1. PAKALA NARAYAN SWAMI V. EMPEROR

The accused was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The evidence against him was, firstly,his indebtedness to the deceased, secondly, the statement of the deceased of his wife that he was going to the accused, thirdly, the steel trunk was purchased by a Dhobie (washerman) for and on behalf of the accused. Some other details about the arrival of the deceased at the accused's house, discovery of blood-stained clothes and transportation of the trunk of the station were also proved. The accused appealed to the Privy Council on the grounds that the statement of the deceased to his wife that he was going to the accused was wrongly admitted under S.32(1). A variety of questions has been mooted in the Indian Courts as to the effect of this section. It has been suggested that the statement making it must be at any rate near death, that the “circumstances”can only include acts done when and where the death was caused.... Statements made by the deceased that he was proceeding to the spot where he was in fact killed, or as to his reasons for so proceeding, or that he was going to meet a particular person or that he had been invited by such person to meet him, would each to them be circumstances of the transaction, and would be so whether the person was unknown, or was not the person accused. Such a Statement might indeed be exculpatory of the person accused.The Supreme Court has emphasised the need for effort by courts, as far as possible, to include a statement within the scope of the S.32(1). Hence, statements as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death would be included.Statement of accused under S.162 Cr.P.C. But the statement of the accused to the police that the deceased arrived at his place was held to be not relevant by virtue of Sec.162 of Cr.P.C. This section provides that a statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation cannot be used against him in any inquiry or trial.The definition attempted by the Privy Council has found favour with the Supreme Court in Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor over two scores. Firstly, that the definition is that it must either admit the guilt in terms or admit substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and secondly, that a mixed up statement which, even though contains some confessional statement, will still lead to acquittal, is no confession.

2. PALVINDER KAUR V. STATE OF PUNJAB

Palvinder tried for offences under section 302 and 201, Indian Penal Code, in connection with the murder of her husband, Jaspal Singh. Mohinderpal, her illicit lover murdered Jaspal, her huband by making him ingest KCN. Thereupon the body was placed in a trunk for 10 days and then carried to another storeroom in a jeep and stored for couple more days. Finally, the body was dumped in a well and the jeep was taken to Gurudwara to clean.Convicted by the Sessions Judge under section 302 and sentenced to transportation for life. No verdict recorded regarding the charge under section 201. Appeal to the High Court: Acquitted of the charge of murder, but was convicted under section 201, and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. Her appeal by special leave is now before the Supreme Court.Decisions Of The CourtsBelowView of Sessions Judge:The circumstantial evidence (no direct evidence in the case) incompatible with the innocence of the accused. Held that the case against the appellant was proved beyond any reasonable doubt.Decision of High Court on appeal: [Different Conclusion]Cause of death could not be ascertained from the medical evidence given in the case.Extra-judicial confessions

alleged to have been made to father and grandfather of the deceased, held inadmissible and unreliable. Palvinder might have desired to continue her illicit intrigue with Mohinderpal and she may have had a motive to kill her husband but a stronger motive to preserve her own position as the wife of a prospective chief of Bhareli.Held, impossible to state with confidence that poison was administered by her on basis of the circumstantial evidence. Issues before the Supreme Court:

1. Whether the pieces of circumstantial evidence were sufficient to convict the Appellant?

2. Whether the alleged confession of the Appellant being an exculpatory statement, was inadmissible in evidence?

Supreme court on CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE:There is no material, direct or indirect evidence for the finding reached by the High Court that the death of Jaspal was caused by the administration of potassium cyanide.Cases are not unknown where death is accidental and the accused has acted in a peculiar manner regarding the disposal of the dead body for reasons best known to himself. One of them might well be that he was afraid of a false case being started against him.Life and liberty of persons cannot be put in jeopardy on mere suspicions, howsoever strong, and they can only be deprived of these on the basis of definite proof… and the circumstance is not of a character which is wholly incompatible with the innocence of the appellant.Confession:“My husband Jaspal Singh Was fond of hunting as well as of photography…He asked Mohinderpal Singh, to get a medicine to develop some of his photos. Thereupon Harnam Singh went to the Cantt. and brought the medicine. I kept this medicine. As the medicine was sticking to the paper I put it in water in a small bottle and kept it in the almirah….He went for hunting for 2-3 days and there he developed abdominal trouble and began to purge. He sent for medicine 3-4 days from Dr. Sohan Singh. One day I placed his medicine bottle in the almirah where medicine for washing photos had been placed. I was sitting outside and Jaspal Singh enquired from me where his medicine was. I told him that it was in the almirah. By mistake he took that medicine which was meant for washing photos. At that time, he fell down and my little son was standing by his side. He said 'Mama, Papa had fallen'. I went inside and saw that he was in agony and in short time he expired….”Admitted in her confession that,

She went to Mohinderpal Singh and told him all that had happened. Did not tell father because their relations with each other were not good . Out of fear she placed his corpse in a box with the help of Mohinderpal Singh. Admitted to disposing off the body as stated by the prosecution.

JUDGEMENTSC held that the statement in whole was an exculpatory statement and not a confession because it showed that Jaspal’s death was an accident.Upheld the definition of confession in Pakala v. Emperor.Appeal allowed.Ratio:

Life and liberty of persons cannot be put in jeopardy on mere suspicions, howsoever strong, and they can only be deprived of these on the basis of definite proof… and when the circumstance is of a character which is wholly incompatible with the innocence of the appellant.

Confessions and admissions are to be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole and that the court is not competent to accept only the inculpatory part while rejecting the

exculpatory part as inherently incredible…where there is no other evidence to show affirmatively that any portion of the exculpatory element in the confession is false.

3. NISHIKANT JHA V. STATE OF BIHAR

Facts:The appellant was charged for the murder of a fellow student in a railway compartment. The appellant was noticed washing blood-stained clothes, and bathing in a river. He was taken to the village Mukhiya, where he made a statement and signed it. In this statement, he admitted his presence at the scene of murder but stated that the crime was committed by someone else, that he was injured by the knife of assailant when he tried to prevent the crime, and that when the assailant jumped off the train he 'followed suit being apprehensive of arrest on the charge of murder. Thereafter, the appellant was handed over to the police. A blood stained knife, which could be the cause of the victim's injuries, was found on his person. Only an incised skin deep injury, which could not account for the profuse bloodstains on the clothes was found on him. In his statement under s. 342 C.P.C. the appellant denied all connections with the crime stating that he was injured at another place in a scuffle--blood-staining his clothes, books etc. He admitted being taken to the Mukhias house, and stated that he had signed a blank paper there on being assaulted and threatened, but he denied making the statement in writing ascribed to him. In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that the statement' recorded by the village Mukhiya before handing over the appellant to the police was inadmissible in evidence; and if admissible, the statement had to be taken as a whole, and one portion of it could not be acted upon while rejecting the other.Dismissing the appeal, HELD:

1. The contention that the statement was not voluntarily made and as such could not be admitted in evidence must be rejected. No suggestion had been made to any one of the persons who had taken the appellant to the Mukhiya and had been tendered for cross-examination that any one of them had assaulted the appellant. nor was

any suggestion made that the appellant had been coerced or threatened with dire consequences, if he did not make the statement. The appellant's own version that he was made to give his signature on a blank piece of paper cuts at the root of his case that he made a statement as a result of a threat or assault, for in that case, all that was necessary was to get his signature.

2. In the circumstances of this case, the exculpatory part of the statement made before the Mukhiya being not only inherently improbable but also contradicted by the other evidence was rightly rejected and the inculpatory part was rightly accepted.

The statement reads: "I am Nishi Kant Jha, son of Nilkanth Jha, resident of Baburpur, P.S. Jasidih sub division Deoghar, District Santhai Parganas. To-day 12-10-61 at about 12 midnight, chowkidars Pathal Turi and Ayodhya Turi of village Saptar and Sheo Shankar Pandey, Ram Kishore Pandey and Basudeo Pandey of the same village arrested me and brought me. My statement is that when I boarded the first class compartment in Barauni passenger at Jhajha, an unknown person was sitting in it when the train reached near Simultala and when it stopped there, Lal Mohan Sharma, resident of Deoghar, P.S. Deoghar, district Dumka entered into that compartment. I had been knowing him from before. When the train stopped at the Jasidih station and when I went to get down, Lal Mohan Sharma who had boarded the train at Simultala, did not allow me to get down at the Jasidih station. When the train moved ahead of Jasidih station, in the meanwhile Lal Mohan Sharma took that outsider into the lavatory and began to beat him. At this I caught hold of his hand, as a result of which my left fore-finger

got injured with knife. Thereupon he asked me to be careful. Then, on being afraid, I sat quietly in that very compartment. He further said that I should not open the door and window of the compartment and if would do so I would be inviting death. At that very time, he killed him. When the train was reaching near Mathurapur, he jumped down from the running train and fled away. Lal Mohan Sharma fled away. also jumped down on the other side of Patro river near Madhupur and fled away in order to save my life, because I apprehended that I would be the only person who would be arrested. Thereafter, I came to the village Ratu Bahiar lying by the side of Patro river and afterwards I took my clothes to Patro river and washed them with a soap. Meanwhile a bullock cart was going to Deoghar. Therefore I sat on that very bullock cart and started for Deoghar. After I had covered about a mile, Pathal Turi, Shanker Pandey, Ram Kishore Pandey, Ayodhya Turi, the chowkidar and Rameshwar Mahto got me down from the bullock cart and brought before you. I know their names after enquiring the same from them."

What didn’t work in his favour:1. It is not possible to believe that if Lal Mohan Sharma wanted to commit the murder he

would prevent the appellant from getting off the train at Jasidih so as to have a witness who knew his name and address and testify to his commission of the crime.

2. Lal Mohan Sharma was not in the train at Jhajha and no details were given about any quarrel between him and the victim which might lead the former to make the attack on Jai Prakash.

3. Apparently there was no motive for Lal Mohan Sharma's commission of the crime. Again it is not possible to believe that Lal Mohan Sharma should not have tried to do away with the appellant also.

4. The version of the appellant receiving the injury on his left hand in the railway compartment was also unbelievable.

5. So was his story of a scuffle with the herdsman and cutting his hand as a result thereof. The cause for the herdsmen abusing the appellant and his remonstrance followed by an attack on his person all appear to be imaginary. The only incised injury which the appellant had suffered was skin deep and it is impossible to accept the story that the bleeding was so profuse as to have necessitated his washing his shirt and trousers in the river.

6. Nor does such an injury account for the other articles like his belt, shoes and books being stained with blood which was sought to be removed by washing.

Taylor: "In the proof of confessions--as in the case of admissions in civil causes-the whole of what the prisoner said on the subject at the time of making the confession should be taken together...But if, after the entire statement of the prisoner has been given in evidence, the prosecutor can contradict any part of it, he is at liberty to do so; and then the whole testimony is left to the jury for their consideration, precisely as in other cases where one part of the evidence is contradictory to another. Even without such contradiction it is not to be supposed that all the parts of a confession are entitled to equal credit. The jury may believe that part which charges the prisoner, and reject that which is in his favour, if they see sufficient grounds for so doing. If what he said in his own favour is not contradicted by evidence offered by the prosecutor, nor is improbable in itself, it will be naturally believed by the jury; but they are not bound to give weight to it on that account, being at liberty to judge of it, like other evidence, by all the circumstances of the case."

4. CBI V. V.C. SHUKLA

Three Brothers (S.K Jain, B.K Jain and N.K Jain) were business man and carrying their different business.

J.K Jain was employ in Jain Brother’s business and he had acted as a middle man in the award of certain big project in the power sector of the Government of India to different bidders.

CBI was investigating a case RC Case No.5(s)/91SIU. During investigation CBI received some information about some illegal money.

To work out information, CBI searched the house of a HAWALA broker J.K. Jain. In course of the search they recovered some documents and two diaries, two notebooks, two files containing details of receipts of various amount from different illegal sources and details of payment to various person recorded in similar fashion.

CBI comprehended and decoded those entries and found that total recorded amount was 65.47 crores and out of which 53.5 crores had been illegally transferred from abroad through hawala channels. Jain brothers had official dealing with politicians and public servants whose name were recorded in the diaries and files

On the basis of these information, CBI registered a case against Jains, some politicians and others on march 4,1995 U/S 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 and sec. 56 read with 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973. Case no is RC NO 1(A)/95ACU (VI).

After the investigation of the case 34 charge sheets are filed in the court of the special judge, New Delhi. One of the above charge–sheet (C.S No.4 dated 16.1.1996) was against Shri Lal Krishna Advani, and another was against (C.S No. 8 dated 23.1.1996), Shri V.C. Shukla, both were Member of Parliament at that time. Common allegation was made that they had entered into a criminal conspiracy during 1988 to 1991 to receive uncounted money and to disburse the same to their companies, friends, close relatives and other person.

JUDGEMENT

The judges discussed the possibility of treating the book entries under Sections 34 and 10 of the IEA before coming to Sections 17 and 21.

The question whether the entries are 'admissions' within the meaning of Section 17of the Act so as to be admissible as relevant evidence under Section 21; and if so, as against whom can the entries be prove. In Section 17 admission has been defined to be a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, mentioned in the subsequent Sections (Section 18 to 21). Section 18, so far as it is relevant for our present purposes, provides that statements made by apart to the proceeding or by an agent to any such party, whom the Court regards under the circumstances of the case, has expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them are admissions. Section 21 reads as under:Proof of admissions against persons making them and by or on their behalf - admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or his representative in interest; but hey cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them or by his

representative in interest except in the following cases:- (1) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, when it is of such a nature, that if the person making it were dead, it would be relevant as between third persons under Section 32. (2) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, when it consists of a statement of the existence of any state of mind or body, relevant or in issue, made at or about the time when such state of mind or body existed, and is accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable.

An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, if it is relevant otherwise than as an admission."From a combined reading of the above Sections it is manifest that an oral or documentary statement made by a party or his authorised agent, suggesting any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact may be proved against a party t the proceeding or his authorised agent as 'admission' but, apart form exceptional cases (as contained in Section 21), such a statement cannot be proved by or on their behalf.

In Pakala Narayana vs Emperor [AIR 1939 privy Council 47] " .... a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitutes the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession, eg. An admission that the accused is the owner of an was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused a death.”

It is thus seen that only voluntary and direct acknowledgement of guilt is a confession but when a confession falls short of actual admission guilt it may nevertheless be used as evidence against the person who made it or his authorised agent as an 'admission' under section

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS Firstly, a statement made by an accused person, if it is an admission, is admissible in evidence under Section 21 of the evidence Act, unless the Statement amounts to a confession and was made to a person in authority in consequence of some improper inducement, threat or promise, or was made at a time when the accused was in custody of a police officer. If a statement was made by the accused in the circumstance just mentioned it s admissibility will depend upon the determination of the question whether it does not does not amount to a confession. If it amounts to a confession, it will be inadmissible, but if it does not amount to a confession, it will be admissible under Section 21 of the Act as an admission, provided that it suggests an inference as to a fact which is in issue in, or relevant to, the case and was not made to a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of criminal procedure.

Secondly, a statement made by an accused person is admissible against others who are being jointly tried with him only if the statement amounts to a confession. Where the statement falls short of a confession, it is admissible only against its maker as an admission and not against those who are being jointly tried with him.

In the light of the preceding discussion we proceed to consider the validity of the arguments canvassed by Shri Altaf Ahmed in this regard. mr. Altaf Ahmed urged that it

being a settled principle of law that statements in account books of a person are 'admissions' and can be used against him even though those statements were never communicated to any other person, the entries would be admissible as admission of J. K. Jain, who made them that apart, he contended, they would be admissible against jain brothers also as they were made under their authority as would be evident from their endorsements/signatures appearing against below some of those entries.

Even if we are to accept the above contentions of Mr. Altaf Ahmed the entries, [which re statements' as held by this Court in Bhogilal chunilal (supra) and hereinafter will be so referred to ], being 'admissions' - and not t' confession'- cannot be used as against Shri Advani or Shri Shukla. however, as against jains the statements may be proved as admissions under Section 18read with Section 21 of the Act provided they relate to ' any fact in issue or relevant fact.' Needless to say, what will be 'facts in issue' or 'relevant facts' in a criminal trial will depend upon, and will be delineated by, the nature of accusations made or charges levelled against the person indicated. It is thus seen that the prosecution sought to prove that there were two separate conspiracies, in both of which Jains together figured as the common party and Shri Advani or Shri Shukla, as the other . Since we have already found that the prosecution has not been able to made out a prima facie case to prove that Shri Advani and Shri shukla were parties to such conspiracies, the charges of conspiracy, as framed/sought to be framed, cannot stand also against the Jains, for the simple reason that in a conspiracy there must be two parties. Resultantly , the statements cannot be proved as admission of Jains of such conspiracy.

5. STATE OF TAMIL NADU V. KUTTY

Double murder of actress and her mother by watchman, driver and cook.

The confession of A-2 was recorded by a judicial magistrate on 24.11.1986. A-3 also confessed to the magistrate which also was recorded purportedly in terms of Section 164of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, both of them retracted from the confessions during the trial of the case.

Learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court while acquitting A-2 (Lakshmi Narasimhan) found that the judicial confession was fraught with flaws and hence they did not rely on the confession. According to the Division Bench, the materials brought on record by the prosecution for corroborating the confessions were not acceptable and the extra judicial confessions attributed to A-1 and spoken to by PW-30 was frowned at by the High Court.

The only question now, in this appeal, is whether A-2 Lakshmi Narasimhan had also joined A-1 Jebaraj in murdering the two ladies.If the confession recorded by the judicial magistrate as from A-2 cannot, for any reason whatsoever, be used by us, it would be an exercise in futility for the State to endeavour for reversal of the order of acquittal with the help of the remaining evidence. So we would first consider and decide whether we can rely on that confession.

Learned Judges of the High Court declined to act on the said confession mainly for two reasons.

1. confession was retracted by the maker thereof

2. recovery of articles was made prior to the confession

We may state at the outset itself that both reasons are too insufficient for over-ruling the confession:

1. It is not the law that once a confession was retracted the court should presume that the confession is tainted. As a matter of practical knowledge we can say that non- retracted confession is a rarity in criminal cases. To retract from confession is the right of the confessor and all the accused against whom confessions were produced by the prosecution have invariably adopted that right. It would be injudicious to jettison a judicial confession on the mere premise that its maker has retracted from it. The court has a duty to evaluate the evidence concerning the confession by looking at all aspects. The twin test of a confession is to ascertain whether it was voluntary and true. Once those tests are found to be positive the next endeavour is to see whether there is any other reason which stands in the way of acting on it. Even for that, retraction of the confession is not the ground to throw the confession overboard.

2. We are unable to understand how a judicial confession would become bad by reason of the fact that articles belonging to the victims were recovered prior to the making of the confession. That aspect, instead of vitiating the confession, could be a factor in favour of the voluntariness of the confession. When the culprit finds that the articles concealed by him are all disintered it is possible that he might feel that there is no use in concealing the facts any more. Then he may desire to make a clean breast of everything to any person or authorities.

More arguments by the defense counsel:

- Lakshmi Narasimhan was in police custody for a long time if not tortured, by the police to make the confession before the magistrate. This contention is made by overlooking certain broad facts.

During the time A-2 was in police custody he was produced before the magistrate on three different occasions (5th, 11th and 17th of November 1986). On none of those occasions did A-2 tell the magistrate that he wanted to make a confession. If there was any pressure on him to make a confession it would have been during the time when he was in police custody. Why the police did not do on any of those three occasions when he was produced before the magistrate from police custody would tell heavily against the said contention of Mr. Vishwanathan. There is no scope for any contention that A-2 was unaware that the person who recorded the confession was a magistrate.

- Shri Vishwanathan then contended that A-2 in his confession did not own that he also stabbed at least one of the two deceased.

That does not matter much, because a reading of the confession as a whole leaves no doubt that A-2 has admitted the full length role played by him in association with the other two assailants for murdering the two ladies. Hence the very fact that he did not say in so many words that he also inflicted one stab injury on the deceased is of no consequence. In a way this aspect is a further assurance to us that his confession was not what the police wanted him to say to the magistrate

There was also other corroborative evidence like presence of watchman’s fingerprints inside the house: something suspicious given the nature of his work ensures that he remains confined outside.

6. AGNOO NAGESIA V. STATE OF BIHAR

The appellant was tried for murder. The principal evidence against him consisted of a first information report containing a full confession of the crime. The appellant was convicted under s. 302 Indian Penal Code by the trial court and the High Court upheld the conviction, By special leave he appealed to the Supreme Court. The question before the court was whether the whole confessional statement in the first information report was banned by s. 25 of the Evidence Act or only those portions of it were barred which related to the actual commission of the crime.HELD :A confession may consist of severd parts and may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime but also the motive, the preparation, the provocation etc. If the confession is tainted the taint attaches to the whole statement of the accused. If a statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that admission but also every other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the statement is part of the confession. Little substance and content would be left in ss. 24, 25 and 26 if proof of admissions of incriminating facts in confessional statement is permitted. The appellant's first information report was a confessional statement to a police officer and as such no part of it could be admitted into evidence on account of the ban in s.25 except in so far as the ban was lifted by s. 27 and except in so far as it identified the appellant is the maker of the report.

We think that the separability test is misleading, and the entire confessional statement is hit by  s. 25  and save and except as provided by  s. 27  and save and except the formal part identifying the accused as the maker of the report, no part of it could be tendered in evidence.

We think, therefore, that save and except parts 1, 15 and 18 identifying the appellant as the maker of the first information report and save and except the portions coming within the purview of  s. 27 , the entire first information report must be excluded from evidence.

Section 27 applies only to information received from a person accused of an offence in the custody of a police officer. Now, the Sub Inspector stated that he arrested the appellant after he gave the first information report leading to the discovery. Prima facie, therefore, the appellant was not in the custody of a police officer when he gave the report, unless it can be said that he was the in constructive custody. On the question whether a person directly giving to a police officer information which may be used as evidence against him -may be deemed to have submitted himself to the custody of the police officer within the meaning of  s. 27 , there is conflict of opinion. For the purposes of the case, we shall assume that the appellant was constructively in police custody and therefore the information contained in the first information report leading to the discovery of the dead bodies and the tangi is admissible in evidence. The entire evidence against the appellant then consists of the fact that the appellant gave information as to the place where the dead bodies were lying and as to the place where he concealed the tan,-,', the discovery of the dead bodies and the tangi in consequence of the information, the discovery of a blood-stained chadar from the appellant's house and the fact that he had gone to Dungi Jharan Hills on the morning of August 11, 1963. This evidence is not sufficient to convict the appellant of the offenses under  s. 302  of the Indian Penal Code.

7. KARAN SINGH V. STATE OF J&K

The main issue to be determined in these appeals is whether 563 articles lying in 'Toshakhana' (Treasury of the State of Jammu & Kashmir) can be declared as the private property of the appellant or this issue deserves fresh determination by Government of India or it be referred to arbitration for adjudication.

The appellant in his biography entitled "Heir Apparent" has made a statement to the following effect :

"Again unlike most of other Rulers, my father made a clear distinction between his private property, including jewellery and State property. He left family jewellery, shawls, carpets and Regalia worth crores with the State Toshakhana (Treasury) which most others in his place would have appropriated without turning a hair."

In respect of the aforesaid statement, learned counsel for the appellant, referring to Sections 17and 31 of the Indian Evidence Act and certain decisions, contends that there is no admission abandoning the articles in favour of the State Government and also that it is open to the appellant to explain the circumstances under which the same were made.

Reliance has been placed on Shri Kishori Lal v. Mst. Chaltibai. [1959 Supp.(1) SCR 698] where dealing with admissions, this Court stated thus : "And admissions are not conclusive, and unless they constitute estoppel, the maker is at liberty to prove that they were mistaken or were untrue : Trinidad Asphalt Company v. Coryat [(1896) A.C. 587]. Admissions are mere pieces of evidence and if the truth of the matter is known to both parties the principle stated in Chandra Kunwar's case [(1906) 34 I.A. 27] would be inapplicable."

Again in Bharat Singh & Anr. v. Bhagirathi [(1966) 1 SCR 606], on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant, this Court held : "Admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them. Admissions are subjective evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted."

Further reliance was placed on Chikkam Koreswara Rao v. Chikkam Subba Rao & Ors. [(1970) 1 SCC 558] for the observations to the following effect:

"Before the right of a party can be considered to have been defeated on the basis of an alleged admission by him, the implication of the statement made by him must be clear and conclusive. There should be no doubt or ambiguity about the alleged admissions."

In the present case, the reliance on aforesaid decisions is as misplaced as the argument itself. It has to be borne in mind that the statements made in the book are not being taken into consideration as conclusive admissions as such but have been taken as additional circumstance along with other circumstances that have already been noticed, for determining whether the conduct of the appellant amounts to waiver and/or abandonment of right in respect of the articles in question. The appellant has not been declined relief only on account of the statements made by him in the autobiography.

8. QUEEN V. ABDULLAH

In Queen-Empress v. Abdullah, 1885, the running down a street by a wounded person simultaneously saying the name of his assailant and how the wounds were inflicted were proved together held to constitute his conduct as a whole. The signs made by the deceased Dulari, in response to the questions put to her, may be given in evidence, with the object of supplying material from which the inference may properly be drawn, that she either adopted or negatived the matter of such questions. If the significance of these signs is established satisfactorily to the mind of the Court, then I think that such questions, taken with her assent or dissent to them, clearly proved, constitute a "verbal statement" as to the cause of her death, within the meaning of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Statements by the witnesses as to their impressions of what those signs meant were, in my judgment, inadmissible, and should be eliminated.

However, If a person was found making such statement without any question first being asked his statement might be regarded as a part of his conduct. But where the statement is made merely in response to some question or suggestion it shows a state of things introduced not by the fact in issue, but by the interposition of some thing else. For these reasons, I think that the signs made by the accused cannot be admitted by way of "conduct" under section 8 of the Evidence Act.

9. SITARAM V. STATE OF UP

The appellant was convicted for under under s. 302 Indian Penal Code. The prosecution relied on amongst other materials, a letter. The letter contained a confession and was addressed to the Sub-Inspector. The appellant wrote the letter with the intention that it should be received by the Sub-Inspector, kept it near the dead body and left the house after locking it. The lock was broken open and the letter was recovered by the Sub-Inspector. In appeal to this Court the admissibility of this letter was challenged.

HELD: (Per Curium) There was sufficient material on the record, apart from this letter, establishing the guilt of the appellant.

Per Sarkar, C.J. and Mudholkar, J:-The letter was admissible in evidence.

No doubt, the letter contained a confession and was addressed to a police officer. That could not make it a confession made to the Police officer which is within the bar created by s. 25 of the Evidence Act. The Police Officer was not nearby when the letter was written or knew that it was being written. In such circumstances quite obviously the letter would not have been a confession to the police officer if the words "Sub-Inspector" had not been written. Nor it can become one in similar circumstances only because the words "Sub-Inspector" has been written there. It would still have not been a confession made to a police officer for the simple reason that it was not so made from any point of view. [267 H-268 B]

Per Bachawat J.,-The letter was inadmissible in evidence and was a confession made to a police officer. A confession to a police officer was within the bar of s. 25, though it was not made in his presence. A confessional letter written to a Police officer and sent to him by post, messenger or otherwise is not outside the an of s.25 because the police officer was

ignorant of the letter at the moment when it was being written. R. V. Hurribole, (1876) I.L.R. 1 Cal. 207, approved.

10. DHANANJAY REDDY V. STATE OF KARNATAKA

Pati fauj main, beewee mauj main.

Pati returns to find his wife’s three lovers. Thinks that they are all putting up a drama for him till they decide to pull off a Julius Caesar moment. One of the accused then felt too guilty, went to confess. His luck maashallah, the magistrate forgot to take signature. Now the judges speak:

A magistrate, therefore, cannot in the course of investigation record a confession except in the manner laid down in S.164. The power to record the confession had obviously been given so that the confession might be proved by the record of it made in the manner laid down. If proof of the confession by other means was permissible, the whole provision of S.164 including the safeguards contained in it for the protection of accused persons would be rendered nugatory. Compliance of sub-section (4) of Section 164 of the Code is mandatory and its non- compliance renders the confession not admissible or reliable. It is settled position of law that if a part of confession is excluded under any provision of law, the entire confessional statement in all its parts, including the admission of minor incriminating facts must be excluded unless proof of it as permitted by some other section, such as Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

We examined the matter with a different angle as well by considering to see the admissibility of said confessional statement not as a judicial confession but as extra judicial confession made to PW50. We found it difficult to treat Exhibit P-77 as extra-judicial confession of A4 made to PW50. Confessions in criminal law have been categorised to be either judicial or extra-judicial. The prosecution is obliged to refer and rely on the alleged confession of the accused in any one of the aforesaid categories. As extra-judicial confession cannot be treated as judicial confession, similarly an alleged judicial confession proved to have not been legally recorded cannot be used as extra-judicial confession. Otherwise also such an approach would result in dragging the judicial officers into uncalled for and unnecessary controversies. In Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor[AIR 1936 PC 253] it was observed, which we approve, that:

"....it would be particularly unfortunate if Magistrates were asked at all generally to act rather as police officers than as judicial persons; to be by reason of their position freed from the disability that attaches to police officers under S.162  of the Code ; and to be at the same time freed, notwithstanding their position as Magistrates, from any obligation to make records under S.164. In the result they would indeed be relegated to the position of ordinary citizens as witnesses and then would be required to depose to matters transacted by them in their official capacity unregulated by any statutory rules of procedure or conduct whatever.

11. NAZIR AHMAD V. EMPEROR

The appellant was convicted mainly, if not entirely, on the strength of a confession said to have been made by him to a Magistrate of which evidence was given by the Magistrate but which was not recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code and thereupon, the sole question for decision is whether such evidence was or was not admissible. 

12. PULUKURI KOTAYYA V. KING EMPEROR

whether the statement of the appellant to the effect that 'he had hidden them (the ornaments)' and would point out the place' where they were, is wholly admissible in evidence under S.27 or only that of it is admissible where he stated that he would point out the place but not the part where he stated that he had hidden the ornaments.

In Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, the above question was answered as :If we may respectfully say so, this case clearly brings out what part of the statement is admissible under S.27. It is only that part which distinctly relates to the discovery which is admissible; if any part of the statement distinctly relates to the discovery it will be admissible wholly and the Court cannot say that it will excise one part of the statement because it is of a confessional nature. Section 27 makes that part of the statement which is distinctly related to the discovery admissible as a whole, whether it be in the nature of confession or not.It is however urged that in a case where the offence consists of possession even the words where he had hidden them' would be inadmissible as they would amount to an admission by the accused that he was in possession. There are in our opinion two answers to this argument. In the first place S.27 itself says that where the statement distinctly relates to the discovery it will be admissible whether it amounts to a confession or not. In the second place, these words by themselves though they may prove the offence, for after the articles have been recovered are connected with crime. i.e. In this case the prosecution will have to show that they are stolen property. We are therefore of opinion that the entire statement of the appellant would be admissible evidence. In the light of this decision, we must hold that the accused must be deemed to be in exclusive possession of the articles concealed under the earth though the spots at which they were concealed may be accessible to public.Appellants guilty of murder made some confessions in the police custody - in appeal, they contended that their statements admitted in violation of S26 & 27 - The statement of one of them was "I, Kottaya and others beat Sivayya & Subbaya to death. I hid the spear & my stick in the rick of the village. I will show you if you come. We all did this at the instance of P. Kottaya" - Another accused said "I stabbed Sivayya with a spear. I hid the spear in a yard in my village. I will show you the place." - relevant articles produced from respective places of hiding - Privy Council observed - S27 provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by S26 and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to be proved - Condition of necessity to bring S27 into operation in that discovery of a fact in consequence of info rcvd from accused(in police custody) must be deposed to – therefore so much of the info as relates distinctly to the fact discovered may be proved - sec based on view of a fact is discovered in consequence of information given, same guarantee afforded that info is true & can safely be allowed to be given in evidence - normally this section brought in op when a

person in police custody produces from same pl of concealment same object e.g. dead body, weapon or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused - expl relationship between S26 & S27 their Lordship said :- the proviso to S26 added by S27 shouldn’t held to nullify the substance of the section, its fallacious to treat "fact discovered" as equivalent to the object produced; fact discovered also embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of accused as to this, and info given must relate distinctly to this fact - info related to past use of this object not related to its discovery - info supplied by a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed in my roof of my house" does not lead to discovery of a knife, it leads to discovery of a fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge and if the knife discovered is proven to have been used in the commission of the offence then fact discovered is very relevant - but if to the statements the word "I stabbed A" are added, these words are inadmissible because they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant - the part which relates as to 'what he did to the object' and not 'what he did with the object' is relevant u/s 27, because latter entails a remote connection w/ d fact - further if no other evidence connecting the knife w/ the crime & the only evidence is statement coming u/s 27 then accused must be acquitted. - referring to facts of case their Lordship held that whole of passage except the passage "I hid it(spear) and my stick in the rick of the village. I will show you if you come" is inadmissible. The above passage is admissible as it served to connect the object discovered w/ offence charged - other portion relates to past history of the object produced, thus not admissible SC in Prabhu vs St of UP approved the test laid down in the above case, in this case a blood stained axe, clothes, etc was held admissible but a statement to police that such clothes belonged to him(accused) and the axe was used in the murder was held inadmissible u/s 27.

13. NThe appellant along with others was charged with various offences relating to transport of gold. Their confessional statements recorded by customs authorities under ss. 107 and 108 were sought to be given in evidence at the trial. On the question, whether the customs authorities should be deemed to be police officers, and therefore, the statements were inadmissible by reason of s. 25 of the Evidence Act.HELD: Under Customs Act, 1962, the customs authorities have been invested with many powers of a police officer in matters relating to arrest, investigation and search, which the customs officers did not have under the repealed Act namely, the Sea Customs Act, 1878. For example, under s.104(3) after arrest, the customs officer has the power of releasing the arrested person on bail and for that purpose has the same powers as an officer in charge of a police station. Under s. 107 a customs officer empowered by the Collector of Customs can require any person to produce any document, which power is similar to those exercisable by 'a police officer under ss. 160 and 161, Cr. P.C. Under s. 105, if the Assistant Collector of Customs has reason to believe that any goods liable to confiscation are secreted in any place he may authorise any customs officers or may himself search for the goods. But, customs officers have not been invested with all the powers which an officer in charge of a police station can exercise under Chapter XV, Cr. P.C. The powers conferred do not include the power of submitting a charge sheet under s. 173, Cr. P.C., either expressly or by necessary implication. Therefore, in order to enable a magistrate to take cognizance of an offence under the Customs Act, (the offences under the Act are non-cognizable), the customs officer will have to file a complaint before the magistrate under s. 190(a), Cr. P.C., and cannot like a police officer submit a report under s. 190(b). Hence even though the customs officers have been invested with many of the

powers which an officer in charge of a policestation exercises when investigating a cognizable offence he does not thereby become a police officer within the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act and so the confessional statements made by accused persons to customs officials would be admissible in evidence against them.