da pamphlet no. 20-243 (german antiguerrilla operations in the balkans)

8/11/2019 DA Pamphlet No. 20-243 (German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans)

1/94

C o

p y 2

w

r

D E

P A R T

M E N

T O F

T H

A R

M Y P A M

P H L E

T

N O 2

2 4 3

jS

r m y i l i t a r y H is t o r y

I n s t i t u t e

H

I S

T O

R I

C

L

S T

U D

Y

G R M N

N

M

G

U

E

R

R

I

L L

O

P

E

R

H

O

N

S

I N

T

H

E

B

L

K

N

S

D E

P A R T

M E N

T O F

T H E

A R

M Y

A

U G U S

T 9 5


2/94

Departm

ent of

the

Army Pamphlets Published

In

the

GERMAN

REPORT SERIES

Title

Publicatio

n

date

o

20-201

Military

Improvisations During the Ru

ssian Campaign___ Aug 51

20-202 Germ

an

Tan

k

Mainte

nance

in

World

War I I

Jun 54

20-230

Russian Combat Methods in World War II.__________ No

v 50

20-231 Combat in R

ussian Forests and w a m p s

Jul

51

20-232 Airborne

Operations: A German

Appraisal._____ Oct 51

20-233 German D

efense

Tactics Against

Russian Break-Throughs Oct

51

20-234 Operations o

f

Encirc

led ForcesGerman Experience in

R u s s i a

_

Jan 52

20-236

Night

Combat______________________________

Jun

53

20-240

Rear Area

Security

in RussiaThe S

oviet

Second

Front

Behind the German

Lines_______________..____

Jul

51

20-242 German Ar

mored Traffic Control During the Russian Cam

paign___.___________

__________________

Jun

52

20-260 The German

Campaigns

in the Balk

ans (Spring 1941 ___ Nov 53

20-269

Small Unit Actions During the German

Campaign in Russia.

Jul 53

20-290 Terrain Factors in the

Russian Campaign___________

Jul

51

20-29

1

Effects

of Climate on

Combat

in

European Russia

__

Feb 52

20-292

Warfare in the Far

North____________________

_

Oct

51


3/94

D E P A R T M E N T O F T H E R M Y P A M P H L E T N O

2

- 2 4 3

G E R M A N

A N T K M R H I A

O

P E R A T I O N S

I N

T H E

B A L K A N S

1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 4 )

D E P A R T M E N T

O F

T H t

A R M Y

A 8 6 D S

T 9 5


4/94

DEPAR

TMENT OF THE

A R M Y

W S H I N

G T O N 25, D . C.,

6

Augu

st

1954

Depar

tm ent of

the Army

Pamp

hlet 2 0- 2 4

3

is

published for the

in

form atio

n

an d

use

o

f

a

ll con

cerned.

[AG385

(U

un54)]

Y

O R D E R

O F THE SECRETARY

O F THE fiKY

OFFIC

IAL :

J O H N A. KLEIN

M

ajor Genera

l United States

Army

The Adju

tant

General.

M .

B.

RIDG W A Y

General

Un

ited States

Army

Chief of Staff.

D

I S T R I B U T I O N

Active

Army

Gen Sta ff D A 5)

SS D

A 5)

Tec

Svc D A

26)

Admin Tec Svc

Bd 10)

TP

10)

OS Ma] Comd 50

)

Arm ies

10)

Corps

10)

D lT

8)

Brig

3)

Eegt 3

Gen Br

Sv

c

Sen

25)

P M S T

HOTO Units

1)

T/O

B

30-

500A

Teams

A A

th rough A E 1)

T/O B

30-510 Te

ams A-l

through A-5

1)

T/O E

30-600 Teams

A A

throu

gh AE 1)

NO

Special.

VSAR

Special.

Unless

oth

erwise

noted

distribution

ap

plies to GonU S

and

Overse

a.

F

o r

explanation of abbreviat

ions

use

d see SB

320-50-1.


5/94

FOR WOR

The

purpose

of this

stu

dy is to

describ

e briefly the German cam

paign

against

the guerri

llas

in the

Balkans during the

period of

the

European Axis occupati

on, from the

end

of h

ostilities against Greece

and

Yugoslavia in April

1941 to the ca

pture of Belgrade by the

Sovi

et forces

and the

Partis

ans in October 1944.

The

activities

of

Ge

rmany's Italian

,

Bulg

arian, Croatian,

and

other

allies, as

well

as

the British, Soviet,

and U

nited States

forces in

the

area,

are

treated

only to the

extent that they affected German operations.

In seq

uence

of

time,

this

study is

a contin

uation of

Department of

the

Army

Pamphlet

20-260, The

German

Campaigns in the

Balkans (Spring

1941) , of

November

1953 .

The

materia

l

for

this study was

obtained

from

Germ

an military

records

n

ow

in the

custo

dy

of

The

Adjutant

General,

Department

of

the

Army.

n

addition to

these

official

records,

monographs

by

former

German

officers

who participated

in

these operations

furnished

con

siderable general

in

formation and

were

of

assistance

in supplementing

the terse official

reports of specific

actions. The authors of the

se

monographs

prepared for the

Historical

Division,

United

States

Army, Europ

e,

include General

der Gebirgstrup

pen

(Lieutenan

t

General) Hubert Lanz,

form

er

commander

of

the XX

Mountain

Corps,

and

Polizeiob

erst (Colonel of Police) Karl Gaisser, Germ

an

te

chnical adviser to the

Croatian Police.

The

w ork

of

preparing

this

study

was

done by

Major Robert

M .

Kennedy of the Office

of

the C

hief of Military

History.

In its presen

tation, every effort wa

s made to give an accurate account

of

the

pro

tracted

attempt

by

the

German

occupation forces to destroy

their

elusive

guerrilla enemy

in

this

.seconda

ry theater of

war from 1941

t

hrough 1944 .

ii i


6/94


7/94

C O N T E N T S

P o r t

On*.

T H E BALKAN AREA AND

ITS

PEOPLES

C h a p t e r 1.

P h y s i c a l G e o g r a p h y

I.

Topography...................................

2

II. Climate .. . _ _ . 3

2. N o t i o n a l States

I.

General._________. ..___ 4

II.

Greece.__________________.. __ 4

III. Yugoslavia. . .... ... . .. . . . 5

IV.

Albania. ._........___.....

..

--

6

V .

Bulgaria,

Hungary, Romania, and Turkey ... 7

3. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d C o m m u n i e a t i o n i

I. General . .. . 8

II. Main Rail

Lines ______. ...___......

8

III.

Principal

Highways______________

9

IV. Waterways, Airfields, and Signal Facilities.._....

9

P a r t T w o . T H E

OCCUPATION

OF T H E

B A L K A N S

AND T H E RIS E OF

T H E

G U E R R I L L A

MOVEMENT

1941-42). 10

C h a p t e r 4. T h e O c c u p a t i o n Z o n e s

a n d F o r c e s

I. Division and Dismemberment-.- - 13

II. The

Italians___

1 3

III.

The Germans____________.-_. 15

IV.

The Bulgarians and

Hungarians ...

17

V . The Puppet Governments .. . .. 18

5. The E a r l y M o v e m e n t

a n d A x i s C o u n t e r m e a s u r e s

I.

Yugoslavia.._ ... ...._ ...

20

II.

Greece... . . . ... . 27

6. O r g a n i z a t io n o f G u e r r i l l a

Units

I. Unit and

Command Structure--------------- 3 1

II.

Communications and Supply______

- 3 2

III. Training and

Tactics_________

--

3 3

P o r t T h r e e . T H E

G U E R R I L L A

MOVEMENT

IN G R E E C E ,

YUGOSLAVIA,

AND ALBANIA 1943-44)..

3 5

C h a p t e r 7. O p e r a t i o n s

J a n u a r y - A u g u s t

1943)

I. Yugoslavia..........__

3 6

II. Greece_______________.....- 3 8

III.

The German Situation by Mid-1943. 40

0.

T h e D e f e c t i o n of

Italy

and I t s E f f e c t s

I. General._____________ ___

44

II.

Yugoslavia

and Albania. 44

III.


8/94

Vi

C O N T E N TS

P

a r t T h ree . T H E

G UE RR

I L L A

MOVEM

ENT

IN GREECE, YUGOS

LAVIA,

P

a g e

A

ND

A

LBANIA (194

3-4 4 ) Co n t in

u e d

C h a p t e r

9.

O p e r

a t i o n t o t h e En d

o f 1943

I.

General.__________............._._.

47

II.

Y

ugoslavia

and Alba

nia...

............

... 50

III.

Greec

e______

__. ..__

_........_..

_. 52

10.

O p e

r a t i o n s In 194

4

I.

Gener

al .__...

_.._____

._..........

.

53

II. The Area

of

A

rm y Group

E . _.

........... 54

III. T

he

A

rea

of

Army Grou

p F

____...._

_....... 64

11.

GEMSBO

CKandSTEIN

ADLER..

.............

.........

7 0

P a r t F o u r .

RESULTS AND

CONCLUSIONS-.. ..-._

73

A p p e n d ix

I. C

h r o n o l o g y o f

Event*-..

... ....-.

..

.... ..

.. 79

II.

B i b l i o g r a p h

i ca l Note....

_._ .

....

.. 82

M A P

S

A

o.

1 . General Re

ference Map-------

-.--_-_-_----

-------------

---Facing

1

2.

T

he

P

artition

of

G

reece___

__.______

______

____

12

3. The Partition

of Yugos

lavia_...._

__

__ _

__

1 4

4 .

German Dispositions in

the

Balkans as

of

Mid-A ugust

1944....Facing 53

5 .

Ge

rmanEstimate

of Guerrilla

Strength

and Dispo

sitions in Greece as

of M

id-August 1944___

__...__._

_______

__...........

61

6 . Germ

an

Estim

ate

of Guerrilla

Strength and

Dispositions

in Yugos

lavia

an

d

A

lbania

as

o

f Mid-Augus

t 1944....

._

_...Facing

6 7

7 . Operati

on

GEM

SBOCK.

.________

_..

_

_.._Facin

g 70

8. Operation

S

TEINAD

LER.__..

______..._

....._. Fac

ing 7 2

C HA

RTS

o

1 .

G erman Ground

Forces

in

O ccupied Greece

and

Yugoslavia

as

of

July

1

941.........._

_..__....

......_

.

_..

....... 1

7

2 . German

Ground Fo

rces in Occup

ied Greece a

nd Yugoslavia

as of

1 December

1942__

_.______

_____._

.._____._

__

27

3 . G erman

and Bulgarian Gr

ound Force

s in

O ccup

ied G

reece, Yugoslavia

and A lbania

a

s of 26 D e

cember 1943.__

.

.._____.

51

4. Germ an Gro

und

F

orces

in

Occupi

ed Yugoslav

ia and

Albania as

of

the

Fall of Belg r

ade 20 O ctober

1944

________

_ _______

___

68


9/94

G E N E R A L R E FE R E N C E M A

P

T KTN

N

Map 1

General re fere

nce

map


10/94

P R T O N E

THE B LK N R E N D

T S

PEOPLES

The term Balkan is derived from a Turkish word meaning

mountain. As used by the English-speaking nations, however,

the

word

refers

to

that

peninsula

of

southeastern

Europe

lying

between

the

Black and Adriatic Seas and extending south to

the Mediterranean.

To

the north,

the geographic boundary

is less

definite, but

is

generally

accepted as the area

south

of the line of the

Danube

and

Sava,

west

along the Kupa Eiver,

whence

an

imaginary

line

is

drawn to

the

Adriatic port

of

Fiume.

From north to south,

the

broad expanse of

the

Danube Basin gives

way to

the

mountain ranges of Yugoslavia

and Bulgaria.

The re

mainder of the

peninsula

consists

mainly

of rugged

mountains, broken

occasionally

by

such

features

as

the coastal lowlands

of

Albania, the

area surrounding

the Gulf

of Salonika in Greece,

and the

lowlands

of Turkish

Thrace.

The

Balkan

peoples have

been

in contact

with the

inhabitants of

Asia Minor,

the

Hungarian

.Plain, Central

Europe,

and

the

highly

developed Mediterranean civilizations for thousands

of

years. Never

theless

it

is still possible to distinguish such ethnic

groupings as the

Albanians, Serbs,

Bulgars, Turks, Greeks, and

Vlachs,

the last a

semi-

nomadic race of herdsmen being absorbed gradually into

the

various

national states into

which

the

Balkan area

is

divided.

Occupied

for

centuries by Romans,

Turks, Austrians,

and Hungar

ians,

the Balkan

peoples were forced

to adopt the

methods

of irregular

warfare

in

the struggle

against their oppressors. When

not resisting

foreign

invaders,

they

battled one

another

or kept alive their fighting

traditions in bitter blood feuds. The mountainous terrain of their

peninsula,

with

few good roads or

rail

lines, hampered the

counter-

measures of

regular

forces and

made possible

sustained

guerrilla

operations.


11/94

C

HA PT

ER

PH

YSIC

A L GE

OGR

APH

Y

I

Top

og r ap

h y

The

most

im

port

ant ph

ysical

feat

ure of th

e Balk

ans

as

a

s

cene of

milita

ry

o

peratio

ns

is its wild

te

rrain.

Th

e brus

hym o

untain

cou

ntry

c

raggy

pea

ks,

and

ro a

dless

fore

st are

as of

fer irreg

ular

troops

num

er

ous

pla ces

to

hide ,

opportunity

to

shift

forces

unse en even

from

the

a

ir

andlo

cation

s fo

r amb

ush.

To the

west

,

th

e D

inaric

Alps

fo

llow

Y

ugos

lavia s

A

driati

c c

oast

i

n a

south

easter

ly d

irectio

n and

bar

access

to the

inte

rior of

thecou

n

try

. A

lthou

gh

so

me

coas

tal areas

are f

ertile

the

lim

eston

e

com

posi

t

ion of th

ese m

ountai

ns

make

s

the

hi

nterla

nd a ba

rren

region

incap

able

of sup

portin

gany

con

sidera

ble po

pula t

ion.

Deep

gorg e

s make

tr

ans

ve

rse

movem

ent diff

icult,

and

there

are only

a

few

s

econd

ary ro

ads

and

rail

lin

es u

ntil the

cen

tral Yu

gosla

v up

lands

to the

east are

re a

ched.

F

rom th

e

headw

aters o

f the

Drin

Rive

r the l

ength

of Alb

ania

to

the

port

cit

y

of Valon

a,

the m oun

tains

dr

aw

back from

the

coa

st,

m aki

ng for

ea

sier ac

cess

to

the

in t

erior

and

assum

e

a north-

south

d

irectio

n . Sou

th o

f

V

alona

, the

m

ounta

ins

re sum

e the

ir

so

uthea

sterly

m

arch

and m er

ge

in t

o theGree

k Pind

us.

These

l

atter

exten

d t

o

t

he

Gul

f of

C

orinth

reap

pearin

g

o

n

th

e

south

ern

side of the

g

ulf

in

th

e

Pe

loponn

esus.

Directly

south

of

Gre ece

proper

is

the

large

is land

of

Crete ,

of

con

sidera

ble st

rategi

c im po

rtance

. O

ther

Gre

ek is

lands

dot

ting the

Ionia

n and A

egean

Seas

are

Cor

fu Cepha

lonia ,

Z

ante

Rhod

es, th

e

D

odeca

nese, the

Sporad

es, th

e

Cycla

des, Lem

nos,

and

Khio

s.

T

he cen

tral

upla

nds eas

t of

the m

ounta

in c

hain

exte

nding

t

he

length

of

the B

alkan

Penin

sula

are

fe

rtile

enoug

h to su

pport

larg

e

cente

rs of po

pulati

on a

nd some

indu

stry.

T

o

t

he

north

thi

s regio

n

is drain

ed by the

Sa

va and M

orava

Rive

rs,

flo

wing in

to

th

e Dan

ube;

to

the

south, by

the

Vardar

wending

its

way

through

M acedonia to

th e

Gulf

of Salo

nika

and

t

he A

egean

.

The easte

rn

po

rtion

of the p

eninsu

la

is

bi

sected

b

y the

Balka

n

M

ount

ains.

To the

nort

h th is

are

a

desce

nds to the

Dan

ubian

pla

in;

to

th

e

south

,

to

the

stepp

e-like

lands

of Turk

ish

THrac

e.


12/94

GERMAN

ANTIG UERRIUA

OPERATIONS

IN THE

B A

UCANS 1941-1944)

II

Cl imate

With the ex

ception

of

its coastal ar

eas,

the Balkan Peninsula has a

central Eu ropean

climate,

characterized

by

warm and

rainy

summers

and cold w

inters, differing

little

from

the

Danubian lands to the

north.

The

Dalmatian coas

t

of Yugoslavia, facing the Adriatic,

and the

Io

nian

and western

Aegean coasts of Greece

enjoy

variations

of

th

e

M editerranean typ e of

climate, with warm, dry

summers

and

mild,

rainy winter seasons; o

ther coastal

areas have

a

climate

betw

een that

of central Euro

pe and

the

Mediterraneanfor example, the north

Aegean coast with its

hot summers

and

cold wint

ers and

the

Black Sea

coast with its

moderately

hot

su mmers

and

cold

winters.


13/94

CH

P

TER

NAT

IO

NA

L S

T T

ES

T

he p

eace

t

reat

ies fo

llow

ing

the

Ba

lka

n

Wa

rs of

191

2

and

1

913

W or

ld W

ar

I

and

the

G

ree

k-T

urk i

sh

co

nfli

ct endi

ng

in

192

3 reso

lved

th

e fro

ntie

rs

of the

va

riou

s Ba

lkan

sta

tes

unti

l 193

9.

I

n

tha

t y

ear,

Italy

occupied

Albania

and

proceeded

to

implement

her

designs

for

d

omi

nati

ng the

B

alka

nP

eni

nsul

a.

Th

e

c

reat

ion

of

thes

e sta

tes

ha

d

sati

sfie

d m

any

na

tion

al a

sp i

ratio

ns,

butnum

erou

s

m i

nori

ty an

d

te

rrito

rial

pro

blem

s

wer

e le

ftu

nset

tled

,

an

d b

oth

Ita

lian

s

a

nd G

erm

ans

we

re ab

le

to

turn

them

to

thei

r

o

wn

adv

anta

ge;

A

mon

g the

diss

atisf

ied

w

ere th

e

Hun

gar

ians

in

th

e

part

o

fn

ort

h

c

entr

al Y

ugo

slav

ia th

at

ha

don

ce bee

n

pa

rto

f the

Aus

tro-

H

un

gari

anE

mp

ire; th

e

Ital

ians

a

long

Y

ugo

sla v

ia s

nor

thw

este

rn

b

or

der

;

tii

e M

ace

don

ians

,

torn

amo

ng

th

e

Bu

lgar

ia ns

,

Y

ugo

slav

s,

and

Greeks;

and

the

la

rge

colonies

of A

ust

rian

s

and

G

erm

ans

i

n

n

orth

ern

Yu

gosl

avia

.

T

here

w

ere

a

lso bit

ter r

ival

ries

b

etw

een

me

mbe

r na

tion

s

of

th

e

s

ame

sta

te, as

th

e Se

rbs

an

d C

roats

of

Yug

osla

via,

and

both

Y

ugo

slav

ia

an

d

B

ulg

aria

w

ere

re

sent

ful of G

reek

p

osse

ssio

n o

f the

A

ege

an

co

ast.

Des

pite

the

eff

orts

o

f som

e

B

alka

n

l

ead

ers

to

fo

ster

i

ntra

-Bal

kan

co

ope

ra tio

n an

dg

ood

w

ill

pr

ior

to 194

1 t

hese

so

urce

s of

anim

os

ity a

nd

fri

ctio

n

r

ema

ined

to

ham

per

resi

stan

ce

toItal

ian

and

G

erm

an

sub

juga

tion

.

II

G reec e

Sli

ght

ly

sm

all

er

in

area

th

anEn

glan

d

Gre

ece

h

ad a

pop

ulat

ion of

l

ess t

han

eig

ht

m

illi

on

in

1

941

. M

igra

tio n

s a

nd ex

cha

nges

of p

opu

la

tio

n, ch

ief

am

ong

the

mt

herep

la c

eme

nt

of

Tu

rksi

n

w

est

ern

Thr

ace

wi

th a m

illio

n

an

d a

qua

rter

Gr

eeks

exp

elle

d from

Asia

M

in o

r in

19

22 -2

4

co

ntri

bute

d t

o mak

in g

the

i

nhab

itan

tsof

the

He

llen

ic st

ate

p

red

om i

nan

tly G

reek

b

y the

o

utbr

eak

of

W

orld

W

ar

II.

Alth

oug

h

the

re

w

ere

a

num

ber o

fAl

bani

ans

a

nd

Vl

achs

in

the

Pin

dus

M

oun

ta in

s

area,

they presented

no

minority

problem.

A

then

s,the

cap

ital,

w

ith

its

por

t city

o

fPi

raeu

s w

as

the nu

cleu

s

of

th

e Gr

eek

m a

ritim

e

sys

tem;

S alo

nik

a wa

sa

ce

nter o

flan

d

tra

nsp

orta

t

ion

and

anim

po

rtan

t s

eapo

rt

for t

he m

ore

nor

ther

lyo

f the

Balk

an

c

oun

tries

.

W

ith

an

e

con

omy

base

d

ch

iefl

y

o

n o

cea

n

com

mer

ce a

nd

a

gric

ultu

re,

G

reec

e ha

d

n

o hea

vy

ind

ustr

y.

B

ath

er it

res

tric

ted

its


14/94

G E R M A N

ANTI GUERRI L L A O P ERA

T I O NS IN

THE B A L K ANS 1941-1944

)

processing

of goods

mainly to olive

oil, currants, and

tobacco.

Cereals

l

ed among heavy food

im ports, since

G re

ece

co

uld not

feed its

own

populati

on

o

n its do

mestic pr

oduction.

When

Italian

forces

attacked from

occupied

Albania

on

28

October

1940,

the Gree

ks

adop

ted astrategy

of

holding ligh

tly

on the

ir

lef

t,

a

llowing Italian

columns

to advance deep into

the barrenPindus, while

they

re

sisted

strongly and t

hen

launch

ed

a

counteroffens

ive on their

right. Their

advance brou

ght the

G r

eeks in

to

Alb

ania,

w h

ere

they

presented

a

serious

threat to the l

eft

flank o

f th e Italian

f

orces to the

south.

Despite their vi

ctories over

the

Italian

invaders, the Greeks

could

not

l

ong resist the

fast-moving German forces

that inter

vened in the

G reek-Italian

conflict on

6

April

1941.

Greece

surrenderedto the

G er

m

ans o

n

23 Apri

l, an

d

was

then required to su

rrender to the Italians

as w ell. T

his

subm

ission t

o

an

enemy

t

hey

had

all

b

ut defeated aroused

therese

ntment

of

th eG

reeks. Later coupled with

the occupation of

most of

Greece

by

Italian forces,

it contributed i

n

no s

mall measure

to

the

rise of the

Greek

re sistance mo

vement.

III

Y u g o

s lav ia

A

most

heterog

eneous

state, the homeland of

th eSerbs, C

roats, and

Slovenes,

derived

its

name

from

the

Slavic

te rms

for

South Slav

and

became

a statefollowing

W

orld War I.

Yugoslaviahad

a population

of nearl

y

sixteen

millions by 1941,

and

in

geographic area

w asslightly

smaller than th

e state of

W

yoming.

Almost one half

of

its

inhabitants,

or six

and one-half milli

on

peop

le, were Serbs, oc

cupying the

areas

o

f

t

he form er Kingdom of

S

erbia and the old pro vinces

of

Bo

snia, Herce-

govina, and D

almatia. The Serbs used t

he Cyrillic

alphabet,

pro

fessed

mainly th eOrthodox faith

tho

ugh many Serbswere

Moslems,

a

nd

stubb

ornly resiste

d

th

e C entral Powers in

World

War

I. Serbian

Belgrade

w as

th e

seat

of the

Yugoslav

national

government,

le nding

credence to the

claim of

the

minor

ities that th

e

Serbs do

minated

the

sta te. t was

the Se

rbs' violent protestto

Regent

P

aul's

acco

rd

with

Hit

ler and their overthrow

of the go

vernment

in

M arch

1941

tha

t pre

cipitated the German

attack th e follo

wing month,

and

it w a

s

f

rom

among the Serbs

that the C

hetniks

r

ose to resist the

occ

upation

forces.

Next in numbers

to th e Serb

s

were

the C roats, som

e three an

d

thre

e-

qu

arter million,

inhabiting the

northwestern

part

of

Y

ugoslavia. The

tradit

ional capit

al of the Croats was

Zagreb ,

and

the

ir

territory

was

part

of the Austro-Hun

garian Empire

until

the

end of

Worl

d

War I.

The Croats were

culturally more

ad vanced than

the Serbs, were west

ern European in their outloo

k,

and

the

majority profes

sed

C a

th oli

cism.

Although

th

eir

language was related

closely to that of

the

Serbs,

the

Croats usedthe Latin

alphabet. German

influence among

the C r

oats

in t

he pre-194 1

period

w

as strong, and it was on

th e

trad

i-


15/94

6

GERMAN REPOR

T S

R S

tional

Croatian

h

ostility

to the Serbs

that

t

he invader

s placed much

con

fidence in

1941.

Last amo

ng the major

racial groupscompris

ing the Y

ugoslav state

were

the

Slovenes,

inhabiting the

most

northerly

portion

of

th e

coun

try

and numbering som

e one and one-h

alf million.

Like

the C

roats,

the Slovenes

w ere cultur

ally

w

ell advan

ced, usedthe La

tin alphabe

t,

were

oriented toward

the W est,

and for the m

ost

part

Catholic.

Their

historic ca

pital

w

as Ljubljana,

and the

G erman influence

was

very

m

arked.

Smaller national

minorities in

clu ded one-half mill

ion

Hu

ngarians

and almost as

many Albanians;one-

quarter million Romania

ns; and

spli

nter

group

s o

f

C

zechs,

Slova

ks, a

nd other Slavic

p

eoples.

There

were

also

well over

one-half million

Austrians and

G ermans.

n 1941 over

three

q

uarters

of

the

Yugo

slav

popul

ation

worked the

land, an

d agricultur

e

fo

rmed

the

nation's

economic

base. The

chief

e

xports

w e

re

lumber, bauxite, copp

er, some ironore,

and

proce

ssed

fruit

s; im ports

included textiles and

machinery. Depo

sits

of

iron

ore near

the surface

of

t

he groun

d

coul

d not be

use

d to build up

a siz

able steel

industry

because of th e

shortage of cokin

g

coal.

The German onslaug

ht o

f 6 April 1941 caugh

t

the

Yu

goslavs

i

n

th e

midst

of

gen

eral mobilizatio

n,

a

measure that had be

en delay

ed

to

avoid giving provo

cation to Hitle

r. A devastating air

attack on

Be

lgrade

the

day hostilities co

mmenced cr

ippled communic

ations be

tweenthe Yugo

slav

High

Comm

and andthe

armies in thefiel

d. To

placat

e

the

dissatisfied min

orities, which charged t

hat the Serb-

dom

in ated government

would defend only

Serb-inha

bited

areas,

th

e

Yu

goslav Army w as

deployed a

ll

aro und the borde

rs

of

the

countr

y.

T

o

make the Y

ugoslav

position even mo

re

dif

ficult, thousan

ds of Croat

res

ervists

did n

ot

rep

ort asdi

rected for milit

ary

service.

By 17

April

the

G erman

Second

A rmy fromthe northwest and

the Twelfth

Army

from

the

s

outheast, assisted tosom

e extent

by

their

Italian

a

llies,had

broken throughthe thin

shell o

f

resis

tance around the co

untry, cap

tured

al

l major

cities,

and

fo rced

t

he Yugoslav High C o

mmand to

cap

itulate.

I

V Alban

ia

This

small

est of

the

Balkan coun

tries,

approx

imately the

size of

Maryland, had

a population

of slightly over one

million

in

194

1.

After

centuries

of

Turkish

domination,

Albania

had

declared

its

in

dependence

in 1912 , but

it was not until

the end

of

W

orld

War

that

the

tiny state could

consider

itsel

f free

of

it

s stronger neighb

ors.

C onsisting mainly

of

Gheg

tribesmen in

the

north and Tosk

s

h

i

the sout

h,

the

Albanians

were

almost

exclusively

an agricultu

ral and

stock-

raising people. Mineral

and lu mb

er

reso

urces w ere largel

y

undevelope

d

beca

use

of

a

lack of transportation,

although the Italian

s


16/94

G E R M A N ANTIG UE

R R IUA

O PE RA TIO

NS IN TH

E

B A L K

A NS 1941

-1944)

manage

d to

produce

so

me oil a

nd

complete

d

part

of

the s

hort rail

li

ne from Tira

na to the

Adria

tic after

their

occupa

tion

of

the

co

untry

in 1939 .

In

normal

times,

Albania

exported

quantities

of

w ool,

dairy

prod

u

cts, t

obacco,

hides, and

som e

cattle. Texti

les

and

o

ther

finished

produ

cts led

amon

g imports.

Exploi

ted

by

the

Italia

ns Alba

nia furnished

12,000

auxi

liaries to

M us

solini s d

isastrous

campaig

n

a

gainst G

reece in 1940.

A

large

number of

th

ese, howev

er, prom

ptly

deserted

. In

t

he

rugged

moun

tain

areas of

Alban

ia,

Italian con

trol w as Uttle^m

ore than

nomi

nal,

and

the

o

ccupation

garri

sons us

ually re

stricted thems

elves

to

the

few

towns

, t

o

the

throu

gh ro

ads,

a

nd to the

coas

ta l regions.

V.

B u l

gar ia H u n

g a r y R

o m a n ia

an

d

Turi

c ey

Sin

ce

Bulg

aria,

R

omania, andHun

garysuccum

bed to

G erm

an

pres

su

re

to

be

comepartne

rs

of

the

Europea

n A

xis,

an

d Turkey

rem

ained

neut

r l untilthe

end o

f

W

orld Wa

r

II

this

study

will co

nsider these

c

ountries

bu

t briefly.

Bulga

ria, ap

proximat

ely the si

ze of O

hio, had a

popu

lation

of a

little

mo

re

th

an seven

milli

on

in 194

1. Ethni

cally

close

to

the

Rus

sians, the

la n

guage of

the

Bulga

rians w as Sl

avonic.

With an econo

my

primarily

agricultural

the

chief

Bulgarian

exports

w ere

fruits

and

dairy

produc

ts .

Hungary

not

a

tru

e Balka

n c

ountry

b

ut

adjacent

to

t

he Balka

n

area an

d continu

ally

involved in its

pr

oblems, had a

popul

ation

of

slightl

y o

ver nin

em illion and

was approxim

ately the

siz e

of

In

diana.

The eco

nomy o

f Hung

ary w as agr

ic ultural,

w ith m

eat and

cerea

ls

t

hec

hief e

xports.

Rom

ania,

also

outside

th

eBalkan

a

rea

proper,

was approxim

ately

th

e size

of O

regon, and h

ad a

p

opulation

of fifte

en and

one-half

million,

three

quarters

of

whom were engaged

in

agriculture.

With

its

ri

ch Ploes

ti

fields, Roma

nia w as the l

argest

oi

l

produc

er in the

Balkan-

Danubian

ar

ea.

Turkey, as

la

rge as

Texa

s and

M aine combined,

had

a populati

on

of

nineteen

and

one-ha

lf millio

n

an

d

a

n gr

icultur l econ

omy in

1

941 .

In

jthe

Balkans

proper

, Turkey had

only

a

few

thousand

square

m

iles

in

ea

ste rn

Thrace

.


17/94

CH

APTE

R

3

T

RA N

SPO

RTA

TION

AN

D

COM

MUN

ICA

TIO

NS

I

Gene

ral

The

rug

ged

terrai

nof

the B

alka

nsprop

er h

as

beena

hea

vy

hand

i

ca

p tot

he deve

lopm

ent of

an ad

equat

e

tran

sport

ation

and

com

muni

c

ation

net,

and

the fr

equen

t wa

rs and

cha

nges

inth

e

p

olitic

al fro

ntier

s

w

ithin

the

area

have m ade

the

extension

and

improvement offacilities

even

mo

re diffic

ult.

Such

ra

il cons

tructi

on

a

s c

ould

be comp

ared

fa

vor

ablyto

th

at of

we

stern Eu

rope

in

194

1

w

as

r

estric

ted

to the

int

er

nat

ional

li

nes co

nnec

ting

the

capita

l cities

an

d so

me lin

es

int

he

l

ow

land

regio

ns

in

the no

rth.

A

lthou

gh

the road

s affo

rded

som

ewha

t

m

ore

c

omple

te c

overa

ge

tha

n

the

ra

il l

ines,the

re

were

few

h

ard-s

urfac

e h

ighw

ays as

ide fr

om

tho

se

paral

leling

the

main

railro

ads.

Th

e

terra

in

m

ade

ne

cessa

ry

n

umero

us serpe

ntine

s

and br

idges,

an

d deto

urs

were

o

ften

dif f

icult or

im possible .

On

the

whole

road

repair

was very

deficient.

Cab

le s conn

ectin

g

the

vari

ous Ba

lkan

capi

tals we

re

laid

befor

e

Wo

rld

W

ar

I

an

dsom

e im pr

ovem

ents

w

ere

m

ade

d

urin

g th

e

p

eriod

prec

edin

g

th

e at

tack

in 194

1 .

Howe

ver,

little

wa

s do

ne to estab

lish

a

unif

ied and ef

ficien

t cab

le n

etwo

rk thro

ughou

t the

Bal

kan co

untrie

s.

To

rem

ain

with

in

the sc

ope

of thi

s stud

y i

t

will

be

n

ecess

ary to

lim

it consi

derat

ion

of

the

tran

sport

ation

an

d co

mmun

icatio

nn

et to

th

atof

imp

ortan

ce to the

occu

patio

nf

orces

a

ndth

e irreg

ulars

arra

yed

again

st

them

.

II

Main

R

ail L

ines

At

th

e t

ime Germ

an

fo r

ces

over

ran the

Balk

ans

Yug

oslav

ia had

appr

oxim

ately

6 00

0

miles

and

G

reece

1 70

0

m

iles o

f

railro

ad lines;

bo

th count

ries

us

ed th

e

s

tanda

rd

Eur

opean

gau

ge. Th

e m

ost im

por

tant

lin

es w

ere

th

ose c

onver

ging

on

Zag

reb

fromA

ustria

I

taly

a

nd H

ung

ary;

the

lineZ

agreb

-Belg

rade

-Nish

;

a

nd

the

lines

Nis

h-

Sofiy

a and

N

ish-S

alonik

a-At

hens.

All

we

re

vit

al to th

e

Itali

an-

G

erma

n wa

r

e

ffort

sinc

e B

ritish

ai

r

and n

aval

a

ctivi

ty

m

ade su

pply

by

sea difficult

and

the

Germans

did

not

have

the

necessary

truck

tra

nspo

rt

fa

ciliti

es.

Too

in

a

dditi

on t

o t

he

oc

cupat

ion

fo

rces, th

ose

unit

s and inst

allatio

ns s

uppo

rting

th

e Ger

man a

irand n

aval

effor

t i

n

th

e

east

ern

Medi

terran

ean

had

to

be su

pplie

d byrail

a

long

the line

Z

agreb

-Belg

rade

-Nish

-Salo

nika-

Athe

ns.


18/94

GERM

AN A

NTIOU

ERRIU

A

OPER

ATION

S IN

TH

E BA

UtANS

19

41,19

44)

III.

Pr

i n c i p

a l H ig

hw a

ys

T

he r

oads o

f Gre

ece

an

d Yu

gosl

avia we

re

poo

r, wit

h the

e

xcep

tion

of a

t w

international

highw ays and limited areas

in

and about the

ca

pital

s and

majo

r c

ities.

O

f

th

e

v

ariou

s

ro

ad

n

ets,

t

he

be

stw

ere

t

hose i

nnor

thwe

stern

Y

ugos

lavia

, in the

areas

tak

en

from

t

he A

ustr

o-

Hun

gari

an E

mpi

re;

abo

ut

B

elgra

de;

t

hrou

gh S

kopl

je to Salo

nika

;

in

the

indu

stria

l

area

abo

ut

S

alon

ika;

and

in

the

At

hens

-Pira

eus

in

d

ustri

al

a

nd sh

ippin

g

comp

lex.

T

o

t

he

Ger

man

an

dIt

alian

o

ccup

ation

for

ces, the

mo

st imp

orta

nt

road

ne

ts we

ret

hose

r

ough

lyp

arall

eling

the

rail

line

s thr

ough

nor

th

er

n

Yug

oslav

ia,inc

ludin

g Be

lgrad

e;

along

th

e V

arda

r Bi

vr

to Sa

lonika, thence along

the

Aegean

coast

to

Athens;

a

system

of

road?

th

roug

h

the

n

orth

ern h

alf

of t

heP

elop

onne

sus; a se

ries

o

f sec

onda

ry

ro

ads

alo

ng t

heAd

riati

ccoa

st

of Y

ugos

lavia

; som

e t

ortuo

us r

oads

thro

ugh

th

e

Di

naric

A

lps;

an

d

afew

m

ain roa

ds

inwe

stern

G

reec

e.

Th

ough

s

omeof

the

se

r

oads

we

re

pav

ed,th

e m

ajor

itywe

rebuil

t of

cru

shed

stone

an

d u

nab le

tosup

port

sus

taine

d traff

ic an

dhe

avy t

ruck

s

inan

y nu

mbe

rw

ithou

t con

stan

t

re

pair

. I

n

man

y plac

es,

lengt

hsof

pa

ved

road

alt

erna

te d

with

str

etche

s

of crush

ed st

one.

IV .

Waterw ay s

Air f ie ld s

an d

Si g n a l

Fac i l i t ies

W

hil

e

t

heD

anub

e pla

yed

a

s

igni

fican

t

par

t

in

the

log

istica

l supp

ort

of th

e att

ack f

orces

, th

e

wat

erwa

ys with

in Gr

eece

and

Y

ugo

slavi

a

p

rope

r play

ed li

ttle

part

in th

elat

ersu

pply

o

f t

heo

ccup

ation

troop

s.

P

erhap

s th

at put

to

the

most

ext

ensiv

e u

se

wa

s

the

Cor

in th

Can

al,

link

in g t

he G

ulf

of

C

orin

th

and

the

Aege

an. B

y

us

ingth

is

cana

l,

the

Itali

ans w

ere a

ble

tocut

the

distan

ce

from

the

ir s

uppl

y ba

ses

alon

g

the

Adri

atic a

nd

Ionia

n Se

as

to

Pirae

us and

A

then

s b

y s

oma 1*

6

m

iles,

av

oidin

g the

o

pen

sea a

nd

Brit

ish ai

rcraf

t base

d

m

Egyp

t.

Airfield facilities

in

Greece

and

Yugoslavia,

.though

not

extensive,

wer

e m

ore

tha

n adeq

uate

for

the n

eeds

of the

G

erm

ans

and I

talia

ns.

S

tock

s

o

f ga

solin

ean

d o

ther

supp

lies le

ft b

ehin

din G

reece

by

t

he

Br

itish

w

ere

put

to

use,

an

d

the slig

ht

dam

age

to f

ighte

r

b

ases

wa

s

n

ot

enou

gh

to prev

ent

their

im

me

diate

utili

zatio

n.

Perh

aps

mo

st

im

por

tant stra

tegic

ally

w

ere th

eexc

ellen

t ba

ses on

C

re te an

d

in

t

he

At

hens

-Pira

eus

are

a.

S

ignal

facil

ities

in

the

Var

ious

Balk

an

c

ount

ries at

the t

utfe o

ft h s

occ

upat

ion we

re in

capa

ble o

f sup

porti

ng

he

avytr

affic

.

To

o,

it

wa

s

a

simple

m

atter

for th

e

guerri llas

to

d

isrup

tth e f

ew

lon

g-di

stanc

e

c

ables

a

nd ov

erhe

ad w

ires

th

at exis

ted.

The

moun

tain

ous na

ture

of

the

te

rrain

c

ircu

mscr

ibed

the u

se o

f radio

, b

ut

itw

ason

this

and

f

ield

telep

hone

lin

es,

pl

us lia

ison

air

craf

t

tha

t

th

eocc

upat

ion f

orce

s u

suall

y

had

torely.


19/94

P A R T TW

O

T H E O C C

U P A T IO

N O F

T

H E

B A L K A

N S

AND

T

H E R IS

O F

T H E

G

U E R R I L

LA

M

O VE M

E N T

1941-4

2)

TheGerm

an combat troo

ps,

scheduled to

leave

alm

ost imm ediat

ely

t

o refit for Ope

ration BARB

AROSSA

(the assault on the

Soviet

Unio

n),

h

ad little

time fo

r

pris

oners after

their quick

co

nquest

of

Y

ugoslavia,

and captu

red

Greeks were

paroledas

a

gesture

of res

pect

for their heroic ef

fort in

d

efense of the

ir country

. Thus, short

ly after

the

cessati

on

of

hostilities,

the Yugosla

v and

Greek

force

s were de

mobili

zed, their

pers

onnel

id le, and

stunn

ed

rather

than crushe

d by

their

sudden

defeat.

Many

had

never

seen

the

enem y,

others

had

recently be

en

o

n th

e

offe

nsive, as

the G reek forces

in Albania,

and

had

been

forced to stop

fighting

only when enc

ir cled by th

e

G

ermans o

r

because h

igher command

ers had surre

ndered.

The G

erm an aut

horities

were cognizan

t

of

the.

threat

of

t

hese u

n

em

ployed e

x-soldiers a

nd other dissiden

t elem

ents uni

ting

to

fo rm

a

res

istance m

ovement .

M ore

over,

the

commence

m ent of

hostiliti

es

wit

h

the

Soviet

U

nion

2

m

onths

later

m

ade ex

ternal suppo

rt of su

ch a

m o

vement most

probab

le;

aid

by the R

ussians would

serve

to

div

ert

G

erman divisions

from

the

Russian th

eater of w

ar, gain

the

Kre

mlin

anopening

wedge

for th

e communica

tion of the

Bal

kans,

and

possibl

y

even permi

t

realization of the

age

-old Russian des

ire foraccess

to the

Adria

tic and

M

editerranea

n.

Little

was done to

fore

stall

title obvi

ous

threat o

f revolt.

Perhap

s

the G erm

ans c

onsidered

the few divisions

th e

y were leav

ing behind

su

fficient t

o secure Gree

ce and Yugosla

via and

ke

ep

up

an un

in

terrupted flow of raw

materi

als tothe G

ermanwar

machine

. Most

certainly

German

planners

were,

preoccupied

with

the

approaching

campaign

ag

ainst

th

eSoviet U

nion. At

anyrate,

German

prepara

tionsto contain

and destr

oylarge-scale

risings

were inadequa

te .

Be

lated Ge

rm an

efforts as time

pass

ed

succeede

d

only

in quel

ling

t

emporarilyt

he

growing surge

of

resistanc

e inareas wher

e

th

e

occupa

tion authoriti

es could

m ass

superior forc

es. Suppress

ion

o

f the re-


20/94

G ER

M N NTIGU

ERRIU OPER TIONS

IN TH B

IK NS 194

1-1944)

s

istance movemen

t

became

and

rem

ained

f

or ov

er 2 years

a

makeshif

t

affair,

with the guer

rill s bein g

pursued

from one ar

ea to a

nother,

sufferin

g heavy casual

ties,

but never be

ing destroyed.

During this

2-year

period

duty

in

the

southeast was

regarded

as

relative

ly saf

e

by

the averageLand

aer so

ldier); n

ot

as

pleasa

nt,

per

haps, as

assignm

ent to

occup

ation d

uty in

France Belgiu

m , or Ho

l

land,

but infinitely

preferabl

eto

service

in

the Soviet

Union or North

Africa. F

or

i

ts part,

the A

rm ed Forces H

igh

Comm

and consid

ered

its

Balkan

theat

er

a

bulwark

against attack fr

om th

esouth an

d

its

possession nec

essary for

the secu

rity of th

e

forces

in the

southern

p

art

of the

Soviet Union

.

The R

eichs

primary

inte

rest in

th e

are

a itself

once the

se securit

y

objective

s

had been achieved, w

as

as a source of

strategic

raw m aterials.

Its

im portance increased when

the

supply

of

chrome

f

rom

Tur

key was

stopped

and the Turks beg

an to

drift toward

the Allied cam

p.

The

Germ a

n attitude

toward th

e population

was on

e of

mistrust

.

The maj

ority of

th e

inha

bitants

were

S

lavs, a

nd

o v

n a

ultmr (lac

king

cu

lture).

H

owever, as in

th e other occupied

countries,

the Germans

felt th

ey

could

re

ach a modus v

iven i to achieve

their

military

and

political

aim

s; the

p

opulation coul

d be kept

under cont

rol by

a

p

ro

gram of dividi

ng and ruli

ng well

illustrat

ed by th

e

establis

hment of a

Croatian

state

out

of

the

body

of

Yugoslavia.


21/94

GE

RMA

N R

E P O

R T S R I

S

Y

U

O

SL

VI

THE

P

ART

ITIO

N OF

GRE

ECE

Arto

t O c

c u p i

ed

r b

y

t h a I tal

lo n s

A r

s t O

c c u p

ied

b y

ta

O

trma

at

A

reas

A n a

e i e t f

b y t h

B u lg a r lo n t

it T

h

Gt

rm on

h o

d A

i r F o

re* b

ait

an d

var i

o u i

a d m in i t t r a t lv * In * fo l ia t i o n s

t o

tht

Athtr.i-Pirocvi arta

ap2

he

p

art

itio

nof

G

reec

e


22/94

CHAPTER

4

THE OCCUPATION ZONE

S ND FORCES

I D i v i s i on

a n d

D i s m e

mbe r men t

To free German troops for

employment

in

Operation BARBA-

KOSSA and in

compliance with comm

itments to Mussolini, the

occupation

of

the

Balkans was

to

be primarily

a

responsibilit

y of the

Italians.

German

interests

in

the

area, as

def ined

by

Hitler,

included

only

the

secur

ity of

sup

ply routes and

communications to German

air

bases in Gr&ece and

Crete, the safeguarding of the copper-pro

ducing area

in

northeastern Serbia,

the protection of a

n

open shipping

r

oute on the Danube, and

reten

tion of the

econc-mic

privileges

granted

Germany

by

t

he

former Yugos

lav Gov

ernment.

In

addition to Albania, which they had

held since 1939,

theItalians

assumed control of

Greece, with

the

exception of German-held areas

around Salonik

a and

Athens, th island

of Crete, and a number

of the

Aegean

Islands.

Another

exception was western

Thrace,

which

was

annexed by

the

Bulgarians.

(M

ap 2.)

In Yugoslavi

a, the Italians

incorpor

ated western

Slovenia, includ

ing Ljubljana, into Italy, and

annexedDalmatia and

Montenegro.

A

small

portion ofsouthwestern Serbia

was

detached

and

added

to

Greater Albania,

The

It

aliansalso dominated the newly

pro

claimed kingdom

of Croatia, which fo

r

purposes

of

security and

antigue

rrilla

opera

tions

was

divided

into

Ge

rman and Italian zones

of interest by a line along the

axis Visegrad-Sarajevo-Banj

a

Lnka-

north to the border

of

the

German-annexed

portion o

f Slovenia;

the Germans

were permittedto send

tro

ops into the area

east ofthis

line

andthe

Italian troops

could

operate

west of the

line.

F

or their

part, th

e

Germans

incorporated into Greater Germany that

portion

of Sloveni

a that had once been

part

o

f

the

Austri

an

province 6f

Carinthia,

an

d occ

upied

Serbia and the Banat.

The Bulg

arians

an

nexed

Y ug

oslav Macedonia and,

in

early

1942,

occupied

south

eastern Serbi

a;

the Hu

ngarians annexed the Batchka and

Baranya

and a small portion

of

eastern

Slovenia.

(Map

3.)

II The

I ta l ians

T

hree Italian armies and

a total of

4

5 divisions had pa

rticipated

i

n the campaigns

against Greece

and

Yugoslavia.

The armies were

the Secon

d,

Ninth,

and Eleventh, all directly under t

he omm ndo

13


23/94


24/94

G ERMA N

ANTIGUERRIUA

OPERATIONS IN THE BAUC A

NS

1941-

1944) 15

upremo (Supreme General

Staff),

under which

they

remain

ed for

the

period of the

occupation.

By early

August 1941 the army head

quarters

had been redesignated as

area

commands

and

the

total

num

ber of

divisions

reduced

to

32.

The

commander

of

the

Italian

Sec

ond

Army became

Armed

Forces Commander

, Slovenia and Dal-

matia, with

8

divisions; the commanding

general of the N

inth

Army

became Armed

F

orces

Commander, Albania and Montenegro,

with

12 divisions; the

Eleventh

Ar

my commander

became the

Arm

ed

Forces Commander, Gre

ece, with divisions. One

addi

tional

div

i

sion

was

stationed in the Dodecanese

Islands.

A

change in this

organization was made when

the

Ar

med

Force

s Comma

nd,

A

lbania

and

Montenegro, was divided between

the Armed

Forces Comm

and,

Albania,

and the M ilitary

Command,

Montenegro.

The

policy

of the

Italian

occupation

authorities

was waverin

g and

irresolute,

and the Italians accom

plished Pttle

or noth

ing

toward

restoring the economy of

the areas un

der

their

contro

l. Com

mandei-s

were slow to

react to

guerrilla

forays,

and the common soldier hoped

for a

state of mutual

toleration with the population. This

reluct

ance

to act

firmly,

after their poor showi

ng in the

1940-41 campa

igns,

earne

d the Italians the

disdain of the

Greek

s and Yugoslavs

and

encouraged depredations. Harsh and

arbitrary

reprisals,

when

action

was

undertaken,

further

increased

tha

resentment of

the

popu

lation to

ward

the Italians.

Individual punishment was

often in

flicted

w

ithout

trial, and on many

occasio

ns entire

villages were

burned to discourage d

isorders. From disdain, the attitud

e of the

Greeks

and Yugoslavs soon changed

to one of hatred.

The

German

Twelfth Army,

w

hich

had driven the length of the

Balkan

Peninsula

and

conquered

Greec

e, was assigned to

the occupa

tion

of

the

German-held

areas

in

the southeast,

with headquarters

near Athens, whence it moved on

27

Octob

er to

Salonika.

The com

m a

nder of Twelfth

Army,

Generalfeldmarsc

hall Field M arshal)

Wilhelm List, also becam

e

A

rmed

Forces

Commander, Southeast, on

9

June 194

1,

thereafter

functioning in a dual role. As

Armed

Forces

Commander, Southea

st, Field Marshal

List

was

the supreme German

military

authority

in the

Balkans

and was

answerable directly to

Hi

tler. His

responsib

ilities in

tMs capacity included the preparation

and direction

of

a coordinated defen

se agains

t attack,

th

e

suppression

of

internal

unrest,

and the

conduct

of

relations with

the

Italian

and

other Axis milit

ary authorities in the area. Mars

hal List was further

charged

with the

sec

urity

of

German supp

ly

routes

through the

Hereaf

ter

the term Armed Forces

Commander, Southeast, w

ill

be useO

to refer to the

officer

holding

the title W ehrmachlbefehlshab

er

Suedoe

t, while

tlie

abbreviate

d

title

WB

Southeast will be used to refer

to

his

headquarters.


25/94

B

alkans

and the m

ilitary

ad

ministrat

ion

o

f the

German-

occupied

ar

eas.

These last

w

ere thre

e

in

num

ber:

Serbia

p

roper;

t

he Salon

ika

region

and

the is l

ands of L

emnos, M yt

ilene. Kh

io s,

and Skyros

; and

southe

rn

Greece, in

cluding th

e

citi

es o

f Ath

ens and Pirae

us,

and the

islands of C

rete,

Cythera

, and

Melos.

Se

rbia

w a

s plac

edunder,

the

Military

Commander,

Serbia,

with

headquarters

at

Belgrade; the

S

alonika

area un

der the

Milit

ary

C

ommande

r. Salon

ika-Aeg

ean, wi

th

headqu

arters at

Salonik

a;

and Athen

s and Pira

eus und

er the M

ilitary

Com

mander,

S

outhern Gre

ece, w ith

head

quarters at

Athens.

Since

much

of the

Ge

rman

air effo

rt in the

eastern M

editerra

nean was

di

rected

f

rom Ath

ens, the hea

dquarter

s of th

e Militar

y Comm

ander,

Southern

Gr

eece,

w as

staffed

larg

ely by the

Air Forc

e. The

naval

and

air for

ce headq

uarters

inth

e

Ba

lkans

werep

laced under c

ontrol

of Marshal

Listfor

operational

purposes,as were

the

v riou

s

liaison

uiS-scrs

and military m

issions

wi

th

the It

alians,

Bulgari

ans, Hun

gari

ans, an.d

Croats.

Atthe

timehostil

ities ende

d in April,

Twelf

th A

rmyhad un

der

its

control four

corp

s

he

adquarte

rs an

d a to

tal of

t

w elve div

isions,

fou

r of

them arm o

red. By

22

J

une,

w

henOpe

ration BA

RBARO

SSA

began,

three of the co

rps h

eadquart

ers, all

the

arm

ored

divisio

ns, and

all

b

ut 2

mounta

in

and infantry

divisions

had been rede

ployed.

Th

is redis

tribution

o

f forces

l

eft T

welfth Ar

my wi

th the X

Vin

Mountain

Corps,

with

headquarters

near

Athens,

to which were

attac

hed th

e

5th

and 6th M

ountain D

ivisions

,

o

n C

rete and

near

At

hens, r

espective

ly; the1

64th Infan

try

D

ivision,

in

Salon

ika

and

on

the Aeg

ean

I

slands;

and

t

he

125th

I

nfantry Eegime

nt Sepa

rate),

in

Sa

lonika.

The

gap

create

d

b

y the

depart

ed

uni

ts was'

fil

led partially

by tl i

e

rec

ently

creat

ed

L

XVCorps

Co

mmand,

an area,

rather

than a

tactic

al,

h

eadquart

ers st

ationed

in Bel

grade. To

this

headqu

arters w e

re at

tached

the 704t

h,

714th, an

d

7l7th

Infan

try

D

iv isions,

spread

over

Serbia

proper, and the

718th

Infantry

Division,

stationed in

the

Germ

an

zone of i

nterest in

Croatia

, with

headqua

rters

at

Banja

Luk

a.

( Chart

1.) In

contr

ast to the troo

psthe

y

repl

aced, m

ore than o

ne-half

of

the

personn

el

of

th ese

division

s, par

ticularly

th

e platoon

lea

ders

and

nonc

ommissi

oned off

icers,

were ove

r

a

ge for

infan

try

service.

The

co

mbat

experie

nce of m

ost of

the com

pany a

nd highe

r com

man

ders w as li

mited to

World Wa

r

I

and the divi

sio ns lacked

their

full

complem

ent of

m

otor vehicl

es

and logist

ical services

.

Tr

aining

h

ad been int

errupted

by th

e assi

gnment t

o

o

ccupation

d

uty

to

the

ext

ent one

division

had only co

mpleted

battali

on exe

rcises.

Germ

an

str

ength

inthe

Balkans

remain

ed

at

a

pproxima

tely t

his

level

until

mid

-Septemb

er

1941,

the

only

change

b

eing

in mi

d-August

,

when

the6

th Mount

ain Div

ision left. Th

e713th

Infantry

Div

ision.


26/94


27/94


28/94

GE

R M A N AN TIG

UERRILLA O P E R A T I

O N S IN THE

B A L K A N S 1941

-1944) 19

briga

des an

d a railroad se

curity

brigade u

ntil late

i

n the

war,

when

these

bri

gades

we

re

joined

with the ex

panded Ustas

cha force

s

to

form

div

is ions.

Croatian-

German

Legion

units, su

ch as the 369th, 3 7 3

d,

and 392d

Infantr

y

Divi

sions;

two SS div

isions, the 1 3

th and 23d

Mountain; and

addition

al

m

ountain

brigades and

separat

e battalions

were recruited in Cro

atia

by theGermans

draining

of

f m uc

h of the

manpowe

r that might

have

g

one to

the Croati

an forc

es. M

ore

poten

tial

Cr

oatian t

roops w e

re sip honed

off

in

labo

r

dr

afts or

by

t

he poli

ce,

or

fl

ed t

o

join

one

or another

of the

guerrilla groups.

A Peta

in-like figu

re wa

s

fo

und

in

Serbia

in the person

ofGeneral

Nedit

ch, a former chief

of staff

of the Eoya

l

Yug

oslav Army.

Within

Serbia,

in addition

to

the

civil

police,

several

militarized

security

fo

rces

w er

e

fo

rmed to

keep order an

d lighten the

German

occupation

ta

sk. The first

of

these was the Borde

r Guard,

5,600

stro

ng, includin

g

a

Ger

man cadre

of

600; the prima

ry m is

sion

of

thi

s force wa

s tocon

t

rol traffic acr

oss

t

he Ser

bian fron

tier. In addition,

to

su

pport

the

city

and rural

police should the

need arise, the State

Guar

d was organized,

comprisin

g

five

bat

talions with

an

au

thorized

tot

al

s

trength of 3 ,

560

m en.

The Serbi

an

V

olunteer

Battal

ions,la

ter

amalgam

ated into

the Ser

bian Volunteer

Corp s, most

closely

approximated a

national

military

force. Four and

l

ater

five in

num

ber, the

se

batt

alions, under

thecom

mand

ofGeneral Ljotit

ch, were

scatter

ed about

the

German-occ

upied

area

ofSerbia

.

T

heir

a

pproximate

tota

l strength

w

as 2,000.

Anot

her for

ce

fo

rmed in 1941

within

Serbia but n

ot respon

sible

to

the

Neditch G

overnment

was the Russi

an Guard

Corps

, under com

man

d

o

f General

Steif

on

.

It had

thre

e regime

nts and

a total

streng

th

of

4,000. Inc

orporated into th

e

Wehrm

acht, th

e corps w

asco

mposed

largely

of anti-S

oviet emig

res

who

had

served in the arm

ies of the

Czar;

many

of

the

personnel

were

incapable

of

extended

field

service,

and the Germ

ans generally

restr

icted them to

such security du

ties as

the protection

of the

vital Belgrade

-Nish railr

oad lin

e.


29/94

CH APT

ER 5

THE EARLY M O V E M E NT

AND AXIS

COUNTERMEASU

RES

The

political allegiances of the

r

esistance movement

had

little

in

fluence on the

military

operations

cond

ucted

b

y the

occupying

powers.

Rather,

everyon

e fighting against the occupation forces was

considered

a

threat

to

their

hold

on

the

Balkans.

True, the

methods

used

and the

ultimate objectives differed fro

m one group to the other. However, as

far

as

the

Italians,

Germ

ans, and Bulgarians

were

concerned, all

in

ar

msagainst them were ene

mies, whether they

wore

the royal crest of

a

so

vereign in

exile,

the hamme

r and sickle, or no

insignia whatever.

I

Y ugo s la v i a

Armed opposition on

a significant scale received

its start in Y ugo

slavia.

However, any consideration

of

this

movement would

be

incomplete

without distinguishing

between

the Pan-Serb,

monarchical

group ofthe former

Col. Draja Mihailovitch

and

the communist-led

effort of Josip

Broz, or Tito. It was

the former that first came to the

attention of the All

ied world, at the time German domination

,

of

the

C

ontinent was almost complete

and Soviet

forces were retreating

from

we

stern Russia.

Mihailovitch

c

alled his

irregulars

Chetniks, from

the

title of

a

Serb national

ist organizati

on

that had

resisted the Turks, fought well

in World War I and since existe

d asa reserve for

ce to be

called up

when needed. Costa

Pecanatch, the

aging World

War I

leader, went

over to the Neditch

government at the outset of the occupation, leaving

Mihailovitch with

thos

e remnants

willing to

re

sist the oc

cupation

forces.and

collaborationists. TheMihailovitch m

ovement quickly

gained

momentum during the early s

ummer

of 1941,

and liaison was

established

with the government-in-exile

of

King

Peter. A short time

later M

ihailovitch

was

first named

commander

of the

resistance

forces

within

Yugoslavia,

and

then minister of defense

of the royal

govern

ment-in-exile.

Chetnik

policy

called

for the organiza

tion of strong undergroun

d

forces inSerbia

for

the

day

when

they might

rise

in conjunction

with

Al

lied landing

s

on the Balk

an

Pe

ninsula.

Mihail

ovitch, hmisel

f, had

been

appalled by

the

execu

tion of some 35,000 Serb

hostages for

Chetnik acti

vities inWorldWar I

and

was

determined

to

av

oid

repeti-

20


30/94

GERMAN ANTIGUERRILLA

OPERATION

S

IN

TH E

B A L K A N S 1941-194

4) 21

tion

of any

such

reprisals for a premature

rising

o

f the forces under

his

command.

Thus,

Chetnik operations

were

generally

restricted

to

small-scale actions and

sabotage.

It

was

the

communist

irregulars

who

adopted

the

name

of

Partisan

and

m

ade

it

synony

mous

with guerrilla. U

nderTito, bornJosip Broz

in

Croa

tia, converted

to communism while a prisoner

of war of

the

Russians at

the

time of

the

B

ed

E

evolution, and

Secretary

Ge

neral of

the Communist Party of Yu

goslavia

since

1937, the Partisan

move

ment

received its

start

in

Belg

rade immediately after

the surrender to

the G

ermans.

I

n

August

1941 Tito

moved

his headqua

rters into the

field and took over

command of the

gr

owing Partisan

forces.

The

antiroyalist policy of

the Partisans

and

ant

icommunist attitude of the

hetniks

soon

led

to

a

fratricidal

conflict between

the

two,

a

cleavage

the Germans

were quick to turn to

their own advantage. Whereas the

Chetniks

comprised mostly local units

to be called

up as

needed,

the

Pa

rtisans

had

a

gre

at

number

of

l

arge and

active mobile unitscapable

of moving about

the country and not

tied down to any parti

cular

locality. As a

consequence, the Partisans

were

not as

hesitant

as

the

Chetniks

toengage in

o

perations for

which the occupying f

orces

would

e

xact severe reprisals, a deve

lopment

that inc

urred

further

the enmity

of the Chetniks. A

conflict

w

ithin a conflict soon de

veloped, with one

Yugoslav force

attacking the

other

while

that

force was

already

engaged aga

inst occupation troops.

In so

me

cases

the Partisans were given credit for

Chetnikattacks

against the

o

da pamphlet no. 20-243 (german antiguerrilla operations in the balkans)

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