corrupción y desarrollo moral v
TRANSCRIPT
The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption
Daron Acemoglu; Thierry Verdier
The American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 1. (Mar., 2000), pp. 194-211.
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http://www.jstor.orgFri Oct 19 21:03:52 2007
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The Choice between Market Failures and CorruptionDaron Acemoglu; Thierry VerdierThe American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 1. (Mar., 2000), pp. 194-211.Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28200003%2990%3A1%3C194%3ATCBMFA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9
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[Footnotes]
6 Hierarchy, Ability, and Income DistributionGuillermo A. Calvo; Stanislaw WelliszThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, No. 5, Part 1. (Oct., 1979), pp. 991-1010.Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28197910%2987%3A5%3C991%3AHAAID%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
11 Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage IncentivesTimothy Besley; John McLarenThe Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 416. (Jan., 1993), pp. 119-141.Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199301%29103%3A416%3C119%3ATABTRO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E
13 Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?Dilip Mookherjee; I. P. L. PngThe Economic Journal, Vol. 105, No. 428. (Jan., 1995), pp. 145-159.Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199501%29105%3A428%3C145%3ACLEHST%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1
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Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium ApproachDaron Acemoglu; Thierry VerdierThe Economic Journal, Vol. 108, No. 450. (Sep., 1998), pp. 1381-1403.Stable URL:
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Crime and Punishment: An Economic ApproachGary S. BeckerThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 2. (Mar. - Apr., 1968), pp. 169-217.Stable URL:
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Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of EnforcersGary S. Becker; George J. StiglerThe Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1. (Jan., 1974), pp. 1-18.Stable URL:
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Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage IncentivesTimothy Besley; John McLarenThe Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 416. (Jan., 1993), pp. 119-141.Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199301%29103%3A416%3C119%3ATABTRO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E
Hierarchy, Ability, and Income DistributionGuillermo A. Calvo; Stanislaw WelliszThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, No. 5, Part 1. (Oct., 1979), pp. 991-1010.Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28197910%2987%3A5%3C991%3AHAAID%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
Corruption and GrowthPaolo MauroThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 3. (Aug., 1995), pp. 681-712.Stable URL:
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Monitoring vis-á-vis Investigation in Enforcement of LawDilip Mookherjee; I. P. L. PngThe American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 556-565.Stable URL:
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Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?Dilip Mookherjee; I. P. L. PngThe Economic Journal, Vol. 105, No. 428. (Jan., 1995), pp. 145-159.Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199501%29105%3A428%3C145%3ACLEHST%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1
CorruptionAndrei Shleifer; Robert W. VishnyThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3. (Aug., 1993), pp. 599-617.Stable URL:
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Politicians and FirmsAndrei Shleifer; Robert W. VishnyThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 995-1025.Stable URL:
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