immigration policy opinion and the 2016 presidential vote
TRANSCRIPT
1
Center for Immigration Studies
1629 K Street, NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20006 • Phone 202.466.8185 • Fax 202.466.8076 • www.cis.org
C I S
CIS Letterhead_Layout 1 7/26/12 4:34 PM Page 1
December 2017
Summary Points
• Approachingthe2016election,immigrationpolicypolarizedopinionbypartisanidentitymorethanatanyothertimeincontemporaryhistory.
• ElectionsurveyssuggestthatimmigrationpolicyopinionwasresponsibleformovingcrossovervoterstoDonaldTrumpinthe2016presidentialelection,improvinghisperformanceoverMittRomneyin2012.
• Contrarytothepost-electionconclusionsofRomneyadvisers,Romneywouldlikelyhavedonebetter,notworse,bycampaigningmorevigorouslyforimmigrationcontrol.
• WomenweremorelikelytobemovedtovoteforTrumpasaresultofimmigrationpolicyopinionthanmen.WorkingclassmenweremorelikelytosupportTrumpthanRomney,butthedifferenceisnotas-sociatedwithimmigrationpolicyperse.
• VotersathigherlevelsofeducationvotedforTrumpoverRomneywhentheyweremoreconservativeonimmigration.
• Democratic voters supported Trump more than Romney when they were more conservative onimmigration.
• TrumpdidworsethanRomneyamongsomegroupswhoheldliberalimmigrationviews,includinghigh-erincomeRepublicans.
IntroductionAsapolicyissue,immigrationplayedanunusuallyprominentroleinthe2016election,onethatissuesdonotregularlyplayinpresidentialcontests.DonaldTrumpmadeimmigrationacentralthemeofhiscampaign,rais-ingthesubjectfrequentlyatmajorralliesandinwidelycoveredspeeches.Itwasonetopicofconsistentmessagedisciplineinanorganizationthatmanycalleduntidyandhaphazard.
Justasimportant,themediahasalsopaidagreatdealofattentiontohispledgesonimmigration.Tobesure,manystorieshavebeenwrittenidentifyingthepresident’sviewsoninfrastructure,taxes,andotherissues,butimmigra-tiontriggersintensereactionsamongbothsupportersandopponents.Wallbuilding,bordersecurity,andendingDACAdrawlargeandopinionatedaudiences,whereasroadbuilding,thesolvencyofSocialSecurity,andtradepolicydonot.
Immigration Policy Opinion and the 2016 Presidential Vote Issue relevance in the Trump-Clinton election
By James G. Gimpel
1629KStreet,NW,Suite600•Washington,DC20006•(202)466-8185•[email protected]•www.cis.org
James G. Gimpel is a professor of government at the University of Maryland, College Park.
2
Center for Immigration Studies
BackgroundThepolarizationofimmigrationalongpartylinesisnotsomethingthatbeganwiththe2016electioncycle,norwithTrump’sannouncementspeech.TurningtoGallup’speriodicsurveys,thereisabundantevidencebackto2000ofamarkedpartisandifferenceinsupportfor increased/decreasedimmigration.Theopiniontrendindicatesthat,after2001,thegapinpartysupportforimmigrationwidenedfortheremainderofthatdecade,thoughtheoverallpercentagecallingfordecreasedim-migrationdiddeclineatfirst.
TheblankspaceintheGallupsurveyseriesinFigure1appearsbecausethestandardquestionaboutimmigrationlevelswasnotaskedin2009,2010,or2011.Whentheytookupthequestionagainin2012,therewasasurgeinthepercentagecallingfordecreasedimmigration,withanevidentpartisangulfthatwidenedfurtherintheyearsleadinguptothe2016election.1AsIindicatedinapreviousCISBackgrounder,theTrumpcampaignseemstohaveclearlycomprehendedthesetrendswhilerivalGOPcandidatesremainedwillfullyblind,deaf,andmute.2
Figure 1. Percentage of Democrats and Republicans Favoring Decreased Immigration, 2001-2016
Source:Galluppolls,combined,2001-2016.
2001
R Decreased
D Decreased
45.5%
59.6%
23.4%
63.2%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
Question Not Asked
Thepartisangulfinthemostrecentpollingcanbeseenjustasclearlyinthegrowinggapbetweenthepartybasescallingforincreasedimmigration(seeFigure2).Onethingisforcertain,theincreaseinsupportformoregenerousimmigrationoverthelastfouryearscomesoverwhelminglyfromwithintheDemocraticParty,notfromRepublicans.
3
Center for Immigration Studies
Figure 2. Percentage of Democrats and Republicans Favoring Increased Immigration, 2001-2016
Source:Galluppolls,combined,2001-2016.
2001
R Increased
D Increased
9.5%
17.8%
10.0%
28.4%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
Question Not Asked
Immigrationnowpolarizesthemasspublictoanextentnotseenincontemporarytimes.3NooneconteststhattheTrumpcandidacyinthe2016electionwasasourceofthisheightenedinterest.Buttherearelegitimatequestionsaboutwhatroleimmigrationplayedinvotechoicecontrollingfortraditionalinfluencesonvoting.Foronething,thereissomedoubtaboutwhetherissuesreallymattertovotersoncewecontrolfortheirdeeplyrootedpartisanidentities.IfallthepeoplefavorabletorestrictionistimmigrationpolicywouldhavevotedforDonaldTrumpbecausetheyareRepublicans,thenmaybehispolicypositioningdidn’tmakethedifferencesomeobserversclaim.Onceresearcherscontrolforpartyidentification,theremaybenoremainingroleforissuestoplayinexplainingvotechoice.Ontheotherhand,giventheRepublicannominee’swidelyal-legedappealtonon-traditionalRepublicanconstituenciesandtovoterswhorefusedtosupportMittRomneyin2012,therearereasonstothinkthatTrump’spolicypronouncementscausedrealpoliticalmovement.
Asdetailedbelow,dataanalysisbasedontheDemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupsurveyreleasedinJune2017suggestthatimmigrationpolicyattitudesdiddrivevoterstosupportDonaldTrump,controllingfortheirpartyidentification,sex,age,raceandethnicity,income,andeducation.4Perhapstheimpactofimmigrationonthiselectionappearsobvioustomanyobservers,butitisnot.Messagingcommonlythoughttobeessentialtoacandidate’svictoryoftenturnsoutnottobebecausethoseissuesarealreadyembracedenthusiasticallybyacandidate’ssupporters.Nomatterhowmuchanomineediscussesthem,theyhavenopersuasivepower,andattractnocrossoversupport.
ToconductaplausibletestoftheimpactofimmigrationopiniononTrumpsupport,asensiblestartistocreateanadditiveindexoutoftheresponsestothreesurveyitemstappingimmigrationopinion.Becauseimmigrationisamulti-facetedareaofpublicpolicy,researcherscommonlycombinesurveymeasuresratherthanrelyuponasingleitemtogaugeopinion.Thesethreeitemsreadasfollows,andthecross-tabulatedresultsbypartyidentificationarereportedintheappendixtables:
• Overall,doyouthinkillegalimmigrantsmakeacontributiontoAmericansocietyorareadrain?
• Doyoufavororopposeprovidingalegalwayforillegal immigrantsalreadyintheUnitedStatestobecomeU.S.citizens?
• DoyouthinkitshouldbeeasierorharderforforeignerstoimmigratetotheUnitedStateslegallythanitiscurrently?
Asconstructed,thismeasurerangesfrom1to8,where8indicatesthemostrestriction-orientedresponseand1representsopinion-holdingfavorabletogenerousimmigration.5In2016,about29percentofallrespondentsscoreda7or8onthescale.Onthegenerousendofthecontinuum,about18percentscoreda1or2.Similarresultswereobtainedwhenthesameques-tionswerecombinedinascalefortheearlierwaveofthesurveyconductedin2011.6
4
Center for Immigration Studies
Asforpresidentialpreference,higherscorersonthisscalearepronouncedlypro-TrumpwhenitcomestotheirNovember2016vote(seeFigure3).ComparisonsofthesameimmigrationopinionscaleagainsttheRomneyvoteshowthatopinioninthe2016electionwasmorepolarizedthanin2012.Intruth,thetwoGOPnomineesdidnottakewildlydifferentpositions.ThedifferencewasthatRomneywasadvisedtoremainquietaboutthesubjectonthecampaigntrail,havingbeenrepeatedlywarnedthathisviewswouldalienateHispanicvoters.Throughoutthefall,theRomneycampaignwasobservedtobefearfulofdiscussingimmigration,avoidingthetopicandabruptlycutting-offquestionsaboutit.7Consequently,manyotherwisein-formedvotersreachedNovemberof2012barelyawareofRomney’sviewsonavarietyofimmigrationoptions.Hiscampaignchief,MattRhoades,waswidelyreportedtoadmitregretsaboutmovingthecandidatetowardamorerestriction-orientedimmigrationpolicyintheprimary.8
Figure 3. Estimated Percent Voting for Romney and Trump by Immigration Position
Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.
Generous 2
5 710
37
62
81 81
90
11 1215
43
61
70 71 70
Perc
ent V
otin
g R
epub
lican
3 4 5 6 7 Restrictive
100%
90% Percent Trump
Percent Romney80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
TheTrumpcampaigntookaverydifferentcourse,announcingimmigrationrestrictionasamajorthemeonhisfirstdayintherace.9Thecandidate’saggressivepositioningontheissuearguablycausedtheClintonteamtoembraceracialandethnicidentitypoliticstoanevengreaterextentthantheyhadinresponsetotheprimarychallengebyrivalBernieSanders.TheendresultwasfargreaterpolarizationbetweenthetwomajorpartycandidatesonimmigrationpolicybyNovember,asshowninFigure3,where90percentofthoseatthemostconservativepolevotedforTrump,comparedtojust5percentatthemostliberalpole.Figure3alsoshowsthatthoseembracingrestrictionistviewsweremuchmorelikelytovoteforTrumpthantheywereforRomney.
Notably,exitpollingindicatesthattheGOPnomineedidnotsufferamarkedlynegativereactionamongLatinovotersforboldlycallingforimmigrationcontrol.10Hispanicturnoutreportedlysurged,andyetthepresident-to-bestilloutperformedRomney.Inhindsight,Romney’sadviserslooktohavebeenwronginpushinghimtoremainsilentonimmigrationforfearofalienatingHispanics.ThisbadadvicewasbasedontheassumptionthatHispanicsthinkandvotealike,andareuniformlyfavorabletowardliberalimmigrationpolicies.Butthismustbewrong-headedifDonaldTrumpcanwin28-30percentofthemwithoutagreatdealofoutreach.11
5
Center for Immigration Studies
Networkexitpollsaredisparagedwhenevervariousgroupswindupdislikingtheirestimates,butalternativemethodsofobtainingestimatesalsohaveshortcomingsandsourcesoferror.12SomepollsshowgreaterTrumpsupportamongLatinos,others less,butcertainly therewasnoseveredrop-offofHispanicsreportingRepublican loyalty.13SomeHispanicvotersvaluedotheraspectsoftheTrumpcandidacy,ignoringhisstatementsonimmigration.Othersmayhavetakenanintensedislikingtohisopponentorsimplyfellbackontheirpartyidentificationlikesomanyothervotersdo.ThevariousreasonsofferedfortheirchoicepresshomethepointthatLatinosarenotsingle-issuevoters,andthatthesameexplanationsthataredeployedtoaccountforhownon-LatinovotersbehaveapplytoLatinovotersaswell.14Talkingaboutthemasiftheyareasingle-mindedblocdoesnotmakeitso,butneitheraretheypoisedtosurgeintotheRepublicanParty.Theemergentpictureisoneofanenduringpoliticaldivisionrangingfromabout25percenttothehigh30sinsupportforRepublicancandidatesnationally,withlowerturnoutbolsteringGOPprospects.
Middle-Income Voters Amajorityofelectionpost-mortemshavesettledonlower-middle-incomevotersasthesinglemostimportantgroupthatdecidedtheelectioninTrump’sfavor.Thisisapopulationthoughttobeanimatedbyassociatedconcernsincludingasloweconomicrecovery,asteadyinfluxofillegalandlegalimmigrants,andlong-termeconomicrestructuringwithconsequentlossofstatus.15
Figure 4. Probability of Men in Middle Income Brackets Voting for Romney (2012) and Trump (2016) by Immigration Opinion
Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.
Generous
Generous
Generous
Generous
0.212
0.248
0.238
0.277
0.305
0.295
0.272
0.295
Men 2016
Men 2016
Men 2016
Men 2016
Men 2012
Men 2012
Men 2012
Men 2012
0.833 0.852
0.885
0.914
0.889
0.900
0.903
$40,000 to $49,999
$60,000 to $69,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$70,000 to $79,999
Restrictive
Restrictive
Restrictive
Restrictive
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0
0
0
0
6
Center for Immigration Studies
Researchersmightacquireaclearersenseofhowmuchimmigrationpolicymatteredtoworkingclassmenin2016bylook-ingatestimatesofTrumpvotingbysexandincome,controllingforpartyidentification,age,education,andrace.Fromthesefigurescanbeinferredapolicy’simpactonaspecificgroup’svotingcontrollingfortheseothercharacteristics.Asdescribedabove,theDemocracyFund dataprovidedbyYouGovarethebasisforthisevaluation.16
Figure4displaysgraphssummarizinghowmeninseveralmiddle-incomebracketsvoted,bytheliberalorconservativena-tureoftheirimmigrationviews.Acoupleofaspectsofthecomparisonsinthesefiguresstandout.First,asexpected,acrossallthemiddle-incomegroups,holdingconservativeimmigrationviewspredictshighvotepercentagesforbothRomneyandTrump,whileliberalviewsalignvoterswithDemocratsinbothelections.
Second,meninthetwo lowermiddle-incomebracketswereuniformlymorelikelytovoteforTrumpthanforRomneyateverypositionontheimmigrationscale,evenattheliberalend(Figure4,top).Fromthisevidenceareasonableconclusionisthatimmigrationwasnottheonlythingthatattractedmiddle-incomementoTrump,asthosewhoweremoreliberalonimmigrationalsofavoredhimoverRomney.Inthetwo uppermiddle-incomebrackets,ontheotherhand,menwereverysimilarintheirvotinginbothyears(Figure4,bottom).Asincomerises,differencesinvotingfromoneelectionyeartothenextgrowconsiderablysmalleramongmen.Immigrationpolicypositioningmatterstovotechoiceamongmen,butnotthatmuchmorein2016thanin2012forthoseinuppermiddle-incomebrackets.
WomenImmigrationlikelymadealargerdifferencein2016forwomenthanformen(Figure5).Womenwhofavorimmigrationrestriction,andaboutone-thirdofthemdo,votedforTrumpatanestimatedrateof86percent,comparedto2012whentheyvotedforRomneyatabout68percent,asubstantialdifferenceof18percentagepoints.Notably,Trumplostthevotesofwomenoverall,collectingonly42percentsupport,comparedwithClinton’sestimated54percent.17ButFigure5indicatesthatimmigrationwasbothmoredivisiveforwomenin2016thanin2012,anddrovemorewomentowardTrumpthanawayfromhim.
Figure 5. Probability of Women Voting for Romney (2012) and Trump (2016) by Immigration Opinion
Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.
Generous Restrictive
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.102
0.857
0.040
0.678
2016
2012
7
Center for Immigration Studies
African American and Hispanic VotersBynowitisnosecretthatAfricanAmericansexpressmanyofthesamereservationsaboutimmigrationthatnative-bornwhitesdo.18Giventhistruth,weshouldnotbesurprisedthatahard-linestanceonimmigrationwonTrumpsomevotesinunusualplaces.AmongblackvotersthereisgreaterevidenceofTrumpsupportathigherlevelsofrestrictiveopinionin2016(75percent)thanin2012(32percent).Thesearenottrivialdifferencesasabout20percentofAfricanAmericanrespondentsexpressedoppositiontoimmigrationata7or8ontheeight-pointscalein2016.Ifthree-fourthsofthoserespondentsvotedforTrump,black support amongthat group would have been atabout 15 percent, compared toonly about 8 percent for blackvotersoverall.19Blackswithreser-vationsaboutimmigrationcanbesaidtohavecontributedmodestlytotheTrumpvictory,whileblackssupportive of open immigrationwereaboutashostiletoTrumpastheyhadbeentoRomney.
As indicated above and in otherresearch,Latinosarenotuniform-lypro-immigrationandareespe-cially divided on undocumentedimmigration.20 The DemocracyFundsurvey indicates thatabout23 percent of Hispanic respon-dents can be placed in the threemost conservative categories onthe immigration scale. Estimatesfromthisanalysisalso show thatthis subgroup was supportive ofTrump, slightly more than theywereofRomney(seeFigure6).
Ontheotherhand,Latinosonthegenerousendoftheopinionscaleare decidedly pro-Clinton, simi-lartoAfricanAmericans.Trumpseemstohavealienatedmorepro-immigration Latinos than Rom-neydid,whilewinninga slightlylargershareofthemostconserva-tiveLatinos.ForalloftheTrumpemphasis on immigration andwall-building,thenetchangewassurprisingly small. Across elec-tions,LatinosupportforRepubli-cansrisesorfallsmarginallywhensupportforGOPcandidatesrisesor falls among the broader elec-torateofwhichtheyareapart.To
Figure 6. Probability of African Americans & Hispanics Vot-ing for Romney (2012) & Trump (2016) by Immigration
Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.
Generous
Generous
Restrictive
Restrictive
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0
0
0.025
0.112
0.747
0.749
0.020
0.020
0.324
0.699
2016
2016
2012
2012
African American
Hispanic
8
Center for Immigration Studies
theextentthattheycanbecharacterizedasagroupatall,theirbehaviorrunsmoreconsistentwithelectoraltidesthanagainstthem.
Strong and Weak PartisansDespitethepartisandivideonimmigrationidentifiedabove,wedoseestrongRepublicansandstrongDemocratssupport-ingTrumpathigherlevelswhentheyarefavorabletoimmigrationrestrictionthanwhentheyarenot.FromFigure7,forexample,anestimated26percentofDemocraticrestrictionistsvotedforTrump,comparedtoonlyaround11percentwhosupportedRomneyfouryearsearlier.
OntheRepublicanside,somefall-offinTrumpsupportisalsovisibleattheleftendoftheopiniondistribution(seeFigure7).StrongRepublicanswhofavoredamoregenerous immigrationpolicyvotedforTrumpatarateofabout18percent,comparedtothe40percentwhosupportedRomneyin2012.Attheconservativeendofimmigrationopinion,thestrongRepublicanswereaboutthesameintheirsupportfortheRepublicannomineesbothyears(seeFigure7).
Figure 7. Probability of Strong and Weak Partisans Voting for Romney (2012) and Trump (2016) by Immigration Opinion
Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.
Generous
Generous
Generous
Generous
0003
0.179
0.691
0.006
0.401
0.034
0.720
2016
2016
2016
2016
2012
2012
2012
2012
0.1040.113
0.265
0.925
0.463
0.980
Strong Democrat
Strong Republican
Weak Democrat
Weak Republican
Restrictive
Restrictive
Restrictive
Restrictive
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0
0
0
0
0.007
0.969
9
Center for Immigration Studies
Amongweakpartisans, it isprettyclearthatweakDemocratswerecross-pressuredbyimmigrationin2016toanextentthattheywerenotin2012.Figure7showsthattheprobabilityofweakDemocratsvotingforTrumpsteadilyrisesastheycometoholdmorerestrictionistviews.Anestimated46percentoftheseDemocratssupportedtheRepublicannomineein2016,comparedwithonly11percentfouryearsearlier.Thisresultsuggestsconsiderableprescienceonthepartofpoliticalscientistswritingin2014whofoundimmigrationpoliticstobeanongoingsourceofwhiteDemocraticdefection.21WasthissupportbyDemocratsdesiring immigration limitscounterbalancedbyRepublicanswhoheldmore liberalviewsonimmigration?No.Whiletherewassomedrop-offinTrumpsupport,amuchsmallershareofweakRepublicansdefectedtoClintonthanweakDemocratssupportedTrump.
EducationSofar,thesesurveydatasuggestthatimmigrationwasanidealexampleofawedgeissuethatbenefittedtheTrumpcandidacy,movingmanyordinaryDemocraticvotersovertotheTrumpsidewhilealienatingfewerRepublicans.Whatabouteduca-tion?Votersinthehighesteducationcategories(e.g.,bachelor’sdegree,post-graduateeducation)areprettycommonlysplitbetweentheparties,orevenleanDemocratic.NetworkexitpollingawardedClintonanine-pointlead(52percentto43percent)amongcollegegraduatesandthedatareportedheresuggestedaDemocraticleadaboutsixpointsgreateramongthosewithpost-graduatedegrees(i.e.,M.A.,M.S.,JD,Ph.D).Evenso,thechoiceforpresidentamongthebetter-educatedwasclearlyrelatedtotheirimmigrationviews(Table1).Asvotersmovetothemorerestriction-orientedendoftheopinionscale,weseeanotableuptickinsupportforTrumpacrossallthreeoftheselevelsofeducation,withanotableshifttowardTrumpinthetwomostconservativeopinioncategories(seeTable1).
Immigration Opinion
1-Generous2345678-Restrictive
Table 1. Estimated Percentage Voting for Donald Trump in 2016 by Education Level and Immigration Opinion
Source:EstimatesderivedfromDemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupDatabyYouGov,releasedJune2017.
Two-Year College
2.4%4.7%9.1%
17.0%29.4%45.8%63.2%77.8%
Four-Year College
2.6%5.2%
10.0%18.5%31.5%48.4%65.6%79.5%
Post Graduate
2.1%4.3%8.3%
15.5%27.2%43.1%60.7%75.8%
10
Center for Immigration Studies
Thosewithpost-graduatedegreesweremuchmorelikelytosupportTrumpthantheywereRomneywhentheyweremoreconservativeonimmigration(Figure8).ButsimilarvoterswhowereliberalonimmigrationwereaboutequallylikelytosupportClintonin2016as theywereObamain2012.Thesecomparisonssuggest thatevenamongthehighlyeducated,PresidentTrumpwonmanyvoterswhohadvotedforObamain2012,andthattakingsuchaprominentstandonimmigra-tionprobablycontributedtothatsuccess.Anytrade-offsinelectoralsupportresultingfromhiscontroversialviewsworkedmoreinhisfavorthanagainsthim.
Figure 8. Probability of Post-Graduate Degree Holders Voting for Romney (2012) and Trump (2016) by Immigration Opinion
Source:DemocracyFund,VoterStudyGroup,YouGovSurvey,andauthor’scalculations.
Generous Restrictive
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
00.041
0.758
0.441
2016
2012
0.021
11
Center for Immigration Studies
Summary and ConclusionsIntheaboveanalysisIhavetakenstockofseveralwaysinwhichopiniononimmigrationshapedvotingbehaviorinthe2016election.Thiscontestwasassociatedwithanunprecedentedlevelofpartisandivisiononmanytopics,includingthesubjectofimmigration.ThepartisandividebothprecededtheTrumpcampaignasavisibletrendinavailablepolls,andwasheight-enedbyit,asthecampaignwasaninformationsourcedrivingopinion-holdingontheissue.ThePewResearchCenter’slatestreport(2017)suggeststhatthispolarizationhasonlybeensustainedoraugmented10monthsintothepresident’sfirstterm.22
Notaddressedhereistheimpactofthe2016campaignonturnoutlevelsforthecandidates.CertainlytheTrumpcampaignmighthavealsoimprovedonRomney’sperformancebasedonthehigherturnoutofcertainelectoralsubgroups,andthediminishedenthusiasmofothers.BecausetheDemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupdataconstituteapanelofvoters,withfewnon-votersincluded,itisnotasuitableresourceforstudyingdifferencesinparticipationacrossthetwoelections.Thesedataalsohavealloftheweaknessesofotherobservationalstudies,includingambiguityaboutcasualdirection,andthepos-sibilitythatimportantexplanatoryvariableshavebeenomitted.Evenso,theresultshereforimmigrationpolicyopinionaretoorobusttobetheconsequenceoffalsepositivity.
ApparentlytappingintowidespreaddiscontentwiththetrajectoryofU.S.immigrationpolicywasawinningstrategyin2016,asevidencedbyTrump’simprovementoverRomneyamongvoterswithconservativeconvictions.TheRepublicannominee’semphasispushedtheDemocratsintoadifficultcornerinwhichtheywereforcedtochoosebetweenwhiteworkingclassvotersandracialandethnicidentitypolitics.Thatfatefulchoice,andtheelectionresult,indicatesthatimmigrationwasawedgeissueinthecampaign,andonethatDemocratswillstruggletoaddressgoingforward.23Likeotherwedgeissuesinpastcampaigns,however,itisunlikelytobepermanent,aselectoralcircumstanceschangeandpartiesadapt.24
ImmigrationpoliticshadanotableimpactontheimprovementoftheTrumpvoteovertheRomneyvoteforthefollow-ingsubgroupsofthepopulationwhentheywerefoundtoadheretoconservativeimmigrationpolicies:thewell-educated,women,AfricanAmericans,andweakDemocrats.Atthesametime,whenvoterswereproponentsofgenerousimmigra-tionpolicy,TrumpdidworsethanRomneyamongthefollowinggroups:Hispanics,strongRepublicans,andhigherincomevoters.TrumpalsodidbetterthanRomneyamonglower-middle-incomemen,butthisimprovementrunsacrosstheentirerangeofimmigrationviewpoints,andsocannotbeattributedtoimmigrationrestrictionperse.RelatedresearchhasshownthattheshiftofworkingclassmentowardRepublicansisalong-termphenomenon.25OnlyfurtheranalysiswillrevealwhatotherspecificissuesmighthavebeenasourceofTrumpsupportamongmen.
Anycampaignstrategyemphasizinganincendiarywedgeissuewillproducetrade-offsinsupport,asacandidatemaylosevotersthatanalternativecandidatefromtheirpartymighthavewon,while improvingonsupportfromotherblocsthatanothercandidatewouldhavelost.Fromtheevidenceassembledhere,thegainsfromafocusonimmigrationrestrictionappeartohavebeenconsiderablylargerthanthelosses(seeFigure3).
Whatanycampaignmanagerhopesisthatthegroupscrossingovertobenefittheircandidatewillbelargerthanthosede-fectingtheotherway.Alienatingafewaffluentandliberal-leaningRepublicansturnedouttobeasmallpricetopay,atleastforacampaignthatwasnotrequiredtobegformoney.Thesesameaffluentelitesarenowscramblingtoregaincontroloftheirpartyfromapopulisthijacking.Successwillrequirethattheytakealesslibertarianviewofthenation’sborder,favoringmodestbutreasonableimmigrationcontrolmeasures.ImmigrationisnottheonlyissueonwhichRepublicaneliteswillhavetomakeadjustmentsinDonaldTrump’sdirection,butdoingsowillbeastepbacktowardregainingthatmostimportantofpoliticalresources:electoraltrust.
12
Center for Immigration Studies
Appendix Tables
Response
MostlymakeacontributionNeitherMostlyadrainDon’tknowTotal
Response
FavorOpposeNotsureTotal
Response
MucheasierSlightlyeasierNochangeSlightlyharderMuchharderDon’tknowTotal
Overall, do you think illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain?
Do you favor or oppose providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens?
Do you think it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the US legally than it is currently?
Table A1. Responses to Democracy Fund Questions on Immigration Policy, 2011 & 2016 from YouGov Survey
Source:Frequencytablefromsurveyitems,DemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupSurveybyYouGov,releasedJune2017.Dataareweighted.
Number
2,0171,0254,090803
7,935
Number
3,1613,0081,7657,935
Number
7181,3881,8191,4151,904680
7,923
Number
2,833972
3,461673
7,939
Number
3,8322,7941,3227,948
Number
6811,1042,1351,4531,955606
7,953
Percent
25.2%12.8%51.1%10.0%
Percent
39.5%37.6%22.1%
Percent
9.0%17.3%22.7%17.7%23.8%8.5%
Percent
35.4%12.2%43.3%8.4%
Percent
47.9%34.9%16.5%
Percent
9.3%15.1%29.1%19.8%26.7%7.6%
2011
2011
2011
2016
2016
2016
13
Center for Immigration Studies
Independent Variable
ImmigrationOpinionScale(highismorerestrictive)StrongDemocratDemocratLeanDemocratLeanRepublicanRepublicanStrongRepublicanIncome$20-29,999Income$30-39,999Income$40-49,999Income$50-59,999Income$60-69,999Income$70-79,999Income$80-99,999Income$100-119,999Income$120-149,999Income$150,000andaboveHighSchoolSomeCollege2-YearDegree4-YearDegreePostGraduateDegreeBlackHispanicAge65UpAge18-29Female
Table A2. Odds Ratios Associated with Clinton-Trump Voting in the 2016 November Election
Source:DemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupSurveybyYouGov,releasedJune2017.Dependent variable: 0=Clinton vote; 1=Trump vote; third party voters have beenexcluded.CellentriesareoddsratiosshowingbyhowmuchtheoddsofvotingforDonaldTrumpincrease/decreaseforeachoneunitchangeinx,holdingothervariablesconstant.Statisticalsignificancelevels:1p≤.052p≤.01.Example:Foreachadditionalincreaseontheimmigrationrestrictionopinionscale,theoddsofvotingforRomneyincreaseby1.52,andforTrumpby2.03,holdingallothervariablesconstant.
2012 Vote
1.52.01.18.03
24.855.72
68.191.242.021.651.942.632.102.121.852.773.12.41.34.25.27.24.16.88
1.23.55.66
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
2016 Vote
2.03.02.14.05
13.215.31
37.111.752.523.133.352.932.862.711.581.482.04.55.51.44.44.36.38.40
1.30.29.70
14
Center for Immigration Studies
Independent Variable
ImmigrationOpinionScale(highismorerestrictive)
StrongDemocrat
Democrat
LeanDemocrat
LeanRepublican
Republican
StrongRepublican
Income$20-29,999
Income$30-39,999
Income$40-49,999
Income$50-59,999
Income$60-69,999
Income$70-79,999
Income$80-99,999
Income$100-119,999
Income$120-149,999
Income$150,000andabove
HighSchool
SomeCollege
2-YearDegree
4-YearDegree
PostGraduateDegree
Black
Hispanic
Age65Up
Age18-29
Female
Constant
LogpseudolikelihoodN%CorrectlyClassifiedNullModel
Table A3. Complete Logistic Regression Model of Clinton-Trump Voting in the 2016 November Election
Source:DemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupSurveybyYouGov,releasedJune2017.Dependentvariable:0=Clintonvote;1=Trumpvote;thirdpartyvotershavebeenex-cluded.Cellentriesarelogisticregressioncoefficients(standarderrorsclusteredbystate)Statisticalsignificancelevels:1p≤.052p≤.01.
2012 Vote
0.416(.030)-4.282(.229)-1.734(.151)-3.375(.232)3.213(.265)1.744(.225)4.222(.320)0.212(.311)0.704(.302)0.499(.323)0.661(.225)0.968(.356)0.743(.442)0.750(.331)0.615(.322)1.019(.388)1.137(.361)-0.899(.437)-1.092(.458)-1.395(.444)-1.328(.410)-1.435(.448)-1.852(.490)-0.132(.186)0.206(.152)-0.592(.326)-0.415(.119)-1.556(.537)
-880.9734,46292.052.5
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2016 Vote
0.710(.040)-4.186(.333)-1.996(.225)-3.043(.256)2.581(.303)1.670(.235)3.614(.375)0.557(.309)0.924(.255)1.141(.255)1.208(.298)1.075(.285)1.051(.306)0.998(.343)0.456(.271)0.393(.309)0.712(.313)-0.590(.388)-0.675(.403)-0.817(.406)-0.830(.421)-1.016(.389)-0.978(.393)-0.929(.321)0.258(.157)-1.233(.756)-0.359(.106)-3.906(.549)
-847.1124,83789.450.5
15
Center for Immigration Studies
End Notes1SeeBradfordS.JonesandDanielleJ.Martin,“Path-to-CitizenshiporDeportation?HowEliteCuesShapedOpiniononIm-migrationinthe2010USHouseElections”,Political Behavior,39:1:177-204,2017;andChristopherP.Muste,“TheDynam-icsofImmigrationOpinionintheUnitedStates,1992-2012”,Public Opinion Quarterly77:1:398-416,2013.
2JamesG.Gimpel,“ImmigrationOpinionandtheRiseofDonaldTrump”,CenterforImmigrationStudiesBackgrounder,July2016.
3“ThePartisanDivideonValuesGrowsEvenWider”,PewResearchCenter,October5,2017.AccessedOctober12,2017.
4“2016VOTERSurveyDataSet,TopLines,andCrosstabs”,DemocracyFundVoterStudyGroup,June2017.AccessedOc-tober17,2017.ThesurveywasconductedbyYouGov,ofPaloAlto,Calif.
5TheseitemsscaleatreliabilityvalueCronbach’salpha=.66.
6This scale is also highly correlatedwith other indicators of immigration policy opinion, such as the desire to see theRepublicanandDemocraticpartiesadoptmorerestrictivepositionsonimmigration.
7BrettLoGiurato, “MittRomney IsTerrifiedOfTalkingAbout Immigration”,Business Insider, June20,2012; andEvanMcMorris-Santoro,“FollowingObama’sMove,HowWillMittRomneyBreakHisSilentTreatmentOfImmigration?”,Talk-ingPointsMemo,June15,2012.AccessedOctober16,2017.
8Forexample,see:JonWard,“MittRomneyCampaignManagerMattRhoadesLamentsHard-RightShiftOnImmigration”,HuffingtonPost,December3,2012,accessedOctober16,2017;andJeffZeleny,“RomneyCampaignManagerSaysHeRe-gretsImmigrationStance”,The New York Times,December3,2012,accessedOctober17,2017.
9JamesG.Gimpel,“ImmigrationOpinionandtheRiseofDonaldTrump”,CenterforImmigrationStudiesBackgrounder,July2016.
10SeeHarryEnten,“TrumpProbablyDidBetterWithLatinoVotersThanRomneyDid”,FiveThirtyEight,November18,2016,accessedOctober18,2017.
11Forexamplepost-electionstoriesaboutTrumpandLatinovoting,see:KevinDrum,“TrumpReallyDidWin28%oftheLatinoVote”,Mother Jones,March6,2017,accessedOctober18,2017; MarcelaValdes,“‘We’reLookingataNewDivideWithintheHispanicCommunity’”,The New York Times,November16,2015,accessedOctober18,2017;ThomasB.Edsall,“TheDemocrats’ImmigrationProblem”,The New York Times,February16,2017,accessedOctober18,2017;andAlejandraMatos,“OntheElPasoborder,Trump’sappealwithLatinosdefiesexpectations”,The Washington Post,December9,2016,accessedOctober18,2017.
12Grace Sparks, “PollstersCan’tAgreeOnHowLatinosVoted In 2016”,HuffingtonPost,December 12, 2016, accessedOctober18,2017.
13 See, for example: “LatinosWillNeverVoteForARepublican,AndOtherMythsAboutHispanicsFrom2016”,NPR’s“MorningEdition”,December22,2016,accessedOctober18,2017;FranciscoNavas,“WhatHispanicpeoplethinkofTrump:USLatinosgiveawiderangeofanswers”,The Guardian,January23,2017,accessedOctober18,2017;and,BrittnyMejia.“Despitescornandcriticism,theseLatinovotersdon’tregretvotingforTrump”,Los Angeles Times,January17,2017,accessedOctober18,2017.
14AngelSaavedraCisneros,ed.,Latino Identity and Political Attitudes,London,UK:PalgraveMacmillan,2017.
15JustinGest,The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2016.JeffManzaandNedCrowley,“WorkingClassHero?InterrogatingtheSocialBasesof theRiseofDonaldTrump”,The Forum,15(1),pp.3-28,2017.ShannonM.MonnatandDavidL.Brown,“MorethanaRuralRevolt:
16
Center for Immigration Studies
LandscapesofDespairandthe2016PresidentialElections”,Journal of Rural Studies55:227-236,2017.L.Collingwood,T.Reny, andA.A.Valenzuela, “Flipping forTrump: Immigration,NotEconomics,ExplainsShifts inWhiteWorkingClassVotes”,July7,2017.ShadTurney,FrankLevy,JackCitrin,andNeilO’Brian,“WaitingforTrump:TheMovetotheRightofWhiteWorking-ClassMen,1968-2016”,The California Journal of Politics and Policy,UCBerkeley,InstituteofGovernmentalStudies,2017.AccessedOctober17,2017.
16FormoreontheDemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupproject,seehere.AccessedOctober16,2017.
17In2012,Obamawon55percentofwomenandRomney44percentaccordingtoexitpolling;see“PresidentExitPolls”,The New York Times,undated.AccessedOctober18,2017.
18VincentL.Hutchings andCaraWong, “Racism,GroupPosition andAttitudes about Immigration amongBlacks andWhites”,Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race11:2419-442,2014.
19AlecTysonandShivaManiam,“BehindTrump’sVictory:DivisionsbyRace,Gender,Education”,PewResearchCenter,November9,2016.AccessedOctober16,2017.
20AngelSaavedraCisneros,ed.,Latino Identity and Political Attitudes,London,UK:PalgraveMacmillan,2017.MarkHugoLopez,RichMorin,andPaulTaylor,Illegal Immigration Backlash Worries, Divides Latinos,Washington,D.C.:PewHispanicCenter,October28,2010.S.M.Rouse,B.C.Wilkinson,andJ.C.Garand,“DividedLoyalties?UnderstandingVariationinLatinoAttitudesTowardImmigration”,Social Science Quarterly,91:3:856-882,2010.
21ZoltanHajnalandMichaelU.Rivera,“Immigration,Latinos,andWhitePartisanPolitics:TheNewDemocraticDefection”,American Journal of Political Science,58:4773-789,2014.
22“ThePartisanDivideonValuesGrowsEvenWider”,PewResearchCenter,October5,2017.AccessedOctober12,2017.
23PeterBeinart,“HowtheDemocratsLosttheirWayonImmigration”,The Atlantic,July/August2017.AccessedOctober18,2017.ThomasB.Edsall,“TheDemocrats’ImmigrationProblem”,The New York Times,February16,2017.AccessedOctober18,2017.WilliamA.Galston,“ThePopulistMoment”,The Journal of Democracy,28:2:21-33,2017.
24D.SunshineHillygusandToddG.Shields,The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns,Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009.
25ShadTurney,FrankLevy,JackCitrin,andNeilO’Brian,“WaitingforTrump:TheMovetotheRightofWhiteWorking-ClassMen,1968-2016”,The California Journal of Politics and Policy,Berkeley,Calif.:UCBerkeley,InstituteofGovernmentalStudies,2017.AccessedOctober17,2017.