european integration, public opinion and immigration policy: testing the impact of national identity

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European Union Politics

DOI: 10.1177/1465116505049609 2005; 6; 83 European Union Politics

Adam Luedtke Impact of National Identity

European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy: Testing the

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European Integration, Public

Opinion and Immigration

Policy

Testing the Impact of National Identity

Adam Luedtke

University of Washington, USA

A B S T R A C T

This article empirically investigates the effect of national

identity on public opinion towards European Union (EU)

control over immigration policy. The EU has recently gained

some control over immigration policy, but has faced strong

opposition from reluctant national politicians. This study

argues that public opinion is an important factor in explain-

ing such reluctance. I propose a hypothesis of national

identity to explain public opinion, positing that those who

identify with their nation-states (vis-à-vis Europe) are less

likely to support EU control over immigration policy than are

those who identify with ‘Europe’. Using logistic regression,

this factor is shown to be stronger than support for Euro-

pean integration, opinions about immigrants themselves,

and other variables such as economic calculation, political

ideology, age and gender.

8 3

European Union Politics

DOI: 10.1177/1465116505049609

Volume 6 (1): 83–112

Copyright© 2005

SAGE Publications

London, Thousand Oaks CA,

New Delhi

K E Y W O R D S

� European Union� identity� immigration� nationalism� public opinion

04 luedtke (ds) 17/1/05 11:52 am Page 83



Immigration is a crucial political issue in 21st century Europe. It was identifiedas one of the top problems facing Europe by 82% of members of the EuropeanParliament (Lahav, 1997). A survey of the British public found that immigrationwas considered a more important problem than the economy, education, drugsor Europe (BBC, 2001). In a recent Eurobarometer survey, respondents fromacross the EU ranked the importance of immigration higher than terrorism,pensions, taxation, education, housing, the environment, public transport,defence and foreign affairs (Eurobarometer 60, 2004).

Concurrent with the growing political salience of immigration, themember states of the European Union (EU) have taken tentative steps towardbuilding a common immigration policy. Immigration policy cooperation isseen by many as necessary for the EU’s single market, its internal border-freespace, and its shared external borders. Especially since the attacks of 11September 2001, immigration is also high on the EU’s agenda as a securitythreat that can be mitigated only through common action.

These goals were taken seriously by EU leaders who met in 2003 to drafta European Union constitution, despite a decades-long legacy of failedpromises and weak cooperation on immigration policy (Papademetriou,1996). The Convention on the Future of Europe considered extending the EU’spowers in this field, and the resulting draft did, in fact, considerably expandBrussels’ control over immigration. However, despite the (premature) percep-tion of a new consensus on supranationalism, the ‘harmonization’1 of a newEU immigration policy is by no means assured. It was not only the usualEuro-sceptic suspects but also (and most fervently) Germany that insisted ona ‘national veto’ on the numbers of immigrants admitted. Furthermore, manypoliticians (e.g. Edmund Stoiber, the conservative premier of Bavaria) voicedan intention to use subsequent Intergovernmental Conferences further to trimBrussels’ proposed powers. Thus, after decades of trying by the Commission,Parliament and their allies, and a great deal of contentious politics, the successof an EU immigration policy is by no means assured. This is in spite of theaforementioned perception that such a policy is necessary if projects such asthe single market and the Schengen zone are to succeed.

The spectacular political divergence between mandate and resultspresents a puzzle: why has harmonization of immigration policies been soelusive, if such harmonization is seen as necessary for the EU to become asingle market with free movement of labour? The answer obviously lies withnational politics, since some member state governments have, at varioustimes, blocked harmonization proposals advanced by other member statesand by the EU’s governing organizations.

From where does this national opposition to harmonization of immi-gration policies originate? I suggest that some EU citizens have been resistant

European Union Politics 6(1)8 4




to the idea of granting Brussels control over immigration not because of instru-mental calculations regarding perceived strategic gains or losses from immi-gration cooperation, and not because of their opinions of immigrantsthemselves, but because the proposed supranationalization of immigrationcontrol clashes with historically rooted national identities. To test this hypoth-esis, I will show who supports harmonization and who opposes it, and whatfactors stand out about these opposing groups, while attempting to differen-tiate between identity and instrumental calculation.

Remarkably, the prominent literature on immigration policy harmoniza-tion does not address the nature of public opinion on harmonization – suchknowledge could be crucial for understanding why harmonization has failedpolitically thus far. Immigration policy harmonization, like most immigrationpolicy in general, is seen as an elite project built by functionalist and tech-nocratic civil servants (in league with business interests) who are insulatedfrom populist hostility (McLaren, 2001; Fetzer, 2000; Guiraudon, 1997; Sassen,1996; Soysal, 1994; Simon and Alexander, 1993; Hollifield, 1992). But theseassertions, as well as the oft-floated claim that public opinion tends to followelite opinion over time, fail to explain why a large degree of immigrationpolicy harmonization has failed to materialize in recent years (Geddes, 2003).This puzzle can perhaps be solved by delving into public opinion, to deter-mine the degree to which European publics are supportive or hostile towardsgiving Brussels increased control over immigration.

Some might invoke the ‘democratic deficit’, arguing that it makes nodifference what the average EU voter thinks of the need for a harmonized EUimmigration policy, since these decisions are made at the elite level, behindclosed doors and with very little public input. ‘EU integration constitutes athreat to democratic accountability derived from the empowerment of un-accountable, expert transnational coalitions of national ministers, officials andtechnocrats’ (Geddes, 2000: 4). However, the EU has taken greater stridestowards open and accountable decision-making in recent years, including apush for a greater role for the European Parliament – the EU’s only directlyelected body. Brussels has been stung by public criticisms and discouragingreferendum results, and its political difficulties have shown that ‘mass atti-tudes appear to be crucial to the success of new institutions and reformsassociated with the process of European integration’ (Cichowski, 2000: 1244).This factor, coupled with the need for national-level politicians to be sensitiveto their voters’ opinions regarding European integration, means that explain-ing voter opinion about integration remains of paramount importance forunderstanding the future of the Union. Arguments for a linkage betweenpublic opinion and European integration are well documented in the litera-ture (Carey, 2002; Christin and Trechsel, 2002; Anderson, 1998; Dalton and

Luedtke European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy 8 5




Eichenberg, 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998; Gabel andWhitten, 1997; Inglehart, 1977; Shepherd, 1975). On the issue of immigration,understanding public opinion on harmonization is especially important now,given that the draft European constitution, which gives Brussels a high degreeof control over immigration policy, must be ratified in public referendums.

My study builds on recent work that attempts to demonstrate a linkbetween national identity and support for European integration, whilecontrolling for other factors (Marks and Hooghe, 2003; Carey, 2002; Christinand Trechsel, 2002; McLaren, 2002). But although these studies fruitfullyexamine opinions about the European Union in general, I argue that a specificfocus on opinions about a single policy area – immigration – is also a valuablecontribution. Such a focus builds a bridge between the literature on publicopinion and the literature on immigration politics, since the latter demon-strates that immigration tends to be a ‘special’, or idiosyncratic policy area asfar as both European integration and identity are concerned. In the realm ofEuropean integration, immigration has lagged far behind other policy areasin its level of Europeanization, despite its clear link with the single marketproject and the stated goal of free movement of labour. Other ‘lagging’ policyareas, such as defence or foreign policy, do not have the same clear link withthe core single market project. Thus, public opinion about EU control overimmigration might diverge considerably from public opinion about the EUin general. In the realm of identity, I argue that immigration is a ‘special’policy area, because of its links with the actual definition of the nation itself.Immigration policy separates insiders from outsiders. Thus, scholars shouldunderstand how national identities in Europe might affect feelings about thenation losing control over immigration.

Given the potential importance of public opinion, this article will showwho supports a common EU immigration policy and why. Do theyconsciously support such a policy for ‘rational’ reasons, based on calculated(cognitive) support for economic integration, or is their reaction based on non-economic, non-calculated (affective) considerations such as national identity?How do feelings towards immigrants themselves affect beliefs about Brusselscontrolling policy? Very little work has been done, theoretical or empirical,to answer these questions. Therefore, this paper will test the hypothesis thatnational identity (versus ‘European identity’ or some mixture of the two) canaccount for the dependent variable in my study: level of support for theharmonization of EU immigration policy. Obviously, this level of supportcannot necessarily explain policy outcomes. Nonetheless, I argue that explor-ing public opinion might allow scholars to learn why immigration policyharmonization has failed to materialize, despite more than a decade ofcontinuous effort by the European Commission and Parliament.





In addition to testing the national identity hypothesis, I will propose andempirically test several alternative explanations of public support for immi-gration policy harmonization using survey data. The next section defines theconcept of national identity and proposes a hypothesis of how nationalidentity affects public opinion about harmonization of immigration policy.After proposing alternative explanations for public opinion, I introduce mydata and lay out my methodological approach. I then present the results ofmy data analysis on national identity and the alternative explanations in theEU as an entire sample and in all 15 member states as separate samples. Thefinal section concludes.

Conceptualizing national identity

What is ‘national identity’? The concept is widely used, yet ‘there is a lack ofstandard and commonly accepted definitions and measures’ (Christin andTrechsel, 2002: 417). For the purposes of this study I draw on the field of socialpsychology to define identity, in a social sense, as an affective state of belong-ing to a social group (Van Oudenhoven et al., 2002; Wenzel, 2002; Brown, 2000;Mercer, 1995). An affective state, as opposed to a cognitive state, is one thatcan independently generate social preferences, leading to emotional evalu-ations of social groups. These evaluations can take both positive and negativedirections, i.e. ‘ingroup love’ and ‘outgroup hate’, to use extreme terms(Brewer, 1999; Brown, 2000).

This definition of social identity can be applied to the concept of thenation and nationalism. Whereas some theorists of nationalism would seenational identity as freely and/or instrumentally chosen in a cognitive sense(Hardin, 1995), theorists such as Benedict Anderson (1991: 7) see nationalidentity in an affective sense, as a ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’. Buildingon the work of Anderson, Tsygankov (2001: 15) defines national identity as‘a cultural norm that reflects emotional or affective orientations of indi-viduals toward their nation and national political system’. As a norm ofbelonging and self-definition that is cultural and affective in nature, thistheory implies that national identity would hold relatively steady over time,despite instrumental or political incentives for members of nations to drop,add to or modify their national identities. National identity can thus be priorto instrumental calculations, and it ‘explains the occurrence of ingroup bias even in the absence of objective or instrumental causes – for example,conflicts of economic interests’ (Brown, 2000: 748). Some experimentalresearch has shown that, beyond instrumental causes, ‘national identificationby itself was the most consistent predictor of xenophobic attitudes, an





association observed in other studies of inter-nation or inter-ethnic attitudes’(Brown, 2000: 748).

As institutions in their own right, national identities can thus be prior to,or ‘constitutive’ of, citizens, and can shape their preferences. This hypothesisalso accords with social constructivism, which seeks ‘to understand howpreferences are formed and knowledge generated, prior to the exercise ofinstrumental rationality’ (Katzenstein et al., 1998: 681). Obviously, sorting outthe mutual influence of identity and instrumentality is a challenging businessbut, if identity is a mere proxy for support for European integration or aninstrumental motivation, then it will not be a stronger predictor of prefer-ences than any other variable. However, this paper will ask whether theopposite might be true, and whether national identity, by itself, is thestrongest predictor of my dependent variable, support for EU control overimmigration policy.

What would be the logic of this relationship? Institutions, laws andpolicies to regulate immigration2 are often said to be based on conceptions ofnational identity. Indeed, seminal works on immigration politics have explic-itly drawn this link (Checkel, 2001; Thielemann, 2001; Ugur, 1995; Hollifield,1994; Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994; Baubock and Cinar, 1994; Faist,1994; Wischenbart, 1994; Schnapper, 1994). If national identity means self-definition and belonging in the national polity, then immigration cuts to theheart of this concept, because it raises political questions about how thenation-state should be defined. Immigration policy determines who shouldbelong to the nation-state (and who should be excluded), and determines thevery nature of that belonging by establishing the criteria for entrance, expul-sion, settlement and naturalization. ‘There is a close connection between theways a polity responds to the challenge of migration and its values, collec-tive understandings and institutions’ (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 1).

In postwar Europe, nation-states chose widely differing immigrationpolicies, from the assimilationism of French republicanism and its coloniallybased immigration policy, to the jus sanguinis ethno-citizenship of Germanyand its guest-worker model. Since national identity is embedded in politicalinstitutions (Marcussen et al., 1999), many scholars have located the originsof these particular immigration policies in the national identities of theirrespective countries (Checkel, 2001; Hollifield, 1994; Baubock and Cinar, 1994;Faist, 1994; Wischenbart, 1994; Schnapper, 1994). Therefore, if there is a singlepolicy issue where non-instrumental factors might override instrumentalcalculation, immigration is an ideal candidate.

If immigration is so strongly connected with national identity, then onewould expect national identity to be a determinant of public opinion aboutnational control over immigration policy under conditions of globalization





and/or Europeanization. That is, citizens who identify strongly with theirown nation-state will most likely prefer that it retains control over its ownparticular, historically based immigration policy, despite the countervailingforces of globalization that have pushed immigration policies towards cross-national convergence (Castles and Miller, 1998; Cornelius et al., 1994).

The EU provides an excellent test case for national identities being chal-lenged by Europeanization and globalization, because the process ofEuropean integration has brought with it new norms and identities that haveconfronted historically rooted national identities (Risse, 2001). In the case ofGermany, Checkel argues that ‘Germany’s historically constructed identity,for some domestic agents, has acted as a filter or block vis-à-vis . . . European-level norms’ (2001: 197). In the case of the UK, Wallace argues that nationalidentity causes Tory opposition to Brussels: ‘The Conservative Party’sdiscourse is instinctively that of national identity’ (1995: 50, emphasis added).

Although the EU’s single market, which has given the impetus to immi-gration policy harmonization, is a project of economic integration, some arguethat, in matters of immigration, national identity overrides economicconsiderations, and that people cannot be ‘rational’ when contemplatingoutsiders and the national polity’s ability to control them (Ugur, 1995).3 Ugurargues that immigration policy is a ‘nondivisible, nontransparent policyissue’, meaning that it cannot be dealt with in the bargaining/compromisemanner of most economic negotiations owing to its resonance with citizen-ship, membership and identity. Thus, ‘immigration in Europe is perceived bysocietal forces as a threat to established visions of identity and societalintegrity’ (Ugur, 1995: 972). For example, much thinking on immigrationpolicy in France is dictated by a ‘Republican consensus’ over values, goalsand procedures that is strongly correlated with French national identity(Hollifield, 1994). Those who identify strongly with the French nation-statewill not want to give up immigration sovereignty to the EU (Hoffmann, 1993).

How salient is collective identity in determining preferences over whoshould control immigration policy in the EU? As European integrationproceeds, one should expect to see changes in identity, leading to changes inpublic opinion. ‘This emerging European polity impacts upon the way indi-viduals and social groups view themselves and the nation-state’ (Risse, 2001:200). Identities may be ‘sticky’ (Marcussen et al., 1999), but this does not meanthat they are mutually exclusive. Some Europeans might identify both withthe nation-state and with ‘Europe’, whereas others would identify with onlyone or the other. ‘Individuals inhabit multiple worlds simultaneously, interactin various contexts and grow as personalities by developing various identifi-cations in relation to all these contexts’ (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 24).

This hypothesis draws on broader theories of constructivism and


04 luedtke (ds) 17/1/05 11:52 am 9



sociological institutionalism, which hypothesize that identity factors canoverride and/or prevent individualistic, instrumental calculations (Schim-melfennig, 2001; Marcussen et al., 1999; Checkel, 1999; Finnemore andSikkink, 1998; McNamara, 1998). When contemplating the possibility of asupranational immigration regime, does rational calculation play a role forthe average European voter? The Economist magazine, normally a proponentof rational, instrumental explanations, sees the political difficulty in forginga common EU immigration policy as a problem of ‘balancing the benefitsoffered by the free movement of labour against voters’ fears, often irrational,about threats to national identity’ (The Economist, 2002: 14, emphasis added).In immigration politics, as in many areas of EU politics, ‘a calculus of identityand appropriateness is sometimes more important to actors than a calculusof political costs and benefits’ (Thielemann, 2001: 1). Regardless of consciouslyheld personal interests or economic costs and benefits, perhaps certain optionsare ‘off the table’ for those who see themselves as ‘Finns’ as opposed to ‘Euro-peans’, and one of these options is Brussels having control over who can enterthe national space of Finland.

Therefore, if my hypothesis is correct, as more and more EU citizensidentify with ‘Europe’ (either alone or together with their nation-state), theyshould become more open to an EU-controlled immigration policy. If I canshow that those who now see themselves as ‘Europeans’ (at least partially)are more prone to grant Brussels control over immigration policy than arethose who remain identified solely with their nation (while controlling foreconomic interests and other cost–benefit calculations), then I can demon-strate the political salience of these collective understandings and loyalties.4

H1 (national identity): National identity leads to a preference for the nation-stateto control immigration. The more strongly one identifies with one’s nation-state,the more likely it is that one will oppose a harmonized EU immigration policy.

Alternative explanations

One obvious potential influence of opinions about EU control over immi-gration policy is opinion regarding immigrants themselves. But, to derive atestable hypothesis from this theoretical link, one must be aware of the likelyor perceived policy effects of harmonization on immigrants themselves – thatis, will EU control lead to more immigrants and a more liberal immigrationpolicy, or will it do the opposite? Remarkably, scholarly literature is highlydivided on this topic.

The intuitive assumption might be that EU control over immigrationpolicy would lead to a more liberal policy, for three possible reasons. First,


04 luedtke (ds) 17/1/05 11:52 am 0



‘globalists’ argue that immigrants are more likely to gain protections, rightsand freedoms from the supranational level, because of the forces of economicglobalization and/or transnational discourses of human rights (Jacobsen,1996; Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994). Second, neo-functionalists argue that Euro-peanization will benefit immigrants because it benefits all ‘exchangers’,through the forces of economic liberalization that eventually spill over intoliberalization in other policy areas (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998; Philip,1994; Callovi, 1992; Ireland, 1991). And, finally, political entrepreneurship bythe Commission and Parliament (which have traditionally been pro-immi-grant in their outlook) might be expected to make its mark on policy outputs,despite restrictive national sentiments (Papademetriou, 1996).

However, there is an opposing body of literature on EU immigrationpolicy that has empirically demonstrated how the limited steps towards EUcontrol, thus far, have actually resulted in a less liberal immigration policy(meaning fewer rights, freedoms and privileges for immigrants). This bodyof work is more state centric, and sees the EU’s institutions as part of arational, intergovernmentalist contract (Moravcsik, 1998). Using a commonEU immigration policy, the member states can achieve their restrictive goals,appeasing anti-immigrant electorates (while dodging domestic parlia-mentary and judicial scrutiny) by cracking down on immigrant rightsbehind the closed doors of the Council of Ministers in Brussels (Givens andLuedtke, 2004; Guiraudon, 2003; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Geddes, 2000;Joppke, 1999). Tellingly, many immigrant advocacy groups and their alliesconcur, and thus actually prefer national control over immigration policy,because of the stronger judicial and parliamentary oversights and protec-tions for immigrant rights at the national level (Geddes, 2000; Hix andNiessen, 1996). By the same logic, then, anti-immigrant publics mightsupport EU control over immigration policy, because it would allow for themore effective enforcement of restrictive immigration policies. A loss of defacto sovereignty would be offset by the greater gains to be had in limitingimmigration through a ‘Fortress Europe’ policy of tightly patrolled externalEU borders (Ugur, 1995).

Because of these competing and unclear views of policy implications,both of which invoke strong arguments, I will test opposing hypothesesregarding the effects of opinion about immigrants on opinion about EUcontrol over immigration policy. I will test both arguments in two areas ofopinions about immigration: feelings towards minorities residing in one’scountry, and the belief that immigrants from outside the EU (so-called ‘third-country nationals’, or TCNs) should have the same social rights as EU citizens.

H2a (EU control will expand immigrant rights): The more negatively one feelstowards immigrants and/or the more one feels that immigrants should not have





equal social rights with EU citizens, the more likely it is that one will oppose aharmonized EU immigration policy.

H2b (EU control will restrict immigrant rights): The more positively one feelstowards immigrants and/or the more one feels that immigrants should have equalsocial rights with EU citizens, the more likely it is that one will oppose a har-monized EU immigration policy.

Aside from identity and opinions about immigrants and immigrationpolicy, other perspectives would hold economic interests to be paramount,especially considering that not all members of a national polity will have iden-tical interests regarding a unified EU immigration policy. One might hypo-thesize that blue-collar workers, the unemployed and/or those with loweducation levels would be against harmonization whereas white-collarworkers, the employed and/or the highly educated would support it, sincethese socioeconomic differences would reflect labour competition arisingfrom an EU single market with free movement of labour. The former groupwould fear the labour competition arising from an EU immigration regimeunder which capital and cheap labour could freely move around, potentiallyputting them out of work, whereas the latter group might perceive more gainsfrom such an arrangement (Fetzer, 2000; Harwood, 1986; Simon, 1987). Borjas(1999) argues that an increase in immigration boosts the supply of labour,thus reducing wages for the native working class. Scheve and Slaughter (2001)find that low-skill or low-education workers are more likely to oppose immi-gration, which follows from arguments about labour market competition(O’Rourke, 2003; Mayda, 2003). Working-class voters tend to be the‘modernization losers’ (Kriesi, 1995; Givens, 2004) who feel threatened by thecombined forces of globalization, the EU and immigrants, and who tend tovote for radical Right parties (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Martin, 1996; Lewis-Beck and Mitchell, 1993). Education is likely to play an especially importantrole here. ‘Given that most immigrants . . . lack a university degree, highereducation should decrease natives’ sense of economic threat’ (Fetzer, 2000:21). Further, education might be expected to increase tolerance in its ownright, regardless of economic considerations (Plane, 2001).

H3 (socioeconomic variables): Belonging to the working class, being unemployedand/or having less education makes one more opposed to the free movement oflabour, which leads to a preference for the nation-state to control immigration.The ‘lower’ one’s socioeconomic position, the more likely it is that one will opposea harmonized EU immigration policy.

However, there are other measurable economic interests and preferencesbesides socioeconomic indicators. If one is trying to demonstrate that a





calculus of costs and benefits is more important than a calculus of identityand appropriateness, then one must operationalize a cost–benefit calculus thatwould lead to testable preferences regarding a harmonized EU immigrationpolicy. The entire EU project is fundamentally a project of economic inte-gration, since the single market has been the driving impetus for political inte-gration (Moravcsik, 1998), as well as for a harmonized immigration policy(Papademetriou, 1996; Philip, 1994). Currently the most politically importantfacet of economic integration is the common European currency, the euro. Theeuro holds paramount importance for economic integration because of itshigh visibility and controversy as a ‘flagship’ project. Since support for theeuro has been somewhat shaky following its introduction, a rationalist mighthypothesize that support for the euro is a good test of support for economicintegration in general, including the willingness to give up national controlover an area of policy that has both practical and symbolic value (be itcurrency or immigration policy).

The impetus for the EU to regulate immigration has come from the needfor the free circulation of labour in the single market, which can be achievedonly by open internal borders and cooperative control over external borders.Those EU citizens who understand this linkage, and support the project ofeconomic integration (including the euro currency), will also supportBrussels’ controlling immigration policy, regardless of whether they identifywith their nation-state or how they feel about immigrants in general. Thishypothesis assumes a conscious cost–benefit calculus by EU voters, who arecapable of understanding the link between economic unity and a harmonizedimmigration policy, and it therefore assumes that there will be a pro/anti-EUimmigration policy cleavage cutting across nationalities and even nationalidentities (Gabel, 1998). If most Europeans see the EU as a project of economicintegration, then those who support the single currency, the euro, will alsosupport the EU having control over immigration policy as a key area ofeconomic unification. If EU citizens support economic interdependence, thenthey might also be expected rationally to support relinquishing nationalcontrol over borders, passports, visas and other ‘touchy’ issues, given thegains from trade that would come with the free movement and circulation oflabour (Philip, 1994; Callovi, 1992).

H4 (opposition to European integration): Individuals opposed to the expansionof the single market project (EU, enlargement, euro) will be less likely to supportharmonization of immigration policy.

Other variables also come to mind when trying to explain public opinionabout EU control over immigration policy. For instance, is political ideologya factor at all? One might think it obvious that those on the political Right





would prefer national control over immigration policy. However, this intu-ition ignores the potentially cross-cutting nature of immigration as a policyissue, since many on the pro-business Right might prefer the liberalization oflabour markets and many on the trade union Left might prefer protectionsfor domestic workers and be suspicious of regional integration in this area.Indeed, Sniderman et al. (2000) and Money (1999) find that immigration canbe orthogonal to the Left/Right continuum. Thus, the hypothesis thatconservatives would favour national control is not beyond doubt and can beusefully tested by my study.

H5 (political ideology): Belonging politically to the Right leads to a preference forthe nation-state to control immigration. Those on the Left will be more likely tosupport harmonization of immigration policy.

Perhaps gender plays an independent role in feelings towards immi-gration policy harmonization, as it does in support for the radical Right(Givens, 2004). Women might feel less threatened than men by the freemovement of labour, since most migrant labour in the EU has traditionallybeen male. Some theorists have found a connection between gender andfeelings about outsiders through the mechanisms of marginality and socialstatus, whereby women may feel more affinity with immigrants and thus beless insecure about relinquishing national control over immigration policy(Fetzer, 2000; Myrdal, 1944).

H6 (gender): Women will be more likely than men to support EU control overimmigration policy.

Finally, age might play an independent role as well. The young mightfeel more positive towards EU control than do those who are older, since thecontext for generational outlooks towards fellow Europeans and immigrantshas changed considerably since the Second World War. Also, students in themodern education system are often socialized to have ‘more liberal or pro-outsider views’ (Fetzer, 2000: 20).

H7 (age): As age increases, support for EU control over immigration policy willdecrease.

Data and methodology

To test these competing hypotheses, I use a set of questions and responsesfrom Eurobarometer 53 (Hartung, 2001). This survey asks a broad variety ofquestions on EU issues to measure social and demographic characteristics aswell as opinions about the EU and other political issues. With a size of roughly





15,000 respondents, at around 1,000 per country, this sample is representativeof the 15 national electorates and of the EU electorate as a whole.5

Regarding the harmonization of immigration policy, public opinion issplit somewhat evenly across the EU over whether Brussels or the nationalgovernments should have control, with less than a majority in most countriespreferring that the EU should gain control. Overall, only 43% of EU citizenssupport a harmonized EU policy, but the variation across countries isdramatic, with support ranging from 70% in the Netherlands to only 15% inFinland.6 What accounts for these variations? Remarkably, no study has thusfar conducted thorough empirical tests on the causes of the variation in publicopinion on this issue.

As a preliminary test of my national identity hypothesis, I can descrip-tively compare the above data (support for EU control over immigrationpolicy) with data on identification with the EU and the nation-state. Figure 1compares countries according to the percentages of respondents who favourEU control over immigration policy and the percentages who say that theyidentify with their nation only (as opposed to identifying with Europe only,or with both Europe and the nation). I use this self-identification question tooperationalize my concept of national identity, following the work of Marksand Hooghe (2003), Carey (2002) and Kostakopoulou (2001). Looking atFigure 1, although the rankings on the two variables do not line up perfectly,


0

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Identifying with nation only

Favouring EU control overimmigration policy

Figure 1 Comparison of percentage identifying with nation only and percentagefavouring EU control over immigration policy, by country (N = 15,325).




there appears to be a clear negative relationship between the two factors. Thatis, a public that tends to identify more exclusively with its nation also seemsless likely to favour EU control over immigration policy.

Obviously, this initial correlation (although striking) is not enough toprove that national identity is doing the actual explanatory work. To controlstatistically for the other explanations listed above, and to determine whethernational identity has a more powerful impact than other variables do, I willperform binary logistic regression to enquire into the existence of a statisti-cally and substantively significant relationship between national identity andsupport for an EU immigration policy.

I use dummy variables for all explanatory factors other than age, whichis coded as an interval variable. To indicate the absence or presence of nationalidentity (H1), I employ two variables: ‘nation only’ and ‘European only’. Forfeelings towards immigrants (H2), I use binary variables for ‘too many’ and‘not many’ minorities, and the belief that TCNs should have equal rights. Forsocioeconomic factors (H3), I add dummy variables for ‘manual worker’,‘unemployed’, ‘secondary school education only’, ‘university education’ and‘still studying’. For European integration support (H4), separate variablestrack opinions about EU membership being a ‘good thing’ and a ‘bad thing’,as well as responses ‘against the Euro currency’, and ‘against EU enlarge-ment’. For political ideology (H5), the model includes variables for Left andRight, and, for gender (H6), male is coded as 1. The full wording of the ques-tions and the coding of the responses can be accessed on the EUP homepage.

Results

The dependent variable in the analysis is the belief that immigration policyshould be controlled by the EU. The overall analysis estimates the degree towhich national identity, feelings towards immigrants, socioeconomic vari-ables, opposition to European integration, political ideology, gender and agehave an effect on the probability that an EU resident will support an EUimmigration policy, all other things being equal. Table 1 displays the results.The expected direction of the relationship is negative, since national identityis coded as 0 and support for EU control over immigration policy is codedas 1.

We can assess the overall fit of the model with the h2statistic, which isstatistically significant (p < 0.001). The model predicts roughly 69% of thecases correctly. To deal with heteroscedasticity, I use country fixed effects.

It is clear from Table 1 that the coefficient on national identity is statisti-cally significant, with a p-value below 0.001. But 10 of the 16 control variables






Table 1 Logistic regression model of support for EU control over immigration policyin 15 countries

B Significance Exp (B)

National identity –0.486 0.000 0.615(0.041)

European identity 0.337 0.001 1.401(0.098)

Not many minorities 0.210 0.001 1.234(0.062)

Too many minorities –0.112 0.008 0.894(0.042)

Equality for TCNs 0.239 0.000 1.270(0.041)

Manual worker –0.019 0.703 0.982(0.049)

Unemployed 0.122 0.137 1.129(0.082)

High school education only –0.033 0.526 0.968(0.051)

University education 0.171 0.001 1.186(0.049)

Still studying 0.160 0.029 1.173(0.073)

EU membership a good thing 0.405 0.000 1.499(0.044)

EU membership a bad thing –0.269 0.000 0.764(0.064)

Against euro currency –0.463 0.000 0.629(0.045)

Against EU enlargement –0.145 0.000 0.865(0.038)

Left 0.078 0.082 1.082(0.045)

Right –0.052 0.244 0.950(0.044)

Gender (male) –0.081 0.027 0.922(0.037)

Age –0.001 0.401 0.999(0.001)

Constant 0.659 0.000 1.932(0.111)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.Country dummies are not shown. Italy is the reference category.The model predicts 69% of the cases correctly.�2 = 2840.7 (d.f. = 32).Log likelihood = 18027.8.Pseudo R2 = 0.23.N = 15,325.




are also statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and five even have a p-valuebelow 0.001. Thus, to weigh the explanatory power of national identityagainst the other variables and determine substantive significance, one mustlook at the regression coefficients and the far-right column in Table 1 (‘Exp(B)’). This column gives the change in odds (likelihood) of support for EUcontrol over immigration that one can expect from a one-point shift in therespective independent variable. Thus, if one thinks that EU membership is‘a good thing’, one is roughly one-and-a-half times more likely to support EUcontrol over immigration policy. The most powerful predictors in the modelare the numbers that are furthest away from 1. National identity has thelargest regression coefficient (in absolute terms), and those who identify onlywith their nation-state are 1.63 times more likely to oppose EU control overimmigration policy.7 Thus, national identity seems to have the strongestpredictive power of all the explanatory variables, albeit by a small margin.

What about the alternative hypotheses? All three of the variables repre-senting opinions about immigrants were statistically significant at the 0.01level, though their explanatory power was weak, given the low odds change.Those who feel that there are ‘too many’ minorities in their country are 1.1times more likely to oppose EU control over immigration policy, while thosewho feel there are ‘not many’ minorities living in their country are 1.2 timesmore likely to support EU control. Further, those who feel that TCNs shouldhave the same social rights as EU citizens are 1.3 times more likely to supportharmonization. This seems to confirm, albeit rather weakly, H2a, the assump-tion that EU control is perceived as benefiting immigrants.

As for H3, regarding the impact of socioeconomic variables, the hypo-thesis is not confirmed with respect to employment. Being a manual workeror being unemployed were not statistically significant predictors. Thisprovides disconfirming evidence for theories about perceived labour marketcompetition causing opposition to EU control over immigration, though therewas weak confirmation for the role of education. Possessing a universityeducation or currently being a student made one 1.2 times more likely tosupport harmonization.

H4, regarding the impact of support for Europeanization itself, fared thebest of all the alternative hypotheses. Opinions toward the EU in general,opposition to the euro currency and opposition to enlargement showed thestrongest odds changes after national identity. Opinions about the eurocurrency offered the most dramatic odds change here, with those whoopposed the euro being 1.59 times more likely to prefer national control overimmigration policy.

Political ideology (H5) and age (H7) were not significant predictors ofsupport for harmonization, but gender (H6) was statistically significant at the





0.05 level. However, gender (male) showed only a small odds change, at 0.922,meaning that women are 1.1 times more likely than men to support har-monization, lending weak confirmation to H6.

Though the odds change for national identity (1.63) was the highest inthe model, this cannot necessarily be interpreted as an indicator of relativesubstantive significance. When comparing the predictive power of the inde-pendent variables, all substantive conclusions must be made conditional onthe values of other independent variables. To do this, the analysis in Figure2 shows the predicted probabilities that the average respondent will supportor oppose harmonization, given a shift in each of the four independent(dummy) variables of interest (national identity, EU opposition, euro oppo-sition, and the belief that there are ‘too many minorities’ in one’s country),and with all other independent variables held at their median value. The ‘yes’and ‘no’ bars represent values of 1 and 0, respectively, on each of the fourdummy variables. Looking at Figure 2, one can see that a change in thenational identity variable offers the largest shift in probability of support fora common immigration policy (75% to 65%), though the euro variable is closebehind. This offers confirming evidence for H1.

Although the evidence shows that national identity affects support forimmigration harmonization in the EU as a whole, it does not shed light onthe relative weight of the factors within each country that might be drivingthese opinions. National identity is not a static, monolithic entity. Obviously,the content of national identities varies across Europe and can (over time andacross countries) be more or less favourable towards immigration andEuropean integration. Thus, one might not expect national identity to be


75% 75% 75% 75%

65%70%

66%73%

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Figure 2 Predicted probabilities of support for EU control over immigration policy(from Table 1).




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Table 2 Support for EU control over immigration policy: Logistic regression coefficients for 15 individual models using separate nationalsamples

Bel Den Ger Gre Spa Fra Ire Ita Lux Net Por UK Aus Swe Fin

N 1001 970 1978 963 945 987 954 1046 428 972 962 1244 970 975 988National identity –0.51 –0.87 –0.58 –0.47 –0.42 –0.33 x x x –0.41 –0.82 –0.61 –0.52 –0.59 xEuropean identity x x x x x 0.66 x x x x x x x x xNot many minorities x 0.69 x x x x x x x x 0.47 x x x xToo many minorities x x x x x x x x x x x x –0.49 x xEquality for TCNs x x x x x x x 0.73 x x x x 0.46 xManual worker x x x x x x x x x x x x x x xUnemployed x x x x x x x x x x 0.76 x x x xHigh school education only x x x x x x 0.48 x x x x –0.51 x x xUniversity education x x x x x x 0.63 x x x x x 0.74 x xStill studying x x x x x x x x x x x 0.71 x x xEU membership a good thing x 0.52 0.24 0.78 x 0.49 x 0.40 1.0 x 0.61 0.48 x 0.45 xEU membership a bad thing x –1.1 x x x x x x x x x x x –0.57 xAgainst euro currency x x –0.58 –1.1 –0.92 –0.38 –0.61 –0.65 x –0.41 –0.58 x x x xAgainst EU enlargement x x –0.22 x x x x x x x x x –0.69 x –0.78Left x x x 0.53 0.40 x x x x x x x x x xRight x x x x x x x x x x x –0.48 x 0.46 xMale x x x x x x x x x –0.31 x x x x –0.53Age x x 0.01 x x x –0.02 x x x x x –0.01 x x

Note: ‘x’ = not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.


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equally salient in all 15 member states as far as national control over immi-gration policy is concerned. To understand this cross-national variation in acomparative sense, I will now turn to a 15-nation comparative model that willtest the 18 explanatory variables in each of the 15 EU member states as aseparate sample.

The logistic regression coefficients for the 18 variables, in each countryas a separate sample and model, are displayed in Table 2. Where the variablewas not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, a dash is displayed. As isclear from Table 2, the results are quite mixed for my national identity hypoth-esis in some very interesting ways. My hypothesis is boosted by the fact thatnational identity is significant in more countries than is any of the other vari-ables – it is statistically significant in 11 countries (all but Ireland, Italy, Luxem-bourg and Finland). Thus, it appears that national identity is a relatively stableand consistent predictor of feeling towards EU immigration policy acrossmost member states. The most dramatic results are in Denmark, where thosewho see themselves as Europeans are roughly two and a half times more

Luedtke European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy 1 0 1

Table 3 Comparing the results

Number of countries with Regression coefficientVariable statistical significance in EU-wide sample

National identity 11 –0.486EU membership a good thing 9 0.405Against euro currency 8 –0.463Against EU enlargement 3 –0.145Age 3 xEU membership a bad thing 2 –0.269Equality for TCNs 2 0.239Not many minorities 2 0.210University education 2 0.171Male 2 –0.081High school education only 2 xLeft 2 xRight 2 xEuropean identity 1 0.337Still studying 1 0.160Too many minorities 1 –0.112Unemployed 1 xManual worker 0 x

Note: ‘x’ = not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.




likely to support a harmonized EU immigration policy than are those whosee themselves as Danes only.

However, national identity is obviously not the only significant predic-tor of opinion about immigration policy harmonization in the EU, as the tablereflects. Thus, there are factors other than national identity that are drivingthe attitude towards a Brussels-controlled immigration policy. I do not havethe space to speculate on the likely national causes in this article, so furtherempirical work and case studies within these countries are needed in orderto flesh out the rationale for these causal alternatives to national identity, aswell as some of the interesting anomalies that can be seen in Table 2.

Conclusion

In trying to explain attitudes towards immigration policy harmonization inthe EU, this study has clearly shown that national identity and multiple otherfactors play an important role in driving public opposition to harmonization.Although self-identification and self-definition, through national-level social-ization, are having a marginally stronger impact than support for Europeanintegration (whether the latter is instrumentally motivated or not), it is clearthat the importance of both factors cannot be ignored. Further, opinions aboutimmigrants do have an impact on support for harmonization, though therelationship is weak. This finding might reflect the potential confusion overhow Brussels would act in restricting or expanding immigrant rights andfreedoms.

Regarding my attempt to conceptualize support for European integrationas being instrumentally motivated, one could assume that support forEuropean integration is not actually calculated but is instead learned throughsocialization. Having said that, one could also argue that national identity isactually ‘chosen’ for instrumental purposes. The analysis here brings intoquestion both of these assumptions. If identity were instrumental, then iden-tities would merely be proxies (indirect indicators) for calculated self-interestand/or socioeconomic status, and therefore would have no more explanatorypower than these other factors in analysing why Europeans support or opposethe harmonization of immigration policy. Thus, my analysis shows thatidentity is at least partially non-instrumental when it comes to attitudes aboutimmigration policy, because it has a slightly stronger explanatory impact onthese feelings than do socioeconomic status, attitudes towards European inte-gration, and other factors that are often considered to be instrumentally moti-vated.

Additionally, I must emphasize an intriguing area for further research,

European Union Politics 6(1)1 0 2




namely, the causal factors responsible for some of the other national anoma-lies in Table 2. It would be illuminating to explore, for instance, why attitudestowards immigrants were significant in only five countries, and whether someEuropeans perceive that EU control would help to restrict immigration flows(in line with H2b). Also, the fact that national identity was not significant infour of the national cases means that further research is required to under-stand the kinds of motivations for citizens in these four countries, includinghow instrumentally based they are. Future studies by country specialistscould potentially shed light on why citizens from these countries hold‘unique’ opinions regarding who should control immigration policy in thesingle market, and whether they are more instrumental in their attitudes foror against European integration.

On balance, however, the fact that national identity was significant inmore countries (11) than any other variable, and was the (marginally)strongest predictor in the EU sample, means that the hypothesized linkbetween identity and attitudes towards immigration policy control isconfirmed. Whether the proposed link between public opinion and immi-gration policy outcomes will be confirmed, however, is another story,especially given a lack of consensus over what a harmonized policy wouldmean for immigrant rights and freedoms. But, if the ongoing process ofEuropean integration does cause the rise of a European identity amongyounger generations, as scholars such as Checkel (2001) and Risse (2001)argue, my findings show that public support for an EU-wide immigrationpolicy is likely to grow.





Appendix


Table 4 Descriptive statistics

Std.Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Dev.

Harmonization 15,325 0 1 0.42 0.00 0.49National identity 15,325 0 1 0.44 0.00 0.50European identity 15,325 0 1 0.04 0.00 0.19Not many minorities 15,325 0 1 0.11 0.00 0.31Too many minorities 15,325 0 1 0.37 0.00 0.48Equality for TCNs 15,325 0 1 0.65 1.00 0.48Manual worker 15,325 0 1 0.22 0.00 0.42Unemployed 15,325 0 1 0.06 0.00 0.23Secondary school only 15,325 0 1 0.26 0.00 0.44University 15,325 0 1 0.24 0.00 0.43Still studying 15,325 0 1 0.11 0.00 0.32EU membership a good thing 15,325 0 1 0.53 1.00 0.50EU membership a bad thing 15,325 0 1 0.15 0.00 0.35Against euro currency 15,325 0 1 0.34 0.00 0.47Against EU enlargement 15,325 0 1 0.57 1.00 0.50Left 15,325 0 1 0.25 0.00 0.43Right 15,325 0 1 0.27 0.00 0.45Gender (male) 15,325 0 1 0.48 0.00 0.50Age 15,325 15 99 43.70 42.00 17.67




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Table 5 Nominal associations for independent variables

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1 National identity

2 European identity 0.170.00

3 Not many minorities 0.07 0.030.00 0.00

4 Too many minorities 0.20 0.03 0.270.00 0.00 0.00

5 Equality for TCNs 0.17 0.04 0.10 0.270.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

6 Manual worker 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.030.00 0.62 0.63 0.12 0.00

7 Unemployed 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.130.00 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.89 0.00

8 Secondary school only 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.010.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.30

9 University education 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.330.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00

10 Still studying 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.19 0.08 0.21 0.200.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

11 EU membership good 0.31 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.070.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

12 EU membership bad 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.440.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00


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Table 5 Continued

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

13 Against euro currency 0.32 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.41 0.350.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

14 Against EU enlargement 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.30 0.73 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

15 Left 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.39 0.34 0.01 0.66 0.82

16 Right 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.350.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.01 0.00

17 Gender (male) 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.050.00 0.00 0.02 0.30 0.37 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.36 0.02 0.00

Notes: Cramer’s V values are in bold; p-values are in italics.


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Notes

I am grateful to Jim Caporaso, Rachel Cichowski, Terri Givens, Karen Litfin andJon Mercer for their helpful comments and assistance. I also thank ChristianBreunig, who generously provided detailed methodological advice. My data (fromEurobarometer 53) were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium forPolitical and Social Research URL: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu).

1 Although the term ‘harmonization’ might not seem synonymous with ‘EUcontrol’, the term is used this way in the literature on EU immigration politics(Geddes, 2000). Given that non-enforceable, non-binding immigrationcooperation has largely been a failure in the EU context, true ‘harmonization’requires EU control, which is now accepted by all parties in the debate(Papademetriou, 1996).

2 I use the term ‘immigration’ in its broad sense here, to cover the entry, resi-dence, integration and naturalization of humanitarian, economic and politicalmigrants.

3 These theories, of course, would assume that identities are sociologically‘given’ (constitutive) and cannot be thought of as ‘public goods’ that are‘chosen’ according to some type of cost–benefit calculus on the part of indi-viduals.

4 It would be preferable also to test the impact of subnational identities forregions such as the Basque country, Scotland or Northern Italy. However,considerations of space and focus do not permit me to carry out this testing.For an excellent analysis of subnational identities and their impact onopinions about European integration, see Carey (2002).

5 However, the survey does over-sample East Germany and Northern Irelandand under-sample Luxembourg. This is not done in other Eurobarometersurveys, but I needed to use Eurobarometer 53 because it contained therelevant questions regarding opinions about immigrants.

6 On this question, I deleted the cases that contained a ‘don’t know’, leavingthe N at 15,325. See the EUP homepage for details on coding, deletion of casesand the wording of the survey questions.

7 This number is obtained by dividing 1 by Exp (B), or 1/0.615 in the case ofnational identity.

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About the author

Adam Luedtke is a doctoral candidate in the Department of PoliticalScience, University of Washington, 101 Gowen Hall, Box 353530Seattle, WA 98195-3530, USA.Fax: +1 206 685 2146E-mail: [email protected]





european integration, public opinion and immigration policy: testing the impact of national identity

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