dap reform report 2015

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DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT PANEL MODELS: A DISCUSSION PAPER FOR THE LGA-SA

Professor Andrew Beer and Mr Michael Kroehn Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning

The University of Adelaide

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Executive Summary

• No Australian jurisdiction currently excludes local governments from the development assessment process entirely, and both NSW and

WA include elected members of local government in their regional development assessment panels. • Removing elected members entirely from the DAP process would result in a democratic deficit at the local level.

o It would also potentially recast local planning concerns into state political issues. o DAPs comprised of fully independent experts are a technocratic solution to the challenge of evaluating urban growth.

• The introduction of DAPs that include independent members has one clear benefit: it increases the perception within the industry and the broader community that the outcomes of development assessment have not been affected by local politics.

o The value of this positive outcome should not be under-estimated. • The introduction of Regional DAPs would add a layer of bureaucracy to the planning process in SA.

o Current proposals would see three tiers of government potentially involved in planning – local, regional and state. o Fully independent council DAPs would not result in this duplication and the current hybrid model reduces duplication also. o The SA Government’s response to the Expert Panel would provide a technocratic solution to development assessment issues.

• A move to fully independent members appointed to DAPs would result in higher costs, which would need to be passed on to the sector. o Overall the proposed DAP system would be an expensive one, and it is important to acknowledge that the Expert Panel’s

deliberations were not informed by a consideration of costs. • Independent academic research emphasises that the development industry and governments tend to overemphasise the costs of

development approval under current systems and also overestimate the productivity gains associated with reform. o Development assessment is not a major barrier to urban growth and building activity, and greater productivity gains could be

found in more effective systems for translating planning documents into action, better integrating government actions and more effectively generating strategic plans.

• The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and related processes have had a significant influence on the evolution of development assessment in NSW and WA over recent years.

o ICAC in NSW has emphasised that DAPs – in whatever form – need to have the capacity to take public submissions, and wherever possible undertake their deliberations in public.

• There is a strong case for ensuring elected local government members continue to serve on DAPs.

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Introduction

The Expert Panel on Planning Reform has recently recommended major changes to the planning system in South Australia, including the development assessment process. The changes recommended by the Expert Panel are consistent with recent changes in some other jurisdictions across Australia and reflect a broader planning reform agenda, outlined by the Productivity Commission (2011). In broad terms, these reforms are focussed on improving productivity in the development process, with a strong emphasis on simplifying and speeding the development approval process. The Local Government Association of South Australia (LGA SA) is concerned to learn more about the potential impact of the South Australian Government’s proposals with respect to the future of Development Assessment Panels in this state. It sought the development of this Discussion Paper to inform its deliberations. The South Australian Government has signalled that new planning legislation will introduce a number of reforms relating to Development Assessment Panels (DAPs): • Elected Members will no longer have a direct role in DAPs; • DAP members will be accredited professionals with relevant expertise; • Assessment bodies will have the ability to co-opt specialist members as required; • Existing Council DAPs will continue to operate for an interim period; • Councils will be encouraged to establish regional DAPs through the introduction of incentives; • Regionalisation of DAPs will be reconsidered following evaluation of pilot approaches. The legislation will be structured so that future

changes may be introduced without the need for further statutory amendments. In its response to the Expert Panel on Planning Reform the SA Government (2015 p.24) has indicated its support for the following reforms within development assessment:

• The next steps of in evolution of development assessment panels should now take place – with elected representatives no longer having a direct role;

• Members of assessment bodies should be accredited professionals with expertise relevant to development assessment such as planning, engineering, environmental science, architecture and urban design;

• A system of professional accreditation, including regular training and auditing, should be established; • Private certification should be expanded to include a wider range of standard assessment functions, subject to stricter auditing and

oversight; and, • Assessment bodies should be able to co-opt specialist members as necessary.

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The proposed changes to Development Assessment Panels are a key planning reform for local government and for the state as a whole. The LGA is therefore seeking to develop a better understanding of these proposed reforms by comparing the proposed model with interstate planning systems, examining the ‘pros and cons’ analysis of alternative legislative options relating to DAPs. This report provides: • A high level comparison of the operation of Development Assessment Panels throughout Australia, which addresses:

o The geographic configuration of Panels (local, sub-regional, regional etc) o Membership of Panels (independent, skills-based etc) o The direct involvement of Elected Members o Responsibility for the appointment of Panel members (Minister, Commission, Council etc) o The types of applications that are referred to a Panel for a decision (minor, standard, major projects etc).

• A desktop review of contemporary research into the effectiveness and efficiency of Development Assessment Panel models;

• An objective review of the potential positive and negative attributes of the following DAP models:

o Current model- Council DAP with hybrid of independent and elected members o Fully independent Council DAPs o Fully independent Regional DAPs o Regional DAPs with hybrid of independent and elected members.

• Consideration of the impacts on the assessment system, developers, community members (representors), Elected Members and Council

officers.

• Advice on how the potentially negative aspects of DAP models can be managed through legislation and practice.

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Comparing Development Assessment Models throughout Australia Geographic configuration of

Panels (local, sub-regional, regional etc.)

Membership of Panels (independent, skills-based etc.)

Direct involvement of Elected Members

Responsibility for appointment of Panel members

Referrals to Panel for a decision (minor, standard, major projects etc.)

New South

Wales

Two levels: Local governments

have Development Assessment

officers and Independent Hearing

Assessment Panels (IHAP) and

regionally, Joint Regional

Planning Panels (JRPP). IHAPs are

not legislated but have been

introduced by some Councils for

better governance. The Central

Sydney Planning Committee

considers proposals worth more

than $50m or more than 3

storeys. It includes both

Councillors and state-government

appointed members.

In general, the Councils

who have IHAPs are

comprised of

independent specialists

with skills in town

planning, law,

environment, urban

design and traffic and a

local councillor. JRPPs are

comprised of three

independent experts and

two local members.

One Councillor is a

member of IHAP. Two

Councillors are members

of JRPP and the

remainder are

independent experts.

Local council appoints all

members of IHAP.

Councils appoint two

members and the

Minister for Planning

appoints three members

to JRPP. The Presiding

Chair is selected from an

independent specialist

appointed by the

Minister.

IHAPs assess minor, standard

and those applications that are

in dispute. JRPPs have

responsibility for major projects

that have a regional impact.

The panels have the capacity to

make decisions on proposals.

Victoria Two Levels : Local Government

has Planning and Development

Committees and the State

Government has Planning Panels.

These latter entities perform an

advisory role, with panels drawn

from a pool of members to

consider specific proposals.

Local Councillors are

members of Planning and

Development

Assessment committees.

The Planning Panels are

all comprised of

members with specialist

skills experience.

Councillors have full

involvement with the

Planning and

Development

Committees. There is no

involvement of elected

members in the Planning

Panels.

Council self-appoints

Planning and

Development Assessment

Panels/Committees in

local government area.

Planning Panels are

appointed by the State

Minister for Planning.

Local government assesses

minor, standard and major

projects. Development

applications that are in dispute

or deemed to have major state

significance are referred to State

Planning Panels that provide

advice, rather than a decision.

The State Planning Panels

represent an additional step in

the assessment process.

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Queensland Two Levels: Development

assessment officers undertake

evaluation and approval within

council with oversight from

Council. Developments that have

a 'state matters' classification are

referred to the State Assessment

and Referral Agency (SARA).

Local Councillors are

members of

Development

Assessment Committees.

SARA has members with

specialist experience.

Elected members sit on


Panels/Committees in the

respective local

government areas.

Elected members have no

role in SARA.

Council appoints the


Panel/Committee for

their jurisdiction.

All development applications are

assessed by Councils unless

considered to be a 'State

Matters' application.

South Australia Two levels: Local government


Panels (DAP) and the State has

the Development Assessment

Commission (DAC).

Three Councillors and

four independent

specialists appointed to

the DAPs. The DAC is

comprised of

independent and skills

based members.

Three local members sit

on the DAP. There is no

direct Involvement of

elected members in DAC

although the LGA-SA puts

nominates members.

Elected local members

appoint specialist

members and choose

councillors. DAC members

appointed by Minister:

Nominations for members

to DAC submitted by local

government.

All development decisions are

referred to the relevant local

government DAP for decision in

accordance with the

Development Act 1993.

Development applications

considered to be of state

significance are referred to DAC

for decision.

Three regional DAPs operate in

South Australia.

Western

Australia

There are 15 Development

Assessment Panels in operation

in WA. There are two types: Local

Development Assessment Panels

(LDAPs) and Joint Development

Assessment Panels (JDAPs).

LDAPs serve a single local

government area and only one

has been established – the City of

Perth. The remaining Local

Government Areas are served by

JDAPs which service two or more

LGAs.

There are five members

comprised of three

specialist members and

two local government

members (Councillors)

on the JDAP. The

Presiding member is

selected from the

specialist members.

Two local members sit on

the LDAP.

Elected members choose

two local members to the

LDAP.

DAPs are regulated to assess

applications within a specified

type and value threshold. These

applications, in most cases, are

major developments.

The City of Perth LDAP and the

JDAPS are decision making

bodies.

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Tasmania Two levels: Local governments


Officers and Development

Assessment Panels/Committees.

The State Government ‘s

Tasmanian Planning Commission

(TPC) approves local government

planning schemes and is only

directly involved in development

assessment for projects of state

significance.

Local government

Development

Assessment is

undertaken by local

officers of the council

and non-compliant

matters are referred to

council. TPC members

are selected as specialists

in their fields and are

independent.

Local government has full

control over all


Panels/Committees.

Local government has full

control over all


Panels/Committees.

Minor, standard and some major

projects.

Council is the decision making

body for all assessments, except

for a limited number of projects

of state significance.

Northern

Territory

One Level: Development Consent

Authority (DCA). Appointed and

approved by the State Minister

for Planning.

Can nominate a member

to the relevant DCA.

Nomination requires

approval from State

Minister for Planning.

Minimal involvement of

local government in the

work of the DCA.

Nomination of one

member only.

All developments are channelled

through DCAs for decision.

Australian

Capital Territory

One level. Territorial. All

development applications can be

submitted through the online

portal operated by the ACT

Planning and Land Authority’s

(ACTPLA) website called

eDevelopment.

Minster appointed.

No Involvement.

Minister responsible for

planning.

All development applications

can be lodged through

eDevelopment portal for review

and decision.

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Research into Development Assessment Panel Models • There is considerable variation across Australia in the ways in which development is assessed. Some states have more centralised

systems while others place greater control into the hands of local governments. o It is not clear that one approach is necessarily more efficient than the other. The Expert Panel’s own data (2014) shows that only 2%

of applications lodged in 2012-13 via the merit pathway for development assessment were refused, and the merit pathway constituted more than 90% of all applications.

o Ruming and Gurran (2014) commented that Australia’s development approval system includes elements of the UK merits-based approach, and the USA’s codified planning and development assessment system. Over recent years the latter has strengthened. There have been repeated calls for:

� the simplification of the system � greater independence, transparency and de-politicisation.

o Williams (2014) has dubbed the process of change in planning in Australia ‘panelisation’. • Gurran, Austin and Whitehead (2014) note that there has been a recent tendency for state governments to simultaneously introduce

ambitious strategic planning documents while at the same time reducing the regulatory functions of that system. • There has been a tendency over the past 15 years for states to review their planning systems, and through that process reduce the role of

local government in the development assessment process (Williams 2012). NSW and WA both typify this tendency: o This reflects broader government processes, including the work of COAG on planning capital cities, the efforts of the Development

Assessment Forum (DAF), as well as the Productivity Commission’s (2011) assessment of planning and development approval; o However, both NSW and WA have retained a role for elected members of local government in the assessment process; o Importantly, there is no clear evidence that the decision to move to more centralised development approval systems is based on

robust evidence. There is a significant absence of reputable data on the time taken for developments to be assessed, and this challenge is made even greater when we attempt to compare between jurisdictions or over time.

• It has been argued that recent reviews of planning across Australia have tended to focus on very narrowly-defined process issues – such as the membership and functioning of development assessment panels – rather than tackling broader issues such as the potential role of planning as a mechanism for co-ordinating development and the actions of government departments (Kellett 2014); o Kellett (2014) has argued that better planning – and better development outcomes – for SA needs to focus on the relationship

between the strategic planning process on the one hand and local government on the other. He notes there has been an ‘implementation deficit’ with previous planning reforms and that there is a need for the public to ‘feel a genuine stake in policy formulation’.

• Development assessment inevitably carries risk for governments at all levels, including a ‘reputational risk’ where assessments are seen to be inappropriate or unfair;

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o Development assessment processes have attracted the attention of ICAC in NSW, and this scrutiny appears to have shaped the panels at the level of individual local governments and at the state level;

o Planning decisions have the potential to attract public attention and political agitation, independent of how the development assessment body is constituted. Development assessment panels comprised solely of independent members appointed by the Minister are likely to result in any political contention being directed to the Minister or their department;

o McFarland (2011) noted that reform of NSW development approval effectively meant that all local issues had become state issues, with the potential for relatively minor community planning matters to emerge as major challenges for state governments.

• There is little robust, independent data on the advantages or disadvantages of one form of development assessment process over another. o Data from NSW suggests that the move from local government assessment to a Development Assessment Panel model resulted in:

� Only modest gains in efficiency, with assessments taking on average 65 days rather than 72 days – a 10% productivity gain; � No increase in the approval rate. In their first year of operation DAPs in NSW had slightly higher rates of rejection than

councils in the previous year (Stone 2014); � The perception that the process had been depoliticised. Qualitative data suggests that all parts of the development industry

– including local government – felt that politics ‘had been taken out of the equation’; • The 2014 review of WA’s DAPs found qualified support for the new system, with most submissions arguing for a

wider range of projects to be brought before DAPs rather than councils; • Independent research from NSW has also emphasised the degree to which the introduction of Joint Regional

Planning Panels has improved public confidence in decision making (Ruming 2014), while Stone (2014) notes they have added ‘transparency, integrity and rigour’ to decision making.

� Williams (2014p.442) suggests that Regional Development Assessment Panels in NSW have not improved the speed of assessment but are likely to have raised the quality of decision making:

• ‘while JRPPs do not appear to result in more efficient or timely decision-making, the presumption (yet to be verified) is that they lead to better decisions’.

� There is a commonly reported perception that development assessment processes that take ‘non complying’ developments to a committee of elected local government officials are skewed toward treating the majority of developments in this manner, rather than having local government officers grant approval under the relevant planning schedule.

o Fundamentally, DAPs in WA have not reduced the level of bureaucracy involved in development assessment, they have simply added another layer of decision making.

• The Impacts on the Development Process: o The Centre for International Economics (2013) estimated that reform of the NSW development assessment process would generate

savings of between $569m and $848m per year. o However, independent sources emphasise the fact that the planning process has only a modest impact on whether a development

proceeds or not (Gurran and Phibbs 2014). There is therefore a risk that reform could be introduced – and local democracy reduced – for no substantive gain.

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� Other research notes that the gains from reforming planning processes are often over-stated and that change is often difficult – and time consuming to implement;

• Tasmania sought to introduce private certification of some forms of development in 2013 in the expectation that it would significantly improve efficiency. However, there is not data to support this contention (Castles and Stratford 2014).

• WA and NSW have increased the regional focus of their development assessment, with both introducing regional DAPs. These initiatives are consistent with the policy directions established by COAG. o Regional DAPs make sense in the context of land use planning that is developed regionally, but appear to offer an additional layer of

complexity to the planning process. o In WA, regional DAPs appear to have been accepted by the industry and the broader community and have seen their mandate

extended over time. It is important to note, however, that WA has a relatively large number of quite small local governments. • Mant (2011) notes that there are corruption risks with any development assessment process, and this issue has come to particular attention

in NSW over recent years. o Independently appointed, DAPs comprise of experts are seen to be more effective at managing this risk. However, independence

needs to be matched to a degree of transparency as ‘’Even when there is not corruption, the nature of the process and a lack of transparency in the way in which decisions are made can lead to public disquiet’ (Mant 2011 p. 112). How individuals are appointed to the development assessment process is a critical issue for the transparency of the development approval system.

o Importantly, Mant (2011) observed that the NSW development approval system had a number of corruption-exposed elements, none of which related to the role of local governments or the participation of local government in the approval process. Key factors he identified included:

� Multiple unintegrated planning documents � The capacity for the state to make decisions according to ‘the circumstances of the case’ � SEPP No. 1. That exempted state policy from any control � Few fair hearing opportunities � Limited rights to third party appeal � Substantial powers granted to the Minister � Split departmental responsibility.

• AusPol (2011) working for the Property Council of NSW reported that when surveyed, community members felt local governments performed poorly in the assessment of applications relative to their other areas of activity.

• Other attitudinal research by McGregor Tan for the LGA-SA found that the broader South Australian community tends to believe the current level of control is ‘about right,’ and that local governments need to have a role in development assessment.

• Queensland has retained a distinctive planning and development approval system, and has largely maintained a focus on local government decision making.

o It is important to acknowledge that local governments in Queensland have a long history of both a wider range of functions and more substantial responsibilities, including budgets, than in other Australian jurisdictions.

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o Story and Wiltshire (2011) observed Queensland has also been affected by the centralisation of planning powers, with a consequent threat to local empowerment. Importantly, the Queensland Government has both created new institutions and strengthened its own planning instruments at the expense of local governments, thereby reducing opportunities for community engagement.

o Story and Witshire (2011 p.31-32) were also critical of development assessment panels as � ‘the central ideas behind development assessment panels have been to improve the quality and efficiency of the decisions

made. The expectation has been that development decisions will be made more quickly and will produce better outcomes than under the traditional democratic process. International experience shows that that government appointed assessment panels are subject to a range of factors that detract from their original intentions.

• It is almost impossible for one panel to represent the expertise needed across all assessment projects and corresponding issues.

• The value of ‘expert judgement’ is often over-rated in assessment panel decision-making at the strategic level. • Expert panels are very poor at determining the likely impact of development proposals. • Expert panels are no better at making decisions in dynamic complex environments than any other decision maker

with a clear understanding of the issue. � The authors noted that in 2011 the NSW Minister for Planning transferred a number of applications back to councils to deal

with because the expert panels were not dealing with approvals as efficiently as expected. Williams (2014) commented on the complexity of the state-appointed panels in Victoria. In that state, Development Assessment panels sit within a much larger set of planning panels, operating at a number of scales

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Positive and Negative Attributes of Alternative Development Assessment Models Legitimacy • Development assessment models that do not include community-level representation can be seen to erode local democracy and lack

legitimacy (Bishop 2014). o Reform of the development assessment process in NSW has also been criticised for making the planning system overall more rigid

and less able to accommodate changing circumstances (Ruming 2012). • The WA Regional DAPs have resulted in committees with strong credentials amongst individual members, as well as a significant increase

in the knowledge base of the decision making authorities. o However, it remains a technocratic solution to development control.

Timeliness • South Australia’s current development assessment process is comparable with other jurisdictions. The Productivity Commission (2011)

found it took 24 to 133 months to move through the land supply process in Adelaide, up to 119 in Sydney, 30 to 60 months in Melbourne, 14 to 172 months in SE Queensland, and 36 to 120 months in Perth (Productivity Commission 2011 p. 144).

Complexity and Cost • Regional DAPs - with either fully independent or a mix of independent and council-appointed members – have the potential to add an

additional layer of complexity to the assessment process. Such reforms fundamentally add an additional layer of bureaucracy to planning approvals rather than streamlining development. o The SA Government’s proposed development assessment system is likely to be expensive to administer, imposing additional costs

on developers and the community at large.

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Impacts on the Assessment System, Developers, Community Members Elected Members and Council officers. - Current model- Council

DAP with hybrid of independent and elected members

Fully independent Council DAPs

Fully independent Regional DAPs

Regional DAPs with hybrid of independent and elected members.

Cost Effectiveness Potential for increased cost

effectiveness with some of the

decision making being 'in

house'.

Potential for higher cost to

attract the right panel with the

requisite skill set. May deliver

speedier outcomes and greater

certainty.

Potential for higher cost to

attract the right panel with the

requisite skill set. The volume of

work may be an impediment to

timeliness.

Potential for higher cost in

order attract the right panel

with the requisite skill set.

Efficiency of Decision Making

Low efficiency of decision

making process. Hampered by

possible limited skills and

knowledge amongst local

elected members.

Very efficient in assessment of

developments with high

probability of consensus due to

alignment of members

backgrounds.

Decreased efficiency as buy in

of panel may not be as high as

local members.

Increased efficiency as

consensus action on

assessments is more likely and

local appointed members have

vested interest.

Transparency Questionable level of local

governance and accountability.

While the process is sound,

there is a perception of

problems.

Moderate local governance and

accountability.

Not transparent. Moderate local accountability.

Democratic Representation High level of local (democratic)

input.

Nil. Nil. Moderate level of local

(democratic) input.

Adequacy of Knowledge Base

Diminished specialist and

knowledge capacity. Elected

members may lack requisite

skills and may have their own

agendas.

Increased specialist knowledge

and capacity.

Increased specialist knowledge

capacity.

Diminished specialist and

knowledge capacity. Elected

members may lack requisite

skills.

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Capacity for Regional Consistency

Regional co-ordination

prospects minimised through

more locally focused panel.

Medium capacity for regional

co-ordination through a more

knowledgeable and less locally

focused panel.

High capacity for regional co-

ordination.

High capacity for regional co-

ordination.

Confidence in the Assessment System

Reduced confidence in the

impartiality of the process.

Increased confidence in the

impartiality of the process. May

also be introduced as part of

regional planning.

Increased confidence in the

impartiality of the process. May

also be introduced as part of

regional planning.

Reduced confidence in the

impartiality of the process.

Impact on Developers Uncertainty over outcomes and

timing.

Increased certainty over

outcomes and timeliness.


outcomes. Timeliness may be

impaired.


outcomes and timeliness.

Impact on Community Members (Representors)

Local representors able to deal

direct with elected panel

members in the meeting.

Individuals are therefore able to

have an appropriate influence

on outcomes.

Possibility of local representors

not being heard.

Increased possibility of local

representors not being heard.

Low to moderate chance of

concerns being voiced.

Impact on Elected Members Medium impact. Potential for

greater diversity in views and

chances are greater of

disagreement on individual

assessments. However, this is

not necessarily a negative

outcome.

Removal of some of their power

and authority.

Loss of power and authority by

councillors. Unable to influence

individual decisions.

Dilution of power and

authority. Councillors may

struggle to represent the local

council in a strong manner.

Impact on Council Officers Medium impact. Potential for

more diversity in views. Better

able to respond to non-

compliant developments.

Medium – large impact.

Potential for greater diversity in

views. No in house expertise.

May delay applications from

being processed to diminished

accessibility of panel members.

Should speed processes

through and deliver greater

certainty around outcomes.

Should speed processes

through and greater certainty

around outcomes.

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Managing the Potential Negative Impacts of DAP Models Include Public Inputs • NSW experience suggests that development assessment bodies should have the capacity to take submissions from the public – including

presentations - and that such processes are important for enhancing both transparency and accountability. o NSW experience also suggests panels should be open to the public when they meet, though they should have the capacity to close

the meeting under particular circumstances. • Models that do not include local government representation in development assessment are likely to be more effective, and more widely

accepted, when communities are heavily engaged in the planning process early in the strategy setting process.

Have Realistic Expectations of Workload, Performance and Cost • Some research suggests that models that create a limited number of development authorities – such as Regional Development

Assessment Panels – could serve as a barrier to development if the number of applications grows rapidly. o WA’s DAPs did not meet their statutory timeframes for making a decision in 43 per cent of cases in 2012-13 and 44 per cent in 2011-

12. • A number of sources (Stone 2014; WA Government 2013; ICAC 2013) discuss the cost of fully-professional DAPs, including the cost of

sitting fees, training, and accreditation. o In the long term these costs are likely to be substantial and represent either a cost to the tax payer, or a cost to the development

process. � A user-pays system, with higher fees charged for development assessments that are not conforming to the current planning

schedule is likely to be both more efficient and more equitable, but may generate industry reaction. o Planning Panels in Victoria are not necessarily permanent and may be established to consider one proposal, or a limited number of

proposals. This method of organisation was not considered in depth by the Expert Panel and may be more cost effective than maintaining permanent DAPs.

� The SA Government should give due consideration to this option as it looks to implement the Expert Panel’s recommendations.

Benchmark Performance as the System Changes • To date, there is no clear evidence that one form of development assessment process is more effective or efficient than another. In part,

this reflects the complexity of the decisions being taken, as they are likely to full outside the remit of ‘complying’ development, and/or are large scale projects with the potential for multiple impacts. o Despite recent reform in a number of jurisdictions, there is a marked absence of robust data on the performance of the new

development approval system relative to the previous arrangements. o There is a clear need to develop a framework of performance monitoring and evaluation of the development assessment process in

South Australia in the wake of the Expert Panel’s recommendations.

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Conclusion This Discussion Paper has considered the use of Development Assessment Panels (DAPs) across Australia and a number of important conclusions arise of this examination:

� There is no clear evidence that the SA Government’s proposed new Regional DAPs will result in a better approval system. It is likely to result in a more expensive system, and one that enjoys a higher level of public – as well as industry – confidence. It will also be a system with decision makers with better credentials, but lacking in local legitimacy. Perhaps paradoxically, it may be a more politicised system, with every and any planning decision potentially emerging as a state political issue.

� There appears to be a strong case for maintaining DAPs that are comprised of both elected council officials and independent experts. The independent experts could be appointed by the Minister to remove any potential perception of local bias towards independent members with philosophies sympathetic to the agendas of an individual council. Most jurisdictions have a majority of independent members, and a presiding member who is independent.

� Currently no jurisdiction relies upon independent members alone in making decisions on development applications. South Australia would be an outlier if was to introduce this measure.

� Transparency and accountability are clearly important in the design of development approval systems. Councillor participation in DAPs can enhance both.

� The SA planning system is comparable with other states in the time taken for development approvals and it is highly questionable that

there is a case for reform. Development assessment is only one – relatively small – part of the urban development sector.

o This analysis has found a clear absence of robust and reliable data on the time taken for development assessment across Australia. The estimates of the time taken for development assessment provided by the Productivity Commission (2011) are inexact at best, and in many respects unhelpful. This is a data gap that needs to be filled as a matter of priority.

� It is difficult to objectively assess the case for the introduction of Regional, rather than local DAPs. We do know that they will come at a

substantial cost if introduced, and such expense could only be justified if this reform was integrated with robust regional planning processes. In part the drive to planning at a regional scale in a number of jurisdictions has been driven by the COAG development agenda, but there is little evidence to support this approach over others.

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� The most critical issue appears to be maintaining elected council members on the DAPs, whether at the regional or the local scale. Without their involvement the development approval system will have a very limited capacity to address local concerns. This would represent a substantial loss to the South Australian community and economy.

o The removal of elected officials from the development assessment process would raise the level of political risk for state government.

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model, Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government.

ACT Government 2005 Planning System Reform Project: Directions paper, ACT Planning and Land Authority, May.

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dap reform report 2015

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