corrupción y desarrollo moral v

22
The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption Daron Acemoglu; Thierry Verdier The American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 1. (Mar., 2000), pp. 194-211. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28200003%2990%3A1%3C194%3ATCBMFA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9 The American Economic Review is currently published by American Economic Association. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/aea.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org Fri Oct 19 21:03:52 2007

Upload: value4chain

Post on 20-Aug-2015

76 views

Category:

Business


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption

Daron Acemoglu; Thierry Verdier

The American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 1. (Mar., 2000), pp. 194-211.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28200003%2990%3A1%3C194%3ATCBMFA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

The American Economic Review is currently published by American Economic Association.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/aea.html.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

http://www.jstor.orgFri Oct 19 21:03:52 2007

You have printed the following article:

The Choice between Market Failures and CorruptionDaron Acemoglu; Thierry VerdierThe American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 1. (Mar., 2000), pp. 194-211.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28200003%2990%3A1%3C194%3ATCBMFA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from anoff-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Pleasevisit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.

[Footnotes]

6 Hierarchy, Ability, and Income DistributionGuillermo A. Calvo; Stanislaw WelliszThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, No. 5, Part 1. (Oct., 1979), pp. 991-1010.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28197910%2987%3A5%3C991%3AHAAID%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

11 Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage IncentivesTimothy Besley; John McLarenThe Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 416. (Jan., 1993), pp. 119-141.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199301%29103%3A416%3C119%3ATABTRO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E

13 Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?Dilip Mookherjee; I. P. L. PngThe Economic Journal, Vol. 105, No. 428. (Jan., 1995), pp. 145-159.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199501%29105%3A428%3C145%3ACLEHST%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1

References

http://www.jstor.org

LINKED CITATIONS- Page 1 of 3 -

NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.

Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium ApproachDaron Acemoglu; Thierry VerdierThe Economic Journal, Vol. 108, No. 450. (Sep., 1998), pp. 1381-1403.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199809%29108%3A450%3C1381%3APRCATA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

Crime and Punishment: An Economic ApproachGary S. BeckerThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 2. (Mar. - Apr., 1968), pp. 169-217.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28196803%2F04%2976%3A2%3C169%3ACAPAEA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I

Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of EnforcersGary S. Becker; George J. StiglerThe Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1. (Jan., 1974), pp. 1-18.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0047-2530%28197401%293%3A1%3C1%3ALEMACO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage IncentivesTimothy Besley; John McLarenThe Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 416. (Jan., 1993), pp. 119-141.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199301%29103%3A416%3C119%3ATABTRO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E

Hierarchy, Ability, and Income DistributionGuillermo A. Calvo; Stanislaw WelliszThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, No. 5, Part 1. (Oct., 1979), pp. 991-1010.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28197910%2987%3A5%3C991%3AHAAID%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

Corruption and GrowthPaolo MauroThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 3. (Aug., 1995), pp. 681-712.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199508%29110%3A3%3C681%3ACAG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

http://www.jstor.org

LINKED CITATIONS- Page 2 of 3 -

NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.

Monitoring vis-á-vis Investigation in Enforcement of LawDilip Mookherjee; I. P. L. PngThe American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 556-565.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199206%2982%3A3%3C556%3AMVIIEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?Dilip Mookherjee; I. P. L. PngThe Economic Journal, Vol. 105, No. 428. (Jan., 1995), pp. 145-159.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199501%29105%3A428%3C145%3ACLEHST%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1

CorruptionAndrei Shleifer; Robert W. VishnyThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3. (Aug., 1993), pp. 599-617.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199308%29108%3A3%3C599%3AC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8

Politicians and FirmsAndrei Shleifer; Robert W. VishnyThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 995-1025.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C995%3APAF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23

http://www.jstor.org

LINKED CITATIONS- Page 3 of 3 -

NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.