earnings management - mbo副本
TRANSCRIPT
Paper One
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
Susan E. Perry , Thomas H. Williams
Earnings ManagementPreceding Management Buyout
Offer
JCCarol
TommyLiana
Joana Carla Mamauag ClarusIao Tong TongLin MaizheCao Jingya
B-B1-0015-1B-B1-0352-3B-B1-0111-2B-B2-0461-3
What is Management Buyout?
1
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
• Form of leveraged buy-out
• Company’s existing management team acquires a large part of the company
• Preferred exit strategy by large firms that intend to close or divest
Example of MBO – Virgin
2
Virgin Wines
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
• Virgin Wines’ UK business has been bought out by management as former owner Direct Wines focuses on overseas expansion
• Management team is backed by private equity funds
3
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
Problem?Agency Problem
• Fiduciary duty: legal duty to seek best possible price for the firm
• Self-Interest: personal motivation to seek favorable purchase price
4
Literature – DeAngelo (1986)• Sample: 64 New York and American Stock Exhange companies with
MBO proposals (1973-1982)
• Used discretionary accruals to test understated earnings in period before buyout
• Proxy for discretionary accruals is change in total accruals• H0: Δ total accruals = 0 • H1: Δ total accruals > 0
• Result did not support earnings management hypothesis
• Reason: Detailed scrutiny accompanied MBO
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
Literature – DeAngelo (1986)• Sample
• Too small• Large number of troubled firms• ‘Second-Offer’ firms
• Model• Assumed change in non-discretionary is 0• Does not consider firm’s economic activity in
hypothesized manipulation year (Jones, 1991)
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
5
Problem
6
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
How Do They Improve on Methodology? • More restrict criteria
• Larger sample : 175 companies ( including 96 regional and OTC companies)
• More specific period : 1981-1988
7
Test Sample Group
Methodology
Control Sample Group
Individually Match
Compare
Difference
• Test Sample Group : company had management buyout (MBO) proposals• Control Sample Group : company that don’t have MBO proposals
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
Methodology8
CONCERNThe different generated is not caused by manipulation of earnings management but external factors
SOLUTIONControl sample group chosen base on two criteria
• Industry (proxied by SIC)• Size (proxied by sales)
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
Methodology8
• Example• External factors : competition, political environment,
legal change etc.
• Reason of using two criterias• Matched companies : same industry & similar size —>
affected by similar external factors• Have comparable operating, investing, and financing
opportunity sets• Have comparable voluntary accounting choice sets
9
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
T-test for Paired Samples8
• Null hypothesis : mean difference = 0
• Industry : • 60% (105 companies) match on four-digit SIC codes• 14% (25 companies) match on three-digit SIC codes• 26% (45 companies) match on two-digit SIC code• conclude : two groups of companies are similar with
industry
• Size : Table 2
910
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
8
• conclude : two groups of companies are similar with size
9
T-test for Paired Samples11
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
Detect Earnings Management
8
Abnormal accruals= Total accruals – Expected accruals
Total Accruals = change in noncash working capital – depreciation expense
912
Net income – Operating Cash Flow
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
8913
Expected Accruals :
Abnormal Accruals :
Adjusts for non-discretionary changes in working capital accounts
Adjusts for non-discretionary depreciation expense
Detect Earnings Management
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
8914
Detect Earnings Management
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
Discussion of Results8915
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
Discussion of Results8916
Standardize each abnormal returnVip = AAip / σ(Aaip)
Summarize all the 175 abnormal accrualsZip = Σ Vip / Σ√(Ti – 3)/(Ti-5)
Year -1 Year -2N Z P Z P
MBO 175 -4.010 0.000 -0.217 0.414
Control 175 -0.898 0.185 -0.363 0.358
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
Discussion of Results8917
Strong evidence of earnings management
Political costsDebt-covenant Bonus plan
Management buyout
-0.898-4.010
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
8919
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
8920
Interest expense• $30,812 thousand dollars related to the Loss on
extinguishment of debt
• Retire 7.375% senior notes and notes due 2016 by 7.375% senior notes due 2021
• No cash effect
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
8921
Goodwill impairment2012 2009
- Share price decrease
Incentive for impairment
- Bankruptcy of customers- Decline in revenue- Low growth rate
Incentive for impairment
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
8922
April 30, 2012$15.29
Aug 2, 2012$12.22
Market is not efficient if assumption made is
correct
23
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
SOX, SEC Rules & Listing Standards
Audit Committee• Independence (no personal or financial ties)
• Financially literate members
• Oversee the financial reporting and audit process
24
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
SOX, SEC Rules & Listing StandardsManagement
• Management’s certification of financial report
• Statement of whether the buyout offer is fair to shareholders
26
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
SOX, SEC Rules & Listing Standards
External Auditors• Creation of PCAOB to regulate auditing profession
• Restriction of performing other non-audit services
• Audit committee oversight of external auditors
27
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer
• The takeaway from our presentation is that earnings management prior management buyouts exist due to agency problem
• This problem cannot be fully eliminated but can further be restricted through better corporate governance
Conclusion
Q & A
~Thanks for your attention~
Earnings ManagementBuyout Offer