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G.R. No. 175201 April 23, 2008HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, petitioner, vs.LEOPOLDO F. BUNGUBUNG and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, whereby petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) prays for the reversal of the Decision1 dated 30 June 2006 and Resolution2 dated 26 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89689 which, in turn, reversed and set aside the Ombudsman's Orders dated 11 January 2005 and 28 April 2005 in OMB-ADM-0-01-0502. The Ombudsman found respondent Leopoldo F. Bungubung (Bungubung) administratively liable for grave misconduct, dismissing him from the service and imposing the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.The Hon. Simeon V. Marcelo represented the Ombudsman, with powers and functions provided under Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the provisions of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.Bungubung is the Manager of the Port District Office (PDO) of Manila, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), South Harbor, Port Area, Manila. He is also the Chairman of the Ports District Security Bids and Awards Committee (PDSBAC) of the PPA.On 24 September 2001, Roberto C. Doromal (Doromal), the President of Combat Security & Executive Protection Agency (CSEPA), a security agency that participated in the bidding for security services for the PPA, filed a Complaint-Affidavit3 dated 7 September 2001 against Bungubung before PPA Resident Ombudsman Manolo M. Mabini, alleging as follows:3. That sometime in June 1995, my aforesaid wife was instrumental in negotiating and concluding a contract for Security Services with the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), more particularly at the Port District of Manila (PDO-Manila) for two (2) years starting August 1, 1995;x x x x6. That after a service contract was signed by PPA and this agency on January 28, 1999, the Port District Manager of PDO-Manila, Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung and other PPA officials asked for certain amounts from my said wife as "balato" for winning the award where (sic) the latter obliged herself to give;7. That initially, Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung and other PPA officials demanded amounts ranging from P10,000 a month down to P2,000 for him (Bungubung) and his subordinates, respectively; and my wife directed our staff, particularly the Billing and Collection Clerk and Cashier to include in our records and books of account these disbursements as "Representation expense";8. That when my late wife died on May 3, 2000, the same arrangement was pursued and carried over through the period that I was already the one dealing with PPA, and that, sometime in late April 2000, when the security force was increased to 184 Security guards at North Harbor-Special Take-Over Unit (STU), the amount demanded by Mr. Bungubung was also increased to P40,000 a month and sometimes P50,000;x x x x10. That sometime in late February, 2001, one of office staff received a telephone call from a certain Capt. Valenzuela of the Port Police Dept. of PPA and because I was not around, said Capt. Valenzuela left a message advising me to see Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung for some important matters;11. That upon receipt of the advise (sic) from my office staff, I went to PPA, with my secretary, Ms. Evalyn Cruz, to see Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung at his office located at old PNR Bldg., South Harbor, Port Area, Manila and at the same time personally delivered a sum of money amounting to P50,000 as earlier requested by him (Bungubung).12. That during the course of my conversation with Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung after giving the P50,000, he asked from me a vehicle, Mitsubishi Pajero (late model) van, to be due and delivered supposedly to him in the middle part of March 2001 while there is no award of the winning bidder yet; and that I asked the said Bid Committee Chairman, Mr. Bungubung to give me a grace period of two (2) months to produce what he was asking from me. Unfortunately, however, due to the expensive value of the said Pajero van, I was not able to deliver. Hence, on March 30, 2001, I was served a Notice of Award of the winning bidder which is STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN & DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC. an agency comparatively smaller than mine;13. That taking a cue from the Pajero van being asked, I instructed my men to conduct an investigation and there, they found a late model Pajero van with Plate No. WLA-674 parked in from of the residence of Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung and later verified to have been registered and transferred on 12 March 2001 under the name of Mr. Norman Vincent Bungubung, son of Chairman Bungubung at #45 Buencamino St., BF Homes, Paranaque City.4In support of the allegations in his Complaint-Affidavit, Doromal submitted an affidavit of his secretary Evalyn Cruz (Cruz) and an alleged "blue book" of CSEPA. Cruz recounted in her affidavit another incident wherein she personally handed over the amount of P50,000.00 cash to Bungubung at his office on 16 January 2001. The CSEPA blue book purportedly detailed monthly balato or payola paid to PPA officials from July 2000 to February 2001, recorded therein as representation expenses. It was allegedly prepared by a certain Evalyn M. Ebora (Ebora), and approved by Doromal.Thereafter, PPA Resident Ombudsman Mabini released a Memorandum/Investigation Report5 dated 25 September 2001, recommending the following:a. That criminal complaint be filed against Mr. Leopoldo F. Bungubung for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019; Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713 and Art. 211 of the RPC for demanding and receiving "balato" from COMBAT in the total amount of P320,000 more or less;b. That likewise, an administrative complaint be filed against Mr. Leopoldo F. Bungubung for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service arising from the above criminal act;c. That Mr. Leopoldo F. Bungubung be placed under Preventive Suspension for a period of six (6) months without pay pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. 6770.From the foregoing, the following complaints were filed against Bungubung before the Ombudsman: (1) an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-0502 (OMB-0-01-0793); and (2) a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as OMB-0-01-0793.After the parties submitted the required pleadings, a preliminary conference was held on 21 February 2002 in OMB-ADM-0-01-0502, the administrative case. Bungubung manifested therein that he was submitting the case for resolution. Doromal, however, was still undecided on whether to opt for the conduct of a formal investigation or to submit the case for resolution at once. In a Manifestation filed on 25 February 2002, Doromal informed the Ombudsman that he was opting instead for the conduct of a formal investigation for purposes of submission of evidence and affidavits of witnesses.6Doromal's aforecited manifestation notwithstanding, the Ombudsman, in an Order dated 6 March 2002, through Graft Investigation Officer II Joselito P. Fangon, ordered the submission of the case for resolution.The parties were then required to submit their respective Memoranda.On 28 November 2002, Graft Investigation Officer II Fangon drafted a Decision7 which recommended the dismissal of the administrative case against Bungubung, without prejudice to its re-filing.However, Ombudsman Marcelo disapproved Graft Investigation Officer II Fangon's 28 November 2002 Decision, and issued another Order8 dated 11 January 2005 finding Bungubung liable for grave misconduct (which absorbed the lesser offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service) and ordering Bungubung's dismissal from service, together with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and respondent's perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. The dispositive part of Ombudsman Marcelo's 11 January 2005 Order reads:WHEREFORE, the 28 November 2002 Decision prepared by the former Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB), this Office, recommending the dismissal (without prejudice to its re-filing) of the administrative complaint against [Bungubung] is hereby DISAPPROVED.Respondent LEOPOLDO F. BUNGUBUNG, Port District Manager, Manila Port District, Philippine Ports Authority, is hereby found liable for Grave Misconduct and, as such, is DISMISSED from the service. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and [Bungubung's] perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.In the interim, the Ombudsman issued an Order9 dated 10 September 2003 in OMB-0-01-0793, for the filing of the criminal complaint against Bungubung, after finding that there was probable cause to indict him for violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.10The Ombudsman took into consideration its aforementioned 10 September 2003 Order in OMB-0-01-0793, when it found in OMB-ADM-0-01-0502 that Bungubung took advantage of his position as Chairman of the PDSBAC of the PPA, using it as leverage in soliciting cash and a Mitsubishi Pajero van from the bidders as consideration for the award of the security contract. According to the Ombudsman, such actuations constitute conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It rejected Bungubung's denial and instead gave credence to the attestation of Cruz that she personally delivered the P50,000.00 to Bungubung.Bungubung filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the 11 January 2005 Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-01-0502, but it was denied by the Ombudsman in another Order12 dated 28 April 2005, to wit:WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 21 January 2005 filed by respondent Leopoldo F. Bungubung is DENIED. The Order dated 11 January 2005 finding him liable for Grave Misconduct thereby ordering him dismissed from the service, together with its accessory penalties, is hereby AFFIRMED.Bungubung then sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89689. He asserted therein that the Ombudsman erred in (a) holding that there was substantial evidence to make him liable for grave misconduct, resulting in his dismissal from service and imposition upon him of the accessory penalties; and (b) ordering him dismissed from the service, when the Constitution merely empowered said office to make a recommendation of dismissal. Pending resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 89689 by the Court of Appeals, Bungubung filed therein a Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Ombudsman and the PPA General Manager from implementing the Order dated 11 January 2005 which dismissed him from service.13 The Court of Appeals granted the TRO on 3 June 2005.14In the meantime, Doromal executed an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Complaint15 dated 18 August 2005 and an Affidavit of Desistance16 dated 23 August 2005, which he filed before the Ombudsman. In his Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Complaint and Affidavit of Desistance, Doromal expressed his desire to withdraw his Complaint-Affidavit against Bungubung and desist from the continuance of both OMB-ADM-0-01-0502 and OMB-0-01-0793. Doromal explicitly admitted in said documents that his allegations in the administrative and criminal complaints against Bungubung were all fabricated. He further confessed that Bungubung never demanded or received any balato from him or his wife in exchange for the award of the PPA security service contract; nor did Bungubung ask for a Mitsubishi Pajero van from him.On 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89689 ruling in Bungubung's favor, and reversing and setting aside the Orders dated 11 January 2005 and 28 April 2005 of the Ombudsman. It further absolved Bungubung from liability for the charge of grave misconduct, finding no substantial evidence that Bungubung committed the same.According to the appellate court:There is merit in the petition.Indeed, there is absence of substantial evidence to hold [Bungubung] liable for grave misconduct.To begin with, [Doromal] and his witness failed to appear at the preliminary conference on February 21, 2005 to attest to the truth of the contents of their affidavits. For such failure, their affidavits are inadmissible as they are hearsay evidence.x x x xBy not appearing at the preliminary conference and affirming their affidavits, We can not readily conclude that the contents thereof are true. It is highly probable that [Doromal] is only sour graping for losing the PPA 2001 service contract. As early as January 18, 2001, the bids for the 2001 service contract were already opened and authenticated. Thus, it can not be said that the bids were manipulated or rigged to favour somebody.While rules of procedure do not strictly apply to administrative cases as long as defendant's right to due process is not violated, its liberal application in administrative cases does not allow admission of hearsay evidence, i.e. affidavits not identified by affiants, as this would violate the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and his substantive right not to be adjudged guilty on the basis of hearsay evidence.x x x xIn the instant case, [Bungubung], in denying the assertion of Evalyn Cruz in her affidavit that she gave him P50,000.00, and in describing her claim as a self-serving fabrication, is positive evidence that what she claimed did not occur. This holds true with respect to [Bungubung's] positive denial of [Doromal's] assertion that he gave [Bungubung] another P50,000.00 in late February 2001 and that he also demanded a late model Pajero from [Doromal].[The Ombudsman] accepted as credible [Doromal's] claim that [Bungubung] asked for a late model Pajero in exchange for the 2001 security service contract. x x xThe following must, however, be considered:1. The rule on positive and negative testimonies do not apply where a person who is in a position to know if a fact occurred denies that it did. This is positive denial which has the same weight as a contrary assertion.2. The finding that the van was acquired after the failed solicitation and before the award readily assumes as true private respondent's bare assertion that petitioner asked him for a van.Allegedly taking cue from his failure to deliver a Pajero van, [Doromal] had [Bungubung's] home cased and saw a Pajero in front of his house. If this is the case, why was this not mentioned by [Doromal] when he filed a civil case to stop the award of the security service contract on ground of irregularities in the bidding? Neither was this matter brought up during the hearing on the application for a TRO. [Doromal] only brought up this matter about a Pajero in his affidavit-complaint of September 7, 2001 after hearing that [Bungubung's] son has a newly-bought Pajero.1. [Bungubung] presented proof that on May 4, 2001, [Doromal] filed a false "hit-and-run" report involving the Pajero with plate WLA 674 of [Bungubung's] son. This shows the extent that [Doromal] would go just to spite [Bungubung].2. The President of Star Security Agency declared under oath that he did not give [Bungubung] any Pajero;3. The Pajero was acquired by [Bungubung's] son from a certain Teresito Uy as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale;4. It is unfair to assume that [Bungubung's] son could not afford the price of a used Pajero. He put up a glass and aluminum business after getting married.From the foregoing, [the Ombudsman] should have dismissed the complaint for lack of substantial evidence to support it.The fallo of the Court of Appeals' 30 June 2006 Decision reads:WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE. The Orders17 of the Ombudsman dated January 11, 200[5] and April 28, 200[5] are reversed and set aside and a new one issued absolving petitioner from liability for the charge of grave misconduct.18The Ombudsman filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision, which the appellate court denied in its Resolution dated 26 October 2006 for lack of merit, thus:Notably, the issues raised in the motion have already been thoroughly threshed out and passed upon in the assailed decision. No novel or new matters were introduced therein.The disquisition made by the Supreme Court in Dela Cruz vs. Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera Administrative Region is most helpful, "We have long held that affidavits are deemed hearsay evidence because the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. Hence, affidavits are generally deemed inadmissible or rejected outright unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.19Consequently, the Ombudsman filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court based on the following grounds:I.THE RELIANCE BY THE OMBUDSMAN ON THE AFFIDAVITS OF ROBERTO DOROMAL AND HIS WITNESS IN DETERMINING [BUNGUBUNG]'S ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY WAS PROPER. IT DID NOT DEPRIVE [BUNGUBUNG] OF DUE PROCESS;II.THE FINDING OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT AGAINST [BUNGUBUNG] IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;III.AS CONSEQUENTLY HELD BY THE SUPREME COURT, THE FINDINGS OF THE OMBUDSMAN DESERVE GREAT WEIGHT, AND MUST BE ACCORDED FULL RESPECT AND CREDIT.The Ombudsman prays that this Court render a Decision nullifying and setting aside the Decision dated 30 June 2006 and Resolution dated 26 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89689, and affirming the Ombudsman's Orders dated 11 January 2005 and 28 April 2005 in OMB-ADM-0-01-0502 which found Bungubung guilty of Grave Misconduct and dismissing him from service with all the accessory penalties incident thereto.Bungubung counters that the Court of Appeals correctly held that there was no substantial evidence to hold him liable for grave misconduct; and that the reliance by the Ombudsman on the affidavits of Doromal and Cruz in determining his administrative liability, despite the fact that the contents thereof were not personally attested to by the affiants before the Ombudsman, was a clear violation of his right to due process. He also avers that the Court of Appeals was correct in giving credence to the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw the Complaint and Affidavit of Desistance, filed by Doromal with the Ombudsman in August 2005, as proof of Bungubung's lack of culpability.The present Petition must fail.Before proceeding to the merits of the instant Petition, this Court deems it necessary to first address the allegation of Bungubung that he was denied due process by the Ombudsman. The fact that no formal hearing took place is not sufficient ground to say that due process was not afforded Bungubung. It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, including those before the Ombudsman, cases may be submitted for resolution on the basis of affidavits and pleadings. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies.20 Undoubtedly, due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of,21 which requirement was afforded Bungubung.22In Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. National Labor Relations Commission,23 this Court held that:[A]ctual adversarial proceeding becomes necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to unclear witnesses. This is a procedural right which the employee must, however, ask for it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be conducted. This is to correct the common but mistaken perception that procedural due process entails lengthy oral arguments. Hearings in administrative proceedings and before quasi-judicial agencies are neither oratorical contests nor debating skirmishes where cross examination skills are displayed. Non-verbal devices such as written explanations, affidavits, positions papers or other pleadings can establish just as clearly and concisely aggrieved parties' predicament or defense. What is essential is ample opportunity to be heard, meaning, every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to prepare adequately for his defense.After the filing of the Complaint, Bungubung was allowed by the Ombudsman to submit the following: (a) a counter-affidavit refuting the charges against him; (b) a rejoinder-affidavit; and (c) a Motion for Reconsideration of the 11 January 2005 Order of the Ombudsman. Moreover, Bungubung had the option to subject the case to a formal investigation, but his Manifestation dated 21 February 2002 before the Ombudsman was evidence that he did not choose to do so and, instead, agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the affidavits on record. These facts establish that Bungubung was not deprived of his right to due process, having ample opportunity to present his side before the Ombudsman. In fact, it was only later on in a Manifestation filed on 25 February 2002 that Doromal changed his mind and informed the Ombudsman that he was opting instead for the conduct of a formal investigation.That point having been settled, this Court moves on to determine the merits of the Petition at bar.The Petition primarily involves questions of fact, pitting against each other the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and those of the Ombudsman, both of which depended on the probative weight to be given to the affidavits of Doromal, Cruz, and the alleged CSEPA blue book.We stress the procedural tenet that a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court shall raise only questions of law.24 A question of law has been defined as one that does not call for any examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties;25 a question of fact arises when the doubt or difference pertains to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when the query necessarily solicits calibration of the whole evidence considering mostly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole and probabilities of the situation.26 We have consistently held that in a petition for review on certiorari, this Court does not sit as an arbiter of facts for it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.27 Such factual findings can be questioned only if, among other exceptions,28 the findings of fact are conflicting and the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the lower court and/or administrative agency, which exceptional circumstances are present herein, thus, justifying the review by this Court of the factual findings of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals.In Montemayor v. Bundalian,29 this Court laid down the following guidelines for the judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial power:First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.As stated above, the fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is that the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is unequivocal: Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Conversely, therefore, when the findings of fact by the Ombudsman are not adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts. Such is the case in the present Petition.Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.30 The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of,31 even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.32 While substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case,33 or evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases,34 it should be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. There is none here.Bungubung is being charged with the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct, which has been authoritatively defined in Amosco v. Judge Magro35 as:Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer x x x. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. x x x.In In re: Impeachment of Horilleno,36 this Court authoritatively defined serious misconduct --"[S]ufficient cause" must exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court involving "serious misconduct." The adjective is "serious"; that is, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The noun is "misconduct"; that is, a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. x x x.Being guided accordingly by the aforementioned evidentiary rules and jurisprudence, this Court finds that the evidence on record in the present case does not constitute substantial evidence of Bungubung's administrative culpability for grave misconduct.Within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded.37In his Affidavit-Complaint, Doromal accused Bungubung of soliciting and receiving P100,000.00 from him and a Mitsubishi Pajero van from another bidder in exchange for the award of the security services contract of the PPA. Doromal also accused Bungubung and other PPA employees of demanding and receiving balato in consideration of the award of the PPA Security Service Contract.In addition to his Complaint-Affidavit, Doromal submitted a Reply-Affidavit, as well as the following supporting documents:(a) Affidavit of Evalyn Cruz, his secretary;(b) CSEPA blue book detailing the monthly "balato" or "payola" paid to PPA officials and employees, referred to therein as representation expenses.On the other hand, Bungubung filed his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit. In his defense, Bungubung further submitted the following evidence:(a) Affidavit of Celso A. Fernandez, President and Chairman of Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc., the winning bidder, who denied giving any money or a Pajero to Bungubung;(b) Affidavit of a certain Rufino Valenzuela, who denied giving instructions for Doromal to go to Bungubung's office;(c) A copy of the petition in Civil Case No. 01-100678, entitled "Roberto C. Doromal, etc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, et al.," questioning the legality of the case filed by Doromal against Bungubung before the RTC to show that Doromal never mentioned therein that Bungubung requested for a Pajero from him;(d) A copy of the Deed of Sale of the Pajero executed by Teresito Uy in favor of Norman Vincent Bungubung, as proof that the said vehicle was bought and is now owned by Bungubung's son;(e) A copy of the "Traffic Incident Report" of the Central Police Traffic Enforcement Office to evidence the fabricated "hit and run" charge made by an employee of CSEPA against the Pajero owned by Bungubung's son; and(f) PSBAC Resolutions establishing that the award of the PPA Security Contracts was made by public bidding.The Ombudsman chose to give more credence to Doromal's allegations and evidence when it found that Bungubung took advantage of his position as Chairman of the PSBAC and used it as leverage in soliciting cash and a Mitsubishi Pajero van from the bidders as a consideration for the award of the PPA security service contract. However, Doromal's evidence is hardly substantive.First, Doromal's allegation that Bungubung acquired the Mitsubishi Pajero van from another bidder after failing to successfully solicit the same from him is highly suspect, since Doromal only narrated the alleged solicitation in his Affidavit-Complaint against Bungubung filed with the Ombudsman on 7 September 2001. He failed to mention such a significant circumstance in Civil Case No. 01100678, Roberto C. Doromal v. Philippine Ports Authority, before the RTC or in his petition for TRO in the same case, both of which were filed ahead of his Affidavit-Complaint before the Ombudsman.Second, little weight should be given to the CSEPA blue book allegedly detailing the monthly payola or balato paid to PPA officials and employees from July 2000 to February 2001, recorded therein as representation expenses. According to the CSEPA blue book, the following PPA key officials received monthly representation allowances:NAMEPOSITIONPERIODTOTAL AMOUNT

Mr. CecilioAGM OperationsJuly 2000-Feb 2001P200,000.00

Leopoldo BungubungPort District ManagerJuly 2000-Feb 2001P300,000.00

Ted AlcaldeDistrict ManagerJuly 2000-Feb 2001P144,000.00

Capt. GamisChief of Port Police North HarborJuly 2000-Feb 2001P144,000.00

Felix BarcalaChief of Port Police South HarborJuly 2000-Feb 2001P35,000.00

Alex CruzJuly 2000- Feb 2001P144,000.00

The CSEPA blue book, however, is evidently self-serving. The entries therein were purportedly made by a certain Ebora, who was never presented to personally identify the entries she made or confirm the same. The only other person involved in the preparation of the blue book was Doromal who supposedly approved the entries therein. The blue book is not audited, nor is it subject to review by an independent party. The blue book then can easily be manufactured. Considering the seriousness of the charges which may arise against the public officers named therein, the entries in the blue book must not be accepted at face value when the entries therein are uncorroborated by any other evidence.Third, while the Ombudsman gave much weight and credit to Doromal's evidence, it lightly brushed aside that submitted by Bungubung. Among Bungubung's evidence which the Ombudsman failed to consider was a copy of the "Traffic Accident Incident Report" prepared by the Central Police Traffic Enforcement Office, stating that on 4 May 2001, Doromal filed a false report of a "hit-and-run" incident which supposedly occurred on 1 May 2001 involving the Mitsubishi Pajero van of Bungubung's son. The report was made by the police investigator in his official capacity; thus, it enjoys the presumption of regularity and is a prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The filing of the false report establishes ill motive on the part of Doromal specifically directed against Bungubung.Fourth, the main defense put up by Bungubung is complete denial, a defense which is said to be the weakest, seldom believed or given weight, as it is easy to fabricate. Nonetheless, Bungubung's denial of -- (a) Cruz's allegation in her affidavit that she personally gave Bungubung P50,000.00 on 16 January 2001; (b) Doromal's assertion in his affidavit that he gave Bungubung another P50,000.00 in late February 2001; and (c) Doromal's assertion that Bungubung demanded from him a late model Mitsubishi Pajero van -- is given weight in this instance.In the absence of corroborative evidence, the Court would not be prepared to accept the usual lame defense of denial over the straightforward and positive declaration of a witness since denials constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Thus, in the case of contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight is generally given to positive testimonies than to mere denials.38In this instance, however, Bungubung's denial of the allegations against him are supported by his own controverting evidence. In contrast, Doromal's Complaint-Affidavit and Cruz's Affidavit support only each other.Finally, this Court cannot ignore Doromal's Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated 18 August 2005 and Affidavit of Desistance dated 23 August 2005, which he filed with the Ombudsman. In both documents, Doromal expressed his desire to withdraw his Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Ombudsman and desist from the continuance of the criminal and administrative complaints against Bungubung. Doromal explicitly admitted therein that he merely fabricated all his allegations against Bungubung.While this Court looks with disfavor on affidavits of desistance, still, its effect on the instant case cannot be ignored. Doromal's Affidavit of Desistance includes an explicit admission that he fabricated the charges against Bungubung. Therefore, Doromal's Affidavit of Desistance is an express repudiation of the material points alleged in his Complaint-Affidavit, and not a mere expression of his lack of interest to pursue his complaints against Bungubung. Since Doromal willfully and knowingly executed his Affidavit of Desistance, there being no showing that he was made to do so fraudulently or under duress, then it may be admitted and considered as evidence which considerably puts into question the probative value of the Affidavit-Complaint he executed earlier and he now repudiates.In Gaviola v. Salcedo,39 which involved an administrative case for suspension or disbarment against a lawyer, this Court gave probative value to the Affidavit of Desistance of the complainant, pronouncing that while the filing of an Affidavit of Desistance by the complainant for lack of interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of the administrative case, it was constrained to dismiss the charges since such charges cannot be proven without the evidence of the complainant and her witnesses. Such is the case at bar. Essentially, the administrative case against Bungubung was based on the allegations made by Doromal in his Affidavit-Complaint, without which, the case against Bungubung collapses.The Court of Appeals therefore took proper notice of Doromal's Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw the Affidavit-Complaint and Affidavit of Desistance since they cast a different light on the evidence previously considered by the Ombudsman.After evaluating the totality of evidence on record, this Court reaches the inescapable conclusion that complainant Doromal failed to present substantial evidence that Bungubung is administratively liable for grave misconduct.As this Court declared in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,40 the assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 30 June 2006 and Order dated 26 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89689 are AFFIRMED.No Costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177223 November 28, 2007PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.CASTOR BATIN, Accused-Appellant.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:We are reviewing herein the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 6 February 2007, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01396, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, convicting father and son, Castor and Neil Batin, of the crime of murder. The conviction was for the killing of one Eugenio Refugio, who was shot in the afternoon of 21 October 1994, while he was leaning against a mango tree near his house on St. Peter Street, San Paolo Subdivision, Nagkakaisang Nayon, Novaliches, Quezon City.The Information2 against Castor and Neil Batin was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 11 April 1995, alleging as follows:That on or about the 21st day of October, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Eugenio Refugio y Zosa, in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.Castor and Neil Batin entered pleas of not guilty.The prosecution, presented as its witnesses Eusebio Farrales, Vilma Juadinez Rodriguez, Florante Baltazar, Josephine Refugio, PO3 Marifor Segundo and Police Inspector Solomon Segundo, offered the following version of the facts, as summarized by the trial court:Eugenios wife, Josephine Refugio, was with him when he was shot, facing him as he leaned against the mango tree and, in fact, had her arms resting on his shoulders. She recalled that before the shooting, she was at home at No. 4-A St. Peter Street that afternoon when, looking out of the window, she caught sight of Castor Batin washing his feet at a nearby faucet. Castor was angrily muttering, and she distinctly heard him say, among the other things he said: "Mga matatandang kunsintidor, dapat manahimik na." Then, being through with washing himself, Castor moved towards the street. Seeing this, she went down and also went to the street because of a feeling of uneasiness ("Para po akong kinakabahan, kasi, ganoon naman ang ginagawa nila lagi, eh, pag nalalasing"). Finding her husband leaning against the mango tree on the side of St. Peter Street, she went to him. She tried to talk Eugenio into going home with her because Castor was again into one of his wild ways ("Nagwawala na naman, daldal ng daldal"). As he was talking with Eugenio, she glanced to her left and saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to their (Batins) compound, looking towards her and her husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from inside. She next noticed Castor going towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car and shouting: "Huwag!" Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards the right rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to him.When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine heard Castor ordering his son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil responded by drawing the gun from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and firing twice from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former, backwards, and the latter landing on top of her. As they tried to get up, Eugenio uttered to her: "Nanay, may tama ako." She then pulled her husband by the shoulder of his shirt so that she could take him to their house as he was already slumped to the right. She later rushed her husband to the Quezon City General Hospital, where he underwent surgery, but later expired.Other eyewitnesses from the neighborhood were presented and they substantially corroborated her testimonial account.One of them, Eusebio Farrales, a resident of No. 7 St. Paul Street, in relation to which St. Peter Street was perpendicular, recalled being at the barangay outpost near the corner of St. Peter Street and St. Paul Street between 3:00 and 3:30 pm of the afternoon of October 21, 1994 engaged in the clearing of the debris of the recent typhoon when he heard someone cursing and challenging to a fight. Walking towards St. Peter Street where the voice came, he saw that it was Castor. He also saw other neighbors, namely, Eugenio, Josephine, and Eugenios mother, Emilia Refugio. According to Farrales, Castor was moving aimlessly for around five minutes ("Walang direktion at pa-ikot ikot lang siya doon") while cussing: "Putang ina ninyo, sino ang matapang lumabas."Farrales stated that a white car and a white-and-yellow colored taxicab were parked on the side portion of the street fronting the gate to the compound of the Batins and near where Eugenio and Josephine stood. Emilia, the mother of Eugenio, then came towards him, but he advised her to seek assistance from the barangay tanod. After Emilia proceeded towards St. Paul Street to do so, Neil came out through the gate, opened the door of the white car, took out a gun from inside, and handed the gun to Castor, but the latter returned the gun to Neil. Upon getting back the gun, Neil reentered the yard through the gate.Farrales asserted that in the meanwhile Eugenio remained leaning against the mango tree with Josephine facing him and her arms resting on his shoulders. They were in this position when Neil again came out through the gate a few moments later and proceeded to the right side of the car, still holding the handgun. From there, Neil fired twice at the Refugios. The Refugios both fell to the left of the mango tree. Farrales saw both Castor and Neil quickly enter the compound. At that point, Farrales decided to run home in order to summon Alfredo Dizon, his tenant, who was a police officer because he feared that the Batins might escape from the scene by car.Farrales and Dizon lost no time in going to the place of the Batins. After Dizon talked with Castor at the gate of the latters compound, the latter entered the house of his nephew, Ricky Basilio, which was beside Castors own house. A few moments later, Castor came out of Basilios house to let Dizon in through the gate. It was about this time that the responding police officers arrived at the scene. The victim had been rushed to the hospital immediately.Another neighbor, Vilma Juadines Rodriguez, resident of No. 7-A St. Peter Street, declared that while she was at home taking care of her baby at between 3:00 and 3:30 pm of October 21, 1994, she heard someone challenging others to a fight; that looking out of her window ("dungaw"), she saw that it was Boy Batin Castor and he was then walking about on St. Peter Street; that just then, her child cried, and so she went to him; that upon returning to the window to call her other child, she saw Castor hand over a handgun to Neil, and the latter thereafter entered through their gate; that she next saw Neil load bullets into the gun and then tucking it in his right waistline; that after loading, Neil went out to the street, went between the parked white car and yellow taxicab, aimed the gun at Eugenio and Josephine who were at the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay, banatan ko na?"; that Castor replied: "Sige, anak, banatan mo na." that, at that instant, Neil fired two shots; that as she went down to get her other child upon hearing the gunshots, she heard Josephine say: "Tay, may tama ka"; that she later reentered her house; and that she knew that Eugenio died afterwards.Although Eugenio was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital right after the shooting and was operated on, he expired the next day. His remains were properly identified in writing by his brother, Tito Eugenio.3The medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Dr. Florante Baltazar, conducted an autopsy on Eugenios remains. In his Medico-Legal Report No. M-1715-94,4 he indicated that Eugenio sustained one gunshot wound, which was, however, fatal, because "it went slightly upward, slightly anteriorward from the right to the left of the body, fracturing the right to [the] left [of the] thoracic region, lacerating the right lumbar region." Dr. Baltazar made the certification as to the cause of death in the death certificate.5Upon a written request6 from the Novaliches Police Station, Quezon City, Police Inspector Solomon Segundo, Chief of the Firearms Identification Branch of the Central Crime Laboratory, Northern Police District Command, Quezon City, conducted the ballistics examination to ascertain whether or not the bullet recovered from the victim was fired from the specimen firearm submitted for examination. P/Insp. Segundo prepared Ballistics Report No. B-042-94,7 wherein he certified that the bullet from the recovery box8 and the bullet recovered from the victims body9 were fired from the same specimen firearm.10 This conclusion was arrived at after a test fire and a comparison under the bullet comparison microscope.The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Neil Batin, Castors common-law wife Maricon Pantoja, and one Restituto Paller. Neil Batins testimony is summarized by the trial court as follows:Neil substantially claimed that it was his responsibility to conduct his younger brothers to school and fetch them by car; that he also drove their taxicab; that it was about 7:00 oclock in morning of October 21, 1994, while he was cleaning the family-owned taxicab, that he found a short gun ("de bola") underneath it beside the right rear wheel; that he picked the gun and concealed it in the compartment of the taxicab; that he continued with his chore of cleaning; that as soon as he finished cleaning the taxicab, he drove the white Datsun car to Tondo to fetch his six-year old brother Mark, the son of his father with Maricon Pantoja; that Mark was a pupil at the Magat Salamat Elementary School in Tondo; that after picking up Mark, they drove to the house of his uncle, Domingo Batin, in Marulas, Valenzuela, to get his clothes from his cousin; that they arrived there at 11:00 am, and spent around two hours there; that from Marulas, they went home, arriving at St. Peter Street at around 2:30 pm; that he parked the car on the road in front of their fence; that he and Mark first entered the house to deposit Marks school things and later went outside to await the arrival of Marks mother; that his other brothers were outside; that Castor was also outside talking with a man whose name he did not know but whom he had seen thrice before as well as with Boy Iigo in front of the latters house; that Iigos house was 15 meters from their gate; that Pantoja soon arrived at around 2:45 pm; that he continued talking and playing with his brothers; and that at that point he decided to take the gun from the compartment of the taxicab then parked around 2 meters away from where he and his brothers were and tucked it in his waistline.Having thus tucked the gun, Neil went to stand at the right rear side of the Datsun car which was parked facing the mango tree ("halos magkatapat lang po"). Maricon came out to the street at that point to ask him about the time he had fetched Mark. It was while he was standing there with the others that, according to Neil, he suddenly felt the impulse of drawing the gun from his waistline ("Bigla kong naisipang bunutin ang baril"). He thus drew the gun and turned around, but, as he did so, he accidentally pulled the trigger, causing the gun to fire twice ("Tumalikod po ako, tapos nakalabit ko, pumutok ng dalawang beses").Neil admitted knowing the late Eugenio Refugio and his wife Josephine because they were his neighbors with only a high wall separating their houses; but denied seeing them that afternoon beside the mango tree.At the sound of gunfire, Castor rushed towards Neil from where he was in front of Iigos house, shouting twice to his son: "Huwag!" Pantoja, for her part, forced Neil to enter the compound, where she brought him inside the house of his aunt. Neil concealed the gun in the ceiling of the aunts house.Neil said that he and his father did not grapple inside the Datsun car for possession of the gun; that his father did not wrest the gun from him; that he did not enter the compound to put bullets in the gun; that his father did not order him to shoot Eugenio; and that his father was not drunk and challenging others to a fight. He insisted that he and the Refugios, with whom he was acquainted since 1987, had no misunderstandings, for he even had shared drinks with the late Eugenio before October 21, 1994.11As regards the testimonies of the defenses two other witnesses, the trial court could not make an intelligible narrative of the version of the facts presented by them, considering the contradictions it found in their testimonies. The trial court found glaring Maricon Pantojas "self-contradiction" as to where she and the accused were when Eugenio was shot. During the trial, Maricon testified that she, Neil and Castor were outside their house when Neil drew the gun and accidentally fired. However, in her affidavit,12 she alleged that they went outside their house upon hearing a gun explosion and saw "Eugenio Refugio alone holding his stomach x x x we have no any knowledge whether he was hit by a bullet."13On 8 June 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision finding both accused guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, to wit:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused CASTOR BATIN and NEIL BATIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended, and they are hereby each sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua; and ordered to pay the heirs of EUGENIO REFUGIO, through his wife, JOSEPHINE REFUGIO, as follows:1] P50,000.00, as death indemnity;2] P61,500.00, as actual damages;3] P500,000.00, as moral damages;4] P307,920.00, as indemnity for lost of earning capacity; and5] The costs of suit.14Neil and Castor Batin filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. However, on 13 November 2000, accused Neil Batin filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The People interposed no objection to the Motion, which was granted.On 6 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming, with modification, the Decision of the trial court, to wit:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. Q-95-61003 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to civil liabilities. With the exception of the award of moral damages which is reduced to P100,000.00 and the indemnity for loss of earning capacity which is increased to P723,840.00, the awards for death indemnity and actual damages are retained.15Castor Batin now comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPAL FOR INDUCEMENT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.IITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TRACHERY.16Castor Batin prays that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside and a new one entered acquitting him of the crime charged. In the alternative, he prays that he be held liable for the crime of homicide only, arguing that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently stated in the Information.Whether there was conspiracy in the killing of Eugenio Refugio It is evident from Castors Supplemental Brief and all his other issuances after the withdrawal of Neils appeal that he had already discarded Neils theory of accidental shooting. Instead, his arguments are geared toward his distancing himself from the act of Neil in shooting Eugenio Refugio.We cannot, however, dispose of the discussion of Neils theory of accidental shooting. As Neils testimony had been the only evidence presented by the defense to rebut the prosecutions evidence concerning the acts of Castor during the incident, we should carefully scrutinize Neils testimony to determine his credibility.Neil claims that while his back was still turned against the Refugios, he suddenly felt the impulse to draw the gun from his waistline. He drew the gun, turned around with the gun in hand, and accidentally fired it twice without aiming it at anyone.As held by the trial court, this account is plainly far-fetched and incredible. As observed by the trial court,The revolver involved herein was a mechanical firearm which belonged to the so-called double-action type of guns. This type has a firing mechanism which permits two methods of firing the first is by manually cocking or retracting the hammer and then pressing the trigger to release the hammer; the second is by applying continuous pressure on the trigger in order to cock the hammer and then releasing the trigger. The drop of the hammer by either method propels the firing pin forward so that its other end strikes the primer cap to explode the propellant charge inside the shell which then forces out the bullet through the gun barrel. From the nature of the firing mechanism of Exhibit O, and there being no evidence showing that the hammer was manually cocked before the gun fired, it was absolutely physically impossible for the gun to fire accidentally.In order to determine for himself how much pressure was necessary to cock the hammer into firing position, the undersigned presiding judge personally tested the trigger pull of Exhibit O. Even assuming that the passage of time from the date of the shooting caused some change on the efficiency of the firing mechanism, such change can only show up by way of a weakening of the hammer spring. Nonetheless, it was not surprising for the undersigned presiding judge to find heavy resistance at each trigger pull, such that he exerted some force to cock the hammer. This actual testing easily validated the conclusion that firing the gun accidentally and unintentionally was impossible.17Neils claim that he accidentally fired the gun twice in quick succession is, thus, even more incredible. Given the difficulty of pulling the trigger to cock the hammer into firing position, it is inconceivable how the gun could have been fired by Neil twice in quick succession except by a deliberate and intentional pulling of the trigger.Given the physical attributes and condition of the gun involved in the case at bar, the testimony of Eusebio Farrales is likewise observed to be much more credible than that of Neil. Whereas Neil claims that he accidentally fired the gun twice using only one hand, Eusebio Farrales testified that Neil fired at the Refugios while holding the gun with both hands and from a standing position.While the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence,18 Neils credibility has been severely tarnished by the foregoing portion of his testimony. Thus, we should likewise take with a grain of salt the following parts of his testimony which tend to refute the account of the prosecution concerning the acts of Castor during the incident: (1) that Neil and Castor did not grapple inside the Datsun car for possession of the gun; (2) that Castor did not wrest the gun from him; (3) that Neil did not enter the compound to put bullets in the gun; (4) that Castor did not order Neil to shoot Eugenio; and (5) that Castor was not drunk and challenging others to a fight.As stated above, Castor has already discarded Neils theory of accidental shooting and, instead, focuses on distancing himself from the act of Neil in shooting Eugenio Refugio. Castors principal defense in this appeal is that the conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor.19Castor claims that there is no conclusive proof that he participated in the shooting, and that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words Sige, banatan mo na" cannot be considered as the moving cause of the shooting. According to Castor, if he had wanted his son to shoot Eusebio Refugio, he would not have shouted "Huwag" and struggled for possession of the gun.We are not persuaded.First of all, the theory presented by the prosecution in both the Information and in their arguments before the courts is not Castors being a principal by inducement, but rather his being a co-conspirator. If conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the act of all. As stated above, the widow, Josephine Refugio, and the neighbors -- Eusebio Farrales and Vilma Juadinez Rodriguez -- testified to the fact that Castor handed the gun to Neil and urged the latter to fire at the Refugio spouses. The trial court, whose assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe first-hand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses at the trial,20 found these witnesses credible, thus:From its careful and thorough evaluation of the record, the Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This finding is inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses that Castor returned the gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting: "Sige, banatan mo na"; and that Neil then fired his gun twice were credible and sufficed to prove Castors indispensable cooperation in the killing of Eugenio. Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was.The reliability of witnesses Farrales and Rodriguez, for one, cannot be doubted. Being the neighbors of both the Batins and the Refugios, their claim of witnessing the events that culminated into the shooting of Eugenio was unassailable. The accused, in fact, could not provide any reason or motive for them to testify against the Batins unless it was upon the truth.21While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the gun. It was established by credible testimony that he handed back the gun to Neil and urged him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly stated on cross-examination that Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car grappling for possession of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at the spouses. Thus:(Atty. Siobal Cross-examining)Q The second time around that you saw him was when he moved towards the right rear of the car?A I did not remove my sight at Neil Batin as he moved towards this car, sir.Q Also, without moving your glance or gaze at Neil Batin, you saw him proceed to the right rear portion of the car and open the right rear door of said car, is it not?A Yes, sir.Q And without also removing your gaze or sight at Neil Batin, you saw him open and get a gun inside the car?A I saw Neil Batin opened the right rear door, as if he is putting all his body inside the car, when Mang Boy took hold of Neil, they were grappling for possession of the gun, and raised it above, and that was the time when my husband saw the gun raised, and I also saw the gun.CourtSo they were both inside the car, their arms were both inside the car and the gun was inside the car when you and your husband saw this particular scene?A Yes, your Honor.Atty. SiobalSo you saw Castor Batin and Neil Batin grappling for the gun when they were inside the car?A Yes, sir, and then Castor Batin shouted "huwag."Q And at that time they were grappling for the gun inside the car and Castor Batin shouted "huwag," after that, you and your husband saw the gun atop the roof of the car, is that what you want to convey to the Court?A The gun was still inside the car, only we saw it through the glass window, sir.Q And what happened after that?A Neil Batin got out of the car, followed by Castor Batin and then Castor gave the gun to Neil, and after receiving the gun, Neil placed the gun at his waist, sir.Q You said Neil Batin got out of the car ahead of Castor Batin, where did Neil Batin go or proceed, to what direction?A He proceeded to that place labeled as Exhibit G-7, sir.Q And you said Castor Batin followed Neil Batin to the place where he proceeded here at Exhibit G-7?A Yes, sir.Q Of course, when Neil Batin got out of the car ahead, his back, he must have turned his back from you?A He was sidewise in relation to me, sir.Q How about Castor Batin, when he got out of the car, he must have turned his back from you?A Yes, sir.Q And where was Castor Batin facing when you said he gave the gun to Neil Batin?A He was facing Neil, sir.22As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castors utterance of "Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same, not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the gun to Castor. These circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in committing the crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun and Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor finally decided to give the gun to Neil a crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins concerning the commission of a felony.Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before, during, and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.23 Prosecution witnesses Josephine Refugio and Eusebio Farrales positively indicated in their testimonies that prior to the shooting of Eugenio Refugio, Castor was drunk, was openly challenging others to a fight, and was uttering angry words. It was at this juncture that witnesses saw Neil retrieve his gun from the parked car, after which Castor grabbed the gun from his son, grappled with it, returned it to his son, and ordered the latter to shoot the Refugios.Secondly, even if we pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us to, the results would be the same. Castors argument is that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words Sige, banatan mo na cannot be considered as the moving cause of the shooting and, therefore, he cannot be considered a principal by inducement.Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have held that words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. In People v. Tamayo,24 we held that the moral influence of the words of the father may determine the course of conduct of a son in cases in which the same words coming from a stranger would make no impression.There is no doubt in our minds that Castors words were the determining cause of the commission of the crime. As stated above, Vilma Juadines Rodriguez testified that the eighteen-year-old Neil Batin asked his father before shooting: "Tay, banatan ko na?" Neil Batin was clearly seeking the consent of his father before proceeding with the act, and it was Castors words "Sige, banatan mo na"25 that sealed Eugenio Refugios fate.Whether treachery was specifically alleged in the InformationThere is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.26According to the trial court, treachery was attendant in the killing of Eugenio because Castor ordered Neil to fire at Eugenio after they clearly saw that he was still leaning against the mango tree and being restrained by Josephine who had her arms on his shoulders. Thereby, "the accused insured their safety from any defensive or retaliatory act of Eugenio who, in that position of helplessness and unpreparedness, obviously had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate even if he wanted to. The accused thus consciously used the firearm to assault from a distance, all the more to enhance the chances of killing the victim without risk to themselves."27Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial court that treachery was sufficiently proven during the trial. All that Castor claims before us is that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not specifically alleged in the Information. The Information filed against the Batins states that "the accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death."28 Castor claims that this charge does not allege the specific treacherous acts of the accused. According to Castor, the allegation therein that the accused "with treachery x x x, attack, assault and employ personal violence" is a mere conclusion of law by the one who drafted the said Information. Hence, it did not satisfy the test of sufficiency of Information as provided in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 provides:SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.Pertinently, we have held in Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas29 that the main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set forth in an Information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. We added in said case that[I]t is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. For instance, it is not necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to be defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is sufficient. Jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein we found the allegation of treachery sufficient without any further explanation as to the circumstances surrounding it. Here are some of the cases:In People v. Lab-eo,30 Wilson Lab-eo was indicted for murder under the following Information:That on or about October 21, 1996, at the Barangay Hall, Poblacion, Tadian, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and with the use of a sharp knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike and stab Segundina Cay-no with a well-honed and pointed knife and thereby inflicting a mortal stab wound upon the victim as reflected in that medico-legal certificate, to wit:Stab wound infrascapular area left, penetrating with massive hemathorax, which caused the death of the victim thereafter.That the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength and craft attended the commission of the offense.The accused in this case argued that the Information above, while captioned as "Murder," only charged him with homicide as written. This Court found nothing wrong with the Information, and ruled that the Information sufficiently charged the accused with murder, not even considering the absence of an explanation of the treachery stated therein, thus:The fact that the qualifying circumstances were recited in the second paragraph and not in the first paragraph of the Information, as commonly done, is a matter of form or style for which the prosecution should not be faulted. That the Provincial Prosecutor decided to write the Information differently did not impair its sufficiency. Nothing in the law prohibits the prosecutor from adopting such a form or style. As long as the requirements of the law are observed, the Information will pass judicial scrutiny.x x x xThe test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. The rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the accuseds constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial. Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him because of the style or form adopted in the Information.31This Court went on to affirm the conviction of the accused therein with murder qualified by treachery.The allegation in the Information of treachery as a qualifying circumstance was similarly assailed in People v. Opuran,32 wherein the charge was as follows:Criminal Case No. 4693That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road, Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to handle with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.This Court again rejected the argument of the defense by finding the allegation of treachery sufficient, and later on finding the accused therein guilty of murder qualified by treachery:We do not find merit in appellants contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio, Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Such contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.33Finally, the following constitutes the Information in People v. Bajar34 :That on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 oclock in the evening, at sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, then armed with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85 year old Aquilio Tiwanak, accuseds father-in-law, hitting him on the different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak in such amounts as may be allowed by law.The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior strength, disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his age, habitual intoxication and relationship attended the commission of the crime.CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation [to] Article 14, paragraph 3 and 15, and Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.Like in the previous two cases, this Court found the Information to have sufficiently alleged treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.35Whether the civil liabilities of the accused were correctly awarded by the lower courtsThe trial court ordered the accused, Neil and Castor Batin, to pay the heirs of Eugenio Refugio in the following amounts:1) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;2) P61,500.00, as actual damages;3) P500,000.00, as moral damages;4) P307,920.00, as indemnity for loss of earning capacity; and5) the costs of suit.36Jurisprudence pegs the death indemnity in the above amount (P50,000.00) pursuant to the current judicial policy on the matter. No proof thereof is required. The P61,500.00 in actual damages consists of the expenses incurred by the family of Eugenio Refugio, which Josephine Refugio testified to and was summarized in Exhibit H:37 (1) P25,000.00 for medicines, surgery and other expenses for the hospitalization and emergency treatment;38 (2) P20,000.00 for funeral expenses, inclusive of the costs of coffin, funeral services, and expenses during the wake;39 and (3) P6,500.00 as for burial expenses.The Court of Appeals also modified the trial courts computation of the indemnity for loss of earning capacity. The trial court, finding the work of Eugenio Refugio to be hazardous, reduced his life expectancy to 20 years.This modification is in accord with our ruling in Pleyto v. Lomboy.40 Pleyto offers the following computation for the award for loss of earning capacity:Net Earning = 2/3 x (80 Age at x (Gross AnnualCapacity time of death) Income Reasonable& Necessary LivingExpenses)Eugenio Refugio, who was 31 years old at the time of his death, had a daily income of P145.00. The Court of Appeals multiplied this amount by 26 working days to get Eugenio Refugios monthly income of P3,770.00. The Court of Appeals thus applied the Pleyto formula as follows:Net Earning = 2/3 x (80 31) x [(P3770 x 12) (P3770 x 12)]CapacityNet Earning = 2/3 x (49) x [(P45,240) (P22,620)]CapacityNet Earning = 32 x [P22,620]CapacityNet Earning = P723,84041CapacityLastly, the Court of Appeals found the award of P500,000.00 as moral damages to be excessive, and instead fixed the amount at P100,000.00. In accord with prevailing jurisprudence, however, we further reduce this amount to P50,000.00.42WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the conviction of accused-appellant Castor Batin for murder is AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATION as to the amount of the moral damages, which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155550 January 31, 2008NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs.STEVEN P. CHIONG, respondent.D E C I S I O NNACHURA, J.:Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 503082 which affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision3 holding petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Northwest) liable for breach of contract of carriage.On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOceans vessel M/V Elbia at the San Diego, California Port. Under the service crew agreement, Chiong was guaranteed compensation at a monthly salary of US$440.00 and a monthly overtime pay of US$220.00, or a total of US$7,920.00 for one year.Subsequently, on March 27, 1989, Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL Hutchins & Co., Inc., TransOceans agent at the San Diego Port, confirming Chiongs arrival thereat in time to board the M/V Elbia which was set to sail on April 1, 1989 (California, United States time). For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane ticket for San Diego, California with a departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. Ten (10) days before his scheduled departure, Chiong fetched his entire family from Samar and brought them to Manila to see him off at the airport.On April 1, 1989, Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport4 (MIA), at about 6:30 a.m., three (3) hours before the scheduled time of departure. Marilyn Calvo, Philimares Liaison Officer, met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiongs seaman service record book for clearance. Thereafter, Chiongs passport was duly stamped, after complying with government requirements for departing seafarers.Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest check-in counter. When it was Chiongs turn, the Northwest personnel5 informed him that his name did not appear in the computers list of confirmed departing passengers. Chiong was then directed to speak to a "man in barong" standing outside Northwests counters from whom Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong approached the "man in barong" who demanded US$100.00 in exchange therefor. Without the said amount, and anxious to board the plane, Chiong queued a number of times at Northwests Check-in Counter and presented his ticket. However, the Northwest personnel at the counter told him to simply wait and that he was being a pest. Frustrated, Chiong went to Calvo at the PCG counter and inquired if she had money so he could obtain a boarding pass from the "man in barong." Calvo, who already saw that something was amiss, insisted that Chiongs plane ticket was confirmed and as such, he could check-in smoothly and board the plane without shelling out US$100.00 for a boarding pass. Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board Northwest Flight No. 24 bound for San Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at the M/V Elbia by April 1, 1989 (California, U.S.A. time).It appears that Chiongs name was crossed out and substituted with "W. Costine" in Northwests Air Passenger Manifest.6 In a letter dated April 3, 1989, Chiongs counsel demanded as recompense: (1) the amount equivalent to Chiongs salary under the latters Crew Agreement7 with TransOcean; (2) P15,000.00 for Chiongs expenses in fetching and bringing his family from Samar to Manila; (3) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P500,000.00 as legal fees.8Northwest demurred. Thus, on May 24, 1989, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage before the RTC. Northwest filed a Motion to Dismiss9 the complaint citing the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but the trial court denied the same.10In its Answer,11 Northwest contradicted the claim that it breached its contract of carriage with Chiong, reiterating that Chiong had no cause of action against it because per its records, Chiong was a "no-show" passenger for Northwest Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989. In the RTCs Pre-trial Order12 based on the parties respective Pre-trial Briefs,13 the triable issues were limited to the following:(a) Whether [Chiong] was bumped-off by [Northwest] from Flight NW 24 or whether [Chiong] "no-showed" for said flight.(b) If defendant is found guilty of having breached its contract of carriage with plaintiff, what damages are awardable to plaintiff and how much.In the course of proceedings, Northwest, on September 14, 1990, filed a separate criminal complaint for False Testimony14 against Chiong based on the latters testimony that he did not leave the Philippines after April 1, 1989 contrary to the notations in his seaman service record book that he had left the country on April 17, 1989, and returned on October 5 of the same year. Chiong did not participate in the preliminary investigation; thus, on December 14, 1990, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information against Chiong with the RTC Manila, Branch 54, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-89722. In the meantime, after a flurry of motions filed by Northwest in the civil case were denied by the RTC, Northwest filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.15 Correlatively, Northwest moved for a suspension of the proceedings before the trial court. However, both the Petition for Certiorari and Motion for Suspension of the proceedings were denied by the CA and RTC, respectively.16After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding preponderance of evidence in favor of Chiong, and holding Northwest liable for breach of contract of carriage. The RTC ruled that the evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that Chiong was deliberately prevented from checking-in and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an American passenger by the name of W. Costine.The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, in consideration of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant liable to plaintiff in damages by reason of the latters inability to take defendants NW Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, for the following amounts:1) U.S.$8,447.0017 or its peso equivalent at the time of finality of this judgment with legal interests until fully paid, representing compensatory damages due to plaintiffs loss of income for one (1) year as a direct result of defendants breach of contract of carriage;2) P15,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing plaintiffs actual incurred damages as a consequence of his failure to avail of defendants Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989; 3) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing moral damages suffered and sustained by the plaintiff as a result of defendants breach of contract of carriage;4) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing exemplary or punitive damages due to plaintiff from defendant, owing to the latters breach of contract of carriage with malice and fraud; and5) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, for and as attorneys fees, plus costs of suit.SO ORDERED.On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. Identical to the RTCs findings, those of the CA were as follows: on April 1, 1989, Chiong was at the MIA three hours before the 10:15 a.m. departure time for Northwest Flight No. 24. Contrary to Northwests claim that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger, the CA likewise concluded, as the RTC did, that Chiong was not allowed to check-in and was not issued a boarding pass at the Northwest check-in counter to accommodate a certain W. Costine. As for Northwests defense that Chiong had left the country after April 1, 1989 and worked for M/V Elbia, the CA ruled that Northwests failure to raise this defense in its Answer or Motion to Dismiss is equivalent to a waiver thereof. The CA declared that, in any event, Northwest failed to present any evidence to prove that Chiong had worked under the original crew agreement.Hence, this recourse. Northwest ascribes grievous errors to the CA when the appellate court ruled that: (1) Northwest breached the contract of carriage with Chiong who was present at the MIA on April 1, 1989 to board Northwests Flight No. 24; (2) As a result of the breach, Northwest is liable to Chiong for compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit; and (3) Northwests Exhibits "2" and "3," the Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name Record, respectively, were hearsay evidence and ought to be excluded from the records.The petition must fail.We are in complete accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that Northwest breached the contract of carriage with Chiong, and as such, he is entitled to compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.Northwest contends that Chiong, as a "no-show" passenger on April 1, 1989, already defaulted in his obligation to abide by the terms and conditions of the contract of carriage;18 and thus, Northwest could not have been in breach of its reciprocal obligation to transport Chiong. In sum, Northwest insists that Chiongs testimony is a complete fabrication, supposedly demonstrated by the following: (1) Chiongs seaman service record book reflects that he left the Philippines after April 1, 1989, specifically on April 17, 1989, to board the M/V Elbia, and was discharged therefrom upon his personal request; (2) the Information filed against Chiong for False Testimony; and (3) the Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name Record both indicate that he was a "no-show" passenger.We are not convinced.The records reveal that Chiong, as plaintiff in the trial court, satisfied the burden of proof required in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence. Section 1 of Rule 133 provides:SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony, Chiongs evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket for the April 1, 1989 Flight No. 24, Chiongs passport and seaman service record book duly stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of Calvo, Florencio Gomez,19 and Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA) personnel who all identified the signature and stamp of the PCG on Chiongs passport.We have scoured the records, and found no reason to depart from the well-settled rule that factual findings of the lower courts deserve the utmost respect and are not to be disturbed on appeal.20 Indeed, Chiongs Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, coupled with the PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct evidence that he was present at MIA on said date as he intended to fly to the United States on board that flight. As testified to by POEA personnel and officers, the PCG stamp indicates that a departing seaman has passed through the PCG counter at the airport, surrendered the exit pass, and complied with government requirements for departing seafarers. Calvo, Philimares liaison officer tasked to assist Chiong at the airport, corroborated Chiongs testimony on the latters presence at the MIA and his check-in at the PCG counter without a hitch. Calvo further testified that she purposely staye