critical analysis of the f35 joint strike fighter project failure

P E R S O N A L E S S A Y

Prepared for: SMBA6108: Leading Project Management Prepared by: Nicholas Peter Charles Flood Date: 15th July, 2015 Submission: Critical Analysis of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter Project Failure

2 SMBA6108: LEADING PROJECT MANAGEMENT – NICHOLAS PETER FLOOD PERSONAL ESSAY

Table of Contents

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 3

SECTION ONE | Stated Causes of Project Failure & Underlying Issues ........................................ 4 Sponsor Organisation Strategy & Project Selection .......................................................................... 4 Project Scope ..................................................................................................................................... 4 Concurrency ....................................................................................................................................... 5

SECTION TWO | Where is Blame Being Apportioned? .................................................................... 6 Project Manager ................................................................................................................................. 6 Prime Contractor ................................................................................................................................ 6 Sponsor Organization ........................................................................................................................ 6

SECTION THREE | Other Significant Factors .................................................................................... 7 Relationships ..................................................................................................................................... 7 Politics ................................................................................................................................................ 7

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 8

APPENDIX 1.1 | Project Failure .......................................................................................................... 9 Time ................................................................................................................................................... 9 Cost .................................................................................................................................................... 9 Quality & Performance ....................................................................................................................... 9

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................... 10


Introduction The Lockheed-Martin F35 Lightning II is a 5th generation multi-role fighter undergoing testing and final development by the United States. Billed by its maker as representing the “pinnacle of more than 50 years of fighter development technology” and being designed to “dominate the skies” (Lockheed Martin, 2015) the fighter was heralded as the answer to the United State’s need to ensure they maintained air dominance well into the 21st century and to do so affordably.

With the fighter intended to enter active service in July 2015 and the United States and its eight major partner nations committed to the acquisition of over 3,100 airplanes through 2035 - in the largest defense procurement program in history - a realization has dawned on both detractors and supporters alike that the program faces irrecoverable issues. Such is the turmoil the program finds itself in, it may very well go down in the annuals of project management case literature as a historic trillion dollar disaster.

The F-35 is already close to a decade behind schedule, its cost is already more than twice the original estimate – a jaw dropping USD$2 trillion dollars - and performance specifications have had to be lowered significantly in order for the program to satisfactorily achieve the performance benchmarks required for it to proceed to subsequent stages of development (Boardman, 2014). Despite all of this, the jet is still years away from being operational. A more complete summary of the project’s failings is included within Appendix 1.1.

This essay will; (i) Critically examine the stated causes of the project’s failure; (ii) Analyze the underlying issues that have led to this situation; (iii) Identify where blame is being apportioned, including who gained and who lost from this apportionment, and finally; (iv) Detail other key factors that were significant in the project’s failure.


SECTION ONE | Stated Causes of Project Failure & Underlying Issues Given the pervasiveness of the project’s failure, it is not surprising to discern that the causes stem from a range of underlying factors. Three key causes of and the underlying issues that have facilitated for project failure will now be explored.

Sponsor Organization Strategy & Project Selection A critical examination of a project’s success or failure must first begin with clarity on who is the sponsor organization, what is their strategy and how these are reflected in project selection. The dual aims of the United States Department of Defense (DoD) - as the sponsor organization for this program – was to fulfill:

(i) The need to project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges. (ii) The need to balance the defence agenda with the fiscal reality the United States face in the

21st century.

United States Department of Defense, 2012

In an attempt to reconcile the seemingly contradictorily needs of deploying a highly advanced jet fighter, whilst doing so affordably, a central tenant of project selection was that the winning proposal would be the one which facilitated for the replacement of four distinct models of aging “fourth generation” military jets with a standardized fleet of state-of-the-art “fifth generation” aircraft (Vanity Fair, 2014). When one pauses to consider the disparate missions, approaches, strengths and respective weaknesses of each of these aircraft - alongside the need to incorporate the latest developments in stealth technology - the herculean task that the bidding contractors faced becomes apparent and the cost overruns, delays and performance failings somewhat more understandable. Ward, reiterates this sentiment where he states that any “future warplane should have clear and narrow requirements, as opposed to the F-35's broad, incompatible guidelines" (Axe, 2015). This inability to discern strategic priorities clearly and to establish limitations & exclusions in project selection - including what the aircraft will do well and what it won’t do at all - has clearly had a detrimental and significant impact on project success.

Project Scope The second factor underlying this project’s failure and one that pointedly illustrates the complex interplay between factors that can come to manifest themselves in failure is, a poorly defined scope. Realizing the challenges inherent to the sponsor organization’s strategy & project selection, the prime contractor set out to build three distinct variants (F35A conventional takeoff; F35B vertical takeoff and landing and; F35C carrier-launched) of the aircraft concurrently. Regrettably, by defining their scope so broadly a case can be strongly argued that this led the project to fall prey of what research informs us to be the most commonly cited barrier to project success, namely; an unmanageable and unrealistic scope (Larson & Gray, 2011, p.101).

Core to the explanation of this is a concept introduced by Harvard Business Review in their 2013 review of the program, specifically; “The trade-off fallacy” (Sullivan, 2013). In reviewing the project scope, Sullivan draws attention to the significant design tradeoffs among the three models;

“The Air Force wants a sleek plane that avoids radar detection, the original remit of the design, but the Marines need vertical takeoff and landing capability, which requires an ugly bump behind the cockpit to accommodate a fan, and the Navy version has to include a tail hook for carrier landings”

Sullivan, 2013.


With three models do it all, unfortunately none do anything particularly well. With the benefit of hindsight, even the prime contractor is of the same opinion. Steve O’Bryan (Lockheed Martin VP of Program Integration) for instance cites that; “This program was overly optimistic on design complexity and software complexity, and that resulted in overpromising and under-delivering,” (Vanity Fair, 2014). Having previously discussed the sponsor organization strategy and project selection, the complex interplay between stakeholder interests and how these have manifest in project failure is rendered apparent. With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps a preferable recourse of action for Lockheed Martin would have been to negotiate with the sponsor organization a narrower, more specialized scope and deliver to these requirements rather than to attempt to eek out every last procurement dollar available.

Concurrency Having established the flaws in the sponsor organization’s strategy, how this informed project selection and the scope defined by the prime contractor, attention now turns to how the project was delivered. More specifically, the strategy known as “concurrency” which means that the F-35 is being, built, developed flown and tested all at the same time. The interplay between this factor and those previously discussed becomes further apparent when one considers that this strategy was employed in a response to the complexity and breadth of the program in an attempt to speed up the F-35’s development. Sullivan expands;

You can see where the military was coming from with this idea. Testing usually preceded widespread use, happening well before the military pilots got their hands on the aircraft for a real shakedown. But testing takes time, often-inordinate amounts of it, and everyone wants to get the plane in the air. To avoid this lag, the military decided to try to do it all at the same time, a plan, I’m guessing, that frustrated pilots had been discussing for years.

Sullivan, 2013

Whilst sound in principle, everyone now knows Lockheed Martin and the Department of Defense placed far too much faith in the benefits of concurrency (Clark, 2013). What has manifest in reality is that significant flaws in the design of the aircraft have been discovered necessitating costly reengineering and project delays. This situation has been exacerbated exponentially by the fact that not only do these solutions need to be engineered into plans for future aircraft but they must also be retrofitted to aircraft already built. This very real example certainly prompts one to consider if the project’s Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) and ensuing project plan were developed effectively. Scenario planning would have undoubtedly assisted in prompting the organization to consider such eventualities and their ensuing impacts in greater detail.

In synthesizing the most significant stated causes of the project’s failure what is clear is that this project’s failings do not originate from one distinct source bur rather through the interplay of factors across various stakeholder groups. This, in turn, highlights the criticality of applying the end-to-end concepts of the project management discipline and the role that the project manger can play throughout all phases – not just delivery – in helping stakeholders better evaluate and consider how choices made at any one stage can come to have deleterious and/or advantageous impacts on latter stages.


SECTION TWO | Where is Blame Being Apportioned? With the magnitude and implication of the project’s failure being so significant it is not surprising that the “blame game” is well underway. Unfortunately for all of those involved it would appear that all parties are – justifiably – coming in for their share of criticism.

Project Manager When the project’s issues first came to the widespread attention of commentators the first scalp to be taken was that of the project manager’s. In 2010, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates sacked Maj. Gen. David Heinz who was overseeing the program citing that the program had been plagued by problems and had failed to hit performance targets from the outset (BBC, 2010). Regrettably, this is an all-too-common response when a project faces difficulties, yet one - in light of the analysis provided in previous sections – that doesn’t adequately account for the impact of issues outside of the project manager’s control in this specific scenario.

Prime Contractor Less surprisingly, the prime contractor are also well within the sights of those seeking to apportion blame. As not only the originator of the plan to develop the program under the principles of concurrency but also the chief benefactor of the ensuing cost overruns, Lockheed Martin are chief among those being blamed for the project’s failure. In describing the overall program as both a “scandal” and a “tragedy” Sen. John McCain in addressing the US Congress firmly asserts that;

"Lockheed Martin must be held increasingly accountable for cost overruns that come as a result of wringing out necessary changes in the design and manufacturing process for this incredibly expensive aircraft,"

McCain, J 2011

This is to say nothing of the diatribe being leveled on Lockheed Martin in relation to the aircraft’s performance. The most recent scandal - which has gone viral - being the leak of a test pilot’s report detailing the results of a series of mock within-visual-range engagements between the F35 and the cold-war era F16 (Axe, 2015). The shocking conclusion being that America’s brand-new stealth fighter - which is on track to replace almost all of the Pentagon’s current fighters – won’t stand a chance against the enemy combatants it will face in any future air battle. The reputational damage to Lockheed Martin as a firm who can deliver programs at the bleeding edge of technology and to reliably meet the commitments they make to their customers is substantial.

Sponsor Organization The final party coming in for their share of criticism and blame is the sponsoring organization. Tellingly, the Department of Defense are themselves on record as seeing the foolishness in the approach employed, particularly so in relation to the their approval of Lockheed Martin’s plans to deliver the project in-line with the principles of concurrency. Frank Kendall (Acting Acquisition Undersecretary) for instance, cites that; “Putting the F-35 into production years before the first flight test was acquisition malpractice” (Kendall, 2013). That the sponsor organization are making public admissions of culpability not only speaks volumes to the significance of the issues faced but also to the interconnectedness of supporting structures of projects within and between organizations that enable and constrain project success.


SECTION THREE | Other Significant Factors

Section One of this paper detailed how the sponsor organization’s inability to establish clear priorities for project selection – including limitations and exclusions – alongside Lockheed Martin’s failure to adequately define the scope of the project resulted in a project of unrealistic and unmanageable complexity. It also argued that the way in which the project was delivered under the principles of concurrent design & development sought to not only mask issues until much further along the development cycle than would have otherwise been the case but this served to exacerbate the issues the project faced in terms of cost, time and project performance. Two additional factors that were significant to the project’s failure are also worth considering.

Relationships Given the issues encountered it is hardly surprising that relations between Lockheed Martin and the Department of Defence are severely strained. The literature, after all, is replete with examples of cohesion and cooperation breaking down if one party feels that they are being unfairly treated by others (Larson & Gray, 2011, p.101). Such is the magnitude of the issue, Maj. Gen. Christopher Bogdan the man in charge of the overall program is on record as stating that the relationship “is the worst I've ever seen, and I've been in some bad ones” (Szoldra, P & Johnson, R 2015). This breakdown in relations would have undoubtedly impacted and contributed to the challenges that the project finds itself in today. Fortunately, Bogdan also demonstrates an acute awareness of the criticality of righting the current situation as part of his remit to turn around this troubled project when he states; “I guarantee you: we will not succeed on this if we do not get past that” (Bogdan, 2013). Whilst managing dysfunctional conflict is a demanding task and one where there is often no easy solution, a project manager’s capacity to mediate, arbitrate, control, accept or eliminate it all hinge on their capacity to firstly recognise it for what it is (Larson, E.W. & Gray, 2011, p. 396). Bogan’s posturing provide comfort that this is fortunately the case within the context of the F35 program.

Politics The final factor to be explored – yet one without which any critical analysis of this project’s failure would be incomplete – is politics. A strong case can be argued that how this project has been conceived, organized and delivered has exposed key stakeholders to political realities that severely constrain the capacity of the project manager to perform their function effectively or the sponsor organization to act objectively. Bloomberg, in their 2013 review of the program capture the situation well:

The F-35 funnels business to a global network of contractors. It counts 1,300 suppliers in 45 states supporting 133,000 jobs -- and more in nine other countries, according to Lockheed. The F-35 is an example of how large weapons programs can plow ahead amid questions about their strategic necessity and their failure to arrive on time and on budget.

Miller, K., Capaccio, A., & Ivory, D., 2013

Many would argue that politics and project management should not mix. A more proactive response is that projects and politics invariably mix and that effective project managers recognize that any significant project has political ramifications (Larson, E.W. & Gray, 2011, p. 33). What this factor so pointedly illustrates is how supporting structures of projects - in this case the broad political support that the program enjoys – can not only present opportunities but, if left unchecked, can come to constrain a project’s ultimate success. World-class project managers must remain ever vigilant to the duality and complexity inherent to organizational politics if they are to have the best chance at facilitating for project success.


Conclusion This critical analysis has identified a range of causes and underlying issues that have contributed to the failure of the F35 program. What it has also done is highlight the interconnectedness of these factors which has served to emphasise the complexity that project managers need to navigate if they are to best position themselves, their project, their stakeholders and their organisation for success.

The critical analysis has also highlighted that the project management profession and the project manager themselves can only do – and be held accountable for - so much. What this leads us with is a deeper appreciation for the strategic imperative for all organisations to more fully embed project management - beyond a standalone discipline – within their organisation as a pervasive results-oriented management style. If the F35 program, as a historic disaster, can facilitate for this outcome than one can argue that the failure was not entirely in vain.


APPENDIX 1.1 | Project Failure Any analysis of the underlying issues of this project’s failure must first consider the dimensions across which the project has failed. In the case of the F35, this unfortunately allows for one to more clearly appreciate the magnitude and breadth of the project’s failure.

Time When the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program formally got under way, in October 2001, the Department of Defense promised that the first squadrons of high-tech fighters would be “combat-capable” by 2010 (Vanity Fair 2013). As of 2015, however, the aircraft is at least seven years behind schedule and remains plagued by countless design flaws. Despite the already extensive delays - and reflecting the significance of issues that are only now being encountered – many commentators are on record stating that the fighter will not even be able to “fire it’s guns” until 2019 (Milward 2014). Given that this is the primary function of a fighter jet and that this date is nearly a decade later than required the absurdity of the situation is rendered apparent.

Cost The F35 will be the most expensive defense procurement program of all time. Astoundingly, the program is already $US167 billion over-budget with the cost to build each F-35 having risen to an average of $US160 million from $US69 million in 2001 (Szoldra et al 2015). The Pentagon will now be spending 70 percent more money for 409 fewer fighters—and that’s just to buy the hardware (Bogden, cited by Vanity Fair, 2014). The estimated additional cost to operate and maintain the F-35 for 55 years is another $1.1 trillion. At more than $2 trillion, the F-35 is projected to cost more than half the entire Iraq War…..so far (Bordman, 2014).

Quality & Performance Most concerning of all, however, is the projected performance of the aircraft. Influential analysts having undertaken in-depth analysis of the fighter’s capabilities conclude that the fighter; “can’t turn, can’t climb, can’t run,” (Stillion & Perdue, 2014); that it is; “a dog … overweight and underpowered,” (Inslow, 2014) or rendered it bluntly; “It’s a turkey” (Sprey, 2013). The performance of the F35 is so lackluster that many defense analysts equate the aircraft’s performance with that of the F105 Thunderchief, a 1950’s design (Air Power Australia, 2015). The comparison is particularly concerning when one considers that the F105 caries the unenviable reputation of being the only aircraft in US history to have been deemed no longer combat effective and withdrawn from active service as a consequence of combat attrition in the skies over Vietnam in the 1960’s. In face of the criticism from these esteemed and reputable commentators, it is very difficult to defend the program as upholding the original design brief to represent a “quantum leap” forward in combat aviation design.


REFERENCES Airforce Technology, The Revolutionary Strike Fighter, retrieved on 22nd June 2015 from: http://www.airforce-technology.com/features/feature46212/feature46212-3.html

Air Power Australia, Joint Strike Fighter, retrieved on 22nd June 2015 from: http://breakingdefense.com/2013/12/concurrencys-costs-an-f-35-example/ Axe, D. 2015, One Analyst Predicted the F-35’s Dogfight Failure, retrieved on July 5th 2015 from: https://medium.com/war-is-boring/one-analyst-predicted-the-f-35s-s-dogfight-failure-50a942d0cf8a BBC, Pentagon chief fires head of F-35 aircraft programme, retrieved on July 5th 2015 from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8492430.stm Boardman, W 2014, The F-35 Strike Fighter. Technical Failures of the World’s Most Expensive Weapons System, retrieved on 22nd June 2015 from: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-f-35-strike-fighter-technical-failures-of-the-worlds-most-expensive-weapons-system/5390065 Clark, C. 2013, Concurrency Costs: An F35 Example, retrieved on 5th July 2015 from: Kendall, F. cited by Miller, K., Capaccio, A., & Ivory, D., Flawed F35 Too Big to Kill as Lockheed Hooks 45 States, retrieved on July 5th 2025 from: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-22/flawed-f-35-fighter-too-big-to-kill-as-lockheed-hooks-45-states

Larson, E.W. & Gray, C.F., Project Management; The Managerial Process, 5th Edition, McGraw-Hill-Irwin, 2011 Lockheed Martin, 2015, F35 Lightening II, retrieved on June 22nd 2015 from: http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f35.html McCain, J. cited by Ryan, J. 2011, Fighter program a ‘tragedy’, retrieved on 30th June 2015 from: http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/197275--mccain-calls-f35-join-strike-fighter-program-a-tragedy Miller, K., Capaccio, A., & Ivory, D., Flawed F35 Too Big to Kill as Lockheed Hooks 45 States, retrieved on July 5th 2025 from: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-22/flawed-f-35-fighter-too-big-to-kill-as-lockheed-hooks-45-states

Milward, D, F-35 stealth jet 'will not be able to fire its guns until 2019' retrieved on 29th June 2015 from; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11319455/F-35-stealth-jet-will-not-be-able-to-fire-its-guns-until-2019.html

Szoldra, P & Johnson, R 2015, The F-35 Fighter Jet That Australia's Buying Is A Historic $1 Trillion Disaster, Business Insider, retrieved on 22nd June 2015 from: http://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-f-35-is-a-disaster-2014-7?

United States Department of Defense, 2012, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, retrieved on 7th July 2015 from: http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf


Vanity Fair, Will it Fly?, retrieved on 29th June 2015 from: http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2013/09/joint-strike-fighter-lockheed-martin

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