document of the world bank report no: icr0000662...indicator 4 : integrated human resources and...

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR0000662

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-37260 IDA-3726A)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 3.6 MILLION (US$ 4.76 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA

FOR A

PUBLIC SECTOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CREDIT (PSTAC)

May 20, 2008

Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Caribbean Country Management Unit Latin America and Caribbean Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective 12-Jul-2007)

Currency Unit = Guyana Dollar (GY$)

GY$1.00 = US$ 0.004891171 US$ 1.00 = GY$ 204.45]

FISCAL YEAR

January 1- December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AG Auditor General BOS Bureau of Statistics BPRS Budget Preparation and Reporting System CARTAC Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre CAS Country Assistance Strategy DFID UK Department for International Development FFMP Fiscal and Financial Management Project GEC Guyana Electric Company GPCL Global Procurement Consultants, Ltd. GNCB Guyana National Cooperative Bank GOG Government of Guyana GRA Guyana Revenue Authority HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries program HRMIS Human Resource Management Information System IC Inter-Ministerial Committee ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association IDB Inter-America Development Bank IFI International Financial Institution IFMAS Integrated Financial Management System IMF International Monetary Fund LAN Local Area Network M & E Monitoring and Evaluation MLHSSS Ministry of Labour Human Services and Social Security MOF Ministry of Finance NICIL National Industrial and Commercial Investments Limited NPTA National Procurement Tender Administration OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentPAD Project Appraisal Document PCPMU Policy Coordination and Programme Management Unit PDO Project Development Objective

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PPF Project Preparation Facility PMMP Public Management Modernization Project PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility PRPMO Poverty Reduction and Public Management Operation PRSC Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSC Public Service Commission PSAR Procurement Systems Assessment Report PSCES Parliamentary Sectoral Committee on Economic Services PSM Public Service Ministry PSTAC Public Sector Technical Assistance Credit PU Privatization Unit QAG Quality Assurance Group SAA Semi-autonomous Agencie SB Statutory Body SBDs Standard Bid Document SSN Social Safety Net TIN Taxpayer Identification Number TRAP Tax Reform Action Plan TRIPS Total Revenue Integrated Processing System TSC Teaching Service Commission VAT Value Added Tax

Vice President: Pamela Cox Country Director: Yvonne Tsikata Sector Manager: Nicholas Manning

Project Team Leader: Chris Parel ICR Team Leader: Carmen Machicado

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GUYANA

Public Sector Technical Assistance Credit

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 5 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 13 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 17 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 17 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 17 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 21 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing.......................................................................... 22 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 23 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis................................................................. 41 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 42 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 44 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 45 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR..................... 46 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders....................... 48 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 49

MAP

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A. Basic Information Country: Guyana Project Name:

Public Sector Technical Assistance Credit (PSTAC)

Project ID: P074762 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-37260,IDA-3726AICR Date: 05/22/2008 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: TAL Borrower: Original Total Commitment:

XDR 3.6M Disbursed Amount: XDR 2.9M

Environmental Category: C Implementing Agencies: The Office of the President Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 02/07/2002 Effectiveness: 05/23/2003 05/23/2003 Appraisal: 08/19/2002 Restructuring(s): Approval: 12/17/2002 Mid-term Review: 12/14/2005 12/01/2005 Closing: 07/12/2006 07/12/2007 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Not Applicable

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Not Applicable

Overall Bank Performance: Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project No Quality at Entry Highly Satisfactory

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at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 100 100

Theme Code (Primary/Secondary) Administrative and civil service reform Secondary Secondary Poverty strategy, analysis and monitoring Primary Primary Public expenditure, financial management and procurement

Primary Primary

Social safety nets Secondary Secondary Tax policy and administration Secondary Secondary E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Pamela Cox David de Ferranti Country Director: Yvonne M. Tsikata Orsalia Kalantzopoulos Sector Manager: Nicholas Paul Manning Ronald E. Myers Project Team Leader: Carmen Machicado Chris Parel ICR Team Leader: Carmen Machicado ICR Primary Author: Carmen Machicado Herman J. Nissenbaum F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Public Sector Technical Assistance Credit (PSTAC) is to assist the Government in building its capacity to meet the governance and poverty reduction objectives set out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The International Development Association (Association) will support the implementation of the PRSP through a series of Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) covering a broad range of policies.

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The PSTAC supports the first PRSC and focuses on two of the seven pillars that comprise the poverty reduction strategy, namely (i) build stronger institutions and improve governance, and(ii)improve safety nets. Specifically, the PSTAC's development objectives are to: - Strengthen fiscal, financial and fiduciary management - Improve the coverage and efficiency of social safety nets - Develop institutional capacity to manage, monitor, evaluate and improve PRSP implementation Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 :

State modernization by reforming supporting (a) GY Revenue authority (GRA) (b) Procurement agencies (c) payroll/HR MIS link (d) fiduciary oversight (e) Privatization Unit

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

(a) IMF/CARTAC study of GRA, VAT. (b) CPAR identified reforms (c) payroll software implemented (d) CFAA identified reforms (e) Agenda supported by previous Bank loan

a)Commissioners retained, VAT proceeding b)Regulations approved, secretariat strengthened c)HRMIS/payroll merged d)FO reforms submitted to GOGe)Bank privatization, improved GOG asset management

a)Commissioners retained, VAT implemented b)Regulations approved, secretariat strengthened c)HRMIS/payroll merged d)FO reforms submitted to GOG e)Bank privatization, improved GOG asset management

Date achieved 05/23/2003 07/12/2007 07/12/2007 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Indicator 2 : - Improved coverage and efficiency of social safety nets

Value quantitative or

Bank diagnostic during preparation found serious

-Systems diagnostic and Systems diagnostic

& upgrading- 4

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Qualitative) management and systems weaknesses

upgrading -4 studies completed: risk & vulnerability, targeting, labor market, SSN legislation -systems work completed -reform agenda put before GOG

studies completed:risk&vulnerability, targeting, labor market, SSN legislation and needs assessment systems work completed; Social Action Plan reform agenda put before GOG


Indicator 3 : - Developed institutional capacity to manage, monitor, evaluate and improve PRSP implementation including Bureau of Statistics (BOS)

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

PRSP requirements for M&E could not be done by Bureau of Statistics and was brought into President's Secretariat which required, along with PIU, significant PSTAC resources for staffing.

PCPMU functioning adequately, M&E system satisfactory, BOS census work/training done, equipment installed, drill-down/poverty map mainstreaming advancing

PCPMU functioning adequately, M&E being debated; component moderately unsatisfactory; BOS census and HBS work/training done, equipment installed, drill-down/poverty map training given-must be mainstreamed


(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Strengthened Revenue Authority

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

The GRA was without a Commissioner or Deputy commissioner to manage launch of IMF/CARTAC

GRA commissioners retained; IT work transferred to IDB;

GRA commissioners retained; IT work transferred to IDB;

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program IDB and IMF implementing VAT reforms

IDB and IMF implementing VAT reforms


Indicator 2 : Strengthened Procurement Administration


Laws and regulations inadequate as were basic procurement tools. Confirmed by a CPAR. HIPC required new law.

Regulations approved, Secretariat strengthened with new tools (SBDs, training, e-procurement, etc.) and staffed adequately

Regulations approved, Secretariat strengthened with new tools (SBDs, training,MIS) and staffing funded by PSTAC; E-procurement design done


Indicator 3 : Strengthened Fiduciary Oversight (FO)


CFAA determined inter alia that strengthened FO was essential, especially reduced discretionary authority, asset declaration, parliamentary oversight

Reports done and proposals presented. IDB will support some FO work as will PSTAC.

Reports done & proposals presented. IDB supported FO Standing Orders reforms-30 of these approved by GOG and many implemented; discretionary authority reforms must be addressed by GOG


Indicator 4 : Integrated Human Resources and Payroll Databases


Payroll system funded by previous Bank loan

Payroll/HRMIS merged for MPS and MOF. Rolling out to teachers and upscaling by IDB mean benchmarks exceeded.

Payroll/HRMIS merged for MPS and MOF. Rolling out to teachers and upscaling by IDB mean benchmarks exceeded

Date achieved 05/23/2003 07/12/2007 07/12/2007

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Comments (incl. % achievement)

Indicator 5 : Supporting Privatization Unit Activity


Continuation of Bank loan support for unit

Support Privatization Unit to finalize GNCB privatization and advance in NICIL management. Targets met.

Privatization Unit to finalized GNCB privatization and advanced in NICIL management. Targets met funded mostly by alternative sources


Indicator 6 : Strengthen Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security and management of existing Social Safety Net programs


SSN diagnostic indicated inadequate management capability, systems problems, basic targeting information lacking

MIS work completed and 6 studies done (with School Feeding Study financed by PHRD grant). Action plan, audit and IDB mean targets exceeded.

MIS work completed and 6 studies done (with School Feeding Study financed by PHRD grant). Added Social Action Plan and needs follow-up; Operations Audit was not done


Indicator 7 : Design of severance package for vulnerable (sugar workers) groups


Bauxite severance package was being negotiated and sugar restructuring figured in Bank program

Design of severance package if needed

Design of severance package was never required as there was no sugar sector restructuring requiring severance packages


Indicator 8 : Strengthened the Bureau of Statistics Capacity Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

Bank diagnostic signaled inadequate management capability, need to

-Support for Census & Household Budget

Support for Census & Household Budget Survey; IT

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upgrade hardware/systems, and a need for TA for the census & Household Budget surveys

Survey -Equipment -Consultants -Training (Bank delivered and sporadic) -Drill down/poverty mapexceed benchmarks

Equipment -Consultants, Training; added Drill down/poverty map capability must be mainstreamed


Indicator 9 : Establish a Policy Coordination and Programme Management Unit (PCPMU)


M&E unit needed to be established in President's Secretariat under PSTAC and to meet IFI requirements: FM, procurement, M&E, economic research

-PCPMU staffed and functioning. -M&E functioning satisfactorily supported by economists -PSTAC implementation well managed.

PCPMU staffed and functioning but M&E unit and function did not adequate systems & other problems deeper than foreseen.


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements (USD millions)

1 05/14/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/09/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.54 3 06/07/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.07 4 12/09/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.65 5 05/05/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.12 6 01/04/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.11 7 01/06/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.68 8 08/29/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.22

H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

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I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal. Country/Sector Background. Guyana is a highly indebted, low middle-income economy, with a population of about 750,000 people, many impoverished. Following its independence in 1966, the country pursued a state interventionist policy. After two decades, inadequate investment and negative growth led to an unsustainable debt situation. To remedy its difficulties, the Government adopted an economic recovery program in 1988. Its key tenets included: (i) trade and capital liberalization; (ii) removal of price controls and subsidies; (iii) privatization of state activities and reduction; and (iv) expanded social services. These helped to bring about a strong improvement as growth averaged 7% during 1991-97 and inflation fell to single digits. By 1998, however, the initial gains from the reforms appeared to have been exhausted. Annual GDP growth declined to -1.7% in 1999 and public finances deteriorated, partly due to external and domestic shocks and delays in the implementation of key structural reforms. There were also labor strikes, outbreaks of violence, El Niño droughts and lower commodity export prices. These and the continuing emigration of skilled personnel, impeded governance and economic management, and obstructed planned reforms. The continued manifestations of these problems revealed the significant burden of the country’s strong ethnic rivalries which have dominated national politics. As a result of these factors, Guyana remains a relatively fragile state. Past public sector reform efforts aimed at institutional strengthening and streamlining have made little progress. The public sector continued to suffer from weak financial management, overlapping and inconsistent responsibilities, and excessively central decision-making. At the same time, its wage bill has kept steadily growing. The challenges existing in public sector management were highlighted in various assessments. The IMF and the Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre (CARTAC) completed a comprehensive tax and customs diagnostic and were particularly concerned with tax policy and the management of the Revenue Authority (GRA). The Bank’s Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) identified the shortcomings of the 2002 Procurement Law and the need for strengthening central and regional tender boards. The Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) showed deficiencies in the financial management systems. Addressing social safety nets was deemed essential as reflected by the poverty indices and the prospects of more unemployment and dislocation resulting from sector restructuring of some productive sectors. And there was evidence of weak capacity for managing the government’s development agenda. Following the earlier government National Development Strategy, and under a HPIC initiative, Guyana prepared its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2001. It emphasized: (i) stimulating economic growth, (ii) strengthening governance, public sector capacity and accountability, and (iii) improving the delivery of basic services. It called for initiatives in: (i) broad-based, job-generating growth; (ii) environmental protection; (iii) stronger institutions and better governance; (iv) human capital

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investments, especially for basic education and health; (v) upgrading physical capital; (vi) improved social safety nets; and (vii) interventions in regional poverty pockets. Rationale for Bank Assistance. The CAS approved in September 2002, called for supporting the Government’s PRSP through a series of closely spaced Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs). These were to assist the Government in achieving the benchmarks defined in the PRSP particularly those aimed at improving social services and institutional upgrading. Related technical assistance was to attack key capacity constraints through Public Sector Technical Assistance Credits (PSTACs). The PRSC in conjunction with the PSTAC intended to address (i) the strengthening of governance, public sector capacity and accountability, and (ii) the delivery of basic services including social safety nets. Furthermore, PSTAC was to address these agenda items in close coordination with the donor community and other development partners.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) PSTAC development objectives were to strengthen: (i) fiscal, financial and fiduciary management; (ii) the coverage and efficiency of the social safety nets; and (iii) institutional capacity to manage, monitor, evaluate and improve PRSP implementation. The key PDO indicators were: (i) improved functioning of the Revenue Authority; (ii) strengthening the procurement system; (iii) development of recommendations concerning Executive branch discretionary limits and fiduciary oversight; (iv) integration of civil service payroll and personnel management systems; (v) advancement of the national cooperative bank’s privatization; (vi) better management of the Government holding company for commercial and industrial entities; (vii) more efficient social safety net management; (viii) design of severance packages for restructured state industries’ staffs; and (ix) effective monitoring and evaluation processes for PRSP activities.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification No revisions were made to the PDO

1.4 Main Beneficiaries The Project’s primary target group effectively was the entire population of Guyana, which was foreseen to benefit from the implementation of the poverty reduction strategy and improved public sector performance. The latter was expected to be achieved by expanding Government efficiency in fiscal, financial and fiduciary management. In addition, through the projected strengthening of safety net programs for the poor, it was envisaged that the Ministry of Labour Human Services and Social Security (MLHSSS) would become better able to provide better services and expanded coverage. Secondary beneficiaries were expected to include private sector entities through the collateral improvement of the country’s investment and commercial environment.

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1.5 Original Components (as approved) Component 1: Strengthen fiscal, financial and fiduciary management. The objective of this component was to improve the accountability, transparency and efficiency of Guyana's public sector in its fiscal, financial and fiduciary management. Sub-Component 1.1: Strengthen the Revenue Authority (GRA). This sub-component was not defined in detail during appraisal. Instead, it was to be fleshed out later based on agreements between the Government and the IMF. The plan foresaw the likelihood of activities aimed at supporting: (i) The employment of consultants to help the Government manage the GRA, which

had amalgamated the former Customs and Excise, as well as Inland Revenue Departments;

(ii) The definition and implementation of an anti-corruption program; (iii) Improved tax and customs systems; and (iv) Implementation of a value added tax (VAT) system. Sub-Component 1.2: Strengthen Procurement Administration. The objective of this sub- component was to modernize the outdated public procurement system. It targeted revising the procurement law, rules and regulations (which were conditions for HIPC and PRSC disbursements). It would support the: (i) Provision of advice on drafting new rules and regulations; printing and

dissemination of a new law, and training Government officials in associated changes; and

(ii) Establishment of a new National Procurement Tender Board and its Secretariat and systems, installing a management information system, training employees, and expanding public information on Government purchasing.

Sub-Component 1.3: Fiduciary Oversight. The objectives of this sub-component were to reduce the excessive discretion in executive branch management and expand the legislature’s system of checks and balances. It would provide for studies aimed at: (i) Strengthening Parliament’s fiduciary oversight. This was to be focused on the

Parliamentary Sectoral Committee on Economic Services (PSCES) and its secretariat. These institutions, although authorized, were not yet effectively constituted. The planned studies were aimed at (a) developing their operational framework; (b) developing systems and procedures for their analyses and deliberations; and (c) identifying their training needs;

(ii) Developing proposals on limiting discretionary powers of key line agencies and ministries. The proposals were to be geared to evaluating their governance instruments and to recommending how their frameworks should be reformed; and

(iii) Tightening disclosure requirements on public officials’ assets. This study was to review the existing law and render its rules more effective. The plan focused on strengthening the Integrity Commission looking at the adequacy of the Commission’s resources and its Government support.

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Sub-Component 1.4: Integrate Human Resources and Payroll Databases. The objectives of this sub-component were to help improve civil service personnel management, and to establish more reliable data for its incorporation into an integrated financial management system. It was planned to provide consultants, hardware and software for helping to link the Finance and Public Service Ministries payroll functions and personnel data. Sub-Component 1.5: Privatization Support. The objective of this sub-component was to build upon previous IDA-supported privatization of the state owned bank, under the Financial and Private Sector Institutional Development Credit (FPID), which mainly consisted of assisting the finalization of the sale of the National Cooperative Bank (GNCB) and its properties. It was also intended to help the Government obtain greater order in its National Industrial and Commercial Investments Limited (NICIL), the holding company for government assets. The subcomponent would support: setting up a computerized accounting system, ascertaining the status and value of the state’s properties, and improving their management. Component 2: Improved coverage and efficiency of social safety nets. The objective of this component was to identify weaknesses in social safety net programs for the poor and otherwise needy members of the population, and to improve the service delivery systems. It was also intended to examine possible assistance to those vulnerable groups likely to be affected by planned public sector retrenchments. Sub-Component 2.1. Strengthen Existing Social Safety Net Programs. The objective of this sub-component was to help the Government’s principal social safety net manager- Ministry of Human Services, Labour and Social Security (MLHSSS) upgrade its efficiency, coverage, and service targeting and distribution. Sub-Component 2.2. Prepare Safety Net Options for Vulnerable Groups. The objective of this sub-component was to prepare solutions for vulnerable groups that could be affected by possible retrenchments from sugar and water sector restructurings. Component 3: Institutional capacity to manage, monitor, and improve poverty reduction and public sector governance operations. The objective of this component was to support Government efforts to implement its PRSP strategy, and monitor and evaluate their progress. Specifically, it aimed to improve the Government's capacity to implement programs in these areas, with particular emphasis on generating and disseminating reliable data, as well as to involve communities in monitoring PRSP activities. Sub-Component 3.1: Strengthened Bureau of Statistics (BOS). The aim of this sub-component focused on upgrading the BOS’ processes, systems and IT capabilities. Moreover, this subcomponent was intended to strengthen BOS’ managerial and supervisory capacities, including assistance for the provision of modern equipment for data management and help establish a BOS website. Training and support for a planned national census and household budget surveys were also to be supported. Sub-Component 3.2: Policy Coordination and Programme Management (PCPMU). This sub-component was directed at establishing a central Government entity to help manage

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the PRSP and public sector reform activities, and provide advice on their implementation. The PCPMU was also to be responsible for monitoring and evaluating PRSP activities and the PSTAC itself.

1.6 Revised Components There were no revisions of the Project components.

1.7 Other significant changes The Project’s original July 12, 2006 closing date was extended by one year to July 12, 2007. This was intended to enable the Government to consolidate initial advances made in monitoring and evaluation, fiduciary oversight and social safety nets, and to implement some studies’ recommendations. The activities included an evaluation of the M&E system and how to implement a systems approach. Additional time was needed to complete the procurement component work plan and process the Household Survey, including the continuation of essential BOS consultants. The extension was also designed to permit the Government to expand the Project’s original scope so that it would encompass some initially unplanned activities, these included the completion of a second Integrity Commission Study to advance reform of that unit's anti-corruption agenda; the operational audit of the main social safety nets and advancement of some of the activities identified in the Social Action Plan. This was facilitated by changes in the PSTAC’s funding plan, enabled by the availability of alternative financing resources and significant gains in the SDR exchange rate. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry During preparation, the Bank team was confronted with a wide range of possible reform objectives to support Government efforts to obtain higher levels of economic growth and social development. Moreover, the PRSP and PRSC had flagged pressing poverty reduction requirements and identified a sizeable body of “priority” undertakings for which the Government sought external funding. These comprised a more formidable agenda than the Project could realistically tackle. IDA funds were also limited. This resulted in a lengthy gestation process with considerable discussions on how best to organize the operation. Also, experience in Bank-funded projects in Guyana had clearly shown a need for setting limited goals. Domestic public sector planning and implementation capabilities were very thin, especially because of the narrow human resource base and the continuing emigration of skilled Guyanese. Some agencies, notably the MLHSSS, were challenged to carry out development tasks properly. This and the poor compensation of government staff made dependence on consultants a necessity. Finally, vested interests and ethnic inspired political pressure that translate into occasional strikes, parliamentary stalemate

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and security problems often undermined efforts to introduce governance and economic reform. As a result of the above factors, it appeared that the Government would be confronted with a challenging situation in trying to properly implement the Project. On these and related grounds, the QAG’s entry review appropriately judged its risks to be "high" and recommended special attention on the degree of government commitment and its capabilities. In order to address the inherent risks, the Bank team made special efforts to build into the project’s design good parameters for the proposed activities, and also mandated suitable tools for their surveillance. The Bank maintained a local project management consultant in the Georgetown Office from the onset for day-to-day monitoring and assistance. The head of the Bank Resident Mission were brought into the team as well to help coordinate activities. Furthermore, the preparation team appropriately framed the PSTAC’s components as "seed money" geared to accomplishing broader goals than the Project itself could help realize. This was aimed at enlisting support from other donors to roll out the PSTAC-funded initiatives, as well as to try to spread the risks of the operation. The work underlying project design was quite innovative and did indeed help the Government obtain the envisaged collaborative funding. The appropriateness of this approach was particularly noteworthy in the enhanced coordination between the Bank and the IDB (the major external funding source) as well as the IMF. The resulting links that were fostered between the Bank, these partners, and other donors (notably DFID) provided significant support to the PSTAC’s implementation and the parallel Poverty Reduction and Public Management Operation (PRPMO)1 (see details in section 2.2). The Government demonstrated positive interest and ownership in the Project during its preparation. It agreed to address policy, oversight, and administrative reforms in essential fiduciary and fiscal agencies, and to undertake activities affecting tax policy and tax and customs administration. It also agreed to fix the main responsibility for the Project within the Office of the President on the assumption that a well placed central body would provide and maintain suitable top level direction. But this arrangement proved at times to be disadvantageous at times as evidenced in the implementation problems, especially pertaining to the M&E component as described in Section 2.2. Other features of the preparation work included the Government’s involvement of some 8,000 citizens in PRSP consultations, which in turn led to defining the technical assistance that would be needed to support its poverty agenda. Furthermore, the Bank team met with Guyana's main opposition party to discuss Project design – a fact that may

1 Operation was a result of an IDA shift from annual Poverty Reduction Support Credits, as proposed in the 2002 CAS, to development policy operations. The initial development operations, the PRPMO, was approved in March 2006

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have contributed later to the pivotal bipartisan backing on contentious Parliamentary rules changes. Institutional weakness and lack of ownership, however, adversely affected the execution of some components. The potential difficulties of reforming the M&E system were badly underestimated (as detailed in Section 2.2). Implementation of the proposed social safety net system did not take place owing to inadequate support. Also, the performance indicators were not well defined. Outcome benchmarks were too general, e.g., “improved functioning of Revenue Authority to be defined”, “strengthening of new procurement structure”, “increased efficiency in safety net management”. They dealt mostly with the outputs of components, e.g., “development of recommendations, limiting discretionary powers, new procurement regulations”. It is true that these followed logically from the Project’s design. It consisted mainly of studies and diagnoses aimed largely at stimulating new initiatives and keeping good existing ones alive, along with a few instances of actions to complete some partially installed measures. Furthermore, a basic characteristic of the Project, as a seed capital venture, was that the attainment of several components’ desirable outcomes depended on the programs of other financial institutions2. It would have been better if the Project’s results framework had not repeated the PSTAC's outputs or reflected higher level outputs which went beyond the operation’s scope and objectives. Overall, these shortcomings were of minor significance. Based on all the aforementioned counts, this ICR agrees with the QAG’s "overall endorsement of the project in its Quality at Entry Review.” The latter appropriately judged the operation to be well designed and that it properly reflected a high risk and high return strategy. 2.2 Implementation

The Project was implemented with substantial complementary measures taken under the parallel PRPMO (in line with the changes discussed below in the Bank’s approach to support Guyana). The PSTAC’s studies and other “first step” initiatives were supplemented and advanced by the follow-on projects financed by other IFIs and donors. A summary of these activities is displayed in the following table (see also Annex 2). It gives an overview of the extent to which the Project’s activities were successfully carried out, as well as some of those which encountered difficulties. It also illustrates the Project’s success in actually exceeding some of the initial targets, and cites the instances in which this was attributable to other institutions’ contributions. This table is enlarged on in Annex 2.

2 It bears noting that OPCS guidelines advise that: PDOs should focus on outcomes for which the project reasonably can be held accountable, given the project’s duration, resources and approach. They also warn against specifying outcomes which depend on the efforts of others.

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Table 1. Project Components, Completion Status and Follow-on Support

Component Status Explanation Follow-On

1.1 Guyana Revenue Authority

Completed/Satisfactory Component requested by IMF essential to GRA/IFI program

IMF, CARTAC, and IDB carried out the planned tax reform

1.2 Procurement Completed/Exceeded Procurement capacity has been significantly upgraded. The consultant’s needs analysis pointed to seriously inadequate staffing. Project hired consultants who have helped transform the Procurement Agency (NPTA). IMF required satisfactory complementary legislation whose drafting was paid for by PSTAC.

Planned IDB support for key PPC commission did not materialize as the commission had still not been constituted. Bank’s PRPMO included procurement conditions.

1.3 Fiduciary Oversight

• Parliamentary oversight

• Discretionary

authority • Integrity

Commission

Completed • Exceeded, Highly

Satisfactory • Satisfactory • Satisfactory

• Study concluded,

Parliamentary and standing orders approved by body requiring opposition and incumbent party collaboration.

• Study completed. • Study completed,

legislation drafted, reform implementation not furthered as planned during extension period.

• IDB and the Bank’s

PRPMO supported the reform of Standing Orders.

• IDB is prepared to

support a second reform phase for both the Discretionary authority and Integrity Commission reform components.

1.4 Integrate Human Resource and Payroll Databases

Exceeded/ Satisfactory The team leading the consolidation of the budget and personnel systems was retained for longer than projected and the Education Ministry was also included in this exercise.

IDB is rolling out the new systems to other ministries.

1.5 Privatization Unit Concluded/ Satisfactory This component was a follow-on to an earlier Bank loan and was considered very important. Did not need much support as alternative funding was available.

2.1 Social Safety Net Concluded/ Moderately Satisfactory

The weakness of the Human Services Ministry was an impediment. Studies were completed although their quality was mediocre. A Social Action Plan was added

IDB sent missions to develop a new loan addressing some Social Action Plan agenda items. However, it was ultimately a casualty of debt forgiveness following the

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Component Status Explanation Follow-On to the component comprising a good time-bound, costed and prioritized agenda for implementing studies’ and other recommendations. An Operations Audit of the Ministry’s main SSN programs was also added. Implementation during the extension period did proceed as originally expected.

scaling back of the IDB program.

2.2 Social Net Options for Vulnerable Groups

Not Completed/Unsatisfactory

The planned severance studies for the sugar and water industry were not funded by the project. The issue of sugar worker retrenchment did not advance sufficiently at the time to warrant a study. The water companies merged in 2002 and DFID has offered funding for the management contract of the newly formed company. The expected management performance contract was delayed until 2003. Problems arose with the management contract3 and hence there was no need at the time for a retrenchment study. Current sector work by the Bank finds that the water sector is presently understaffed.

A Poverty And Social Impact Assessment (PSIA) on the potential impact of changes in sugar pricing was carried out by the Bank and delivered to the government in 2006. The changes in sugar prices took effect late in 2007. The Bank approved a project in 2005 that "aims to support the achievement of sustainable universal access to safe and affordable water for the population of Guyana, especially the poor."

3.1. Bureau of Statistics

Concluded/ Satisfactory

Important work in support of the Census and Household Survey was completed. The Bank also provided staff support for poverty maps and drill down techniques that had not been contemplated.

IDB, UNDP and DFID contributed extensively

3.2. Project Coordination & M&E

Concluded/ Moderately satisfactory

Good project management, but weak M&E related work

This has been a continuing donor concern. IDB, UNDP

3 In 2002 the Georgetown Sewerage and Water Commissioners (GS&WC) and the Guyana Water Authority (GUYWA) merged to form Guyana Water Inc. (GWI). In January 2003 a performance-based five-year management contract was awarded to an international private operator, the contract was fully funded through a grant from the British government. The introduction of private sector participation through a performance based management contract was considered "a key feature of the process". However, In February 2007 the government terminated the management contract alleging that the company failed to meet five out of the seven objectives in the contract.

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Component Status Explanation Follow-On and CIDA have also supported this work through various programs. The PRPMO required identification of priority PRSP indicators and linked programs.

Table 1 shows that PSTAC had positive overall impact. Bank intervention was timely since the Government’s reform efforts before the Project began was troubled by an extremely complex domestic political situation. Thus, the subsequent successful PSTAC implementation record represented a welcome change.

The improvement can be credited to a number of factors. One was the Bank and its development partners’ production of a wide range of analyses which added to and updated the sector studies on which the PSTAC was founded. Yet another was the IMF’s 2004 assessment and action plan which provided additional valuable material on measures needed to improve public expenditures. Furthermore, the Government endorsed a group of 2003 Bank development policy proposals geared to obtaining more rigorous public sector efficiency. There was also an early recognition of past deficiencies and ensuing corrective actions were adopted. By 2004, experience had shown that Guyana did not have the capacity to implement the annual Poverty Reduction Support Credits proposed in the 2002 CAS. This led to the Bank’s shift to development policy operations, which were to be timed to better match the Government’s implementation capacity and political conditions. The first, the PRPMO, was approved in March 2006. Significantly, it stressed reforms to equip Guyana with better information and reporting systems, as well as to obtain greater efficiency in uses of its limited public funds. These included better provisions for strengthening the Government’s monitoring and evaluation machinery than the PSTAC plan had contemplated. The PRPMO also had a good performance matrix and monitoring arrangements. It was decided that the reforms identified for PRPMO support had to be implemented prior to Board approval of its $9.6 million funding. Furthermore, the conditionality of the Fund’s then Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) strengthened incentives for Government compliance with several important macro requirements, e.g., related to tax policy and administration reforms. This mitigated some of the risks related to IDA credit operations, notably regarding Guyana’s fiscal discipline.

Another important factor was the improvement across Guyana’s political spectrum of public appreciation of and backing for better poverty reduction and governance programs. In 2005, the Government presented a draft of its proposed changes in the country’s poverty reduction strategy. The new Annual Progress Report (APR) document enhanced the originally published strategy and its initial prominence. It was extensively disseminated in Guyana and widely discussed before it was considered by the Parliament. These broadly confirmed the importance and directions of the envisaged reforms. They also incidentally contributed to an improved dialogue among the main political parties on the country’s fiduciary oversight problems.

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The Bank’s own contributions to PSTAC’s successful implementation included the influences of its supervision activities. They involved considerable technical assistance on many governance and other areas and close monitoring of the activities through a local consultant based in the Bank Office in Guyana. The Project’s mid-term review provided helpful stock taking and identified opportunities for strategy changes and new activities. All these usefully served to expand the effectiveness of the Government’s PCPMU and its measures to remedy various PRSP implementation problems. On the other hand, the Project’s execution was marred by some substantial problems. The Government’s commitment to achieving PSTAC’s development objectives was spotty, especially towards the end of the extended implementation period. It notably failed to show sufficient will and decisiveness to establish a suitable M&E operation. Both the new budget and integrated financial management instruments failed to provide bases for system-based M&E activity. As neither one provided the requisite tracking instruments, the necessary data on Government program expenditures were unavailable. It thus proved impossible to gauge performance of priority programs. As a result, PRSP reports were weak. On the institutional side, the Government resisted some system and leadership changes and was not well disposed to acting to solve them in a timely manner. The situation became so complicated that the donors collectively decided to try to negotiate a reassignment of responsibilities for the M&E function. As a result of these factors, the Project component encountered so much resistance that it never really enabled M&E activity to get fully off the ground. However, this review also takes into consideration that Bank review of other M&E systems demonstrate that implementation of M&E systems tends to be a fairly long and complex process in different country contexts.

Other institutional weaknesses were also costly. This especially pertained to the Human Services Ministry, notably on the social safety net action. The latter was to be converted into a full scale implementation measure but it was never launched during the project extension period, as had been agreed. Project-funded activities of the BOS and procurement components were to some extent also slowed by organizational inefficiencies.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

Many monitoring indicators were well targeted as they reflected the key recommendations of sector assessments of the Bank and other agencies. Some were appropriately formulated to provide a good basis to track the status of the overall operation. However, as noted, the indicators/benchmarks used during supervision were concentrated mostly on monitoring advances of the Project’s activities (i.e., outputs), not progress towards attaining PDO outcomes. Despite this, there was effective performance monitoring. Activity progress reports were updated yearly, and more frequently nearing the Credit’s closing date. The data collected had some substantial utility too. The renewal of contracts of the head of the PIU within the PCPMU and some other staff were tied to the fulfillment of specified performance benchmarks and monitored through the detailed activity reports.

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Although project design also envisaged that the Government’s new M&E unit would also help to identify problems across government programs, as noted, the political and technical problems encountered undermined the system’s ability to retrieve adequate information, and to provide very much useful feedback. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance The Government complied satisfactorily with Bank policy and procedural requirements. The PCMPU staff, which remained stable for the duration of the project execution, became quite skilled in its tasks. Project statements of expenditure and disbursement requests were submitted in a timely manner, as were the audit reports (which were also clean). No serious internal control issues arose to the level of reporting conditions except minor ones that were ultimately properly addressed. The PCMPU fulfilled its procurement function satisfactorily. The procurement of consultant services and goods were conducted in compliance with the applicable Bank guidelines and procedures. 2.5. Post-Completion-Operation/Next Phase Transition Arrangements The Government and the Bank agree on the need for a post-completion operation to continue to underpin assistance financed by the Project and the PRPMO. This would be based on the second PRSP which is now being prepared and progress in achieving PSTAC and related goals. The Government has indicated its interest in deepening recent reforms. Meanwhile, the Bank’s staff is continuing the policy dialogue (an integrated Fiduciary Assessment and Poverty Assessment are ongoing) and the monitoring and supervision of the reform areas that were supported under the PSTAC and PRPMO. It is also maintaining close contacts with the IDB and the IMF on the results of their assistance. And the staff hired under the Project by the GRA and NPA have been made permanent, which should provide useful continuity for follow up work. It is considered likely therefore that a PSTAC II project will follow. In addition, there is already some agreement that the Government’s M&E Unit would be better placed within the Finance Ministry. Indicative ares for a follow-up operation might include the following:

• Implementation of recommendations from the Integrated Fiduciary Assessment (IFA)

undertaken by WB, IDB and EU. • Guyana Revenue Authority. A review of the new tax system. • Procurement. An upgrading of the MIS, implementation of e-procurement,

implementation of the OECD’s diagnostic indicators, a Quick Gains diagnostic and rationalization of procurement procedures, and strengthening of the new procurement secretariat.

• Fiduciary Oversight. A second round of Standing Order reforms plus advancing the Integrity Commission reforms.

• Bureau of Statistics. Its role and institutional strengthening continue to be an issue.

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• Ministry of Labour and Human Services and Social Security. Systems upgrade and implementation of the Social Action Plan

• M&E. A new operation could continue to implement the ‘system approach’. It might also include posting experts in key line ministries to mainstream statistical, strategic, budget formulation and execution, and M&E itself.

Recommended follow-up by the Bank. One key aspect will be to continue to work closely with other donors, especially the IDB in order to jointly address key problems, leverage IDB experience and lending on the central issues addressed by the PSTAC.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation (Rating: Satisfactory) The overall relevance of PSTAC’s objectives was high. They were highly relevant to the development priorities of the time and continue to enjoy the same degree of importance at present. As shown, the Project addressed the critical elements of the PRSP agenda concerning stronger institutions and better governance. These still deserve the stature of overriding priority goals, which are shared by other development partners for Guyana. Moreover, the very problems which the PSTAC encountered reinforce its emphases on upgrading the Government’s capacities to carry out reform and development-oriented activities in an effective manner. They also underscore the significance of continued Government efforts to obtain very close collaboration with, and well linked support from, its donor community. The PSTAC objectives and design bearing on this requirement have no less relevance now than before.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Assisting the Government in expanding its capacity to meet the agreed governance and poverty reduction objectives (Rating: Satisfactory) The Project specifically aimed to bring about public sector institutional and efficiency improvements, and better targeting and implementation of poverty remediation programs. The extent to which the operation achieved these goals needs to be viewed in the context of the following factors: (a) The PSTAC was a very modest project. Its $4.8 million financing was intended to

provide technical assistance for relatively small segments of a few components. (b) IDA financing for these sub-components was partly and deliberately limited to

launch initiatives in a comprehensive set of public sector reforms within a complicated and otherwise difficult country situation.

(c) The PSTAC’s plan was open ended in order to create opportunities for other donors to address areas of interest—to which they responded.

PSTAC’s activities mainly consisted of studies, small scale implementation of some recommendations and the provision of short-term services over a three year period. Hence, it is difficult to segregate and assess the direct links between the Project’s outputs and outcomes. This might be better gleaned from review of the Project’s outputs and

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results in conjunction with those from complementary donor (and other Bank) activity. These are set out in Annex 11. Overall, PSTAC directly or through complementary Band and other donor activities affected the following important outcomes:

Improved Revenue Administration. The project financed the selection and hiring of two Revenue Commissioners. Their appointments fulfilled a condition for advancing IMF/CARTAC/IDB work in this area. The VAT and tax reforms were implemented over the following 2-3 years. Strengthened Procurement Framework. The project financed consultant services to help draft the required complementary legislation to implement the National Procurement Act and Regulations, as well as their ultimate dissemination. On the basis of such TA and related work, the Government adopted standard bidding documents, manuals, uniform operating procedures and evaluation criteria, established a modern information system for procurement tracking, management and publication of processes, set up and staffed national and regional tender boards and a secretariat. An initial phase of information disclosure has been implemented, and there is now a government website administered by the NPTA with limited information regarding tendering opportunities, procurement policy and guidelines, and information on contract award information easily accessible to end-users. This initiative is concurrent with the alignment of the procurement policies with e-Government policies. The Government also completed an annual audit of Government procurement. As a result, Guyana now has a legal and regulatory framework for procurement consistent with international standards and a competent Secretariat. Moreover, preliminary results from the Procurement System Assessment Report (PSAR) of 2007 4 indicate that Guyana’s procurement system scored on average the highest for its legislative and regulatory framework. The same report indicates positive measures in terms of greater opportunities for suppliers, contractors, and consultants to compete for public contracts as well as in terms of quicker turnover of bids by the NPTA. All this constitutes a major change from the way in which procurement was being carried out. Strengthened Fiduciary Oversight. The project financed the launching of the first phase of an oversight strengthening program. The parliamentary Oversight study resulted in changes to parliamentary Standing Orders. These have reformed the modus operandi of the Parliament, empowering it considerably, and giving the body a stronger hand in holding the Executive branch accountable.

More Efficient Human Resources Management. A modern computerized personnel system integrating payroll and personnel records was installed. It allows for superior budgeting, real time tracking and reconciliation, planning and personnel management.

4 The PSAR established a baseline based on the OECD/DAC–World Bank’s Methodology for Assessment of National Procurement Systems. The preparation of the PSAR benefited from the analytical work produced during the execution of the project.

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This would result in increased efficiency of payments to civil servants as budgets are now based on computerized data bases. The management of these data bases is being decentralized to ministries by IDB, which should provide additional efficiency at their levels.

Improved Monitoring and Development of Indicators to Gauge Progress in the Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Implementation. There were some monitoring and evaluation activities related to the PRSP. These included the: (i) issuance of the first semi-annual publication of executed current and capital public expenditures by sector and priority poverty-related programs; (ii) publication of a summary of the 2002 Census; (iii) launching of a Household Income and Expenditure Survey; and (iv) training for drill down and poverty map development. These will permit the Government to better identify individuals eligible for social safety nets, and to facilitate the prioritization of poverty reduction programs. The Household Survey has already provided the basis for a Bank Poverty Assessment.

It also bears noting that, while some programmed PSTAC sub-components were not fully implemented, the Project actually exceeded its planned scope in a number of instances, mainly in the social safety net and net services areas. These “extra” achievements are detailed in the description of the Project’s sub-component activities shown in Annex 2 (ref. “Additional sub-component” headings).

3.3 Efficiency

Technical assistance projects of the PSTAC’s type are not generally subject to cost-benefit or economic analyses. However, the Project could ultimately provide the Government useful quantifiable incremental benefits. These would derive from the future results of carrying out Government purchasing on a more standardized, commercial type basis; mobilizing public revenues through the VAT; savings in the public sector wage bill from more computerized civil service pay and pension systems; and comparable savings from the increased Parliamentary scrunity of executive branch operations.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome (Rating: Satisfactory) The Project’s goals were largely achieved and some were substantially exceeded. Its approach confirmed the merit of the objectives, design and advances set out in the PRSP and the PRSC, and operationalized in this project. To be sure, its implementation plan deviated from initial in some areas. However, most of these departures were the consequences of other donors’ co-financing actions, which actually reflected the wisdom of the Project’s design as a source of “seed capital.” Furthermore, the results of the other donor financing which the Government obtained, suggests that the collective progress achieved strengthened the prospects for sustainability of Guyana’s desired public sector reforms over the medium term.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

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The Project’s direct effects on Guyana’s poor and other vulnerable groups are considered limited. And reflects its design decision. The operation’s main purpose was to help the Government equip the country with the basic information needed to develop an effective strategy to remedy its poverty problems while improving its efficiency in using limited public finances. This needed to be done first- before direct poverty reduction could be successfully tackled - and for which much greater funding would be required. While those “building block” steps were being initiated, there were some actions taken that could contribute to more direct future poverty relief. In conjunction with the PRPMO, the studies carried out involving the MLHSSS constituted foundations for better targeting of risky populations. These, the SSN law, the Social Action Plan and the labor market activities were all poverty related, as is upgrading the systems for distributing SSN payments. The Project and the PRPMO also supported the BOS to prepare for the census, the household budget survey, and its own institutional strengthening. These efforts facilitated the preparation of the Guyana Poverty Assessment. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening The Project’s effects on Guyana’s institutional improvement were limited to the identification of opportunities for mitigating the Government’s capacity constraints, and the development of policy changes and the implementation of actions for realizing needed reforms. These were appropriately focused on the public sector’s revenue administration, procurement activities, fiduciary oversight and the civil service management system. Hands-on training through the project as well as by Bank staff on carrying out the design, implementation and processing of survey information also raised the capacity of the BOS for future work in this area. Importantly, these efforts are paving the way for future reform such as in the area of procurement. For example the MOF and the NPTA have developed a plan for implementing the use of a single e-Procurement portal to increase transparency and provide a single comprehensive and reliable information portal with which to plan future procurement base on an analysis of the country’s system and monitor market trends. Given the limited availability of funds and the enormity of the problems of the low quality, poorly staffed, Government work force, the PSTAC’s institutional impacts are considered to be surprisingly good – but they have to be maintained and reinforced. The institutional and management capacity framework to maintain the systems will need follow up efforts to ensure sustainability of the successful outcomes. The main ones were the aforementioned strengthening of the procurement framework, fiduciary oversight function and measures to make civil service management more efficient (ref. section. 3.2). At the same time though, as discussed in section. 2.2, the Project was not successful in developing an adequate M&E capability in the Government. This remains to be done and it will likely involve strong coordination with the other development partners. The high reliance on consultants in the government also means that at end of each project there is a loss of institutional capacity. In this project, the fiduciary team in the PCPMU that had been actually remained for the project duration and become quite skilled in its

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tasks was not integrated into a permanent role in the public service. Follow-on operations will need to again rebuild the institutional capacity for managing technical assistance projects. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) The PSTAC increased public awareness and appreciation of the Government’s reform agenda, especially in the critical areas of procurement and fiduciary oversight. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops (optional for Core ICR, required for ILI, details in annexes) None were carried out.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome (Rating: Significant) The Project's appraisal reflected an appropriate appreciation of the uncertainties Guyana confronted which had the potential to impair achievement of the desired development objectives. These were important in view of Guyana's slippage from its reform gains up to 1998 and its lackluster economic performance until 2005. Among others, it underscored the needs for ensuring adequate funding for the governance and public sector efficiency and accountability advances, as well as social service improvements. These helped to set out a modest-- but arguably adequate-- plan for meeting the foreseeable risks. As the Project's accomplishments indicate, there were some advances made towards attaining the needed development outcomes. But the record shows that these were relatively small steps towards the reduction of poverty and enhancement of public management. Neither, for that matter, do they ensure that those outcomes can be expected to stay in place and to be maintained. Perhaps the best that can be concluded is that some appropriate risk mitigation measures were applied under the Project and that, at least at present, the Project's strides towards realization of the development outcomes appear marginally sustainable (thanks to the PRPMO, IDB, IMF, other donors and the proposed follow-on operations). For the longer term, however, the fragility of Guyana's economy and its somewhat tenuous growth capability, its high turnover of staff and reliance on consultants are considered to still pose substantial risks to the full realization and maintenance of its development objectives. For these reasons the risks are significant.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry (Rating: Satisfactory) As discussed in section 2.1, the Bank did a good job in preparing and designing the operation so as to meet the Government’s development requirements and the strategy for their fulfillment. It did so, moreover, in an effective scheme for close collaboration with other major donors within the framework of the PRSP’s implementation, in which the

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relatively small IDA participation leveraged larger volume of donor resources. Regarding the arrangements for project implementation, the Bank team worked with its Government counterparts in shaping an operating plan that included suitable provisions to mobilize the required level of Government ownership taking QAG’s views into account. This was quite important in view of Guyana’s past track record in public sector improvements. They project team also designed adequate fiduciary arrangements to deal with the high risk environment. The major ones concerned with country ownership and implementation capacity but were appropriately recognized. The Project was structured to take full advantage of the leverage to be provided by future Bank and IDB lending. They kept the components were kept small, well defined, and spread across ministries that had at least a modicum of absorptive capacity. Corruption issues were to be addressed by the Fiduciary Oversight component, the plans for rewriting of the procurement law and reviving the procurement secretariat. QAG’s review appropriately judged the operation to be well designed and that it properly reflected a high risk and high return strategy A notable measure was the Bank’s initiative in visiting members of the opposition party during the Project’s preparation and obtaining their views, which appeared to have paid off later in the form of important bipartisan support for important changes. The team also developed a good working relationship with the PCPMU and other major donors, mainly IDB prior to implementation. The team was proactive during the design of the project. Its high quality, combined with the work of the Resident Representative, contributed to the merit of the arrangements installed. Before the Credit became effective, for example, Bank staff and consultants worked with their counterparts in the preparation of service contract TORs and in drafting the new Procurement Law. (b) Quality of Supervision (Rating: Satisfactory)

Bank supervision largely consisted of detailed and intensive reviews of the Government’s actions. Output indicators were checked every six months, which provided an efficient way to keep resources well aligned with targets. The mid-term review consisted of a visit by the Bank project team leader, and an exchange of information on the status of the performance benchmarks. These flagged implementation problems and methods to advance on remaining activities. It effectively led to useful agreement on the reallocation of the Credit’s remaining balance for funding new activities. The links between the project and the PRSP, PRPMO and other development partners’ programs provided additional monitoring support. In this connection, furthermore, the Bank team developed and maintained a useful instrument to track the planned and actual contributions of other parties to the Project’s activities. This provided a helpful picture of the operating situation, as shown in Annex 11. These were supplemented moreover by the fact that IDB officers often accompanied Bank supervision missions, and there were

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also good communications with the IDB team in Guyana. These strengthened the Bank’s dialogues with the Government on a variety of important issues. In addition, the Bank kept a consultant in the Bank’s Georgetown Office to provide continuing day-to-day monitoring and assistance. The Resident Representative also took on some coordinating activities for the Credit, as well as the PRPMO (whose task team leader was in the field during the latter part of the project’s implementation). The supervision budget was adequate for the effort required. But the Bank’s failure to properly understand the difficulties of reforming M&E (as detailed in Section 2.2) impeded timely and more forceful intervention in that area. To its credit, though, some activities were added to the component in an attempt to strengthen the activity. On the other hand, the problems encountered in getting some of the new activities completed during the Credit’s extension period suggests that the Bank found it hard to maintain the momentum of the initiatives. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance (Rating: Satisfactory ) This rating is based on the quality of its analytical work for the preparation and design of the operation, and its energetic and dedicated supervision and technical assistance to see it implemented in tandem with other donors, all under very difficult country conditions.

The parallel Bank activity to help the authorities overcome substantial macroeconomic problems through HIPC and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative measures contributed significantly as well. IDA also provided extensive technical assistance for the preparation and implementation of the PRPMO supported program.

5.2 Borrower Performance (relating to design, implementation and outcome issues) (a) Government Performance For purposes of this evaluation, the Government and its implementing agency are not segregated. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance (Rating: Moderately Satisfactory) The institutional arrangements underlying project implementation monitoring were for the most part satisfactory. A PIU, placed under the supervision of the Head of the PCPMU in the President’s Office served as the principal agency responsible for coordinating and overseeing all aspects of the operation. The Head of this Unit was also the main counterpart in the preparation and supervision of the PRSC and PRPMO. A reasonable level of Government commitment to the project objectives was sustained. During preparation, the Government contributed constructively to the Bank’s missions and to the formulation of the reform agenda and its work in line with the PRSP.

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Uniquely in the country situation, the Government had facilitated the mobilization of more then 8,000 people from various civil society groups for consultation in the process of defining the PRSP. It also attempted to ensure satisfactory arrangements for project implementation, even to seeing that they were in place prior to the starting date. During the Project’s implementation, the Government pursued its poverty reduction strategy conscientiously and increased its budgetary outlays to the key sectors. It also followed prudent macroeconomic policies and generally adequately supported associated institutional, regulatory and governance changes, which were supportive. But overall, the Government’s direct performance was only moderately satisfactory. There were the difficulties in implementing M&E reform, despite its imperative in the PRSP. In addition, the Government’s backing for the Project waned badly towards the end of the extension period. Other disappointments related to some delays in BOS activities, especially census and household budget survey processing and analysis and difficulties in managing MLHSSS activities. Still others included the failures to carry out the new activities agreed on for the Credit’s extension period: e.g., a follow-up Integrity Commission study and an operational audit of the Ministry of Human Services main Social Safety Net programs. In both cases consultants were selected but neither study was contracted owing to political resistance. Also, it was expected that some of the elements of the Ministry's Social Action Plan, could be prepared or launched. Project funds were also projected to implement a training program for the PCPMU based on a needs assessment, but no training proposals were submitted by the government.

6. Lessons Learned Thinly spread Bank resources can have significant impact if other donor resources are leveraged timely and in appropriate areas. The design of the Project was criticized in its initial reviews for concerns that it had too many components with inadequate funding. However, this format was chosen because it was decided to support as many areas as possible whose interventions could possibly lead to good results. Given the small amount of resources available, however, it was neither feasible nor advisable to engage intensively in the issues targeted. Trying to do so would have magnified the complexity of getting results. The Bank adopted instead a broader -- but thinner-- approach. This was effective in spreading the risk and targeting feasible reforms. The “Christmas tree” approach thus proved successful because of donor collaboration. With a small operation spread across numerous components and limited resources, it was very important to have the IDB help to roll out what this Project began. This in fact happened and it provided leverage and substantively improved results, in the form of progress from studies to actions. The IDB had a larger portfolio and capacity to advance work in Guyana. The sustained close interaction and good working relations with IDB improved the performance of the operation. Need for local consultants. Having a good local consultant in the Bank office was crucial to working on the ground in Guyana. It was particularly helpful for understanding the domestic culture and politics and for helping to move the agenda forward.

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Continuity of project fiduciary staff has positive outcomes for financial management and procurement aspects of the project. Staff continuity facilitated the disbursement of needed funds and procurement procedures, which otherwise become obstacles to reaching project targets. Flexibility for ensuing activities. TALs characteristically produce studies and recommendations, whose implementation are often left uncertain or long delayed by the absence of follow-up resources. In future operations, it might be useful to have provisions for contingent funds for such purposes. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies The Borrower prepared their own evaluation of the project implementation and results. They also included references to their own performance and Bank’s performance during project implementation. This document is included in Annex 7. Overall, the borrower’s perception of project results is the same as the Bank’s evaluation. Their evaluation places emphasis on the fact that project was timely to support the launch of new reform activities, to sustain the on-going work of other donors and in helping realize new opportunities for additional financing for many of the important recommendations and outputs coming out of the various studies. Regarding the borrower and Bank’s performance, the Borrower presents a very positive evaluation of both. The evaluation recognizes that the collaboration with the Bank was successful. No further comments were provided by the Borrower after reviewing this ICR. (b) Cofinanciers Not Applicable (c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society) None were received.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal

Estimate (USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions) Percentage of

Appraisal

Sub-Component 1.1-Guyana Revenue Authority 0.39 0.19 49% Sub-Component 1.2-Procurement Administration 0.57 0.67 118% Sub-Component 1.3 Fiduciary Oversight 0.30 0.50 167% Sub-Component 1.4 Human Resource Management 0.40 0.43 108% Sub-Component 1.5-Privatization Of GNCB and Management Of Proceeds 0.33 0.10 30%

Sub-Component 2.1- Social Safety-Nets Assessment 0.45 0.34 76% Sub-Component 2.2- Severance Packages Analysis For Restructuring Of Sugar Industry 0.05 0.00 0

Sub-Component 3.1-Bureau Of Statistics Capacity Building 0.65 0.55 118%

Sub-Component 3.2-PCPMU Policy Coordination And Programme Management Unit 2.15 1.52 71%

Total Baseline Cost 5.29 4.30 81%

Physical Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Price Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Total Project Costs 5.29 4.30 81% Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00

Total Financing Required 5.29 4.305 81%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Borrower Counterpart 0.53 0.08 168% International Development Association (IDA) External 4.76 4.22 88%

5 Adjusted to reflect slight exchange rate differences.

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Sub Component 1.1 Strengthen the Guyana Revenue Authority Objective: Support the strengthening of the Revenue Authority and tax reform. Component/Sub-component Status Observation

GRA operations and tax policy reform * long term tax consultants * anti-corruption program * improved tax/customs administration * preparation of VAT

Procured Commissioner General and Deputy for the GRA. Provided IT equipment

Completed. These activities were led by CARTAC and IDB which took over tax consultants, Anti Corruption Program, and everything concerned with taxes, Customs and VAT.

Programmed activities under this sub-component included streamlining GRA operations and tax policy reform, contracting tax consultants, implementing an anti-corruption programme, improving tax/customs administration, preparing for VAT implementation, and improving IT capacity by procuring computer hardware and software. A Commissioner General and a Deputy Commissioner General were recruited in 2003. Their initial contract period was subsequently renewed for three months to sustain the reforms started. These helped to implement the Tax Reform Action Plan (TRAP), developed with the assistance from the IMF and CARTAC.

PSTAC’s intervention was instrumental in paving the way for the long-term participation of other donors in the reforms. The IDB’s FFMP project provided US $7 M. to help initiate the following at the GRA: • Establishment of a new legal framework for modernization of customs • Implementation of regulations for the presumptive income tax on the self-employed • Establishment of a modern system for controlling and recording tax exemptions and

publication of exemptions previously granted • Implementation of a new unique Taxpayer Identification Numbering system • Implementation of a new system of commercial invoicing controls • Implementation of the VAT system • Enhancement of GRA’s information systems capacity for customs and domestic tax

administration • Implementation of Total Revenue Integrated Processing System Most notable activities completed were: 1) Amendment of the Customs Act to provide greater autonomy for human resource management; 2) Regulations produced for implementation of the presumptive income tax on self employed; 3) Implementation of a

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new Taxpayer Identification Number; and; 4) Modernization of the recording and controlling of tax exemptions; 5) Implementation of the VAT. Procurement of IT equipment was completed by the first quarter of 2004. The initial equipment list was substantially reduced due to more support from other donors than was expected. The IDA-financed equipment was distributed to the various offices of the Internal Revenue and the Customs and Trade Administration. CARTAC and the IMF are projected to continue to provide assistance to the GRA. Guyana has also submitted a proposal to the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to support further tax and expenditure management.

Sub Component 1.2 Strengthen Procurement Administration Objective: Draft rules and regulations for Procurement Law and implement the Law. Component/Sub-component Status Observation (i) Draft rules and regulations for procurement law

1.2.1 Provide international expertise to assist in drafting rules and regulations for the new Procurement Law

Procured Procurement Lawyer and drafted Procurement Regulations.

Completed

(ii) Implement, the new procurement law

1.2.2 Purchase office furniture and equipment for NPTB's Secretariat

Procured IT and Office equipment for the establishment of NPTA Secretariat and new MIS Unit.

Completed

1.2.3 Provide administrative tools for the NPTB Secretariat

Contracted Firm to strengthen procurement administration - Administrative tools (Procurement manuals, Standard Bid Documents, Evaluation Reports, Training Manuals), Training, MIS and E-procurement strategy provided.

Completed

1.2.4 Establish a Management Information System for Secretariat

Incorporated in contract for 1.2.3

Completed

1.2.5 Undertake Procurement Training of Public Employees


Completed

1.2.6 Provide procurement information for the public and develop plan for e-Procurement systems


Completed

Additional Sub-components*

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Recruit IT and Procurement specialists to staff NPTA Secretariat.

Contracted two IT Specialists and five Procurement Specialists.

Completed.

The activities programmed under this component included: • providing international expertise to assist in drafting rules and regulations of the new

Procurement Act; • purchasing office furniture and equipment for NPTA’s Secretariat • providing administrative tools for the NPTA’s Secretariat • establishing a management information system for NPTA’s Secretariat • procurement training of public employees • providing procurement information for the public and develop plan for e-procurement

systems A consultant was contracted to prepare supporting Regulations for the new Procurement Act. This was completed in late 2004 and the regulations adopted a few months later. The Government appointed the 7 board members of the National Procurement and Tender Administration. The Secretariat of the Board was established with staffing from the defunct Central Tender Board Secretariat. However, the quality of the skills of the staff was inadequate to facilitate capacity building and to move public procurement reforms at the planned pace and desired levels. To ameliorate this problem, the NPTA, identified seven positions in its Secretariat which were filled in March of 2006. This brought the staff complement to the level of thirteen persons, establishing a critical minimum operating level for efficient and effective procurement administration functions. In line with the capacity building efforts in the Secretariat, an initial set of general office and IT equipment for the NPTA was installed in the second quarter of 2005. A second set was approved by Cabinet and given the Bank’s in the last quarter of 2006. This was installed successfully providing the foundation for the planned establishment of an IT based management information system (MIS). Software to serve the new MIS was successfully installed in early 2007. The MIS scheduled for development and implementation by end February 2006 was first delayed substantially and subsequently installed during the second quarter of 2007 with information gathering, data entry and full system testing. Training was provided during the implementation period for both end user and technical staff. It is expected that this will further serve the NPTA in bringing the daily management and monitoring operations, (which were primarily manual processes) to a digital platform providing real time access to data for improved decision making and management. Additionally, the system is expected to provide sufficient information for post procurement analysis to facilitate decision making for more efficient and effective long-term operations and programs. In support of the design and implementation of this MIS, a Website was developed by the IT staff of the NPTA Secretariat. The site is a major boost to the development of the MIS, the E-procurement strategy and the NPTA’s capacity to disseminate procurement information.

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Procurement training under several themes and encompassing the NPTA as well as Ministerial and Regional Procurement staff was carried out. Participants were trained in general procurement policies and practices as well as the new Standard Bid Documents, Procurement Manuals and Evaluation Reports. The NPTA is expected to continue building procurement capacity at the Regional and District levels with similar training seminars and workshops to be implemented with the support of its new staff. The Standard Bidding Documents (SBDs), Procurement Manuals and Evaluation Reports were subsequently mandated for use across all procuring agencies. New administrative procurement procedures are also being formulated and implemented to support the use of these documents as well as the Laws and accompanying Regulations. The NPTA Secretariat is slated to continuously monitor the use and content of the Standard Bidding Documents, Manuals and Evaluation Reports with the help of the new procedures to assess performance, effectiveness and compliance. A procurement audit was requested by the Bank following the acceptance and full implementation of the administrative tools. This task falls within the mandate of the Office of the Auditor General from whom a report is expected in 2008. The Millennium Challenge Corporation has been asked to provide support for the next steps of the procurement reform process through assistance for further training and additional equipment.

Sub Component 1.3 Strengthen Fiduciary Oversight Objective: Strengthen Fiscal, Financial and Fiduciary management Component/Sub-component

Status Observation

Completion of three studies fiduciary oversight committee, limits to discretionary powers, disclosure requirements

Procured firm to carry out Fiduciary Oversight process. Fifty-two recommendations proposed from study.

Completed.

Additional Sub-Componentsi*

Prioritized Action Plan of accepted recommendations for Parliamentary Oversight

Thirty of fifty nine recommendations proposed were accepted and a prioritized action plan was prepared in a follow-on consultancy.

Completed. IDB currently supporting some of the recommendations.

Reform of Integrity Commission

Parliamentary Standing Orders were reformed, the Reform of the Integrity Commission was proposed

N/A

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but PSTAC funds were insufficient for follow on.

Programmed activities included studies on: (i) strengthening Parliament’s fiduciary oversight; (ii) limiting executive discretionary powers; and (iii) disclosing public officials’ assets through the Integrity Commission. An inception report on the oversight studies was completed in February 2005 and a final framework and guidelines report was submitted were submitted to the Government on July 4, 2005. The report benefited from wide ranging stakeholder consultation. In all, 59 recommendations were proposed of which twenty dealt with improving Parliament oversight. The Government accepted 30 of the proposed 59 recommendations and retained consultants, to develop a fully costed action plan. This action plan was discussed with stakeholders and subsequently finalized for prioritization and implementation. The prioritization process was completed early in 2006 and implementation commenced. Support for the implementation of the recommendations came from IDB-funded Fiscal and Financial Management Project (FFMP) and, the Public Management Modernization Project (PMMP). Their assistance was in the areas of strengthening Parliament’s fiduciary oversight and, the limiting of Executive Discretionary Powers. Work has been underway. The following are the expected results:

• New Rules, Procedures, and Operational Policies for formulation and approval to enable the Economic Services Committee and Public Accounts Committee of Parliament to perform their oversight.

• Training for Members of Parliament. • Development and implementation of a general institutional framework to classify

Semi-autonomous Agencies (SAA) and Statutory Bodies (SB) • The revision and reclassification of SAAs and SBs from a sector perspective

It was anticipated that the PSTAC would continue the above progress to cover the third part of the Action Plan’s proposed activities, the Reform of the Integrity Commission (modeled on Trinidad and Tobago’s Integrity Commission.) Accordingly, the new Commission was expected to take on four roles: Prevention; Investigation; Enforcement; and Enlistment of public support. Firms were invited to submit expressions of interest and subsequently present full proposals for the services. Proposals were evaluated and a firm was selected to provide the required services. The completion of this consultancy was projected to set the stage for the reform process. However, the costs of the bids were much more than anticipated and the shortfall in the funds available resulted in no contract being signed.

Sub Component 1.4 Integrate Human Resource and Payroll Databases Objective: Enable the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service Ministry to integrate their payroll and human resources databases. Component/Sub-component Status Observation 1.4.1 Support core Project Implementation Team

Contracted seven IT Specialists for PIU and

Completed.

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maintained their services for 2003-5.

1.4.2 Train project team in the technical aspects of the HR application and user training

Technical and user training provided for PIU and other GoG officials. Net training also provided to support report generation.

Completed.

1.4.3 Purchase and install hardware for LAN and WAN Network

Procured IT Hardware, Software and services (communication links).

Completed.

1.4.4 Acquire, install, and test dedicated and communications line between MOF and PSM


Completed.

1.4.5 Purchase, install and test HR software

Procured HR/Payroll Software

Completed.

1.4.6 Develop workflow documentation / re-engineering and process documentation

Developed workflow documentation / re-engineered system and process documentation.

Ongoing process currently supported by IDB which is rolling out the system to Ministries..

1.4.7 System audit and evaluation

System audited and evaluated.

Ongoing process currently supported by IDB.

Additional Sub-components* Establish communication linkage with PSM and Teaching Service Commission (TSC) and enhance MIS Dept.

Link established and equipment and training provided to support more effective and efficient MIS operations at TSC.

Completed

Integrate TSC database with HR/Payroll database.

TSC Database integrated with HR/Payroll database, analyzed and cleaned.

Completed

The integration of the human resource and payroll systems was designed to facilitate the upgrading of the quality and usefulness of their records with a view to establishing a central repository for the Government’s human resource information. PSTAC supported Ministry consultants to undertake key activities. In particular, the staff of the MISU was successful in facilitating the following:

• Procurement of IT hardware and software for the integration of the HR/Payroll databases

• Establishment of communication linkages between the Public Service Ministry (PSM), Ministry of Finance (MoF), Public Service Commission (PSC), and the Teaching Service Commission (TSC)

• Revision of existing Budget, Payroll and Security Structures • Cleansing and validation of data integrity of HR/Payroll databases • Upgrade of equipment in MIS Unit at TSC

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• Integration of TSC database into the payroll database, cleansing and verification of data integrity

• Development of new custom reports for TSC • Development of interface with the new Budget Preparation and Reporting System

and the creation of new relevant reports In addition, training at end user levels were done on several occasions involving more than twenty persons. Technical training was given in managing Smartstream HR/Payroll database modules as well as working with web based reporting technologies. This was geared to update the skills of the MISU team in implementing web based technologies for reporting purposes. The end result of should be better management through more flexible, accurate, clear and timely reporting. Further, officers of the Teaching Service Commission were given end user training in Smartstream after the integration of the databases. With the successful completion of the Payroll/HR integration, the Government with the support of the IDB funded Public Management Modernization Project (PMMP) commenced additional reforms in the following areas:

• Procurement of additional IT hardware and software to set up PSM as an HRP back-up site to MOF

• Management capacity of the Public Service Ministry improved and strengthened to enhance its competence to regulate and manage the public service system

• Enhancement of the Personnel function to make use of available information in daily operations and for strategic decision making

• Improved management efficiency, transparency and accountability in public sector institutions and systems of the Central Government

• Public Service Rules revised and validated for more normative consistency and management flexibility

• Performance Appraisal System for Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Departments implemented.

• Connectivity for all Public Sector agencies The completion of these additional reforms would permit some of the following:

• Reorganization of the Job and Position Inventory to create a more streamlined representation of the Organization Chart/Inventory of authorized positions

• Stronger control of employment procedures with revised job descriptions and organizational structures

• Annual workforce plans • Trained HR officials and instructors and the provision of accompanying

procedural manuals and guidelines • Revised and updated Public Service Rules • Real time access to data for more accurate and informed policy making decisions • The implementation of a Structured Performance Appraisal System • Better equipment to acquire, store and manage data for dissemination and

improved decision making

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Furthermore, the integrated databases would allow the Budget Office to closely monitor employment expenditure with live reports and real-time access to information on the system. Controls have been put in place to ensure the Budget Office approves all salary and employment changes of individual employees before they are entered into the electronic system. As a result, the Budget Office is now able to reconcile figures on the payroll with expenditure recorded on the budget system. IDB’s intervention via its PMMP builds on the foundation set by the PSTAC project to continue to establish linkages to the new Budget Preparation and Reporting System (BPRS) in the Ministry of Finance. Sub Component 1.5 Support Privatization Activity Objective: Strengthen the capacity of the Privatization Unit to undertake its program of privatization and state-owned enterprise restructuring. Component/Sub-component Status Observation (i) Manage the privatization process of the state-owned Bank (GNCB)

1.5.1 Offer GNCB properties for sale; Set up National Asset Registry

Contracted head of Privatization Unit.

Completed.

1.5.2 Conduct audit of financial accounts, monitoring GNCB, post privatization

Conducted audit of financial accounts, monitoring GNCB, post privatization

Completed under NICIL/Privatization Unit funding.

1.5.3 Provide legal Advice for GNCB privatization

Contracted a lawyer. Completed under NICIL/Privatization Unit funding.

(ii) Support management of Government's portfolio of corporations/entities and the divestiture program; investigate and liquidate non-functional state owned entities

1.5.4 Manage and monitor state owned corporations/entities; Investigate and liquidate non-functional state owned entities

Managed and monitored state owned corporations/entities; Investigated and liquidated non-functional state owned entities

Ongoing under NICIL/Privatization Unit funding.

1.5.5 Manage GNCB privatization and the Government's portfolio contingency

Managed GNCB privatization and the Government's portfolio contingency

Ongoing under NICIL/Privatization Unit funding.

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The primary objective of strengthening the capacity of the Privatization Unit to undertake its program of privatization and state-owned enterprise restructuring was achieved. The GNCB was sold to the National Bank of Industry and Commerce.

PSTAC also provided support for post-privatization activities of GNCB. All outstanding employee issues have been cleared. The collection and disposal of bank loans is still being monitored. The overall monitoring of GNCB post privatization is done by NICIL.

The valuation of properties and overall management and monitoring of state-owned corporations/entities/properties, the leasing, sale or restructuring of unutilized government properties is an ongoing of NICIL’s responsibility. PSTAC provided support to NICIL to facilitate the following:

• Setting up of a National Asset Register • Ascertain the legal status of NICIL properties • Management and monitoring of state-owned corporations/entities • Wind up of entities into NICIL • Investigation and liquidation of non-functional state owned entities • Carrying out of recommended restructuring of state owned entities

The financial and other analysis on state owned entities and centralizing the financial management of NICIL entities with the wind up entities into NICIL is ongoing. The Privatization Unit and NICIL continue to be self sustaining entities.

At the time of project design PSTAC funding for a number of consultants was contemplated. However, a funding shortfall that had been anticipated did not materialize as a result of PSTAC’s intervention and the support of other funding sources. Several of the consultants who were to be procured were already undertaking key functions in the GNCB Privatization process supported by NICIL’s own resources. As a result, only the Head of the Privatization Unit was procured. However, special care was taken to ensure that the component’s entire program was successfully completed despite the limited Bank support. This extended a previous loan’s work on GNCB.

Sub Component 2.1 Strengthen Existing Social Safety Net Programmes Objectives: 1) Strengthen existing Social Safety Net Programs 2) Prepare Safety Net solutions for Vulnerable Groups. Component/Sub-component Status Observation 2.1.1 Establish Safety Net Coordination Unit within MHLSS

Procured IT Hardware, Software and general office equipment for Coordination Unit for project implementation.

Completed.

2.1.2 Design MIS Procured Management Completed.

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Information System (MIS) consultant and designed MIS.

2.1.3 Implement Pilot MIS Procured Management Information System (MIS) consultant and implemented pilot MIS.

Completed.

2.1.4 Evaluate pilot implementation

Procured Management Information System (MIS) consultant and evaluated pilot MIS.

Completed.

2.1.5 Undertake a Needs Assessment

Procured Social Safety Nets Consultant and conducted needs assessment study.

Completed.

2.1.6 Capacity building, training, (center)

Provided training and capacity building on Social Safety Nets issues. Provided training in effective use of Information Technology for GoG officials.

Completed.

2.1.7 Capacity building, training, (local)

Funds allocated for additional components. See 2.1.6

2.1.8 Produce risk and vulnerability assessment

Procured consultant and conducted Risk & Vulnerability Study.

Completed.

2.1.9 Program and targeting study

Procured Consultant and conducted Program & Targeting Study.

Completed.

2.1.10 Implement pilot reforms (Develop a Social Action Plan drawing upon Bank and other studies/materials, prioritizing interventions and indicating time frames and cost of undertakings.)

Procured Consultant and prioritized, costed, sequenced social action plan.

Completed.

2.1.11 Dissemination, training, workshop

Re-allocated to support additional components. See 2.1.6

2.1.12 Labour Market Assessment

Procured Social Safety Nets Consultant and conducted Labour Market Assessment.

Completed.

2.1.13 Safety Nets Legislative Assessment

Procured Lawyer with experience in Social Safety Nets and conducted legislative assessment.

Completed.

2.1.14 School Feeding Study Procured Consultant and conducted School Feeding Study.

Completed under PHRD funding.

2.2 Prepare Safety Net options

33

for vulnerable groups Design appropriate severance package for retrenched workers

Action dependent on Sugar Sector restructuring.

As workers were not retrenched a severance package was not needed.

Additional Sub-components* Provide support for High Risk and Vulnerable Groups

Procured National Commission on Disability Research Assistant and supported completion of Disability Survey.

Completed.

Establish a Social Action Plan (SAP) Establish PEU to prioritize and implement the SAP.

Contracted SAP Facilitator and Assistant.

Completed.

Conduct an Operational Audit including a Hinterland Payment Review of the MLHSSS Social Assistance Programs.

Delayed due to the appointment of a new Minister after 2006 elections, restructuring of Ministry and lack of ownership.

Not completed

Project activities included: • A Labour Market Study to assess the adequacy of current retraining and employment

services and provide guidance on an effective strategy for promoting the skills required for a restructured economy. The study was to assess the projected magnitude of the impact of restructuring in bauxite, sugar and the public sector and identified skills and occupations projected to grow, and skills gaps, absorptive capacity of growth industries, absorptive capacity for on-the-job training programs, retraining needs of displaced workers and their implications. Youth unemployment, gender issues and differences between the needs of urban and rural areas were of particular interest. The Study had three components: (i) assessing the future demand for jobs in the primary affected retrenchment

areas. (ii) evaluating current placement and vocational and other training options

available through MLHSSS/BIT and MoE; and (iii) helping to identify a strategy to reform labor market activities, including

linking employment services, one-stop shop approaches, and involvement of the private sector.

The study was completed on October 15, 2004.

• The task of designing, implementing and review of a pilot Management Information System (MIS) to track MLHSSS programs and provide information on costs and beneficiary payments as input into management processes and to improve the ability to follow payments to individuals or track program costs in a systematic way, was completed in November 2006. The MIS also tracks program costs and helps to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of programs. A system administration manual was completed as well.

34

• An evaluation of this system undertaken in 2006, while suggesting that the system was serving its initial purposes, recommended an upgrade to capture the other responsibilities under the Ministry’s mandate. Report is currently under review.

• An ICT strategy for the Ministry was prepared. The Ministry has been expanding its

Local Area Network (LAN) infrastructure. Beginning with PSTAC’s intervention for six workstations, the network now has twenty.

• A program targeting study was completed in March 2005. The study focused on old

age pension and public assistance, looking at their adequacy, coverage and procedures. It also reviewed legislation underpinning the social security system and staffing levels and adequacy at the Department of Social Security and Citizens Services. The study provided a number of recommendations for significant changes to the Public Assistance Program and overhauling the old age pension program.

• In June 2005, the Government completed a social safety net, risk and vulnerability

assessment. The study provided an analytical basis discussion of poverty, vulnerability and the adequacy of social safety net provision in Guyana. Specifically, the study (i) constructed a typology of vulnerable groups; (ii) constructed a profile of key risks and shocks and assessed their impact on the poor and the vulnerable groups; (iii) examined household and community risk mitigation and coping mechanisms; (iv) reviewed formal risk management and social protection interventions and assessed their effectiveness in reaching and protecting key vulnerable groups; and (v) provided recommendations on ways to improve the social protection and safety nets programs and policies.

• A Needs Assessment study was completed in 2006. The Government was not

satisfied with the quality of the report and the consultant was subsequently asked to revise it. The final report was subsequently submitted and cleared. The report focused on providing a comprehensive assessment of the skills mix in light of the increasing use of technology in the administration of programmes in the Ministry as well as an examination of the staffing and training needs of the Ministry. A strategy was defined for the development and retention of qualified staff, an appropriate skills mix of staff and the use of technology.

• A consultant was retained to provide legislative assessment of the Poor Relief Act

(1903 as amended), and the Old Age Pension Act (1944 as amended). The analysis provided a brief survey of the two laws, identified their principal flaws and proposed changes. It also contains a brief outline of legislation proposed to replace the two Acts. The draft legislation is currently being reviewed by the Ministry for submission to Cabinet. Legislative Review of the Safety Net was completed in October 2005.

• A fully costed action plan for the implementation of the recommendations of the

above studies was completed in December 2005. The SAP had identified and prioritized the recommendations that came out of the Bank studies and other relevant documentation. To oversee the implementation of cross cutting actions, an Inter-Ministerial Committee (IC) was established in September 2005. This was later superseded by the Permanent Secretaries Committee to review the prioritization

35

process at the conclusion of additional studies that were in progress. The SAP was finally agreed upon and prioritized for implementation during the last quarter of 2006.

• In conjunction with the prioritization of the Social Protection Action Plan the Government had approached the IDB for support in continuing the foundation work done under the PSTAC and to develop an operation to strengthen the Ministry of Human Services. It was agreed that the Ministry required more expertise, for which a facilitator and an assistant were contracted in the last quarter of 2006. These persons comprised the PEU charged with aiding the implementation process.

• General office and IT equipment was procured for the Ministry in 2004/2005 for

equipping a small office to facilitate the arrival of consultants for the many studies to be undertaken. The office unit was also to serve as the nucleus for the establishment of the new MIS. Further office equipment was procured for the new PEU contracted to aid the Social Safety Net Action Plan Prioritization and Implementation during the last quarter of 2006. All the equipment implemented successfully. The Ministry now has fully functional, small networked facility for collecting, storing, sharing and disseminating information.

• A consultant was recruited during the last quarter of 2006 to provide non-technical

Information Technology training to senior staff of the Ministry, for them to have a better understanding of the use of the Microsoft Office Suite package in addition to utilizing the technology more effectively and efficiently. This training is expected to continue the capacity building initiatives being undertaken by the Ministry to streamline its data management system.

Sub Component 2.2 Prepare Safety Net Options for Vulnerable Groups

Funding for the activity was re-allocated to other activities. The issue of sugar worker retrenchment did not advance sufficiently to warrant a study.

Sub Component 3.1 Strengthen the Bureau of Statistics Objective: Strengthen the Bureau’s capacity to provide timely and reliable economic, demographic and sectoral data. Component/Sub-component Status Observation (i) Strengthen the Bureau of Statistics (BOS) through improved processes, systems, training and IT capacity

3.1.1 Strengthen managerial and supervisory staff capabilities

Procured Senior Data Processing Specialist.

Completed.

3.1.2 Strengthen in-house research and analytical capabilities

Procured Junior Data Processing Specialist.

Completed.

3.1.3 Strengthen capabilities Re-allocated to support HBS Supported by IDB funded

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in publications, dissemination, outreach and media relations, with new technology and equipment

3.1.12. Social Statistics and Policy Analysis Project.

3.1.4 Develop statistics curriculum at University of Guyana

Re-allocated to support HBS 3.1.12.

Supported by IDB funded Social Statistics and Policy Analysis Project.

3.1.5 Senior management participation in short and medium term focused seminars, workshops and conferences and attachments

Chief Statistician and Senior Data Processing Specialist participated in several regional training workshops and seminars.

Completed.

3.1.6 Undertake structured training and program for junior staff

Re-allocated to support HBS 3.1.12.

Supported by IDB funded Social Statistics and Policy Analysis Project. Bank staff also provided training

3.1.7 Strengthening of IT capabilities (computer, hardware, software, servers, printers)

Procured IT Hardware, Software and communication links.

Completed.

3.1.8 Upgrade printing equipment

Re-allocated for disbursement to 3.1.7

3.1.9 Upgrade data-security measures


(ii) Improve the coverage, timeliness, quality, quantity and use of relevant survey data and statistical output

3.1.10 Train enumeration staff in the BOS survey department

Training completed under Census and Household Budget Surveys.

Completed.

3.1.11 Advise BOS on questionnaire design, sampling, and field operation

Training completed under Census and Household Budget Surveys.

Completed.

3.1.12 Assist BOS staff, in undertaking household survey field operation

Completed Household Budget Survey (HBS).

Completed.

3.1.13 Upgrade data management system


3.1.14 Train census enumerators

Training undertaken for Census

Completed.

Additional Sub-components* Training in census drill down and use of Poverty Mapping Software

Bank staff provided extensive training in census drill down and poverty map software use.

Completed. Supported by IDB.

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This component was addressing some institutional weaknesses of the BOS in the areas of human resources, skills development, and equipment, which seriously handicapped its delivery of quality statistical information services. Through the PSTAC, the managerial and supervisory capability of the BOS was strengthened with the recruitment of data specialists as well as sponsoring the participation of senior managers in several seminars, workshops and regional conferences abroad. In addition, the procurement of goods for the institutional strengthening of BOS was completed and IT and data security equipment and software were procured and installed successfully. Technical support and financial resources were also provided for the analysis of census data. Support staff in the form of Enumerators and Coders/Verifiers was contracted for a Household Expenditure and Income Survey. The Survey was completed successfully with some delay, attributable to the 2005 flood and access to remote districts. Delays were further exacerbated by severe power issues. Nevertheless, the data gathered is in the final stages of processing and is being analyzed as an input to the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) consultative process. Various BOS capacity building exercises in the form of training and workshops were targeted but its limited human resource capacity slowed this process. Some training was however undertaken to facilitate the Census and Household Budget Survey exercises. The successes in developing more robust statistical capacity are largely attributable to the initial investments made by the PSTAC. For deepening the capacities of the BOS and the social sector agencies, the IDB, UNDP and DFID are implementing a Social Statistics and Policy Analysis project. Needs assessments have been completed for all the social sector line ministries and agencies’, about 20 statisticians have been recruited, and training is being provided to statisticians, statistical officers, data entry operators and IT staff. Sub Component 3.2 Establish a Policy Coordination and Programme Management Unit (PCPMU) Objective: Establish a Policy Coordination and Program Management Unit to coordinate and manage 1) monitoring and evaluation 2) policy development 3) PSTAC project Component/Sub-component Status Observation (i) Develop analytic and policy making capacity in the PCPMU

3.2.13 Establish a Staff Policy Unit/ 2 analysts

Contracted Head of Policy Unit and an assistant.

Contracted an assistant under alternative funding.

(ii) Monitor and Evaluate PRSP, HIPC, PRSC implementation

3.2.3 Provide secretariat Procured IT and general Completed.

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support to M&E Steering Committee

office equipment.

3.2.4 Coordinator / M&E Economist

Contracted M&E Coordinator.

Partially Completed. Position eventually taken over by PCPMU Head.

3.2.5&6 Policy analyst provided to undertake M&E Coordination and create a network of focal points to execute timely and comprehensive M&E program

Funds re-allocated to support PRS Monitoring and Evaluation process.

3.2.7,8&9 Execute a communications program to promote broad-based learning and improvement of the government's poverty reduction policies and activities

Contracted Communications Specialist.

Partially Completed. Contribution was limited

3.2.12 Hire consultants to conduct trainings, evaluations, and expenditure tracking studies in key policy areas to strengthen ministry capacity for M&E and reporting to PCPMU

Contracted four M&E Officers to support PRS Monitoring and Evaluation process.

Completed.

(iii) Manage PSTAC implementation

3.2.1 Manage PSTAC implementation

Contracted PSTAC/PCPMU Coordinator.

Completed.

3.2.2 Provide PCPMU IT hardware

Procured IT Hardware, Software and communication links.

Completed.

3.2.10 Provide community development facilitators to pilot a capacity building program for community-level M&E of local PRSP activities and policy impacts

Contracted two Community Development Facilitators.

Partially Completed. Limited impact

3.2.11 Pilot a capacity building program for M&E of local PRSP activities and policy impacts

Provided training to PRS Regional Coordinators and established Regional Information Centres.

Partially Completed. Limited impact.

3.2.14 Audit PSTAC Funds re-allocated to support PRS Monitoring and Evaluation process.

The Auditor General performed the audit.

3.2.15&16 Provide staff for PSTAC procurement and

Contracted Procurement and Disbursement Officers.

Completed.

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disbursement 3.2.17&18 Provide secretarial support to PSTAC

Contracted Secretary and Driver to support PCPMU. Funds re-allocated to support PRS Monitoring and Evaluation process.

Funding provided by alternative sources for Secretary and Driver.

3.2.19 Material and Logistics

Procured IT Hardware, Software and general office equipment to support PSTAC implementation.

Completed.

Additional Sub-components* Recruit a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Specialist to provide Training and M&E technical support.

Contracted an M&E Specialist to provide long term support and build M&E capacity.

Partially Completed. Contract not completed by M&E Specialist

Recruit a Management Information Systems Consultant to design and implement a systems based M&E Solution.

Contracted a MIS Specialist to establish a systems based M&E solution.

Partially Completed. Contract not completed by MIS Specialist

Recruit a Website development specialist to re-design and publish the PRS Website.

Contracted a Web Developer to re-design and publish the PRS Website.

Completed.

The procurement of consultants for the PCPMU Secretariat was successfully completed in the first quarter of 2003. These persons remained throughout the project life. The Policy Unit had contracted only one individual from PSTAC funding. Alternative assistance was utilized to support the unit for a brief period. General office and Information Technology Equipment and Services were procured to support the work of the PCPMU Secretariat and the staff of the Policy and M&E Units. Within the M&E Unit, the Head and six M&E Officers were contracted in the second quarter of 2004 under UNDP and IADB contracts. However, their funding for this support was exhausted in 2006 and staff of the M&E Unit were reverted to PSTAC funding. The M&E unit had suffered serious setbacks in previous years. It lacked a comprehensive work program, a drill down monitoring system, and coordination of sector monitoring and evaluation programs. In recognition of these problems, the Government took several actions to improve monitoring and evaluation. It obtained a PHRD Grant for a Monitoring and Evaluation Institutional Assessment which was concluded in the first quarter of 2006. This study essentially was to provide the basis for a long-term consultancy to offer institutional support and capacity building in monitoring and evaluation.

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Following the assessment, a consultant was recruited in the latter half of 2006 and commenced a series of training sessions within several key Ministries including Health, Education, Housing and Water, and Agriculture. A training manual tailored to Guyana’s M&E needs was developed. The manual and other training materials are expected to be further refined and utilized by those that were trained to train others, in the M&E field and PRS cycle. The consultant also developed a systems based approach to M&E. Complementing the work program developed by the M&E Institutional Assessment, the terms of reference for developing a robust M&E systems approach were approved. The Government subsequently contracted a consultant to begin this activity in September of 2006 in tandem with the consultant recruited to provide capacity building and training services. The new system was delayed slightly to facilitate the procurement of required hardware and software. Training and implementation of the system across ministries and the M&E Unit at the PCPMU were scheduled for completion by end of 2007. The procurement of equipment in support of the ongoing works of the M&E strengthening and capacity building measures was carried out. The UNDP and UNICEF have agreed to provide continued support for the work already undertaken, including the procurement of further equipment for the Regional PRS Information Centres.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) Not Applicable

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending Chris Parel Task Team Leader LCSPS Vladimir T. Jadrijevic Sr. Procurement Specialist LCSPT Eduardo Brito Sr. Counsel LEGAF Camille Anne Nuamah Country Officer ECCAL Edward Daoud Sr. Financial Officer LOAFC Tracey M. Lane Public Sector Management AFTPZ Enzo de Laurentiis Sr. Procurement Specialist LCSPT Rajeev K. Swami Financial Management Officer ECSPS James Droop Country Coordinator Homa-Zahra Fotouhi Country Officer OPCFC Judy Baker Sr. Economist FEU Wolfgang Kohling Economist—YP PRMPS John Pollner Lead Financial Sector Specialist ECSPF Keith Mc Lein Social Development Economist ECSSD John Blomquist Sr. Economist MNSHD Haeduck Lee Sr. Economist DECDG Jamil Sopher Consultant – CFAA LCSFM Tania Hollestelle Language Program Assistant TFO Pilar Gonzalez Counsel LEGLA Juan Carlos Alvarez Counsel LEGLA

Supervision/ICR Saman Karunaratne Finance Analyst LOADM Emmanuel N. Njomo Consultant LCSFM Chris Parel Consultant LCSPS Luis Tineo Sr Procurement Spec. LCSPT Fanny Weiner Consultant LCSPS Enzo de Laurentiis Sr. Procurement Specialist LCSPT Yao Wottor Procurement Spec. LCSPT Ruxandra Burdescu ETC AFCRI Daniel Wallace Local Consultant John Pollner Lead Financial Officer ECSPF Haeduck Lee Senior Economist/Statistician DECDG Emmanuel Skoufias Lead Economist PRMPR Herman Nissenbaum Consultant LCSPS ICR Editor

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(b) Staff Time and Cost

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)Lending

FY02 30 104.78 FY03 37 117.89 FY04 0.26 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00

Total: 67 222.93

Supervision/ICR FY02 0.00 FY03 4 38.45 FY04 26 91.85 FY05 43 108.18 FY06 35 125.66 FY07 8 51.52 FY08 14.09 60.99

Total: 157.09 466.65

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any)

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) Not available

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Borrower: Cooperative Republic of Guyana Financer: International Development Association Project Name: Public Sector Technical Assistance Credit (PSTAC) 3726-GY Credit Amount: US $4.76 Mil. Date of Effectiveness: April 21, 2003 Date of Termination: July 12, 2007

Borrower Implementation Completion Report Background The Public Sector Technical Assistance Credit (PSTAC) project was strategically aligned to assist the Government of Guyana in building its capacity to meet the governance and poverty reduction objectives as set out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). In support of the implementation of the PRSP the International Development Association (IDA) agreed to provide a series of Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC) covering a broad range of policies. The PSTAC project was one such instrument aimed at supporting the PRSCs and whose focus was on two of the seven pillars that comprise of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), ie. (1) build stronger institutions and improve governance (2) improve safety nets. The project’s broadest objective like the PRSP and PRSC was to create suitable conditions for the reduction of poverty and promote sustained growth. Specifically, the project had three main focus areas. These were to:

• Strengthen Fiscal, Financial and Fiduciary oversight management • Improve the coverage and efficiency of social safety nets • Develop institutional capacity to manage, monitor, evaluate and improve HIPC,

PRSP, PRSC and PSTAC. Individually, the development objectives of these three main focus areas were to: (a) improve the accountability, transparency and efficiency of Guyana’s public sector as regards financial management, fiscal discipline and fiduciary arrangements; (b) complete a targeted diagnostic of existing social safety net programs to present options for institutional strengthening, and to identify possible solutions and interventions to address problems in key programs; (c) support the Government’s efforts to implement the strategy embodied in the PRSP and monitor and evaluate progress by improving the Government’s capacity to: generate and disseminate reliable data; involve communities in monitoring PRSP activities and impact; and build institutional capacity to undertake Government monitoring, evaluation and implementation of the PRSP and PSTAC. These objectives were not revised nor were the components.

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Throughout the PSTAC project design process the Government played a key role by supporting technical missions by the Bank to diagnose components and define and reform agendas and work programs. In conjunction, the activities associated with the HIPC, PRSP and PRSC were also continuously carried out. The Government agreed to address major policy, oversight and administrative reforms in essential fiduciary and fiscal agencies and activities affecting tax policy and tax and customs administration and procurement as well as agencies and parliamentary bodies within the Fiduciary Oversight component of the project. This established from the outset a clear commitment and willingness to take ownership on the part of the Government. Further, by establishing the project execution unit within the Office of the President it was felt that project execution would be swifter and the potential for achievement would be greater. Throughout the project this was realized with the recruitment of key and competent staff. The Bank also perceived that close supervision and technical support were going to be required prior to and during project execution to mitigate communications and implementation problems, and as such a technically qualified national was contracted out of the Bank’s local office. This proved to be extremely helpful in many instances during start-up and the initial year of the project. However, mention should be made here that the Bank should continue to recognize and safeguard against interference in Bank clients’ decision making processes as ownership of the project and its associated activities could be severely challenged and even outwardly compromised. Note should also be made here that at the same time collaboration with the Bank was open and friendly, supportive and instructive and the Country Representatives and Task managers were extremely helpful and patient. Ministries and other Government agencies and their officials associated with the activities of PSTAC were visited regularly throughout the project life to discuss the project and the implementation of their respective component activities. (Note: A summary of the PSTAC components and their results which was presented by the Borrower is contained in the Project’s files). Conclusion In conclusion, PSTAC provided key and critical support to the Government through strategic interventions ranging from provision of tangible benefits such as equipment to capacity building for numerous Government staff. Further, PSTAC was able to provide institutional strengthening to the Government in several key areas including Procurement, Statistics, Social Safety Nets, Tax Administration, Financial Management and Accountability (HR/Payroll), and Fiduciary Oversight. The project could not have been more timely and supported the launch of new reform activities and sustained the ongoing works of other donors. It also helped to realize new opportunities for additional financing for many of the important recommendations and outputs coming out of the various studies. The Government is pleased to acknowledge at this juncture the hard work and dedication of many Government officials, their staff, the project staff and consultants who played a key role in achieving such a high level of success.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N.A.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents World Bank (2007) Implementation Completion and Results Report, Guyana Poverty Reduction and Public Management Operation, Report No. ICR0000544 World Bank, (2007), Guyana Public Sector Technical Credit – Final Quality at Entry Assessment (QEA6) World Bank (2006), Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Second Annual Progress Report and Joint IDA/IMF Staff Assessment, Report No. 35759-GY World Bank (2006), Implementation Completion Report, Guyana Poverty Reduction Support Credit I (PRSC), Report No. 35463 World Bank (2004), Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Progress Report and Joint IDA/IMF Staff Assessment, Report No. 29617-GUA IDA/IMF (2003), Guyana Completion Point Document under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPIC) Initiatives World Bank, (2002), Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Joint IDA/IMF Staff Assessment, Report No. 24172-GUA World Bank (2002), Guyana Project Appraisal Document, Public Sector Technical Assistance Credit (PSTAC) Project Files, (2003-2007), Supervision Missions, Aide Memoires, PRSs, ISRs – Guyana Public Sector Technical Assistance Credit (PSTAC)

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Annex 11: PSTAC Monitoring Matrix

The following table was designed to enable the Bank team, as well as the Government and other external financing agencies, to have a common uniform perspective of the PSTAC program and its links with related activities of other donors. It seeks to show, at the level of the PSTAC components, the actions which the different parties took regarding the preparation of those components and, ultimately, their implementation. The maintenance and updating of this data proved to be a useful monitoring technique.

Component Background Work Linked to IFI Activity IFI Follow-On PSTAC

Implementation 1.1 GY Revenue Authority

IMF diagnosed Government Revenue Authority (GRA) operations and recommended possible activities, on which the PSTAC component was based

IDB/CARTAC to help strengthen GRA management and effect reform.

IMF/CARTAC study implemented by IDB loan

Two GRA officers initially funded to carry out reform

1.2 Procurement CPAR indicated need for new legal framework and administrative rules, standard bidding documents, procurement management and more skilled personnel HIPIC disbursement requirement enforced this.

None were cited in the PAD.

1DB agreed to support Government procurement committee, set a requirement for web posting of Government's procurement bidding actions; and also supported procurement training. PRPMO called for help in implementation of procurement reforms.

Consultants were retained for national procurement secretariat and for preparing regulations for the new procurement act. Preparations begun for first annual audit of Government procurement operations. IDA collaborated with 1DB in an integrated fiduciary analysis, covering procurement as well as financial management.

1.3 Fiduciary Oversight A CFAA and IMF study stated that the executive branch employed excessive discretion. Analysis also showed that Guyana's limited checks and balances provided inadequate oversight safeguards. Stronger national fiduciary capacity was recommended.

IDB to consider helping auditor general in its public sector modernization program. CIDA and DFID were expected to upgrade treasury management and accounting. It was assumed that future IDA-financed aid would reinforce these..

IDB conditioned its assistance to Guyana on a reform of the Standing Order system, which has been started. PRPMO supported first phase of Government fiduciary oversight strengthening program.

Government commissioned studies on more effective legislative oversight over public finances, reducing public officials' discretionary powers and expanded public disclosure of officials' assets. PSTAC added a new activity on reforming parliamentary standing order system, paralleling related 1DB assistance

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Component Background Work Linked to IFI Activity IFI Follow-On PSTAC Implementation

1.4 Integrated HR & Payroll Data Base

Bank assistance had helped to launch upgrading of Public Service Ministry's database, which indicated need for integration with Government's revised payroll system

IDB follow-up seen as possible.

IDB completed the initial partial rollout (which had been planned for Bank assistance), and extended it to ministries and agencies

IDB assumed the responsibility for planned PSTAC-supported work (installation of hardware/software for integrating the two systems; clearing their data and staff training).

1.5 Privatization Unit The Financial and Private Sector Development Credit helped the Government prepare for privatization of its National Cooperative Bank (GNCB). Further work was needed to finalize its sales agreement and transaction closure, as well as extending the Government's privatization unit (NICIL)

None None Support of NICIL staff

2.1 Strengthen Existing Social Safety Nets

Social sector, sugar industry and census studies, along with Government poverty reduction strategy paper, showed a need for improved poverty mitigation actions. Government's Ministry of Human Services (MHSLSSS) 13 safety net programs were found to have outdated and inefficient delivery, and suffered from institutional weaknesses.

IDB reported considering financing social action program.

PRPMO has helped Guyana build mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating poverty-related programs. It is also expected to help improve social conditions of the Amerindian population (Guyana's poorest) through upgrading natural resource development.

Implementation of automated management information system to Improve MHSLSSS management; creation of secretariat for the Ministry's social action program; plan designed for operations audit of MHSLSSS activities. Assisted completion of initial work on social action program.

2.2 Prepare Safety Net Options for Vulnerable Groups

Much work was done under the PRSC targeting sugar industry restructuring

Sugar industry reform was essentially dropped from the Bank's agenda and in fact did not really take place for political reasons.

A Norwegian Trust Fund profiled communities that might be affected by sugar industry restructuring

The sugar industry restructuring never happened and funds were reallocated.

3.1 Bureau of Statistics Bank had been assisting the BOS to strengthen its capacity and quality of its data output.

IDB reported working on other BOS support.

Others' actual activity: IDB social statistics loan assumed some of Bank planned help, and provided other assistance.

Supported completion of Guyana's 2007 census and household income and expenditure survey; preparation of poverty report.

3.2 Policy Coordination and programme Management Unit

Government and donors agreed on need for a technical unit able to effectively monitor, evaluate and help implement the PRSP.

IDB planned collaboration on monitoring and evaluation work.

Others' actual activity: IDB funded improvement of M&E-related systems. Other donors collaborated too in examination of how the Government should structure M&E work.

PSTAC Activity: Bank helped finance Government's technical unit, and advised it on M& E requirements and organization.