European Crime Prevention Network

Theoretical Paper

Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

Trafficking in Illicit Firearms: a global and

European overview

In the framework of the project ‘The development of the observatory function of the European Centre of Expertise on Crime Prevention within

the EUCPN’ - EUCPN Secretariat, February 2015, Brussels

With the financial support of the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union

European Commission – Directorate-General Home Affairs

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

2

Abstract

This theoretical paper is published by the EUCPN Secretariat in connection with the

theme of the Dutch Presidency, which is trafficking in illicit firearms. With the terrorist

attacks that shook Europe the past months in hindsight, the subject is more relevant

than ever. Trafficking in illicit firearms is a dangerous and deadly business, which should

not be taken lightly. Because of the cross-border aspect of trafficking in illicit firearms, it

is important to have a global overview. Where do the weapons come from, how do they

enter the illicit market and what are the modus operandi of the traffickers?

This paper should function as a base for a more prevention-orientated manual in which

we will look at the difficulties and attempts to prevent trafficking in illicit firearms.

Furthermore we will focus at the main international weapons and what the international

agencies already do against the phenomenon.

Through these actions, we hope to raise awareness concerning trafficking in illicit

firearms, to exchange good practices and hopefully to propose general guidelines for a

trafficking in illicit firearms policy.

Citation

EUCPN (2016). Trafficking in Illicit Firearms: a global and European overview. In: EUCPN

Secretariat (eds.), EUCPN Theoretical Paper Series, European Crime Prevention Network:

Brussels.

Legal notice

The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the official opinions of any EU

Member State or any agency or institution of the European Union or European

Communities.

Authors

Loy Meijers, Intern EUCPN Secretariat

Febe Liagre, Policy and Practice Officer EUCPN

Cindy Verleysen, Research Officer EUCPN

EUCPN Secretariat

Waterloolaan / Bd. de Waterloo 76 1000 Brussels, Belgium

Phone: +32 2 557 33 30 Fax: +32 2 557 35 23

eucpn@ibz.eu – www.eucpn.org

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

3

Table of contents 1. Definition ..................................................................................................................................... 4

2. A global overview ........................................................................................................................ 4

2.1. Demand: Two markets ................................................................................................................. 7

2.1.1. Organized Crime Groups ....................................................................................................... 7

2.1.2. Political Groups ..................................................................................................................... 7

3. Logistics ....................................................................................................................................... 9

3.1. Supply of the illicit market ........................................................................................................... 9

3.1.1. Illicit production .................................................................................................................. 10

3.1.2. Leakage from the factory .................................................................................................... 10

3.1.3. Fake exports ........................................................................................................................ 10

3.1.4. Conversion of non-lethal firearms....................................................................................... 11

3.1.5. Recycling of discarded weapons, re-use of the surplus parts and 3D printing .................. 12

3.1.6. Theft or fraud from legal dealers or private owners of legal firearms................................ 13

3.2. Firearm routes ............................................................................................................................ 14

3.2.1. Inside Europe ....................................................................................................................... 14

3.2.2. Balkan’s Bazar ...................................................................................................................... 16

3.2.3. Dark Markets ....................................................................................................................... 17

4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 19

5. Annex 1: Data Graphic 1 ............................................................................................................ 20

6. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 21

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

4

Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

1. Definition Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are being called the weapons of mass destruction

of this era. Of course in the big cities of Europe this is of a different order than in areas of

conflict like the Middle-East, however it is still problematic, because in the hands of the

wrong person, firearms can, and will, be deadly. For example the firearms violence

between juvenile gangs in London, but also more recently the terrorist attack on the

satiric weekly paper Charlie Hebdo and after that the series of terrorist attacks on

November 13th that both happened in Paris. These are just a few examples of the

problematic situation around illicit firearms. The United Nations Firearms Protocol defines

the illicit trafficking in firearms as such:

““Illicit trafficking” shall mean the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement

or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across the

territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties

concerned does not authorize it in accordance with the terms of this Protocol or if the

firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol.”1

The illicit trafficking in firearms is often being named in the same sentence and is closely

linked with other illegal activities such as drug smuggling, trafficking in human beings,

financial crimes, terrorism, gang violence etc. The firearms trade causes more social and

political problems than economic problems because of the durability of firearms, one can

be in circulation for several decades.

There are also discrepancies between national and international legislation. Players in the

trade find themselves in a grey area because the legal qualification is not clear: is it legal

or illegal? The question is which legal base is being used: national or international

legislation. National authorized transactions are not always legal transactions, they can

be in conflict with own national legislation or wider international legislation. An example

is when Wallonia, the southern part of Belgium, allowed weapon deliveries to the

Khadafy-regime while on a federal level there was being raised awareness for the human

rights situation in Libya2.

2. A global overview It is being estimated that in the regions of the United Nations there are 640 million illicit

firearms in circulation, which is around 1 illicit firearm per 11 people. Yearly around

500.000 people die as a result of the use of illicit firearms; whereof 300.000 die in armed

conflicts. Still around 8 million legal firearms are being produced every year3. Most

1 Article 3 Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime, 31 May 2001. 2 Amnesty International (2014). Wapens en gerelateerde goederen (Thematische Fiche). Antwerp: Amnesty International, p.3. Retrieved from https://www.aivl.be/sites/default/files/bijlagen/VERK2014_03_WAPENSENGERELATEERDEGOEDEREN_17-3.pdf 3 Fijnaut, C. (2008). De bestrijding van de illegale vuurwapenhandel. Het beleid van de Verenigde Naties en de Europese Unie. Justitiële Verkenningen, 34(4), pp. 9-28. Retrieved from: https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/jv200804-illegale-wapenhandel.aspx

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

5

firearms will be produced and traded legally, and will only later on arrive in the illegal

circuit.

A significant limitation to collecting and analyzing reliable data on the number of illicit

firearms seizures is the absence in all Member States of central databases for reporting

information on recovered firearms and ballistic material4. Using data retrieved from

www.gunpolicy.org we can compare the Member States with each other. Below, in

Graphic 1, 2 numbers have been set out. The rear bars are the estimates for civilian

firearm possession per 100 civilians5. This estimate contains both licit and illicit firearms.

It is important to remember that illicit firearms cannot be counted. So in this category,

only estimates can be attempted. The bar in front of this one gives an estimate of the

registered number of firearms in given country6. This estimate is also not perfectly

reliable, since the data is sometimes dated and gunpolicy.org uses the last available

data7. The two estimates can be subtracted from each other, the difference that remains

will be a rough estimation of the number of illicit firearms in given country.

4 European Commission (2014). Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU (Final Report). Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p.20. (Hereafter: Impact Assessment Report (2014). Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/general/docs/dg_home_-_illicit_fireams_trafficking_final_en.pdf 5 Alpers, Philip, Amélie Rossetti and Leonardo Goi. 2016. Guns in France: Rate of Civilian Firearm Possession per 100 Population. Sydney School of Public Health, The University of Sydney. GunPolicy.org, 23 February. Accessed 9 March 2016. at: http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compare/66/rate_of_civilian_firearm_possession/18,28,46,48,49,50,61,65,69,71,81,86,99,112,104,125,148,149,152,163,247,177,172,192 6 Alpers, Philip, Amélie Rossetti and Leonardo Goi. 2016. Guns in France: Rate of Registered Firearms per 100 Population. Sydney School of Public Health, The University of Sydney. GunPolicy.org, 23 February. Accessed 9 March 2016. at: http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compare/66/rate_of_registered_firearms_per_100_population/18,28,46,48,49,50,61,65,69,71,81,86,99,112,104,125,148,149,152,163,247,177,172,192 7 In Malta and Denmark, for example, there are more registered firearms than there are licit and illicit firearms according to this graphic, which is not possible. This is because the data is dated. See Annex 1 for exact dates and numbers.

01020304050

Fin

lan

d

Cyp

rus

Swed

en

Fran

ce

Au

stri

a

Ger

man

y

Po

rtu

gal

Gre

ece

Cro

atia

Bu

lgar

ia

Latv

ia

Be

lgiu

m

Cze

ch R

epu

blic

Luxe

mb

ou

rg

Slo

ven

ia

De

nm

ark

Ital

y

Mal

ta

Spai

n

Esto

nia

Slo

vaki

a

Un

ite

d K

ingd

om

Ire

lan

d

Hu

nga

ry

Net

her

lan

ds

Po

lan

d

Ro

man

ia

Lith

uan

ia

Registered Firearms - Firearm Possession

Rate of Registered Firearms per 100 Population

Rate of Civilian Firearm Possession per 100 Population

Graphic 1: Registered Firearms - Firearms Possession

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

6

Graphic 2: Annual Firearm Deaths

It immediately stands out that Finland has most firearms per civilian. To be exact 45

firearms (licit/illicit) per 100 population. The data for firearm possession is not enough to

suggest whether or not firearm possession is problematic in a given country, since this is

dependent on different factors. In Graphic 28 the number of firearm related deaths in a

given country are set out.

Now, Graphic 1 and Graphic 2 can be compared. At this point we should be careful with

drawing conclusions, but we can interpret the numbers. Finland ranks the highest in

firearm deaths and in firearm possession. They have easy access to firearms, and tend to

use them quicker when intoxicated9. The same goes for Croatia, they score above

average on firearm possession, and they score high on firearm deaths. Estonia and

Lithuania score low on firearm possession, but high on firearm related deaths, therefore

the number of deaths per firearm is high. Sweden, for example, ranks third in firearm

possession, but in firearm deaths Sweden ranks twelfth. On average they possess more

firearms than other countries, however they have an average number of deaths by

firearms compared to other countries. The same goes for Germany and Portugal.

This indicates that there are discrepancies between countries in their firearm possession

and firearm deaths, but a high number of firearm possession does not implicitly mean a

high number of firearm deaths. Other factors need to be taken into account. Now we

have given a global overview on the scale of the firearms market and the deaths that go

with it. In a next part we will explore who are the main actors of this market.

8 Alpers, P. & Wilson, M. (2016). Guns in Germany: Rate of All Gun Deaths per 100,000 People. Sydney School of Public Health, The University of Sydney. GunPolicy.org, 23 February. Accessed 9 March 2016. at: http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compare/69/rate_of_all_gun_deaths_per_100_000_people/18,28,46,48,49,50,61,65,69,71,81,86,99,112,104,125,148,149,152,163,247,177,172,192 9 Yle Uutiset News (21.12.2015). Something terrible has happened”: Does Finland need to wake up to its gun problem? Retrieved from: http://yle.fi/uutiset/something_terrible_has_happened_does_finland_need_to_wake_up_to_its_gun_problem/8535425

0

1

2

3

4

Fin

lan

d

Fran

ce

Cro

atia

Esto

nia

Slo

ven

ia

Cze

ch R

epu

blic

Be

lgiu

m

Slo

vaki

a

Bu

lgar

ia

Lith

uan

ia

Latv

ia

Gre

ece

Swed

en

Po

rtu

gal

De

nm

ark

Ger

man

y

Hu

nga

ry

Ire

lan

d

Cyp

rus

Net

her

lan

ds

Spai

n

Mal

ta

Po

lan

d

Un

ite

d K

ingd

om

Ro

man

ia

Annual Firearm Deaths in Europe

Firearm deaths per 100 population

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

7

2.1. Demand: Two markets There are a lot of reasons why someone would want to possess firearms: for criminal

purposes; ideological purposes; for collecting; hunting or for leisure purposes. In this

part, two of the most important criminal demand markets will be discussed, which are

Organized Crime Groups and Political Groups.

2.1.1. Organized Crime Groups

We can distinguish between direct and indirect damage caused by the criminal use of

firearms. The number of killings, the direct impact, in the EU alone was over 10.000 the

first decade of the 21st century, and an additional 4.000 suicides by firearm each year10.

The indirect impact is the use of firearms by organized crime groups (OCG’s) involved in

the illegal drugs market and trafficking in human beings to intimidate and coerce their

victims, which cannot be measured. There are clear connections between the trafficking

in illicit firearms and OCG’s, such as: carrying firearms as an intrinsic aspect of trafficking

operations; transnational criminal networks that to some extent specialize in illicit

firearms trafficking; and the already mentioned intimidation of victims and self-defense

by local and national gangs11. These three categories are likely to co-exist.

The 2011 Europol Review showed that the possession of firearms by OCG’s is rising in

Europe. They are forming a significant threat to themselves, the general public and law

enforcement personnel because of their willingness to misuse these firearms. Civilians

are often caught in the crossfire between rival gangs. Most OCG’s prefer firearms, but we

can also notice an upward trend in the use of SALW such as the AK-47 and explosive

devices. The OCG’s rely on the commercial rules of supply and demand. Areas in which

SALW are prohibited and areas of conflict present business opportunities for OCG’s. For

example Russian and Italian criminal organizations were dealing in illicit firearms in the

midst of the Yugoslav conflicts12.

2.1.2. Political Groups

Whereas OCG’s are part of the market that buys firearms for criminal purposes, there is

also a market that buys firearms for political ones, which emerges when a set of militants

finds the resources to equip an unauthorized force, which is of a lesser extent in the EU

than in areas of conflict such as the Middle-East and Africa. Three separatist movements

in Europe that belong in this category and remain heavily armed are: the Northern

Ireland paramilitary groups, the Spanish ETA group and the Corsican nationalist

movements. They possess vast arsenals of weapons, which OCG’s do not require.

According to Europol’s recently published ‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trends Report’ (TE-

SAT 2013), an increased use of firearms has been observed across a variety of terrorist

and extremist groups. Thus, “terrorists and violent extremists have also been found in

possession of a significant amount of firearms and ammunition over the reporting period.

The use of firearms by terrorists and violent extremists has increased in recent years.

This modus operandi appears to be emerging across a range of ideologies and is of

10 UNODC (2011). Global study on homicide: trends, context, data. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf 11 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p.31. 12 Hurst, C., Mariani, B. & Davis, I. (2001). Organized crime, corruption and illicit arms trafficking in an enlarged EU. London: Saferworld, p.25. Retrieved from: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/76-organised-crime-corruption-and-illicit-arms-trafficking-in-an-enlarged-eu

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

8

concern”13. The number of terrorist attacks and use of firearms kept increasing in 201414.

Furthermore, when looking at the recent events, this can also be stated by 2015 and the

beginning of 2016.

In a key stakeholder15 survey from the European Commission some questions were

asked about the illicit firearms market. One of them can be viewed in Table 1, below16.

Table 1: “Who are the main groups involved in illicit firearms trafficking in your

country?”

Options Most Important Least Important

Nº % Nº %

Terrorists 3 3.8 8 10

Organized

Criminal

Groups

12 15 1 1.3

Non-Organized

Criminal

Groups

4 5 5 6.3

No answer 61 73.3 66 82.5

Total 80 100 80 100

Twelve stakeholders answered that OCG’s are the most important actors in trafficking

illicit firearms, and one stakeholder answered that OCG’s were the least important actors.

Only 3 stakeholders answered that Terrorists are the most important actors in trafficking

illicit firearms, and 8 answered that they were the least important. Since OCG’s use

firearms to protect their illegal activities and to establish a base of income, they can be a

serious threat to security within the EU. Dr. Domitilla Sagramoso describes the threat as

such:

“Although the influx of weapons into the European Union (EU) is not overwhelming, there

is a regular trickle of small arms primarily from the Balkan region, as well as from

Eastern Europe, which could increase as the EU and the Schengen Rim both expand to

the east and south-east. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Warsaw Pact

and the wars in former Yugoslavia have resulted in a relaxation of border controls and an

excess supply of light weapons, some of which have found their way into Europe. Small

arms and light weapons (SALW) have fed the local criminal underworld as well as

European terrorist groups, such as the Real IRA, thus contributing to the undermining of

West European public safety.”17

13 Europol (2013). EU Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2013, p.7. (Hereafter: TE-SAT). Retrieved from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/te-sat-2013-eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report 14 Europol (2015). TE-SAT 2015, p.9. Retrieved from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2015 15

Stakeholders are for example law enforcement agencies, national authorities, entities covered by the UN Firearms Protocol, judges, public prosecutors and academics. 16 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p.151. 17 Sagramoso, D. (2001). The proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons in and around the European Union: instability, organized crime and terrorist group. London: Saferworld & Centre for Defense Studies, p.5. Retrieved from: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/77-the-proliferation-of-illegal-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-and-around-the-european-union (Hereafter: Sagramoso (2001))

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

9

If there is demand, either from political groups or OCG’s, there must be supply according

to the commercial rules of the market. Where do the firearms come from and how do

they enter the illicit market if most of the firearms are produced legally? We will look at

just that in the following chapter.

3. Logistics

3.1. Supply of the illicit market The supply of firearms which are being trafficked illicitly since the 1990’s can be

originated to three main sources, which have replaced each other:

- First of all the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact were a source of illicit

firearms in the aftermath of the collapse of the iron curtain;

- Then, during the wars of Yugoslav succession, the Western Balkans became an

important source of illicit firearms;

- More recently, North Africa has superseded the former, with a pool of weapons

available and following some of the main drug trafficking routes into the EU.18

As an example we can name the Soviet Army’s military base in Estonia. At the end of the

1980’s, when the communist regime was collapsing and the control over the Soviet

Army’s weaponry decreased, a considerable number of firearms and military equipment

were illegally obtained by some of the civilians residing in Estonia when the Soviet Union

left. They exchanged money, alcohol, food and other goods for Kalashnikov rifles,

Makarov pistols and ammunition. The number of weapons using this scheme range from

several hundreds to several thousands19. This is just one of the ways how licit weapons

enter the illicit market. We can distinguish between 7 different ways. The following

diagram, obtained from Spapens (2007), gives a clear view in the logistical progress of

the illicit market:

18 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p. 34. 19 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p. 35.

Figure 1: Licit to illicit (Spapens 2007)

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

10

3.1.1. Illicit production

In the upper left corner of Figure 1, you can see the ‘Illicit production’. Although an

estimated 95% of the illicit firearms seized in the Netherlands between 1998-2000 could

be traced back to a legal manufacturer20, there remains a small portion that is being

produced in an illicit way. This can occur in three ways: original designs are being

manufactured at home or in workshops by amateurs; illicit copies of existing designs are

produced in factories and third; the production of legitimate arms manufacturers is

fraudulently diverted21. Amateurs tend to get handy when it comes to crafting firearms:

At the end of the 90’s guns were seized that looked like key chains throughout Europe. In

1999 the Dutch police seized 135 of these handcrafted weapons, whose bullets are

smaller, but are nonetheless deadly. The weapons probably came from Bulgaria22. A

second way of illicit production is the production of firearms in a legal twilight area. This

happened for example during the wars between the countries of the former Yugoslavia in

the 1990’s, when several small scale weapons factories were set up in Croatia to be able

to meet the great demand for weapons independently of foreign countries. These

weapons, so called ‘Croatian Uzi’s’ were found in the Dutch criminal world between 1998-

200023. Thirdly, firearms can be illicitly manufactured by legitimate arms producers which

is only possible when internal controls are defective at these manufacturers. In this way

FN pistols that were completely identical to the legally manufactured weapons but lacking

serial numbers or test-bench marks appeared regularly in the Netherlands24. A thorough

investigation revealed that some of the employees had stolen components in order to

assemble them into working weapons at home.

3.1.2. Leakage from the factory

Besides the illicit production it is more common that the firearms are produced licit and

due to fraud or theft of complete weapons from the factory they enter the illicit market

before they were transported to the buyers. A Yugoslav residing in the Netherlands was

arrested in 1996 on the German-Austrian border at Passau with 200 pistols in his van,

which leaked from the Zastava company in Belgrade. It was not his first time: previously

he already smuggled a few hundred weapons to the Netherlands and had sold them on to

criminals. When his house was searched they found the original packaging complete with

warranty certificates25. In this regard the EUCPN network got the assignment in 2010 to

develop a handbook including guidelines for national authorities in order to prevent thefts

of firearms at critical distribution points26.

3.1.3. Fake exports

One of the most lucrative methods of transferring firearms from the licit to the illicit

market is fake export, because it happens in large quantities and depends on corruption

20 Krause, K. (2000). Small Arms and Light Weapons: Proliferation Processes and Policy Options. Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, p.18. Retrieved from: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 21 Spapens, A. C. M. (2007). Trafficking in Illicit Firearms for Criminal Purposes within the European Union. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 15(3), 359-381, p.363. Retrieved from: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/923753/fulltext.pdf (Hereafter: Spapens (2007)) 22 Kuijper, R. & Leest, Van der, S. (2002). Vuurwapencriminaliteit op basis van het Vuurwapendatasysteem in 2001. Zoetermeer: Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, Landelijk Bureau Wapens en Munitie, p. 11. 23 Spapens, A.C.M. & Bruinsma, M.Y. (2002). Vuurwapens gezocht: vuurwapengebruik, -bezit en -handel in Nederland 1998-2000. Tilburg. Retrieved from: https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/aard-en-omvang-van-de-vuurwapencriminaliteit.aspx 24 Korps Landelijke Politiediensten (1997). De aard en omvang van vuurwapencriminaliteit in Nederland, periode 1991-1995. Zoetermeer. 25 Spapens (2007) p. 365. 26 Council of the European Union (2010). Draft European Action Plan to combat illegal trafficking in so called “heavy” firearms which could be used or are used in criminal activities. Brussels: 29 November 2010, p.10. Retrieved from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/118171.pdf

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

11

in the country of destination. If the applicable export requirements are met, firearms can

legally be delivered to foreign purchasers. A central role here is being played by the ‘end-

user-certificates’, whereby the receiving country guarantee that the transaction is

legitimate. This is why it depends on corruption, since the end-user-certificate must be

bribed. Then the ‘transaction’ can take place, which only happens on paper while the

weapons disappear with an unknown destination.

Another case of false documentation appeared in the course of 2012, when authorities

identified a new trend in the illegal trade of firearms and ammunition involving legal

entities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Companies registered in

compliance with domestic law and the regulations appeared to engage in illegal sales of

firearms and ammunition, however they were found to be falsifying documentation, such

as through false declarations of theft, in order to facilitate illicit exports27.

Normally they choose a country that is not in the possibility to check if the weapons

arrived. But they can also be exported directly from the producing country to unknown

destinations. The Croatian company HS, for example, sold 3700 pistols to post-office box

companies in the United States, Nigeria and the British Virgin Islands. These weapons

never arrived, but where confiscated in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France,

Denmark, Spain and the Czech Republic28.

A last case of fake exportation that needs to be discussed is exportation via detours.

Weapons are delivered by the factory to a broker, who can export the weapons on paper

to another country of destination if he has the required licenses. An example is when

firearms were purchased from various foreign manufacturers by two Belgian arms

dealers in 1998. They were sold on paper to a Dutch broker who ‘exported’ them, but

they already entered the illicit domain from Belgium. Using this technique, some Belgian

arms dealers diverted a few tens of thousands firearms29. Because of the large amounts

they were also smuggled outside the EU. To this day, some of these weapons are still

emerging all over Europe.

3.1.4. Conversion of non-lethal firearms

A fourth way is the conversion of non-lethal firearms to lethal barreled firearms for the

purpose of selling them in the criminal milieu. This happens on a large scale since non-

lethal firearms are freely available and some types can be converted quite easily through

a couple adaptions. An example is the conversion of a gas- or an alarm pistol. They are,

however, less reliable and potentially dangerous for the user since the materials are not

designed to withstand the higher gas pressure that occurs with live ammunition. Besides

that, the converted firearms have not been subject to tests on test benches30. In the

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia this form of trafficking was identified. Authorities

reported the trafficking of gas or signal pistols initially purchased abroad and

subsequently converted in the country to fire explosive ammunition. The converted

firearms then sell within the country for €100-€150 each or are trafficked to other

27 UNODC (2015). Study on firearms 2015. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p.50. https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/UNODC_Study_on_Firearms_WEB.pdf (Hereafter: UNODC (2015)) 28 Information provided by the Bundeskriminalamt during the European Firearms Experts Meeting, Noordwijk, 7 and 8 December 2004. 29 Korps Landelijke Politiediensten (1997). De aard en omvang van vuurwapencriminaliteit in Nederland, periode 1991-1995. Zoetermeer. 30 Spapens (2007), p.366.

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

12

European countries where they are sold for approximately €300-€50031. Another

common example of this situation is the modification of gas pistols that can be purchased

without a permit in Latvia and transferred to another country (e.g. Estonia or Lithuania,

or the UK) where they are modified32

Furthermore there are more ways to convert firearms. They can be converted in a

physical matter, as described above, but they can also be converted in a legal matter. If

a government decides that a previously legal firearm should be illegal, a whole category

of firearms becomes illegal and are, by law, subject to the illicit market.

3.1.5. Recycling of discarded weapons, re-use of the surplus parts and

3D printing

A fifth way of obtaining illicit firearms is by recycling weapons that have been withdrawn

from service, in other words, have been neutralized. In Germany and Austria, for

example, there are wholesale firms that buy up scrapped firearms by the lot and have

them converted to alarm pistols or to deactivated weapons for decoration. Criminal gangs

soon figured out that these weapons could be reactivated into lethal firearms33. This

process has been happening in Europe for several decades now. In 2004 the Dutch police

seized Walther’s PP’s (James Bond’s pistol) that had been used by the Swedish police.

Soon after they discovered34 that Sweden sold a lot of these firearms to a German junk

dealer a similar case happened in different European countries. Makarov pistols were

turning up left and right in Europe and it turned out that these pistols had been used by

the East-German police and had been sold to an Austrian junk dealer, who converted

them into alarm pistols. A Croatian group succeeded in buying considerable numbers of

these pistols and converting them back to lethal weapons. The German

Bundeskriminalamt estimates that some 9000 Makarov, FEG, and Tokarev pistols have

been recycled of which some 400 have been seized in Western-Europe up to the end of

200435.

In a similar way, weapons from surplus lots for which there was no more use leak into

the criminal circuit. The Dutch police investigated a Croatian criminal gang that smuggled

weapons to the Netherlands. These weapons were from different type of brands that

were left over from the conflicts in the ‘90’s. Another example is when the British weapon

law was tightened in 1997 and legal arms dealers were left with weapons they could not

sell. A few criminals let them leak into the illicit market and a few years later they began

to appear in the Dutch underworld36.

Furthermore one more way of recycling weapons needs to be mentioned. The advances

in technology increases the risk that sectors that used to be unable to obtain illicit

firearms, now are able to gain access to them. 3D printing, for example, can be used to

manufacture firearms and produce essential components to reactivate deactivated

firearms37. The world’s first gun made with 3D printing technology was fired for the first

31 UNODC (2015), p.51. 32 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p.14. 33 Spapens (2007), p.366. 34

With information obtained through Interpol 35 Information provided by staff of the Bundeskriminalamt during the European Firearms Experts Meeting, Noordwijk, 7 and 8 December 2004. 36 Spapens, A.C.M. & Bruinsma, M.Y. (2004). Illegale vuurwapens in Nederland: smokkel en handel. Politiewetenschap (26). Zeist: Uitgeverij Kerckebosch, pp. 71-73. Retrieved from: http://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/download/72GgOfZ7kOIbBm4jqAz77y8JBqFvzmrBXWwn6SGf/Ptf5pWFBWvQf4iqSsU7PCfMa5nNcHwZFk8rxgTqo/ (Hereafter: Spapens & Bruinsma (2014)) 37 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p. 35.

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

13

time in 2014, in the United States. The gun was printed from separate printed

components made from ABS plastic, except the firing pin, which was made out of

metal38. 3D technology works by building layer upon layer of, usually, plastic to build

solid objects. This new technology poses a major risk, because the 3D printers become

cheaper and more accessible for certain parts of society where we would rather not see

the use of this kind of technology, especially if it involves lethal weapons.

3.1.6. Theft or fraud from legal dealers or private owners of legal

firearms

Stocks of legally-held firearms are vulnerable to loss, theft or unauthorized misuse.

Whether they are being held privately, by the police, armed forces or other government

agencies, some degree of vulnerability of authorized holdings is inevitable. Moreover,

national regulatory requirements for secure storage and regular stock checks and

reporting are not always stringent or actively enforced39.

Besides theft, there is also a possibility that the legal dealers or private owners

intentionally subverted the firearms by filing a false report of theft, also for insurance

reasons, while the firearm was actually sold illicitly: ‘double the money’. An example is

when in 1998, Germany, there were 6.405 firearms reported stolen or lost by private

owners40. How many of these weapons end up in the criminal environment is impossible

to trace. Just as it is impossible to trace if the owners committed fraud or that they were,

in fact, stolen. It occurs not only from private individuals, but also from dealers. An

example is when a criminal gang in the Netherlands carried out a series of ram raids on

arms stores and got away with dozens of weapons41. Another example is when, at the

end of the 1990’s, 138 Glock pistols disappeared from the customs warehouse at

Schiphol. They were waiting for shipment to Nicaragua and were temporarily stored. The

shipper had not reported this theft to the Dutch authorities and the incident came only to

light by chance42.

38 BBC News (6.5.2013). Working gun made with 3D Printer. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22421185 39 Spapens (2007), p.368. 40 Sagramoso (2001), p.17. 41 Spapens & Bruinsma (2004), p.91. 42 Spapens (2007), p.368.

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

14

3.2. Firearm routes When the weapons are produced and have entered the illicit market, they also follow

different routes to enter the country of destination. The transfers of illicit firearms

happen in a variety of different ways and by the use of different intermediaries. Methods

range from transfers on an individual level, small groups or firms who break the law

deliberately, but also transfers that are facilitated by governments or state officials.

Corruption plays a large role on different levels in the trafficking in illicit firearms43.

Besides these actors there is a large part of the illicit firearms trade that is being

facilitated by OCG’s. Motorcycle gangs, for example, have opened charters in the

Western-Balkans and use existing criminal routes to traffic firearms. The illicit firearms

trafficking is almost exclusively a supplementary rather than a primarily source of income

for the OCG’s involved in this business44. As mentioned before, the firearms trade goes

hand in hand with drug-smuggling, trafficking of human beings and other illegal

businesses. The OCG’s enter the illicit firearm trafficking business through other criminal

activity; they expand their contacts and get knowledge about smuggling routes and

infrastructure. The limited research that is available estimates that 80% of the illicit

trafficking in firearms within the European Union has a destination within the European

Union itself.

3.2.1. Inside Europe

In Figure 245, below, the weapon flows in Europe are given, based on input from several

European countries46.

43

For more information on corruption in Europe, we kindly refer you to the monitor about corruption written by the EUCPN Secretariat. This monitor can be found here: http://eucpn.org/document/european-crime-prevention-monitor-2014 44

Impact Assessment Report (2014), p.33. 45

COM (2013) 716 final. Firearms and the internal security of the EU: protecting citizens and disrupting illegal

Trafficking. Brussels: 21.10.2013. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/trafficking-in-firearms/docs/1_en_act_part1_v12.pdf 46 Based on input from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK.

Figure 2: Firearm Routes Inside Europe

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

15

As we can see, the reactivation of firearms and the conversion of alarm pistols are

common methods of converting the firearms and trafficking them inside Europe. In

Partizánske, Slovakia, there is a shop located in a basement called AFG Security which is

the source of thousands of deactivated weapons that have been sold across Europe47.

These firearms ended up in the hands of terrorists in France, gangsters in Great Britain

and neo-Nazi’s in Germany. Looking at the online store http://www.afg-defense.eu/

there is a wide variety of deactivated army weapons for sale. The AFG website continues

to claim that the weapons are just "for fun" -- for the reenactment of World War II

battles, for example, but the key part comes later: "Most of the expansion weapons (Eds.

Note: alarm weapons) are originals (originally 'sharp') with minor modifications which

disable the shooting with original - 'sharp' ammunition." The word "sharp," refers to the

ability to fire live ammunition48. Companies like Kol Arms bought containers of these

decommissioned weapons from the Slovak military and converted them from lethal

weapons into alarm rifles. When these weapons left AFG Security, they were considered

harmless by law. According to the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) they sold

14,000 alarm weapons abroad over the internet. It took a French locksmith only 2 hours

to reopen the barrel and thus reactivate it. These easily converted alarm pistols are a hot

and easy market for criminals and terrorists49. Figure 350 gives a clear view on the flows

of deactivated firearms which can easily be reactivated, and the flows of lethal firearms

to Western Europe. According to a European Investigative Collaboration51 some

reactivated firearms (with a hallmark from the Slovakian Kol Arms manufacturer,

mentioned above) found their way to a kosher supermarket in Paris and were used for

taking 17 people hostage, and killing 3 people52. According to the same European

Investigative Collaboration some Kalashnikovs found their way from the Balkan area via

47 Candea, S., Dahlkamp, J., Schmitt, J., Ulrich, A. & Wiedmann-Schmidt, W. (2016). The Path to Death: How EU Failures Helped Paris Terrorists Obtain Weapons. Retrieved from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/following-the-path-of-the-paris-terror-weapons-a-1083461.html (Hereafter: Candea, S. et al. (2016)) 48 Candea, S. et al. (2016). 49 Candea, S. et al. (2016). 50 Figure 3 retrieved from Candea, S. et al., (2016) at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/following-the-path-of-the-paris-terror-weapons-a-1083461.html 51

Spiegel (24.3.2016). European Investigative Collaboration: DER SPIEGEL and Eight Other Media Found Investigative Network. Retrieved from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/der-spiegel-and-eight-other-media-found-investigative-network-a-1084054.html 52

Candea, S. et al. (2016).

Figure 3: Firearm routes to Western Europe (Spiegel.de)

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

16

the lethal firearms routes, as displayed below, to Paris where they left 90 people dead,

and hundreds injured.

3.2.2. Balkan’s Bazar

The dissolution of the former Soviet-Union left the remaining countries with huge stocks

of firearms. The destruction of these weapons is an expensive cost, and until this day

there remain stockpiles of functional firearms. After the dissolution, Ukraine inherited

30% of the Soviet-military complex. The country now holds the third-largest stockpile in

the world with an estimated 7 million firearms, after China and the Russian Federation53.

Since the early 90’s this has proven to be a lucrative market for firearms trafficking;

especially for states in Africa involved in regional conflicts. Africa experienced a bloody

decade, and the surplus weapons from the Balkans were the fuel for the fire. According

to the head of the Ukrainian parliamentary commission investigating cases of illegal arms

and munitions sales, Between 1992 and 1997 approximately 28 billion euro’s worth of

military equipment and munitions was stolen and illegally sold abroad54.

Just like many Balkan countries, Bulgaria has massive warehouses filled with stockpiles

of old guns. The standard practice for these countries had been to sell whatever they

could and to destroy what was left over. The same goes for Romania (surplus of 1.25

million firearms), Albania (259,000), Serbia (90,000) and Bosnia-Herzegovina

(53,000)55. These are only the weapons found in government arsenals. This nuance is an

important one, because in 1997 Albanians plundered their army’s warehouses, steeling

550,000 weapons and more than 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition. Weapon supplies of

private individuals could be larger than those of the government arsenals56. The Balkan

countries did not choose for these weapon supplies that they got from the Soviet Union,

so deactivating or destroying them is an international responsibility. The EU and UN

donated a few million euro’s to destroy the firearms in the Balkans, but this did not come

close to the amount of money and effort that was needed to destroy the entire

stockpiles.

Figure 557(p. 15) gives a case study of Romania, a country located far east in the

Balkans. It gives the percentages of all the seized firearms and distinguishes between the

country of manufacture, the country of destination and the country of departure. It

becomes clear that most of the firearms are manufactured in Europe (Germany, Italy,

Spain, Bulgaria) and Turkey (30%). An interesting fact is that Spain (24%) and Turkey

almost have the same manufacture percentage, which means firearms travel both ways

in and out of Europe. Most of the firearms were destined for Romania (80%), and some

for Italy (18%). It is plausible that the seized firearms in Romania were destined for Italy

and manufactured in Turkey and were only passing through Romania. The ‘departure’

country is the country where the traffic route starts. Countries of departure are Germany,

Italy, Portugal and Spain (Total: 46.5%) and Bulgaria (29.1%). When we look at the

data and at the geographic location of these countries it becomes clear that the firearms

depart from South-Western Europe to Romania and from Bulgaria to Romania, so the

firearms enter the country from both ways.

53 UNODC (2010). Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 142. Retrieved from: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf (Hereafter: UNODC (2010)) 54 UNODC (2010), p. 145. 55 Candea, S. et al. (2016). 56 Candea, S. et al. (2016). 57 UNODC (2015), p. 54.

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

17

3.2.3. Dark Markets

In the 21st century, with the extension and modernization of the internet and the online-

world new ways of buying, selling and shipping illegal firearms have established. These

are markets that initially cannot be reached without certain browser programs, like Tor58.

The ‘normal’ internet blocks these markets out. Buyers and sellers of illegal firearms can

use these as a base for their sell or purchase because, until recently, they thought they

could not be traced and they paid with Bitcoins59. In a Q&A by Vocativ, with a seller from

the dark market, he sheds some light about the shipping methods they wield:

“Our favorite is power tools. Take the tool apart, mill out space for the firearm

component and seal it back up. If done carefully, the item can even continue to operate.

We’ve used Drills, saws, other power tools, tanks, engines, computers, furniture, and

even some items costing well over several thousand dollars. The key is to find an item

that has a similar density to the metal as to skew the X-ray taken in customs. Not a

complete preventative measure, but it helps.”60

58 Tor, an acronym for The Onion Router, is a free network designed to anonymize your real Internet Protocol (IP) address by routing your traffic through many servers of the Tor network. Tor is used by a variety of people for both illicit and licit purposes. 59 Untraceable, electronic money. 60 Matthews, S. (24.2.2014). Q&A With a Deep Web Arms Dealer. Vocativ. Retrieved from: http://www.vocativ.com/tech/bitcoin/q-deep-web-arms-dealer/

Figure 5: Seized Firearms in Romania, 2013

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

18

In 2014, on November 6, 16 European countries61, alongside counterparts from the

United States, brought down several marketplaces as part of a unified international

action from Europol’s operational center in the Hague62. This action aimed to stop the

sale, distribution and promotion of illicit firearms, and other harmful items like drugs

which were being sold on a Dark Market. Operation Onymous resulted in 17 arrests of

vendors and administrators running these online marketplaces and more than 410 hidden

services being taken down, alongside with the dark market Silk Road 2.063. In addition,

bitcoins worth approximately USD 1 million, EUR 180 000 euro in cash, drugs, gold and

silver were seized.

61 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 62 Europol (7.11.2014). Global action against dark markets on Tor Network. The Hague, The Netherlands. Retrieved from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/global-action-against-dark-markets-tor-network (Hereafter: Europol (7.11.2014)) 63 Europol (7.11.2014).

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

19

4. Conclusion In this theoretical paper we have explored trafficking in illicit firearms. Firstly we put the

definition of trafficking in illicit firearms that is being wielded by the UNODC into the

context of this paper and after that a problem definition. It is clear that the firearms

business is a big market, but usually comes alongside other markets like drugs or

trafficking in human beings.

In a second part there has been given a global overview of the issue illicit firearms for

the member states. In this part the number of firearm possession and the number of

registered firearms has been set out together, which gives a clearer view on the number

of illicit firearms in a given country. After this the annual deaths by firearms have been

set out for given countries. When these two graphics are compared, it gives a clearer

view of the Member States were firearm possession is most problematic. In a second

part of the global overview the demand for illicit firearms focused on organized crime

groups and political groups (terrorists). The OCG’s are the most important actors in

trafficking in illicit firearms, however when in the hands of terrorists, the firearms cause

more damage to innocent people.

In the third part the logistics of the illicit firearm market have been explored. Firstly, in a

continuation of the demand side, the supply side was treated. There are many different

ways in how a firearm can enter the illicit market: from theft, to illicit production, to

reactivation of deactivated firearms and the conversion of non-lethal firearms. Another

part of logistics was the trafficking routes. With information from different publications

we explored the trafficking routes inside Europe, the routes from the Balkans and lastly

the dark markets, which is an increasing market can be seen as where the future expand

will happen

Because the trafficking in illicit firearms is periodically and is not a steady supply it is

much harder to reveal these markets than, for example, drug markets. Firearms are only

delivered when they are needed and the market does not work in a way that somewhere,

for example every 2 weeks, a delivery happens.. To combat trafficking in illicit firearms

member states should tighten their legislation on the area of non-lethal firearms and

deactivate firearms better. Also, there should be invested in destroying the huge

amounts of firearm remains that are left behind after the cold war because these

weapons are waiting to be stolen, and almost literally are a ticking time bomb. Lastly,

because of the modernization there should also be invested in shutting down online,

untraceable markets. If this is the new way of order and delivery and buyers and sellers

are negotiating freely over the world wide web, the investigation bureaus should be right

on top of that to reveal large pieces of the market.

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

20

5. Annex 1: Data Graphic 1

Country

Firearm Possession Registered Firearms

Firearms per 100 pop.

Date Firearms per 100

pop. Date

AT 30.4 2007 4.08 2015

BE 17.2 2007 7.1 2014

BG 19.4 2006 4.34 2015

HR 21.7 2007 8.36 2015

CY 36.4 2007 10.35 2015

CZ 16.3 2007 6.94 2015

DK 12 2007 15.98 2015

EE 9.2 2007 3.53 2014

FI 45.7 2007 30 2010

FR 31.2 2007 4.44 2015

DE 30.3 2007 8.73 2015

EL 22.5 2007 0.94 2014

HU 5.5 2007 2.1 2015

IE 6.35 2014 3.73 2014

IT 11.9 2007 - -

LV 19 2007 2.48 2015

LT 0.7 2007 2.16 2015

LU 15.3 2007 4.16 2015

MT 11.9 2007 12.75 2015

NL 3.09 2007 2.02 2015

PL 1.3 2007 1.3 2007

PT 24.22 2015 13.04 2015

RO 1.2 2006 0.28 2015

SK 8.3 2007 3.14 2015

SI 13.5 2007 5.08 2015

ES 10.4 2007 6.98 2015

SE 31.6 2007 23.09 2015

UK 6.7 2007 3.43 2013

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

21

6. Bibliography - Amnesty International (2014). Wapens en gerelateerde goederen [Thematic

Marker]. Antwerp: Amnesty International. Retrieved from:

https://www.aivl.be/sites/default/files/bijlagen/VERK2014_03_WAPENSENGERELA

TEERDEGOEDEREN_17-3.pdf

- BBC News (6.5.2013). Working gun made with 3D Printer. Retrieved from:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22421185

- Candea, S., Dahlkamp, J., Schmitt, J., Ulrich, A. & Wiedmann-Schmidt, W. (2016). The Path to

Death: How EU Failures Helped Paris Terrorists Obtain Weapons. Retrieved from:

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/following-the-path-of-the-paris-terror-

weapons-a-1083461.html

- COM (2013) 716 final. Firearms and the internal security of the EU: protecting

citizens and disrupting illegal trafficking. Brussels: 21.10.2013. Retrieved from:

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-

human-trafficking/trafficking-in-firearms/docs/1_en_act_part1_v12.pdf

- Council of the European Union (2010). Draft European Action Plan to combat

illegal trafficking in so called “heavy” firearms which could be used or are used in

criminal activities. Brussels: 29 November 2010, Retrieved from:

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/11817

1.pdf

- Fijnaut, C. (2008). De bestrijding van de illegale vuurwapenhandel. Het beleid van

de Verenigde Naties en de Europese Unie. Justitiële Verkenningen, 34(4), pp. 9-

28. Retrieved from: https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/jv200804-illegale-

wapenhandel.aspx

- European Commission (2014). Study to Support an Impact Assessment on

Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the EU [Final Report].

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Retrieved from:

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-

crime-and-human-trafficking/general/docs/dg_home_-

_illicit_fireams_trafficking_final_en.pdf

- Europol (7.11.2014). Global action against dark markets on Tor Network. The

Hague, The Netherlands. Retrieved from:

https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/global-action-against-dark-markets-tor-

network

- Europol (2013). EU Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2013. Retrieved from:

https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/te-sat-2013-eu-terrorism-situation-and-

trend-report

- Europol (2015). EU Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2015. Retrieved from:

https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-

trend-report-2015

- Hurst, C., Mariani, B. & Davis, I. (2001). Organised crime, corruption and illicit

arms trafficking in an enlarged EU. London: Saferworld. Retrieved from:

http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/76-organised-crime-

corruption-and-illicit-arms-trafficking-in-an-enlarged-eu

- Korps Landelijke Politiediensten (1997). De aard en omvang van

vuurwapencriminaliteit in Nederland, periode 1991-1995. Zoetermeer.

- Krause, K. (2000). Small Arms and Light Weapons: Proliferation Processes and

Policy Options. Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Retrieved from: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org

Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms

22

- Kuijper, R. & Leest, Van der, S. (2002). Vuurwapencriminaliteit op basis van het

Vuurwapendatasysteem in 2001. Zoetermeer: Korps Landelijke Politiediensten,

Landelijk Bureau Wapens en Munitie.

- Matthews, S. (24.2.2014). Q&A With a Deep Web Arms Dealer. Vocativ. Retrieved

from: http://www.vocativ.com/tech/bitcoin/q-deep-web-arms-dealer/ - Sagramoso, D. (2001). The proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons in

and around the European Union: instability, organized crime and terrorist group.

London: Saferworld & Centre for Defense Studies. Retrieved from:

http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/77-the-proliferation-of-

illegal-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-and-around-the-european-union

- Philip, A., Rossetti, A. & Goi, L. (2016). Guns in France: Rate of Civilian Firearm

Possession per 100 Population. Sydney School of Public Health, The University of

Sydney. GunPolicy.org, 23 February. Accessed 9 March 2016. at:

http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compare/66/rate_of_civilian_firearm_possessi

on/18,28,46,48,49,50,61,65,69,71,81,86,99,112,104,125,148,149,152,163,247,

177,172,192

- Spapens, A.C.M. & Bruinsma, M.Y. (2002). Vuurwapens gezocht:

vuurwapengebruik, -bezit en -handel in Nederland 1998-2000. Tilburg. Retrieved

from: https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/aard-en-omvang-van-de-

vuurwapencriminaliteit.aspx

- Spapens, A.C.M. & Bruinsma, M.Y. (2004). Illegale vuurwapens in Nederland:

smokkel en handel. Politiewetenschap (26). Zeist: Uitgeverij Kerckebosch, pp. 71-

73. Retrieved from:

http://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/download/72GgOfZ7kOIbBm4jqAz77y8JBqFvz

mrBXWwn6SGf/Ptf5pWFBWvQf4iqSsU7PCfMa5nNcHwZFk8rxgTqo/

- Spapens, A.C.M. (2007). Trafficking in Illicit Firearms for Criminal Purposes within

the European Union. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal

Justice, 15(3), 359-381. Retrieved from:

https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/923753/fulltext.pdf

- Spiegel (24.3.2016). European Investigative Collaboration: DER SPIEGEL and

Eight Other Media Found Investigative Network. Retrieved from:

http://www.spiegel.de/international/der-spiegel-and-eight-other-media-found-

investigative-network-a-1084054.html

- UNODC (2010). Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat

Assessment. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved from:

http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-

analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf

- UNODC (2011). Global study on homicide: trends, context, data. Vienna: United

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved from:

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-

analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf

- UNODC (2015). Study on firearms 2015. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs

and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-

protocol/UNODC_Study_on_Firearms_WEB.pdf

- Yle Uutistat News (21.12.2015). “Something terrible has happened”: Does Finland

need to wake up to its gun problem? Retrieved from:

http://yle.fi/uutiset/something_terrible_has_happened_does_finland_need_to_wa

ke_up_to_its_gun_problem/8535425