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C I S

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July 2016

Summary• Manyobserversarepuzzlingoverthevoters’choiceofDonaldTrumpasthe2016Republicannominee

forpresident.PartofthepuzzlecanberesolvedbyunderstandingthatTrumpwasclosetotheGOPgrass-rootsonanumberofimportantpolicypriorities,includingimmigration.

• Immigrationpolicychoiceshavebecomeincreasinglypartisanovertime,asmanyotherpolicieshave.Thisisalong-termtrend,notanovernightdevelopment.

• Opinionpollsleadingupto2016wereincreasinglyclearaboutwhereGOPvotersstoodonarangeofimmigrationpolicymatters, includinglegalizationforundocumentedimmigrantsandbordercontrol.Surveysfrommultiplesourcespointinthesamedirection.

• WhenDonaldTrumpannouncedinJune2015,itisnotsosurprisingthathisvocalstandonimmigrationimmediatelyfueledhispopularity.

• Inhindsight,Trump’sriseislesssurprisingthanthefactthatothercontendersforthenominationflatlyignoredclearsignpostsinnumerouspublicopinionpolls.

• ThoughthereareotherexplanationsforTrump’ssuccessintheprimaries,itshouldnotbeshockingthatcandidateswinwhentheypositionthemselvesproximatetovotersonissuesasimportantasimmigrationpolicyandeconomicrecovery.

BynowitisnotnewsthatDonaldTrump’sfastriseamongRepublicanprimaryvotersrestsinpartonhisstandonimmigrationcontrol,1andparticularlyhispungentcriticismoftheillegalimmigrationflow.Hiswidelycov-eredannouncementspeechinJune2015inwhichhepromisedhewouldbuildaborderwallifelected,andmakeMexicopayforit,capturedthesupportofvotersasmuchforitsaudacityasforthesubstanceoftheproposalitself.WithanoppositionparceledoutacrossmorethanadozenrivalsfortheGOPnomination,adheringtois-suepositionspopularamongasizableshareofRepublicanvotersfueledhismomentumthroughthepresidentialprimariesascompetitorssuccessivelydroppedout.

Ontheonehand,itshouldcomeasnosurprisethatacandidate’scouragetotakepositionspopularwithvoterspropelledhimtovictory.Afterall,accordingto leadingtheoriesofcandidacy,electionwinnersareordinarilythosewhoseviewpointsmatchthoseoftheirconstituencyonleadingissues.Whatismoresurprising,indeed,isthatTrumpwasabouttheonlycandidatetostakeoutsuchclear-cutpositions.Waspublicopiniononimmigra-tioncloudyorunclear?IfRepublicansheldtoclearpositions,butwereevenlysplit,sendingmixedsignals,thatmightexplainthediscrepancybetweenmassandeliteviews.Sowhatdoesareviewofimmigrationpolicyopin-ion,bypoliticalparty,reveal?

Anexaminationofvariouspublicopinionpollsleadinguptothe2015-16electioncycledemonstratesthatpublicopiniononimmigrationwasfarfromunclear,eitheramongregisteredvotersmoregenerally,oramongRepub-licansinparticular.Ifothercandidateschosetoignorepublicopinionbyadoptingunpopularpositions,perhaps

Immigration Opinion and the Rise of Donald Trump

By James G. Gimpel

James Gimpel is a professor of government at the University of Maryland, College Park.

1629KStreet,NW,Suite600•Washington,DC20006•(202)466-8185•center@cis.org•www.cis.org

2

Center for Immigration Studies

theyconcludedthattheirotherstrengthscompensated.SomeobservershavespeculatedthatadoptingpoliticallypopularpositionsagainstimmigrationriskedalienatingimportantRepublicandonorsthatfavormoreliberalimmigrationpolicies.2Certainlytherewaswidespreadpresscoverageintheinitialmonthsofthecycleabouthowinfluentialdonorswerepushingforlegalstatusforillegalimmigrants,andrelatedreforms.3

Regardlessoftheviewpointsofleadingdonors,however,ifpublicopinionwasunclear,andtheearly-cyclevotersdidn’tmuchcareaboutimmigration,Republicancandidatescouldbeforgivenforfocusingtheirattentionelsewhere.Ifopinionwasclear,primaryvoterscaredagreatdealandcandidatesignoredthemanyway,theymiscalculated,tookbadadvice,andtheirpoorperformanceislessexcusable.

Long-Term TrendsPublicopinionisintermittentlymeasuredonimmigrationissuesbymajormediaandreputablesurveyresearchfirms.Forexample,Figure1displays tabulations fromtheGalluppoll seriesaskingwhether immigrationshouldbe increased,de-creased,orremainthesame,fromFebruary1999throughJune2015.Afteraccountingforthemarginoferrorinthesesur-veyestimates,opinionsonimmigrationlevelshavebeenprettystable.Extendingbackto1999,combinedopinionfavoring

Figure 1. Percent Favoring Decreasing or Keeping Immigration at Present Levels, 1999-2015

Source:SeriesconstructedfromperiodicGallupsurveys.

Immigrant Hispanics

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% F

avor

ing

Month/Year

Present Level Decreased

Present Level Mean: 36.3%Decreased Mean: 43.9%

3

maintenanceofpresentlevelsordesiringadecreaseinimmigrationrangesacrossa20-pointsupermajorityfrom70to90percent.Anaverageof36percentfavorpresentlevelsofimmigrationandanaverageof44percentfavoradecrease.Therangeoffluctuationhasbeennarrowersince2012,suggestingopinionhasbeenevenmorestablesincethelastpresidentialelection.

Insurveyssince2014,Galluphasrecordedsupportforanincreaseinimmigrationtorunashighas27percent,butnotamongRepublicans,whereonlyanestimated15percentreportadesiretoincreaseimmigration.

ReportsbasedonCBSNews/New York TimessurveysarequiteconsistentwiththeGallupsurveys,astheyregularlyaskasimilarquestion,“ShouldimmigrationtotheUnitedStatesbekeptatitspresentlevel,increased,ordecreased?”Inthema-jorityofsurveyssincethemid-90s,amajorityorsolidpluralityhasfavoredadecrease,andsimilartoGallup,neverhasthepercentagefavoringincreasedimmigrationexceeded25percent.

Opiniononimmigrationlevelshasunquestionablybecomemorepartisanovertheyears,asRepublicanvotershavefavoredstricterenforcementandreductionofoverallnumbers,whileDemocratshavesettledintoamoreopen-doorposture.

A1965GallupsurveyshowedthatwhilefewAmericansfavoredincreasedimmigrationatthetime,RepublicansandDemo-cratsweredividedinternally,withsimilarsharesofrespondentsinbothpartiesfavoringadecrease.In1977,asurveycontin-uedtoshowthatpartisandifferenceswerenegligible.In1986,astheImmigrationReformandControlAct(IRCA)waspass-ingwithabipartisancongressionalmajority,aCBSNews/New York Timespollrecordednostatisticallysignificantpartisandifferencesinopiniontowardoverallimmigrationlevels.Giventhishistory,itiscuriousthatby2016thepartyfollowingshavecometodiffersowidelyintheirthinking.

Thedawnofamorepartisandivisioninmassopiniononimmigrationarrivedinthe1990s,astheRepublican-controlledHousetookupimmigrationlegislationshortlyaftertheirsweeping1994victory.The9-11terroristattacksbroughtaboutatemporaryuptickinsentimentfavoringimmigrationrestriction,butvoterssoonrecoveredasensethatlegalimmigrationwasapolicyquestionseparablefrombothillegalimmigrationandhomelandsecurity.Publicopinionalsobegantoreflectthecomplexityofthepolicydebate,asmorevoterscametoexpressviewsonillegalimmigrationthatweredistinctfromtheiropinionsaboutlegalimmigrants.

Byearly2015,thankstoregularpolling,ithadbecomeincreasinglyclearwherevoters,RepublicansandDemocrats,stoodonarangeofimmigrationpolicies,atleastforanyonepayingattention.4Ontheverygeneralquestionofincreasingimmigrationlevels,fewfavoredanyincreaseinimmigration,andawideningpartisangulfseparatedthosewhodidfromthosewhodidn’t.

Onspecificaspectsofimmigrationpolicy,suchasaddressingillegalimmigration,thepartisandivisioninopinionwasalsosharpandstriking.Forexample,insurveysconductedearlyin2015,CNN/ORC askedrespondents,“Howimportantwillillegalimmigrationbetoyourvoteforpresidentnextyear?”InbothFebruaryandJune,moreRepublicanthanDemocraticrespondentsreportedthatimmigrationwouldbea“very”or“extremely”importantissueinthecomingpresidentialelection.TheresultfromthecombinedpollscanbeseeninTable1.

Notably,thepartisangapreportingimmigrationtobeextremely/veryimportanttotheirvoteis16percentagepoints.Theimpor-tanceof immigrationasa themewasprobably inflated insum-mer (2015) polling by the Trump announcement. Even so, thesizable three-fourths Republican majority at this critical pointinthepre-primaryperiodprobablyexplainsTrump’simmediatecompetitivenessuponentry.Inadditiontothecelebritywattagehebroughttotherace,hewastunedintograssrootsopiniontoanextentthatotherRepublicancandidateswerenot.

Thereisalwaysthepossibilitythatthepartisangapinimmigra-tion’simportanceseeninTable1isbetterexplainedbycharacter-isticsotherthanpartyidentification.Perhapsitisreallyamatterof incomeoreducation level,or raceandethnicity,orage, and

Importance

Extremely-VeryImportantSomewhatImportantNotthatImportant

χ2=39.8;p≤.001N=2,041

Table 1. How Important Will IllegalImmigration Be to Your Vote in 2016?

Rep.

74.1%20.4%5.5%

Dem.

58.0%28.0%13.9%

Ind.

60.0%28.1%11.8%

Total

62.7%26.3%11.0%

Source: Combined CNN/ORC February and June 2015surveys.

Political Party

4

Center for Immigration Studies

notparty.Furthertestsoftherelationshipusingstandardstatisticaltoolsrevealedthatthepartisandifferenceholdsupaftercontrollingfortheseothervoterattributes(seeAppendixTableA1).EvenbeingofLatinoorAsianancestrydoesnotmattertotheimportanceofimmigrationasmuchaspartisanidentitydoes.Notably,respondentswithhigherlevelsofeducationandincomearemorelikelytoreportthatimmigrationislessimportantthanthoseinlowereducationandincomebrackets.Theseresultsreinforcetheimpressionthatimmigrationdividesvotersbytheirsocioeconomicstatus,inadditiontotheirpartyloyalty.

Tobesure,thissurveyquestionleavesunansweredthecriticalquestionofwhatvotersprefertobedoneaboutillegalim-migration.Presumably,manyDemocratswhobelieveimmigrationtobeanimportantissuewoulddosomethingotherthanbuildawalltopreventit.Somemightpreferaplantolegalizeillegalimmigrants,forexample,asthe2013GangofEightleg-islationproposed.Fortuitously,otherquestionsonearly-cycleCNN/ORCsurveysdoaddressspecificpolicyoptions,albeitinasimplifiedform.

For example, an important additionalquery asks about the ap-propriateway to address illegal immigration, as follows: “WhatshouldbethemainfocusoftheU.S.governmentindealingwiththeissueofillegalimmigration—developingaplanthatwouldallowillegalimmigrantswhohavejobstobecomelegalU.S.resi-dents,ordevelopingaplanforstoppingtheflowofillegalimmi-grantsintotheU.S.andfordeportingthosealreadyhere?”

Thisquestionisposed inthreeearly-cyclepollscurrentlyavail-ableforanalysis:December2014andFebruaryandJuly2015.Inthecombinedsurveys,anunmistakablepartisandivisionispres-entinviewpointsaboutthedirectionillegalimmigrationpolicyshould take.Agreater than two-thirdsmajorityofRepublicansprefersthatpublicpolicyfocusonstoppingtheflowanddeporta-tion.Byasimilarlylopsidedpercentage,Democratsfavorpoliciesthatwilllegalizethestatusofillegalimmigrants.Needlesstosay,theseareverydistinctalternativeswithdecidedminoritiesineachpartywillingtosupporttheopposingposition.

Whenopinionisdividedinsuchastarkmanner,itdoesn’ttakepublicopiniontabulationstodiscernthepreferenceofparti-sangroups.Apparently,however,onlyDonaldTrumptookheedoftheclearindicationsofgrassrootsopinion.Nooneissug-gestingthatTrumpwasstudyingpublicopinionpollsbackinearly2015,butothercandidatesseemtohavequitedeliberatelyignoredviewpointsthatwereabundantlyevident.

IsTable2justachimera?Ispoliticalpartyreallyjustconfoundedwithsomethinglikeage,income,education,orsomeotherqualityoftherespondents?Afterconductingstandardstatisticaltestsoftherobustnessoftheparty-illegalimmigrationpoli-cyrelationship,it’shardtoconcludethatpartyidentificationshouldbediscounted.Theseresults,reportedinAppendixTableA2revealthatthepartisandifferenceofopinionis,byfar,theoverridinginfluenceonopinion.Evenso,better-educatedandhigher-incomerespondentsfavorlegalizationoverborderenforcement,asdoLatinosandyouth.Nooneshouldbestartledbytheseresults.

The Party Divide on Immigration Opinion Was Clear Even EarlierPerhapsthereasonwhyGOPcandidatespaidso littleattentiontothe immigrationviewsofGOPvoters isbecausetheyfiguredgrassrootsopinionsfluctuatedonaspectsofimmigrationpolicy,thatthetabulationsIhaveshownabovewouldnotbeenduring,orthattheviewsofRepublicanvotersweremalleable.Butnumerouspollingquestionsfromreputablefirmshaveshownastablepartisandivideonimmigrationpolicysincewellbeforethe2012election.Wecanpointtonumerousinstances,concretely.

AnotherexamplecomesfromaseriesofquestionsCBSNews/New York Timesaskedrepeatedlybetween2006and2010,spanningtheworstoftheGreatRecession,asking:“Howseriousaproblemdoyouthinktheissueofillegalimmigrationisforthecountryrightnow—veryserious,somewhatserious,nottooserious,ornotatallserious?”

Policy

AllowLegalizationStopFlow/Deport

χ2=231.8;p≤.001N=2,953

Table 2. What Should the Focus Be for Policy on Illegal Immigration?

Rep.

32.2%67.8%

Dem.

71.3%28.7%

Ind.

51.9%48.1%

Total

53.2%46.8%

Source:CombinedCNN/ORCDecember2014andFebru-aryandJuly2015surveys.

Political Party

5

Thecontrastbetweenthe2007surveysandthe2010surveysistelling(seeTable3).Betweentheseobservations,someimpor-tanteventsunfolded:theeconomicdownturn,achangeinpartycontroloftheexecutivebranch,andthemobilizationoftheTeaPartymovement.Somecombinationofthesedevelopmentsarguablycontributedtoillegalimmigrationbecomingmorepartisan,byabout10additionalpoints(63.9percentto74.2percent)fortherowindicatingillegalimmigrationis“veryseri-ous”.PartisandivisionisalsoevidentinthegrowingshareofDemocratswhoinsistby2010thatundocumentedimmigrationisnotseriousornotveryserious(ashiftfrom11.6percentto19.6percent).5Notably,theviewpointsofindependentsdonotchangebymuch,nordotherowtotalpercentages,suggestingtheparty-centriccharacterofthechange.

Importance

NotSerious(NotVery)SomewhatSeriousVerySerious

χ2=30.9;p≤.001N=2,200

χ2=206.8;p≤.001N=4,411

Table 3. How Serious a Problem Is Illegal Immigration? Survey Results from 2007 and 2010

Rep.

6.1%30.0%63.9%

Rep.

5.1%20.7%74.2%

Dem.

11.6%34.8%53.6%

Dem.

19.6%30.1%50.3%

Ind.

12.9%27.2%59.9%

Ind.

13.0%26.0%60.9%

Total

10.5%30.9%58.6%

Total

13.0%25.9%61.1%

Source:CombinedCBSNews/New York Times2007and2010surveys.

2007Political Party

2010Political Party

Immigrationisonlyoneamonganumberofissuesthatvoterscareabout,anditiscommonenoughforcandidatestobeelectedtopublicofficeindependentlyoftheirpositionsonspecifics.Thedisconnectbetweenvotersandelitesonthisandotherissuesistheresultofpublicinattentivenesscoupledwiththevaryingextenttowhichissuesinformvotingacrossgeo-graphiclocationsandtime.Moreover,alargeshareofvotersisknownnottohavecoherentpolicyopinionsmakingthemun-abletosendclearandprecisesignalstocandidates.Stillothersweighcompetingissueconsiderations,holdingcross-cuttingpolicyviewpoints,openingthemuptoswingvotingandleavingcandidatesuncertain.6Butinrecentyears,withrivalpartybasestakingoppositepositionsonimmigrationpolicy,candidateshavelessjustificationforignoringresonantthemes.

Eventhetablesshownaboveimplythatimmigrationisnotapreeminentpoliticalconsiderationforeveryone,anymorethangaymarriageorfreetrade.Butonecircumstancethathasgreatlyenhancedimmigration’slinkagetovotechoiceisthepro-longedrecession,andthevagueimpressionthatillegalimmigrantsareprosperingattheexpenseofnatives.

OthershavealsosuggestedthatthesloweconomicrecoverysincetheGreatRecessionbeganhasdefinedimmigrationasacontentiousissue.Thereturnofjobsandprosperityhasbeensufficientlyslowthatformanyitfeelsfarmorelikearestructur-ingthathasleftthempermanentlyworseoff,ratherthanashort-termadjustmenttheyneedtomerelywaitout.

Economistshaveadvancedmultipleexplanationsfortheunevenrecovery,butrarelydotheyciteimmigrationasanaggra-vatingfactor.Ifanything,thedominanteconomicviewisthatlegalizationandamoregenerousimmigrationpolicywouldbringabouteconomicrecovery.7Clearlyvotersfailtoseeitthisway,particularlythoseonthelowerandmiddlerungsofthesocioeconomicladderwhohavenotexperiencedthebenefitsofimmigrationinthesamewayasthewell-off.

Immigration Opinion as a Response to Slow RecoveryForevidencethattheimportanceofimmigrationasanissuehasbeenfueledbyeconomicdownturn,researchrequiressur-veysthataskrespondentstoassessthestateoftheeconomyortojudgethepaceofeconomicrecovery.Mostsocialscientistsrealizethatretrospectiveeconomicassessmentsareimportantguidesformanytypesofdecisions,withsomevotersrelyingheavilyoneconomicappraisalstodecidetheirvote.8

Anumberofsurveysareavailabletodocumenttheassociationbetweeneconomicoutlookandimmigrationopinioninthelead-upto2015.Theresultsaremostlyconsistentsoonlyafewneedtobeshownheretopunctuatetheargument.

6

Center for Immigration Studies

InDecember2014andagaininMay2015,thePewResearchCenteraskedsurveyrespondentstochoosebetweentwobasicoptionsformanagingillegalimmigration:“Whichcomesclosertoyourviewabouthowtohandleundocumentedimmi-grantswhoarenowlivingintheU.S.?1)Theyshouldnotbeallowedtostayinthecountrylegally[OR]2)Thereshouldbeawayforthemtostayinthecountrylegally,ifcertainrequirementsaremet.”

SocialscientistsmightcritiquethePewquestionwordingonmultiplegrounds.Somewouldquestiontheuseoftheterm“un-documented”ratherthan“illegal”,whileotherswouldcomplainthattherequirementsforstayinginthecountryinoptiontworemainunspecified.Theoptionofnotallowingillegalalienstostayinthecountry,byimplicationacallfordeportation,willstrikesomeasanunrealisticchoicetoofferasaresponse.Inspiteoftheselimitations,sharppartisandisagreementap-pearsinbothsurveys,withfarmoreDemocratsthanRepublicansfavoringthelegalizationoption.IntheMaysurvey,onlyweeksbeforeDonaldTrumpannouncedhiscandidacy,Pewalsoaskedroutinequestionsaboutthenationaleconomy,per-sonalfinances,andwhethertheeconomyhadrecoveredfromtherecession.Table4showsthedeepimpactoftheseeconomicassessments.

Policy

ShouldNotStayintheU.S.StayifCertainRequirementsAreMet

χ2=250.4;p≤.001N=3,036

Table 4. Immigration Policy Preference by Views of the Economic Recovery

Recovering Strongly

16.5%83.5%

No SoStrongly

23.3%76.7%

Not at All

54.7%45.3%

Total

28.5%71.5%

Source:PewResearchCenterMonthlySurvey,May2015.

Economic Recovery

First,mostrespondentsareatleastsomewhatforgiving,sayingthey’rewillingtoallowillegalimmigrantstoremainsolongascertain(unspecified)requirementsaremet.Thisresultisconsistentwithothersurveysshowingthatapolicyofoutrightremovalofmorethan11millionillegalimmigrantsisthoughttobeextremeandimpractical.

Viewpointsdoshiftmarkedly,however,comparingthosewhobelievethattheeconomicrecoveryhasbeenstrongtothosewho think that the economyhasnot recoveredat all.More thanhalfof thosedoubting that any recoveryhasoccurredtakeahardlineposition,comparedtoonly16.5percentofthosewhoclaimtheeconomyhasmadeastrongrecovery,a38percentage-pointgap(seeTable4).

Assessmentsoftheeconomyarealsoknowntoberelatedtopartyidentification,education,andage.Certainlyoldervotersandthosewithmiddlinglevelsofeducationaremorelikelytosupportstricterimmigrationenforcement.Buttheimpactofrecessionexperienceonpolicyopinionremainsrobustevenaftercontrollingforthesealternativeexplanations(seeAppen-dixTableA3).Fromthisevidenceitcanbeconcludedthatkeepingeconomicandimmigrationgrievancesincloserhetoricalproximitywassmartpolitics,whetherTrumpwasstudyingRepublicanopinionorjustsensingitsunambiguousdirection.

Thesefindingswillnotbenoveltoresearchersfamiliarwiththehistoryofresearchonthisissue.Immigrationbecomesmorecontroversialintimesofeconomichardship.Fewgeneralizationsinsocialsciencestand-uptoempiricalscrutinyaswellasthisone.

Asafinalpieceofevidence,thePaloAlto-basedresearchfirmYouGovdrewontheirverylargeinternetpanelofnationallyrepresentativesurveyrespondentsineachOctoberin2010,2012,2014,and2015togaugeopiniononseveralimmigrationpolicyoptions.Theirqueryrequiresasimpleyes/noreplytoaproposaltogrant“legalstatustoillegalimmigrantswhohaveheldjobsandpaidtaxesforatleastthreeyearsandhavenofelonyconvictions.”Theyalsoaskaroutinequestionaskingforanevaluationofnationaleconomicconditions.Theexpectation,followingfromTable4fromthePewstudy,isthatnegative

7

evaluationsofeconomicconditionswillbecloselyassociatedwithviewscontrarytolegalization,andthatthispatternwillshowupacrossallfoursurveys,notjustinthe2010surveyclosertotheGreatRecession’slowpoint.9

TheresultsinTable5generallyshowthatpositiveevaluationsofthenationaleconomyareassociatedwithmorelenientat-titudestowardillegalimmigrationthroughsupportforlegalization.Evenin2010,inthemiddleoftheeconomiccrunch,the61percentwhoreportedthattheeconomyhad“gottenmuchbetter”indicatedthatlegalizationwasanacceptablepolicyoption,comparedwithonly14percentofthosewhoindicatedthattheeconomyhad“gottenmuchworse”.

Year and Views on Legalization

2010 YesNo

2012 YesNo

2014 YesNo

2015 YesNo

Table 5. Immigration Policy Preference by Evaluation of National Economic Conditions

Gotten Much better

60.8%39.2%

71.3%28.7%

74.8%25.2%

75.4%24.6%

Gotten Better

67.8%32.2%

68.4%31.6%

70.1%29.9%

69.2%30.8%

Gotten Much

Worse

14.3%85.7%

24.2%75.8%

20.6%79.4%

25.0%75.0%

Stayed About the

Same

51.0%49.0%

49.8%50.2%

46.4%53.6%

46.5%53.5%

Total

39.7%60.3%

47.8%52.2%

48.1%51.9%

49.0%51.0%

Gotten Worse

30.0%70.0%

33.0%67.0%

31.8%68.2%

34.7%65.3%

Source:YouGovCCESSurveysfrom2010,2012,2014,and2015.

National Economic Evaluation

χ2=8,529.9;p≤.001,N=54,653

χ2=6,100.8;p≤.001,N=53,820

χ2=6,739.7;p≤.001,N=54,631

χ2=1,548.3;p≤.001,N=13,793

By2015,thisgaphadgrownevenwider,to50points,separatingthoseatthetwoextremesofeconomicevaluation(seeTable5).Wellaftertherecessionhadbeendeclared“over”,voters’grimassessmentsofthenationaleconomywereshapingtheirviewsonimmigrationpolicy.Whateverelsemayconditionimmigrationpolicyviews;theseresultsdonotleavemuchdoubtabouthoweconomicanxietiesarerelatedtoviewsaboutthelegalizationofundocumentedimmigrants.

Conclusions DonaldTrump’srapidriseintheearlymonthsofthe2016campaigncyclemaybesurprising,butabiggersurpriseiswhynoothercandidatesemphasizedimmigrationcontrol,eitherin2015orearlier,whenmultiplesourcesshowedthesamedistri-butionofopinion.Aswehaveseen,oppositiontothelegalizationofillegalimmigrantsdidnotsuddenlymaterializeinlate2014,eitheramongRepublicansoramongthepublicatlarge.Rather,theviewpointsofGOPregularshavebeenignoredforalongtime,certainlyasfarbackasthebeginningoftheGreatRecession.ThiscollectionoffactsshouldresolvepartofthepuzzleofhowsuchanimprobableoutsiderwontheRepublicannomination.

ImmigrationpositioningnotonlyqualifiedTrumpforthenominationasfarasprimaryvoterswereconcerned,butitalsoproveddisqualifyingforJebBushandMarcoRubio,theleadingalternatives.Inthisdevelopment,wewerereminded,onceagain,ofthelimitsofthepowerofbig-moneyinsidersinmajorelections.IftheBrahminGOPdonorshadtheirway,some-oneelsewouldhavewonthenomination.RepublicanleadersunhappywithTrumparenowleftwonderinghowtheymightregaincontrolofthenominationprocesssoastostructuretheoutcomemoresecurelynexttime.

8

Center for Immigration Studies

NoneofthisistoarguethatTrump’spositiononwall-buildingorotherimmigrationcontrolmeasuresaregoingtobewin-nersinthe2016generalelection.Hisstandsmayhelpandhurtinequalmeasure,windingupneutralinimpact.Fortheirpart,independentvotersarenotveryissue-orientedintheirdecisionmaking,whentheyvoteatall,andprobablycarelittleandknowevenlessaboutthecandidates’viewsonspecificpolicies.

Nordoesanythinginthispapersuggestthatgoingoutofone’swaytoantagonizeLatinoorimmigrantvoters,ratherthanstickingtoadisciplineddiscussionofimmigrationpolicyoptions,isawinningstrategyforthegeneralelection.FavoringastricterimmigrationpolicydoesnotalienateeveryLatinoorimmigrantvoter.Tosaysoistoassertthatallimmigrantssharethesameviewofimmigrationpolicy.Atthesametime,thesevoterswillbeeasilyalienatedbyattacksthatgolesstopolicychoicesandmoretotheirethnicandnationalitybackground.

Finally,weseethatviewsaboutimmigrationpolicyarenottheonlymattersthatseparateelitesfrommasseswithintheGOP.Arguably,economicexperienceshavebecomeverydifferentaswell.AsCharlesMurrayhasemphasized,thepeoplewhoaremostactivelyseekingtoexerciseinfluenceongovernmenthavelittleornodirectexperiencewiththelivesofordinaryAmericans.They “make their judgments aboutwhat’s good forotherpeoplebasedon theirownhighly atypical lives.”10MisjudgmentsbytheleadingRepublicancampaignsaboutimmigrationpolicyareonlyhalfthestory.Theotherhalfistheirapparentcluelessnessabouttheenduringeconomichardshipsanduncertaintiesproducedbyeconomicrestructuring.

ThegreatironyisthatsomeonewhohaslivedalifeassecureandinsularasDonaldTrumpwoundupwithasenseofrank-and-fileopinionsomuchclearerthanpoliticianswhosebusinessitistoaccuratelyperceivewhattheirvotersthink.OnecanonlyconcludethattheremustbeapowerfulsourceofsignaldistortionhoveringaroundWashington,D.C.,suchthatpoliticalelitesbecomedesensitizedtotheconcernsandproblemsoftypicalcitizens.Themassmediausedtofacilitatethisconnection,buttheyarenolongerviewedascredible,objectivesourcesofinformation.Adurablereconnectionofelectorstotheelectedisnotlikelytobefoundinthenominationofanoddandimpulsiveoutsidersomuchasitisinmorelastingchangesaimedatremovingtheobstaclestoclearmessagetransmission.

9

Appendix Tables

Independent Variables

PartyIdentification(5-pointRtoD)

Women

Age

Hispanic

Asian

Income$25-$30,000

Income$30-$40,000

Income$40-$50,000

Income$50-$75,000

Income$75-$100,000

Income$100,000Up

HighSchoolOnly

SomeCollege

4YearsCollegeandUp

Cutpoint1

Cutpoint2

Cutpoint3

NLLAIC*p<.05;**p<.01

Table A1. Explaining Respondents’ Self-Reports about the Importance of Immigration Policy to Their Vote in 2016

b (SEb)

-.17(.02)

.13(.08).01

(.002).03

(.15)-.49(.28)-.10(.15)-.10(.14)-.22(.16)-.17(.12)-.22(.14)-.46(.12)-.01(.18).21

(.18)-.12(.18)-2.01(.31)-.43(.31)1.12(.31)2,295

-2,946.1;p≤.0015,926.2

**

**

**

Probability of Extremely Important

with X at Highest

.23

.39

.21

Probability ofExtremely Important

with X at Lowest

.36

.20

.30

Difference

-.13

.19

-.09

Source:CNN/ORCCombinedFebruaryandJune2015SurveysDependentvariable:1=notimportant;2=moderatelyimportant;3=veryimportant;4=extremelyimportant,estimatedwithorderedlogisticregression.

10

Center for Immigration Studies

Independent Variables

PartyIdentification(5-pointRtoD)

Women

Age

Hispanic

Asian

Income$25-$30,000

Income$30-$40,000

Income$40-$50,000

Income$50-$75,000

Income$75-$100,000

Income$100,000Up

HighSchoolOnly

SomeCollege

4YearsCollegeandUp

Constant

NLLAIC*p<.05;**p<.01

Table A2. Explaining Respondents’ Preferences for Illegal Immigration Policy in CNN/ORC Surveys

b (SEb)

-.51(.03)

-.10(.08).01

(.002)-.81(.17)-.14(.28).12

(.16).06

(.14)-.36(.17)-.16(.13)-.49(.15)-.25(.13)-.31(.18)-.51(.18)-1.11(.19)2.69(.33)

3,065-1,794;p≤.001

3,618

Probability ofStop Illegal Flow

with X at Highest

.26

.58

.30

.39

.36

.42

.38

.31

Probability ofStop Illegal Flow with X at Lowest

.72

.37

.49

.48

.48

.48

.51

.58

Difference

-.46

.21-.19

-.09

-.12-.06

-.13-.27

Source:CNN/ORCCombinedDecember2014andFebruaryandJuly2015surveys.Dependentvariable:0=focusonlegalization;1=focusonstoppingflowofillegalsanddeporta-tion,estimatedwithlogisticregression.

**

**

**

**

**

*

**

**

11

Independent Variables

EconomicRecovery:NotSoStrong

EconomicRecovery:NotatAll

PartyIdentification(5-pointRtoD)

Women

Age

Hispanic

Asian

Income$10-$20,000

Income$20-$30,000

Income$30-$40,000

Income$40-$50,000

Income$50-$75,000

Income$75-$100,000

Income$100-$150,000

Income$150,000Up

SomeHighSchool

HighSchoolDiploma

SomeCollege

2-YearDegree

4-YearDegree

SomePostGraduate

PostGraduateDegree

Constant

NLLAIC*p<.05;**p<.01

Table A3. Explaining Respondents’ Preferences for Illegal Immigration Policy in Pew Survey

b (SEb)

-.01(.32).98

(.35)-.28(.06)

-.22(.18).02

(.005)-.82(.33).79

(.52)-.24(.44)-.07(.41)-.15(.43).12

(.45)-.29(.42)-.13(.42)-.67(.44)-.83(.48)1.21(.91)1.99(.83)1.67(.85)1.78(.86).68

(.86).73

(1.08).81

(.86)-1.31(1.12)

850-409.4;p≤.001

864.8

Probability ofDisapproving

Legalization with X at Highest

.38

.13

.31

.12

.57

.53

.58

Probability ofDisapproving

Legalizationwith X at Lowest

.19

.37

.16

.24

.15

.17

.19

Difference

.19

.24

.15

-.12

.42

.36

.39

Source:CNN/ORCCombinedDecember2014andFebruaryandJuly2015surveys.Dependentvariable:0=focusonlegalization;1=focusonstoppingflowofillegalsanddeporta-tion,estimatedwithlogisticregression.

*

*

*

12

Center for Immigration Studies

End Notes1Fordetails,seetheTrumpcampaignwebsite,accessedJune5,2016.

2DenizCam,“BillionairesRallyAroundImmigration,AgainstTrump’s ‘Xenophobia’”,Forbes,March12,2016.AccessedJune4,2016.AshleyParker,“Big-NameG.O.P.DonorsUrgeMembersofCongresstoBackImmigrationOverhaul”,The New York Times,July31,2013.AccessedJune4,2016.LauraMeckler,“SomeGOPDonorsStepUpImmigrationPush”,Wall Street Journal,October23,2013.AccessedJune4,2016.

3SalilKapur,“Rubio’s ImmigrationEffortsHauntHisPresidentialAmbitions”,BloombergNews,November3,2015.Ac-cessedJune5,2016.McKayCoppins,“MarcoRubioRakesInDonorMoneyByToutingImmigrationRecord—BehindClosedDoors”,BuzzFeedNews,April22,2015.AccessedJune5,2016.

4ForasummaryofopiniontrendsbasedonPewResearchCenterpolls,seeDaraLind,“OneChartShowsWhytheRepub-licanPartywasReadyforDonaldTrump”,Vox,May3,2016.AccessedJune6,2016.5Measuresofstatisticalassociationbetweenpartyidentificationandtheseriousnessofillegalimmigrationnearlydoublebetween2007and2010.

6ThisviewpointonswingvotersisspelledoutinD.SunshineHillygusandToddG.Shields,The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Political Campaigns,Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006.

7DavidFrum,“DoesImmigrationHarmWorkingAmericans?”The Atlantic,January5,2015.AccessedJune4,2016.GeorgeJ.Borjas.2013.“ImmigrationandtheAmericanWorker”,CenterforImmigrationStudiesBackgrounder,April,2013.

8Forageneralstatement,seeChapter13ofMichaelS.Lewis-Beck,WilliamG.Jacoby,HelmutNorpoth,andHerbertF.Weisberg,The American Voter Revisited, AnnArbor,Mich.:TheUniversityofMichiganPress,2008.AclassicstatementoneconomicvotingcanbefoundinChapter14ofAngusCampbell,PhilipE.Converse,WarrenE.Miller,andDonaldE.Stokes,The American Voter,NewYork:JohnWiley&Sons,1960.Onhoweconomicevaluationsarepoliticized,seeAlanS.GerberandGregoryA.Huber,“Partisanship,PoliticalControlandEconomicAssessments”,American Journal of Political Science54:1:153-173,2009.Ontheoriginsofnationaleconomicevaluations,seeAndrewReevesandJamesG.Gimpel,2012.“Ecolo-giesofUnease:GeographicContextandNationalEconomicEvaluations”,Political Behavior34:3:507-534,2012.

9Objectiveeconomicconditionsmaybelessrelevanttoopinionthanalingeringorpersistentthreatofeconomichardship.See JudithL.GoldsteinandMargaretE.Peters,“NativismorEconomicThreat:Attitudes towardImmigrantsDuring theGreatRecession”,International Interactions40:3:376-401,2014.

10CharlesMurray,Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010,NewYork:CrownForum,2012,p.105.