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Illinois Wesleyan UniversityDigital Commons @ IWU
Honors Projects History Department
2015
Defying the United States: General DouglasMacArthurLuke G. MuellerIllinois Wesleyan University, [email protected]
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and FacultyDevelopment, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU bythe faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact [email protected].©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended CitationMueller, Luke G., "Defying the United States: General Douglas MacArthur" (2015). Honors Projects. Paper 52.http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/history_honproj/52
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Defying the United States—General Douglas MacArthur
By: Luke Mueller Honors Research Project
April 24, 2015
2
General Douglas MacArthur has long been considered one of the premiere
military generals in United States history. Although recent scholarship has
scrutinized his failures1, he has maintained a renowned reputation. His father,
General Arthur MacArthur, famously told him, “There are times when a truly
remarkable soldier must resort to unorthodox behavior, disobeying his superiors to
gain the greater glory.”2 Consequently, Douglas MacArthur established his
reputation by disobeying direct orders. These incidents in many ways defined and
although made him controversial also helped to make him famous. MacArthur’s
defiance began during his stint as a cadet at West Point, one of the U.S. Military
Academies. This paper focuses on MacArthur’s defiant behavior throughout his
career, ultimately ending with his infamous confrontation with President Harry S.
Truman. It argues that MacArthur only escaped reprimand through his
overwhelming public support and military brilliance. Ultimately, MacArthur was
destroyed when his defiance became a threat to U.S. democracy and world peace
and perhaps the survival of humanity.
MacArthur’s defiance of authority prompted President Franklin Roosevelt,
after winning the presidential election in 1932, to reference him in a conversation
with economist Rexford G. Tugwell: “’You said Huey [Long] was the second most
dangerous person, didn’t you?’ he asked. ‘Did I hear it the way you said it.” Roosevelt
replied, “’You heard right,’ he said. ‘Huey is only second. The first is Douglas
1 Schaller, Michael. Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General. (Oxford University Press, New York, 1989). 2 Manchester, William. American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-‐1964. (Back Ray Books, New York, 19780: 16.
3
MacArthur.’” 3 To Roosevelt’s recollection, Douglas MacArthur was the most
dangerous man in America, over Louisiana Senator Huey Long, * which displays the
potential threat MacArthur could place on U.S. policy and security. Roosevelt
reasoned that MacArthur’s extreme disregard for authority put him, as well as the
United States, in perilous situations that had the potential to alter not only World
War II, but also United States history. After analyzing General Douglas MacArthur’s
career, it is troubling that a man who consistently disregarded orders from superior
officers accomplished and sustained such success in a rigid and structural military
setting.
MacArthur’s actions throughout the first half of the 20th century elevated him
to being considered one of the top United States military commanders of the
century. Accordingly, much scholarship has been produced relating to his many
exploits. Journalist William Manchester wrote a national bestselling biography
praising MacArthur—American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-‐1964.
Furthermore, Geoffrey Perret wrote a biography entitled Old Soldiers Never Die: The
Life of Douglas MacArthur, which not only faults MacArthur at appropriate times, but
also praises him.4 In The Most Dangerous Man In America, Mark Perry concentrated
on MacArthur’s actions following Franklin Roosevelt’s election to Presidency in
1932. Seymour Morris Jr. who decided to focus on MacArthur’s position as the 3 Perry, Mark. The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur. (Basic Books, New York, 2014): Prologue xi. * Huey Long was a politician and served as Governor of Louisiana from 1928 to 1932. He was a Democrat, very outspoken and willing to take forceful action. He is best known for his Share Our Wealth program and planned to run for president in 1936 before being assassinated in 1935. See: 4 Perret, Geoffrey. Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur. (Adams Media Corporation, Holbrook, MA, 1996).
4
commander of the occupation of Japan following World War II, wrote Supreme
Commander: MacArthur’s Triumph In Japan.5 Michael Schaller wrote a biography,
Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General, which focused on MacArthur’s career
in the Far East.6 Historians such as Michael Schaller exploit his defiance as a critique
and degrade his achievements, yet minimize certain examples of his military
brilliance. Michael D. Pearlman’s book, Truman-‐MacArthur: Policy, Politics, And The
Hunger For Honor And Renown, was entirely devoted to the Truman-‐MacArthur
debates during the Korean War.7 These biographies are able to utilize many sources
of information in order to typically provide both sides of MacArthur’s character.
Historians offer several different theories as to why MacArthur continually
disregarded direct orders from his superiors, but generally focus on one or two
episodes rather than his entire career. I contend that MacArthur defied his superiors
due to the fact that his superiors lacked front-‐line combat experience. Essentially,
MacArthur trusted his own brilliance and continually utilized his experiences from
combat to make his own tactical decision instead of following the orders of
inexperienced general and presidents (e.g. George C. Marshal, Dwight Eisenhower,
Herbert Hoover, Roosevelt, and Truman). While Truman did see combat in World
War I, he was a reservist, which placed a natural animosity between himself and a
West Point professional.
5 Morris, Seymour, Jr. Supreme Commander: MacArthur’s Triumph in Japan. (HarperCollins Publishers, New York, NY, 2014). 6 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 5. 7 Pearlman, Michael D. Truman-‐MacArthur: Policy, Politics, And The Hunger For Honor And Renown. (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 2008).
5
Recently historians have examined MacArthur’s psychological state that
could have contributed to his continual defiance of authority. While there is not
enough evidence to definitively conclude that he had Narcissistic Personality
Disorder (NPD), he does exhibit several traits and symptoms. The rudimentary
symptoms of NPD include “a pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, and a lack
of empathy.”8 However, it also can include fantasies with unlimited power and
brilliance, a belief that the person is special and unique and can only be understood
by other special people, is often envious, displays arrogant attitude, and is
interpersonally exploitative. 9 MacArthur displays most of these traits and although
the author is not qualified to make a diagnosis, it is quite possible that he had NPD.
Furthermore, MacArthur’s continual reward for disobeying orders, in the form of
medals or popular praise, served to increase the likelihood of that defiance
continuing and growing in intensity.
West Point (1899-‐1903)
In order to understand MacArthur’s supposed inherently defiant nature that
made him ”the most dangerous man in America,” it is necessary to understand that
his insubordinate actions began as a cadet, from 1899 to 1903. Schaller described
early 20th century West Point as “an anachronistic shrine most notable for outdated
military instruction, brutal hazing, and an archaic curriculum.”10 According to
Manchester, there were hundreds of hazing techniques, but most notable were
“scalding steam baths, ‘crawling’ (being insulted by an upperclassman whose jaw 8 Diagnostic And Statistical Manual Of Mental Disorders: DSM-‐5 Fifth Edition. (American Psychiatric Publishing, Washington, D.C., 2013): 345. 9 DSM-‐5, 369-‐370. 10 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 5.
6
was one inch from the plebe’s nose), ‘bracing’ (standing at rigid attention for long
periods of time), ‘dipping’ (push-‐ups), ‘eagling’ (deep knee bends over broken glass)
. . .”11 MacArthur endured hazing to an extreme that, in one case, his legs convulsed
after ”eagling.” In 1900, when cadet Oscar L. Booz died of tuberculosis that was
attributed to the hazing he suffered as a plebe, West Point garnered national
attention.12 This incident prompted President William McKinley and the War
Department to order a special court inquiry by West Point and eventually a separate
Congressional inquiry to investigate the extent of the hazing. The committee
summoned MacArthur to testify as a key witness, as well as name the cadets who
had hazed him. However, “if he did as ordered, he would incur the scorn of the
entire corps. Yet if he refused to obey, he could be dismissed from West Point.”13
Although MacArthur himself claimed in his Reminiscences that he did not provide
any names, he did give the names of the cadets who had previously admitted guilt
(or were already expelled) and declined to give the names demanded of him.14
MacArthur’s refusal to incriminate cadets who had not confessed demonstrated his
inherently defiant nature that characterized him to a great extent and enhanced his
willingness to defy orders in the future while also cementing his reputation as one
who would place his colleagues ahead of his military duty.
Shortly following the Committee hearings on hazing, MacArthur captured
attention again for defying the wishes of Lieutenant Colonel Wright P. Edgerton, a 11 Manchester, American Caesar, 51. 12 “Military Board hears Testimony at Bristol and Philadelphia: Physician Says Alleged Treatment of the Cadet Might Have Made Him More Susceptible to Disease. New York Time, December 18, 1900. 13 Perret, Old Soldiers, 36. 14 Ibid.
7
mathematics instructor at West Point. Due to an illness, MacArthur repeatedly
missed weekly tests in mathematics during his second year at West Point. Typically,
to avoid failing out of the course, students, referred to as “goats,” received a special
examination. Upon seeing his name on the list of “goats,” MacArthur “went to see the
instructor and pointed out that the grades he had scored on those math tests he had
taken were so high that in effect, he already had a passing grade.” Although
MacArthur omitted this incident in his Reminiscences, mostly due to the fact he
focused more on his actual military career, Geoffrey Perret claimed MacArthur
threatened to resign from West Point when MacArthur stated, “I know it is an order,
but it is an unreasonable one. If my name is not removed from that list by nine
o’clock tomorrow morning, I will resign.”15
Ultimately Lieutenant Colonel Edgerton removed Douglas’ name from the list
of “goats.” During his career at West Point, MacArthur “achieved the highest rank
available to him—senior corporal as a yearling, senior first sergeant as a second
classman, and, as a first classman, the crowning glory: first captain, like Lee and
Pershing before him,” so it is easy to deduce that MacArthur had the potential to
pass the “goat” test with ease.16 Because MacArthur often flouted the rules as well as
orders during his time at West Point, it is not surprising that he defied superior
officers during combat, which occurred during the Veracruz operation in 1914.
Veracruz 1914
In September of 1913, General MacArthur served as a member of the General
Staff, which planned and prepared the U.S. Army for war; this position allowed 15 Perret, Old Soldiers, 43. 16 Ibid., 54.
8
MacArthur to serve closely with the Army Chief of Staff—Leonard Wood. Merely
weeks after the election of President Woodrow Wilson in 1912, General Victoriano
Huerta seized control of the Mexican government and committed countless
atrocities in the process.17 Furthermore, U.S. ambassador Henry Lane Wilson aided
Huerta in the murder of the President, at the time, Francisco Modero. In response,
President Wilson refused to recognize the Huerta regime, and in October 1913, sent
a naval squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher to the
Tampico and Veracruz ports. Within months, several disputes occurred that,
although seemed minor, threatened war. On April 21, 1914, American sailors and
Marines seized and occupied the city of Veracruz. 18
Two weeks after the initial Veracruz incident, the General Staff ordered a
small expeditionary force, commanded by Major General Frederick Funston, to
Veracruz and, if necessary, a field army under the command of General Wood was to
follow.19 General Wood planned to mirror the strategy employed by General
Winfield Scott in 1848—lead his army from Veracruz to Mexico City in order to
“conquer a peace.”20 Wood sent then Captain Douglas MacArthur to Veracruz in
order to “observe and report on all matters that might be useful to General Wood
17Perret, Old Soldiers, 68-‐69. 18 The standard work on Veracruz is Quirk, Robert E. An Affair of Honor! Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz. (Ley, KY, 1982). Quirk does not mention the incident of MacArthur, leading one to conclude it is of relatively little importance. Ryan, Paul B. “Ten Days at Veracruz” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute 98, No. 6, 1972: 65. MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. (McGraw-‐Hill Book Company, New York, 1964): 40. 19 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 40. 20 Perret, Old Soldiers, 69.
9
and the War Department.”21 While there, Captain MacArthur quickly discovered the
lack of transportation, which is vital to sustaining military success. Although
severely lacking in animal and automobile transportation, Veracruz had an
abundance of railcars; however, there were no locomotives to operate them. Due to
the fact that American railroad engines operate on a different size gauge, it was
useless to ship U.S. locomotives to Veracruz. Determined to prevent a war, Funston
was under orders by Wilson to restrict anyone from conducting reconnaissance
behind Mexican lines.22
However, MacArthur understood that the key to the success of any military
conflict in Mexico depended on finding the locomotives, and he proposed the idea of
a personal reconnaissance mission to Captain Constant Cordier, in order to discover
the location of the locomotives. MacArthur’s idea eventually reached General
Funston’s aide, Captain William G. Ball, as well as Captain W.A. Burnside. According
to MacArthur’s Reminiscences, he did not approach General Funston; but “Major
Alexander Dade of the cavalry, whom I had known since childhood, advised against
the plan.” MacArthur believed his instructions from General Wood and the War
Department permitted him to scout behind Mexican lines, regardless of the fact that
General Funston and men under his command were prohibited from such actions.
According to MacArthur’s memorandum, notes of what occurred read as follows: “I
crossed our line unseen . . . . We reached Alvarado shortly after one o’clock and there
found five engines . . . . I made a careful inspection of them and then started back.”23
21 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 40. 22 Perret, Old Soldiers, 70. 23 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 40-‐42.
10
On his return trip, MacArthur and his few Mexican aides, were attacked and forced
to kill several of Huerta’s soldiers. Although General Wood recommended
MacArthur for the Medal of Honor, “an awards board rejected the recommendation
on the ground that since Funston had not known about the reconnaissance,
decorating Captain MacArthur ‘might encourage any other staff officer, under
similar conditions, to ignore the local commander, possibly interfering with the
latter’s plans with reference to the enemy.”24
While it can be debated whether or not MacArthur’s actions were
permissible according to Wood’s orders, junior officers have an obligation to inform
local commanders of their potential actions—especially actions that occurred
behind enemy lines. The fact that MacArthur was recommended for the Medal of
Honor, an award he yearned for in order to live up to his father’s reputation, served
to reinforce his defiant nature. MacArthur incensed at hearing the decision from the
awards board, wrote a memorandum to the new Chief of Staff, Major General Hugh
L. Scott, and claimed the board was too narrow minded and severely lacked
imagination.25 This memorandum is quintessential of MacArthur’s insubordinate
behavior, which only occurred with more and more severity as his military career
grew.
During World War I MacArthur remained defiant, yet became one of the most
decorated soldiers in the United States Military. He won Seven Silver Stars, two
Croix de guerre’s, two Distinguished Service Cross’s, and a Distinguished Service
Medal along with several Wound Chevrons while fighting in World War I. Beginning 24 Manchester, American Caesar, 76. 25 Perret, Old Soldiers, 72.
11
the war as Chief of Staff of the 42nd Rainbow Division with the rank of Colonel,
MacArthur ended the war as a Brigadier General. Due to his many successes in
World War I, his popularity started to increase in the U.S. Following World War I,
MacArthur became superintendent of West Point from 1919-‐1922. In this role,
MacArthur implemented several radical changes that were rapidly discarded. These
changes included dancing as a part of the curriculum, abolishing summer camp,
requiring instructors to spend a month each year teaching at a civilian college, and
dropping the standards of appearance.26 His radical intentions to reform the
traditional West Point curriculum display his affinity to defy his superiors, most of
whom were all educated on traditional West Point standards and objected to these
new reforms Although he claimed these changes were necessary in order to adapt
West Point to the 20th century, none of his reforms stayed in place after he left.
Between 1922-‐1925 MacArthur spent several years in the Philippines and was
promoted to Major General on January 17, 1925. MacArthur then commanded IV
Corps Area, based in Fort McPherson, Georgia and in 1927 he was appointed as
President of the American Olympic Committee. In 1929 MacArthur commanded the
Philippine Department, but was appointed to Chief of Staff on November 21, 1930,
where he became famous for his disobedience during the Bonus Expeditionary
March in 1932.
The Bonus Expeditionary Force 1932
As a result of the global economic depression of the early 1930s,
26 Perret, Old Soldiers, 118-‐119.
12
Americans experienced drastic levels of hardship forcing them to request aid from
the national government. The legend of the so-‐called Bonus Expeditionary Force
(BEF) and the battle of the Anacostia Flats are well known and were a direct
consequence of the Great Depression.27 However, the BEF movement’s roots stem
back to 1924 when, against the wishes of President Calvin Coolidge, Congress issued
roughly 3.5 million Adjusted Compensation Certificates to veterans of World War I,
which amounted to nearly one thousand dollars, payable in 1945 or on the death of
the holder.28 Due to the widespread Depression and harsh economic times, many
veterans requested the money before 1945. Consequently, in 1932 when Democrat
Representative Wright Patman of Texas introduced a bill to pay veterans a cash
bonus, thousands of veterans flocked to Washington D.C. to pressure the passage of
the bill.29
By mid-‐June, the BEF had nearly 15,000 members encamped on U.S.
government property—in Anacostia as well as along Pennsylvania Avenue in
buildings scheduled to be razed. Although the bill passed the House of
Representatives (211-‐176), the Senate rejected the bill by a wide margin on June 17,
1932. The Bonus Marchers, awaiting the reconsideration of the bill, remained in the
city and increased their pressure on the government by marching around the
Capitol. On July 16, Congress adjourned until December, which resulted in
thousands of marchers returning home. However, nearly 10,000 Bonus marchers 27 Roger, Daniels. The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression. (Greenwood Publishing Company, Westport, Connecticut, 1971). Paul, Dickson. The Bonus Army: An American Epic. (Walker & Co. New York, 2004). 28 Perret, Old Soldiers, 155. 29 Price, John W. “The Army Evicts The Bonus Marchers,” Military Review 51, no. 5 (1971): 57.
13
stayed in Washington in order to continue their pressure group tactics. To make
room for a new building, the Treasury Department decided to demolish several of
the “residences” of the BEF located on government property. After a brief battle
with insurance companies, the government decided “to evict the Bonus Marchers—
not merely from these buildings, but from all other Government property . . .”30
Government officials sent out eviction notices in the morning of July 28 and
proceeded to clear government property immediately thereafter.
An altercation broke out between local authorities and a small group of
marchers who reclaimed one of the buildings that had been previously evacuated.
Pelham D. Glassford, the superintendent of police, took charge of the situation, but
protestors struck him with a brick and attacked the authorities, resulting in the
hospitalization of Glassford and five policemen. Merely two hours after that, a
second outbreak of violence occurred which prompted a protest of 5,000
marchers.31 It was at that point, according to MacArthur’s Reminiscences, that the
Army “defused the situation.”32
Secretary of War, Patrick J. Hurley, ordered Army Chief of Staff, General
Douglas MacArthur, to “have United States troops proceed immediately to the scene
of the disorder . . . . Surround the affected area and clear it without delay.”33 Against
the advice of his aides, predominantly Dwight Eisenhower, MacArthur took
command of the situation personally and refused to delegate the task to a
30 Price, “The Army,” 57-‐59. 31 Perret, Old Soldiers, 157. 32 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 94. 33 Ibid.
14
subordinate.34 The ensuing action, according to MacArthur and verified by
historians, was relatively peaceful, and by 9:30 P.M. authorities had cleared the area
up to the Anacostia flats. The Army did employ tear gas, but the BEF retreated
across Pennsylvania Avenue and retired to its camp. At this point, MacArthur
received word from Hurley to suspend operations at his discretion.35
There are multiple accounts of the battle of the Anacostia flats and the event
has remained unclear to scholars today. In his own autobiography, MacArthur
omitted the battle, which adds to the confusing situation. President Hoover realized
an engagement against the main BEF encampment located on the other side of the
Anacostia River would reflect badly, so he “sent duplicate orders, via two officers,
forbidding troops to cross the Eleventh Street Bridge.” However, MacArthur, directly
insubordinate, “led his men across, and the tents, shacks, lean-‐tos and packing
crates which had sheltered the bonus marchers and their families were put to the
torch.” In the battle, the Army inadvertently killed two infants and bayoneted a
seven-‐year-‐old boy through the leg; this should have resulted in severe
consequences for those involved, but did not. The incident altogether would have
been avoided had MacArthur obeyed the orders of his superior President Hoover. 36
Scholars and historians who often praise MacArthur, including Manchester
and Cornelius Ryan, are incapable of defending his actions during the clearing of the
BEF. However, Geoffrey Perret came to an alternative theory that actually, if true,
may exonerate MacArthur’s name. According to Perret, the orders Hoover sent to
34 Manchester, American Caesar, 150. 35 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 95. 36 Manchester, American Caesar, 152.
15
MacArthur never reached him. Hoover ordered Secretary of War Hurley to forbid
troops from crossing the Eleventh Street Bridge, which cannot be disputed. Hurley,
following the chain of command, sent Assistant Chief of Staff George Van Horn
Moseley to deliver the message to MacArthur.37 While historians often accept
Moseley’s statement in his memoirs, that he delivered the orders to MacArthur,
whom then deliberately violated orders in an act of clear insubordination—the
truth may be more obscure. In Perret’s alternative theory, he claimed Moseley
defied orders and refused to deliver the message to MacArthur. First-‐hand accounts
from Dwight Eisenhower, F. Trubee Davidson, and General Perry L. Miles
corroborate Perret’s theory.38 Although it is difficult to believe scholars such as
William Manchester and Cornelius Ryan would omit such evidence from their
biographies, the testimonies of Eisenhower, Davidson, and Miles shed new light on
the issue and may partially shield MacArthur from criticism.
Regardless, the importance of the situation and the risk of repeated violence
compelled President Hoover to order Patrick Hurley to send another message to
MacArthur. Orders only reached MacArthur due to the fact that he had by this time
agreed to give the BEF enough time to evacuate the women and children prior to the
clearing of the camps. Patrick Hurley gave the message to a Colonel to deliver to
MacArthur, but “ Moseley told him to ‘get lost.’ The Colonel took three hours to
travel less than three miles. By the time he arrived at the Anacostia bridge, the
soldiers . . . were moving out.”39 Receiving the message, MacArthur sent word that it
37 Perret, Old Soldiers, 158. 38 Ibid., 160. 39 Ibid.
16
was too late to suspend operations. While Perret argues that the Colonel’s delay
excuses MacArthur’s behavior, it is hard to defend MacArthur when he received
orders not to cross the bridge, yet did so regardless. Even though Perret justified
MacArthur’s insubordinate actions, MacArthur was still clearly disobedient. He
received orders to suspend operations, but in an act of defiance, crossed the bridge
and cleared the main BEF camp on the Anacostia flats.
Naturally, there was much criticism of how the government handled the
situation; however, MacArthur subdued the situation by holding a late night press
conference in which he received support from his staunch Republican allies. Holding
this press conference before Hoover could act rescued him from disciplinary
procedures. Understanding that Republicans approved of his show of strength,
MacArthur disclaimed responsibility and praised Hoover’s actions.40 MacArthur’s
memoirs demonstrate this:
If President Hoover had not acted when he did he would have been faced with a serious situation. Another week might have meant that the government was in peril. He had reached the end of an extraordinary patience and had gone to the very limit to avoid friction before using force. Had the President not acted when he did he would have been derelict in his duty.41
The New York Times confirms MacArthur’s synopsis of the press conference.42
Hoover would have lost even more public and political support had he disciplined
MacArthur for insubordination. By stating Hoover rescued the government from a
potentially perilous situation, MacArthur forced the President to accept his account.
40 Manchester, American Caesar, 152. 41 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 95. 42 “MacArthur Declares Hoover Had To Act: Another Week’s Delay Might Have Imperiled Government, General Declares,” New York Times, July 29, 1932.
17
This is largely due to the fact that Hoover had terribly low approval ratings and
needed good press to have a chance at defeating Franklin Roosevelt in the
November election. MacArthur’s nighttime press statement forced Hoover into
supporting his insubordinate actions. Although openly disobedient and
insubordinate, MacArthur maintained his position as Chief of Staff and escaped
disciplinary actions due to not only his political maneuvering, but also through the
use of national support via the press conference. By holding the press conference
and connecting with the mass majority of citizens, MacArthur not only limited
Hoover’s ability to respond to the situation, but also secured his own growing role in
the U.S. military and American politics.
Defense of the Philippines: 1941-‐1942
In 1935, Douglas MacArthur resigned as Chief of Staff of the Army and retired
to Manila, still a U.S. colony. He became a military advisor, with the rank of Field
Marshal, to the newly formed Philippine national government. However, Franklin
Roosevelt recalled MacArthur to active duty on July 26, 1941 as war loomed and
placed him in charge of American and Filipino forces in the Philippines making him
the overall commander when the Japanese invaded—December 8, 1941. Although
MacArthur’s defense of the Philippine islands can be considered lacking, the
American defenders, who resisted Japanese attacks for five months, lasted much
longer than the British and Dutch in Indonesia and Malaysia. Regardless of how the
lengthened defense changed the Japanese battle plan, the defense transformed
MacArthur into “the first American hero of the war.”43 Yet, throughout the defense
43 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 56.
18
of the Philippines, MacArthur consistently defied and disobeyed orders from his
superiors. America’s need for a hero to support and to improve morale, both
domestically and abroad, saved MacArthur from citations for insubordination and
possibly even replacement.
The Japanese enjoyed overwhelming success during the initial day of the
invasion of the Philippine Islands resulting in the destruction of MacArthur’s air
force at Clark Field, which has often led to much criticism among academic circles.44
MacArthur discovered the U.S. declared war on Japan at 5:30 AM on December 8.
Consequently the War Department instructed him via radiogram to implement
rainbow Five immediately, yet he hesitated.45 Instead of acting on reliable
information from Washington, MacArthur closed himself off in his office and
communicated with his men via his Chief of Staff General Richard Sutherland.46 Air
Force Chief General Brereton requested permission to launch a B-‐17 strike against
Formosa (Taiwan), which complied with the Rainbow Five plan, yet MacArthur did
nothing; he did not give permission until nine hours after the Pearl Harbor attack.47
To compound the issue, MacArthur’s strategy for the defense of the Philippines
called for the destruction of the Japanese invasion fleet barges before they reached
the beaches, so it is curious as to why MacArthur’s air force remained on the
ground.48
44 Manchester, American Caesar, 207-‐208. 45 Ibid., 208. 46 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 56. 47 Ibid., 160 48 Manchester, American Caesar, 207.
19
Due to MacArthur’s clear defiance of not only his own defense plan, but also
the United States’ Rainbow Five, the Japanese destroyed his air force on December
8. It was not until 11 AM that MacArthur authorized bombing missions—roughly
nine hours after initially hearing about the attack on Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately for
the Allied forces in the Philippines, Brereton recalled all of his P-‐40s to refuel,
leaving Clark Field without adequate fighter protection. Following the Japanese
attack, “Clark was unrecognizable. All the hangars had been demolished. The parked
aircraft had been reduced to tortured, charred skeletons, and a black, roiling pillar
of oily smoke, towering into the sky, was visible as far away as Manila.”49 The
destruction of the U.S. Air Force on the Philippine islands severely hampered
MacArthur’s ability to withstand a Japanese invasion. While it is likely the
Philippines would have fallen nevertheless, American defenses, potentially, could
have held out much longer than five months. Regardless of the fact that MacArthur,
in Reminiscences, denied that General Brereton requested these bombing missions,
he still failed to implement Rainbow Five as well as his defense plan for the
Philippines. Military historians consistently point out MacArthur’s drastic failure on
December 8, so it is curious as to why MacArthur was able to retain command of his
Pacific forces if he was wholly unsuccessful.
Furthermore, MacArthur continued to disobey orders openly throughout the
entire Japanese siege of the Philippines. For example, MacArthur cabled the War
Department to convince Russia to enter the Pacific War. While diplomatic leaders
endorsed this plan, they failed to realize that MacArthur severely crossed the line
49 Manchester, American Caesar, 212.
20
separating military and civilian authority.50 This act is crucial because, from this
episode until his dismissal, MacArthur continually affected U.S. diplomatic relations.
However, Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to return to Australia to take charge of the
situation in order to direct the Pacific War. Even though MacArthur threatened to
resign his commission, the general inevitably left the Philippines on March 11, 1942.
Upon reaching Australia, MacArthur released a press statement, against the advice
from the Office of War Information, in which he vowed to return and liberate the
Philippine Islands.
Throughout MacArthur’s defense of the Philippines, MacArthur, ironically,
became a symbol of national resistance and continued to gain mass support
domestically. George Kenney, a U.S. Army Air Forces general, observed, “The battle
of Luzon stands out like a beacon of hope in comparison with the incredible debacle
at Singapore, the easy fall of the Dutch East Indies, and the confusion in
Washington.”51 Furthermore, a “MacArthur craze” swept over America during the
defense of the Philippines, which caused anti-‐Roosevelt Republicans to magnify the
achievements of MacArthur. These Republicans frequently assailed Roosevelt for
rescuing the British and Russians, while leaving MacArthur to fight alone, despite
the fact that the Allies were dedicated to defeating Nazi Germany first and Japan
later.52
When MacArthur retreated to Australia in March of 1942, there were few, if
any, Allied victories. American troops were just beginning to arrive in Africa, and
50 Manchester, American Caesar, 214. 51 Ibid., 235. 52 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 61.
21
Pacific operations had not yet taken place, as the Japanese had an overwhelming
control over the vast Pacific region. Morale for the Allies, especially America, was at
an all-‐time low. To combat this issue, Roosevelt awarded MacArthur the Medal of
Honor—an award he yearned for to match his father’s reputation. However as
Michael Schaller states, “Two years later when asked to sign a special citation for the
medal, Roosevelt claimed he could not recall what heroism the award was actually
based on.”53 This is because Roosevelt awarded the medal to boost morale; he gave
it to him to provide the United States with a hero figure to support. MacArthur
proved he was one of the few Allied generals capable, not of defeating the Japanese,
but of stalling them. Therefore, he provided a chance to improve morale. So while he
was directly insubordinate to superiors, MacArthur was able not only to retain his
command, but also won the Congressional Medal of Honor to improve the fragile
Allied morale. It was at this point that MacArthur began to gain massive amounts of
domestic support that only grew throughout his re-‐conquest of the Philippines.
Re-‐taking the Philippines: 1944-‐1945
MacArthur’s insubordination and defiance littered his campaign to liberate
the Filipino people from Japanese oppression. MacArthur admitted in his memoirs
that “The Philippine Islands had constituted the main objective of my planning from
the time of my departure from Corregidor in March 1942 . . . . I regarded this
strategic archipelago as the keystone of Japan’s captured island empire . . .”54 This
was because, by seizing the Philippine Islands, the U.S. effectively cut the Japanese
access to oil, which is the lifeblood of a modern military. Furthermore, the 53 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 61. 54 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 209.
22
Philippines lay directly in the middle of the main sea route to and from Japan from
the resource rich Indies, Malaya, and Indo-‐China. Thus, taking the Philippines also
limited Japanese production capabilities.55
MacArthur’s plan for re-‐taking the Philippines was entitled “Reno,” and he
selected the island of Mindanao as the initial tactical objective. According to
MacArthur, “The advance would be made by a combination of airborne and
seaborne operations, always supported by the full power of land-‐based aviation, and
assisted by the fleet operating in the open reaches of the Pacific.” “Reno” called for
troops to move across the enemy’s lightly guarded defense line, allowing them to
bypass more heavily defended areas. Operation “Reno”, later changed to “Musketeer
II,” set November 15, 1944, as the date for the operations in southern Mindanao and
December 20, 1944, at Leyte Gulf. Essentially the strategic plan called for “The
prompt seizure of the Central Luzon area to destroy the principal garrison,
command organization and logistic support of hostile defense against Japan.”56
However, air reconnaissance discovered serious weaknesses in Japanese air
defense over Leyte in mid-‐September, causing Admiral Halsey to suggest a change in
strategy—to seize Leyte immediately.57 MacArthur approved Halsey’s proposal, and
soon they had permission from superiors to move up the invasion date for Leyte by
two months to October 20. The invasion of Leyte included four phases:
Phase one covered minor preliminary landings to secure the small islands lying across the entrance to Leyte Gulf. Phase two included the main amphibious assaults on Leyte from Dulag to Tacloban, and called for the seizure of the airstrip, an advance through Leyte Valley, and the opening of
55 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 209. 56 Ibid. 210-‐211 57 Ibid., 211.
23
San Juanico and Panaon Straits. The third phase consisted of the necessary overland and shore-‐to-‐shore operations to complete the capture of Leyte and the seizure of southern Sama. Phase four contemplated the occupation of the remainder of Samar and the further neutralization of enemy positions in the Visayas.58
MacArthur’s defiant nature emerged even before the invasion occurred. On October
19, MacArthur, aboard his flagship Nashvile, ordered all his officers to wear steel
helmets and to take atabrine tablets to protect against malaria. However, in typical
MacArthur fashion, he never took the atabrine tablets himself.59 While it is not an
act of insubordination per say, it does demonstrate willingness to take unnecessary
risks.
The liberation of the Philippines took far longer than initially expected.
Although MacArthur declared imminent victory in Leyte on October 29, 1944, heavy
fighting remained on the islands until the Japanese surrendered in March 1945.60
This is proven during the mopping-‐up operations on Leyte, which occurred from
November 1944 to the beginning of March 1945, and resulted in the killing of
27,000 Japanese soldiers. Once Leyte was in relative American control, MacArthur
aimed at seizing Mindoro: an island three hundred miles from the Leyte Gulf.
However, the Pentagon had advised the General that the operation was “too daring
in scope, too risky in execution.”61 However, by this time MacArthur began to ignore
cables from Washington. MacArthur’s complete disregard of cables from
Washington shows his utter contempt for the War Department.
58 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 214. 59 Manchester, American Caesar, 384. 60 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 96. 61 Manchester, American Caesar, 405.
24
After taking Leyte and Mindoro from the Japanese, MacArthur now needed to
seize control of Luzon, which he invaded on January 9, 1945. Although he intended
to re-‐take Manila and Clark Field before his sixty-‐fifth birthday on January 26,
General Yamashita’s war of attrition prevented this. American forces entered Manila
on February 5, which prompted a Japanese rampage against the citizens and
civilians of Manila. When the fighting ceased in Manila, on March 3, almost the
entirety of the capital lay in ruins.62 It was not until July 4, roughly five weeks before
Japan’s ultimate surrender that MacArthur announced the official end of the
Philippine campaign.63
One of the more intriguing actions of MacArthur occurred after the Yalta
Conference in 1945, where the U.S. secured Russian participation in the Pacific War.
During this conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the British, without consulting
MacArthur, that the U.S. had no plans to re-‐take the rest of the Philippines; however,
without informing the JCS of his intentions, MacArthur planned and executed more
than a dozen amphibious operations in the central and southern Philippines.64 The
JCS gave MacArthur wide latitude to a point. He had no specific directives for any
operations subsequent to Luzon. This has led Manchester to conclude that
MacArthur was directly challenging the JCS’s authority. As Manchester notes in
reference to the Korean War, “It is little wonder that this same commander less than
six years later would act with insolence towards his superiors in Washington.”65
62 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 197. 63 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 259. 64 Manchester, American Caesar, 428-‐429. 65 Ibid.
25
MacArthur’s disobedience plagued his defense of the Philippines, as well as
his campaign to re-‐take the islands. It continues to puzzle military historians as to
how MacArthur was able to keep his command. During the Philippines, it was a
combination of factors. While his defense of the archipelago is at times confusing,
his forces did hold out much longer than any other allied unit. Therefore, his
superiors could not fire one of the few generals who showed promise to defeat or at
least limit Japanese advances. Furthermore, because MacArthur sustained such
success in the Philippines his national support never decreased. During the re-‐
taking of the Philippines, MacArthur continued to garner national attention and his
public support grew. Additionally, following the death of Franklin Roosevelt,
President Truman left tactical decisions in the Philippines up to MacArthur because
the islands received a low priority. MacArthur’s defiant and insubordinate behavior
continued and grew while on post in Japan during the American Occupation.
However, considering this paper is focused on his military career and his clear acts
of defiance to superior officers, it seems best to include only his major acts of
defiance.
Occupation of Japan: 1945-‐1950
MacArthur entered Japan on August 30, 1945 amidst the complete
devastation of not only every city, but also the entirety of Japanese infrastructure.
After accepting the Japanese surrender aboard the battleship Missouri, MacArthur
became the supreme commander and “virtual ruler of seventy million people.”66 The
U.S. government as well as MacArthur immediately set out to rebuild Japan through
66 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 121.
26
reforms. After the demobilization, the United States and MacArthur planned to
rebuild industry. Referring to the building of industry, Army Secretary Royall stated
in January 1948 that further destruction of industry would leave Japan vulnerable to
aggression. In response, MacArthur “established a Holding Company Liquidation
Commission (HCLC), which promptly designated over three hundred firms,
possessing more than half of the nation’s industrial and commercial strength, as
‘excessive concentrations of economic power’ and targets for dissolution.”67
MacArthur’s reforms here were in direct opposition to U.S. policy for the occupation
of Japan. However, because Truman feared MacArthur’s impact on the 1948
election, he did nothing to reprimand him for going against the stated U.S. policy.
Furthermore, from 1948-‐1950, MacArthur consistently criticized orders and
delayed their implementation.68 Although this is not a serious breach of the chain of
command, it still was insubordination and potentially caused him to defy orders
again not only during the occupation of Japan, but also in the Korean War.
Furthermore, MacArthur’s popularity was steadily decreasing throughout the entire
occupation of Japan and it was not until his success at Inchon in the Korean War that
he regained his enormous support.
MacArthur consistently disobeyed orders from President Truman and
altered U.S. economic and political policy in the region, much like he unsuccessfully
tried to do during the Korean War. Because Truman never reprimanded him for
altering U.S. policy during his time as Supreme Commander, MacArthur’s
67 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 149-‐155. 68 Ibid.
27
insubordinate behavior only increased during the Korean War until it reached a
crux and Truman finally relieved him of command.
The War in Korea: 1950-‐1952
The Korean War was MacArthur’s last post as a military commander. It was
not until the Korean War that his disobedience threatened U.S. policy, which
resulted in his dismissal. MacArthur’s actions and aims in Korea can be defended to
a point, it cannot be denied that he threatened the policy of the Truman
administration, regardless of the debate about the effectiveness of this policy. The
Truman administration succumbed to a policy of limited war in Asia during this
time and greatly constricted MacArthur’s military effectiveness.69
As in the Philippines, MacArthur’s insubordination during Korea was
tolerated due to his military successes and brilliance in the face of adverse
situations. On Sunday, June 25, 1950, a duty-‐officer at MacArthur’s headquarters in
Japan informed the general of the North Koreans crossing the 38th parallel en masse
and overwhelming South Korean defensive posts.70 The Soviet-‐trained North
Korean army, equipped with modern weapons from the Soviets, easily routed South
Korean forces because the State Department, trying to prevent South Korea from
invading the north, equipped them with light weapons and no air or naval force.71
Prior to approval from Washington, MacArthur dispatched a shipload of munitions
69 Brune, Lester., ed. The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and Research (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1996). Alexander, Bevin. Korea: The First War We Lost. (Hippocrene, New York, 1986). Bernstein, Barton J. “The Truman Administration and the Korean War.” The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989: 410-‐444. 70 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 327. 71 Ibid., 328.
28
under air cover to South Korea.72 While MacArthur insisted that ordering this
shipment of munitions to Korea was the correct military maneuver, he did not
follow the command structure or wait for approval from JCS. Within days of the
attack, the United Nations issued a statement essentially allowing the U.S. to “render
every assistance” to the South Koreans militarily. Washington then ordered
MacArthur to direct the U.S. Seventh Fleet to Formosa and prevent any Nationalist
attack on the mainland and defend the island from Communist attack.73 This
directive by Washington alarmed China and resulted in two Chinese Armies to be
moved to the border of Korea and China and be used in the Chinese intervention
later in the Korean War.
After visiting Seoul, MacArthur realized that he could only save South Korea
with the immediate commitment of U.S. ground forces into the region. So he directed
his soldiers into Korea to try to halt the North Korean advance. The JCS, on June 30,
1950, authorized the use of American ground forces to hold the port of Pusan and
additionally permitted MacArthur to extend air operations north of the 38th parallel.
However, MacArthur had, hours before, ordered the attack of airfields north of the
38th parallel; once again stretching the powers of his command.74 MacArthur’s
primary objective was to slow down the advance by putting his troops in piecemeal
and bluffing the North Korean commander into thinking a much more substantial
American force was in Korea than there actually was. The city of Pusan became the
root of the U.S. defensive line in Korea. By the time the North Korean commander
72 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 184. 73 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 331. 74 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 189.
29
realized MacArthur’s deception, the Eighth Army under General Walton Walker was
already in place in Pusan. MacArthur cabled Washington requesting massive
reinforcements on July 7, 1950 in order to strike behind the enemy’s lines in an
amphibious operation.75 Although MacArthur repeated this request twice,
Washington refused and thus began the dialect of hostility between Washington and
MacArthur during the Korean War. By July 20, 1950 MacArthur began to prepare for
an offensive with the invasion of the port-‐city of Inchon.
Before discussing MacArthur’s brilliance at the port of Inchon, his message to
the Veterans of Foreign Wars needs to be addressed. On August 17, 1950, the
President of the VFW invited MacArthur to send a message to be read at their
annual encampment. The letter, according to MacArthur, “expressed my personal
opinion of the strategic importance of Formosa and its relation to our defensive
position in the Pacific.” Furthermore, MacArthur stated, “It was in complete support
of the President’s announced policy toward Formosa.” However, a week after
sending the message, MacArthur received a directive from President Truman telling
him to withdraw the message due to the fact that it was in conflict with the policy of
the United States, which was dedicated to maintaining peace in Formosa by
preventing Chiang Kai-‐Shek’s Nationalist forces from attacking Communist China
and vice-‐versa. This prompted MacArthur to re-‐examine the letter.76 MacArthur
claimed through the rest of his life that the letter was in complete support of the
President. However, Truman correctly and conclusively pointed out that the letter
was in fact in direct contrast to U.S. policy. According to Truman, MacArthur 75 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 335-‐337. 76 Ibid., 341.
30
advocated a policy of military aggression based on Formosa’s strategic location.77
Furthermore, Truman argued the letter was “at odds with my announcement of June
27, and it also contradicted what I had told Congress.”78 U.S. policy regarding the Far
East attempted to reduce the area of conflict, but MacArthur’s letter suggested
otherwise and promoted further military build-‐up.
Michael Schaller argued that the letter told the world that America has “an
uncontrollable military commander,” as well as a desire to have a base in Formosa.79
William Manchester solved the debate by claiming that Truman essentially had two
different policies—a domestic one and United Nations one. Furthermore, he argued
that MacArthur, in this instance, “was a casualty of rough politics, a loser in a game
whose rules he never mastered.”80 Regardless, the letter almost pushed Truman into
relieving MacArthur, but, due to his massive public support, doing so would set off a
major political firestorm in the U.S.81 MacArthur would have been relieved if it had
not been for Truman’s fear of the political backlash of curbing MacArthur’s
authority. These events left MacArthur increasingly resentful of his superiors in
Washington, and Truman’s reluctance to reprimand MacArthur served to encourage
his defiance. Additionally, his outright disagreement for stated U.S. policy only
continued and increased until his dismissal.
With the Pusan perimeter stable, MacArthur now decided for a decisive
attack aimed at the rear of the North Korean lines. This tactical decision, if rendered 77 Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope Volume 2. (Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1956): 354. 78 Ibid., 355. 79 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 197. 80 Manchester, American Caesar, 570. 81 Ibid, 569.
31
successful, would effectively sever North Korean supply lines and encircle all enemy
forces south of Seoul. MacArthur controversially chose the port of Inchon as the
location for this amphibious landing. After MacArthur cabled Washington informing
them of his operation planned for mid-‐September, 1950, he received much caution
against the location. On August 23, 1950, MacArthur called a strategic conference in
Tokyo to debate the issue, with Army Chief of Staff General Joseph L. Collins and
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest P. Sherman in attendance. There were
several problems with choosing Inchon as the site for the landing, all of which were
pointed out by high-‐ranking military officials at this meeting.
A naval briefing staff argued that two elements—tide and terrain—made a landing at Inchon extremely hazardous. . . . Even under the most favorable conditions ‘Flying Fish Channel’ was narrow and winding. Not only did it make a perfect location for enemy mines, but any ship sunk at a particularly vulnerable point could block the channel to all other ships. . . . Within two hours after high tide most of the assault craft would be wallowing in the ooze of Inchon’s mud banks, sitting ducks for Communist shore batteries. . . . In effect, the amphibious forces would have only about two hours in the morning for the complex job of reducing or effectively neutralizing Wolmi-‐do. . .
Furthermore, General Collins presented his arguments next; he argued the invasion
of Inchon would take Marines from the Pusan perimeter, thus endangering the
defensive line. Additionally, he proposed an alternate landing site at Kunsan, which
was much further south of Inchon and had much less difficulty associated with it.82
Omar Bradley and President Truman were primarily against the plan due to these
excessive risks. Bradley concluded, “Inchon was probably the worst possible place
ever selected for an amphibious landing. . . . I had to agree that it was the riskiest
82 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 346-‐349.
32
military proposal I had ever heard of.”83 Furthermore, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson reflected these risks in his memoirs. Although he never stated outright that
he opposed Inchon, he made it clear that there were excessive and unnecessary
hazards involved.84 To MacArthur, all of these seeming impossibilities provided him
with an opportunity to seize the element of surprise, and he argued effectively to
maintain the Inchon operation.
Despite its reluctance, the JCS approved MacArthur’s Inchon operation for
September 15, 1950. Similar to re-‐taking the Philippines in World War II, where
MacArthur essentially destroyed Japanese supply routes, the “seizure of Inchon and
Seoul will cut the enemy’s supply line and seal off the entire southern peninsula. . .
.”85 By landing at Inchon and quickly seizing Seoul, MacArthur could effectively
destroy North Korean supply lines. Although MacArthur received a letter from the
JCS on September 8, 1950 that expressed doubt over the Inchon operation and
suggested a delay, the invasion remained on schedule. This letter, doubting
MacArthur’s operation, increased his resentment towards the Truman
administration.86
The invasion of Inchon demonstrated MacArthur’s absolute tactical
brilliance. It enhanced his reputation domestically as well as globally. At 8 AM on the
morning of September 15, MacArthur received a note updating him on the situation:
“the first wave of Marines have landed and secured a beachhead without a single 83 Bradley, Omar N. A General’s Life: An Autobiography By General Of The Army. (Simon And Schuster, New York, 1983): 544. 84 Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, New York, New York, 1969): 579-‐580. 85 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 350. 86 Ibid., 350-‐352.
33
fatality.”87 Within two days, on September 17, 1950, Marines seized Kimpo Airfield
near Seoul. During the initial landings at Inchon, MacArthur discovered that the
North Koreans had started to construct massive fortifications to be completed
within a month. Had he listened to his superiors and delayed the Inchon operation,
MacArthur’s forces would have been slaughtered on the beaches.88 This reinforced
his egotistical nature and further enhanced his willingness to defy orders and advice
from his superiors in Washington. MacArthur ordered to the prompt seizure of the
South Korean capital city—Seoul. Within days, September 28, 1950, MacArthur’s
forces cleared Seoul of enemy troops. MacArthur’s success at Inchon was
remarkable; in “ninety-‐six hours half of the In Min Gun, fifty thousand soldiers, was
trapped between MacArthur’s two gigantic pincers . . . . MacArthur had freed all of
South Korea of Communist domination in fifteen days.”89 MacArthur immediately
started the process to reinstate the South Korean government, which had been
kicked off the peninsula when the North Koreans invaded.90
As in the Philippines five years earlier, MacArthur intended to turn Seoul
over to the South Korean government ceremoniously, so he informed the Pentagon
of his intentions. The Truman administration replied to MacArthur’s intentions by
advising him that any plans to restore President Rhee must have prior approval of
higher authority. MacArthur instantly replied by saying, “Your message is not
understood. . . . Such action is not only very much desired by the American
87 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 353. 88 Ibid. 89 Manchester, American Caesar, 381. 90 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 354.
34
Ambassador and all others concerned, but appears to be implicit in my directives.”91
He consequently ignored the order to obtain prior approval and ordered that Seoul
be formally restored to the South Korean government on September 29, 1950. This
act of outright defiance demonstrated MacArthur’s growing resentment towards his
superiors and specifically Truman. While MacArthur may have believed his actions
were justified, the fact remains that he disobeyed direct orders and it was obvious
that he was out of control—incapable of following orders.
With South Korea in solid U.S. control, the decision to cross the 38th parallel
into North Korea loomed. Three factors influenced this decision: the actions of the
Soviet Union and Communist China, members of the United Nations, and the risk of
general war. The National Security Council recommended the crossing of the 38th
parallel so long as there “was no indication or threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese
Communist elements in force. . . . However, no ground operations were to take place
north of the 38th parallel in the event of Soviet or Chinese Communist entry.92 On
September 27, Washington provided MacArthur permission to cross into North
Korean territory to conduct military operations. However, Washington gave him
several restrictions: “he was forbidden to send aircraft over Sino-‐Russian territory,
and only ROK troops could approach the Yalu.”93 Truman specifically said, “As a
matter of policy, no non-‐Korean ground forces were to be used in the provinces
bordering on the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.”94
91 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 355. 92 Truman, Memoirs, 359. 93 Manchester, American Caesar, 584. 94 Truman, Memoirs, 360.
35
On October 1, 1950, MacArthur’s forces crossed the 38th parallel into North
Korean territory and pressed rapidly forward toward Pyongyang, while the X Corps
landed at Wonsan. By mid-‐October, MacArthur’s forces approached the line that
only South Korean troops could cross. Chinese intervention in the Korean War has
been significantly debated academically. While MacArthur is often blamed for not
seeing the massive build-‐up of Chinese troops, he did not accept the premise that a
nuclear war was unwarranted or that Korea was a diversion to tie down U.S. forces,
leaving Europe exposed.95 The fall of Pyongyang, on October 20, 1950, symbolized
the complete defeat of North Korea, “leaving only a type of guerrilla warfare in its
place.”96
Wake Island Conference: October 13-‐17, 1950
With evidence of a slight Chinese troop movement toward the Yalu, Truman
demanded a face-‐to-‐face meeting with MacArthur, at Wake Island. Truman arrived
on Wake Island to meet MacArthur on the morning of October 15. Truman and
MacArthur discussed many aspects of Far East policy including Formosa, Chinese
and Soviet intervention in Korea, Japan, North Korean Prisoners, and the overall war
in Korea.97 The entire purpose of this meeting was to ensure complete
understanding of U.S. foreign policy between MacArthur and the Truman
administration. After the Wake Island meeting, while speaking in an Opera House in
San Francisco on October 17, 1950, Truman outlined U.S. policy in Korea to the
press:
95 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 359-‐364. 96 Ibid. 97 Truman, Memoirs, 365-‐367.
36
Our sole purpose in Korea is to establish peace and independence. Our troops will stay there only so long as they are needed by the United Nations for that purpose. We seek no territory or special privilege in Korea or anywhere else. We have no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place in the Far East or elsewhere. And I want that to be perfectly clear to the whole world.98
Truman very bluntly told MacArthur during the Wake Island Conference not to
provoke the Chinese and Soviet Union into a general war.99
Merely mopping-‐up operations remained in Korea, and on October 24, 1950,
MacArthur violated orders once again and sent American units along the Chinese
border because he believed that ROK troops were ineffective.100 Truman pointed out
this defiance of authority by saying, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed
MacArthur that in his advance north he should not place non-‐Korean elements near
the Manchurian and Soviet borders. But in his order to his commanders the general
provided for the drive to the north to be spearheaded by American units.”101 While
this was obviously an act of total disobedience and insubordination, the JCS again
dropped the issue.
Retreat: Winter 1950-‐1951
By the end of October, 1950 Chinese Communist forces were already engaged
in Korea and had fought against United Nations forces.102 According to MacArthur,
had Washington let him fight without restrictions, the Chinese may have been
slaughtered, and their effect on the war severely limited. First, he claimed
Washington limited the use of MacArthur’s Air Force by forbidding “hot pursuit of
98 Truman, Memoirs, 369 99 Ibid., 399. 100 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 207. 101 Truman, Memoirs, 372. 102 Ibid.
37
enemy planes that attacked our own. . . . denied the right to bomb the hydroelectric
plants in North Korea. . . . refusal to let me bomb the important supply center at
Racin. . . “ While these directives may have been the right strategic decision to
decrease the odds of Chinese and Soviet intervention, it displayed Washington’s
intent to limit the war. Only to be countermanded by Secretary George Marshall,
MacArthur “ordered General Stratemeyer to employ ninety B-‐29’s on the following
morning to destroy the Yalu bridges and cut this easy line of communication
between Manchuria and North Korea, over which large armies of Chinese Reds
could swarm.”103 MacArthur later remarked: “The order not to bomb the Yalu
bridges was the most indefensible and ill-‐conceived decision ever forced on a field
commander in our nation’s history.”104 However, the Truman administration
doubted, from an operational standpoint, “whether the results to be achieved would
be important enough to outweigh the danger of bombing Antung or other points on
the Manchurian side of the river.”105 Truman later reminisced about the discovery of
a highly secret report in which a Russian diplomat claimed the Soviet Air Force
would retaliate in force if United Nations forces bombed Manchurian airfields.106
MacArthur’s insistence on expanding operations by bombing targets near or in
foreign territory demonstrates his outright disobedience to the Truman
administration and desire to create a general all-‐out war, which contradicted U.S.
policy.
103 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 365-‐368. 104 Ibid., 372. 105 Truman, Memoirs, 374. 106 Ibid., 394.
38
MacArthur’s troops occupied positions near the Yalu approaching the
Manchurian border when, on November 27, 1950, massive numbers of Chinese
troops commanded by Lin Piao invaded Korea.107 These attacks forced the Eighth
Army to make a rapid withdrawal and the X Corps under General Almond to retreat
towards Wonsan. It soon became clear that the present forces in Korea did not have
the strength to meet the new attack; MacArthur switched to the defense and
ordered his troops to retreat. China’s intervention forced Washington to change its
war policy from the entire unification of Korea to consider evacuating MacArthur’s
entire army. By early January 1951, the lines of U.S. forces had been stabilized and
the Chinese supply lines were far overextended. Surprisingly, “MacArthur’s Korean
retreat was one of his most successful feat of arms. . . . And the price the Chinese had
paid for the ground yielded to them was shocking.”108 While MacArthur’s successful
retreat allowed him to maintain command, his insistence on speaking his mind to
the press to demand a change in U.S. policy led to his relief.
MacArthur’s Dismissal: April 11, 1951
Washington debated what to do in Korea during the winter of 1950-‐1951,
and it finally decided to essentially settle for a tie—38th parallel. However,
MacArthur consistently requested permission to widen the scope of the war in a
series of letters and cables to the Truman administration and complained openly to
107 Manchester, American Caesar, 607-‐608. 108 Ibid., 611.
39
the press throughout January 1951.109 This was in direct violation to a directive
issued on December 6, 1950, which instructed civil and military officials to clear
policy pronouncements with the State and Defense Departments and to avoid
communicating opinions directly to the press.110
Additionally, Truman believed, “we should not allow the action in Korea to
extend into a general war. All-‐out military action against China had to be avoided, if
for no other reason than because it was a gigantic booby-‐trap.” The Truman
administration never allowed the Korean War to alter U.S. foreign policy. It knew
the designs and goals of Soviet policy and knew that “in our age, Europe, with its
millions of skilled workmen, with its factories and transportation network, is still
the key to world peace.”111 Had the U.S. widened the war in Korea to an all-‐out war
against China, Soviet forces, which enjoyed a 10-‐1 military man-‐power advantage,
could have easily steam-‐rolled through all of Europe and the U.S. would have been
defenseless to stop them. Basically, as Truman later maintained, “If we became
preoccupied in Asia, Russia would gain a free hand in Europe.”112 Although
MacArthur may have believed he was protecting U.S. interests by attempting to
widen the war in Korea, he was wrong, as far as the Truman administration was
concerned.
109 Ibid., 621-‐624. Higgins, Trumbull. Korea and the Fall of MacArthur: A Prêcis in Limited War. (Oxford University Press, New York, 1960). Spanier, John W. The Truman MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. (Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1959). 110 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 218. 111 Truman, Memoirs, 378-‐380. 112 Ibid., 398.
40
MacArthur’s continual defiance of not accepting national policy and
advocating aggression in Korea was the primary reason as for his dismissal. By mid-‐
March 1951, MacArthur had retaken Seoul and reached the 38th parallel.113 At this
point, the debate over whether or not to cross the 38th parallel renewed itself.
Washington decided on “the idea of holding a defensible line somewhere on the
peninsula and then negotiating an armistice or orderly withdrawal.”114 To
MacArthur, this was the same as surrender. On March 24, MacArthur issued his final
statement as a commander, which led to his dismissal. MacArthur, referring to the
38th parallel, stated, “Our naval and air forces cross it at will and both ground forces
have done so in the past.”115 In addition, he declared,
Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items necessary to the conduct of modern war . . . . Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset the vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies . . . . Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea . . . . Within the area of my authority as the military commander, however, it would be needless to say that I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander-‐in-‐chief of enemy forces in the earnest effort to find any military means . . . of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea . . .116
Essentially, MacArthur, in his statement, threatened Communist China with an
ultimatum and inferred that if they did not comply the full use of Allied power
would be brought upon them. These statements not only violated the authority of
the December 6 order, but also defied the official policy of the United States.
113 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 384. 114 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 217. 115 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 388. 116 Truman, Memoirs, 440-‐441.
41
MacArthur’s insubordination reached a breaking point. Truman perceived
these statements as an act of total insubordination, rightfully so. In his memoirs he
wrote, “It was an act totally disregarding all directives to abstain from any
declaration on foreign policy. It was in open defiance of my orders as president and
as Commander in Chief. This was a challenge to the authority of the President under
the Constitution. It also flouted the policy of the United Nations.” It was by this act,
Truman admitted, that he no longer could tolerate MacArthur’s insubordination.117
Although Truman had thus already decided to relieve MacArthur of
command before April, on April 5 another incident of disobedience occurred, which
served to cement MacArthur’s fate. MacArthur wrote a letter on March 20, 1951,
replying to Representative Joseph W. Martin, the minority leader in the U.S. House at
the time. In this letter, MacArthur directly challenged the policy of the U.S.
government and United Nations. He wrote, “Here in Asia is where the Communist
conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest . . . ; if we lose this
war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable . . . . There is no substitute
for victory.”118 MacArthur’s letter to Martin contradicted U.S. policy to limit the war.
To Truman, this letter showed that MacArthur was not only in disagreement with
the policy of the U.S., but also he challenged this policy through open
insubordination to the President. At a news conference at 1 a.m. on April 11, 1951,
Truman announced the relief of General MacArthur by stating, “I have concluded
that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his whole-‐hearted
support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in 117 Truman, Memoirs, 442. 118 Ibid., 442-‐445.
42
matters pertaining to his official duties.” In MacArthur’s place, Truman appointed
General Matthew Ridgeway. Furthermore, Truman explained the relief of MacArthur
by saying to a radio audience, “The Free nations . . . have united their strength in an
effort to prevent a third world war.”119MacArthur advocated an all-‐out war; he
planned to widen the war, which was in direct opposition to the official policies of
the United States. Reacting to MacArthur’s view, Bradley stated, “this strategy would
involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the
wrong enemy.”120 MacArthur’s incessant and continual defiance of policy threatened
U.S. security and world peace.
MacArthur simply could not understand why the Truman administration
desired to fight a limited war. Molded to be a soldier from youth, MacArthur fought
every war with the belief that it was a full-‐scale war—to win and completely defeat
the enemy. This is why he had such trouble accepting the Truman administration’s
policy regarding Korea. His long career of insubordination and disobedience
without facing disciplinary actions enhanced his willingness to defy his superiors. It
is not surprising therefore that MacArthur defied and disobeyed several orders not
only from his superiors in Washington, but also President Truman. Due to a
MacArthur’s threat to peace, Truman relieved MacArthur of command.
Although support for Truman has been steadily growing since the late 1960s,
his public support decreased as a result of MacArthur’s dismissal. While MacArthur
was welcomed back to the U.S. as a hero;121 Truman was harshly criticized and
119 Truman, Memoirs, 446-‐450. 120 Bradley, General’s Life, 640. 121 Manchester, American Caesar, 678-‐680.
43
never had enough support to run in the next presidential election. The Truman-‐
MacArthur controversy killed Truman’s political career. Furthermore, MacArthur’s
attempt to continually alter stated U.S. policy against the wishes of the President
marked the first time in U.S. history that civilian oversight over military affairs,
which is essential to maintaining a secure democracy and is explicitly stated in the
U.S. constitution, was threatened. Due to MacArthur’s actions, nobody has
threatened civilian oversight of the military since, which demonstrates how close he
pushed the U.S. to an all-‐out war. Ultimately, Truman was correct and the public
eventually realized that he saved the U.S. from getting involved in another world
war and possibly nuclear annihilation.
General Douglas MacArthur continually defied orders from superior officers
throughout his military career. This behavioral trend began as a cadet at West Point
in 1899 and continued until his ultimate dismissal from command in 1951. His
insubordination not only defined him as well as his career, but also helped to make
him famous. Because he consistently escaped reprimand due to his strategic
brilliance and domestic support his defiant actions only increased in intensity and
scope, as did his role in U.S. affairs. Ultimately, his ability to escape reprimand
served to reinforce his willingness to repeat his defiant behavior. MacArthur was
not dismissed from command until he threatened not only U.S. policy in the Korean
War, but also threatened the security and democracy of the United States.
44
Epilogue: 1951-‐1964
MacArthur’s return to the U.S. was a triumphant affair. Millions of Americans
applauded him.122 Manchester describes his yearlong drive across the country by
stating,
He crisscrossed the United States in a one-‐man drive to arouse the country to what he regarded as its peril. Invitations from mayors and governors had been accumulating in his suite since the night he had reached the hotel. At first he agreed to visit six cities, then eleven states; in the end the Great Homecoming, as the MacArthur’s called it, took them to Chicago, Milwaukee, Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, Houston, San Antonio, Evanston, Fort Worth, Miami, Los Angeles, Little Rock, Seattle, Norfolk, Austin, Natchez, Lansing, Dallas, Murfreesboro, Manchester, New Hampshire, and Portland, Oregon. Had he yielded to the appeals of all the communities that wanted him to come, he would have remained in perpetual motion.123
Throughout his cross-‐country tour MacArthur gave volatile political speeches
denouncing Truman by claiming a communist influence played a role in the past
direction of the public administration. However, with each swipe at Truman,
MacArthur’s support decreased.124 MacArthur briefly attempted win the 1952
Republican presidential nomination, but quickly lost to Eisenhower. Following the
election of Eisenhower, MacArthur never again played any type role in U.S. affairs
mainly because U.S. policy hereafter revolved around limited wars. Within one year,
a year that began with an absolute overwhelming amount of public support,
MacArthur was not even invited to San Francisco for the signing of the Japanese
peace treaty.125
122 Manchester, American Caesar, 678. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid., 679. 125 Ibid., 688-‐690.
45
After 1952, MacArthur retired to the board of Remington Rand (later Sperry
Rand), and became a banquet speaker. He never lost his zeal to speak out against his
superiors or defending his defiant behavior.126 The public, however, and the
historians who came after judge him more harshly, as one who succumbed to his
own hubris.
126 Manchester, American Caesar, 692.
46
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