Documrtl

T he W or: -' ;>..., f iz11, 1.b

FOR OFFICIAI

Report No. 9829

PROJE%..T COMPLETION REPORT

RWANDA

MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II(CREDIT 937-RWA)

AUGUST 30, 1991

Agricultural Operations DivisionSouth-Central and Indian Ocean DepartmentAfrica Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

EXCHANGE RATES

Unit: Rwanda Franc

Year - USS 1.00Ecuivalent

1978 - 92.841979 - 92.841980 - 92.841981 - 92.841982 - 92.841983 - 94.341984 - 100.171985 - 101.261986 - 87.641987 - 79.671988 - 76.451989 - 79.981990 - 82.60

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 are (a) = 0.0247 acres1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.39 square mile! 1 kilogram (kg) 2.20 pounds1 liter (1) 0.26 US gallon

0.22 Imperial gallon1 ton (t) = 2,204 pounds

ABBREVIATIONS

FAO United Nations Food and Agricultural OrganizationCA Cattle unit per hectareCIDA Canadian International Development AgencyEEC European Economic CommunityMAL Ministry of Agriculture and LivestockOPROVIA Marketing parastatal?OVAPAM Office for the development of agriculture and

livestock in Mutara (Office pour la ValorisationPastorale et Agricole du Mutara)

TSC Technical Support Center

FISCAL YEAR

Government: January 1 - December 31

FOR OFCI USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washington. D.C. 20433U.S.A.

Office nI DvectorGueneralOpe#atmns Evakiultun

August 30, 1991

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report - RWANDAMutara Agricultural and Livestock Development Project -

Phase II (Credit 937-RWA)

Attached, for your information, is a copy ef a reportentitled 'Project Completion Report on Rwanda - Mutara Agricultural

and Livestock Development Project - Phase II (Credit 937-RWA)I,

prepared by the Africa Regional Office with Part II of the reportcontributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made

by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time.

Attachment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

RWANDA

MUTAPA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II(CREDIT 937-RWA)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ............... . . . . . .* .*.... . .

EVALUATION SUMMARY ... . . i.

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANU S PERSPECTIVE

A. Project Identity .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1B. Background.. . . . .. 1C. Project Objectives and Description . . . . . . . .2D. Project Design and Organization .. 3E. Project Implementation .. 3F. Project Results .. 4G. Project Sustainability .. 7H. Performance of the Bank .. 7I. Performance of the Borrower.. . 8J. Bank/Borrower Relations ............... 9K. Performance of Consultants .. 9L. Documentation and Files .. . . . 9

PART I1: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORO_ER'S PERS5PEC-TIV

A. Mutara I Project .............. .... 10B. Project Objectives . . . . . ................ 10C. Project Achievements ...... ............ . 11

PART III: STATISTZCA2 IDbTA

Table 1: Related IDA Credits . . .......... . . . .15Table 2 Project Timetable. . .. 16Table 3: Credit Disbursements 17Table 4: Project Implementation 18Table 5: Project Costs and Financing. .** . . .19

A. Project Costs and F$nancing . 19B. Exchange Rates and Price Contingencies . . . . . 20

Table 6t Project Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21A. Economic Rate of Return .. .. ... . . 21B. Cashfiow for the Economic Rate of Return . . . . 22

Table 7: Status of Covenants. . 23Table 8: Use of Bank Resources . . .- . .. . . . . . . . . 24

A. Staff Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24B. Missions . . . .. . . . . . .. .25

Maps: 1. Rwanda Country Map - Location of Project Area (IURD 1386S)2. Project Area (IBRD 13866)

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their offcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

i

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

RWANDA

NUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II(CREDIT 937-RWA)

PPEFACE

This document is the Project Completion Report for the MutaraAgricultural and Livestock Development Project, Phase II. in Rwanda, for whichthe Bank provided a credit of US$8.75 million (Cr. 937-RWA) in 1979. The creditwas closed on December 1986; it was fully disbursed, and the last disbursementwas on February 17, 1987.

The Preface. Evaluation Summary and Parts I and III of this reportwere prepared by the FAO Investment Center (FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program)in collaboration with the Agriculture Division of the Africa Region. SouthCentral and Indian Ocean Department. The Borrower prepared Part II of thisreport and also a full completed report in 1987.

This document is based on reports (in particular the Staff AppraisalReport, the Credit and Project Agreements, supervision reports and correspondencebetween the Bank and the Borrower), consultations with project officials, and anon-site assessment of the results.

iii

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

RWANDA

MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II(CREDIT 937-RWA)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

1. The project was intended as the second phase of a settlement projectfor farmers and pastoraLists in a sparsely populated, toe-too infested area.The first phase settlement project was conceived as a means to reduce landpressures elsewhere in the country. The achievements under the first phasewere considerable, but not sustainable. A second phase project was thereforefelt necessary.

Obiectives

2. As a second phase of a settlement project, the project was intended tocomplete the social infrastructure needed for the region, and to consolidatethe achievements of Phase I, in particular with regards to soil fertility,range management, and institutions. The production components for Phase IIincluded the development of extension services for 10,000 farmers (8,400farmers who had been resettled during the first phase, and 1,600 farmers wholived in areas adjacent to the resettlament area), who would be encouraged touse organic matter and anti-erosion techniques, of extension and veterinaryservices for a thousand herders, organized in group ranches, and of atechnical support center to provide improved fodder species and cattlebreeds; in order to restore ranch productivity, 2,500 head of cattle (13% ofthe total herd) would be made to leave the area, and 7,000 ha of range wouldbe rehabilitated by the project. Marketing services would be developed, andprimary schools, health facilities, and water supply provided.

implementation experience

3. Continued settlement took place during phase It, which absorbed most ofproject management efforts (700 families). Now %reas were made available tothe ranches, range rehabilitation was successful, and stocking rates couldthus adjust initially to carrying capacities without significant destockLng.This led to optimism regarding the progress of group ranchest the emphasis ofproject staff shifted from de-stocking to improving livestock health andmarketinq services. This was done with reasonable success. After 1982, whenstocking rates started to exceed the carrying capacity of the pastures,insufficient action was taken to reverse the situation, as project managementlacked the legal power to enforce de-stocking and market outlets werelimited. The project was succesful in introducing the concept of growingcrops on cultivation plots to erstwhile nomadic and semi-nomadic herders.

4. Additional settlement in the Paysannat style schemeVJ proceededswiftly (3,500 families), with the experience of phase I, but it was soonrealized that the technical package for intensification of production hadlittle to offer. Efforts to develop it were insufficient. Despite thisconstraint, crop production and yields improved during projectimplementation, as a result of efforts to increase soil fertility throughorganic fertilization. With much delay, but clear success, a credit schemewas set up for the acquisition of cows for stall-feeding ("fermettes").

}J settlemnt of farmers on 2 ha lote in lees densely pcpulatedareas.

iv

5. The construction program proceeded fast once firm bank action hadhelped improve planning and procurement procedures. Management problems werenot however limited to these initial adjustments, but were felt throughoutimplementation, resulting largely from the institutional met-up establishedby the previous project. The water supply component suffered much delay dueto engineering difficulties, but implementation was satisfactory.

Results and gustainability

6. The projoct met most of its phymical targets regarding cropsproduction, animal health, and infrastructure, and added a settlementcomponent not initially envisaged. The development of markets, and theimprovement of housing are clear achievements. Which of the economicbenefits can be directly attributable to the project, i.e. that spontaneoussettlement would not have achieved anyway, is however, less clear, but wouldcertainly include the "fermette" development, still limited (4% of all"payeannat" farms in 1985), a real improvement in animal health, and thedevelopment of a modest dairy activity. On the other hand, the main projectobjective was not achieved: group ranches are still not sustainable, and noprogress has been made in this direction. Stocking rates have almost doubledduring implementation, and still continue to increase, resv.lting in seriousrange degradation. Pasture rehabilitation through woed eradication has beenresumed by government, but does not address the problem of ewosion throughovergrazing: time for pasture regeneration is not available. Although theproject cannot be rated satisfactory from a purely economic point of view(ERR is 7.5%), it has achieved considerable social goals (settlement of 4,200families and completion of the infrastructure for these and previoussettlers). If social returns could be included in the analysis, projectachievements can be considered satisfactory.

7. In October 1990, Rwandese refugees living in Uganda invaded Rwanda andconducted guarilla ectivities in the project area. As the PCR missionvisited the project area prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it is notknown to what oxtent the war has affected project achievements.

Findings and lessons learned

S. While project staff, government officials, and supervision personnelendeavored, in a difficult context, to achieve immediate project objectives,they lacked the perspective to orient their activities towards building upthe conditions for sustainability. This can partly be attributed to afailure to analyze and define these conditions during project appraisal andimplementation. For example, while it was anticipated that stocking rateswere to remain stable, no strategy beyond developing some marketing outletshad been proposed and no incentives were developed to enable herders todispose of their older and least productive animals. The mid-term review,impressed by technical improvements, missed the last opportunity to re-orientthe project. These improvements were not sustainable, because of continuedsettlement of new herders and insufficient maintenance of the pastures by theexisting herderee

9. Lessons to be learned include the following:

. Settlement brings drastic changes to semi-nomadic herders.Acceptance of sedentary village life does not mean that the need forchanges relating to production techniques (pasture rotation, weeding,reseeding, etc.) and management (e.g., deo-stocking) is understood.Even if it is, changes may take a very long time to be accepted.

Group ranches imply collective management, i.e. new individualrights and obligations, to be collectively discussed, decided, andenforced; project formulation should envisage not only new techniques,but also new institutions and organizations, drawing from a basicknowledge of existing practices.

v

Extension activities and associated monitoring and evaluationactivities should be given a major emphasis by project management. Themonitoring and evaluation activities should provide the information tomanagement to intervene and re-orient the' extension service.

POECT COHMPLET.ION REPORT

RWANDA

MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEJELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE IIiCREDIT 937-RWA

PART I: P

A. Pro1eet j4pr&t1t

Name: Mutara Agricultural and Livestock Development Project- Phase II

Credit No: 937 IWARegion: AfricaDepartment: Souith-Central and Indian Ocean DepartmentSector: AgricultureSub-sectors: Crops/Livestock

B. Background

2.1 Rwanda is one of the smallest, but most denseiy populated countries inAfrica. In 1976, at the time of project design, the population was estimatedat 4.2 million, growing at an annual rate of 2.8%. Population density variedwidely, between 372 inhabitants per km2 in the most fertile areas to 109inhabitants per km2 in the tse-tse infested savannah areas. Land pressureshad already resulted in excessive clearance of forests and overutilization ofthe soil. Other natural resources being limited, agriculture was the mostimportant sector of the economy. In 1976, it contributed about 80% of GNP,accounted for more than 99% of its export earnings, and supported over 95% ofthe population. Agricultural productivity was, however, low and about 30% ofexport revenues had to be spent on food imports.

2.2 Since 1953, the Government has crganized a number of settlement schemes(lgvsannats) in the less densely populated areas. The objectives of thesesc.iemes are to remedy the general shortage of land, and to increaseproductivity by intensifying the delivery of technical and social services(access roads, extension services, education and health care). Resetzlodfarmers enter into a contract with the Government, represented by theCommune, and in return are given the cultivation rights of a 2 ha plot. Whenthe Government approached the Bank in mid-1967 for assistance with some ofthe agricultural projects listed in the 1967-72 Development Plan, about20,000 familiea had been resettled under a dozen paysannat schemes. In 1973,IDA financed the Firset Mutara Agricultural Project (Cr. 439-RWA), whichsettled about 8,400 farm families in payeannat style settlement schemes and960 on a newly introduced settlement echeme: the group ranches.

First Mutara aricultugal Prolect (Cr. 439-RWAI

2.3 At the time of preparation for the First Mutara Agricultural Project,in 1971-73, the Mutara area in north-eastern Rwanda was ragarded as amarginal toe-toe infested region, which was sparsely populated with anestimated 3,000 farming families and 150 Sahima nomadic herding familieo,owning together some 30,000 head of cattle. With the development of roadsand water supply, the provision of veterinary and marketing services, and aprogram for tso-tse eradication, the project aimed at settling 5,700 familiesover an area of 45,000 ha: 4,300 families would receive farm plots of 2 haeach (the standard area for paysannat settlement schemes) in the wetter,hilly part of the area (900 to 1200 mm of rain), and 1,400 pastoral farmerswould be settled on group ranches for cattle development, in the drierrolling savannahe (700 to 900 mm of rain). Total project costs wereestimated at US$ 4.3 million. Contrary to the institutional system underwhich similar settlement schemes had been established in the past, theproject was to be implemented by an independent parastatal development

2

agency, the -Offifo pour la Valorisation Fastorals at Agricole du Mutara"OVAPAM, to ho financed mainly from fees paid by beneficiaries.

2.4 Project implemontation was plagued by numerous difficulties, partlyrelated to the creation of OVAPAM and partly due to: (i) a massive migrantinflux between project preparation and effectiveness; (Li) departure of manyBahima herders, distrustful of Government policies, to Uganda; and (iii)changes in the project area, because 6,000 ha of marshlands in the proje-'area was designated for irrigation development to be financed by the CanadianInternational Development Agency (CIDA), in compensation for which theGovernment released 9,000 ha additional land from the hunting reservebordering the project area. In addition, high cost increases led to areduction in the size of the ranch component, and to postponement of watersupply 'nventments.

2.5 While revised physical targets were met for infrastructure development(the water supply component was dropped), and were substantially exceeded forsettlement (8,400 families were installed in the "paysannat" settlementschemes, and 960 on the group ranches), production of subs_stence crops hadonly marginally increased, efforts to introduce cash crops had failed, andthe overall Mutara herd had declinsad by an estimated 16,000 head. Still,orderly settlement had been achieved in a difficult ethnic context, roadinfrastructure had been provided, and group ranches, a system introduced inRwanda by the project, were gaining acceptance, albeit after installation,grazing and veterinary fees had been suspended. The project completionreport for the first project concluded that, if the ERR was at best marginal,social achievements were significant. The most obvious flaw wasinstitutional, since next to OVAPAM, new organizations had emerged for thedevelopment of marshlands in the Mutara area, with duplicated infrastructureand sometimes conflicting interests.

2.6 Mid-way in the implementation of the first project, it became apparentthat a second project would be necessary in order to complete the originalinvestment program, which had become impossible to complete because of severecost over-runs, and to safeguard the investments made under the firstproject. It was foreseen that, without urgent action, soil fertility andcrop yields would further decline on the crop farms, pastures would beinvaded by weeds and acacia trees, and an additional 10,000 head of cattlewould have to leave the area.

C. Proiect ObiectiZes and DescriEtion

3.1 The major objective of the second project was therefore to developtechniques, procedures and an institutional environment which would make itpossible to (i) stop the process of soil and pasture degradation and preservethe long term production potential of the area; (ii) make rational use ofland and other resources; (iii) intensify the use of available resources in-order to cope with population increases; (iv) make use of existingtechnologies for erosion control, herd maintenance and integration of cropand livestock development; (v) adjust the orientation of the project asexperience was gained; and (vi) incorporate the project into the local Uadministration, in order to ensure its sustainability.

3.2 The project included the following components:

(i) Development of improved extension services for _rop and livestockin the Payeannat (8,400 families) and adjacent communal sectors(1,500 families), including crop development, the introduction ofa livestock stall-feeding program (fermette), and staff andfarmer training;

(li) Development of improved extension and veterinary services forcattle and crops on the Group Ranches, including a pastureimprovement program (7,000 ha), an improved veterinary and animal

3

husbandry program, technical support for cultivation plots, andstaff and pastoralist trainingl

(iii) Development of a Techniual Support Center (TSC) for foddermultipllcation and trials, and reproduction of "improved cattlebreeds";

(lv) Assltance to develop marketLng servLce8s

(v) Construction of schools and health centernp

(vi) Development of a water supply schem to serve about 9,500familles and 10,000 head of cattl- and

(vii) ProvLiLon of Technlcal servLco, lncludlng general servLces forthe project, road maintenance, agricultural credit, stafftrainlng, consulting servLces, technical assistance for ProjectManagement and support for the Studies and Projects DLvisLon ofthe MinLitry of Agrlculture and LLvestock (MAL).

The project area covered 61,000 ha, including the 51,000 ha covered by PhaseI, plus approxlmately 10,000 ha ln adjacent communal sectors where farmerswould benefit from the same servLces as ln the "0aysannat."

D. Proiect Design antd OranLzation

4.1 The project design was appropriate and took into account the mainlessons learned during the Lmplementation of the first project. Mostimportantly, the organlzation and management of the project would besubstantially strengthened. In order to avoid a repetitlon of thedifficulties in project management encountered during the first phase, theBank initially insisted that OVAPAM would be replaced by a Pr^4ect Unit, anidea that Government orlignally endorsed (May 1978), but subsequentlyrejected. As a result, OVAPAM was maintained as a parastatal, responsiblefor project management, but with the terms of reference that the Bank hadproposed for the Project Unlt. Local adminietrative authorities wouldparticipate in the Project through OVAPAM's Board of Directors and theBeneficiaries Committee, and the Communal Technical Crx=itee and DevelopmentCouncil. A mechanism had been established within the Minietry of Agriculturethat would allow for OVAPAN to liaise with other projects. The project wouldbe organized into two subprojects, the Paysannat and the Group Ranchessubprojects, each with a director. Furthermore, the tochnical aseeistantswould be on-board, and the selection of the consultants for the marketing andwater supply studies would have been made prior to credit effectiveness. Amid-term review would take place after two years of project execution inorder to assess progress of the project and of the Government Ln defining adevelopment strategy for the region.

E. Protect IMl2ementation

5.1 caedLt iyAne and Proiect Start-un. The credit was approved onJune 19, 1979. EffectLveness was delayed by seven months, from October 15,1S 9, to May 30, 1980, due to delays in the selection of the TechnicalAssistants (Project Director and Marketing Specialist), who would asslstOVAPAM in project management, and in selectlng the consultants who wouldcarry out the water supply and marketing studies.

5.2 Imolementatlon Schedule. The project was originally scheduled to becompleted by December 31, 1983. All project components, except for the watersupply, technlcal assistance and the agricultural :redit scheme, werecompleted on target. The 4alays in the water supply component were causedprimarily by disagreement between IDA and Government on the type and cost ofwater supply (gravity system versus wells) and about the sustainability of

4

the investment. The technical assistance component was extended due todelays in implementing the pasture and crop improvoments, and to ensureproper execution of the water supply component. The agricultural creditscheme took longer than anticipated to got off the ground. In order toensure completion of theme three components, a first extension of the clogingdate was granted until December 31, 1985, on Narcn 15, 1984. A secondextenoion to December 31, 1986, for the completion of the watersupplycomponent was granted on February 3, 1986.

5.3 J!igcgJgp_ _ts. Total project costs were estimated at US$ 11.4 million,to which IDA would contribute by a credit 2f USS 8.75 million, and the EEC bya Special Action Crsdit of USS 1.65 million. The final project cost io aboutUS$ 12.7 u'iillion. The increase in project costs is in part due to costoverrunn for civil works and the water supply component, and in part tohigher than expected local inflation.

5.4 Disburement. The estimated and actual disbursements are given inTable 3 in Part III. The credit initially disbursed ahead of the appraisalschedule, but delays occurred due to problems in implementing the civil worksand water eupply component. The original closing date was December 31, 1983;but the credLt was only closed on December 31, 1986, after 2 extension. ofthe closing date (para. 5.2). Disbursements against commitments were madeuntil February 1', 1987. No cancellations were made.

5. credit Allocation. The original and actual allocations for the creditare shown in Table S.A. in part III.

5.6 Procurement. Procurement for construction followed standard governmentprocedures of hiring contractors and providing them with constructionmaterials or doing the construction on force account. Although the formerwas not envisaged in the Development Credit Agreement, the method had beenuoed during phase I and was accepted by the Bank. This method of procurementwas one of the main reasons for the sizeable cost overruns during the firstproject. When IDA supervision missions became aware that the proposed civilworks program would again suffer major cost overruns, IDA stopped alldisbursements on civil works until OVAPAM had submitted the plans andcorresponding cost estimata.. This decision was instrumental in getting thecosts for civil works under control.

F. Prolect Restlts

6.1 The project was able to meet its main objectives within the originaltime frame. The two exceptions are the water supply component, whichencountered a three year delay because of technical problems and doubts aboutthe sustainability of the investment, and the group ranches component, whichwas unable to achieve its main objectives.

6.2 E1!ttlmeqt. After Board presentation, the Government of Rwandaallocated 10,160 ha of additional land to the project from the adjacenthunting reserve. The total ranch area could thus be increased by 6,180 ha,the remainder was allocated to Paysannat style settlements. This was notforeseen at appraisal or negotiations, and consequently no provision had beenmade in the credit. It also diverted attention from project management.Despite these constraints, by the end of 1984, the project had resettled anadditional 700 families on the group ranches and 3,500 families in thepaysannat area.

6.3 PAiman"i. The Paysannat component progressed slowly, particularly theintroduction of anti-erosion measures, and the uae of organic fertilization.The anti-rosion measures were only slowly adopted by farmers, but by 1984,80% of appraisal targets were met. The introduction of compost pitsinitially ouffered from the inadequate availability of water. When thisoituation improved after the repair of several wells, the use of compost pits

5

increased rapidly, greatly exceeding appraisal targets (Table 4). 2lExtension was reorganized to concentrate on model farmers, rather than tryingto visit all farmers, and staff training wau strengthened. The weakneesos ofthe available technical package were recognized, but the few trials anddemonstrations initiated to develop it were poorly planned and managed,because of an insufficient linkage between the management of the paysannatsubproject and the extension service. The few results (row seeding andmaize-bean intercropping) were therefore never widely dioseminated. Seedmultiplication was mostly limited to local cultivars, due to the poorperformance of varieties recommended by research. Experiments with animaltraction, envisaged by the mid-term review as a means of reducing possiblelabor constraints, were only partially implemented, because of a lack ofexperienced staff.

6.4 Crop production increased significantly during implementation.According to OVAPAM data, total crop production increased by 64% from 1979 to1985, while the area allocated to crops production was extended by 42%. Farmproductivity improvements are attributed to better yields, since croppingintensities stayed at 90%. Other than through the improved soil fertility asa result of compost use, there is no satisfactory explanation for theincrease in yields, which casts some doubt on the reliability of the OVAPAMdata. The SAR had estimated that yields would drop by as much as 2.5% perannum in the absence of the project.

6.5 The fermette program (distribution of heifers on credit to farmers forpermanent stalling) started late, but came close to meeting appraisal targets(Table 4). This program may be the most successful innovation brought aboutby the project to the paysannat and provides the most significantcontribution towards improving soil fertility. In 1985, the management ofthe credit program was transferred from OVAPAM to the Banques Populaires,because the former lacked experience in collecting payments.

6.6 Group Ranches. The increase in the group ranch area, together with theredistribution of herds among ranches to adjust population densities, and theimprovement of pastures resulting from weed eradication, initiallycontributed to a dramatic improvement of pastures and herds' nutrition. De-stocking efforts were therefore limited, in part because older lessproductive animals were not marketable, but mainly because the need was nolonger urgent.

6.7 When the mid-term review mission visited the project in November 1981,it concluded that de-stocking was no longer a priority, and could be limitedto the elimination of unproductive animals, while settlement could continuein the new areas. It was also decided to carefully monitor herdproductivity, to test chemicals for weed control (manual weed control havingproven to be too difficult too implement), to speed-up the pasture reseedingand forage crops program, to develop new actions to facilitate the marketingof livestock produce, including the provision of a small slaughterhouse and apilot milk processing unit, and to test artificial insemination in the TSC.The provision of the slaughter house was necessary for the marketing of meat.Unfortunately, demand for meat declined significantly after OPROVIA, theparastatal charged with meat marketing, cancelled its cont:act with OVAPAM.

6.8 In 1982, after the mid-term review, a number of refugees, who had fledfrom Uganda with their herds, had to be accepted for resettlement 3/.

2/ Part II states, however, that only few of the 16,970 compost pitsor heaps established during the project were utilized afterproject completion. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation,it is difficult to believe this information is correct.

J/ The number of herders and the size of their cattle is not in projectfiles.

6 i

Improved animal health care and the continued practice of selling only youngmale calves, also contributed to the continued growth of the herds. Inaddition, only marginal weed eradication efforts were undertaken by theherders after OVAPAM stopped weed control activities. As a consequence,pastures became overgrazed, pasture rotation became nearly impossible becauseof land pressures, Acacias and Cymbopogon grasses started spreading again,reducing the useable area and its nutritive value, and patches of bare landreappeared. The situation became critical during the dry season of 1985,when some ranches lost 20 to 30% of their animals. Bank supervision missionssoveral times brought this problem to the attention of MAL and OVAPAM, whichresulted in renewed weed control efforts, but not in serious de-stockingactiviries. Do-stocking could not be enforced, because no legal frameworkhad been established and markets were limited (para. 6.7 and 8.4). At thetime of credit closing, herd size greatly exceedod carrying capacity of thepastures (a h.rd size of over 42,000 animals compared to a carrying capacityof about 25,000 animals).

6.9 Even though the Group Ranches sub-project was unable to achieve itsobjective of pasture rehabilitation, it was very successful in introducingthe concept of cultivating plots to erstwhile nomadic and semi-nomadicherders, and thus increasing their food security.

6.10 T6chnical Suoport Center. This center, has become an importantingredient for livestock extension in the region. It has built up two herds(one pure Ankole breed and one of crossbred Ankole and Sahiwa), plays animportant role in cattle marketing activities and is the basis for trials inthe field of forage crops, pasture upgrading, artificial insemination anddraft animals. In addition, the Technical Support Center is providingheifers and young cows to farmers under the credlt program (para. 6.5).During project implementation, milk processing activities were started on apilot basis.

6.11 The Technical Support Center was expected to become self financingthrough its commercial activities, such as the marketing of live animals andcarcases, and insemination services. In general, the commercial activitieshave been profitable, although the profits so generated were never enough tofinance all activities.

6.12 Marketina Services. The marketing study carried out in 1980 byIfagraria did not produce any new information, and the marketing specialisthired by the projeft left after two months and was never replaced, because itwas felt that (L) OVAPAM should not get Lnvolved in commercLal activities, asthe private sector was already developing; and (Li) little addLtional benefitwas expected from this activity. ActivitLes thereafter includeds (i)construction of stores, and limited operations to sustain prices of crops,which were then handed over to OPROVIA, a marketing parastatalt (ii)purchases of calves, bulls and steers to facilitate destockingu and (iii)operation of the slaughterhouse and the pilot milk unit.

6.13 SociAl Infrastructure. The construction and equipment of the primaryschools and health centers, was completed prior to the original closing date,despite initial delays. The delays were caused because OVAPAMs' coatestimates were far too high and the proposed buildings were of a differentdesign than agreed upon at appraisal. The problems were resolved inconsultation with the Government, who agreed to pay part of the costoverruns.

6.14 Water 5uPlv *Comoonen. This component was originally included Ln theFirst Mutara Project. At the time of the mid-term review of that project, itwas decided to postpone implementation and include it as a component in thesecond project. As substantial inflation had taken place since appraisal of Ithe first project, the cost of the water supply component was re-appraisedfor the second project. The oriqinal desLgn called for a simple gravitydesign filled from springs and wells. in 1981, a consultant firm came upwith cost estimates of US$ 1,000 per beneficiary family. A decision on

7

construction was postponed until viability studies were completed, andassurances were obtained that user fees would be collected for the expresspurpose of financing the maintenance of the water supply system. As aresult, the construction of the water supply system did not start until early1985, justifying a second extension of the credit closing date to December31, 1986. The provision of water to most of the settlers and the successfulimplementation of a system of user fees and hook-up charges4/ are some ofthe main achievements of the project.

6.1S Economic Pelformance. In October 1990, Rwandese refugees living inUganda invaded Rwanda and conducted guerilla activities in the project area.As the PCR mission visited the project area prior to the outbreak ofhostilities, it is not known to what extent the war has affected projectachievements. Prior to the war, the economic rate of return was estimated at10.5% for the Payeannat sub-project, negative for the Group Ranches sub-project, and 7.5% for the project as a whole, as compared to 14% estimated atappraisal (table 6). Like the First Mutara Project, the project had achievedconsiderable social goals: orderly settlement of an additional 4,200 settlerfamilies; provision of the requisite infrastructure for these settlers(houses, schools, health facilities and, most importantly, water); anddevelopment of fermettes in the Paysannat. If these social returns areincluded, project achievements could have been considered as satisfactory. Afinancial rate of return could not be calculated for the project, becauseOVAPAM did not maintain a database with the necessary information.

G. Proiect Sustainabilitv

7.1 OVAPAM has not yet achieved the reforms envisaged at appraisal.Progress has been made, however, with the preparation and discussion of theMutara master plan in 1985, which charged OVAPAM with regional planning andcoordination. It has given solid evidence of it. capability to manage theproject with government resources only. Schools and health facilities aremaintained and operated by the relevant government departments, and the watersupply system, handed over to the concerned communes, is maintained by a"syndicat intercommunal" which receives water rights from users. Extensionand veterinary services are still managed under OVAPAM, as well as the TSC.Cattle fattening and marketing by the TSC appear financially viable atpresent. Milk processing, mainly because the new plant is operating belowcapacity due to a lack of market outlets, is not preser.tly financially viablealthough it is considered to have good potential.

7.2 The ranches are clearly not sustainable, with stocking rates havingvirtually doubled after rehabilitation. The problem is not expected toimprove when some 3,000 ha of rarshlands now used for dry season grazing arereclaimed for rice cultivation. Even after a new program to eradicate weedsand bushes, total carrying capacity is unlikely to exceed 20 to 25 thousandhead. Sustainability will not be possible to achieve without massivedestocking and the introduction of improved range management practices.

H. Performance of the Bank

8.1 Bank supervision has been most effective in containing project costs,ensuring that infrastructure equipment would serve their purpose, and thatmajor covenants were being met. Bank missions displayed flexibility inadjusting to unforeseen developments, e.g. the changes in technicalassistance composition, or the addition of the milk pilot plant, but alsofirmness; thus disbursements for construction were interrupted for a year,pending a thorough cost review. Supervision missions were adequately staffedand generally timely, with one exception in that no mission was sent for a

AI The hook-up charges only recovered part of the initial investment.

8

full yaar early in the life of the project, although the previouu mtiuoion hadreported a deteriorating trend and recommended close supervision and frequentvisits.

8.2 Technically, the misesions had promptly diagnosed the weaknesses of theagricultural programi consequently they attempted to boost the fermettes aswell as to strengthen the adaptive research component. With respect to thelivestock component, there may have been too prompt a reaction to theimprovements obtained in pastures and animal condition by weed and busheradication, in allowing the pressure on destocking to be relaxed. It wasparticularly unfortunate that in late 1981 the mid-term review mission,impressed with such improvements, concluded that destocking was no longercrucial (although the herd contained already 26,000 head), and that the focuoshould be on eliminating unproductive cows. The mid-term review simplyrecommended to closely monitor the evolution of the herd and the developmentof the range carrying capacity, which war expected to continue to improve.Subsequent missions paid therefore little attention to the issue, and onlythree years later was it realized that pasture maintenance had beenneglected, while herd size had continued to increase.

8.3 The lack of strategy to influence herders' management can be partlyattributed to poor preparation work by the firm which provided technicalassistance during Phase I. This firm saw no reason for any profound changein project concept betweezt Phases I and II; the Bank took the same view,therefore no further preparation effort was deemed necessary, and theopportunity to undertake an in-depth review of how to set up a structure thatwould enable timely de-stocking was missed.

8.4 In retrospect, Bank missions, including the mid-term review mission,did an excellent supervisory job, but lacked a clear long-term vision of thechanges implied by the project for the pastoralists. The need for some formof collective management of herds and pastures was only explicitly recognizedat the time of the preparation of the first phase of the project, whenemphasis was given to ranch associations, which would link together herdersthrough contractual rights and obligations. Such associations were neverformed, depriving the project of a basic institution through which thediscipline needed to manage pastures and adjust herd sizes could be enforced.

I. Performance of the Borrower

9.1 Efficient project management by the project director has beenconstantly hindered by interference in day-to-day project management by thedirector of OVAPAM, which ran contrary to the agreed on terms of reference.Due to effective Bank supervision, direct damage from this situation haslargely been limited to strained relationships with or among project staff.Otherwise, government selection of project staff has been generallysatisfactory, particularly for those in charge of livestock activities, whichis remarkable in view of the lack of trained staff in the country.

9.2 The Government did not strictly comply with the Development CreditAgreement requirement to maintain a revolving fund of at least RwF 30 millionin the project's bank account, resulting in frequent cash flow problems.However this is partly because the project rarely prepared detailed cash flowprojections to justify its financial requests to Government before thediscussion of the annual budget. In fact, the Government has always shownkeen interest and commitment towards the project, as is shown by theassumption of respons`.bility for recurrent costs for all components (exceptwater supply) by 1984.

9

J. Blank/Borrower Relations

10.1 Bank-Borrower relations have been very good, as evidenced by theBorrower's responsiveness to Bank requests and by its willingness to provideadequate recurrent funding.

K. Performance of Consultants

11.1 Long-term technical assistance wan limited to anagriculturalist/extension specialist, who was at the same time projectmanager for two years, and to a financial and administrative director forthree years. The latter, not foreseen at appraisal, was recruited in May1981 to improve accounting and financial management, a task that wassubstantially achieved. The performance of the project manager wasacceptable, given his difficult situation. The marketing specialist, who wasexpected to stay on as a long-term technical assistant, left after twomonths.

L. Documentation and F~Ies.

12.1 Gathering the information required to prepare this report presenteddifficulties, because the project had already been closed for 5 years.Furthermore, the supervision missions in 1986 and 1987 did not collectimplementation data in the same way of those prior to 1985, primarily becausethe implementation focus had shifted to the watersupply sub-component, thismay explain some of the discrepancies between the information presented inParts II and III.

10

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

RWANDA

MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II(CREDIT 937-RWA)

PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

A. MUTAPA I PROJECT (1974-19791

1. The Mutara region was traditionally an extensive grazing area. With aview to utilizing it also to resettle farmers from overpopulated areas, theGovernment undertook from 1969 to 1973, with assistance from FAO and IBRD, aseries of studies which led to the preparation of an agro-pastoral project(Credit 439-RWA, Nov. 1973). Its objectives were to install 4,300 farmingfamilies under a "payeannat" scheme, and 1,400 herding families with 28,000aead of cattle in collective ranches. It was also envisaged to set up abreeding ranch and to launch a tse-toe eradication program. An Office pourla Valorisation Pastorale et Agricole du Mutara (OVAPAM) war to beresponsible for implementing the project.

2. By the end of phase I (1979), the major project achievements included:for the "payeannat," 7,898 farms covering 30,000 ha, 760 km of feeder roadsand 409 km of anti-erosion lines; and for the livestock component: E4ranches, enclosed with hedgeo and covering 27,943 ha, with 992 families and23,972 heads of cattle, and served by 294 km of feeder roads.

3. In spite of such achievementr, the first phase encountered greatdifficulties caused by: (L) a lack of qualified personneli (ii) creepinginflation which led to reduced quantitative objectives, shortened projectduration, and postponement of a water supply components and (iii) rapidinflux of squatters into the area, which induced the need to give priority tothe demarcation and allocation of farm plots, at the expense of otherdevelopment tasks.

B. MUTARA II: ORJECTIVES

4. The second phase of the project aimed at: (i) strengthening theachievements of phase I and preserving the production potential of the areathrough erosion control and soil fertility improvement, and (ii) increasingincomes of farmers and herders by raising the productivity of pastures andanimals, improving animal health, and introducing modern methods ofproduction and management to farmers and herders. The other projectobjectives were to strengthen training and extension, carry out marketingstudies, set up a market information system, and buy animals in order toencourage destocking. Finally, the project was to develop a water supplysystem to serve the project area.

S. In the "paysannat," the envisaged technical improvements were to fitthe existing farming systems and mest farmors, noedsu in particular, theywere to include the productlon of compost or farm manure, and thelntroduction of green manurel the active promotion of stall-feeding of smallstock and cattle, with a view to increasing manure productioni theintroductLon of new varieties and now cropsi and a reforestation program.The area covered by the "payeannat" was planned to be extended by 10,000 hato 34,700 ha.

11

6. The total area allocated for the ranches amounted to 27,850 ha. Inorder to preserve the production potential of grazing land and of animals, aswell as to increase herders, income, the project had to observe the followingconditions:

- forbid access to the ranches of any new herd;- redistribute existing herds according to the carrying capacity of

the various zones;- eliminate 2,500 head of unproductive cattle and young males to

limit current overstocking;- embark on a massive grazing land improvement program by weed

eradication and reseeding of the most degraded parts, to coverultimately some 7,000 hal

- set aside 3,000 ha of marshlands for grazing.

In addition, the project was to complete veterinary infrastructure, organizeweekly dippings for all cattle, and carry out a strict program to controltrypanosomiasis.

7. As a result of the project, it was expected that the annual extractionrate would increase from 10 to 17%, the culling rate from 8 to 13-14%, thecalving rate from 60 to 62%, while the mortality rates would be reduced from25 to 16% for calves, and from 6 to 5% for adults. Pastures would berotated, and each ranch would include 10 ha of forage crops. The breedingranch set up under phase I would be upgraded into a Technical Support Centerthe role of which would be to: (i) multiply fodder crops; (ii) produceimproved sires and dams for distribution to farmers and possibly to herders;(iii) serve as a transit center with a view to encouraging animal sales; and(iv) to introduce artificial insemination.

8. A mid-term review carried out in late 1981 resulted in Lhe addition ofthe following new components:

- resettlement of 3,800 families in the "payeannatr";- an agricultural credit program to allow farmers to buy pregnant

cows for stall-feeding;- the setting-up of an additional 8 ranches in the cyonyo zone

released from the game reserve;- construction of a slaughterhouse at Nyagatare to encourage

destocking; and of a pilot milk processing unit at Rukomo.

The review mission also modified some of the initial objectives of theproject, particularly with regard to destocking, which is no longerconsidered a priority, since pastures have significantly improved throughweed and acacia eradication.

C. ACHIEVEMENTS

9. The IDA Credit was extended until December 1986 so as to allow. completion of the water supply system; however, all other components were

completed by end 1984, and the project has been continued since solely fromits own resources and government budget. The following relates toachievements reported in 1985.

C.1 PavsanIat

10. Farmers' resettlement has met the targeted objectives: 4,170 newfamilies have been settled, i.e. a total of 12,068 families for an overallarea of 33,900 ha. Over 4,300 km of anti-erosion lines of Setaria orTrypsacum have been planted, sometimes in association with Leucaena,Cedrella, Cassia, or other tree species.

12

11. A total of 16,970 compost pits of heaps were prepared, but few haveever been used. Adoption of organic matter utilization is only common withfarmers who have cattle. Others fallow their land regularly, and apply strawmulch to their banana plantations. Green manure has never been adopted.However, stall feeding is progressing very satisfactorily: by the end of1985, 580 farms owned cattle, including 279 who benefitted from the creditprogram, and 551 produce farm manuret 333 farms have over 0.1 ha of foddercrops. The number of applicants for credit has increased every year.

12. With regard to improvement of cultural techniques, few results havebeen achieved; mechanization tests with draught power of tractors have beendiscontinued, new crops introduced by the project have not performed well,and new varieties had limited success. The project withdrew from allcommercial activities, which were taken over by public corporations orprivate operators, as envisaged; however, no attempt has been made to developmarket information.

13. Reforestation covered a total of 1,831 ha, including 1,310 ha in blocksof individual woodlots, the rest being under collective, communal or Stateownership; over 80% of this is eucalyptus. This activity has been mostappreciated by beneficiaries, and the first plantations are already beingexploited.

14. The agricultural gross product per family in the Paysannat wasestimated at about FRw 158,000 in 1985 (crops only). In volume, thePaysannat production increased by 74% from 1979 to 1984, and per capitaproduction by about 25%. Major increases concerned beans, groundnuts,sorghum, cassava and bananas, while soybeans (marketing difficulties) andpeas (ill-suited for the area) were reduced.

C.2. Collective Ranches

15. The settlement of herders, started during phase I, was completed in1984. From 1979 to 1984, the number of herder families increased from 992 to1,803 (the mid-term review target was 1,300), and the number of ranches from64 to 77. The project has clearly succeeded in modifying the deeply-rootednomadic traditions of herders, who have adopted a settled village life. Thishas been made possible through: (i) careful selection of beneficiaries by aspecial Committee, which was headed by Byumba Prefect and included as membersthe Director of OVAPAM, the project manager, and the mayors of the communesconcerned; and the establishment of a contract between OVAPAM and eachindividual herder, stating his rights and obligations; and (ii) carefuldistribution of ranches according to carrying capacity, water availability,and social affinities between families. The allocation of 1.5 ha of arableland for each family did reduce the amount of land available for grazing, buthas allowed many of them to become self-sufficient in food crops, andcontributed to creating a farming spirit, which is reflected by steadyinvestments in housing improvements.

16. It must be noted, however, that water supply has not reached allvillages, and that some of the conditions in the settlement contract have notalways been met, particularly the minimum herd size (15 head), and themaximum share of grazing rights which should not exceed 45% of the totalranch for any individual herder. Moreover, pastures have been seriouslydegraded during the latter part of project implementation, and theircondition has continued to worsen since.

17. Herders in the Mutara are still practicing an extensive productionsystem, based on the utilization of hill pastures during the rainy season,and that of marshlands during the dry season. Ranges are invaded byCymbopogon and Imperata grasses, and by Acacia trees. Cymbopogon, which islittle grazed, accounts for up to 90% of the grass cover in some of theranches. During the dry season, hill ranges have little to offer, and cattlemay lose 20 to 30% of their weight. This situation is due to overstocking,failure to control weeds and acacias, and to rotate pastures.

13

18. Cymbopogon eradication war efficiently carried out by the project from1980 to 1982, but herders did not take over. By the end of phase II, thisgrass covered 60 to 80% of 14,000 ha of ranches, and 30 to 60% of 6,700 ha.Acacia trees were also cut over 9,700 ha by the-project from 1980 to 1982,particularly with a view to eliminating toe-toe flies. The trees, which werecut at one meter above ground, grew much thicker thereafter since there wasno follow-up maintenance, and have choked large expanses of land which are nolonger accessible to men or cattle. Complete tree uprooting is nowenvisaged. Reseeding of degraded pastures with Chloris gayana has never beencarried out, except on a trial basis, and pasture rotation, which had startedin some of the ranches, has not been continued.

19. While the project envisaged maintaining the herd at about 20,000 head,the total number increased to 42,185 head by December 1985, because of newinflows of refugees from Uganda. efficient health care which resulted inincreased ht c-tt t at.:t r- - U r d mtortality, and due to a significantreduction in commercial activities by OVAPAM after the termination of acontract for meat sales with OPROVIA, the meat marketing parastatal. Herdcomposition has markedly improved i.e. with, per 100 cows, 55.7 calves in1985 as against 37.6 i 1979.

20. Veterinary services have provided systematic protection againsttrypanosomiasis, black quarter and, in 1985, against rinderpest; control ofworms is practiced by few herders, but 60% regularly dip their animals. Alltreatments are provided against payment. In addition, veterinary staff arealso responsible for extension of improved herd and pasture management; theyhave been fairly successful with fire control, dipping and tagging ofanimals, but much less with pasture rotation or manuring, early culling orcultivation of fodder crops.

21. The Technical Support Center covers 1,925 ha, including a breedingranch with 598 head (550 ha), and a transit center (1,375). The Centerproduces planting material for fodder crops, of which 22 ha have been plantedin collective ranches. In 1985, the breeding herd included 99 Sahiwal xAnkole and 86 Ankole dams, and the center distributed 41 animals to farmers,which is far below the demand. Artificial insemination could not start forlack of liquid nitrogen. The Center sold up to 5,172 head of cattle annuallybefore 1984, which was insufficient for destocking, but barely above 1,100head in 1985, when private operators were given more leeway. Theproductivity of the herd in the center is higher than in collective ranches,except as regards milk production, but while SxA crosebreeds gain weightfaster than pure breeds, they lose more weight during the dry season. Thereis as yet no clear breeding policy, and no clear superiority of improvedbreeds in the present conditions, except for stall-feeding in paysannatfarms.

22. The pilot milk plant processed daily 1,950 liters in 1985, collectedfrom 1,803 families in 59 ranches, and was profitable. The volume handledhas been reduced since, because of marketing difficulties. Since thecontract with OPROVIA was terminated in 1984, the slaughterhouse works onlyfor local needs (126 head in 1984), and represents a heavy burden for OVAPAM.

23. The net income of an average herder with 23 head of cattle wasestimated at about FRw 120,000 in 1985. Of this, 43% was provided by milk,30% by meat, and 27% by food crops.

24. In summary, the project achievements are quite sizeable and include:the successful settlement of farmers and herders, the provision of socialinfrastructure, particularly schools and a hospital, of roads and of watersupply, the improvement of animal health, and a better organized extensionsystem. Much remains to be done, however, to inprove the efficiency ofextension, to further promote integrated crop-livestock farming and agro-forestry, to rehabilitate degraded pastures, and to encourage destocking byimproving market opportunities. Further investments are still needed tocomplete the water supply network, which does not reach all sectors at

14

present. Finally, while a number of new projects are now actively developingother parts of the Mutara region, particularly the marshes which provided acrucial supplomentary source of food for cattle during the dry season, OVAPAMhas not succeeded in fulfilling the role of overall planning and coordinationwhich was envisaged at appraisal.

15

PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT

RWANDA

MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II(CREDIT 937-RWA)

PART IIIt STATISTICAL DATA

Table 1: AgEicultureRelated IDA Credits

ADDroval b~~~mount I/ PurDose Appoval Stts Commenu

1. Mutara 1 3.8 Area Development 1973 Completed PCR avail-(Cr. 0439-RW) in 1979 able

2. Cinchona 1.8 Perennial Crops 1976 Completed PCR avail-(Cr. 0656-RW) in 1983 able

3. BGM I 14.0 Area Devdopment 1976 Completed PCR avail-(Cr. 0668-RW) in 1982 able

4. GBK (Agro- 21.0 Foreary/Liveadck 1910 Completd PCR avail-Sylvo l) in 1987 able

(Cr. 1039-RW)

5. PCCV 11.8 Area Development 1981 Completed PCR pending(Cr. 1126-RW) in 1988

6. BGM DI 15.0 Area Development 1982 In progress(Cr. 1283-RW)

7. Agricultural 11.5 Researeb 1985 In progressReserh

(Cr. 1546.RW)

8. Gitarama 12.7 Ftion and 1986 In progress(Cr. 1669-RW) related services

9. Agro-Sylvo 11 14.1 ForettyLivestock 1987 In progress(Cr. 1811-RW)

10. Agri-services 19.9 Extension and 1989 In progress(Cr. 2026-RW) related services

I/ Amounu are expreused in millions of US dollars.

16

Table 2: Proiect Timetab

12ateDaPlanne Revise: Plttnned

mm (Month/YA (Mpnth,/Year) (MonSh/YIr

Identification it oon7Preparation 2I 05/78Appraisa 05/8Post-appraisal 12/78Nagociations 06/79 05/79Board approval 06/79 06n9Effectiveness 10179 01/80 05/80Completion 3/ 06/83 06/85 06/86Credit closing 12/83 12/85 12/86

1/ Identification was carried out during supervisions of Phase 1.-I Preparation was carried out from April 1977 to May 1978 by IFAGRARIA.3/ All projoet components except water supply, technical assistance and agricultural credit fund were completed on schedule byJune 3983.

17

Table 3: Planned and Acual Cumlulative Disbursements(la milg

SAR Estimai AlnYear Qgarr I MA IF

1980 2 0.10 0.223 0.25 0.10 0.824 0.40 0.10 1.22

1981 1 0.60 0.40 1.662 0.90 0.60 2.223 1.30 0.90 2.434 1.80 1.20 2.56

1982 1 2.30 1.40 2.912 2.90 1.65 3.29 0.2233 3.60 3.53 0.4764 4.30 3.91 0.564

1983 I 5.00 4.32 0.9042 5.70 4.57 1.1713 6.50 5.13 1.2384 7.20 5.24 1.2S0

1984 1 7.90 5.412 8.75 5.463 5.484 5.50

1985 I 5.792 5.893 6.104 6.63

1986 1 7.682 8.063 8.354 8.57

1987 1 8.75

18

Table 4:

maii reProect Revul R 9a1979m (1244)

-Sealnent 6snUbg nb 8,400 1,400 12.000 11,9S3.Ana alloe I/ ha 23,400 30,000 33.900 33,900Ajti-eoslon liMs km, 5,600 4,014Compost productiOn(pi"uaund hewp) ab 9500 27,5?3

Night stailnp(including sheep/gots) nb 270

Pomaent milings nb 420

Troe nursing production low ta, S30

H. gBOUP RANCHESScttamentFumilics 950 960 1,660y. Ar¢u allocated ha 27,350 27,850 34,120 34,120Total catle heand 19,000 20,500 (26.000) 3/ 45,750

Rango Rageneation- Cymbopogoneradication I/ ba 53,800 - 36,560

- Acaci eradlcation ha 1.750 - 14,826- Reseeding It ha 3SO 10Dipping (ab per monh

and per had) 4 3.2Annual ofttak. rat 5 10.5 17 13.S

1/ Three adminisaive sors fom Nguam commune wee addbd In 1979, nd 1,50 ha from the hundng rsrve in 1980.21 Additona settlement sulted from an inc in the amea llocted to the Group Ranches sub-ProjeetI/ In fac, no xplicit targt wu mentioned.4/ Total of 3 annuai uprootingp.At Discontnued since tras w not succesfu.

19

Table Sa: Prgiect csts andt financing

Edimato Uni~

IDA Contribution

1. Civil works &infrastructure 432 820.86 1.90

2. Equipment & 'ehicules 89 988.94 1.10

3. Staff sahries &operating costs 2083 2127.40 1.02

4. Agric. credit 117 47.93 0.41

S. Watr supply 2299 3217.54 1.40

6. T.. hnical services &training ISII 988.22 0.65

7. Technicai assitnce 910 378.27 0.42

8. Pre-investment study 500 180.85 0.36

Total IDA Contribution 8750 8750.00 1.00

EEC Contribution (item 1) 1650 1650.00 1.00

Government Contribution 950 2374.01 ZJ 2.50

Tota CostJFancing 11350 12774.01 1.13

Jl For a meaningful comparison betwen actual and eetimated figures, the unallocated amount of UrS 1.18 shown inthe SAR bas baen here reditributed betwn etgories I to 6 proportioely to their initil amounts.

a/ Actual government contribuidon (esimaed from the rapport d'bbvm t) rr from 1980 to 1985, instead of1980- 1983 (appraiul). However, the main reason for thoe lr dicrepac is in Lie cost overrun in conetuctions,which was not digible for IDA refunding (see pa. 25).

20

Table Sb: Project u4ts and FinancingExEganee Rae ad Price ContiRgencies

US$ to ER Exchange Cost Costs I1/1w SAR est. act em aai simat acu

............... .(Annual increase in %).

1980 91.91 92.84 6.0 9.7 10.0 7.3

1981 91.91 92.84 6.0 0.5 10.0 6.5

1982 91.91 92.84 6.0 -1.4 10.0 12.6

1983 91.91 94.36 6.0 -2.6 10.0 6.6

1984 91.91 100.18 -1.7 5.4

1985 91.91 101.26 1.1 1.7

1/ Actual local costs increase is not readily available. It has been equated with GeneralConsumer Price Increase.

Dfocur MIC'IRUFfGHE c,IcV?y

The Wor: Rseport No:. /9b^j-9dw Typ (e CR)JIAMV.13, E. / X317'h6 / T *90;'! IE:l]1

FOR OFFICIAl

Report No. 9829

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

RWANDA

MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE II(CREDIT 937-RWA)

AUGUST 30, 1991

Agricultural Operations DivisionSouth-Central and Indian Ocean DepartmentAfrica Regional Office

This document has a restkited distbuion and may be used by recpents only In the perfonance ofthdir oficflu duties. Its content may not othewise be dislosed wihot Wodd Bank authozation.

22

Table 6b: Cashflow for the Economic Rate of Return(Constant 1985 FRw)

igX ~~Investment Cost 1/ Invcstment Net Bend it(Milion FRw) (Million FRwlo

Pcvrunna& a' Bmbasu _'1980 22S.6 -11.6 0

1981 196.4 -26.9 5.0

1982 265.6 -33.1 17.6

1983 126.2 0.4 21.0

1984 138.9 45.5 30.3

1985 29.6 83.0 37.3

1986 32.7 103.3 39.4

1987 34.5 111.9 42.2

1988 57.5 119.1 43.0

1999 57.5 117.8 45.8

I/ Includes IDA Credit and Government contributions minus 0 -st of water supply and social infrasructurand equipment(school and hospita).

a/ Incremental production accruing from the 210r new lern instL%d during Phan U and from the 'fermettes (a total of 600ferme has been assumed). For the new setten, the without project siuation assumes a minimum sbisec producton levd inyea 1. Without manure, yields decline by I% annualy in the setloment aru end in tho aeas where setlers camo from.

3r It is assume that total herd niize has not been affected by the project and will decline to 35,000, through destocidag orincraed mortaity. Incnmental producton is accruing through higher had productivity (paur improvement, destockingofunproductive aniauds, etc...).

--- NDA 30° \To Mborara a Kampala

o ~RWANDA \

MUTARA AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK ! -kuo -- °-DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - PHASE 11

LOCATION OF THE PROJECT AREARutshuru . P Ir

....... KAGERA NATIONAL PARK BOUNDARY T A N Z A N I AMAIN ROADS REPUBLIC O\agolfre

'J,Z7Jo RIVERS AND LAKES ZAIRE gota

-* _ INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES ,

in,. w10 w &. WW bO*. v., .. o'ty lb, 'A* 000.o..,0,

Ruhengeri04ffi-tO*8"$h ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 'I 4f, o ipto~Sl*~ t °b*} )<> uhondi r 5 }

bo.o,d.0*0 0*000,00110* /,~ 00 001 fo04,. on 110m 00 Wd /01 0,K A G E R A

; Fs \ %< _ t ffi < J X S~~~~~~~~~~~~~yum buX0, a N A T I 0:N A L g t

anr/odomol -, .. (flat 0*01.0 09 a "'im tantWyOtAlflodOnao , o

I Mema Z

,,<_ \to t f- < t i ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Rugwe'o R

RWANDA < BtDS_ BURUNDI /

'~~~ Buqaromafram 0

};9 \ ;i \ / ) > K ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~KILOMETERISRE PU B LIC Of 9tt

ZAIRE ___S_U_R_U_N_D_I______________-____m

29° S\,VN j| i 30° mML

290 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A. 300usub L. yhoh

RWANDA- UGANDAMutara Agricultural & Livestock Development Project, Phase ,-Projet de Developpement Agropostoral au Mutora, Phase I[f

Project boundaries C IDA financed rnarshland development project ZPerimetre du projet Projet d'amenagement des morais finance par lICDI lN \PAYA RNT

-_______ Phase I - Project boundary Main road >Perimetre du projet - Phase I Route Nationale

…____ Sector boundaries Other roadsPerirntre des secteurs Routes secondaires

Paysannat sub-project A HillSous-projet Paysonnot Collisne

rfl N Group ranch sub-project Rivers c o rt ;I Sous-projet ranches collectifs Rivieres ,

r- Project extension area I_ nternalional boundariesA Zone d'extension du projet Frontieres internationoles GROUP

/# X. . J tRANCHES \

MILES _ __ 2 3 4 5we#poKILOMETERS t * , , , ,7 ri1 q~~~~~ I' 2' : ' 4a 5T 6 7r a 8/

GROUP(' RANCHES

j;===S J teMy?asfar 1 tJ ROUP jD/ >& { X R~~~~~ANCHES

r \ ttSfoagssfe Sector X~~~- Nyagc8rf CYANZOZ HpuLA AJ ,

UGANDA (,

. . y $f7crngo Sectcr , ,

,_ ' / Sho,pngo 5 c t ! / Sector , /acsro0| A

! ./ n < t/ ~~~~~~Nor+J?r-rr

\s' . .AL.f.' '. t~~~~CHICA

. ~~~~Ceriralsc$o K.iv 9 s

#/ /~~- Sout,hern Sector z v

- V + , X rQ HUNTING R~~~~~~~~ENTERV

. \ , W A W. _ fi UGANDAo PA R

EXTENuSl?QN AREA \ S AR i*/' 1 aANZANlA/ ~Approx 10,000 iho) .- '/-a rood

(~~~~ ~ ~ ~ . -) '-, ,;YS NS> NA7W D

I)' ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~roKaynz o-d >OKiga li

_i ) \\ ,/' | I~~~~~~~~~~~~This m=p hes bee prpae by th Worldr Bak staMff exclusvl for th conven .' ence - ? of the readers of the report to arh;n it s atrached The denommeatons used snd the IX i' + } \ iY t bound6r/es shown on this map do not impfv, on tho part of ths World Reek end its ? Ngr,)affiliates, any jud9ment on the legal status of a eny trritory or any cndorsement otr

acceptance of such boundenes 4UN r

, To GObiro 20 3,0