duns escoto -- ord. i.27 (sobre verbo mental) (latín-inglés)

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Translated by Peter Simpson

ContentsOne: Whether a Created Word is Actual IntellectionQuestion Two: Whether the Word in Divine Reality States something Proper to the Generated PersonQuestion Three: Whether the Divine Word states a Respect to the CreatureI. To the First and Second Questions

A. The Opinion of Others1. Exposition of the Opinion2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. As to the First Questionb. As to the Second Question

B. Scotus own Response1. To the First Question

a. Which of the Things Found in the Intelligence is the Wordb. Whether any Actual Intellection at all is the Wordc. Whether Will Concurs in the Idea of the Word

2. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question3. To the Second Question4. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

II. To the Third QuestionA. The Opinion of OthersB. Rejection of the Opinion and Scotus own ResponseC. To the Principal ArgumentD. To the Arguments for the Opinion of OthersE. A Doubt about the Expression of the Divine Word

Notes

One: Whether a Created Word is Actual Intellection

Latin English

Quaestio 1 Twenty Seventh Distinction Question One Whether a CreatedWord is Actual Intellection

>1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam septimamquaero de verbo, et primo de verbo intellectuscreati, utrum verbum creatum sit actualisintellectio. Quod non: Augustinus VIII Trinitatiscap. 10 vel 24: ((Phantasia Carthaginis, inmemoria mea, hoc verbum eius)) est; phantasiailla sumitur ibi pro specie, non pro actuali

1. About the twenty seventh distinction I ask about the word,and first about the word of a created intellect, whether acreated word is actual intellection. That it is not: Augustine Onthe Trinity VIII ch.6 n.9: the image of Carthage, in mymemory, this is its word; the image there is taken for thespecies, not for actual imagination; therefore in the same waythe intellectual word is an intelligible species and not actual

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imaginatione; ergo eodem modo verbumintellectuale est species intelligibilis et nonintellectio actualis.

intellection.

2 Item, Augustinus XV Trinitatis cap. lla vel 26:((Verbum, quod foris sonat, signum est eius verbiquod intus lucet)); verbum autem exterius estsignum rei et non intellectionis, - alioquin>quaelibet affirmativa esset falsa in qua nonpraedicatur idem de se, quia intellectio subiectinon est intellectio praedicati, licet res sit res; ergoverbum est obiectum et non actualis intellectio.

2. Again, Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.11 n.20: the wordthat sounds exteriorly is a sign of the word that shinesinteriorly; but the external word is a sign of a thing not of anintellection, otherwise any affirmative proposition in whichthe same thing is not predicated of itself would be false,because the intellection of the subject is not the intellection ofthe predicate, although the thing is the thing; therefore theword is object and not actual intellection.

3 Praeterea, Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo:'Verbum est proles et genitum a memoria'; actioautem non gignitur, sed est quo aliud gignitur; ergoverbum est aliquid formatum per actumintelligendi et non ipse actus.

3. Further, Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18: the wordis offspring and thing born from memory; but action is notborn, but is that in which something else is born; therefore theword is something formed by an act of understanding and isnot the act itself.

4 Contra: Ibidem vocat Augustinus verbumnotitiam: ((Notitia eius, quod est proles eius)); etXV Trinitatis cap. 12 a, et 21: 'Est visio de visioneet notitia de notitia'.

4. On the contrary: In the same place Augustine calls the wordknowledge: the knowledge of it, which is the offspring of it;and On the Trinity XV ch.12 n.22, ch.21 n.40: It is visionfrom vision and knowledge from knowledge.

Question Two: Whether the Word in Divine Reality States something Properto the Generated Person

Latin English

Quaestio 2

5 Secundo quaero de verbo divino, an verbum indivinis dicat proprium personae genitae. Quodnon: Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. 10 vel 25:((Verbum est cum >amore notitia)); haec omnia,posita in definitione verbi, sunt essentialia; ergo etverbum.

5. Second I ask about the Divine Word, whether word indivine reality states something proper to the generated person.That it does not: Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.10 n.15: theWord is knowledge along with love; all these things [sc.knowledge and love], placed in the definition of word, areessentials; therefore the word is an essential too.a

6 Praeterea, XV Trinitatis cap. 7 'de magnis' et 22et 28 'de parvis': 'Sicut Pater intelligit sibi et vultsibi et meminit sibi, ita Filius et Spiritus Sanctus',actus autem proprius intelligentiae ut intelligentiaest, est verbum; igitur sicut in Patre est formaliterintelligentia ut intelligentia, ita in eo est verbum utverbum. Assumptum probatur per hoc, quod illatrinitas quam assignat Augustinus IX Trinitatiscap. ultimo ('mens, notitia et amor', quae notitiaest verbum, secundum ipsum ibidem), et illa>assignata secundum eum X Trinitatis 10('memoria, intelligentia et voluntas'),correspondent sibi invicem, - prima pars primaeparti, et secunda secundae, et tertia tertiae; ergo

6. Further, On the Trinity XV ch.7 n.12 On Great Things andchs.15 and 16 On Small Things: Just as the Fatherunderstands for himself and wills for himself and remembersfor himself, so also do the Son and Holy Spirit; but the properact of intelligence as it is intelligence is the word; thereforejust as in the Father there formally exists intelligence asintelligence, so there exists in him word as word. Theassumption is proved by this, that the trinity which Augustineassigns in On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18 (mind, knowledge,and love, which knowledge is the word, according to him inthe same place), and the trinity assigned according to him inOn the Trinity X ch.10 n.13 (memory, intelligence, and will)correspond to each other in turn, the first part to the firstpart, and the second to the second, and the third to the third;

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sicut non est perfecta voluntas sine amoreformaliter, nec perfecta mens sine memoriaformaliter, ita non est perfecta intelligentia - utvidetur - sine verbo formaliter.

therefore, just there is no perfect will without love formally,nor perfect mind without memory formally, so there is noperfect intelligence as it seems without the word formally.

7 Item, non sunt duo propria unius personae, quiaunius constituti in esse est unum formaleconstitutivum; filiatio est proprietas constitutivapersonae genitae (secundum Augustinum De fidead Petrum cap. 2), non ergo verbum; non enimvidentur ista dicere eandem proprietatem, quianon omnis filius est verbum nec omne verbum estfilius.

7. Again there are not two things proper to one person,because there is one formal constitutive property for one thingconstituted in being; filiation is the property constitutive of thegenerated person (according to Augustine On the Faith toPeter [really Fulgentius] ch.2 n.7), therefore the word is not;for these do not seem to state the same property, because notevery son is word nor is every word son.

8 Oppositum: Augustinus VII Trinitatis cap. 4:((Eo verbum quo Filius)), et utrumque relativedicitur. >

8. The opposite: Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3: He isword by that by which he is Son, and each of these is saidrelatively.

Question Three: Whether the Divine Word states a Respect to the Creature

Latin English

Quaestio 3 Question Three Whether the Divine Word states a Respect tothe Creature

9 Tertio quaeritur utrum verbum divinum dicatrespectum ad creaturam. Quod sic: Augustinus VITrinitatis cap. ultimo: ((Verbum est arsomnipotentis Dei, plena omnium rationumviventium)); ars dicit respectum ad artificiatum;ergo et verbum ad creaturas.

9. Third the question is asked whether the divine word states arespect to the creature. That it does: Augustine On the TrinityVI ch.10 n.11: the Word is the art of the almighty God, full ofall living reasons; art states a respect to the thing made byart; therefore word also states a respect to creatures.

10 Oppositum: Augustinus VII Trinitatis cap. 4,per idem quod prius; Filius non dicit respectum adcreaturas; ergo nec verbum, quia 'eo verbum quoFilius'.

10. The opposite: Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3,through the same as before [n.8]; Son does not state a respectto creatures; therefore neither does the word, because he isword by that by which he is Son.

I. To the First and Second QuestionsA. The Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

Latin English

11 Ad primam quaestionem dicitur quod verbumest intellectio actualis, et non quaecumque seddeclarativa. >

11. [To the first question] To the first question it is said thatthe word is actual intellection, and not any intellection but adeclarative one.


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12 Ad quod intelligendum ponitur sic: Intellectusprimo recipit simplicem impressionem ab obiecto(sive intellectionem), qua impressione receptaintellectus - ut activus est - convertit se supra se etsuper actum suum et obiectum, intelligendo seintelligere; tertio sequitur impressio notitiaedeclarativae in intellectum nudum conversum, ethoc ab intellectu informato notitia simplici, itaquod intellectus informatus tali notitia est ratioimprimendi notitiam declarativam, - et isteintellectus nudus conversus est propriumreceptivum. Et inter has duas intellectiones,primam scilicet quae est ratio imprimendi etsecundam quae est impressa, est habitudo mediaquae est actio de genere actionis, quae notatur perhoc quod est 'dicere': est enim 'dicere' istud,exprimere vel imprimere notitiam declarativamnotitiae simplicis, - et ista 'notitia declarativa',impressa in intellectum nudum conversum etterminans istum actum dicendi, est verbum.

12. To understand this the position is set down as follows: Theintellect receives first a simple impression (or intellection)from the object, by which received impression the intellect as it is active converts itself to itself and to its own act andobject, by understanding that it understands; third, therefollows an impression of declarative knowledge in the bareconverted intellect, and this from the intellect informed withsimple knowledge, such that the intellect informed by suchknowledge is the reason for impressing declarative knowledge, and the converted bare intellect is something properlyreceptive. And between these two intellections, namely thefirst, which is the reason for the impressing, and the second,which is the one impressed, there is a middle disposition that isan action in the genus of action, and it is marked by thatwhich to say is; for this to say is to express or impress adeclarative knowledge of simple knowledge, and so thisdeclarative knowledge, impressed on the converted bareintellect and being the term of the act of saying, is the word.

13 Non ergo quaecumque intellectio actualis estverbum, sed illa quae est declarativa, quaepraesupponit intellectionem actualem simplicem etconversionem actualem super illam, et gignituractu dicendi, cuius principium activum est notitiasimplex et receptivum est intellectus nudusconversus.

13. Not any actual intellection, then, is the word, but the onethat is declarative, that presupposes simple actual intellectionand actual conversion to it, and is born in the act of saying,whose active principle is simple knowledge and whosereceptive one is the converted bare intellect.

14 Huic concorditer respondetur ad secundamquaestionem, quod intellectus Patris primoinfor>matur quasi notitia simplici essentiae, adquam fuit quasi mere in potentia passiva, et factusin actu isto 'notitiae simplicis' ut nudus convertitursuper se ipsum sic informatum; et in ipsumconversum, quasi in passivum dispositum,imprimitur notitia declarativa virtute notitiaeactualis simplicis, quae notitia declarativa etterminus actus dicendi est verbum. Et secundumhoc patet quod verbum est terminus generationissicut et Filius, et ita erit proprium secundaepersonae.

14. [To the second question] In agreement with this, ananswer is given to the second question [n.5], that the intellectof the Father is first informed with quasi simple knowledge ofthe essence, to which it was quasi merely in passive potency,and, when brought into this act of simple knowledge as bare,it is converted to itself as thus informed; and on it whenconverted, as if on a passive disposed thing, there is impresseddeclarative knowledge by virtue of simple actual knowledge,which declarative knowledge and term of the act of saying isthe word. And according to this, it is plain that the word is theterm of generation as also of the Son, and so it will be properto the second person.

15 Ista opinio recitata est supra distinctione 2,quaestione 'De duabus productionibus'.

This opinion was stated above in distinction 2 nn.273-277,280, in the question On the two productions.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. As to the First Question

Latin English


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16 Contra istam opinionem - quantum ad primamquaestionem arguo primo, quia irrationabilevidetur ponere eandem potentiam esse activamrespectu unius actus sui et passivam respectualterius actus, quia ex hoc videtur quod non estpotentia eiusdem rationis. Quaecumque enimpotentia unius rationis importat similemhabitudinem potentiae ad obiectum: visus enimnon est activus respectu unius actus videndi etpassivus respectu alterius, unde quicumque actusunius potentiae habet similem habitudinempotentiae ad obiectum. Ergo si intellectus esttantum passivus respectu notitiae simplicis lapidis,et perfecte activus respectu conversionis quae estactus secundus - qua intelligit se intelligerelapidem, >non erit (ut videtur) una potentia;videtur etiam inconveniens quod non possithabere aliquam activitatem respectu actusimperfectioris et tamen possit esse totale activumrespectu actus perfectioris (ponitur autem aquibusdam quod conversio illa est actus perfectiorintellectione simplici).

16. Against this opinion as to the first question [n.12] Iargue first that it seems irrational to posit that the same poweris active with respect to one of its acts and passive withrespect to another of its acts, because from this it seems that itis not a power of the same nature. For any power of onenature involves a like disposition of the power to the object;for sight is not active with respect to one act of seeing andpassive with respect to another; hence any act of one powerhas a like disposition of power to object. Therefore if theintellect is only passive with respect to simple knowledge of astone, and perfectly active with respect to conversion whichis second act whereby it understands that it understands astone, it will (as it seems) not be one power; it also seemsunacceptable that it would be unable to have some activitywith respect to a more imperfect act and yet could be totallyactive with respect to a more perfect act (now it is posited bysome people that that conversion is a more perfect act thansimple intellection).

17 Quod postea additur quod intellectio actualisest ratio gignendi notitiam declarativam, hocvidetur esse inconveniens in nobis, quia formaimperfectior non potest esse ratio perfectagignendi perfectum; illa autem notitia prima innobis confusa est et imperfectior notitia distincta;igitur etc.

17. As to what is added afterwards, that actual intellection isthe reason for generating declarative knowledge [n.12], thisseems to be unacceptable in our own case, because a moreimperfect form cannot be a perfect reason for generatingsomething perfect; but the first knowledge in us is confusedand more imperfect than distinct knowledge; therefore etc.

18 Praeterea, si prima est ratio gignendi notitiamsecundam, aut quando prima non est, et tunc nonens erit ratio agendi, aut quando est, et tunc autsunt eiusdem rationis aut alterius: si secundomodo, et prior est imperfectior secundo, ergo nonest >principium gignendi secundum, quiaimperfectius non est principium producendiperfectius (unde in productione aequivoca sempercausa est perfectior effectu); si primo modo, tuncduo actus intelligendi eiusdem speciei erunt simulin eodem intellectu sive in eadem potentia (etrespectu eiusdem obiecti), quia memoria etintelligentia sunt una potentia.

18. Besides, if first knowledge is the reason for generatingsecond knowledge [sc. distinct or declarative knowledge] then either when it is not first, and then a non-being will bethe reason for acting, or when it is, and then they [sc. first andsecond knowledge] will be either of the same idea or of adifferent one; if the latter, and the prior is more imperfect thanthe second, then it is not a principle for generating the second,because the more imperfect is not a principle for producing amore perfect (hence in equivocal production the cause isalways more perfect than the effect); if the former, then twoacts of understanding of the same species will be in the sameintellect or in the same power (and with respect to the sameobject), because memory and intelligence are one power.

19 Item, tunc non poneretur trinitas in mentesecundum quod mens est, quia mens non habebitaliquam activitatem propriam secundum quodmens est, sed praecise secundum accidens eius peraccidens (quod est notitia simplex), sicut neclignum habet aliquam activitatem respectucalefactionis, quae attribuitur sibi per calorem quiest accidens eius per accidens; et ita videturAugustinus frustra quaesivisse in mente 'secundumquod mens est' parentem et prolem, quia ratio

19. Again,a then a trinity would not be posited in the mindaccording as it is mind, because the mind will not have anyproper activity according as it is mind, but precisely accordingto an accident of it through an accident (which is simpleknowledge), just as neither does wood have any activity withrespect to the heating that is attributed to it through the heatthat is an accident of it through an accident; and so it seemsAugustine sought in vain for parent and offspring in the mindaccording as it is mind, because the idea of parent does notseem to belong to the soul according to anything in it, but

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parentis non videtur competere animae secundumaliquid in ea, sed secundum aliquod accidenspraecise, quod imprimitur ei ab obiecto. >

according to some accident precisely, which is imprinted on itby the object.

20 Praeterea, gignere verbum non est actusintelligentiae sed memoriae , secundumAugustinum XV Trinitatis cap. 14; omnis autemintellectio actualis est intelligentiae, nonmemoriae, secundum eum XIV Trinitatis cap. 17;igitur nulla actualis intellectio est ratio gignendiverbum.

20. Further, to generate a word is not an act of intelligence butof memory, according to Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.14n.24; but every actual intellection belongs to intelligence, notto memory, according to him ibid. XIV ch.7 n.10; therefore noactual intellection is a reason for generating the word.

21 Praeterea, quod dicit de conversione quod illasit necessario praevia gignitioni verbi, videtur essecontra Augustinum XV Trinitatis cap. 16 vel cap.41, ubi videtur dicere quod verbumperfectissimum nostrum erit in patria respectuobiecti beatifici, - et tamen ille actus non eritconversivus, quia visio beatifica non habet aliquidcreatum pro obiecto immediato (omnis autemactus conversivus in nobis, habet aliquid creatumpro obiecto, ut actum vel potentiam); nec illa visiopraesupponit conversionem, quia si illa visio esteffectus solius essentiae divinae (aut intellectuscooperantis essentiae divinae), praeceditnaturaliter conversionem intellectus super suumintelligere.

21. Further, what it says about conversion, that it isnecessarily previous to generation of the word [n.12], seemsto be against Augustine ibid. XV ch.16 n.26, where he seemsto say that our most perfect word will be in the fatherland withrespect to the beatific object, and yet that act will not be aconvertive one, because the beatific vision does not have anycreated thing for immediate object (but every convertive actin us has something created for object, as the act or thepower); nor does that vision presuppose conversion, becauseif that vision is the effect of the divine essence alone (or of theintellect cooperating with the divine essence), it naturallyprecedes the conversion of the intellect to its ownunderstanding.a

22 Quod etiam dicit quod ut convertitur est mereactivus et tamen ut conversus est mere passivusrespectu notitiae genitae quae >est verbum, -videtur valde irrationabile quod idem sub rationequa est 'activum' sit tantum passivum respectuactus eiusdem rationis, vel in quantum est mere'passivum' sit activum respectu actus eiusdemrationis; intellectus autem in quantum recipiensnotitiam simplicem est tantum passivus et inquantum convertens est tantum activus; ergovidetur quod inconveniens sit quod in quantum estconvertens sit passivus respectu generationis verbiet in quantum habens notitiam simplicem sitactivus respectu eiusdem generationis.

22. Also as to the statement that the intellect, as it is beingconverted, is purely active and yet, as converted, it is purelypassive with respect to the generated knowledge which is theword, it seems thoroughly irrational that the same thingunder the idea under which it is active is only passive withrespect to an act of the same idea, or that insofar as it is purelypassive it is active with respect to an act of the same idea;but the intellect, insofar as it receives simple knowledge, isonly passive and, insofar as it converts, it is only active;therefore it seems that it is unacceptable that insofar as itconverts it is passive with respect to generation of the word,and insofar as it has simple knowledge it is active with respectto the same generation. b.

b. As to the Second Question

Latin English

23 Contra etiam illud quod dicit ad secundamquaestionem videtur posse obici per idem, quiaintellectus Patris 'ut convertitur' est mere activuset 'ut habens notitiam simplicem' est merepassivus, secundum eum; ergo videturinconveniens quod 'ut conversus' sit illud ut de

23. Also against what it says to the second question the sameobjection, it seems, can be made, that the intellect of theFather as it is converting is purely active and as havingsimple knowledge it is purely passive, according to him[Henry of Ghent]; therefore it seems unacceptable that asconverted it is that as from which the word is generated, and

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quo gignitur verbum et 'ut noscens notitia simplici'sit ratio gignendi verbum quasi active.

that as knowing with simple knowledge it is the reason forgenerating the word quasi actively.

24 Praeterea, aliqui dicunt conversionem istamintellectus esse quasi dispositionem materiae, -quod videtur inconveniens, quia dispositiomateriae non est perfectior neque aeque perfectacum >forma activa agentis; haec autem conversioest actus aeque perfectus cum notitia simplici, velperfectior; igitur etc.

24. Further, some say that this conversion of the intellect is aquasi disposition of matter, which seems unacceptable,because the disposition of matter is not more perfect nor asequally perfect as the active form of the agent; but thisconversion is as equally perfect as simple knowledge, or moreperfect; therefore etc.

25 Praeterea, ista conversio est respectu primiactus ut obiecti, ergo est notitia declarativa illiusactus, sicut omnis notitia declarat obiectum cuiusest; ergo ante gignitionem verbi quae sequituristam conversionem (secundum eum), habeturnotitia declarativa primi actus, et ita verbum anteverbum!

25. Further, this conversion is with respect to first act asobject, therefore it is declarative knowledge of that act, justas any knowledge declares the object of which it is; therefore,before the generation of the word that follows this conversion(according to him [Henry]), there is had a declarativeknowledge of first act, and so a word before the word!

26 Item, ista opinio quantum ad hoc quod ponitintellectionem Patris esse rationem gignendiverbum, improbata est supra distinctione 2,quaestione praedicta 'De productionibus', etquantum ad hoc quod ponit intellectum Patris esseillud de quo gignitur, improbata est ibidem etetiam distinctione 5; et repeto unum argumentumibi tactum: Quia intellectus ut conversus, estalicuius suppositi; conversio enim ista estsecundum eum quaedam actio intelligendi, etactus sunt suppositorum; ergo conversio ista estalicuius suppositi. Quaero cuius suppositi est utconvertitur? Si verbi, et 'ut convertitur' praeceditgignitionem (secundum eum), ergo praeceditverbum, et ita verbum est ante verbum! Si Patrisest ista conver>sio, et cuius est 'ut convertitur'eius est ut de quo generatur per impressionem, etcuius est 'ut de quo generatur aliquid perimpressionem' eius est ut illud impressum est inipsum et per consequens eius est 'ut habet illudimpressum', - ergo, a primo ad ultimum, sequiturquod intellectus Patris 'ut Patris' formaliter habetnotitiam genitam impressam sibi, et ita Paterformaliter intelliget notitia genita, contraAugustinum VII Trinitatis cap. 3.

26. Again, this opinion, as to the fact it posits the intellectionof the Father to be the reason for generating the word, wasrefuted above in distinction 2 nn.291-296, in the aforesaidquestion About productions, and as to the fact that it positsthe intellect of the Father to be that from which the word isgenerated, it was refuted in the same place, nn.283, 285, andalso in distinction 5 nn.72-75; and I repeat one of thearguments touched on there. Because the intellect asconverted belongs to some supposit; for the conversion is,according to him, a certain action of understanding, and actsbelong to supposits; therefore the conversion belongs to somesupposit. I ask whose supposit it is as it is converted? If theWords, and as it is converted it precedes generation(according to him [n.25]), then it precedes the Word, and sothe Word exists before the Word! If the conversion is theFathers, and whose it is as it is converted is his as fromwhom generation happens by impression, and whose it is asfrom whom something is generated by impression is his as theimpressed thing exists in him and consequently is his as hehas that impressed thing then, from first to last, it followsthat the intellect of the Father as Father formally hasgenerated knowledge impressed on it, and so the Fatherformally understands by generated knowledge, contrary toAugustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2.

27 Respondetur quod sicut in generatione increaturis est distinguere tria signa naturae, primumin quo materia est sub forma corrumpenda,secundum in quo materia est sub nulla forma sedquasi nuda et in proxima potentia ad formamgenerandam, et tertium in quo est sub formageniti, - ita correspondenter potest dici in divinisquod intellectus in primo signo, ut est in Patre, sicconvertitur super se, et ista conversio est quasidispositio materiae ad generationem Filii; in

27. The response made is that, just as in generation increatures there are three moments of nature to distinguish, thefirst moment in which matter is under the form that is to becorrupted, the second in which the matter is under no form butis quasi bare and in proximate potency to the form that is to begenerated, and the third in which it is under the form of thegenerated thing, so it can correspondingly be said in divinereality, that the intellect in the first moment, as it is in theFather, is thus being converted to itself, and this conversion isa quasi disposition of the matter for the generation of the Son;


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secundo signo, in quo est quasi nullius personae,tunc est in potentia proxima ad terminumgenerationis; et in tertio signo, in quo est subproprietate personae genitae, est tunc illiuspersonae. >

in the second moment, in which it belong as it were to noperson, it is then in proximate potency to the term ofgeneration; and in the third moment, in which it is under theproperty of the generated person, it belongs then to thatperson.

28 Exemplum ponitur: si vinum sit in potentiaproxima ad acetum (ita quod forma vinipraeexigitur ordine naturali in materia, ad hocquod sit in potentia proxima respectu aceti), sicum hoc materia vini esset illimitata ad istas duasformas et per consequens neutra inductaexpelleret aliam, et si cum hoc utraque essethypostatica, dans esse personale, - tunc acetumgeneraretur de materia 'ut fuit vini' quasi demateria disposita dispositione praevia necessariopraecedente formam istam. Sed si quaerereturcuius est ut immediate acetum generatur de ea, -responsio, quod nullius, sed generatur de eaimmediate ut materia est sub neutra formahypostatica.

28. An example is set down: if wine is in proximate potency tovinegar (so that the form of wine is pre-required in the matterin natural order for its being in proximate potency with respectto vinegar), if along with this the matter of wine were notlimited to these two forms and consequently neither of them,when introduced, would expel the other, and if along with thiseach is hypostatic, bestowing personal existence thenvinegar would be generated from matter as it was the matterof the wine as if from matter disposed with a previousdisposition necessarily preceding this form. But if it be askedwhose it is as vinegar is immediately generated from it, theresponse is that it is no ones but is generated from itimmediately when matter is under neither hypostatic form.

29 Per hoc ad formam argumenti hic in proposito:conceditur quod est Patris, sicut materia est vini utest disposita ad formam aceti.

29. Hereby response is given to the argument here in thematter at issue; the concession is made that it is the Fathers,the way the matter is the wines as it is disposed to the form ofvinegar.

30 Et cum arguitur 'ergo ut est Patris recipitnotitiam genitam', negatur consequentia; immo perhoc quod recipit notitiam genitam, est alteriussubsistentiae, et etiam de quo immediate generaturverbum, non ut Patris, sed ut conversus.

30. And when it is argued therefore as it is Fathers itreceives generated knowledge, the consequence is denied;nay, by the fact that it receives generated knowledge itbelongs to another subsistent, and even that from which theword is immediately generated does not exist as the Fathersbut as converted.

31 Et si contra hoc obiciatur quod non magisgeneratur de intellectu ut est Patris, quam deintellectu ut est Filii et Spiritus Sancti, - negaturconsequentia, quia est ibi duplex 'ut'. Unum quodnotat rationem immediati principii 'de quo', - et sicgeneratur de eo verbum ut nullius, quasi deimmediato receptivo, quod notat rationemdispositi ad illam formam quae est terminus, licetnon sit ratio immediati receptivi absolute; ergoverbum gene>ratur de intellectu ut nullius, - uttamen praefuit Patris et prius exsistens in Patre,ita quod neutra reduplicatio est praecise sinealtera. Et tamen per hoc quod verbum generaturde eo, non est in subsistentia verbi neque Patris,neque nullius.

31. And if it be objected against this that generation is notfrom the intellect as it is the Fathers more than from theintellect as it is the Sons and the Holy Spirits, theconsequence is denied, because there is a double as there.One that indicates the idea of the immediate principle fromwhich and thus the word is generated from it as it is noones, as from the immediate receptive thing, which indicatesthe idea of what is disposed to the form that is the term,although it is not the idea of the immediate receptive thingabsolutely; therefore the word is generated from the intellectas it is no ones as however it was first the Fathers it wasalso first existing in the Father, so that neither reduplication[sc. of as] is precisely without the other. And yet by the factthe word is generated from it [sc. the intellect], it is not in thesubsistent of the word but of the Father and not no ones.

32 Additur autem quod decipiuntur aliqui,arguentes contra istam opinionem 'de quo, quaside materia vel quasi materia', quasi imaginantes ibiesse distinctionem quasi potentiae passivae ab

32. But the addition is made that some people are deceivedwhen they argue against this opinion from which, as frommatter or quasi-matter, as if they imagine that there is there[sc. in God] a distinction of a quasi-passive potency from act,


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actu, - quod non est verum, sicut teneturgeneraliter a quibusdam de attributis; sed tantum,sicut est ibi sapientia formaliter et bonitasformaliter, sine distinctione, ita ponitur quod ibiest vere impressio et vere imprimens, - et omniaquae dicuntur ibi, esse sine distinctione: distinctioautem istorum non est nisi per actum intellectusnegotiantis circa idem unum quod est in re.

which is not true, the way it is held generally by certainpeople about the attributes; but only, just as there is therewisdom formally and goodness formally, without distinction,so it is posited that there is truly impression there and truly theone impressing, and everything that is said there to bewithout distinction; but a distinction of these things is only byact of intellect busying itself about the same one thing thatexists in reality.

33 Contra ista: Generatio in creaturis videtur essemutatio formaliter, pro eo quod materia ut nulliusprius, postea autem intelligitur sub forma geniti:per hoc enim intelligitur transmutari a privationead formam, quae transmutatio est formalitergeneratio mutatio. Ergo si sub hac ratione ponaturpotentia passiva in divinis, erit tunc in divinis veramutatio. >

33. Against these arguments [nn.27-32]: Generation increatures is a change formally, for the reason that the matter,belonging to nothing before, is afterwards understood to beunder the form of the generated thing; for by this it isunderstood to be changed from privation to form, whichchange is formally generation-change. Therefore if under thisidea passive potency is posited in divine reality, then there willbe true change in divine reality.a

34 Confirmatur ratio in exemplo eorum, quia etsivinum non corrumperetur in generatione aceti,vere tamen illa generatio esset mutatio aprivatione ad formam, licet non concurreret illaalia mutatio 'a forma ad privationem', sicut acciditmodo communiter quando unum generatur et aliudcorrumpitur: tunc enim concurrunt communiter ibiduae mutationes et quattuor termini (duae formaeet duae privationes), sed - circumscripta alteramutatione et terminis eius - nihil minus essetreliqua mutatio; ergo ita erit in proposito, quodillud in quantum est prius nullius - et ita subprivatione termini 'ad quem' et post sub illotermino mutatur.

34. The reason is confirmed by the example they give [n.28],that although the wine is not corrupted in the generation ofvinegar, yet the generation would be truly a change fromprivation to form, although there not go along with it the otherchange, from form to privation, as now commonly happenswhen one thing is generated and another corrupted; for in thiscase there commonly come together there two changes andfour terms of change (two forms and two privations), but after removing one of the changes and its terms the otherchange would no less exist; therefore so will it be in theproposed case, that insofar as it belongs to nothing before and so is under privation of the term to which and is laterunder that term it changes.

35 Praeterea, si primo est Patris et secundonullius, et tertio est Filii per hoc quod recipitnotitiam illam impressam (ergo per hoc quod estFilii, quia est quasi potentiale, recipiens formaleFilii), et est Filii ut terminus formaliscommunicatus Filio per generationem (sicutostensum est distinctione 5), - ergo Filius duplicimodo habendi habebit intellectum, ita quodutrolibet illorum duorum modorum circumscriptonihil minus haberet alio modo >habendi: sicut increaturis materiam compositum habet ut aliquidsui, et vere habet, licet non sit formalis terminusgenerationis; idem etiam compositum habetformam ut aliquid sui, et vere habet, licet non sitsubiectum generationis.

35. Further, if first it belongs to the Father and secondly tonothing, and third belongs to the Son by the fact that itreceives the impressed knowledge (so by the fact it belongs tothe Son, because it is quasi-potential, it receives the formalfeature of the Son [nn.27, 30]), and belongs to the Son as theformal term communicated to the Son by generation (as wasshown in distinction 5 nn.64-85), then the Son will haveintellect in a double way of having it, such that, when either ofthese ways is removed, it would no less have it in the otherway of having; just as in creatures the composite has matter assomething of itself, and truly has it, although it is not theformal term of generation; also the same composite has theform as something of itself, and truly has it, although the formis not subject of generation.

36 Consequens autem illatum, scilicet quod Filiusduplici modo habendi habeat essentiam, videturimpossibile, tam in re quam in considerationeintellectus negotiantis. Probatur etiam per hoc,quod illud quod est materiale generationis, est inpotentia ad formalem terminum eiusdem

36. But the inferred consequence, namely that the Son has theessence in two ways of having, seems impossible, both inreality and in the consideration of the busying intellect. Thereis proof also through this, that what is material in generation isin potency to the formal term of the same generation; but thesame thing, under the same idea, is neither in reality nor in the

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generationis; idem autem, sub eadem ratione, necin re nec in intellectu est in potentia ad se; ergonec intellectus erit simul potentia receptiva etterminus formalis eiusdem generationis.

intellect in potency to itself; therefore neither will the intellectbe at the same time a receptive potency and the formal termof the same generation.

37 Et quod additur de duplici 'ut' ex partemateriae, quasi ad illud 'ut' quod est ratio proximisusceptivi, necessario praeexigatur illud 'ut' quodest eiusdem 'ut' sub forma ordinata ad formamgenerandi, - videtur non esse per se in creaturis,quia si poneretur materia illa quae est sub formavini absque omni forma et agens creatum possetagere in illud sicut denudatum a forma, ipsumesset proximum receptivum cuiuscumque formaenatae imprimi in materiam puram, et ab agentequocumque sufficiente posset talis forma induci.Ergo secundum 'ut' praecise sufficit in creaturis adpotentiam proximam, licet frequenter modoconcomitetur ille ordo, quia numquam materia estsine forma et ut est sub forma non transmutaturindifferenter a quacumque in quam>cumque - peragens creatum - sed a determinata indeterminatam; istud probatur, quia quandointelligitur ut nullius, tunc non est sub formapriore, quae ponitur quasi dispositio ad formamgenerandi: tunc ergo ordo eius ad illam formamnon est nisi relatio posterioris ad prius, quae fortenon est relatio positiva (quia terminus 'ad quem'tunc non est ex natura rei), aut si est relatio realis,non videtur esse ratio propria in materia recipiendiformam inducendam. - Ex his ad propositumvidetur quod licet oporteat intellectum priusorigine esse in Patre quam in Filio, tamen siponeretur receptivus notitiae genitae, ponereturtalis non essentialiter propter aliquem talemordinem ad exsistentiam in Patre, sed secundumquod nullius est praecise et secundum quod ipsidicunt 'quasi nullius'.

37. And as to what is added about the double as on the partof the matter, as if there is pre-required for the as which isthe idea of the proximate susceptive factor the as which isthe same as under the form ordered to the form of generating[n.31], this does not seem to exist per se in creatures,because if the matter which is under the form of wine isposited to be without any form and a created agent can act onit as it is denuded of form, then it would be the proximatereceptive factor of any form that is of a nature to be impressedon pure matter, and such a form could be induced by anysufficient agent at all. Therefore the second as is preciselysufficient in creatures for proximate potency, althoughfrequently now its ordering is concomitant with it, becausematter is never without form and is, as it is under form, notchanged indifferently from any form to any form by acreated agent but from a determinate form to a determinateform; the proof is that when it is understood to belong tonothing, then it is not under the prior form, which is posited asthe disposition for the form of what is to be generated[nn.27-29]; its order then to that form is only a relation ofposterior to prior, which perhaps is not a positive relation(because the term to which is not then of the nature of thething), or if it is a real relation, it does not seem to be theproper reason in the matter for receiving the form to beinduced. Applying this to the issue at hand, it seems thatalthough the intellect should in origin be in the Father before itis in the Son, yet, if it were posited as receptive of generatedknowledge, it would not be posited to be such essentiallybecause of some order to existence in the Father, butaccording as it belongs precisely to nothing and, according tothe way they themselves say precisely, to quasi nothing.

38 Quod etiam additur ad excludendumdeceptionem, videtur esse dictum decepti, quiaillud dictum videtur in se absurdum et se ipsuminterimere.

38. What is added to exclude a deception [n.32], seems to bethe remark of someone deceived, because that remark seemsin itself absurd and to destroy itself.

39 Primum probatur per hoc quia tunc ita vere innatura rei intellectus est potentia passiva et itavere recipit, sicut Deus ex natura rei vere est actuset sapiens et bonus, - quod videtur absurdum, quiaquod in creaturis necessario habet imperfectionemannexam vel est imperfectio (sicut est ratiopotentiae passivae, quia semper dicitimperfectionem prout dividit ens contra potentiamactivam), ponitur ita veraciter in Deo sicut illudquod est perfectio simpliciter!

39. The first point is proved by the fact that the intellect in thenature of the thing is as truly a passive potency and as trulyreceptive as God is from the nature of the thing truly act andwise and good, which seems absurd, because what increatures necessarily has imperfection annexed to it or is animperfection (as is the nature of passive potency, because italways states an imperfection the way it divides being againstactive potency) is posited to exist as truly in God as what is aperfection simply!


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40 Et si dicas, immo potentia passiva dicitperfectionem, licet >non distinctam ab actu, - hocvidetur esse fictio, quia nihil est in creaturisinferius ratione potentiae passivae: haec enimratio vere competit materiae primae, quae poniturinfima entium; ergo verius potest dici quod sitformaliter lapis quam potentia passiva, si propterperfectionem aliquam in ratione potentiaepassivae debet ibi poni formaliter potentia passiva.

40. And if you say that rather passive potency states aperfection, although one not distinct from act, this seems tobe a fiction, because there is nothing lower in creatures thanthe idea of passive potency; for this idea belongs truly toprime matter, which is posited as the lowest of beings;therefore more truly can it be said that God is formally a stonethan passive potency, if it is because of some perfection in theidea of passive potency that passive potency should beformally posited there.

41 Secundo probo quod hoc dictum interimat seipsum, quia non videtur intelligibile quod ibi sintrelationes oppositae, quin sicut sunt relationesoppositae, ita sint relationes distinctae (si reales,realiter, - si rationis, ratione); ergo si ibi est exnatura rei imprimens et quod imprimitur et illudcui imprimitur (quae non possunt intelligi sinerelatione), ponere ibi ista ex natura rei sine omnidistinctione, est contradictio.

41. Second I prove that the remark destroys itself [n.38],because it does not seem intelligible that there be oppositerelations there without there also being distinct relations (ifreal, really, if of reason, by reason) just as much as oppositeones; therefore if there is there from the nature of the thingsomething that impresses and something that is impressed andsomething on which it is impressed (which cannot beunderstood without relation), then to posit that they are therefrom the nature of the thing without any distinction is acontradiction.

B. Scotus own Response

1. To the First Question

Latin English

42 Ad quaestiones ergo istas respondeo aliter. Adprimam. - Quia rationem verbi praecipueaccipimus ab Augustino libro De Trinitate,supponenda sunt quaedam certa >quae secundumipsum conveniunt verbo; ex illis investigandum estquid est in intellectu cui potissime conveniant illa,et illud ponendum est verbum.

42. I reply therefore in a different way to these questions. Tothe first. Because we chiefly take the idea of the word fromAugustines book On the Trinity, certain definite things mustbe supposed that according to him belong to the word; fromthese we must investigate what in the intellect they mostbelong to, and that thing must be set down as the word.

43 Verbum secundum ipsum non est sine actualicogitatione, sicut patet XV Trinitatis cap. 38 velcap. 15.

43. The word according to hima is not without actualcognition, as is plain from ibid. XV ch.15 n.25.

44 Verbum etiam genitum est de memoria vel descientia, vel de obiecto relucente in scientia, sicutpatet per ipsum XV Trinitatis cap. 24: ((Formatacogitatio ab ea re quam scimus, est verbum)); etcap. 36: ((Verbum nostrum de nostra scientianascitur, >quemadmodum verbum Dei de Patrissola scientia natum est)). Et ista omnia sunteadem, quia secundum ipsum IX Trinitatis cap.ultimo 'ex cognoscente et cognito simul, pariturnotitia', quae duae sunt una causa integralisrespectu notitiae genitae, sicut dictum estdistinctione 3 quaestione 2.

44. Also the word is generated from memory or from science,or from the object shows itself in the science, as is plain fromibid. XV ch.10 n.19: The word is thought formed from thething we know; ch.14 n.24: Our word is born from ourscience in the way the word of God the Father is born byscience alone. And all these things are the same, becauseaccording to ibid. IX ch.12 n.18: from the knower and knowntogether knowledge is born, which two things are one integralcause with respect to generated knowledge, as was said indistinction 3 question 2 n.494.a

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45 Tertio, verbum ab eo inquiritur propterimaginem in mente et ponitur secunda parsimaginis (scilicet proles), sicut patet per ipsum IXTrinitatis cap. ultimo vel cap. 32: ((Est quaedamimago Trinitatis: ipsa mens, et notitia eius (quaeest proles eius ac de se ipsa verbum eius), et amortertius)).

45. Third, the word is investigated by him because of theimage [sc. of the Trinity] in the mind and is set down as thesecond part of the image (namely the offspring), as is plainfrom ibid. IX ch.32: There is a certain image of the Trinity;the mind itself, and its knowledge (which is its offspring andits word from itself), and love third.

46 Posset ergo describi verbum, quod verbum estactus intelligentiae productus a memoria perfecta,non habens esse sine actuali intellectione,repraesentans verbum divinum (propter illud enimAugustinus inquisivit de verbo nostro).

46. The word may therefore be described as: the word is anact of intelligence produced by perfect memory, not havingexistence without actual intellection, representing the divineword (because for this reason Augustine inquired into ourword).

47 Ex his apparet quod verbum nihil est pertinensad voluntatem, neque ad memoriam (quia estsecunda pars imaginis, non prima nec tertia), etper consequens non est species intelligibilis nechabitus, nec aliquid pertinens ad memoriam; estergo aliquid pertinens ad intelligentiam. >

47. From these it is plain that the word is nothing pertaining tothe will, nor to memory (because the word is the second partof the image, not the first or third), and consequently it is notthe intelligible species nor the habit, nor anything pertaining tomemory; it is therefore something pertaining to intelligence.

a. Which of the Things Found in the Intelligence is the Word

Latin English

48 In intelligentia autem non videtur esse nisi velactualis intellectio, vel obiectum terminans illamintellectionem, vel secundum alios species genitain intelligentia de specie in memoria, quae 'speciesin intelligentia' praecedit actum intelligendi, velsecundum alios aliquid formatum per actumintelligendi, vel quinto secundum alios ipsametintellectio ut passio, quasi causata a se ut actio; etsecundum haec quinque, possunt esse quinqueopiniones de verbo.

48. Now in the intelligence there seems only to be [1] actualintellection, [2] or the object that is the term of thatintellection, or, according to others, [3] the species generatedin the intelligence from the species in the memory, whichspecies in the intelligence precedes the act of understanding,or, according to others, [4] it is something formed by an act ofunderstanding, or fifth, according to others, [5] intellectionitself as a passion, as if caused by itself as action; andaccording to these five there can be five opinions about theword.

49 Non est autem species in intelligentia prior actuintelligendi, quia talem speciem superfluum estponere. Ipsa enim non perfectius repraesentaretobiectum quam species in memoria, et >sufficithabere unum perfecte repraesentans obiectumante actum intelligendi.

49. Now the species in the intelligence is not prior to the act ofunderstanding [contra the third opinion], because positingsuch a species is superfluous. For it does not more perfectlyrepresent the object than the species in the memory, and it isenough to have one thing perfectly representing the objectbefore the act of understanding.

50 Quod autem 'non perfectius', patet perAugustinum XV Trinitatis cap. 12: 'Nihil plus inprole quam in parente'.

50. But that it is not more perfect is plain from Augustineibid. XV ch.14 n.23: There is nothing more in the offspringthan in the parent.

51 Tunc etiam duae species eiusdem rationisessent in eadem potentia, quia istae duae speciessunt eiusdem rationis; et ipse intellectus utmemoria et intelligentia, est una potentia, quiaidem est actus primus, et quo habens operatur etquo habens actum primum est in actu secundo.

51. Also in that case two species of the same idea would be inthe same power, because these two species are of the samepower; and the intellect itself as memory and intelligence isone power, because it is pure act, and that by which thepossessor operates and that by which it has first act is insecond act.


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52 Tunc etiam habitus non esset immediatumprincipium actus, nec habens habitum esset inpotentia accidentali ad agendum secundum illumhabitum, quia requireretur forma prior ipsaoperatione, alia ab habitu.

52. In that case too the habit would not be the immediateprinciple of the act, nor would what has the habit be inaccidental power to acting according to the habit, because aprior form would be required for the operation, different fromthe habit.

53 Nec ista 'species in intelligentia' posset ponigigni naturaliter, si numquam posset esse sineactuali intellectione, quia actualis intellectiosubest imperio voluntatis; nec etiam posset dicigigni libere vel eius gignitio subesse imperiovoluntatis - ut videtur - si ponatur species prioractu, quia videtur quod primum pertinens adintellectum quod est in potestate nostra, estactualis intellectio. >

53. Nor can the species in the intelligence be posited asbeing born naturally, supposing it could never exist withoutactual intellection, because actual intellection is subject to thecommand of the will; nor even can it be said that it is bornfreely or that its generation is subject to the command of thewill as it seems if it is posited as a species prior to act,because it seems that the first thing pertaining to the intellectthat is in our power is actual intellection.

54 Nec ipsum obiectum potest poni verbum, sicutdicit alia opinio, quia obiectum secundum se nonest aliquid productum virtute memoriae (sivealicuius in mente), quale est verbum, - nec ipsumobiectum 'ut in memoria' producitur virtutememoriae, ut patet; ipsum autem obiectum 'ut inintelligentia' non gignitur nisi quia aliquid priusgignitur in quo obiectum habet esse, quia sicutdictum est distinctione 3, istae actiones etpassiones intentionales non conveniunt obiectonisi propter aliquam actionem vel passionemrealem, quae convenit ei in quo obiectum habetesse intentionale.

54. Nor can the object itself be posited as the word, as anotheropinion says [the second, n.48], because the object in itself isnot anything produced by virtue of memory (or of anything inthe mind), such as the word is, nor is the object as it is inthe memory produced by virtue of the memory, as is plain;but the object as it is in the intelligence is only generatedbecause something is first generated in which the object hasbeing, because, as was said in distinction 3 nn.375, 382, 386,these intentional actions and passions do not belong to theobject save because of some real action or passion thatbelongs to that in which the object has intentional being.

55 Nec etiam est aliquis terminus productus perintellectionem, quia intellectio non est actioproductiva alicuius termini: tunc enimincompossibile esset intelligere eam esse, et nonesse termini, sicut incompossibile est intelligerecalefactionem esse et non esse calorem ad quemsit calefactio. Non est autem impossibileintelligere intellectionem in se, non intelligendoquod sit alicuius termini ut producti per ipsam.

55. Nor too is it some term produced by intellection [sc. thefourth opinion, n.48], because intellection is not theproductive action of any term; for then it would beincompossible to understand it to exist and not to be of theterm, just as it is incompossible to understand that there isheating and no heat toward which the heating exists. But it isnot impossible to understand intellection in itself withoutunderstanding that it is of some term as produced by it.

56 Confirmatur etiam, quia operationes talesdebent esse actus ultimi, ex I Ethicorum et IXMetaphysicae. - De ista materia dictum est supradistinctione 3, qualiter est quaedam actio degenere actionis, et alia quae est qualitas,cuiusmodi est intellectio. >

56. There is a confirmation too, that such operations ought tobe ultimate acts, from Ethics 1.1.1094a3-5 and Metaphysics9.8.1050a-b1. This matter was spoken about above indistinction 3 nn.600-604, as to how it is a certain action of thegenus of action, and another action that is quality, of whichsort intellection is.

57 Improbatur etiam haec via - et sequens 'deintellectione passione' - per idem medium, quiatunc intelligentia gigneret verbum et non memoria,quod est contra Augustinum; intelligentia enimproduceret illum terminum actionis intelligendi, siquis esset, - et intelligentia produceretintellectionem passionem, si qua esset.

57. This way and the following one about intellection-passion are also refuted [sc. the fourth and fifth opinions,n.48] through the same middle term, that then the intelligenceand not the memory would generate the word, which iscontrary to Augustine [n.44]; for intelligence would producethe term of the action of understanding, if there were any and intelligence would produce intellection-passion, if there


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were any.

58 Ista etiam via 'de intellectione actione etpassione' non videtur rationabilis, quia intellectioest forma una, quae licet possit comparari adagens a quo est et ad subiectum in quo recipitur,tamen ex hoc non habet ipsa talem distinctionemut possit esse quasi causa sui vel esse terminusactionis secundum hoc et non secundum illud;quia si est terminus actionis, hoc est secundum se,et nec secundum istum respectum nec secundumillum, sed concomitantur eam isti respectus.

58. Also this way about intellection-action and passion [thefifth] does not seem reasonable, because intellection is oneform, which although it can be compared to the agent fromwhich it is and to the subject in which it is received, yet it doesnot have from it such distinction that it could be as it were thecause of itself or the term of action in accord with this [sc. thesubject] and not in accord with that [sc. the agent]; because ifit is the term of action, this is in accord with itself, and not inaccord with this respect or that, but those respects areconcomitants of it.

59 Sequitur ergo, per viam divisionis, quodverbum est actualis intellectio.

59. It follows, therefore, by way of division that the word isactual intellection [the first opinion, n.48].

60 Et confirmatur per Augustinum XV Trinitatiscap. 16 vel cap. 40: ((Cogitatio nostra perveniensad illud quod scimus, atque inde formata, verbumnostrum est)). Idem etiam habetur ab eo XVTrinitatis cap. 10 vel cap. 24: ((Formata quippecogitatio)) etc., ((verbum est)), sicut supra dictumest. >

60. And there is confirmation from Augustine On the TrinityXV ch.16 n.23: Our thinking, reaching to that which weknow, and formed from it, is our word. The same is held byhim in ibid. ch.10 n.19: Formed thinking, indeed, etc. is theword, as was said above [n.44].

61 Et confirmatur istud per simile de verbo vocaliet imaginabili: formatur enim verbum vocale adsignandum et declarandum illud quod intelligitur,sed quod vox non statim formatur ab intelligentein quantum intelligens sed per aliam potentiammediam (puta motivam), hoc est imperfectionis; siergo statim gigneretur vel formaretur utexpressivum illius quod latet in intellectu, et hocvirtute intellectus intelligentis, non minus essetverbum. Obiectum autem habitualiter latet inmemoria; si ergo virtute eius statim causeturaliqua intellectio actualis, quae genita exprimat etdeclaret illud obiectum ibi latens, - vere estverbum, quia expressivum latentis et genitumvirtute eius ad exprimendum ipsum.

61. There is confirmation of this through a likeness about thevocal and imaginable word: for the vocal word is formed tosignify and make clear what is understood, but that a vocalsound is not at once formed by someone who understandsinsofar as he understands but through some other middlepower (namely a motive one), this belongs to imperfection; iftherefore it were generated or formed at once as expressive ofthat which is latent in the intellect, and this by virtue of theunderstanding intellect, it would no less be the word. Now theobject lies habitually latent in the memory; if therefore byvirtue of it is at once caused some actual intellection, whichonce generated expresses and makes clear the object latentthere, truly it is the word, because expressive of what islatent and generated by virtue of it to express it.

b. Whether any Actual Intellection at all is the Word

Latin English

62 Sed restat dubitatio ulterior, utrumquaecumque intellectio actualis sit verbum.

62. But a further doubt remains, whether any actualintellection at all is the word.

63 Ad hoc dicitur quod non, sed oportet addere -quasi differentiam specificam - 'quae estdeclarativa'.

63. [Opinions of others] To this a reply is given in thenegative, and that one must add as a specific difference intellection which is declarative [n.11].

64 Contra hoc arguo, quia in Patre est notitiadeclarativa formaliter, - nam intellectio quae est

64. I argue against this because in the Father there isdeclarative knowledge formally, for the intellection that is in


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Patris 'in quantum est intelligentia', est declarativaPatris 'in quantum memoria', et ita perfecte, sicutactualis intellectio 'ut in Filio' declarat habitualemut in memoria Filii; in Patre tamen non est verbumformaliter, sicut dicetur in solutione quaestionis. >

the Father insofar as he is intelligence is declarative of theFather insofar as he is memory, and thus perfectly, just asactual intellection as it is in the Son declares habitualknowledge as it is in the memory of the Son; but in the Fatherthere is not the word formally, as will be said in the solution ofthe question [n.71].

65 Similiter, verbum declarat se, secundumAugustinum VII Trinitatis cap. 5 vel 16: ((si)),inquiens, ((hoc verbum quod nos proferimus,temporale, et se ipsum ostendit et illud de quoloquimur, quanto magis verbum Dei)) etc., et seipsum ostendit? 'Declarare' ergo non dicitrelationem realem, nec per consequens relationemgeniti; verbum autem non est nisi intellectio genita(IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo), alioquin posset poni inPatre formaliter.

65. Likewise, the word declares itself, according to AugustineOn the Trinity VII ch.3 n.4: If, he says, this word that wepronounce is temporal and manifests both itself and that ofwhich we speak, how much more does the word of God etc.and manifest itself? To declare then does not state a realrelation, nor consequently the relation of what is generated;but the word is nothing but generated intellection (ibid. IXch.12 n.18), otherwise it could be posited formally in theFather.

66 Aliter dicitur, quantum ad istum articulum,quod verbum est notitia actualis 'quae est terminusinquisitionis'.

66. A reply is also given in another way as concerns thisarticle [n.62], that the word is actual knowledge that is theterm of inquiry.

67 Quod ostenditur per Augustinum IX Trinitatiscap. ultimo, ubi dicitur quod verbum est partumsive proles: est autem partum, quia est repertum, -non est autem repertum nisi quia inquisitum; undevult quod partum istum mentis praecedit appetitusimpellens ad inquirendum. >

67. This is shown from Augustine ibid. when he says that theword is a thing born or an offspring; but it is a thing bornbecause it is a thing found, but it is not a thing found savebecause it is inquired into; hence Augustine means that thisthing born of the mind is preceded by an appetite moving toinquiry.

68 Idem videtur velle XV De Trinitate cap. 15 vel39, sic inquiens: ((Tunc fit verbum verum, quandoillud quod nos dixi 'volubili quadam motioneiactare', ad illud quod scimus pervenit atque indeformatur, eius omnimodam similitudinem capiens,ut quomodo quaeque res scitur, sic etiamcogitetur)); ipsa 'volubilis cogitatio' est inquisitio,qualis non erit in patria, sicut innuit cap. 41 vel 16:((Fortassis non erunt ibi volubiles cogitationes)).

68. He seems to mean the same in ibid. XV ch.15 n.25 whenhe inquires as follows: Then a true word comes to be whenthat which I said to us spreads with a certain rapid motioncomes to that which we know and is thence formed, taking onits likeness in every way, so that in whatever way each thing isknown so too is it thought; this rapid thinking is inquiry, ofthe sort that will not exist in the fatherland, as he indicates[ch.41 or 16]: Perhaps there will not be rapid thoughtsthere.

69 Ponitur tunc quod post notitiam confusamsequitur inquisitio per divisionem etargumentationem, et ultimo devenitur adperfectam notitiam, quae quasi gignitur istainquisitione; et illa perfecta notitia, quae estterminus inquisitionis, est verbum.

69. The position then is that after confused knowledge therefollows inquiry and argumentation, and finally one reachesperfect knowledge, which is as it were generated by thatinquiry; and the perfect knowledge, which is the term ofinquiry, is the word.

70 Contra istud arguo sic: si de ratione verbi sit'gigni inquisitive', ergo Deus non habet verbum;secundo, igitur angelus non habet verbum denaturaliter sibi cognitis; tertio, igitur bea>tus nonhabet verbum de essentia divina, nec de aliquoperfecte cognito sine inquisitione; quarto, igiturhabens perfectum habitum scientiae, statimoperans per illum habitum non potest habere

70. Against this I argue as follows: if it belongs to the idea ofthe word that it is born through inquiry, then God does nothave a word; second, in that case an angel does not have aword about things naturally known to him; third, then theblessed do not have a word about the divine essence, norabout anything perfectly known without inquiry; fourth,therefore he who has the perfect habit of science and at onceoperates through the habit cannot have a word, all which


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verbum, - quae omnia videntur absurda. things seem absurd.

71 Ideo, istis opinionibus omissis, quoad istumarticulum dico quod non quaelibet intellectioactualis est verbum (sicut probatum est contraillam viam quae ponit 'declarativum' esse propriumverbi), sed notitia genita; et ideo in Patre non estverbum formaliter.

71. [Scotus own opinion] Therefore, setting these opinionsaside, I say as to this article [n.62] that not any actualintellection at all is the word (as was proved against the waythat set down declarative as proper to the word [nn.64-65]),but generated knowledge is; and therefore in the Father thereis no word formally.

72 Quaelibet autem notitia genita - quamAugustinus vocat prolem - est verbum, non tameneo modo quo Augustinus ponit verbum perfectum,quod scilicet repraesentet verbum divinum.

72. But any generated knowledge whatever whichAugustine calls offspring is a word, though not in the wayAugustine posits a perfect word, namely one that representsthe divine word [nn.45-46].

73 Primum istorum declaro, quia quaelibetintellectio actualis gignitur de memoria,imperfecta de imperfecta sicut perfecta deperfecta; ergo quaelibet notitia est proles etexpressiva parentis, et genita ad exprimendumparentem. - Et istud confirmatur primo perAugustinum IX Trinitatis cap. 10 vel cap. 24:((Omne quod notum est, verbum dicitur animoimpressum, quamdiu de memoria definiri etproferri potest)); item, XV Tri>nitatis cap. 12 vel32: ((Nec interest quando illud didicerit, qui quodscit loquitur: aliquando enim statim ut discit, hocdicit)). Et breviter, quaecumque differentiainveniatur inter notitiam primam genitam'imperfectam' et illam quae sequitur inquisitionem,non est differentia formalis, propter quam haecpossit dici verbum et illa non, ut videtur.

73. I make clear the first of these [sc. that any generatedknowledge is a word], because any actual intellection isgenerated from memory, imperfect from imperfect as perfectfrom perfect; therefore any knowledge is offspring andexpressive of the parent, and is generated to express theparent. And this is confirmed first from Augustine On theTrinity IX ch.10 n.15: Everything known is said to be a wordimpressed on the mind, as long as it can be defined andproduced from the memory; again ibid. XV ch.12 n.22: Nordoes it matter when he who speaks what he knows learnt it;for sometimes as soon as he learns it he says it. And briefly,whatever difference is found between the first generatedimperfect knowledge and the knowledge that follows inquiry,there is no formal difference because of which the latter couldbe called word and the former not, as it seems.

74 Secundum declaro sic, quia intellectus nosternon statim habet notitiam perfectam obiecti, quiasecundum Philosophum I Physicorum innata estnobis via procedendi a confuso ad distinctum; etideo primo, ordine originis, imprimitur nobisnotitia obiecti confusa, prius quam distincta, - etideo est inquisitio necessaria ad hoc ut intellectusnoster veniat ad distinctam notitiam: et ideo estnecessaria inquisitio praevia verbo perfecto, quianon est verbum perfectum nisi sit notitia actualisperfecta.

74. I make the second clear [sc. not any generated knowledgeis the perfect word, n.72], because our intellect does notimmediately have perfect knowledge of the object, becauseaccording to the Philosopher Physics 1.1.184a16-23 what isinborn in us a way of proceeding from the confused to thedistinct; and therefore first, in order of origin, there isimpressed on us a confused knowledge of the object before adistinct one, and therefore inquiry is necessary for ourintellect to come to distinct knowledge; and therefore inquiryis necessary previous to the perfect word, because there is noperfect word unless there is perfect actual knowledge.

75 Sic ergo intelligendum est quod cognito aliquoobiecto confuse, sequitur inquisitio - per viamdivisionis - differentiarum convenientium illi; etinventis omnibus illis differentiis, cognitiodefinitiva illius obiecti est actualis notitia perfectaet perfecte declarativa illius habitualis notitiaequae primo erat in memoria: et ista definitivanotitia, perfecte declarativa, est perfectumverbum. >

75. So then one must understand that when some object isknown confusedly inquiry follows by way of division intothe differences that belong to it; and when all the differenceshave been found, definitive knowledge of the object is perfectactual knowledge and is perfectly declarative of the habitualknowledge which was first in the memory; and this definitiveknowledge, perfectly declarative, is the perfect word.


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76 Hoc dicit Augustinus IX Trinitatis cap. 10 vel24: ((Definio quid sit intemperantia, et hoc estverbum eius)); et ibidem praemisit Augustinus, ineodem capitulo, quod iam superius positum est:((quamdiu de memoria proferri et definiri potest)),- id est distincte et definitive actualiter cognosci,virtute eius quod est in memoria.

76. This is what Augustine says ibid. IX ch.10 n.15: I definewhat temperance is, and this is its word; and in the sameplace Augustine premises, in the same chapter, what he wasalready set down above: as long as it can be defined andproduced from the memory, [n.73] that is distinctly anddefinitively and actually known, by virtue of what is in thememory.

77 Non ergo est de ratione verbi gigni postinquisitionem, sed necessarium est intellectuiimperfecto - qui non statim potest habere notitiamdefinitivam obiecti - habere notitiam talem postinquisitionem; et ideo verbum perfectum non estin nobis sine inquisitione. Et tamen quandoverbum perfectum sequitur talem inquisitionem,illa inquisitio non est generatio ipsius verbiformaliter, sed quasi praevia ad hoc ut genereturverbum; quod bene innuit Augustinus inauctoritate praeallegata (libro XV cap. 39): ((Hacatque illac, volubili cogitatione)) etc., ((quando adillud quod scimus pervenit atque inde formatur)),verbum est etc., - innuens quod ista iactatio (id estinquisitio) non est gignitio verbi formaliter, sedeam sequitur gignitio verbi de eo quod scimus, idest de obiecto in memoria habitualiter cognito.

77. It does not therefore belong to the idea of the word to beborn after inquiry, but it is necessary for an imperfect intellect which cannot at once have definitive knowledge of theobject to have such knowledge after inquiry; and thereforethe perfect word does not exist in us without inquiry. And yetwhen a perfect word follows such inquiry, the inquiry is notthe generation of the word itself formally, but isquasipreliminary to the word being generated; whichAugustine well indicates in the afore cited authority [n.68]hither and thither with a certain rapid motion etc. when itcomes to that which we know and is thence formed, it is theword etc., indicating that this scattering about (that is,inquiry) is not the generation of the word formally but isfollowed by the generation of the word from what we know,that is, form the object habitually known in the memory.

78 Et si obiciatur 'ad quid tunc est inquisitionecessaria?', - pos>set dici ad illud, quod motusnecessarius est ad hoc ut inducatur forma perfecta(quae non posset statim in principio motus induci),vel inductio multarum formarum ordinatarum adinductionem ultimae formae, et absque illo ordineformarum non posset ultima forma induci statim.Et secundum hoc ponitur iste ordo: primo esthabitualis notitia confusa, secundo actualisintellectio confusa, tertio inquisitio (et ininquisitione multa verba de multis notitiishabitualibus virtualiter contentis in memoria),quam inquisitionem sequitur distincta et actualisnotitia primi obiecti cuius cognitio inquiritur, -quae notitia 'actualis distincta' imprimit habitualemperfectam in memoriam, et tunc primo estperfecta memoria, et assimilatur memoriae inPatre; ultimo, ex memoria perfecta gigniturverbum perfectum, sine inquisitione medianteinter ipsam et verbum, - et ista gignitio assimilaturgignitioni verbi divini perfecti, ex memoriapaterna perfecta. Nullum ergo verbum estperfectum, repraesentans verbum divinum (quodpotissime investigat Augustinus), nisi istud quodgignitur de memoria perfecta sine inquisitionemedia inter talem memoriam et tale verbum, licetnec illa memoria possit haberi in nobis - propterimperfectionem intellectus nostri - nisi praecedatinquisitio.

78. And if it be objected for what then is inquiry necessary? one can say to this that motion is necessary for theintroduction of perfect form (which could not be introduced atthe beginning of the motion), or there is introduction of manyforms ordered to the introduction of the final form, andwithout that order of forms the final form could not be at onceintroduced. And accordingly this order is posited: first there ishabitual confused knowledge, second confused actualintellection, third inquiry (and in inquiry there are many wordsfrom many habitual knowledges virtually contained inmemory), which inquiry is followed by distinct and actualknowledge of the first object whose knowledge is beinginquired into, which actual distinct knowledge impressesperfect habitual knowledge on memory, and then first there isperfect memory and it is likened to the memory in the Father;ultimately, from perfect memory is generated a perfect word,without inquiry coming between it and the word, and thisgeneration is likened to the generation of the perfect divineword, from perfect paternal memory. No word is perfect, then,representing the divine word (which is what Augustine is mostinvestigating) save that which is born of perfect memorywithout inquiry coming between such memory and such word,although neither could that memory be had by us because ofthe imperfection of our intellect unless inquiry precede.


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c. Whether Will Concurs in the Idea of the Word

Latin English

79 Ultimum dubium istius quaestionis est, utrumad rationem verbi concurrat voluntas, - puta utrumde ratione eius sit quod sit voluntarie genitum, sivevoluntate agente 'copulante intel>ligentiammemoriae', secundum quod dicit Augustinusinmultis locis.

79. The last doubt in this question [sc. question 1] is whetherthe will concurs in the idea of the word, namely whether itbelongs to its idea that it be generated voluntarily or by anagent will joining the intelligence to memory, according towhat Augustine says in many places.

80 Istam quaestionem movet Augustinus IXTrinitatis cap. 10 a: ((Recte)) - inquit - ((quaeriturutrum omnis notitia sit verbum, vel tantum notitiaamata)); et respondet: ((Non omnia quae quoquomodo tangunt, concipiuntur, sed alia ut tantumnota sint, nec tamen verba dicantur, - sicut illaquae displicent nec concepta nec parta dicendasunt)); ((aliter omne quod notum est, verbumdicitur, quamdiu de memoria proferri vel definiripotest, quamvis res ipsa displiceat)). Et posteasubdit: ((Verumtamen, cum illa quae odimusdisplicent, eorum notitia nobis non displicet)), - itaquod de ratione verbi non est gigni amore obiecticogniti, sed nec etiam gigni amore notitiae quaeest verbum.

80. This question is moved by Augustine in On the Trinity IXch.10 n.15: Rightly, he says, is the question raised whetherall knowledge is a word or only loved knowledge is; and hereplies: Not everything words in any way touch upon isconceived, but some things are so in order only to be knownand are yet not called words as things that displease are saidto be neither conceived nor brought to birth; in another wayeverything that is known is called a word, as long as it can bepronounced or defined from memory. And afterwards headds: However, although the things we hate displease us, yetthe knowledge of them does not displease us, such that itdoes not belong to the idea of the word that it is generated bylove of the known object, nor does it even belong to the wordto be born by love of the knowledge that is the word.

81 Tamen concomitatur perfectum verbum duplexactus voluntatis: unus praevius, quo imperaturactus ille et inquisitio praevia, sine quo nonperveniretur ad verbum perfectum (sicut patet>IX Trinitatis cap. ultimo), et alius quo intellectusquiescit in intelligibili notitia iam habita, sine quonon permaneret intellectus in illa notitia. Non ergoactus voluntatis est de essentia verbi, necformaliter nec ut causa, sed concomitaturnecessario ad generationem eius in nobis propterinquisitionem eius praeviam et ad continuationemeius; similiter propter hoc quod intellectus - sivoluntas non complaceret in ista notitia - nonpermaneret in ea, et ita ista notitia non haberetrationem verbi permanentis. Ista tamenpermanentia non est de ratione perfectionis verbiintensive, quia non minus perfecta est albedounius diei quam unius anni; voluntas autemrespiciens obiectum - cuius est verbum nonpertinet ad rationem verbi, nisi stricte sumendoverbum, quomodo Augustinus pertractat cap.praeallegato Nemo potest dicere 'Dominus Iesus'nisi in Spiritu Sancto (hoc 'dicere' includitacceptionem obiecti dicti et addit aliquid ultrarationem verbi absolute).

81. Yet there accompanies the perfect word a double act ofwill: one is previous, whereby the act and the previous inquiryare commanded without which the perfect word would not bereached (as is plain in ibid. IX ch.12 n.18), and the other isthat in which the intellect rests in intelligible knowledgealready possessed, without which the intellect would notpersist in that knowledge. An act of will, therefore, is not ofthe essence of the word, neither formally nor as cause, but isnecessarily concomitant with the generation of it in us becauseof previous inquiry into it and for continuing it; likewisebecause of the fact that the intellect if the will is not wellpleased in the knowledge would not persist in it, and so thisknowledge would not have the idea of permanent word. Yetthis permanence is not of the idea of the perfection of theword intensively, because a whiteness of one day is not lessperfect than a whiteness of one year; but the will that hasregard to the object of which there is a word does notpertain to the idea of the word save when taking word strictly,the way Augustine takes it in the afore cited chapter [n.80],No one can say Lord Jesus save with the Holy Spirit (thissaying includes acceptance of the said object and addssomething beyond the idea of word absolutely).

2. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question


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Latin English

82 Ad argumenta huius quaestionis. Ad primumpatet quod illa auctoritas indiget expositione. Dicitenim ibi: ((Ipsa phantasia eius)) (scilicetCarthaginis) ((in memoria mea verbum eius)) est;patet autem - secundum eum >XV Trinitatis cap.38 - verbum non esse formaliter in memoria; ergooportet quod intelligatur causaliter, non formaliter.

82. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-3]. As to the first[n.1] it is plain the authority needs interpretation. ForAugustine says there: the image itself of it (namely ofCarthage) in my memory is its word; but it is clear,according to him On the Trinity XV ch.15 n.25, that the wordis not formally in the memory; therefore it must be understoodin a causal way and not a formal one.

83 Ad secundum. Licet magna altercatio fiat de'voce', utrum sit signum rei vel conceptus, tamenbreviter concedo quod illud quod signatur pervocem proprie, est res. Sunt tamen signa ordinataeiusdem signati littera, vox et conceptus, sicutsunt multi effectus ordinati eiusdem causae,quorum nullus est causa alterius, ut patet de soleilluminante plures partes medii; et ubi est talisordo causatorum, absque hoc quod unum sit causaalterius, ibi est immediatio cuiuslibet respectueiusdem causae, excludendo aliud in rationecausae, non tamen excludendo aliud in rationeeffectus immediatioris. Et tunc posset concedialiquo modo effectum propinquiorem esse causameffectus remotioris, non proprie, sed propterprioritatem illam quae est inter tales effectus adcausam; ita potest concedi de multis signiseiusdem signati ordinatis, quod unum aliquo modoest signum alterius (quia dat intelligere ipsum),quia remotius non signaret nisi prius aliquo modoimmediatius signaret, - et tamen, propter hoc,unum proprie non est signum alterius, sicut ex aliaparte de causa et causatis.

83. To the second point [n.2]. Although there has been a lot ofdispute about vocal sound, whether it is a sign of a thing or aconcept, yet I concede in brief that what is signified properlyby a vocal sound is a thing. However letter, vocal sound, andconcept are ordered signs of the same signified thing, just asthere are many ordered effects of the same cause none ofwhich is cause of the other, as is plain about the sunilluminating many parts of the medium; and where there issuch an order of caused things, apart from one being cause ofthe other, there is an immediacy of any effect with respect tothe same cause, excluding anything else in the idea of causebut not excluding anything else in the idea of a moreimmediate effect. And then one could concede that in someway a nearer effect is cause of a remoter effect, not properlybut because of the priority that exists between such effects inrelation to the cause; thus one can concede about manyordered signs of the same signified thing that one of them is insome sense sign of the other (because it gives to understandit), for a remoter sign would not signify before a moreimmediate one in some way signified first, and yet, for thisreason, one is not properly sign of the other, just as is true onthe other side about cause and things caused.

84 Ad tertium concedo quod notitia est proles etvere genita, scilicet actualis intellectio, - sed illanon est actio de genere actionis (quia, ut dictumest supra, actualis intellectio non est actio >degenere actionis), sed est qualitas nata terminaretalem actionem, quae signatur per hoc quod est'dicere' et - in communi - per hoc quod est'elicere'. Non ergo verbum est aliquid productumactione quae est intellectio, quia ipsa intellectionon est productiva alicuius, sed ipsa est productaactione quae est de genere actionis, sicut dictumest supra.

84. To the third [n.3] I concede that knowledge is offspringand truly generated, namely actual intellection, but it is notan action in the genus of action (because, as said above d.3nn.600-604, actual intellection is not action in the genus ofaction), but it is a quality of a nature to be the term of such anaction, which is signified by what it is to say and in general by what it is to elicit. A word, then, is not somethingproduced by an action that is intellection, because theintellection itself is not productive of anything but is itselfproduced by an action that is in the genus of action, as wassaid above [ibid.]

3. To the Second Question

Latin English

85 Ad secundam quaestionem dico quod idem perse significant concretum et abstractum, licet alio

85. To the second question [n.5] I say that concrete andabstract per se signify the same thing, although in a different


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modo significandi, sicut filius et filiatio, - quiasicut filiatio significat relationem de genererelationis, ita filius (per modum tamendenominantis suppositum relativum), et siaccipiatur substantive, idem significat cum talisubsistente. Ita ergo idem significant verbum etabstractum eius: eius autem abstractum - si essetnominatum - esset 'verbatio', quae notatrelationem formaliter (idem enim significat quodexpressio passiva alicuius de intellectu); sed sicutfilius connotat naturam viventem, in qua est talisrelatio, ita verbum connotat notitiam actualem,cuius est talis expressio; ergo cum in divinis'intellectualiter exprimi' sit proprietas secundaepersonae, sequitur quod verbum sit ibi merepersonale, et significat proprietatem personalem.

way of signifying, as son and filiation, because just asfiliation signifies a relation in the genus of relation, so doesson (by way, however, of denominating the relative supposit),and if it is taken substantively [d.26 n.100] it signifies thesame as such subsistent thing. Thus therefore word and theabstract of it signify the same thing: but its abstract if it werenamed would be word-ness, which indicates a relationformally (for it signifies the same as the passive expression ofsomething of the intellect); but just as son connotes a livingnature, in which there is such relation, so word connotesactual knowledge, of which it is such expression; thereforesince in divine reality to be intellectually expressed is theproperty of the second person, it follows that the word is therepurely personal, and it signifies a personal property.

86 Patet etiam quod ratio gignendi verbum non estPater ut actu intelligens, sed Pater ut memoriaperfecta (scilicet ut intellectus >habens obiectumactu intelligibile sibi praesens), sicut declaratumest supra distinctione 2, quaestione 'Deproductionibus'.

86. It is plain too that the reason for generating the word is notthe Father as actually understanding, but the Father as perfectmemory (namely as intellect possessing the actuallyintelligible object present to itself), as was made clear above indistinction 2 in the question On Productions [nn.291-293,221, 310].

87 Patet etiam quod verbum non habet aliquid dequo producatur, ex distinctione 5, - quia siprincipium productivum habeat virtutemsufficientem ad producendum per s

duns escoto -- ord. i.27 (sobre verbo mental) (latín-inglés)

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