Defining Terrorism at the Macro, Meso, and Micro Levels

By: Damian Niolet

The statements of the author contained in this report do not reflect the views of the USAF.

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INTRODUCTION

In order to write this paper, I felt I needed to wrap my mind around the totality of the BSI

415 curriculum. In order to wrap my mind around the totality of the curriculum, I needed to

build a visual representation of all that was discussed during class. This I have done. Said visual

representation can be found in Appendix 1. There are numerous inferences that I can draw from

this particular chart, each of which carry implications at the various levels of consideration for

policymakers and analysts alike within the Intelligence Community (IC). That is, the chart pro-

vides insights on the act of “defining terrorism” on the Macro, Meso, and Micro levels of analy-

sis within the IC.

Within each section below, I am first going to focus on the purpose for defining terrorism

at that level. More often than not, it is important to understand why an action is being carried out

before carrying it out, at least, that is, if you wish to carry the action out optimally. At all levels,

the overarching goal is to proactively prevent terrorism, but within each level, that goal takes a

different form. I will then emphasize one key point from the class lectures that stood out as most

vital for success at that level, supporting my assertion with various sub-arguments. As you will

see, each level can feed the effectiveness of the level next to it. The Macro can feed the Meso,

which can feed the Micro and vice versa. This symbiotic relationship is important for overall

success in the stated task. You will also notice that there is a common theme throughout, which

is: “truth is relative.” What exactly that statement entails will be articulated within each section.

MACRO

It seems to me that the purpose for proactively defining terrorism at this level must be

strategic in nature and therefore must be focused on understanding WHY terrorist choose to

commit terrorist acts. Breaking this out further, acts are the result of some motive, so we want to

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understand what drives a terrorist’s motives. Ultimately, we want to understand these things so

that we can intervene, and possibly “rewrite the narrative,” or the story that potential terrorists

buy into. In order to understand motives and driving forces within people, we have to use tools

meant for that very task, namely psychological and sociological theories on human development

and behavior. Here, we are concerned with how individuals create self identity, group identity,

and ultimately their world views.

What stands out as being most critical for success at this level is allowing “them” to de-

fine themselves for us. Our obtaining a copy of AQAP’s Inspire Magazine is the best chance we

will ever get at truly understanding the motives and driving forces of the most prolific terrorist

organizations of today, that can be discussed here. We covered, during discussions, numerous

sets of theories regarding human development and behavior, which find their roots in either psy-

chology or sociology. There are several reasons why such theories are ineffectual for achieving

success at this level. I will explain those reasons in separate paragraphs below.

First, but not foremost, no single theory can account for the myriad of factors that influ-

ence the growth of individuals. Psychological theories, such as Maslow’s needs paradigm, Erik-

son’s 8 stages, or Freud’s psychosexual development, leave several gaps in an analysis, and

worse, are wholly inadequate for analyzing some people.1 Sociological theories, such as Tajfel’s

Social Identity Theory (SIT) focuses so heavily on interaction with others that it seems individu-

als do not make decisions on their own, but at some point they must.2 Only when all of these

theories are utilized in conjunction with each other can an analyst hope to glean any incite into

human development and behavior. As Appendix 1 shows, this is a daunting task, but as Cronin

1 You need only ask a female how applicable Freud's theories are to her personally to see just how inap-plicable his theories can be to a vast majority of people. Erikson’s theory presumes an established ratio-nality and morality exists in humanity that just is not accurate. Maslow’s needs are very structured, hu-man behavior often is not. 2 People have original thoughts, made completely apart from any group they may be affiliated with; for example, people have “gut” feelings all the time, a sense deep within that prompts action.

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suggested, a necessary one. Not only should analysts consider the totality of the individual, but

the organizations and state they belong to, as well as the international atmosphere.3 An analyst

does not stand a chance at appropriately plotting the typical path a terrorist takes through such a

maze of theories, space, and time.

Second, an analyst may as well not even begin to utilize such theories for proactively

defining terrorism or identifying terrorists because the process is doomed from the start. Defini-

tions demand some semblance of underlying truth. It is not ideal to use theories to come to a de-

finitive conclusions. Such theories as were covered in class are not “absolute” truths, which

blanket all of humanity whether humanity knows it or not; they are merely theories, based on

trends that their creators witnessed, which they witnessed only from their perspectives as well-

off, white men. To a certain degree, theories that seek to define people will be used by people to

define themselves and their world views. For example, Astrology seeks to define people by their

signs; people in turn use Astrology to define themselves. I do not believe that terrorists of the

past have been too concerned with Maslow, Erikson, Freud, or Tajfel.

Third, and foremost, we cannot hope to successfully proactively define terrorism because

“truth is relative.” This point is similar to the one made above. Maslow, Erikson, Freud, nor

Tajfel are appropriate for the task (proactive prevention) because they produced biased theories.

But, even if a potential terrorist was exposed to the theories of one or more of these men and be-

gan using the theories as a basis for defining themselves and their world view, we still could not

possibly hope to predict their every action, thus, preventing any future terrorist acts, because the

issue of perspective still exists. We can never fully walk in their shoes. Their interpretation of

the theories may stray far and away from the original as the theories are morphed in accordance

with their cultural contexts. They will create a truth apart from the truth that was intended.

3 Taken from the “Tactics, Targets,Waves, Theory & the Religious Aspect” Lecture and Slides.

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Even though “truth is relative,” really, it is only relative to some, just depending on what

side one stands. Despite the relativity of truth, people will none-the-less form world views. The

dangerous world views involved extremes, wherein the person holds certain things scared and

most everything else profane, and they will believe these truths to be universal, absolute, encom-

passing everyone. They will likely also believe whole-heartedly that only they and their compa-

triots (in-group) stand between that which they consider sacred and that which they consider pro-

fane. Their sense of identity is completely wrapped up in their extreme visions of the sacred and

profane - the absolute and the intolerable. This imbues such individuals with a justification for

forcing these “absolute” truths on others. While, we can at least determine this much about hu-

man behavior, we cannot know the process by which they create these world views without ma-

terial like AQAP’s Inspire Magazine.

AQAP’s Inspire Magazine is the prime channel by which we can determine the motives

and driving forces that lead a certain group of people to commit terrorist acts. Undoubtedly, that

is being picked apart at this very moment. I will not mentioned in what ways for obvious rea-

sons, but with the gleaned information from the review, we can then begin to rewrite the narra-

tive, countering much of what AQAP’s Inspire Magazine has to say. We will better understand

what motives can be influenced and in what directions driving forces can be steered. In the ab-

sence of such a boon as obtaining AQAP’s Inspire Magazine, there are other avenues by which

we can learn the same information. Again, I will not delve into these avenues. The point is, if

we attempt to proactively define and identity terrorists - their motives and driving forces - we

would more than likely be off target and remain off target until proven wrong.

MESO

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In an effort to proactively prevent terrorism at this level, the operational level, it is neces-

sary that IC agencies, such as the NSA, which I have worked for, understand WHAT terrorists

are targeting, so that they can provide risk assessments to US entities or US allies. Obviously,

the best way to obtain this information is through sources like AQAP’s Inspire Magazine again.

However, at this point, it is possible for IC analysts to actually conduct some note-worthy analy-

sis. The key to success in this endeavor is to fully understand ourselves in relation to the defined

threat, which requires a sturdy springboard from the Macro level. IC agencies should be looking

at that which stands out to terrorists as vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, or high-profile opportu-

nities. In order to come to determinations in this way, it is necessary to look within as if through

the eyes of the threat. In other words, analysts must cross over the “proverbial relativity line”

and see the enemy’s “truth”

Having a clear understanding of what motivates and drives terrorists, analysts should

look for the “operational targets” of said terrorists. These would be incremental steps in their

overall strategic plan as outlined in the Macro level. Here analysts assess those components of

the US infrastructure, citizenry, and culture, which the terrorists consider inconsistent with their

world view, either as competition to their “absolute” truths or a direct attack upon them. So, an-

alysts are focusing on that which would be a glaring infarction to terrorists’ world view. Draw-

ing cartoons of Muhammad is an example of an intolerable offense upon that which they have

deemed sacred, hence, their targeting the cartoonists involved. At the same time analysts should

consider that which terrorists could exploit in their campaign to promote their world view. Ana-

lysts should look for possible in roads that terrorists could widen an an attempt to drive a wedge

between the US government and the citizenry or the US government and the international com-

munity. An example might be staging a fake US bombing of an orphanage.

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Simultaneously, analysts at this level could assess the risk level of potential targets of ter-

rorist recruitment. Analysts would be looking for individuals that have yet to form strong world

views of their own, which terrorist recruiters use to their advantage. If the theories from the

chart in Appendix 1 were applied at this point, the potential terrorists would reside before the

horizontal line created by extreme world views and self and group identities. Terrorist would

look for individuals who have not had successes in life and begin to offer them the chance to

have success, if not in this life, then the next. The recruiters will attempt to indoctrinate the

young minds with symbolism, influencing them to respond courageously when one of their new

found truths are rebuke by others. Lastly, the recruiters are trying to bring the recruits to a “tip-

ping point,” where they feel compelled to act. Analysts would be on the look out for recruits

who are testing their new views, perhaps by blogging. Potential recruits can then perhaps be tar-

geted with a counter propaganda campaign.

Generally this kind of analysis is initiated once word comes from the Micro level; how-

ever, there is no reason why it should not begin at this level and be corroborated with analysis

from the Micro level. In fact, analysis at this level could even initiate analysis at the Micro level.

How well analysis works at this level, as in, how accurately analysts can accurately pinpoint po-

tential operational targets, without using shotgun tactics, depends on how thoroughly the enemy

is known. The more complete the understanding of the enemy, the fewer potential operational

targets need be analyzed and the more accurate the chosen ones will likely be. The final analysis

will center on a risk estimate for each potential operational target, which could be used by ana-

lysts working in the Micro level to “Rack ‘n Stack” and direct collection efforts.

MICRO

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At this level, the tactical level, proactively defining terrorism entails understanding ex-

actly HOW terrorists intend to carry-out terrorists acts. With this information, the IC stands the

best chance at assisting in preventing planned attacks. Logistical knowledge of the enemy is of

utmost importance here. All-source analysts will need to discover what resources, from commu-

nications to execution, are available to the terrorists in question. With this information, analysts

can direct collectors on how, when, and what to collect for better intel. NSA analysts, for in-

stance, will work to exploit intel regarding the enemy’s communications network, since the NSA

will be responsible for collecting on these communication lines and extracting as much detail as

possible about any planned attacks, or amplifying information. As the collection commences,

tips will undoubtedly present more leads, which will lead to a fully picture of the terrorists com-

plete logistical infrastructure, and all the while, planned attacks will be thwarted.

Yet again, the best source for obtaining information about a terrorist networks logistical

infrastructure is from material like AQAP’s Inspire Magazine. While they probably did not

come right out and reveal their logistical infrastructure, small pieces here and there can be ac-

quired that when pieced together can present the framework needed to plot a way ahead, which

focuses on filling gaps. Analysts have to be weary, however, in that, considerations at the Meso

level still need to be applied here. Analysts should consider how much the terrorist network

knows about US capabilities. Such knowledge on their part could allow them to enact Denial &

Deception campaigns that steer use away from their actual target. Here again, the common

theme of this paper surfaces, “truth is relative.” That which analysts believe to be true about a

threats planned actions might change if they viewed the matter from a different perspective, one

that incorporated foreign knowledge of us. This type of analysis would be done at the Meso

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level, but handed off to analysts at the Micro level as appropriate in order to adjust collection ef-

forts.

CONCLUSION

This paper has summarized the importance of proactively defining terrorism at the

Macro, Meso, and Micro levels, which the IC is tasked with performing ceaselessly. In order to

follow-through with this charge flawlessly, it is important to understand what the desired goal is

at each level. This paper has postulated what those goals are at each level. As shown, the goal

changes at each level, requiring focus on different aspects of the task. This paper then high-

lighted the key(s) to success within each level, citing example instances throughout. The sum-

mation is below.

The Macro level is concerned with the reasons WHY a terrorist chooses terrorism. The

key to understanding WHY is in allowing “them” to tell us from their own perspective. The

Meso level is concerned with WHAT the terrorists are targeting. The key to success is having a

full and accurate impression of oneself (nation) from the perspective of the enemy. The Micro

level is concerned with HOW terrorists are planning on conducting terrorist acts. The key to

success at this level is obtaining complete logistical knowledge of the enemy, in terms of their

resources, from communications to execution. The thread that ran through all of the levels was

the concept that “truth is relative.”

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APPENDIX 1

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