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Murakami Wood: Cultures of Urban Surveillance Report - RES-063-27-0194

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Cultures of Urban Surveillance: Assessing the Character and Intensity of Surveillance in

Contemporary Global Cities

FFinal Report to the ESRC

David Murakami Wood

Background and Objectives

The concept of ‘surveillance society’ describes a highly bureaucratised modern nation-state in which surveillance practices constitute a dominant mode of social ordering (c.f. Lyon 2007). It is now recognised that surveillance has major differences in its character, scope and reception in specific places (e.g. Bennett and Lyon, 2008; Murakami Wood, 2009). The major driver of this project was to understand the interaction of globalizing surveillance and local cultures in places with high intensity interactions between them:‘global’ or ‘world cities’. The research programme had three broad areas of concern around surveillance: extent; political economy; and public and policy understanding.

The programme was designed with four case studies: London, UK; Tokyo, Japan; Toronto, Canada; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Three parallel streams of research were to be conducted in each: development of quantitative and qualitative indices of surveillance;interviews on the political economy of surveillance; and workshops on understanding and ethics of surveillance. The programme also involved training in research methods andcommunication.

Methods and Practice

Delays in the application process meant an effective six-months slippage in the project start date. Therefore the proposed initial training programme could not be carried outbecause the Brazilian research visit was already fixed by institutional arrangements. I then accepted a position in Canada, which meant cutting the Fellowship to one year. The best use of the remaining time was a research visit to Japan. Both research visits focused on interviews, documentary analysis and urban neighbourhood studies. Interviewees and areas are listed in the Appendices.

InterviewsNational-level elite interviews proved difficult (due to a snap general election in Japan, for example), but a range of urban policy-makers, academics, police officials, NGOs and community representatives were interviewed: 20 interviews with 25 interviewees in Brazil, and 14 interviews with 26 interviewees in Japan. Interviews were conducted with a native speaker as interpreter. Semi-structured interviews with a common list of topicsand questions, supplemented by more specific questions were used. Interviewees were

To cite this output: Murakami Wood, David (2010). Cultures of Urban Surveillance: Assessing the Intensity and Character of Surveillance in Global Cities: Full Research Report ESRC End of Award Report, RES-063-27-0194. Swindon: ESRC


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offered the options of full, partial or no anonymity, and the ability to speak on or off-the-record, at the start and end of the interview. The interviews were transcribed and translated, resulting in over 250,000 words of text, which is being analysed formally, using NVivo 8.

Other MethodsRelevant policy documents were gathered and translated. Social-morphological studies of four urban neighbourhoods (two in each city), including security and surveillance mapping, were conducted. In each country, I visited the research sites of surveillance researchers and discussed their work.

Results

Due to space constraints, this report will concentrate on two domains of surveillance in each city: the area of citizenship, and policing. Several other domains, including transport and telecommunications, were also examined.

1: Rio de Janeiro

Citizens and State: welfare, rights and identificationIn Brazil, a large percentage of everyday interactions require multiple tokens of identification. Obtaining these tokens is therefore vital to inclusive citizenship1

One new source of identification is crucial for marginalised citizens not possessing other identification. The Programa Bolsa Família (‘Family Grant Program’ / PBF) provides a small, direct payment to families with children, provided that the children go to school and have medical check-ups. The PBF allows the state to acquire personal details from people otherwise excluded from state data gathering. Underlying it is the collection of personal information through the Cadastro Único para Programas Sociais (‘Single Register for Social Programs’ / CadÚnico) based on a unique Social Identification Number (NIS). School attendance is monitored by Projeto Presença (‘Project Presence’). Gilliom (2001) showed how Federal assistance programs in the USA could impact negatively upon the lives of claimants, particularly women. However, female Community Association representatives in favelas in Rio saw the combination of enforced school

. After the Birth Certificate (Certidão de Nascimento) and school papers, the first formal adult methods of identification is the Identity Card (Carteira de Identidade) or RG (for Registro Geral, the General Registry identification database). The RG is intended to be a comprehensive identification method, but in practice the Registry of Physical Persons (CPF) card is more important. Other identification schemes also exist (e.g. Carteira Nacional de Habiliação (driving license), voter cards, military service certificates). For contractual negotiations, at least the RG, CPF and proof of address are usually required. For some negotiations, even voter ID (with proof of having voted) and military service certificate (for males only) are needed. There is a separate system of identification for foreign residents, the Registro Nacional de Estrangeiros.

1 For more details of this argument, see: Murakami Wood and Firmino, 2009.



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attendance with economic assistance as a double benefit not as ‘control’. Attendance at school provides an education keeping kids out of gangs or early pregnancy, and a record with the state, building up early forms of identification that would lead to a CPF and ‘normal’ citizenship.

There are two main problems with Brazilian identification systems: firstly, identification is insecure and according the Federal Police, it is relatively easy to acquire multiple identities from different states. Secondly, Brazil has relatively weak data protectionregulation (Doneda 2006). The principle of habeas data is recognised however this requires enforcement through the courts and is therefore beyond most ordinary people. Senior officials interviewed saw the solution as merely technical not one of new rights or laws, however no-one interviewed articulated trust in the state’s technical or moral capabilities. One exception may be the PBF, which has an internal Observatório de Boas Práticas (‘Observatory for Best Practice’) with comprehensive data protection measures.

In the name of security and efficiency the Ministry of Justice is currently merging the RG, CPF, Driving License and Electoral Registration into a new Registro de Identidade Civil (RIC) smart card system, based on a unique number. Enrolment and issuing new cards started in January 2009 in the poorer and remote northern and north-eastern states, with the aim of registering 20 million people per year, with the entire population being registered by 2017. The plan also creates a nationwide fingerprint database, which had not thus far existed, even for law enforcement, unlike in other democracies (Cole 2001). Given the lack of data protection, it seems likely this database will be accessible to the police.

Interviews demonstrated widespread support across political and social spectra in favour of the new system. For Brazilians, the legacy of the twentieth century with its rapidly changing mixture of dictatorship, military rule and more or less democratic republics, was not the nightmare of order of the ‘surveillance states’ of mid-century Europe, but of corrupt and arbitrary rule. The new ID cards therefore seen as a guarantee against the anonymity that would allow abuses by the state, even disappearance. Fischer (2008) quotes an old woman encountered in a Rio favela in the mid-1990s who said ID papers made her feel like a person. Such sentiments were common amongst marginalised interviewees in 2009 and was referred to as a ‘cultural characteristic’ by Delegado Berredo of the Federal Police. Only from a few educated elite interviewees with international connections was there concern about state control.

Crime, Policing and Public Space Rio’s topography and historical development means that marginalized favelas (informal settlements) abut wealthy formal neighbourhoods, resulting in turbulent politics. From 2008, Mayor Eduardo Paes and State Governor Sergio Cabral have abandoned the effective Favela Bairro (Favela Neighbourhood) programme of former Mayor Cesar Maia (Moreno-Dodson 2005), in favour of Choque de Ordem (Shock of Order). This involves demolition of illegal buildings, walling some favelas, removal of unlicensed street vendors, and high-profile occupations of favelas by police Unidades Pacificadores



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(Pacification Units / UPs). Three favelas were occupied in 2008 – Santa Marta, Cidade de Deus and Batan – since expanded to seven.

In Santa Marta, drug traffickers had been expelled and trust built between charismatic UP Captain Pricilla and the local community association. However several factors threaten to undermine the apparent progress. The first is the police themselves. Policing in Rio is complex, with the paramilitary Policía Militar (PM), the Policía Civil detectives (PC),national Polícia Federal (PF), and the newer civic Guarda Municipal (Municipal Guard / GM). In addition, there are the PM ‘elite squad’ Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE, which remains largely independent), and the new UPs. According to every interviewee, including the police themselves, police corruption is pervasive. Captain Pricilla suggested a possible gender and generational shift in the mainstream PM, however Santa Marta residents still did not trust the police in general, even having established a personal working relationship with Captain Pricilla.

The second factor is the numerous unofficial armed groups. Many favelas are controlled by criminal gangs associated with cocaine-trafficking. These gangs owe nominal allegiance to one of three umbrella groups, and are in conflict with each other, the police,and various militias (Autodefesas Comunitárias / ADCs), supported by elements in thearmy, police and rightist political parties. There are also 80,000 registered private security organisations in Brazil and as many unregistered (Kanashiro, 2008). Several interviewees claimed police officers moonlight as private security guards and many private security firms were owned by relatives of senior police officers. The chair of the wealthy Santa Teresa community association argued that private security companies, ADCs and gangs reinforce each other in a spiral of criminality and securitization. In Santa Teresa, richer residents are employing private security to gate several (public)dead-end streets, where guards check ID and restrict access. Residents say this is legal; the Community Association disagrees.

The third factor is the growth of surveillance. There are only 188 public space surveillance cameras in the whole of the state of Rio de Janeiro, and another 88 traffic monitoring cameras in the city itself. Senior PM and BOPE officers were indifferent towards cameras – like Colonel Duarte seeing them as a mere supplement to ‘real policing’ – and the office of the Secretary of State for Security dismissed them for cost reasons. However the PC deputy director was strongly in favour of more ‘intelligence-led’ and surveillance-based policing. For him, video surveillance was essential for the city’s preparedness for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. All agreed that currently Rio was not ready, and the architect of ‘Zero Tolerance’, ex-Mayor of New York and inspiration for Choque de Ordem, Rudy Giuliani, has now been appointed as Security Advisor2

2 Globo.com, 03/12/09, ‘Governo do Rio contrata ex-prefeito de Nova York para ajudar na segurança’

. The Superintendent of Video Surveillance, responsible for managing the 188 cameras, expressed nostalgia for a surveillance airship used during the 2007 Pan-American Games but said that greater investment, centralisation, co-ordination and professionalization of surveillance operations was taking place. However, he stated there

http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Rio/0,,MUL1402463-5606,00.html



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were no plans to expand video surveillance into the pacified favelas, and Captain Pricilla agreed this would undermine local trust.

However, in late 2009, nine networked surveillance cameras were installed in Santa Marta. The reaction from the Community Association was shocked. Posters called Santa Marta, “the most watched place in Rio” and asking, “we are a pacified favela […] when will we be treated as ordinary citizens instead of being seen as suspects?” They contrast the costs of the cameras, and a wall being built along one side of the favela, with the minimal amount spent on sewage and water, and claim that the Community Association was not consulted. PM representatives have stated that cameras will be introduced into the other ‘pacified’ favelas. By invading, walling and installing video surveillance against local wishes, community representatives argued that the state (and the PM in particular) is operating like a gang, and it does seem the Rio administration is moving increasingly towards what Steven Graham (2010) calls ‘military urbanism.’

However, many favelas are already subject to intimate micro-authoritarian internal control by gangs and it is not just police who have been installing surveillance cameras.In September 2008, the military police found a whole system of 12 cameras and a hidden control room in Parada de Lucas, a favela in the north of the city3, and in 2009, another was discovered in Morro dos Macacos4

Japan has no national system of identification. Instead the Driving Licence is used as de-facto ID. There are two main state registers. The koseki is a late C19th family-based system. It is now a computer record and few regularly carry a printed version. Thejyuminhyou (Residents’ Register) is a current address register kept by local authorities, on many different local computer databases and paper files. In 1999 the Resident Registration Law introduced a voluntary Resident Registration Card and a system for connecting jyuminhyou: the jyuminkihondaichou network system (Residents’ Registry Network System, juki-net). This is legally restricted to transmitting four pieces of personal data (name, sex, date-of-birth and address), plus a randomly-generated 11-digit unique number. The system was opposed through a class-action suit from residents’groups, which argued it was anti-constitutional and put personal data at risk, but this suit failed in the Supreme Court, in March 2008

. Traficantes video surveillance systems therefore predated those of the police in the favelas.

2: Tokyo

Citizens and State: welfare, rights and identification

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From interviews, we identified eight main threads of opposition discourse, all of which referenced kanshi shakai (‘surveillance society’). Shared by all were: objections to acentral database; the potential for progress to national identification; and objections to

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3 UOL.com.br, 12/09/2008 ‘Polícia estoura central clandestina de monitoramento de TV no RJ’,http://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2008/09/12/ult5772u806.jhtm4 ‘Mandante da invasão ao Morro dos Macacos utiliza câmeras para controlar favelas’5 See e.g: Japan Times, March 18 2008, ‘Editorial: Privacy vs. Juki Net’, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20080318a2.html



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loss or illicit sharing of personal information. Emphasised by neo-liberal opponents like the Mayor of the Suginami, Hiroshi Yamada, were: national state control over both local government and citizens; privacy; and cost. On the left, from opponents like Professor Ogura Toshimaru and the Kanshi-No! campaign were: objections to any register of addresses at all; the nature of the data shared – the jyuminhyo is still a patriarchal system with a household ‘head’ and ‘dependents’; the increasing influence of large IT companies in government; connections to the border, passport and visa system; and the disproportionate effects on trades unionists, activists, and gaikokujin (‘foreigners’).

Foreign residents must carry the gaikokujin touroku shoumeisho (Certificate of Alien Registration). This is seen as discriminatory in the case of ‘Korean’ or ‘Chinese’permanent residents, whose increasingly distant ancestors came from those countries. Thecard was also controversial as it included fingerprinting requirements for foreigners, a legacy of the colonial period. These were removed in 1999, but reintroduced in 2007,along with facial photographs, for all ‘foreigners’ except Korean and Chinese residents. Foreigners will also be listed on the jyuminhyou from 2012.

Government interviewees disagreed with opponents. The Director of Lasdec (Local Authorities Systems Development Centre, responsible for juki-net) argued that oppositionwas based on misunderstanding and fear of computerisation. He claimed that juki-net was prevented by law from expanding into a national ID scheme and in any case would not be the best such foundation: passport, driving licence and healthcare databases all had more useful information.

The Prime Minister’s IT Senryaku Honbu (IT Strategic Headquarters), responsible for developing the ‘i-Japan’ strategy said that movement towards a centralised government database will continue, and there will eventually be a full identification system and card.Any remaining laws preventing this would be changed or removed. They said that juki-net had been intended as a basis for identification systems development, but the focus has shifted to national insurance, health and pensions. The eventual database will also enablecitizens to add information from private sources, such as bank account and savings.However the government had still not decided who would have access, and both police and private insurance companies were considered as potential users.

Data protection was underappreciated by state interviewees. A comprehensive new Personal Information Protection Bill was passed in 2003 (in force from 2005). However, like Brazil, but unlike Canada and the UK for example, this law does not empower any independent regulatory authority. Instead data protection remains an internal matter for government ministries and companies, with legal action the ultimate sanction. The IT Strategic HQ developed data protection in Japan but did not appear to understand the internationally-recognised principles of necessity, proportionality and consent.

Crime, Policing and Public Space Video surveillance systems in Japan have been expanding since the 1990s. There are just 363 Keisatsuchou (‘National Police Agency’ / NPA) cameras, however there are more owned by local municipal authorities, particularly in Tokyo, and thousands more



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operated by the transport networks, private companies and shoutenkai (shopkeepers’ associations).

The image of gaikokujin has been vital to the growth of state and transport surveillance, the direct trigger being the 2002 FIFA World Cup, which produced a combined government, police and media campaign with two foreign threats, football hooligans, and illegal vendors (Abe, 2004). 190 cameras were put up in the host cities and they remained afterwards (Abe, 2004; Murakami Wood et al. 2007). Also in 2002, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) installed 50 CCTV cameras in Kabukicho, the major red-light district in Shinjuku, in response to an alleged increase in violence from Chinese gangs, and expanded this to four other areas: Ikebukuro, Shibuya, Roppongi and Ueno. Now, the NPA is installing new cameras costing ¥597M (around £3.85 Million) in 15 residential areas, starting January 2010 (including Higashiyamato and Musashimurayama, in Tokyo). These small systems of around 25 cameras each, will be on streets used by children going to and from school, and operated by local ‘volunteers’. The local authorities selected for this in Tokyo are clearly unhappy but had no on-the-record comment to make to us about the schemes.

In 2003, long-time Tokyo Governor, Ishihara Shintaro, an independent ‘tough-on-crime’populist, introduced an Anzen anshin machizukuri (‘community safety development’ / AAM) jourei (ordinance). According to the Metropolitan Police Department (keishicho),this was because crime reached a record high in 2002. The ordinance made community safety the responsibility of the choukai (community associations) with co-ordination, information and encouragement from the Seikatsu Anzen Bu (Everyday Safety Divisions, SAB) of the ku (city wards). Local SABs consist of a mixture of ward officials and officers seconded from the keishicho’s central SAB. Three areas were selected as case-studies for this research: the central commercial and administrative ward of Shinjuku; thewealthy residential ward of Suginami; and the relatively impoverished ward of Arakawa. All three claimed to be practising AAM but with very different emphases.

Suginami prioritises citizen community safety patrols, organised through the local Parent-Teachers Associations, shoutenkai and choukai. There are 140 groups with 9600 people actively involved. They also have 15 community ao patoka (blue patrol cars): miniature police-style cars and bikes, driven mainly by retired police officers. Suginami has experimental video-surveillance help points introduced by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police after 2003, however the SAB representatives said that these cameras caused problemsbecause children would press the alarms and run away. Suginami was also the first Japanese local government to introduce a bohan kamera jourei (security camera ordinance) in 2004, based on principles of data protection and privacy. The ordinance followed public consultation showing that although 95% considered video surveillanceeffective, 72% wanted regulation to protect privacy. Until neighbouring Setagaya-kuintroduced an ordinance in 2008, this remained the only such ordinance in Japan.

In Shinjuku, patrols also existed but the main effort was in attempting to co-ordinate the state video surveillance systems with shoutenkai systems. At present the latter systemsare generally not monitored and there is no control room. Both shoutenkai and choukai



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are being encouraged to install video surveillance, and there is a Tokyo grant scheme: one third of capital costs from the city, one third from the ku, and one third from the kai.This means that coverage is uneven and generally restricted to wealthier areas like Shinjuku.

Marginal Arakawa, in contrast, has only a handful of video surveillance systems, but alsohas some of the lowest crime rates of all 23 Tokyo wards. The SAB has no video surveillance strategy and were also realistic about the appropriateness (and cost) of video surveillance, concentrating instead on using the natural surveillance capacities of local communities. These include wan-wan (‘woof-woof’) patrols involving mainly older female residents and their dogs, but with much lower levels of participation than Suginami. Arakawa also has ao-patoka, but have gone further with anzen anshin sutashion (‘security and safety stations’), repurposed traditional koban (neighbourhood police boxes). Staffed by ex-police officers, they deal with security holistically, offering help for older people with benefits, for example, as well as physical security. But the local authority is partly compensating for services that used to be provided by the police: the police’s own Seikatsu Anzen Bu is separate from the Chiki Bu (community division),responsible for (and now scaling back) the koban. A competing new system is thus emerging, prioritising local volunteerism and video surveillance over direct community policing.

There is some objection to video surveillance. Academic critics had more political economic objections, linking urban restructuring and the introduction of video surveillance, which is clearly the case in Tokyo. Anti-surveillance group, Kanshi-No!,argued that AAM was being appropriated for the war on terror, but I found no evidence of this. Kanshi-No! also saw little difference between mini-patoka and wan-wan patrol initiatives and the expansion of video surveillance as all enforcing a stifling conformity.Puraibashi (privacy) was mentioned, but the main concern was that video surveillance cameras and other surveillance measures were being used to compensate technologically for lost social trust and community.

3. Surveillance Societies?

The first question to ask is whether there was evidence of linking the two domains of surveillance considered here. In Japan, despite juki-net, there is no general connection between the AAM agenda, and i-Japan. The lack of coordination could explain the relative complacency of Japanese civil society on privacy and surveillance. Increasing concern for privacy in Japan is also perhaps a product of a decline in surveillance, but that traditional intense mutual social regulation, reinforced by state ‘moral suasion’ (Garon, 1997).

The Suginami SAB officers see the possibility of revitalising traditional surveillance, while protecting privacy, without going down the route of impersonal technologies (video cameras). Mutually monitored communities can however be conformist and exclusionary, but the concentration on the foreign ‘other’ seems stronger in wards where technocratic surveillance (CCTV) dominates. And here linking is clearly visible. Both immigrants’



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rights groups and the Kabukicho Town Manager told us that surveillance cameras there were used largely against illegal migrant workers, mainly South-east Asian women working in bars and massage parlours. The inclusion of foreigners on the jyuminhyo from 2012 combined with juki-net, means the state could correlate residency and immigration status, entry records, fingerprints and facial photos.

A preliminary classification would be to consider Tokyo as a city in transition between a traditional indigenous ‘mutual surveillance society’ based on carefully constructed trust, to a global ‘technocratic surveillance society’, albeit one that it still unevenly distributed and applied, focussed most intensely on marginal foreigners.

In Rio de Janeiro, in contrast, divisions of class, wealth and physical force predominate and trust is simply an ideal. Areas of ‘advanced marginality’ (Waquant 2008), the favelas, provide a justification for the insular security of the wealthy, and a source of personnel and a hiding place for the ‘parallel power’ of the gangs. Amongst the marginalized, where there were no surveillance cameras, concerns about surveillance and privacy were seen as a frippery of the privileged, however in Santa Marta, video surveillance and intrusive policing were regarded as infringements of hard-won liberty.

The police were divided between the ‘new breed’ (PF and GM and some in the UP) who recognised ‘limits’ and rights, the hard-nosed pragmatism (or regressive authoritarianism) of the PM more generally, and the ‘intelligence-led policing’ approach of the PC, whose deputy-director even argued for microchipping all Brazilians (were it possible). However the complex multilevel, uncoordinated structure of the federal state mitigates against totalising surveillance. Brazil is not a pervasive surveillance society and the changes that it would take to become one would be massive in scale and cost.

Neither is Brazil a security state: although it still retains reminders of its more authoritarian past, the concentration on security is largely private. Industry reports6

It is easy to see this simply as part of a neoliberal global trend towards privatisation and individualized, market-based responses to risk. However, James Holston (2008) argues that the delegation of the National Guard to large landowners owners (coronelismo) early in the C18th conflated of private interest and the law and built elite private interests into the Brazilian state structure. Since then there has been a continuing struggle to bring what was private into the public sphere. Given what Holston (2008) terms the inclusive but inegalitarian nature of Brazil´s citizenship, Brazil’s problem is perhaps a lack of surveillance rather than a surfeit, but whereas the increasing influence of ‘global technocratic surveillance’ (as seen with the video cameras in Santa Marta) may be

,indicate that the security industry is growing between 10 and 15% pa. The trend is not in public space surveillance (although the industry report mentioned above estimates a $1Bn US market for electronic surveillance technology mainly for the private sector), but both fortification (especially the upsurge in the building of secure condominiums) and the increasing numbers of guards.

6 See e.g. Massachussets South America Office (2008) The Brazilian Security Industry.http://www.moiti.org/pdf/Brazil Security Industry.pdf



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unpopular and counterproductive, a more progressive and empowering model can be seen in the Projeto Presença of the PBF.

However, the accumulation of new data by the state brings new problems. Szreter (2007) has argued for several requirements for accountable systems of identification: recognition of citizen ownership of information; democratic civil society, and independent oversight.The youth of the Brazilian democratic system and persistence of strong anti-democratic attitudes in police, local government and amongst the wealthy is also a serious concern as the state collates more data. However, the advanced data protection principles within the PBF are also an unusual sign of better protections for the marginalized than for the wealthy. Data-protection and human rights around surveillance in Japan also seemed not to be taken seriously by those responsible for developing and using new systems.

Both Rio and Tokyo show signs of the intensification of a technocratic form of surveillance promoted by a global coalition of interests. This is most obvious in the encounter with global mega-events, for example the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics, both of which are already generating an intensification of military urbanism in Rio, which will need further research. But globalizing trends do not mean local reception and socio-cultural results are identical. Tokyo and Rio both have aspects of their govenmentality that make them surveillance societies, but only in Tokyo could one argue that ‘surveillance’ is approaching being a ‘dominant’ mode of social order and even there, it is in an uncertain transition between forms of surveillance. In Rio, it is still mainly security and violence that form the basis of urban order, not surveillance.

Activities

Presentations:� ‘A Watched World? Globalization, Place and Surveillance.’ A Global

Surveillance Society?, London, 13-15 April 2010.� ‘Global Surveillance Societies: What can Canada learn from the experience of

video surveillance in other countries?’ Camera Surveillance in Canada, Kingston, 13-15 January 2010.

� (with Kiyoshi Abe) ‘The Spectacle of Fear: Anxious Events and Foreign Threats in Japan.’ The Surveillance Games, Vancouver, 20-21 November 2009.

� (with Rodrigo Firmino) ‘Inclusion or Repression? Opening up questions of identification and exclusion in Brazil through a case of 'identity fraud.’ 2nd

Workshop on Identity in the Information Society, London, 5 June 2009.� ‘Surveillance in Brazil, Japan and the United Kingdom: A Comparative

Approach.’ Invited Seminar, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, 7 April 2009.� Seminars on Cultures of Urban Surveillance to the Sociology and Geography

departments of Queen’s University, the Geography Department of the University of Toronto, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Union.



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Outputs

Published:Murakami Wood, D. (2010) Extended review of Contemporary Urbanism in Brazil,

Urban Studies, 47(3): 691-5.Murakami Wood, D. and Firmino, R. (2009) ‘Empowerment or Repression? Opening up

Identification and Surveillance in Brazil though a case of “Identification Fraud”’, Identity in the Information Society (IDIS) 2(3): 297-317.

Submitted:Murakami Wood, D. (2011 forthcoming) ‘Global Surveillance Societies? The Spread of

Camera Surveillance in Brazil, Japan and the UK’, in A. Doyle, R. Lippert and D. Lyon (eds.) Eyes Everywhere: The Global Growth of Camera Surveillance,Culhompton: Willan.

Murakami Wood, D. and Abe, K. (2011 forthcoming) ‘The Spectacle of Fear: Anxious Events and Foreign Threats in Japan’, in C. Bennett and K. Haggerty (eds.) The Security Games, London: Routledge.

Murakami Wood, D. and Abe, K. ‘The Aesthetics of Control: Mega-Event and Urban Governance in Japan’, for Urban Studies special issue on Mega-Events (ed. Richard Giulianotti and Francisco Klauser)

Under development:Murakami Wood, D. (2011 forthcoming) Global Surveillance Societies. Basingstoke UK: Palgrave Macmillan.Murakami Wood, D. ‘The Politics of Urban Public Space Surveillance: a Comparative

Study of Video Surveillance in Tokyo and Rio de Janeiro’ Surveillance & Society.Murakami Wood, D. ‘Everyday Surveillance in the Global City: the Evolution of

Community Safety Development in Tokyo’ (for Urban Studies).Murakami Wood, D. ‘Globalization, Space and Surveillance: Re-placing Surveillance

Society, Rethinking Surveillance Theory.’ (for Society & Space).Murakami Wood, D. ‘The Shock of Order: the Reassertion of Local State Authority in

Rio de Janeiro’.Murakami Wood, D. and Barreto Leblanc, P. ‘Big Mothers versus Big Brother:

empowered women and masculine power in Rio de Janeiro’.

Impacts

I was an organiser of the Surveillance, Security and Social Control in Latin America,Curitiba, Brazil, 4-6 March 2009, and helped found the Latin American Surveillance Studies Network, which has since held its second conference in Tolucca, Mexico.



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Future Research Priorities

My Canada Research Chair in Surveillance Studies at the Surveillance Studies Centre, Queen’s University, is founded on the same agenda as ‘Cultures of Urban Surveillance’. I will extend the work into other parts of Latin America, China and India with Research Associates and PhD students, as well as continuing the work in Japan and Brazil.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all my interviewees and contacts in both Japan and Brazil, and in particular, in Brazil: Rodrigo Firmino, Paola Barreto Leblanc, Marta Kanashiro and Fernanda Bruno, and PCUP, Curitiba; and in Japan: Abe Kiyoshi, Ogasawara Midori, Murakami Kayo and Ryu Yuki.

References

Abe, K. (2004) ‘Everyday policing in Japan: Surveillance, media, government and public opinion’, International Sociology, 19: 215-231.

Bennett, C.J. and Lyon, D. (eds.) (2008) Playing the Identity Card: Surveillance, Security and Identification Regimes in Global Perspective. London: Routledge.

Doneda, D. (2006) ‘Os direitos da personalidade no Código Civil’, in Gustavo Tepedino (ed.) A parte geral do novo Código Civil: Estudos na perspectiva civil-constitucional. 3ª edição. Rio de Janeiro: Renovar.

Fischer, B. (2008) A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

Garon, S. (1997) Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Gilliom, J. (2001) Overseers of the Poor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Graham, S. (2010) Cities Under Siege: the New Military Urbanism. London: Verso.Holston, J. (2008) Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in

Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kanashiro, M.M. (2008) ‘Surveillance Cameras in Brazil: exclusion, mobility regulation,

and the new meanings of security’, Surveillance & Society 5(3).Lyon, D. (2007) Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Cambridge: Polity.Moreno-Dodson, B. (2005) Reducing Poverty on a Global Scale: Learning and

Innovating Development. Washington DC: World Bank Publications.Murakami Wood, D. (2009) ‘The Surveillance Society: Questions of History, Place and

Culture’, European Journal of Criminology 44(2)Murakami Wood, D., D. Lyon and K. Abe (2007) ‘Surveillance in Urban Japan: A

Critical Introduction’, Urban Studies 44(3): 551-568.Murakami Wood, D. and Firmino, R. (2009) ‘Empowerment or Repression? Opening up

Identification and Surveillance in Brazil though a case of “Identification Fraud”’, Identity in the Information Society (IDIS) 2(3): 297-317.

Szreter, S. (2007) ‘The Right of Registration: Development, Identity Registration, and



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Social Security - A Historical Perspective’, World Development 35(1): 67–86.Wacquant, L. (2008) Urban Outcasts: a Comparative Sociology of Advanced

Marginality. Cambridge: Polity.



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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees in Brazil

1. Instituto Pro Bono, Sao Paulo: Marcos Roberto Fuchs (lawyer)2. Artigo 1 (human rights NGO), Sao Paulo: 2 activists.3. University of Campinas, Sao Paulo: Dr Marta Kanashiro.4. Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights and Minorities, Brasilia: Pompeo di

Mattos (President), Marcio Marques de Araujo (Secretary) 5. Federal Police, Brasilia: Rômulo Berredo (Deputado)6. RJ Institute for Public Security, Mario Sergio de Brito Duarte (Director), Vanessa

Campagnac (Researcher)7. Santa Marta Community Association: Sonia Oliveira (Board Member)8. Santa Teresa Community Association, Rio de Janeiro: Paulo Oscar Saad (Chair)9. Morro dos Prazeres Community Association: Elisa (Chair)10. RJ Civil Police: Ricardo Martins (Deputy Director)11. RJ Municipal Guard: Cesar Couto Lima (Director of Operations) 12. RJ State Secretariat for Public Security: (Office of the Secretary)13. RJ State Secretariat for Public Security CCTV control room: Claudio de Almeida

Neto (Superintendant)14. Instituto Carioca de Criminologia (ICC): Nilo Batista (Director, and former

Governor of RJ) Vera Malaguti Batista (Researcher)15. Parliament of Rio de Janeiro: Alessandro Mollon (Deputado Estaduel) 16. Santa Marta Pacification Unit: Captain Pricilla17. Laranjeiras: (2 community activists)18. Tavares de Bastos Community Association: (Chair)19. RJ Military Police Special Operations battalion: (Director)20. Tavares de Bastos: Bob (ex-BBC reporter and local campaigner)

Appendix 2: Interviewees in Japan

1. Campaign Against Surveillance Society: Mr. Kawakami, Mr. Oshita2. LASDEC (Local Authority Systems Development Center): Mr. Toda (Director)3. Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department: Inspector Hashimoto, Inspector Shirai4. Building Research Institute: Dr. Hino (Senior Researcher)5. Arakawa Ward Office: Mr. Hayakawa, Mr. Nagataki, Mr. Sugimoto6. Shinjuku Ward Office: Mr. Takahashi, Mr. Yabe7. IT Strategic Headquarters for the Cabinet: Mr. Ohashi, Mr. Toyoshige8. Kabukicho Town Management: Mr. Shimoda (Director)9. Mejiro Community Association: Mr & Mrs Shibata, Mr & Mrs Suzuki, Mr. Aoki10. Suginami Ward Office: Mr. Yamada (Mayor)11. Tohoku University: Prof. Igarashi 12. Consumers Union of Japan: Mr. Yoshimura13. Solidarity Network with Migrants & Japan Civil Liberties Union: Mr. Takaya

(Director), and anonymous researcher14. Suginami Ward Office: Mr. Ohyagi, Mr. Akai



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Appendix 3: List of Case-Study Areas in Rio de Janeiro

LaranjeirasMorro dos PrazeresSanta Marta*Santa Teresa*Tavares de Bastos

Appendix 4: List of Case-Study Areas in Tokyo

Arakawa (*Nippori)Mejiro Shinjuku (*Kabukicho)Suginami

*indicates security / surveillance mapping exercise


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