excid seminar with julian garritzmann

Universität Konstanz

Julian L. GarritzmannOslo, ExCiD Seminar, March 3, 2015

The Political Economy of Higher EducationFinancea

A Comparative Analysis of the Politics of Tuition Fees and Subsidies

Universität KonstanzPol Econ of Higher Edu Finance (Garritzmann)2

Motivation / Puzzle

- $ 670 / Term= $ 6700+ $ 0

>> - $ 6700

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- $ 6000 / Year= $ 30000+ $ 1500+ $ 1000

>> - $17500

- $ 8000 / Year= $ 40000+ $ 8000 Loan / Year= $ 40000

>> - $ 40000

- $ 0 / Year+ $ 650 / Month(max. 55)= $ 35750

>> + $ 35750

?


Research Questions

1) How do the tuition-subsidy systems differ across the advanced democracies?

(How) Have they changed over time?- “Four Worlds of Student Finance“- identical starting point radical change stability

2) How can we explain the emergence of the Four Worlds?- “Time-sensitive partisan theory“

3) Why don’t the regimes change anymore?- Positive Feedback-Effects (Individual- & Elite-Level)

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Relevance

Theoretical relevance:- No explanation yet- Higher education research dominated by educational scientists and

economists, often disregarding political factors- Political economy of skill formation literature (Busemeyer 2009 u.a.; Thelen 2004; Iversen

2005) focuses on VET

Societal relevance:- Enormously important for students, their families, and tax payers in general- Immense distributional effects

- E.g., on wages socio-economic inequality- (Preferences towards) redistribution- Studying behavior social mobility- Varieties of Capitalism- Macro-economis consequences- ...

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- Existing literature does not provide answers (ecclectic unsystematic descriptions of

single cases are predominant)

- New dataset from several sources:- 33 countries- 70+ characteristics- 1995 – 2010

- Bivariate example


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- Bivariate example

- More systematically: Multivariate Cluster-analyses


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1) Welche unterschiedlichen Konstellationen finden wir in den OECD-Ländern?




- Bivariate example

- More systematically: Multivariate Cluster-analyses

„Four Worlds of Student Finance“

- Historical sources (worse data situation): After WWII identical regimes in all OECD-countries:

low tuition, no subsidies, (low enrollment)3.3.2015


2) How can we explain the emergence of the Four Worlds?

Why have the systems developed from the identical starting point after WWII to the Four Worlds of Student Finance?

1945 2015 (1980s)

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Subsidy generosity Subsidy generosity



Why have the systems developed from the identical starting point after WWII to the Four Worlds of Student Finance?

Cursory literature review:- Literature dominated by

- Economists (functionalistic arguments) (Johnstone 1989 u.a.;

Ehrenberg 2000; Vedder 2004; Archibald/Feldman 2011; ...)

- Education scientists (cultural arguments) (Chevallier/Eicher 2002; Barr

2004; Jongbloed 2004; Kaiser et al. 2002; ...)

- Fundamental problems:- Variation of the Four Worlds unexplained- Variation over time unexplained- Actor-blind, functionalistic (blackbox)

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My Argument:

vs. Economists & Educational scientists:Politics matters! Especially governing parties!

Starting point: Partisan hypothesis (Hibbs 1977): Ideology & Voter preferences

„Leftwing“ = pro socio-economic upward mobility and progressive change; equality of opportunities > quality of HEIs pro subsidies (McPhersen/Schapiro 2006)

contra tuition fees„Rightwing“ = Status Quo > change;

Quality of HEIs > equal chances for access contra subsidies in principal also contra tuition... ...aber pro tuition as soon as they fear that the quality might

decrease (especially due to rising enrollment levels) Can only explain 2 of the Four Worlds!

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My Argument:

Extend partisan hypothesis: time dimension!- Sequence & duration in office

>>> Four paths:1. Leftwing predominance no tuition, high subsidies2. Rightwing predominance high tuition, low subsidies

3. Rightwing after longer leftwing government high tuition, high subsidies4. Rightwing after short leftwing government low tuition, low subsidies

“Time-sensitive partisan theory“

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Universität KonstanzPol Econ of Higher Edu Finance (Garritzmann)12 3.3.2015


a

Mein Argument:



Methodology:

Multi-Method Design- Qualitative analyses

- Historical comparative case studies (4 countries, „diverse cases“ [Gerring 2007;;

Seawright/Gerring 2008], 7 decades, „Systematic Process Analysis“ [Hall 2006, 2008])- Quantitative analyses

- Meso: party positions (expert surveys & party manifesto analysis in UK)- Macro: expenditure data (OECD-countries, 1995-2010, [TS]CS)- Individual: attitudes (ISSP-data, multilevel models)

Advantages of the MMD- Circumvents partly miserable data situation- Analyses of effects und mechanisms- Various levels of analyses test many implications of the model

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Finland- always tuition free- 1944-48: first subsidies (SDP-gov.)- High reparation payments prohibit further extension- 1969: publicly guaranteed, subsidized loans (SDP-gov.)- 1972: combination of loans and grants (opintotuki) (SDP-gov.)- 1977: Housing allowances & generous subsidy (leftwing majority)- 1980s: further extensions (SDP-gov.)- 1992: pure grant system (SDP-plan, rightwing minority government)

Leftwing predominance Low tuition, high subsidies

Japan- Predominant fiscal-conservative LDP (“one party state”)- LDP = pro elitist vs. „massification“; vs. public spending no subsidies- Highly elitist HE-system, severe restriction of access- 1960s: “economic miracle“ increasing demand „laissez-faire“ policy...- ... “outsources” expansion into private HEIs no public support massive tuition

Rightwing predominance High tuition, low subsidies

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Empirical results (qualitative)



Germany- 1957: CDU/CSU Honnefer Model: loans for “gifted students”

“Die Aufwendungen für das Honnefer Modell sind etwas geringer als die Aufwendungen für die Eiersubvention”

- 1971: SPD/FDP BAFöG enormously generous subsidies- 1970s: economic situation prevents further extension- Kohl (1982-98) retrenches BAföG drastically- 2005+: Attempts to install tuition fees (by rightwing gov.) defeated by public opinion (FB-effects)

Shortly leftwing, then rightwing Low tuition, low subsidies

“U.S.”- prewar: identical to other OECD-countries- 1944-1980: “The Democrats’ Age of Grants and Enrollment Expansion“

- 1944: G.I. Bill, Roosevelt- 1965: HEA, LBJ- 1972: Pell Grants (1980: 80% grants)

- 1981-2015: “The Republican-led creeping shift from grants to loans & tax-deductions“ (1989: 31% grants)

Long leftwing, then rightwing High tuition, high subsidies

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Empirical results (qualitative)

Universität KonstanzPol Econ of Higher Edu Finance (Garritzmann)16 3.3.2015


Empirische Ergebnisse (qualitativ)

a

Mein Argument:



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Empirical results (quantitative, meso)

Do parties’ positions differ as assumed?

Bulk of existing literature: simply assumes party positions; empirically unclear (cf. Busemeyer, Franzmann, Garritzmann 2013)

Here: Empirical investigation

Data: Rohrschneider / Whitefield (2012): 114 parties, 15 EU-countries

Operationalization: “Should the state make higher education available free to all who have the appropriate qualifications […] or should higher education be paid for […] by individuals […] or something in between?” (1-7)



Problems of data availability!

Cross-sectional regressions- DV = current regime characteristics (tuition & subsidies)- IVs = parties’ historical cabinet seat-shares (e.g., 1945-1975) Result: Partisan composition of gov has strong effect!

Result: historical government composition more explanatory power!

TSCS- Data = OECD.Stat, expenditure data, 1995-2010, 21 countries- DVs = regime characteristics- Unit of analyses: Country-years or government terms (Garritzmann/Seng under review)

- DiD; ECM Result: no party-effects anymore for current phase!

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Empirical results (quantitative, macro)


3) Why don’t the regimes change anymore?

Observation (“Puzzle“):- Identical starting point (1945)- Radical change along four paths to Four Worlds 1945 – ca. 1990- Stability in Four Worlds since 1990s

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Observation (“Puzzle“):- Identical starting point (1945)- Radical change along four paths to Four Worlds 1945 – ca. 1990- Stability in Four Worlds since 1990s

How can we explain this stability? (Garritzmann 2015, JESP)

- Positive feedback-effects (Pierson 1993, 2000; Kumlin/Stadelmann-Steffen 2014; …; …; …)

- Why FB?- Micro: Students pay tuition “others should also pay!“- Micro: Students receive subsidies „others should also receive!“- Mechanism: RC or sociological- Macro: the more tuition/subsidies established the more costly to abolish

- Why “suddenly“ FB?- Size of the affected group grows (exponentially)! (Trow 1972; Windolf 1997)

Im Erscheinen in Journal of European Social Policy

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Methodology:- ISSP-RoG-Data (3 waves: 20 years, 19 countries)- Multilevel models (ordered logit)- DV: “do you think it should be or should not be the government’s responsibility

to give financial help to university students from low-income families?”

Main results:- Individual-level:

- Attitudes vary by party affiliation- ... controlled for material self-interest...- ... Controlled for redistribution- and general spending preferences.

- Macro-level:- positive FB-effects: the more generous the subsidy systems (amounts and

type) the more support in public opinion (levels and changes) policy change costly for political parties stability

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Conclusions (I)

3 Research Questions- Variation across OECD-countries? “Four Worlds of Student Finance“- How can we explain the emergence of the Four Worlds from the identical

postwar starting point?- Why don’t the regimes change anymore (path dependency)?

Argument1. Politics matter!2. Partisan theory...3. ...has to expanded by a time-dimension!4. four development paths Four Worlds5. positive Feedback-Effects explain stability

Empirical analyses- Multi-Method-Design- Several analyses on various analytical levels

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Conclusions (II)

Main results

- Descriptively: Four Worlds of Student Finance

- Macro-level:- Large-n (quantitative) and small-n (qualitative) analyses of the effects and

mechanisms provide strong support for my “time-sensitive partisan theory”

- Meso-level: - Leftwing and rightwing parties do have different positions…- ... but adapt these to the status quo path, due to positive FB-effects

- Individual-level:- Leftwing and rightwing voters differ in their attitudes- Positive Feedback-effects reinforce the existing regimes...- ...and contribute to path dependencies by making policy-change costly

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Contributions to the literature

... To the „Skill-Literature“:- Adding to economists and education scientists: politics matter!- Focus on higher education (vs. political science literature focus on VET)- Highly relevant but unexplained phenomenon politico-economic explanation- Party positions on HE Literature: contradicting results; here: attempt to reconcile

... To the Comparative Political Economy Literature:- Importance of HE as an extremely relevant and interesting policy-field (very strong

(re-)distributional effects strong party competition; complex distributive dynamics...)

... To Policy-research and political science in general:- Theoretically: Expansion of the omnipresent partisan theory by a time-dimension- ... Potentially transferable to other policy-fields- Combination of RC and HI- Explanation of Policy- and institutional stability and change- Relates very well to other research and discourse (“liberalization”, “marketization”, “institutional

change”, varieties of capitalism, …)

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Universität Konstanz

Many thanks for the invitation and your attention!

Julian L. Garritzmann

Tel.: +49 (0) 75 31/88 – [email protected]

excid seminar with julian garritzmann

Presentations & Public Speaking

universitt konstanz

higher education research

tuitionsubsidy systems

low tuition

predominant new dataset

bivariate example

advanced democracies

loan year