels of Accountability of the Agencies...88

7.4. Recommendations …………………………………………………………..90

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………….92

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACEOs Agency Chief Executive Officers

ADDO Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlet

CSRP Civil Service Reform Programme

DAP Director of Administration and Personnel

DFID Department for International Development

DUCE Dar es Salaam University College of Education

EAP Executive Agency Programme

ESRF Economic and Social Research Foundation

GOT Government of Tanzania

MAB Ministerial Advisory Board

MDAs Ministries, Departments and Agencies

MLHSD Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement Development

MOHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare

NHBRA National Housing and Building Research Agency

NHBRU National Housing and Building Research Unit

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPRAS Open Performance Review Appraisal System

OPSR Office of the Public Service Reform

PO-PSM President‘s Office Public Service Management

PSRP Public Service Reform Programme

QMS Quality Management System(s)

TFDA Tanzania Foods and Drugs Agency

URT United Republic of Tanzania

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

Table3.1: Respondents …………………………………………………….………. 30

Table.6.1: Information Delivery Channels of the Two Agencies…………………. 63

Table6.2: Feedback Mechanisms Available in the Two Agencies ……………..…. 69

Table6.3: Rate of Use of NHBRA‘s Construction and Consultancy Services ….. 72

Table6.4: Customers‘ Ranking of Service Delivery Improvements…………..…. 75

Table6.5: Customers‘ Satisfaction with Services of the Two Agencies……...……. 76

Table6.6: Customers‘ Satisfaction with Specific Attributes of Service Delivery by

the Two Agencies ……………………………………………..……….. 78

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure1.1: The Legal-Institutional Framework for Executive Agency Accountability

in Tanzania…....................................................................................... 25

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank my supervisor, Prof. Samuel S. Mushi, for his help to shape the raw ideas and

his confidence in my ability for independent thinking.

I acknowledge the contribution of my colleague, Bruno Godfrey, for sharing with me

the agonies of academic life throughout the Masters‘ programme. I thank even more

deeply, my soul mate, Mwanahamisi Salimu for her love.

My appreciation is to the Head of Political Science and Public Administration

Department at the Dar es Salaam University College of Education (DUCE), Mr.

Frank Mateng‘e, for his patience and understanding of the need for thinking space

outside my work station, especially during the write-up stages.

I thank the Chief Executive Officers of the National Housing and Building Research

Agency (NHBRA) and the Tanzania Foods and Drugs Agency (TFDA) for granting

the permission to interview their staff and access some of their documents and

publications. I recognize the facilitative roles by Mr. Mazanda (NHBRA), and Mr.

Usingizimali P. Matagi and Mr. James Ndege (both of TFDA). The same goes to the

officials from the Ministry of Lands and Ministry of Health for their cooperation.

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to all of the respondents who took time to

provide their views as requested by the researcher.

ABSTRACT

Despite the increased visibility of executive agencies in Tanzania, the key question

about their accountability to the public remains unanswered. To fill the gap, the study

assessed the extent to which agency autonomy has affected performance

accountability of two agencies, namely the National Housing and Building Research

Agency (NHBRA) and Tanzania Foods and Drugs Agency (TFDA), to the

Government and the public. Data was collected through documentary analysis, a

small survey of agencies‘ customers, and interviews with agency managers and staff,

as well as officials of the Ministries of Lands and Health.

This study established that the process of ―agencification‖ has increased autonomy of

the two agencies but it has not contributed to enhanced agencies‘ responsiveness to

their customers. Instead, ―agencification‖ has weakened ministerial control over the

agencies, attributable to faulty framework stipulated in the Executive Agencies Act

of 1997 and little interest shown by the Ministries to monitor the agencies

effectively, which also has not been reinforced by customers‘ (or public‘s)

willingness and ability to make the agencies responsive. The overall low levels of

performance accountability have been influenced by weak accountability framework,

commitment of agency leadership to make their organizations responsive, and

customers‘ dispositions towards exerting pressures for the agencies to perform.

It is recommended that incentives for agency performance and disincentives for

Ministries‘ disinterest in effective monitoring need to be devised; Parliament should

play a more active role in oversight of the agencies, and public disclosure of

information on agency performance should be made obligatory to all agencies.

1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TANZANIAN

PUBLIC SERVICE

1.1. Context and Background of the Problem

The ways governments organize themselves to undertake their functions have always

been changing in response to changing needs and demands (Rugumyamheto,

2004:437). In the immediate post-independence period, the Government of Tanzania

(GOT) adopted reform measures that addressed three important needs: First, there

was need to create a machinery to handle new responsibilities occasioned by the

country‘s independent statehood, hence the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

Ministry/Department of Defense. Second, the need for the Government to spearhead

socio-economic development in response to the citizens‘ expectations. This entailed

setting new organizational units at the centre and local levels as well as establishing

service delivery points. Third, the need to build from scratch a cadre of public

service personnel to occupy new and expanded functions so as to create an adequate

human resource capacity (Rugumyamheto, 2005:6).

During this period (1962 to early 1970s), the civil service was small, but efficient,

effective, and less vulnerable to administrative vices than today (Mukandala, 1990).

After the country adopted socialism in 1967 and state-controlled economy became a

strategy for its development, GOT became the key provider of social services and

actor in socio-economic development. As GOT over-stretched its capacity to provide

2

services free of charge or at subsidized prices, the quality of those services received

less attention than the broader goal of achieving equity among various groups in the

society. Eventually, by late 1970s, performance and integrity of the civil service had

begun to drastically degenerate partly due to dysfunctional accountability system

which allowed widespread embezzlement, corruption and other administrative vices

(Shelukindo and Baguma, 1993; Teskey and Hooper, 2003; Therkilsen, 2000).

In its attempt to reverse the deteriorating economic situation in the 1980s, GOT seen

an urgent need for wider institutional reforms to speed up the recovery process.

Reform of financial institutions, the public enterprise sector and the civil service

became a government priority (Ntukamazina, 2001). There emerged a ‗consensus‘

among Tanzania‘s development partners that the shift towards a free-market

economy, where the private sector was to serve as engine for growth, needed to be

reflected in the structure and size of the nation‘s public service. This consensus

informed the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) whose implementation

spanned the period 1993 to 1999 with the support from basket funding by

development partners. The CSRP focused on cost-containment, re-definition of

Government‘s role and functions, and restructuring of the Government.

Despite the achievements recorded under CSRP, it was realized that there was still a

need to translate the structural and institutional reforms into improved service

delivery to the people (World Bank, 1999). Three arguments were put forth for a

more comprehensive program which has longer-term perspective. First, the nature of

the problem changed because after downsizing and achieving macro-economic

3

stability, the need to impose further cost-containment lessened. Second, political

pluralism amplified citizens‘ demands for improved service delivery, which begged

for a broader focus. Third, as public expenditure collection increased, cost-cutting

became less relevant. These changes led to a need for a reform initiative that would

focus intensively on service delivery improvements (PO-PSM, 2008).

The Public Service Reform Programme‘s (2000-2011) strong focus on service

delivery improvement and emphasis on institutional pluralism in the delivery of

public service provided the basis for continued implementation of the Executive

Agencies Programme (EAP) which began as part of the restructuring initiative under

CSRP. The EAP aims to transform Government structures and role by placing its

non-core functions to semi-autonomous executive agencies within the ambit of the

Ministries. Implementation of the EAP began in 1996 with support from the

development partners, especially the United Kingdom Government‘s Department for

International Development (DFID) following the Cabinet‘s approval.

The Executive Agencies were given a mandate ―to act as means for the Government

to improve the delivery of public services which lead to better quality and greater

efficiency, more value for money and augmented capacity for continuous

improvement‖ (URT, 2001: 22). The formation of Executive Agencies was based on

the argument that it was effective for addressing perceived problems of democratic

accountability and increasing efficiency in delivery of public services. Politically, the

agencies are seen as one method for creating more flexible and responsive public

services in order to maintain popular support for the government. In policy terms,

4

agencies are viewed as rationalizing tools because they specify the goals and means

of policy implementation (Talbot, et al 2000).

Lessons drawn from many countries reveal that executive agencies raise serious

governance challenges. This is partly because there are often diverse motives

underpinning agency creation, and upon their establishment some significant changes

tend to occur to the traditional notion of accountability in the public service. Some

other motives include: the need by state leaders to create conditions for political

patronage outside the normal civil service rules (Varela, 1995), the desire by public

managers to escape political scrutiny by yielding more autonomy (Laking, 2002),

and to benefit from training opportunities and attractive remuneration packages that

comes with the agency status (ESRF, 2004:14).

On the one hand, these diverse motives for agency creation indicate potential risks

that can jeopardize the mission of achieving an efficient and effective public service,

especially when the system of accountability is inappropriate or dysfunctional. On

the other hand, the changes in accountability system have raised concerns, whether

they have positive or negative impact on government accountability to the public.

The GOT considers executive agencies as critical part of its efforts to reform the

Public Service because they are assumed to bring about clarity of roles and functions,

management of financial and human resources and lines of accountability. These

attributes are assumed to cause improved access to services, speedier delivery of

services than before, service with customer-focus, and participation of the public in

service improvement through feedback. The GOT anticipates executive agencies to

5

become a model for the rest of the public services in client orientation, result-

oriented management and public accountability.

However, the PSRP has so far produced mixed results. While service delivery levels

for many executive agencies are reported to have increased, the increase is only

moderate without adequate evidence of service quality improvement (PO-PSM,

2005a). Moreover, delays in service provision and low quality results are still very

prevalent and rate of citizens‘ dissatisfaction is relatively high. Ethical conduct

within the Public Service is ranked very low due to corruption and self-

interestedness of public servants (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006).

The Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) has delegated substantial authority

of Government Ministries to the executive agencies. This raises serious concern

given the risks involved such as rent-seeking, monopoly, abuse of power and so forth

(Posner, 2007). Thus far, there has not been an in-depth inquiry to assess the impact

of ―agencification‖ on public accountability in Tanzania. To fill this research gap,

this study analyzes the appropriateness of the legal and institutional frameworks in

facilitating accountability of the agencies, and explores the effect of autonomy on

accountability of two selected agencies charged with the responsibilities of

protecting and promoting public health (TFDA) and providing quality, low-cost

shelter (NHBRA).

1.2. The Research Problem

Despite the growing presence and importance of executive agencies in provision of

public services and regulation in Tanzania, whether and the extent to which these

6

agencies are accountable to the public remain not only unknown but also uncertain

due to the potential risks stated above. This study therefore sought to assess the

extent to which ―agencification‖ has improved the accountability of the Public

Service.

1.3. Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study was to investigate whether and to what extent the

executive agencies in Tanzania are accountable to the public.

More specifically, the aim was to:

1. Establish whether the governance frameworks of executive agencies in

Tanzania have facilitated performance accountability of the two agencies;

2. Assess how increased autonomy of the executive agencies has affected

performance accountability of the two agencies (whether positively or

negatively);

3. Explore salient factors that affect accountability of the agencies;

4. Recommend ways to improve public accountability of the executive agencies.

1.4. Research Questions

To achieve the objectives stated above, the following three questions guided the

inquiry:

1. What is the impact of increased autonomy on accountability?

2. What factors determine the levels of accountability of the agencies?

7

3. Do the existing legal and institutional frameworks facilitate or constrain

agencies‘ accountability?

1.5. Justification for the Study

In contemporary democracies, public administration is an essential tool for good

governance (Carlos, 2005). The importance of this study stems foremost from the

fact that it deals with accountability which is among the widely accepted principles

of effective public administration. The GOT has made numerous efforts to improve

governance in the past two decades, the most recent of those efforts being formation

of the executive agencies. Experiences from other countries have however revealed

variability of what the executive agency can or cannot achieve. These experiences do

not show conclusively that ―agencification‖ improves or does not improve

accountability of the public service. This study sheds more light on the

―agencification‖-accountability equation, at least in the Tanzanian context.

1.6. Organization of the Study

This dissertation has seven chapters. Chapter one has introduced the study by a way

of contextualizing the problem of deficit performance accountability in the

Tanzanian Public Service. It has also stated the research problem and provided study

questions. Chapter two presents the theoretical literature on the ―agencification‖-

accountability relationship. Chapter three discusses the methodology of the study.

Chapter four gives details on the formation and organizational characteristics of the

two case studies, and examines their relative autonomy. Chapter five analyzes the

legal and institutional frameworks, under which vertical accountability of the

8

agencies is examined. Chapter six examines the interface between the agencies and

their customers to determine its implication on horizontal accountability. Chapter

seven makes a conclusion of the main findings of the study and the factors that

affected the level of accountability of the two agencies, and recommends changes in

the legal and institutional framework in order to improve accountability of the

executive agencies in Tanzania.

9

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON “AGENCIFICATION”, ITS EFFECTS

AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

2.1 Introduction

The way governments conduct their business has witnessed radical changes in the

twenty-first century, with ‗agencification‘ increasingly becoming the most

fashionable alternative service delivery strategy (Talbot, 2000; Office of Public

Service Reform, OPSR, 2002). By mid-1990s, a number of European countries,

especially members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) and North America, had opted for the agency model as the principal

organizational type for public service delivery (James, 2003; Laking, 2000; OECD,

1997). Many governments in the developing countries have also taken up this New

Public Management-type of reform initiative (Polidano, 1999). Despite the apparent

popularity of this new model, there is still a hot debate among scholars on whether

―agencification‖ enhances accountability.

Objectives of this chapter are twofold: first, to discuss the underpinning ideas of the

Executive Agency Model. Secondly, to discuss the two contending perspectives on

the impact of ―agencification‖ on accountability with a view to drawing a conceptual

guide for empirical analysis of the Tanzanian case studies. We shall first look at the

reasons for the entry of the executive agency model as a public service delivery tool.

10

2.2.The Executive Agency Model

Civil Service has conventionally been a large, unified ministerial-type entity that

handles diverse governmental functions. The unified system, being so big and

diverse, imposed a serious handicap on the three ‗Es‘ of managerial efficacy, namely

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. The strains noted by governments in Europe

during the 1970s include: work overload to ministers and top management staff;

insufficient attention given to delivery of services; a lack of clear lines of

responsibilities and accountability; and absence of sustained pressure to perform

(OECD, 1997). These structural weaknesses led these governments to reassess which

functions require to be undertaken directly within ministerial departments and which

could work better if hived-off and run by separate entities outside ministerial

structures, but subject to overall ministerial guidance.

From thence, executive agencies have been created to address those key weaknesses

in the delivery of public services. They are seen as tools of unbundling the

bureaucracy by separating policy from operations and then locating the latter in new

structures outside the ministerial structure. The Executive Agency Model has now

been adopted by many countries as strategy for public service delivery.

The Executive Agency Model is very flexible. Its main feature is autonomy:

provided agency managers work within the strategic direction set by ministers to

whom they are accountable for policy outcomes, the agency has adequate discretion

over its operations and flexibility in allocation and use of resources (Efficient Unit,

1988). It thus provides greater delegated authority to the Agency Chief Executive

11

Officers (ACEOs), who take ultimate responsibility for the working of the Agency.

Powers of the ACEOs include making input decisions, setting flexible rules and

standards of operations, and controlling and disciplining the staff of the agency.

Furthermore, the model gives the ACEO discretion in using resources and upgrading

the financial and management systems and skills available within the agency. Thus

the agency prepares its financial forecasts according to ‗generally accepted

accounting practice‘, and with an obligation to provide financial statements to the

minister at agreed intervals. In addition, the agency must produce and submit an

audited record of the agency‘s performance in accordance with its approved

corporate and annual business plans.

The model assumes that greater freedom and authority is indispensable to

accountability and improved outputs. The overall responsibility for performance rests

with the ACEO. It is assumed that the agency will be more customer-oriented than

the ministerial bureaucracy and that it will remain accountable to the minister

responsible for the service delivered (OPSR, 2002:5). The minister does not however

interfere in day-to-day running of the organization.

The model provides for ACEO‘s strategic engagement with the ministry so as to

facilitate a shared understanding of overall and cross-cutting objectives, and to

remove obstacles and restrictions on agency freedom to make effective choices for

improved performance. Ministers retain the right to alter the system and reorganize

the status of executive agencies, including power to abolish them (James, 2003).This

authority is supposed to be a disincentive for low performance by the ACEOs and

12

staff of their organizations. Operationally, the ACEO acts as a contracted officer and

the Permanent Secretary as the enforcer of performance agreement and reviewer of

performance. Performance agreements replace the conventional public service ethic

of trust, the failure to deliver the set outputs may lead to ACEO's removal. Staff

accountability for operational performance within the agency rests with the ACEO.

Separating the agency from the traditional ministerial structure is considered

important to allow specification and specialization of the government executive

tasks. It is held that service delivery is a distinct function from policy making, which

can be performed better if it does not compete for attention with policy issues (ADB,

2000). The agency can then focus on improving quality of outputs to meet public

expectations. The agency, therefore, becomes responsive to its customers and the

general public. The separation of policy from operational functions assumes two

conditions. The first is that the function of service delivery should not give rise to

policy issues that necessitate interventions from the government ministry. The

second is that the policy on service delivery must be specified in sufficient detail and

in terms that allow close monitoring of its implementation.

The executive agency model has at least three main weak points. First, it assumes a

clear-cut separation of policy and operations. Secondly, it overlooks the likelihood

that the separation could create a risk of agency capture by private interests, other

than politicians and public servants who are its allies. Whilst separation of policy and

operations can reduce the eminent risk of capture by public interest, it

simultaneously creates a risk of capture by private interests. For example, Kozak and

13

McCartney (1987) established the dominance of corporate interest groups in the

Congress policymaking, making most policies to be tailored to suit or accommodate

corporate interests which compromise broader public interests. Thirdly, arguments

behind the model are not well supported by hard evidence that multi-purpose

agencies perform less well or are less readily held to account than the single-purpose

agencies (ADB, 2000:191).

2.3. Perspectives on „Agencification‟, its Effects and Implications for

Accountability in the Public Sector

―Agencification‖ implies substantial change in the framework and processes of

accountability within the public service. This is mainly attributed to the shifts of

control over operational matters from the ministry, which is left with responsibility

over policy formulation and takes on oversight role (―hands-off, eyes-on‖), for a

detached and increasingly autonomous agency. The model is built on theoretical

assumptions that accountability is possible despite its autonomy, but researchers log

horns when addressing the question whether after their formation executive agencies

become more accountable for their performance to their key stakeholders and the

general public.

Two perspectives have emerged, based on several arguments. The first asserts that

policy-operations separation increases transparency. The first argument is that under

the separation, tasks and responsibilities are clarified, which makes accountability

easier as political principals (ministers) can maintain pressure for improvement

(Efficient Unit, 1988). With the principals relieved from operational tasks, they can

14

more effectively monitor activities and performance and evaluate the outputs in the

light of policy outcomes they set. Performance monitoring mechanisms like

performance audits are said to be critical and helpful to ensure agencies do what they

are required promptly, efficiently and in accordance with acceptable standards. As

Cook (2003:14) asserts, a core aspect of the Agency Model, as practised in New

Zealand, is the strong focus on performance audits, which has made it possible to

hold agency managers accountable for the delivery of specified services.

The second argument is that separation of policy and operational functions reduces

the risk of public organizations being captured by self-interests of politicians and

bureaucrats, which is likely to happen when they exist within the same domain. By

making agencies separate and independently working entities, without any political

roles and ties with the ministries, save for general policy directions, public interests

would be secured (ADB, 2000).

The third argument is that creation of agencies can improve accountability through

performance contracting. The logic of performance contracting is that formal or

quasi-formal contracts based on clarified roles, responsibilities, and explicit key

performance targets allow the portfolio ministry to embed a results-oriented focus

that supplants the traditional bureaucratic emphasis on inputs and procedures. An

additional argument, drawn from institutional economics is that contracts make it

possible to specify agency results in terms of outputs or outcomes which permit the

portfolio ministry, the legislature and citizens themselves to look at the set

performance targets and determine easily the extent to which they were achieved.

15

The fourth argument is that decentralized management brings the service providers

and users within each other‘s easy reach (Kaul, 1997; OPSR, 2002). It provides

opportunity for consumers of public services to exert direct pressure on the agencies

towards increased responsiveness. The Service Quality Charters or Client Service

Charters are increasingly used to bridge the gap between agencies and consumers of

their services. Agencies' customer-focus orientation is made possible by consultative

engagement with the public, thereby providing greater public access to their

operations and performance. It gives agencies a chance to receive feedback through

formal complaints procedures which provide the basis for improvement. As feedback

increases, the agencies' responsiveness also increases.

The second perspective, in contrast with the previous one, sees organizational

separation from ministerial structures and increased autonomy to agency managers as

fragmenting the framework for their accountability to the Government and the

public. McKinlay (2000:219) argues against the policy-operations dichotomy,

stressing that it tends to disrupt feedback mechanism between policy makers and

policy implementers. When these, practically interlocking and preferably

complimentary activities are disaggregated into two separate domains, ‗a serious and

continuous‘ accountability gap in the public sector is created.

The separation is seen as giving policymakers a chance to avoid responsibilities and

find solace in blaming agency activities. As for agency managers, they may disregard

policies from central ministries, sound or otherwise, which creates risks of corruption

and other administrative vices. Segsworth (2003:6) illustrates this argument with a

16

concrete example from the United Kingdom (UK), where the Home Secretary

refused to accept responsibility for a number of prison breaks and prison suicides and

instead sacked the Director General of Her Majesty‘s Prison Service (an Agency).

The Minister, Michael Howard, argued that the appointed Director General should be

accountable for short-term operational matters while he, the Minister, should be held

responsible for longer-term policy.

It is further argued that ‗agencification‘ weakens the system of political control

through the minister, as it compromises ministerial accountability to public

institutions like the legislature (Pollitt, 2001; McKinlay, 2000). For many scholars in

this perspective, clear separation of policy and operations is fictitious, and even when

achieved, it causes problems in coordination. In its Agency Policy Review, the UK‘s

Office of the Public Service Reform (OPSR) reported an increasing gap whereby the

operations of executive agencies had become disconnected from the aims of their

ministries (OPSR, 2002), thereby creating an accountability gap. Again, it is argued

that executive agencies tend to undermine public accountability because they gain

the upper hand while political principals like the legislature end up receiving vague

information from the ministry. The shift of control over operational matters and

information strengthens the agency managers to the extent of undermining the

system of public accountability (Sterick and Scheers, 2003; James, 2004; Moynihan,

2004).

Gains (2003:64-65) who focuses on resource exchange between the Ministries,

Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) supports this argument also. She argues that the

17

introduction of agencies has led to a huge transfer of financial, organizational and

informational resources to agencies and devolved statutory authority which makes

them very powerful in operational and resource allocation matters. Ministers, on the

other hand, have only political resources derived from elected office and authority

over policy goals and spending decisions. It is therefore possible for the two sides to

'struggle' for control of resources or for their principals (ACEOs, minister, principal

secretary and other senior ministerial officials) to agree to cooperate in actions which

are contrary to public interest (example rent-seeking behaviour).

The agency model is accused of strengthening the hands of agency management

which undermines public accountability, especially when political principals are kept

at the sidelines (Caulfield, 2003). Boston (1999) also criticises the logic of the

agency model and concurs with the second perspective‘s position after showing that

increased discretion encourages maladministration which puts the citizenry at a

disadvantage. As evidence, reference is made to a (then) sharp rise of citizens‘

complaints against autonomous public bodies in New Zealand, whereby the rate of

complaints against public managers submitted to the Ombudsman more than doubled

since introduction of executive agencies.

According to its report on the assessment conducted between 1997 and 2001, United

Kingdom‘s Select Committee on Public Administration revealed that public audit of

executive agencies (―Quangos‖) fell from 81% to 64% and public access to these

bodies remained low. They met only just a half of the accountability measures. More

18

strikingly, those advisory ―Quangos‖ dealing with public safety and the quality of

people‘s lives were found to be largely closed and secretive bodies.1

Other scholars (example Schick, 1996) have questioned the extent to which internal

control mechanisms are appropriate and adequate to ensure broad-based

accountability in these organizations. Effective implementation of these systems is

considered to be, technically, very difficult, and they contain inherent disincentives

to the managers and employees of the agency. McDavid (1998:6) argues that

performance measurement systems, for instance, make sense only at a general level

as tools for improving accountability, but they tend to fail in implementation.

Performance measures that were applied in Sweden hit the wall as the set

performance targets turned out to be vague rather than explicit and most often were

unrelated to results, of poor quality, or incomplete (Rexed, 2006). Flynn (2004)

argues with concrete cases that instituting performance management system is often

not translated into high satisfaction with public services.

Internal control systems that are devised and supposed to be operated by the agency

managers are discredited by some scholars who argue that it is often not in the best

interest of these managers to enforce accountability in an effective manner. For, there

is conflict between what the public value and what these managers see as important

for their entity to survive and secure of their interests. It is argued that, since

agencies often compete for government resources, they are less likely to institute

effective control system because exposition of poor performance jeopardizes

agency‘s potential success in getting resources. It is this conflict of interest that

1 see www.democraticaudit.com

19

belongs to the second line of thinking, which makes increased autonomy to the

agency managers unlikely to enhance accountability to external stakeholders like

members of the public.

Scholars whose ideas fall into the second perspective about ‗agencification‘ share the

idea that accountability is not a welcome idea among those who have to render the

account. These scholars are of the view that increased autonomy reduces propensity

of the agency managers to become transparent about their performance and related

matters. With resource transfers as explained by Gains (2003:65), agencies become

less dependent on the ministry, and wield much discretion which may likely

culminate into secrecy rather than transparency. As Cook (2003:26) found out,

ministers could not fulfil their oversight role because after the agency reforms in

New Zealand, the policy implementers (ACEOs) increasingly resorted to

withholding information on their performance.

The second perspective, therefore, sees the agency model as having a built-in

disincentive. With increased autonomy over their operations and decision-making

processes, agency managers are expected to consider transparency and complete

accountability to the public and ministerial political principals as curtailing their

freedom and are most likely to manipulate rather than strengthen those internal

control systems to their own advantage.

Notwithstanding their different perspectives on the impact of ‗agencification‘ on

accountability, these scholars agree on certain things which are necessary for an

effective system of accountability. Cook (2003) and Segsworth (2003) explain that

20

disclosure of information through various ways of dissemination is necessary to

support governance of executive agencies. But this is achievable where the

consumers of agency services have a 'voice' to make high-sounding demands (Paul,

1991; Flynn, 2004). For Sterick and Scheers (2003), and Rexed (2006), what matters

more than having clearly-defined role is the principals‘ capacity to exert pressure

through close monitoring and detailed evaluation of agency performance.

Pollitt (2005) uses experiences from Sweden, Finland, and Netherlands to

demonstrate that success of effective accountability is determined by the attitude of

those responsible for oversight of executive agencies. In these countries, though

there was clarity of tasks and lines of accountability, ministers showed little interest

in their oversight role. They limited their intervention to setting targets, without

subjecting agency performance reports to scrutiny or pushing them hard to improve

performance.

In the debate on reforms of public service, a widely-agreed idea is that political and

institutional setting of a given country has a significant influence on the New Public

Management-type reform initiatives. Thus, the various differing arguments about the

impacts of executive agencies on accountability are considered ‗theoretical‘ in the

sense that they need validation in the political and institutional context within which

‗agencification‘ has actually taken place.

2.4. A Conceptual Framework

The idea of ‗agencification‘, as used in this study, is borrowed from a work by Colin

Talbot, Christopher Pollitt, Karen Bathgate, Janice Caulfield, Adrian Reilly, and

21

Amanda Smullen. These researchers have explored the idea in a context that

perfectly matches our own, as ―the idea of creating autonomous, or semi-

autonomous, agencies within the public sector, in order to improve, in some way,

how government works‖ (Talbot et al, 2000:2). This definition of ‗agencification‘

points to a conceptual link between disaggregation and increased ‗autonomy‘, which

is the core of the whole process of ‗agencification‘. As large-scale bureaucratic,

ministerial-type organizations are disaggregated into agencies, they tend to acquire

freedom and discretion in their operations and managerial affairs.

Agency ‗autonomy‘, refers to a situation where the organization has discretionary

authority, and enjoys a range of freedoms from the usual ministerial interventions in its

day-to-day operations. To put the concept in more operational terms, we identify its

three dimensions; institutional, managerial, and financial autonomy.

The basis for institutional autonomy of an agency is the process of disaggregation,

whereby large, ministerial-type organization is broken-down into separate entities with

their own governance structures. A body fulfilling executive functions needs to be able to

lead a separate existence (OECD, 2007), without sharing its governance structure with

the previous structures.

Upon acquiring the agency status, the executive agency shifts its focus to performance

and operates like a business entity which requires maximum discretion to allow for

greater flexibility in decision making and putting its own plans and strategies into action.

It is at this point that the agency needs its managerial autonomy, that is, to have high

degree of latitude in making decisions and implementing its action plans and strategies

22

based on independently-set operational targets. This dimension embodies sufficient

control over personnel resources, because they are core to agency operations.

The third financial dimension of agency autonomy is certainly the most complicated. As

a public organization, usually an agency receives subvention from the Government to

add to its own sources for its operations and development activities. This inter-

governmental transfer of financial resources makes financial autonomy restricted to the

relative latitude to prepare (determine) its own budget and decide on efficient ways to

allocate and use financial resources towards achieving its performance targets. Though

this autonomy is very relative to the parent ministry and other institutions, especially the

Ministry of Finance, it requires the agency to be able to withstand undue political

interference which might be exerted through budgetary pressures.

‗Accountability‘, on the other hand, is a broad, ever-expanding concept (Mulgan,

2000) which makes it far more complex. Typical of a broad concept, accountability

has been defined as being called upon to account for your actions to someone, but the

definition is not uniformly agreed across or even within disciplines and even same

organizations (see Bovens, 2005; Ayeni, 1998; Brinkerhoff, 2001; Lawson and

Rakner, 2005). Besides the controversy, such a broad and vague definition makes the

concept less amenable to empirical analysis and thus not useful to achieve the aim of

this research.

In this study, we understand accountability as a relationship in which one party,

having the obligation to inform, explains and justifies its conduct to another party,

the holder of accountability, who is expected to investigate or scrutinise the actor‘s

23

actions with possibility of invoking sanctions. Accountability of public organizations

is designed to be enforced both within Government and between Government and

citizens. It is understood also as a situational concept, in that it needs to be specified

in context: who is accountable to whom and for what?

As for executive agencies, the accountability relationship and arrangements exist at

two different but complimenting levels (Verhoest, et al., 2005). The first (horizontal)

level is the interface between executive agencies as service providers on the one

hand and on the other hand, services users and other citizens. The second (vertical)

level involves executive agencies responsibility to several principals from the

Government institutions such as ministries, the National Assembly, the National

Audit Office, and others.

The study‘s attention rests on performance accountability, which is both process-

based and results-based kind of accountability. Under process-based accountability,

the agency is responsible for adhering to the set Government principles, standards

and regulations related to its performance and to share results with stakeholders. As

for results-based accountability, the agency is responsible for producing

outputs/outcomes, on time and in sufficient quality.

To start with horizontal accountability, the customers and the citizens are the

stakeholders who have the right to seek for information, scrutinize decisions and

actions in the light of performance results, and finally pass judgement through ―exit‖

or ―voice‖ options (Paul, 1991). If performance results are to their dissatisfaction

when matched against their own standards or expectations, the consumers and public

24

at large may decide to find alternative service provider or submit their complaints to

the concerned executive agencies or directly to the responsible persons, who should,

hopefully, use the feedback information to improve their performance for achieving

more satisfactory results. As a process, accountability is an interactive one with both

the executive agencies and the service users and citizens being proactive.

The vertical accountability, on the other hand, is about executive agencies and the

ACEOs specifically, to be answerable to the minister whose ministry sets a policy

framework and Permanent Secretary who is responsible for its strategic direction.

The minister possesses a mandate to monitor and ensure that the executive agencies

are answerable for those policy-related outcomes. Usually, ACEOs enter into

Performance Agreements with the Minister or the principal official at the parent

ministry to facilitate monitoring and evaluation on the basis of explicit, preset

benchmarks.

Based on this conceptualization, an executive agency is accountable when it is

adequately responsive, in a political sense, to the minister, or in civil sense, to the

service users and citizens. The two-dimensional view of accountability and related

processes of agency accounting to the Government (Ministry and Parliament),

customers and the public is presented in figure 1.1.

25

Figure1.1: The Legal-Institutional Framework for Executive Agency

Accountability in Tanzania

Vertical Accountability to Parliament

(via Minister) Enquiries Performance Reporting

Performance Vertical Accountability to Parent Ministry

monitoring Performance reporting

Pressure

Downwards Horizontal Accountability Information sharing, Complaints handling

Response

Voice

Source: Author, 2008

The model demonstrates two centres of accountability for the executive agency. As

key benefactors of agency performance, both the parent Ministry and the public are

assumed to be interested and able to be proactively engaged in the account-

demanding process. On behalf of the Government, the Ministry pressurizes for

results that would contribute towards positive policy outcomes whereas the service

users and the citizens demand the performance of the agency that meets their

expectations and standards.

The model suggests that executive agencies need to become transparent about their

performance and bring the service users and citizens closer to them through some

PUBLIC

Customers and Citizens

PARENT MINISTRY Minister, Permanent Secretary,

Ministerial Advisory Board

EXECUTIVE

AGENCY

PARLIAMENT

26

consultative mechanisms. A conical element here is reliable information flow that

would enable citizens and customers to evaluate and give comments about the

agency performance. These comments and complaints act as impetus for the agencies

to reach their threshold as they stand for promoting more quality, standards and

value of the public services (Osborne, 2007).

On the other side, the ministry effectively monitors the agency performance by

ensuring there is regular reporting and that the results are measured (assessed) using

an agreed-upon performance targets as benchmarks. In a complete framework for

agency accountability, the vertical accountability extends to include accountability

between the ministers and the Parliament. As the minister is given responsibility for

specific agencies, he becomes responsible for their conduct and results and could

face parliamentary enquiries. Chief executive officers and managers of the agencies

are expected to be responsive to policy priorities, and work to preserve its integrity

and professionalism.

Independent and Dependent Variables

The conceptual framework has allowed for identification of independent and

dependent variables. Based on the framework, the autonomy which the agency gains

following its separation from the ministry is presumed to cause the agency to become

more accountable for its performance. The independent variable is, thus, ‗autonomy‘

and the dependent variable will be ‗(performance) accountability‘. The criteria for

examining and comparing these variables are explained in detail in the specific

relevant chapters dealing with those issues.

27

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The way in which research is conducted may be conceived in terms of the research

methods employed and the research instruments utilized in the pursuit of a solution

to a research problem and/or a goal (research objective). The purpose of this chapter

is firstly to expound on the adopted research methods and to introduce the research

instruments used to collect data for analysis in order to provide answers to the set

research questions and thus fulfil the research objectives. The considerations behind

the choice of the methods and instruments of data collection are explained as well.

3.2. Qualitative Research Design

Qualitative research is the approach to understanding the essential nature of a

phenomenon, within a particular context. This kind of research design was found

appropriate for this study for a number of reasons. Firstly, its purpose is not

generalization, but rather, to produce evidence about the impact of increased

autonomy on the executive agencies' responsibility and responsiveness to the

Government and public, without imposing biased preconceptions. Secondly, the task

of analysing governance of executive agencies is a complex one. It is assumed that

effectiveness of these organizations depends on the institutional context within

which they exist and operate (Schick, 1998). Through qualitative research approach,

we can examine the executive agencies within their unique institutional contexts

thereby ensuring the ecological validity of the research and better understanding of

their governance.

28

In addition to that, qualitative research approach provides grounds for getting

sufficient and trustworthy information through the use of multiple methods of data

collection for meaningful results. It frees the process of data collection from

constraints of some predetermined categories of analysis, allowing for a level of

depth and detail that quantitative strategies can't provide (Patton, 2002). The use of

multiple data collection methods generates sufficient data for analysis.

Qualitative research offers four types of methods: experimental, longitudinal, cross-

sectional and case studies. Case studies are considered as prime designs of

qualitative research due to its interpretive approach to data and consider the

subjective meanings that people bring to their situation2. Case study is a qualitative

method for an in-depth, empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its

real-life context that produces context-dependent knowledge (Yin, 1989). What

made the method appropriate is that it allows asking ―how‖ and ―why‖ questions so

as to understand more comprehensively the accountability processes taking place

between the executive agencies, government ministries, customers and other citizens.

It was also taken into consideration that ‗accountability‘ being so broad in scope

cannot be comprehensively investigated. By employing the case study method, the

scope is narrowed down as the research involves investigation of one or two cases.

Rather than generalization, this method provides for an effective approach for

falsification (Flyvbjerg, 2006); which in this study happens to be falsification of the

assumptions of the agency model.

2 See http://www.nyu.edu/classes/bkg/methods/005847ch1.pdf.

29

Research experts advise the use of multiple cases to make the findings

‗generalisable‘, but they insist that there are instances where even a single case is

instructive.3 For comprehensive investigation two executive agencies were selected.

3.3. Scope of the Study

This study investigated two case studies from Tanzania, namely NHBRA and TFDA.

The field work was done in Dar es Salaam, which is the centre of business of the two

agencies and their ministries. Further details on the cases are found in chapter four.

3.4. Target Population and Characteristics of Respondents

Governance of executive agencies involves interaction among concerned officials

from the ministries, agency managers and staff, and the public. To ensure inclusion

of appropriate number of people in the research, probability samples or non-

probability samples are used. Miles and Huberman (1994), Weiss (1998) and

Flyvbjerg (2006) argue that non-probability sampling which is information-oriented

and involves a small sample is the most appropriate for the study as it allows in-

depth examination and analysis while maintaining a high degree of validity. From

the three broad categories of stakeholders, namely Ministries, Agencies, and the

Public, a total of 61 respondents were selected. The size of the selected sample was

found to be manageable considering time constraint faced by the researcher, but also

representative of the target population especially for the case of customers that were

randomly selected from a constructed sample frame. Table 3.1 gives the categories

and number of selected respondents from each of the three categories or levels.

3See http://www.is.cityu.edu.hk/staff/isrobert/phd/ch3.pdf.

30

Table3.1 Respondents from the Ministries, Agency and Public

Level Type

Respondents

Studied

Agencies

Number of

Respondents

NHBRA TFDA Total

Ministry 3 2 5

Agency Managers 2 2 4

Staff 1 1 2

Public Customers 25 25 50

Total 31 30 61

The Ministry officials (5) from the Ministry of Lands and Ministry of Health were

selected on ‗knowledge‘ and ‗relevance‘ criteria which was based on their designate

positions and as suggested by the Director of Administration and Personnel (DAP).

From the two agencies, four respondents were selected from the managerial and

operational cadres, using the ‗knowledge‘ criteria also. The 50customers were

selected using clientele lists obtained from agency (NHBRA) or constructed4

(TFDA). The set of questions that were prepared for and asked to the respondents

differed among the Ministry officials, Agency managers, agency staff, and the

customers.

Besides the basic demographic data on gender and age, it was important for the case

of interviewed customers and the citizens to include level of education because it is

one of the theorized factors influencing the extent to which the public can hold

service providers accountable. The demographic data shows gender imbalance

whereby males accounted for 90% of the 50 customers. Most of the customers fell

under the middle-age categories (54%) or youth (30%). Overall a few (8) customers

4TFDA‘s Clients‘ Service Charter delineates its clients and customers under various categories. The

reviewed document provided the basic guide for the selection of clients.

31

fell under the old age category, 5 being NHBRA customers and 3 TFDA customers.

On levels of education, it was found out that the majority of the customers had

attained adequate education. Out of 50 customers 31 had reached a tertiary level, 13

secondary level, and 6 were degree holders. There was slight difference when

comparison was made between the customers of the two agencies. Out of 25

customers of NHBRA, 18 had reached tertiary level, 4 university level and 3

secondary level; compared to 13, 2 and 10 customers of TFDA that reached those

three educational levels, respectively.

3.5. Data Collection: Sources of Data and Methods of Collection

The bulk of the data used in the study came from written documents and to a much

lesser extent, online publications. Published and unpublished documents obtained

from the agencies themselves and elsewhere enabled us to exploit rich information

about the studied agencies. Also, various government documents, research reports

and those commissioned for the studied agencies were used.

The field data was collected through interviews and questionnaires to augment the

reviewed documents. The data was in the form of views/opinions based on

respondents‘ actual experience as well as details that support documented facts.

The interviews with the managers and clients of the cases were formal but involved

open-ended questions listed in an interview guide. This format was considered

appropriate for collecting facts, details and respondents‘ views. It helped to

understand the respondents‘ points of view about the central issues that the study

aimed to address.

32

The other kind of method was a focus group discussion. Patton (2002) argues that it

is a highly efficient qualitative data collection technique, which allows the

participants (respondents) to hear each other‘s responses and, as a result, be

encouraged to make additional comments beyond their own responses. It is, thus,

fairly easy to assess consistency in the shared views among the participants. In the

study, the focus group discussion involved Government Officials at the Housing

Division at the Ministry of Lands. Besides those advantages, the technique was used

because the respondents themselves found it less time consuming and it was more

convenient to the researcher than the preview kind of interview.

Lastly, questionnaires were used to solicit the views, understandings, experiences

and attitudes of randomly selected citizens, as a segment of the general public. For

ordinary Tanzanian, decent shelter and food safety are very basic needs. Based on

this belief, the researcher approached people randomly in the streets for questioning.

The use of a variety of data sources and multiple techniques to study the problem of

accountability of executive agencies made triangulation possible which is important

for ensuring the validity of information used for analysis.

3.6. Data Handling and Analysis

This study was based on qualitative research. The science of qualitative research

depends on the organization and analysis of rich and complex qualitative data

without the statistical tools that dominate the world of quantitative analysis. This

makes coding a crucial stage of qualitative data analysis. The bulk of unsorted

structured and unstructured data was post-coded using the typology technique. This

33

coding technique allowed for organization of the data into these main categories:

agency autonomy, ―Agency-Public‖ interface, vertical accountability, horizontal

accountability, and factors affecting levels of accountability. These categories were

created based on the conceptual framework and the specific objectives that the study

aimed to achieve.

3.7. Limitations and Challenges Encountered

Most often, limitations and challenges that social science researchers face when

investigating a phenomenon is methodical, or related to data collection. This study

was not exceptional; the researcher did not get access to the Director General of

TFDA and the Chief Executive Officer of the NHBRA who could probably supply

more accurate information about the relationship between them and the Permanent

Secretary, Ministerial Advisory Board, and the Parliament on the other hand.

Alternatively, we interviewed managers that constitute the Management Team of the

two agencies, who proved to be knowledgeable about those issues of concern.

It was also difficult to obtain complete data because access to some important

documents was restricted, especially in TFDA. The researcher had to consult the

Librarian of TFDA whose assistance made it possible to access some of the reports

meant for internal uses. In the case of NHBRA, some of the important documents

that we requested could not be easily found because of the poor conditions of its

library and improper management of records making. These challenges meant that

our research took longer than we had planned, but at the end we were able to

assemble adequate information to make this study possible.

34

CHAPTER FOUR

FORMATION, ORGANIZATION AND AUTONOMY OF EXECUTIVE

AGENCIES UNDER INVESTIGATION

4.1. Introduction

The exploration of the research problem involved two case studies, namely NHBRA

and TFDA. This chapter provides some basic institutional characteristics of the two

agencies which include origin of their formation, organizational structure, and

governance. The aspect of agency autonomy is more thoroughly examined under a

separate section. These institutional characteristics are presented under an individual

agency, after which some comparative notes are inserted.

4.2. Institutional Characteristics of Executive Agencies under Investigation

4.2.1. Case I: The National Housing and Building Research Agency (NHBRA)

Tanzania, like other developing countries, has been facing shortage of quality

housing for decades. Both pre- and post-independence governments realized the

housing problem and the urgency to solve it. Thus Cabinet Paper ECC No. 7 of 1970

established the National Housing and Building Research Unit (NHBRU) as a

division under the then Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development to

address the problem of high cost of building construction which were unaffordable to

the majority of the people.

Under the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), the GOT redefined the Unit‘s

role and objectives so as to meet the present needs of Tanzanians. In accordance with

35

the Executive Agency Act No. 30 of 1997,5 the NHBRU was transformed into a

Government Executive Agency in August 2001 and renamed the NHBRA that

operates commercially for the benefit of its customers, taxpayers and its own

employees (NHBRA, 2001a:2).

With this transformation, NHBRA‘s business portfolio has expanded to include more

services and products. It is now able and ready to act in partnership with local

communities, Non-Governmental institutions, Government Ministries, Departments,

and Agencies (MDAs), Donor organizations and private sector in order to carry out

and fulfill its mission. The new roles of NHBRA are threefold: (1) to ensure research

results and technical information on human settlements and development issues are

made available to all who need them; (2) to promote affordable and durable local

building materials and associated technologies, and appropriate housing construction

techniques; and (3) to provide building research consultancy services. These are in

line with the National Human Settlements Development Policy of 2002, the National

Housing Development Programme, 2002, the Habitat agenda of 1997, and

Tanzania‘s vision for 2025 (NHBRA, 2001A:6).

The governance structure includes the ACEO who is appointed by the Minister of

Lands for a term not exceeding five years. The ACEO is charged with the overall

management of the organization. There are three line managers, who head the

business support, research and development, and consultancy department, and

together with the ACEO constitute the Senior Management Team. The ACEO is

5under the establishment order 2001 section 3(1) of the Government Notice No. 355 (Subsidiary

Legislation of the Government Gazette No. 42, Vol. 82)

36

directly answerable to the Permanent Secretary, who oversees the interests of the

ministry and the government in general and is responsible for policy and strategic

management of the agency. The overall personnel size is 56, which is 6 personnel

short from the needed capacity, and their quality is relatively high partly because of

periodic training in short and long courses they undertake.

4.2.2. Case II: The Tanzania Foods and Drugs Authority (TFDA)

The TFDA is a regulatory body under the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare but

has executive agency status also. It was established under section 4(1) of the

Tanzania Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics Act No. 1 of 2003 and its operations

commenced on 1st July 2003 in accordance with the Executive Agency Act, 1997.

The legislation repealed the Pharmaceutical and Poisons Act No. 9 of 1978 and Food

(Control and Quality) Act No. 10 of 1978 to enable merging of the Pharmacy Board

and the National Food Control Commission into one regulatory body with the status

of an Executive Agency as per PSRP objectives.

The core functions of TFDA as a regulatory agency include: (1) to regulate

importation, manufacturing, labelling, distribution, storage, promotion and sale of

foods, drugs, cosmetics and medical devices; (2) to inspect manufacturing facilities,

product outlets and inlets, to verify compliance, to set standards, and practices; (3) to

prescribe standards of quality, safety and effectiveness for food, drugs, cosmetics and

medical devices; (4) to issue licenses and permits for dealing in regulated products;

(5) to collect data on adverse health effects related to the use of the regulated

37

products; and to educate and provide unbiased information to the stakeholders and

the public on products it regulates.

The wide variety of these regulatory functions has led to a broad, multi-layered and

complex organizational structure. At its establishment, TFDA had a four-directorate

structure but which could not provide for effective and efficient delivery of service

due to fragmentation of related functions and imbalance of responsibilities and

workload among sections. In consultation with the Permanent Secretary and approval

by the Ministerial Advisory Board (MAB), TFDA has been restructured with the

new Public Relations and Customer Care units attached to the Director General‘s

Office and zonal offices established in Mwanza, Arusha and Mbeya in an attempt to

strengthen its regulatory services.

The Director General is the head of the authority and takes executive responsibility

for strategy, operational management and service delivery. As the accounting officer,

he is answerable to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health. The Director

General together with the Departmental Directors constitutes the management team.

The total number of staff at the time of research was 1186. These were found to be

qualified and well-trained to handle the technicality of the agency‘s key activities.

In accordance with section 5(2) of the Tanzania Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics Act of

2003, the TFDA maintains a system of cooperation with a number of public and

private institutions. For example, it collaborates more closely with the Regional and

Local Authorities in implementation of the Public-Private Partnership initiative

6recruitment of additional staff was underway

38

called the Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlet (ADDO) program in Rukwa, Ruvuma,

Morogoro, and Mtwara regions.

4.2.3. Some Comparative Notes on the Two Agencies

The examination of the two agencies has revealed several differences between them.

Firstly, the genesis of the two organizations is different. The TFDA resulted from

merging the defunct Pharmacy Board and the National Food Control Commission,

which were independent authorities, while NHBRA existed as a departmental unit

within the Ministry of Lands.

Secondly, the two agencies belong to different types of executive agencies. The

NHBRA is a ‗mainstream‘ agency which makes it fundamental to the main policy

orientation of the parent Ministry, whereas TFDA is a regulatory agency that has a

more vivid organizational identity.

The third difference lies in their structure and their size. To start with, the NHBRA

has a flat organizational structure with only one level of hierarchy separating the

ACEO at the top from the employees at the bottom. On the other hand, the TFDA‘s

organizational structure is more hierarchical because its line-and-staff structure has

far more sections under staff specialists and lengthier chain of command. Moreover,

TFDA has twice as many (118) employees as NHBRA (56).

4.3. Relative Autonomy of the Two Agencies

It is stipulated in the legislation that executive agencies are ―semi-autonomous‖

organizations within the ambit of Government Ministries charged with the

responsibility to provide public services in selected areas. Pursuant to the study

39

objectives outlined in chapter one, this part presents findings on the extent of

autonomy possessed by the two agencies relative to their Ministries and make a

comparison between them. The relative autonomy was measured and compared

using three variables: financial independence, operational independence, and

autonomy over personnel issues. Financial independence was indicated by the

degree of authority and discretion over agency‘s revenues, assets and liabilities. The

indicators of autonomy to operate were twofold: (1) discretion to set objectives,

priorities, and strategic plans and (2) non-interference in the day-to-day operations.

Lastly, the indicators of autonomy over the personnel issues were: (1) authority over

personnel management and (2) presence of appropriate internal controls over the

performance of the employees.

4.3.1. Financial Independence of the Two Agencies

The legislation stipulate financial powers, procedures and specific guidelines, which

are further clarified under the Framework Documents, to be used for the purpose of

achieving the strategic objectives of the two agencies while maintaining financial

integrity. Both agencies have mandate to charge and collect fees or commissions for

the provision of goods or services, and even borrow monies in order to meet

expenditure in accordance with their strategic frameworks. The revenues collected

by or payable to the two agencies become their property. But Section 12(3) of the

legislation empowers the Minister after consulting the Minister of Finance ―to

determine the amount of revenue which shall remain the property of the agencies,

and the amount which shall be treated as public funds and credited to the Exchequer

Account‖.

40

It was learned that, the amount of revenue which may be credited to the Exchequer

Account depends on three factors: the capacity of the agency to generate its own

income, whether it can become self-financing, and the financial implications of its

plans and budgets. In simpler terms, the agencies which are more capable of

generating income and have potential to become self-financing are more likely to

have more latitude compared to those agencies with low capacity and lack of

potential. These conditions impose limitations to the financial autonomy of the two

agencies because they contain potential to discourage the agencies to strengthen their

income-generating capacities as it would imply losing their revenues.

Caulfield (2003) argues that an expectation in Tanzania that all agencies, after a

time, will become financially self-sufficient is elusive. Our findings concur with

those of Caulfield (2003). The two agencies remain financially dependent on the

government. For instance, review of Cash flow statement of NHBRA which was

found in the Business Plan for the period July 2008–June 2009 revealed that

Government Grant worth Tshs 1.4 billion was expected to be the largest source of its

cash inflow followed by the PSRP‘s Tshs 510 million and NHBRA‘s own Tshs 385

million sources (NHBRA, February, 2008).

It was found out through a review of Framework Documents that the ACEOs of the

two agencies have substantial authority in relation to the capital expenditures. The

ACEOs have powers to authorize capital expenditures on capital projects, to transfer

funds allocated from one budget item to another, and to carry over to the next

financial year unspent funds (in full) on capital provision from the previous financial

41

year. Moreover, with regard to assets and liabilities, the ACEOs can authorize

special payments, disposal of assets, and expenditure on individual consultancy

services.

These budget flexibilities and financial delegation suggests that the two agencies

enjoy a high degree of financial autonomy. But it was found out during the

interviews with managers of the agencies (two from each agency) that the two

agencies are ‗non-immune‘ from close supervision and scrutiny by the Ministries and

less ‗free‘ as it may seem. A manager of NHBRA explained that there were countless

occasions when the agency had to keep ‗begging‘ for timely release of funds from

the Ministry. Another manager (from TFDA) argued that despite increased freedom

in other areas of their operations, bureaucratic tendencies of the Ministry imposed

restrictions on them to access subventions.

It was found out that the Ministries are keen about financial performance of the two

agencies which was indicated by desire to scrutinize their financial accounts. The

legislation under Section 14(2) empowers the Controller and Auditor-General to

conduct audit or to appoint a qualified person to do the task on his behalf. Moreover,

the internal auditors in the Ministries are empowered under the Framework

Documents to perform auditing in the agencies in order to give independent

assurance to the Permanent Secretary. Further scrutiny of accounts is guaranteed

under the statutory requirements of performance reporting by the agencies under

Section 15(1-a) which stipulates that a copy of the audited accounts of the agencies,

42

together with the auditor‘s report on those accounts, must be attached to the annual

performance report.

In the words of an official from the Ministry of Lands during the focus group

discussion, financial scrutiny is necessary to ensure that the agencies do not

manipulate the relationship with the ministry to wield autonomy beyond

government‘s control. We agree that financial scrutiny is critical to avoid

embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds, but the rationale needs to be

more than desire of the government to control the agencies and the efforts will be

meaningful if similar emphasis is put on performance results (outputs) of the

agencies.

4.3.2. Operational Discretion of the Two Agencies

The Framework Documents were found to set out key aspects of the operations of

the two agencies, among those found being the aims, roles, strategic objectives, and

key performance standards. In accordance with legislation under Section 3(1)-(2), the

creation of an executive agency is a decision of the Minister based on the opinion

that it can more effectively carry out the functions of a department of the ministry.

It may seem that the two agencies are creatures of the Ministries but collected facts

revealed that their establishment was based on their own, rather than Ministers‘

initiatives. For the case of TFDA, the current Director General was the founder of the

organization after successful initiative to merge the defunct Pharmacy Board and the

National Food Control Commission. It was learned from the officials at the Ministry

of Lands the proposals to transform the Building Research Unit into a separate and

43

more autonomous agency (NHBRA) were prepared and successfully presented by

those that currently occupy the top positions. In both cases and others not under this

investigation, the Ministers have been receptive on the formation of agencies. ESRF

(2004) thinks it is because they wanted to reduce their workload to focus more on

policy roles. Other analysts have associated speedy formation of agencies with

motives of the would-be top leaders to earn more pay and enjoy other privileges. We

argue that, since the creation of agencies had been accepted as a new policy direction

by the GOT and donors have ensured her resources, Ministers on the one hand had

nothing to lose by being receptive and the would-be leaders had a lot to gain by their

initiatives. After creation of the two agencies, as it will be explained in detail under

chapter six, the Ministers have escaped political accountability and ensured a degree

of autonomy which Caulfield (2003) found to be more than what the legislation

prescribed.

It was learned that, there have been significant changes in the structure and extent of

jurisdiction on the side of TFDA. The Director General of TFDA had successfully

initiated and carried out (with approval of the Minister) restructuring of the

organization on the ground that the previous four-directorate structure was

inappropriate for efficient and effective service delivery. The shortfalls of the old

organizational structure included fragmentation of related functions, centralization of

functions at the headquarters and imbalance of responsibilities and workload (TFDA,

2008). While this move can be interpreted as reflecting a strong commitment of

TFDA‘s leadership to improve service delivery (which is commendable), it also

44

indicates its high degree of autonomy (which may have negative implications for

vertical accountability).

Moreover, TFDA was found to use its legal and leadership capacities to protect and

at times to extend its jurisdiction which indicates its higher autonomy than that of

NHBRA. Using the Legal Service Unit, the leadership of TFDA spearheaded the

review of the Tanzania Dairy Industry Act 2004 which led to drafting of the new

Dairy Regulations which omits provisions for regulating quality and safety of milk

by the Tanzania Dairy Board (TFDA, 2008), and thereby allowing TFDA to extend

its regulation mandate by including milk products under its list of regulated products.

This move has led to extension of TFDA‘s areas of jurisdiction, wielding power and

autonomy7. This kind of bold decision when supported by some visible achievements

had made good impression to the minister at the Ministry of Health which helped in

wielding more power and discretion from the ministry.

With respect to discretion over routine operations, the legislation promises that the

agencies should not be subjected to interference in their routine operations. The

overall responsibility to discharge day-to-day activities of the two agencies and

accountability thereof lies with ACEOs following delegation by the ministers. Of

course to discharge this responsibility necessitated the Chief Executive Officer of

NHBRA and the Director General of TFDA to use their statutory powers to

determine the number and responsibilities of the managers and directors who

7TFDA is now deeply engaged in fighting all sorts of counterfeit products not just drugs, medicines,

cosmetics, and medical devices as prescribed by the legislation; but even electronic products like

televisions.

45

constituted the top leadership (management team) of the two agencies in accordance

with the business needs.

Data obtained from various studies revealed that the creation of agencies in Tanzania

has led to a substantial shift of power through delegation of authority and

institutional separation between the ministries and the created agencies, which result

into the latter‘s increased autonomy as well. A study by Tella (2003) found that after

the transformation and acquisition of agency status there was substantial internal

delegation of authority within the 5 agencies studied and increased discretion in

decision-making relative to their ministries. Most of the staff who were interviewed

argued that the oversight role of the ministry had no interference with day-to-day

management of those agencies. Also, ESRF (2004) analyzed the institutional

framework and management systems of some 12 agencies and reported that agencies

were operating free from bureaucratic and political control8. The field data that were

collected through interviews with agency managers and Ministry officials reaffirmed

the previous findings.

All of the managers and officials that we interviewed agreed that the two agencies

operate without bureaucratic and political interferences from the ministries. The

assessment of these respondents was that they have become relatively more

autonomous than they had been under the previous arrangements. However, there

were variations in the perceptions about the degree of autonomy of the two agencies.

Managers of TFDA thought that the degree of autonomy of their organization was

8It was noted, however, the high demand of the Tanzania Roads Agency‘s services led to

bureaucratic and political interference a ―management nightmare‖ because all politicians

want to improve roads in their constituencies (ESRF, 2004:9)

46

adequate and one of them confidently associated that situation with their

achievements.

The NHBRA‘s managers had expressed less satisfaction with the degree of

organizational autonomy. On the contrary, interviewed officials from NHBRA's

parent Ministry, that is the Ministry of Lands, thought that NHBRA has been granted

―too much‖ freedom. It was explained that, while the drive for efficiency was a valid

reason for disaggregating NHBRU from the Ministerial structure, the need for more

freedom and discretion was even more pressing for those that occupied the top

positions therein.

4.3.3. Authority and Control over the Employees

The review of legislation revealed that the ACEOs have adequate authority for

personnel management, organization, control, and discipline9 of the employees in the

agency. In accordance with that mandate, the ACEOs of the two agencies were found

to possess and have used their authority to appoint employees as they considered

necessary. The procedures for recruitment give the Minister power of approval of

those recruited which is partly because the salaries of agency employees are paid by

the Ministry (case of NHBRA). It was learned from the interviews with the Business

Support Manager (a de facto Human Resource Manager) of NHBRA and Human

Resource Manager of TFDA that this arrangement is a formality because the

recruitment process were initiated and controlled by the agencies themselves without

any form of involvement of persons from the Ministry.

9It is stipulated in the legislation that the ACEO can terminate the appointment of an employee for

misconduct and incompetence.

47

Of course, the recruitment process is supposed to be done in accordance with the

Public Service Employment Policy (1998) which emphasizes openness and

competitiveness for appointments and promotion within and outside the public

organization. We did not find it relevant to explore if those principles of recruitment

were observed because this would have not helped to achieve the study objectives.

However, researchers can explore the propriety of human resource practices which

may offer alternative explanation to variation of levels of service delivery across

executive agencies in Tanzania.

In terms of organization of the employees, the ACEOs were found to have used their

delegated authority to place different types of employees at various levels and to

make job descriptions so that each job could contribute to the achievement of their

missions. Both agencies have Schemes of Service10

which seek to clarify and define

lines of responsibilities and were found to be appropriate as tools for hiring and

promoting their employees. The ACEOs have authority to introduce changes deemed

necessary to maximise the agency‘s efficiency and effectiveness. It was learned from

the interviews with the Business Support Manager of NHBRA and Human Resource

Manager of TFDA that the two agencies were in the process of revising their

Schemes of Service in order to meet the arisen needs. The NHBRA was at the initial

stage of the process while the Director General of TFDA had already produced a

draft amendment document to be submitted to the Workers‘ Council and after there

10

The TFDA‘s ‗Scheme of Service and Salary Structure for the TFDA Staff‘ and the NHBRA‘s

‗Scheme of Service‘ were prepared, respectively, in March and February.

48

to the MAB for further action. The approval powers of the Schemes of Service for

both agencies lie with the PO-PSM.

In addition to the mandate to design and revise the Schemes of Service from time to

time, the ACEOs of the two agencies have authority to determine the terms and

conditions of service for the employees. These terms and conditions were based on

the Executive Agencies (Personnel Management) Regulations of 1999 and because

of the status of their employees (public servants) the ACEOs are required to consider

directions of the Minister responsible for the Civil Service.

With respect to internal controls of its employees‘ performance, the relevant

mechanisms were found in place for both agencies. These mechanisms have striking

differences. The Business Support Manager of NHBRA explained during the

interview that the performance of employees at all levels is appraised through the

Open Performance Review Appraisal System (OPRAS) as per section 34 of the

Public Service Act, 2002, Regulation 22 of the Public Service Regulations, 2003,

and the Public Service Circular No.2 of 2004. In TFDA, performance appraisal of

employees is no longer done using OPRAS.

It was explained by TFDA‘s Human Resource Manager in an interview that

implementation of OPRAS revealed several shortcomings that rendered the system

less useful to manage performance of its employees. The mentioned shortcomings

included: reducing mutual trust and confidence between the supervisor and

subordinate due to the presence of third party in the appraisal process; feedback is

not provided to the appraised employee; rewards and sanctions for performance and

49

non-performance are excluded; and there is room for activities outside the work plan

(which he argued were many and critical). In the light of these shortcomings the

TFDA designed an alternative appraisal system which would address these problems

but remain within the same legal framework. The interviewed manager refused to

explain about the new appraisal system because it was at its infancy stage of

experimentation, but informed the researcher that the PO-PSM had approved the

system and highly commended their innovativeness. The innovativeness showed by

the TFDA has earned the agency trust of its portfolio Ministry and other relevant

authorities which provide potential for increased autonomy over its operations.

50

CHAPTER FIVE

STATUS OF VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

5.1. Introduction

In Tanzania, executive agencies are required to observe three operational principles:

efficient and effective service delivery, high standard of financial management and

accounting, and high responsiveness to customers‘ needs. To enforce the principles,

Act No. 13 of 1997 and the Framework Documents provide for the legal and

institutional framework for governance of the agencies under which hierarchical

accountability relationships between the agencies and key government actors are

stipulated. This chapter assessed the extent of (vertical) accountability of the two

agencies using data from reviewed key documents and interviews with Ministry

Officials and agency managers.

It examined two activities (variables): viability of Performance Monitoring and

viability of Performance Reporting. The choice of these variables took into account

the fact that while performance targets are critical to sound management, they make

sense only when subjected to systematic monitoring and reporting which can make

those responsible individuals accountable (PO-PSM, 2004:61-62). The indicators for

viable monitoring are twofold: (1) proactive Ministries‘ supervision over the

agencies; and (2) sufficient and appropriate incentives to facilitate accountability of

the agencies. While viable reporting is indicated by: (1) appropriate reporting

requirements; (2) extent of compliance by the agencies; and (3) high quality reports.

51

5.2. Monitoring Performance of the Two Agencies

5.2.1. Ministerial Supervision of the Two Agencies

The vertical accountability relationship between the Ministry and the two agencies

involves four key actors: the Minister, the Permanent Secretary, the MAB and the

ACEO. But contrary to the United Kingdom‘s Model which our own is supposed to

emulate, Ministers‘ role is only nominal as they are sidelined from the actual

processes of performance monitoring. Caulfield (2003) has noted that the agency

model strengthens the bureaucracy rather than making it more open to political and

public scrutiny. We concur with her findings, because this framework for

governance of the agencies can undermine democratic principle of ministerial

accountability and findings revealed that the public lacks access to these agencies

(this is discussed in chapter six). It is our view that if the Minister was to face

political scrutiny from the Parliament and subjected to public scrutiny, it could push

the Minister into taking a more proactive role in making the agencies accountable.

The legislation provides that a MAB for each executive agency consists of Minister‘s

appointees from within and outside the public service. The MABs advice the

Minister and Permanent Secretary on various substantive issues which include:

review of strategic plans, business plans and performance reports; setting up of

objectives, priorities and annual performance targets for the Agency; approval of

plans, annual reports and accounts; development and maintenance of a strategic

framework.

52

These advisory bodies have potential that cannot be neglected. Ministers can use

MABs to make the agencies more responsive to the customers because he has

powers to appoint persons who are representative of the interests of the Agency's

customers. Presence of these persons in the MABs can help the agencies take more

consideration of the demands and preferences of their customers. However, a deeper

examination of the legislation revealed that the potential of the MABs to exert

pressure on the two agencies is seriously limited. In the first place, their mandatory

function is advisory rather than executive. The agency managers who were

interviewed admitted that the role of MABs is only marginal due to absence of

incentives for the Board members who are not answerable to the Minister. It was

learned that most often MABs meet once or twice per annum.

The MABs do not seem to have taken their role seriously because despite the low

quality of NHBRA‘s reports and unexplained mismatch between performance targets

and results, the managers did not recollect any incidence where their performance

reports were rejected. In some few cases the MAB approved agency budgets but the

Ministry sent the budget back to the agency for reworking. There was not a case

where MAB facilitated responsiveness of the two agencies to customers and the

public. Also, despite statutory powers of the Permanent Secretary to seek

information or explanation about agency performance, it was learned through the

agency managers that none of them recalled a formal request for information or

explanation on submitted reports from the Permanent Secretaries. This showed

ministries‘ disinterest in becoming proactive in supervision of the agencies.

53

The four managers (two from NHBRA and two from TFDA) who were interviewed

had different explanations for the overall low interest shown by the parent Ministries

to monitor their agencies‘ performance. Ministries were more concerned with the

input side (that is finances). Some argued that financial issues, unlike performance

issues (that is output), affect more directly the Ministry‘s own budget which implies

the Minister can more easily come under political scrutiny by the Parliament and by

the media. Indeed, after reviewing TFDA‘s performance reports (2003-2008) and

NHBRA‘s performance reports (2003-2007), it became apparent that value for

money (quality) from the customers‘ perspective is not treated as among the critical

performance indicators, and the Ministries have never raised queries regarding the

extent to which the performance satisfy the customers and clients.

A manager from the NHBRA believed that performance monitoring is a managerial

and very complicated activity, one which the Ministry cannot perform because of the

bureaucratic orientations and avoidance of responsibilities by the senior officials. He

said the technical aspects of the NHBRA can also be a factor that may discourage

close monitoring. Another manager (from TFDA) argued that minimal intervention

was ‗part of the deal‘ (agreed principle of the executive agency model). He reasoned

that interference by the Government has always resulted into unnecessary delays and

the blame returns to them. He stressed that TFDA‘s status as free standing regulatory

agency is what explains its success within a relatively short time.

Officials from the Ministry of Health expressed high trust in the capabilities of

TFDA‘s top leadership and professionalism of its staff and thus the Ministry was less

54

concerned about scrutinizing the organization. The Officials said they were not

worried about the autonomy of the TFDA because it was a professional body and

results of its activities do not require written evidence. More specifically, they

referred to TFDA‘s success stories in spotting and destroying counterfeit products to

protect public health11

. The successes of TFDA were used as pretext for the

disinterest shown by the ministry in scrutinizing agency‘s performance.

It was found out that the discretion with which the monitoring process is supposed to

be handled by the Ministries has done little to facilitate accountability of the two

agencies. In Sections 6(c)-(d) and 7 of the Executive Agencies Act, No.13 of 1997,

exclusive oversight powers and responsibility are delegated to the Permanent

Secretary and MAB. It was learned from the focus group discussion at the Ministry

of Lands that despite the presence of adequate experts in the Housing Division, these

are not usually consulted by the Permanent Secretary. Though the legislation

specifies and clarifies the lines of responsibility and accountability, we argue that the

arrangement overlooks the fact that the Permanent Secretaries have far more

overwhelming duties as top executives at the ministry and there are sufficient

incentives to members of MABs which create loophole for the two agencies to avoid

effective scrutiny.

5.2.2. Incentives to Make the Agencies Accountable

Incentives constitute the critical element in any effective system of accountability.

Analysts (Mulgan, 2000; Strom, 2003) agree that potential of sanctions (as

11It was reported in that TFDA has exposed and destroy unfit drugs worth 786,148,786/- and

cosmetics worth 24, 267,200/- and approximately 4,600 metric tons of unfit food worth

1bn/- (Daily News; Monday, June 30, 2008).

55

incentives) makes the difference between non-committal disclosure of information

and being held to account. After reviewing the legislation we found out that the

incentives at the disposal of the parent ministry to make the two agencies

accountable are insufficient. Unlike other laws which clearly stipulate penalties

against specific faults, the legislation is silent about such explicit sanctions.

In the legislation the Permanent Secretary has mandatory powers to discipline and

control the chief executive officers of the agencies, and can even recommend for

their termination for misconduct or incompetence.12

Indeed, these powers can be

used to keep constant pressure on the ACEO to improve his performance in a

consistent manner. However, the use of these powers for purposes of holding the

agencies accountable for their performance was found to be very low due to various

reasons that we point out below.

First, the ministries were found to be disinterested to engage in a proactive

monitoring of the two agencies. In the interviews, agency managers admitted not to

recollect any incidence where the Permanent Secretary raised queries about their

performance. We reviewed NHBRA‘s performance appraisal reports and found

discrepancies between performance targets and reported results but the two managers

who were interviewed did not recollect their agency and ACEO being pressurized to

give detailed explanation. Without a close and proactive monitoring the ministries

cannot have accurate and unbiased information of the agencies‘ performance which

impose limit on to control.

12

Under Section 5(2), and 9(6)

56

Second, the institutional set up for vertical accountability of the two agencies is

inappropriate. Review of the legislation revealed three contradictory roles of the

Permanent Secretaries: firstly as responsible for strategic management of the

agencies, secondly as the principal accounting officer to be accountable for

performance of the agencies, and thirdly as chairperson of the MAB which evaluates

the agencies‘ performance and advices him and the Minister. This arrangement

creates a situation in which the account holder (Permanent Secretary) is biased and

not independent from the actor (ACEO), thereby imposing limit on unbiased

monitoring of the two agencies.

The third factor is related to the political context under which the two agencies exist

and operate. In Tanzania holding public officials accountable has not been a culture

of the bureaucracy. This culture is only now being promoted by the opposition

political parties, the private media, and the donors. As McDavid (1998) and Mihyo

(1986), argue bureaucrats tend to resist or avoid any form of full accountability

because this would shift power and discretion away from them. With the minister

and Parliament taking a background role in the monitoring of the agencies, to expect

that the Permanent Secretary will effectively hold the ACEO accountable is to

neglect the mutual interest that they share (to avoid blame from politicians).

5.3. Performance Reporting by the Two Agencies

Monitoring makes sense only if results will be reported and disseminated; for

reporting ―drives‖ monitoring. We reviewed the legislation and Framework

Documents to capture the statutory requirements and obligations of executive

57

agencies and five Ministry officials were interviewed in order to determine

compliance of the two agencies.

5.3.1. Reporting Requirements and Extent of Compliance by the Two

Agencies

In accordance with the legislation, it is the statutory obligation of agencies to report

about their operational performance and financial accounts, for the purpose of

facilitating accountability of those who are responsible. Reporting requirements are

with respect to two aspects: contents of the report, time to submit the report and

dissemination of the reports. We look at these aspects in turn.

Section 15(1)-(2) of the Executive Agencies Act of 1999 provides for a general

format of the annual performance reports of all executive agencies in the country.

The annual report must contain: (1) a copy of audited accounts of the Agency,

together with Auditor General‘s report on those accounts; (2) a report of performance

against key targets and any other related information; (3) a report on the operations

of the Agency during that financial year; (4) such other information as the Permanent

Secretary may require; and (5) the Annual Performance Agreement between the

Permanent Secretary and the ACEO. Once a report contains all these items it was

considered complete and marks the end of reporting process.

We found this process not ―complete‖ in a sense that it is not adequate to make the

agencies accountable. Though the Permanent Secretary can inquire or demand any

information from the agency, there were no evidence that this power was being

utilized effectively to enforce accountability of the agencies. Once submitted, the

58

reports were simply regarded as credible by the ministries and efforts were never

made to verify the information contained therein. In the interviews with the agency

managers, it was learned that none of the two agencies had received a request or

directive from the ministry to provide any extra information besides that contained in

their reports. The general disinterest showed by the ministries was found to reduce

potential to facilitate accountability of the two agencies through the reporting system

because the agencies were not expecting any inquiries or questions, which indicated

non-accountability.

In the same law section 15(2), specific timeframe within which the agencies are

required to prepare and submit those reports is not stipulated. The time to submit the

performance report depends on the kind of reports. Agencies are required to submit

their annual performance reports within two months after the end of each financial

year. Besides the annual reports, the agencies are required to report their

performance twice a year (bi-annually). However, no sanctions for non-compliance

were found out in the legislation, and this limits the usefulness of reporting as a

means to hold the agencies accountable. While interviews with officials from the

Ministry of Health confirmed that TFDA‘s reports and financial accounts are,

usually, timely, it was found out that NHBRA‘s final annual accounts and financial

statements for three consecutive financial years (2002 to 2004) were submitted not

less than a month after the stated deadline.

Related to time requirements, the legislation requires that the agencies publish and

circulate their performance reports among the relevant authorities. Once the

59

performance reports are prepared the agencies are required to send them to the MAB

and the Permanent Secretary for approval before they go to the minister. Moreover,

the minister is directed by the legislation to ensure a copy of the annual reports of the

agencies is laid before the National Assembly not more than two months after

receiving the reports. Although the involvement of the National Assembly is

commendable, its role in facilitating accountability of the two agencies was found to

be only nominal. This was attributed to sidelining of the ministers from governance

of the two agencies which seem to have replaced ‗political‘ accountability (Minister

as answerable) with ‗administrative‘ accountability (ACEOs as answerable).

Moreover, legislation fails to provide for dissemination of these reports to the public

which has kept the agencies from serious public scrutiny. The existing system of

performance reporting system continues to be inward-looking because the public, to

whom the agencies are supposed to be responsive, was not identified by legislation

as an important stakeholder like the government authorities. The failure of the

legislation to require that the agencies publish and disseminate their performance

reports has imposed informational barriers against the public which have hindered

the use of ‗voice‘ against the two agencies.

5.3.2 Quality of the Performance Reports by the Two Agencies

Also, the legislation is silent on the quality of the performance reports which

downplays their potential to help Ministries hold the agencies accountable. The

review of the annual performance reports of the two agencies revealed significant

60

qualitative differences of those reports between the two agencies. The annual

performance reports of TFDA (2003 - 2008) that were examined were found to be

well-written, reader-friendly, and contained sufficient information, explanations and

even some justifications for all actions taken by the top management which affect its

performance outputs. By having these qualities, the TFDA‘s performance reports

revealed potential to help the responsible ministry officials and other stakeholders to

make sound judgement about its performance. Performance reports of NHBRA

(2004 - 2007) were substandard both in terms of substance and style, but we did not

come across ministerial queries on them.

61

CHAPTER SIX

THE “AGENCY-PUBLIC” INTERFACE AND THE STATUS OF

HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY

6.1. Introduction

Horizontal accountability can be considered to be complete and thus potentially

effective when the customers and citizens have substantial influence on the agencies,

and when the agencies recognize and provide the customers and public with formal

or informal avenues through which to get feedback in order to know their needs,

demands, preferences and even disappointments. It is assumed that a closer interface

between service provider and service user promotes information exchanges and

performance-based accountability. The chapter thus focuses on two related issues,

namely ―Agency-Public‖ interface and ―horizontal accountability‖ (for

performance). To examine the ‗agency-public‘ interface three indicators were used:

(1) degree of transparency; (2) presence of appropriate feedback mechanisms; and

(3) rate of customers‘ use of the services.

To analyze ‗horizontal‘ accountability we examined two main variables: first, service

‗effectiveness‘ and second, customers‘ propensity or potentiality to improve

responsiveness by the agency. To determine service effectiveness two indicators

were used: (1) perceived service improvements and (2) customers‘ satisfaction. On

the ―demand-side‖, we examined the potential of the public to hold the two agencies

accountable whose indicators include: (1) public expectations of service

improvement; (2) presence and potential use of ―exit‖ options to make the agencies

62

responsive; and (3) rate of public demand for better services. In close relation with

the potentials of the customers to make the agencies responsive, we assessed their

actual propensity which was indicated by the rate of submitting complaints.

6.2. Interface of the Two Agencies and the Public

6.2.1. Transparency of the Two Agencies to the Customers

Transparency is instrumental to effective accountability (Bovens, 2005) because

provision of sufficient, accurate and relevant information by the actor lays ground for

the account holder to make judgement about the actor‘s conduct or performance. In

line with this fact, the information delivery systems of the two agencies were

examined to establish whether the interface has greater transparency of the two

agencies measured by the extent to which the agencies provide access to information

about the service and performance.

The study revealed that there were information delivery channels in both agencies

and some exclusively used by TFDA, but even these differed in the degree of

appropriateness and effectiveness as tools for enhancing transparency and

accountability to the customers and the citizens. Table 6.1 outlines the information

delivery channels that were found in the two agencies and it shows that a higher

number of channels are present in TFDA than NHBRA.

63

Table. 6.1: Information Delivery Channels of the two Agencies

No Means of Information Delivery NHBRA TFDA

1 Library x x

2 Client Service Charter x

3 Media x x

5 Public Relations Unit/Office x

6 Internet/Website x x

7 Exhibition x x

8 Sensitization seminar x x

Total score out of 8 6 8

Source: Field Data, 2008

The information delivery channels available in both agencies include library,

website, media, sensitization seminars, and exhibitions. Yet, there was a huge

difference in the appropriateness of these channels and TFDA has additional ways to

inform its customers and the citizens about itself.

The library of NHBRA lacks sufficient, up-to-date and relevant materials, and

personnel to run the library. The library is stocked with local newspapers and old

written materials without there being the annual performance reports, which makes

the library unsuitable as a resource centre for low cost housing as it was supposed to

be (NHBRA, 2006:14). Instead of obtaining the documents from the library the

researcher had to ask for print-outs from the Business Support Manager‘s office.

This indicated lack of quick and easy public access to information. In contrast, the

library of TFDA is operated by a professional Librarian with his Assistant, and it was

possible to retrieve the annual performance reports for the past five years with their

help. Other documents found were the various reports and market surveys that had

64

been conducted by the agency or their consultants. By visiting the library, the

customers and citizens can obtain relevant information about the activities and

performance of the agency since its establishment.

The second information delivery channels found in both agencies was internet

website under these addresses: www.tfda.or.tz (TFDA) and www.nhbra.go.tz

(NHBRA). By visiting the homepages of the two agencies, the public can obtain

information on the background, organizational structure, function and objectives, and

services and products which are offered. The NHBRA‘s website contained no

additional information. For the case of TFDA it was found out that the website

offers more details about its activities, previous and upcoming events, publications

(but not the annual performance reports), public alerts about adverse cosmetics,

drugs and medicines in the market, regulations or guidelines on registration, and

public education programmes among others. It can thus be said that TFDA‘s website

is more appropriate as an information delivery tool as it offers detailed and relevant

information to the customers and citizens alike.

To reach out to the public, the two agencies have used media for commercial

advertisements and provision of information about matters intended to inform only.

Under its Publicity or Promotional Programme, NHBRA has used print media and

electronic media for advertisements for the purposes of raising public awareness of

the agency‘s services and products (NHBRA, 2007). The types of media include

print media like newspapers, brochures, and journal13

, as well as electronic media

13

Ministry of Lands publishes a journal titled ―Ardhi ni Mtaji‖ in which information of its other

agencies including the NHBRA were found.

65

like television and radio. Despite these channels being repeatedly mentioned in the

Performance Appraisal Reports, there were no adequate details to ascertain their

actual use by NHBRA.

On the other hand, it was found out that the TFDA publishes the ―Drug Information

Bulletin‖ every three months to inform healthcare providers within the country and

abroad on quality, safety and effectiveness of drugs. The bulletin seeks also to

promote rational prescribing, dispensing and use of drugs. Also, TFDA has used

radio (especially Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam and Radio One14

) as its key media in

dissemination of information and education covering various programmes including:

organization and functions of TFDA, procedures for obtaining permits and license

from TFDA, rational use of Antiretroviral drugs, monitoring of Adverse Drug

Reactions and many others.15

Review of the Five-Year Annual Performance Report

revealed that the Public Relations Unit had organized 2 press conferences, issued 20

press releases, and published 72 newspaper articles in 2006 alone (TFDA, 2008).

The fourth information delivery channel used by both agencies was sensitization

seminars. The review of NHBRA‘s Performance Appraisal Report (2007-2008)

revealed that sensitization seminars and demonstrations on low cost, affordable

housing and using appropriate technologies were conducted in Ruvuma, Tabora,

Iringa, Mara, Arusha, Manyara and Dar es Salaam. On its part, TFDA had conducted

zonal sensitization seminars to inform and educate stakeholders on the Tanzania

Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act 2003 and the organization and functions of the

14

These two radio stations (Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam is now Tanzania Broadcast Corporation)

have the widest national outreach than any other in the country. 15

www.tfda.or.tz

66

TFDA. Participants of such seminar include manufacturers, importers, wholesalers

and retailers of food, drugs, herbal drugs, cosmetics and medical devices. Others are

City/Municipal/Town/District Executive Directors, law enforcers and representatives

from government and non-government organizations. These sensitization seminars

have been conducted in the following zones: Eastern zone (2003), Central Zone

(2004), Northern Zone (2004), Lake Zone (2004), Southern Highlands Zone (2005),

Southern Zone (2005), and Dar es Salaam (2005). The sensitization seminars in these

zones (except Dar es Salaam) the stakeholders were sensitized on Fees and Charges

Regulations & Delegation of Powers Regulation16

.

Exhibitions were used also by the two agencies to provide information to the

customers and citizens about their activities, objectives, achievements, services and

to respond to their questions. According to the Performance Appraisal Report (2007-

2008), the NHBRA carried out five exhibitions for the 2007/2008 period as follow:

Farmers Day (August 2007), Intellectual Property Exhibition (August 2007),

Tanzania Public Service Week (June 2008), Engineers Day (2008) and Dar es

Salaam International Trade Fair (July 2008). The TFDA had also participated in

exhibitions such as Tanzania Public Service Week (June 2008) for the purpose of

increasing awareness of its stakeholders and citizens on: Tanzania Food, Drugs and

Cosmetics Act 2003; organization and functions of the TFDA; procedures for

obtaining license and permit from TFDA; safety and quality of food, drugs, herbal

drugs, cosmetics and medical devices; rational use of food, drugs, herbal drugs,

16

www.tfda.or.tz

67

cosmetics and medical devices; and health hazard associated with the use of food,

drugs, herbal drugs, cosmetics and medical devices like adverse drug reactions17

.

Other information delivery channels were found in TFDA alone, namely client

service charter and public relations unit. On 27 January 2006 TFDA launched its

Clients Service Charter which seeks to establish agency‘s commitment to the

standards for which it strives to reach in providing services to its stakeholders. The

Charter provides information about TFDA service delivery approach and its

relationship with the clients in five areas: functions, communication, standards of

service delivery, clients‘ rights and responsibilities, and channels for feedback or

making a complaint. The Charter was found to be an important tool with potential to

facilitate horizontal accountability in three ways: it clearly specifies quality of

service that the customers should expect, and may use this commitment to demand

better service; it allows customers to evaluate performance of services and give their

feedback on the performance, which is critical for continuous improvement; and it

provides a basis for making comparisons between agencies which offer similar

services to that provided by TFDA, and this is a critical step towards the use of the

exit option by the customers as a means of making the agency more accountable for

its services.

It was learned from the NHBRA‘s Business Support Manager that the agency had

yet to officially launch its Charter as the PO-PSM had not released funds for the

launch event. This explanation was found to be unsatisfactory partly because the

reasons behind the failure of the agency management to secure funds for launching

17

www.tfda.or.tz

68

the Charter were not provided. It can be argued that the leadership of the agency has

not been aggressive enough in the question of launching the Charter.

The other mechanisms for information delivery found in TFDA alone was the Public

Relations Unit which operates under the Office of the Director General. The Public

Relations Unit was established to strengthen the link between TFDA and the general

public through organizing press conferences, issuing press releases, and publication

of articles. It was reported in the Five-Year Annual Performance Report that during

the 2006/2007 financial year 20 press releases were issued, 72 articles appeared in

various newspapers, and 2 press conferences were conducted to clarify the results of

TFDA inspection of cosmetics and medical stores in Dar es Salaam. For the case of

NHBRA, there is no office charged formally and specifically to deal with public

relations matters; instead, the Director General acts as the spokesperson and de facto

public relations officer.

After tallying the number of available mechanisms for provision of customer and

public information from the two agencies, TFDA scored higher than NHBRA. Also,

a close examination of those mechanisms found in both agencies revealed that

TFDA‘s information delivery tools are more institutionalized and had potentials to

facilitate its accountability than those of NHBRA. However, out of 30 ordinary

citizens (not clients) that were asked if they knew about the functions and services

provided by the two agencies, only 3 professed knowledge of at least one function of

TFDA, with 23 admitting that they had no such knowledge while 4 did not even

answer the question. Despite the small size of the sample, the fact that these

69

respondents were a segment of the general public and randomly picked makes their

low level of knowledge indicative of the extent to which the information delivery

system of the two agencies has yet to reach the wider public.

6.2.2. Feedback Mechanisms

As part of their information systems, the two agencies possessed a number of

mechanisms through which they could obtain feedback from the customers and

citizens generally. The common ways shared by both agencies to get feedback for

their performance were four: letters, suggestion boxes, telephone, and exhibitions.

The contact details of the two agencies which their customers and citizens could use

to make a telephone call, send a fax, or send an email are available in the two

agencies‘ websites, client service charter (TFDA) and publications. Exhibitions have

been used to get feedback from stakeholders‘ assessment of the services and products

demonstrated by the two agencies. Other mechanisms were available in TFDA alone.

Table 6.2 outlines feedback mechanisms available in the two agencies.

Table 6.2: Feedback Mechanisms Available in the two Agencies

No Feedback Mechanisms NHBRA TFDA

1 Suggestion Box x x

2 Official Correspondence x x

3 Internet/Website x

4 Exhibitions x x

5 Customer Care/Public Relations Office x

6 Customer Surveys x

Total score out of 6 3 6

Source: Field Data, 2008

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The NHBRA has a website, but the homepage does not provide opportunity for

customers and citizens to give any kind of feedback. On the other hand, TFDA‘s

website has a ―Feedback Form‖ that allows any interested person to make a

comment, or advice, or a complaint about the services of the agency.

As a measure to enhance implementation of Quality Management Systems (QMS)

functions, the Director General‘s Office introduced a Customer Care Desk to attend

all customers for purposes of improving service delivery (TFDA, 2006). The

Customer Care Officer has the responsibility to receive public complaints or queries

through physical visits and official correspondence and forward them to relevant

Directories for necessary corrective measures. Moreover, TFDA had commissioned

consultants or sponsored internal officers to conduct surveys for the purpose of

soliciting perceptions, opinions, and attitudes towards its mission, objectives and

performance in service delivery. These studies include 2004 Customer Satisfaction

Survey (Excel Media 2004), Self-Assessment of the Performance of Tanzania Foods

and Drugs Authority (Singonda and Sillo 2005), and Factors contributing to the

Delay in the Drugs Registration Process at the Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority

(Komero, 2006). The NHBRA had no customer care officer but the secretary to the

Chief Executive Officer acts as a de facto complaints officer, and the only survey

conducted was prior to its acquisition of agency status back in 2001.

6.2.3. Rate of Service Use by the Public

The extent to which the agencies as service providers and public as service users was

determined by focusing on the rate of service use, whereby the high or increasing

71

rate of service use by the customers was taken to signify greater or increasing degree

of close interface as a potential stimulus for horizontal accountability, and the low or

decreasing rate of service use signified lower or decreasing degree of closeness

between agencies and the public.

Data used to determine the rate of service use by the public were obtained from

interviews with a total of 50 customers (25 for each agency) and from the

documentary sources, particularly TFDA‘s annual performance reports (2003-2008)

and NHBRA‘s annual performance appraisal reports (2004-2007). The secondary

data were used as baseline and compared to the results of the customer survey

(2009). By the use of secondary and primary data it was possible to analyze the

trends in the rate of service use. One challenge however was that the two agencies

offered different kinds of services and so the analysis focused on those core services

of the agencies without attempting to set some common criteria for comparison. The

trends were studied separately with TFDA and NHBRA as independent cases and

thereafter a general comparison based on the findings of each agency was made.

To start with NHBRA, we examined the rate of service, particularly its construction

and consultancy services. According to a review of annual performance appraisal,

the trend of service use has not been consistent and there was a significant variation

between individual customers and other types of customers such as Non-

Governmental Institutions. In table 6.3, the trend of construction and consultancy

services use for the periods 2004/2005 and 2007/2008 show the inconsistency and

variations between types of customers that used NHBRA‘s services.

72

Table 6.3: Rate of Use of NHBRA‟s Construction and Consultancy Services

Customers 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8

Individual customers 2 - 2 5

Central Government Institutions 2 - 4 7

Parastatals/Other Agencies 1 - 5 5

Non-Governmental Institutions 4 - 0 0

Total 9 - 11 17

Source: NHBRA (2004, 2006, 2007) 18

The baseline data show a very low rate of construction and customer service use by

the customers of NHBRA. There was a slight increase in the number of Individual

Customers from 2 in 2004/2005 to 5 in 2007/2008, Central Government Institutions

from 2 to 7 as well as Parastatals or Other Agencies from 1 in 2004/2005 to 5 in

2006/2007, but similar (or the same) number of customers used the services for the

year 2007/2008. On the other hand, the number of Non-Governmental Institutions is

shown to decrease from 4 in 2004/2005 to 0 in 2007/2008. Data for 2005/2006 could

not be obtained. The baseline data suggest that the NHBRA has a relatively small

customer base for its construction and consultancy services. Most of its customers

were noted to be governmental institutions or agencies while individual customers

were very few.

18

Data obtained from the Annual Performance Appraisal Reports between 2004/2005 and 2007/2008

raised a concern. It was noted that individual customers in 2004/2005 and 2006/2007 were 2, and

Parastatals or Other Agencies that used NHBRA‘s services were 5 for 2006/2007 and 2007/2008.

There is a possibility that these figures were ‗carried forward‘, because the names of the Individual

Customers in 2006/2007 were not mentioned unlike the case in 2004/2005, and they could not be

retrieved after the researcher asked for them. This however does not overshadow the general trend of

service use by the customers of NHBRA.

73

To augment the secondary data analyzed above, 25 customers of NHBRA were

interviewed. From their responses it was ascertained that consultancy services and

building construction were the key services offered by the NHBRA, but more (17) of

the customers had used consultancy services compared to only 8 who had used

construction services. Asked to indicate how often they had used those services, all

admitted that they had not used the services often or frequently. More specifically,

18 of the interviewed customers did not use NHBRA‘s services more than once and

other 7 consulted the agency twice. Generally speaking, responses from the

customers suggested low rate of service use which tallies with the data from the

secondary sources.

The low rate of customer use of construction and consultancy services offered by the

NHBRA can be explained as follows. Despite the fact that local materials used by

NHBRA bring down the cost of construction, many customers seem to favour

imported building materials as they are associated with social prestige in Tanzania

communities, especially urban dwellers. Also, competition has increased as a result

of economic liberalization which allowed proliferation of private firms that offer

construction and consultancy services as those offered by NHBRA and have

manipulated society‘s attitude to their advantage. NHBRA has to face competitive

institutions even within the Government like the National Social Security Fund

(NSSF) which has recently won tenders to build low cost houses for employees of

various government institutions. Recently also NSSF has won the tender from the

Ministry of Home Affairs to build houses for police officers at Kurasini area in Dar

es Salaam.

74

In addition to researcher‘s interest to establish the rate of service use, the reasons for

customers‘ decision to use those services were deemed important as well. Based on

the customers‘ responses, it was found out that the most influential ‗pull‘ factor was

affordability of NHBRA‘s services. Out of 25 customers who were questioned 16

argued that the costs for construction and consultancy services were much lower

compared to those of private service providers. Other 9 customers said that they were

more attracted by reliability of NHBRA‘s services which was (generally) attributed

to the fact that the agency‘s interest was not just profit-making since it is a

government institution.

From the interview of 25 customers of TFDA, it was found out that 17 of them

interacted with the agency for the purpose of acquiring business licences or permits

and the other 8 customers had used laboratory services. Also, most of the customers

had used the services only once and a fewer number of customers used the services

more than once. The low rate of service use can be attributed to the nature of services

that TFDA offers which include issuance of licenses and permits which are sought

after by customers when the need fore renewing the licenses or permits arise.

The customers‘ responses to the question on the reasons for using the TFDA‘s

services revealed that the number of customers attracted by reliability of the services

was fewer (4) than for the case of NHBRA‘s customers (9). A majority (21) of the 25

customers argued that they could not obtain the licences and permits for trading in

drugs, medicines and cosmetics which left them without an alternative source. It has

been observed that customers were not attracted by the quality of services, which

75

suggests that quality of service has insignificant influence on the rate of service use

by customers of TFDA and NHBRA.

6.3. Extent of Agencies‟ Responsiveness to the Public

6.3.1. Customers‟ Perceptions on Improvement and Satisfaction with Service

Delivery

In the survey, customers were asked to give their perceptions on the extent to which

service delivery levels have improved after the formation of the two agencies. There

was a variation in the customers‘ responses about their perceptions.

In the case of NHBRA, a majority of its 25 customers perceived improvements in

service delivery as either low (11) or moderate (8). Other 4 customers gave no

response. On the side of TFDA, more than a half of customers that were questioned

expressed positive perceptions about its service delivery improvements. Out of 25

customers, 7 ranked the improvements in service delivery as high and 11 thought the

improvements were moderate, while 7 customers believed the improvements were

low. Table 6.5 compares customers‘ ranking of the perceived service delivery

improvements by the two agencies.

Table 6.4: Customers‟ Ranking of Service Delivery Improvements

Source: Field Data, 2009

Studied

Agencies

Perceived Service Delivery

Improvement

Total

High Moderate Low DK/NR

NHBRA 2 8 11 4 25

TFDA 7 11 7 0 25

Total 9 19 18 4 50

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Notwithstanding the findings that a relatively higher number of customers of TFDA

had positive perception about its service delivery improvements when compared to

NHBRA, the aggregated responses revealed that most customers found the

improvements as either moderate (19) or low (18), and only a handful ranked the

improvements as high. Generally, the aggregated responses suggest that the

improvements in service delivery of the two agencies have been adequate.

A related question was asked to establish the extent to which the surveyed customers

were satisfied with the services. The intent was to capture the extent to which the two

agencies effectively respond to the service needs and preferences of their customers.

Fifty (50) customers (25 customers from each agency) were asked to indicate

whether their satisfaction level with services of the two agencies was high, moderate,

or low, or if they were not satisfied with the agencies‘ services. Table 6.6 classifies

the customers‘ responses along those three ranks, as well as indicates customers who

were not satisfied at all with the services and those who gave no response.

Table 6.5: Customers‟ Satisfaction with Services of the Two Agencies

Studied

Agencies

Level of satisfaction Total

High

Moderate Low Not

Satisfied

DK/

NR

NHBRA 3 12 7 2 1 25

TFDA 8 11 2 3 1 25

Total 11 23 9 5 2 50

Source: Field Data, 2009

The findings indicated an overall low level of customer satisfaction with the service

delivery of the two agencies. The aggregated responses show that a majority (23) of

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the customers expressed moderate satisfaction while only 11 customers they were

highly satisfied with the service delivery by the two agencies. A considerable

number of customers (9) expressed low satisfaction and a few (5) were not satisfied

with the service delivery of the two agencies. There were no responses from 2

customers.

The customers‘ level of satisfaction varied when the responses of TFDA‘s customers

were compared to those responses given by the NHBRA‘s customers. It was found

out that the number of customers who expressed high satisfaction with TFDA were

twice (8) as much as those (3) customers of NHBRA, but the number of NHBRA‘s

customers who expressed low satisfaction (7) were three times more than 2 TFDA‘s

customers. There was only a slight difference in terms of customers who were

dissatisfied, 3 for TFDA and 2 for NHBRA.

In order to determine which specific attributes of service delivery influenced the

satisfaction levels of the customers of the two agencies, customers were asked to

mention the aspects considered as satisfactory. Table 6.7 shows customers‘

satisfaction with five specific attributes19

of service delivery for the two agencies.

Those customers who gave no responses are excluded.

19

These five attributes were adopted from the TFDA 2004 customer survey conducted by Excel Media

experts. A comparative analysis between ‗baseline‘ and our own survey became impossible for both

cases because NHBRA has not done a similar study.

78

Table 6.6: Customers‟ Satisfaction with Specific Attributes of Service

Delivery by the Two Agencies

Source: Field Data

Out of 43 customers who responded to the question, 16 customers from TFDA (9)

and NHBRA (7) considered quality of the services of the two agencies as the most

satisfactory attribute of service delivery. Other attribute which were moderately rated

as satisfactory was reliability of the services, and thus some said the service received

met their expectations. These findings suggest only slight difference in the levels of

customers‘ satisfaction with specific attributes of service delivery offered by

NHBRA and TFDA, especially reliability (6 against 5) and services to meet

customers‘ expectations (6 against 5).

It is worth noting that TFDA‘s customers were more satisfied with reception of

information about the agency services and quality of the services than NHBRA‘s

customers. However, none of TFDA‘s customers expressed satisfaction with the

promptness of the agency in service delivery compared to 2 of the NHBRA‘s

customers who were satisfied with this attribute20

. From the TFDA‘s self-assessment

study, the most common aspects for which customers expressed strong

dissatisfaction include lack of prompt responses and delays in the release of

20

If we were to make a comparison between the baseline data from TFDA‘s 2004 customer survey and

our own survey, there is an increase in the level of overall customer satisfaction (42% of 606

customers as per baseline survey to 84% of 25 customers as per 2009 survey).

No Customer satisfaction with: NHBRA TFDA Total

1 Information 1 2 3

2 Promptness 2 0 2

3 Meeting customer expectation 6 5 11

4 Perceived quality 7 9 16

5 Trustworthiness/reliability 6 5 11

Total 22 21 43

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laboratory results and long duration to register products (Sigonda and Sillo,

2005:34).

The observed variations can be explained as follows. According to the TFDA‘s Five-

Year Annual Performance Report, the reasons for its success in service delivery

include changing mindset of staff towards delivering quality services, collaboration

with stakeholders from both public and private sectors, and sufficient donor support

from various international public organizations (like World Health Organization, and

Foods and Agriculture Organization) and private foundations (like Bill and Melinda

Gates Foundation). In addition to these factors the fact that the regulatory nature of

activities undertaken by the two agencies favours TFDA than NHBRA when it

comes to assessment of service delivery. Also NHBRA‘s Annual Performance

Appraisal Reports for 2007/2008 that were reviewed revealed that the agency

operates under-capacity because the current number of staff is below the human

resource need and the necessary equipments are outdated.

However, it is our view that the levels of commitment of the top leadership which

significantly differ between the two agencies have been the most decisive factor. It

was found out that within the period of five years in its operations TFDA has

undertaken important system development based on the results of several scientific

and independent surveys into their stakeholders‘ perceptions and needs. In the first

three years of its operations three surveys were conducted under the Director

General‘s initiative and funding. Based on the research reports, the Quality

Management System was created under which a Customer Care Desk was introduced

80

to attend all customers for purpose of improving service delivery. As a result, it was

reported in the Five-Year Annual Performance Report that a total of 8521 customers

were registered between January and June 2007 owing to courtesy and speed in

handling the customers. These initiatives from the top leadership have proven to

improve service delivery levels. It was learned that NHBRA had not taken initiatives

even remotely similar to those of TFDA.

6.4. Potential of the Public to make the Two Agencies Accountable

6.4.1. Level of Public Expectations for Better Services

The GOT anticipate that the creation of executive agencies would improve efficiency

and effectiveness of the delivery of public services. In order to determine whether the

service users themselves have similar or lower expectations from the agencies as

service providers, we asked 50 customers to state whether they expected

improvements or indifference or decline of service delivery by the two agencies.

This question was posed based on premise that the level of customers‘ expectation

influences their attitude towards pressurizing service providers to become more

responsive to their needs and meet their expectations.

It was found out that 41 out of 50 customers of the two agencies who were

questioned had moderate expectations, 6 had high expectations and only 3 customers

expected no improvements. Customers‘ expectations of improvement in service

delivery were for the following service delivery attributes: low costs or affordability

(20); quality (16); and increased speed (11). The three customers who did not expect

any improvements argued that competition from private contractors (for the case of

81

NHBRA alone), continued use of old technology and relying on the same personnel

cannot improve service delivery by the two agencies.

The reasons behind moderate and high expectations of improved service delivery

differed significantly between the customers of the two agencies. Many of NHBRA‘s

customers believed that the agency‘s mission of providing low-cost housing would

appeal to many Tanzanians (especially residents of urban or semi-urban settings)

because most of them live in rented houses, and other customers thought low-cost

housing would be more preferable to expensive housing due to bad economic

conditions and high prices of building materials. On the side of TFDA customers,

they also expected increased public demand due to fast growth of trade in medicines

and cosmetics in the country but others believed more advanced technology would

have been applied to improve efficiency.

The findings established that unlike the Government of Tanzania, the expectations of

the surveyed customers indicated low potential for their role as agents for improving

of accountability of agencies.

6.4.2. Presence and Potential Use of “Exit” Option by Customers of the Two

Agencies

It matters whether the customers can or cannot find alternative service provider,

because lack of alternative supplier discourages any active involvement of those

customers to pressurize the monopolistic service provider to become more

responsive. To establish the presence or absence of exist options to the service users,

82

50 customers of the two agencies were asked to state whether they had alternative

sources of services.

It was learned from their responses that only 16 customers were able to access the

same services they provided by the two agencies from an alternative service

provider, but 34 customers admitted not to have alternative sources for services that

the two agencies provide. The phenomenon of ‗service dependency‘ was dominant to

TFDA‘s customers because none of its 25 customers who we questioned has

alternative supplier of services. This is based on the fact that TFDA has monopoly as

the sole regulatory authority with mandate to issue licences and permits for dealing

with food and food supplements, drugs, cosmetics, herbal drugs, and medical

devices21

.

On the other hand, 15 out 25 customers of NHBRA claimed to have access to other

contractors and consultants. Although the NHBRA has sole authority to control the

quality and specification of building materials in the country but its commercialized

services are widely supplied by other organizations from the public and private

sectors alike which include public corporations, research institutes, building

contractors, and registered consultants. This variation reflect the difference in the

impact of economic liberalization to public organizations in the country whereby

growth of private sector has increased the number of building contractors and

consultants who become exit options for customers of NHBRA, but the increased

21In addition to that, TFDA has taken several steps either to maintain this status or extend its

jurisdiction.

83

inflow of counterfeit products has created incentive for TFDA to extend its

regulatory activities which has made it a monopoly.

6.5. Propensity of the Public to make the Two Agencies Accountable

The closer interface between agencies and their customers was assumed to help

facilitate increased involvement of the customers in making the agencies more

responsive to their needs and demands. We asked the surveyed customers whether

they knew how to influence performance of the two agencies to their favour, in terms

of achieving improved service delivery. It was found out that 39 out of 50 customers

claimed to be aware of the ways to make the agencies responsive and other 11

customers admitted not to know how they can effectively influence performance of

the two agencies.

Despite the majority of the customers claiming to know how to make the two

agencies accountable, only 8 of those 39 customers had submitted formal complaints

to either NHBRA (3 customers) and TFDA (5 customers). In the interview with the

Secretary to the ACEO of NHBRA, she confirmed that customers do not submit their

complaints through formal channels as they would rather express their

dissatisfactions on site to the contractors. It was learned that the agency do not even

have a file of complaints received.

On the side of the TFDA, the Customer Care Officer that we interviewed said that

only few and minor complaints are occasionally received and these complaints are

most often handled without involving higher authorities. The common complaints

are about long duration of obtaining permits and the procedures and requirements for

84

registration of products. Customer often complained that the procedures and

requirements were cumbersome and too demanding. The dismal number of formal

complaints against TFDA was also captured in the 2004 survey report, whereby only

19 out of 596 customers and only 3 ordinary citizens had registered their complaints

(Excel Media, 2004:23). The overall propensity of customers to forward their

complaints was found to be generally low.

85

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Introduction

In the context of the ongoing PSRP, the study investigated the extent to which the

executive agencies in Tanzania particularly NHBRA and TFDA are accountable for

their performance (service delivery) to the public. The specific objectives of the

study were fourfold: to assess if the frameworks facilitate accountability of the

agencies; to assess the effect of autonomy on levels of accountability of the agencies;

to explore other factors that affect accountability of the agencies; and to recommend

ways to improve the accountability system of agencies.

This chapter has three objectives: first, to draw conclusions on the impact of

formation of executive agencies on accountability; second, to highlight the salient

factors affecting accountability of the studied agencies; and third, to recommend the

ways for improving the system of accountability for executive agencies in Tanzania.

7.2. The Impact of „Agencification‟ on Performance Accountability

The formation of the studied agencies was found to cause a substantial shift of power

through delegation of authority and institutional separation between the ministries

and the created agencies, which resulted into the latter‘s increased autonomy. The

studied agencies were found to discharge their routine operations and strategic

management functions without interference from their ministries, and the ACEOs

had substantial discretion over the human resources and enjoy a relatively high

degree of autonomy in financial management issues. With respect to financial

86

matters one limitation was found to be low degree of financial self-sufficiency which

has made both agencies dependent on Government subventions and thus must

conform to some bureaucratic procedures to secure funds.

The increased autonomy of the two agencies could not be established as a positive

cause for their performance accountability because it has instead reduced ministerial

control over the agencies without there being increased role of customers to make the

latter more accountable. To a large extent its operations, strategic management and

even the performance results of the two agencies have not been effectively monitored

by the Ministries concerned. Ministries demonstrated low interest to monitor their

agencies‘ performance partly because the ministers‘ role under the legal framework

is only nominal and thus the whole process to take place outside political scrutiny. It

was found out that there were no meaningful disincentives for the two agencies to

fully comply with performance reporting to their ministries and thereby failed in

several occasions to comply with the statutory obligations.

The second major impact of the formation of executive agencies was closer interface

between the two agencies and their customers. We found out that three mechanisms

have been commonly employed by the two agencies to get closer to their customers:

client assessments, publicity or promotional programmes, and customer care

practices. But there were variations in terms of appropriateness of the mechanisms

and level of their institutionalization.

The TFDA had institutionalized its customer care practice by formation of the

Customer Care desk under a professionally trained officer and recently established a

87

sophisticated system of obtaining and channelling feedback from its customers. In

addition, its Public Relations Unit has been very active and effective to inform the

public about the services and alerting its stakeholders about harmful products in the

market. On the contrary, NHBRA has only ad hoc mechanisms for public relations,

poor mechanisms to get feedback like Suggestion Box, and the agency relies on

annual exhibitions to reach the public. Between the two agencies, it is only the

TFDA that had conducted customer surveys and studies to understand the levels of

customer satisfaction and their preferences. It can thus be concluded that, TFDA has

managed to establish a closer interface with its customers.

The degree of closeness between the agencies and their customers correlated

positively with the degree of responsiveness to the expectations and preferences of

the customers. This was reflected by customers‘ perceptions about service

improvement and the level of their satisfaction. The majority of NHBRA customers

perceived improvements in service delivery as either low while more than half of

TFDA customers that were questioned expressed positive perceptions about its

service delivery improvements. With regard to customer satisfaction, a considerable

number of customers expressed low satisfaction and few were not satisfied with the

service delivery of the two agencies. However, the number of customers who

expressed high satisfaction with TFDA was twice as much as those customers of

NHBRA, but the number of NHBRA‘s customers who expressed low satisfaction

was three times more than TFDA‘s customers.

88

7.3. Factors Affecting Levels of Accountability of the Agencies

The Executive Agencies Act of 1997 which provides for the external framework for

agency accountability has several shortcomings that have been found to limit the role

of Ministries and the public to exercise effective account holding of the studied

agencies. Relocation of oversight powers from the departments into the office of the

Permanent Secretaries and the Ministerial Advisory Boards (MABs) has faded the

ministerial oversight over the agencies in both cases. In relation to this, the

legislation provides for overload of the responsibilities and contradictory roles to the

Permanent Secretary that has negative implications to the required objective and

effective performance monitor and scrutiny.

The Framework Documents of the two agencies provides for an inward-looking

rather than outward-looking performance reporting system. Under the current system

of accountability, the service users and the public, to whom the agencies are

supposed to be responsive, are not identified as the key stakeholders. It is only the

Government authorities who are clearly recognized and to whom performance

reporting is directed. Moreover, legislation fails to provide for dissemination of these

reports to the public which has kept the agencies from serious public scrutiny. The

failure of the legislation to require that the agencies publish and disseminate their

performance reports has imposed informational barriers against the public which

have hindered the use of ‗voice‘ against the two agencies. And, despite the existence

of performance reporting requirements these are not supported by penalties for non-

compliance which could act as disincentive for late submission and poor quality of

the performance reports, as it has been seen with the case of NHBRA.

89

While the study findings establish that the closer the agency is to its customers the

more likely it becomes responsive because such interface allows easy exchange of

information between the service providers and the service users, it has been found

that the impact of closer interface on responsiveness is limited by the low customers‘

expectations on service improvements and low propensity of the customers to

demand for improved services. It has been found that majority of the questioned

customers of the two agencies had only moderate expectations and few expected

high improvements which indicate low potentiality to make the agencies

accountable. On the other hand, the propensity of customers to make the two

agencies more responsive was low despite most customers admitting that they were

only moderately satisfied with the services. It can be argued thus, the disposition of

the customers is the determinant of the level of accountability of the agencies.

The third factor which was found to influence the level of accountability of the two

agencies was the attitude and commitment of the agency leadership to enhance

responsiveness. Unlike the NHBRA, the leadership of the TFDA has shown to

recognize the importance of public involvement in its activities and thereby has taken

several initiatives to provide for increased public access and involvement. For

instance, its annual ‗Stakeholders Forum‘ established in 2007 provides avenue

through which the stakeholders, inclusive of the customers and ordinary citizens,

give comments and advice the agency on how best to achieve what the customers

and larger public expect from them. Therefore, while the external framework (the

Executive Agencies Act of 1997) has encouraged the agencies to engage the public

90

in a consultative process, the study has established that it is the commitment of the

agency leadership which determine whether this is done or neglected.

7.4. Recommendations

Executive agencies need adequate autonomy to become more flexible and innovative

in their operations but the agencies should not be absorbed in their narrow concerns.

To avoid ministries and agencies becoming disconnected, a clear governance of the

relationship between the ministries and the agencies is necessary to ensure there is

shared strategic direction. Unless a Minister or Permanent Secretary is properly

engaged in agency issues, a governance vacuum will occur. By being actively

engaged, the Minister or Permanent Secretary can be aware of the agency‘s progress

which can help build confidence that the agencies play their part in meeting strategic

objectives. Furthermore, close relationship between ministries and the agencies can

discourage undue interference that may constrain the agencies from realizing high-

level performance.

The MAB should provide strong support to the ministry in regard to strategic

direction of the agency and the ACEO‘s responsibility for the delivery of expected

performance results. However, to avoid role conflict, the Chairperson of MAB

should not be the Permanent Secretary. Alternatively, the MAB should be chaired by

head of the relevant policy directorate within the Ministry. As a focal point within

the Ministry, the Chairperson should be able to use the chance to challenge the

ACEO and facilitate his work in meeting excellent performance.

91

Also, there is a need to augment the role of ministries to oversee performance of the

agencies as part of their executive responsibilities which should be judged by the

National Assembly and specifically the Parliamentary Committees. It is therefore

recommended that an unambiguous statutory provision be inserted into the Executive

Act of 1997 to allow for a proactive parliamentary role because this would more

easily create awareness to the public about the performance processes and results of

the agencies whose activities impact on their lives directly or otherwise.

The facilitative role of the Ministry needs to be taken more seriously for the agency

to achieve continuous performance improvement. Ministries need to ensure that the

agencies‘ performance targets are challenging and responsive to customers‘ needs.

The agency targets should not be retained if no longer relevant. The Ministry should

subject performance targets of its agencies to regular reviews to ensure consistency

with changing policy priorities and customer preferences.

Considering the centrality of information to accountability, it is recommended that

deliberate efforts be taken to make the agencies more open and share with their

customers and the larger public information about their performance. To achieve

this, each agency should be required to publish and disseminate widely its annual

report (or an abridged version) through various ways after the report has been tabled

in the National Assembly.

92

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